MALALOAN vs CA

FACTS:
> 1st Lt. Absalon V. Salboro filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City an
application for search warrant. The search warrant was sought for in connection with
an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions)
perpetrated at Quezon City.
> Respondent RTC Judge of Kalookan City issued Search Warrant.
> Firearms, explosive materials and subversive documents, among others, were
seized and taken during the search. And all the sixty-one (61) persons found within
the premises searched were brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City but most of
them were later released, with the exception of the herein petitioners.
> Petitioners presented a "Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and
For the Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence" before the Quezon City court.
> Respondent Quezon City Judge issued the challenged order, consolidating subject
cases but denying the prayer for the quashal of the search warrant under attack, the
validity of which warrant was upheld.
> Petitioners have come to this Court via the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a court may take cognizance of an application for a search
warrant in connection with an offense allegedly committed outside its territorial
jurisdiction and to issue a warrant to conduct a search on a place likewise outside its
territorial jurisdiction?
RULING:
YES. The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the
application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and
prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a
special criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as
equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific courts of
indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose
for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the
institution of a criminal action.
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely
constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in
writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and
directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and
bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin
to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and
made necessary because of a public necessity.

It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by

the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been
instituted, or in anticipation thereof. In the latter contingency, as in the case at bar, it
would involve some judicial clairvoyance to require observance of the rules as to
where a criminal case may eventually be filed where, in the first place, no such
action having as yet been instituted, it may ultimately be filed in a territorial
jurisdiction other than that wherein the illegal articles sought to be seized are then
located. This is aside from the consideration that a criminal action may be filed in
different venues under the rules for delitos continuados or in those instances where
different trial courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the same criminal
offense.
Section 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court on the venue of criminal actions and
which we quote:
(a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the
offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took
place.
(b) Where an offense is committed on a railroad train, in an aircraft, or any other
public or private vehicle while in the course of its trip, the criminal action may be
instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where such train,
aircraft or other vehicle passed during such trip, including the place of departure and
arrival.
(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the
criminal action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry
or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such
voyage, subject to the generally accepted principles of international law.
(d) Other crimes committed outside of the Philippines but punishable therein under
Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the proper court in which
the charge is first filed.
It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only the court which has jurisdiction over the
criminal case can issue the search warrant, as would be the consequence of
petitioners' position that only the branch of the court with jurisdiction over the place
to be searched can issue a warrant to search the same. It may be conceded, as a
matter of policy, that where a criminal case is pending, the court wherein it was filed,
or the assigned branch thereof, has primary jurisdiction to issue the search warrant;
and where no such criminal case has yet been filed, that the executive judges or
their lawful substitutes in the areas and for the offenses contemplated in Circular No.
19 shall have primary jurisdiction.

PEOPLE vs PARDILLA
FACTS:
> Accused conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other,
armed with a sharp-pointed knife known as pinote and canes, with intent to kill, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, beat and stab ALFREDO
SOLINAP SR which caused the death of said ALFREDO SOLINAP SR.
> Upon their arrest, the said petitioners posted bail bonds.
> All accused, namely, Rudy Manzano, Reynaldo Pardilla and Leopoldo Pardilla are
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder which was
erroneously denominated as homicide. Rudy Manzano and Reynaldo Pardilla are
hereby sentenced to death while Leopoldo Pardilla is hereby sentenced to life
imprisonment, in view of his old age.
> The bail bonds for the provisional liberty of all the accused are hereby cancelled
and all convicts are ordered committed to jail. No bail bond is fixed in case they
should appeal.
> The accused filed their notice to appeal the decision to this Court. However, on
September 10, 1976, the said accused filed a motion to withdraw their notice of
appeal to enable their new counsel to file a motion for the reconsideration of the
decision.
> The accused filed a motion for the reconsideration of said decision, contending
that since they were charged with homicide, they cannot be convicted of murder. The
trial court, however, denied the motion.
> The accused filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary
injunction, to annul and set aside the decision, upon the ground that conspiracy.
> The records of Criminal Case were elevated to the Court for the automatic review
of the decision.
> Court dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary
injunction, the issue therein raised being involved in the automatic review of the
judgment.
> Petitioners filed the instant petition for habeas corpus, praying, inter alia, that they
be released on their original bail bonds pending the review of the trial court's
decision.
> In the instant petition for habeas corpus, the petitioners pray that they be released
on their original bail bonds pending the review of the trial court's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus with prayer to be released on
their original bail bond pending appeal for review is valid?

RULING:
YES. We take note of the fact that the information filed against the accused
does not allege any qualifying circumstance. The gravest offense therefore, for
which they may be found guilty is only homicide. For this reason, the instant petition
shall be considered as a petition for bail and an incident in this case. It is consistent
with equity and justice that the accused should be released on bail pending
determination of the criminal case against them on the merits. The records of
Criminal Case, however show that after the denial of the motion for reconsideration
of the decision, the accused, Leopoldo Pardilla, who was "sentenced to life
imprisonment" did not file a notice of his intention to appeal the decision. Hence, the
judgment of the lower court, insofar as he is concerned, has already become final
and executory.
WHEREFORE, the accused-petitioners Rudy Manzano and Reynaldo Pardilla are
hereby ordered released from custody upon their filing of a bond unless there be any
other reason for which they shall continue to be detained.

MALTO vs PEOPLE
FACTS:
> Private complainant AAA was 17 years old. She was a college student, and
accused was her professor in her Philosophy II class.
> A professor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage
and exert influence, relationship and moral ascendancy and induce and/or seduce to
indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct for several times with him as in
fact said accused has carnal knowledge.
> She learned that he was either intimately involved with or was sexually harassing
his students in Assumption College and in other colleges where he taught. In
particular, he was dismissed from the De La Salle University-Aguinaldo for having
sexual relations with a student and sexually harassing three other students. His
employment was also terminated by Assumption College for sexually harassing two
of his students. It was then that AAA realized that she was actually abused by
petitioner. Depressed and distressed, she confided all that happened between her
and petitioner to her mother, BBB.
> On learning what her daughter underwent in the hands of petitioner, BBB filed an
administrative complaint in Assumption College against him. She also lodged a
complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City.
> In his defense, petitioner proffered denial and alibi.
> Court finds the accused Michael John Malto y Zarsadias guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of Article III, Section 5(a)[,] paragraph 3 of RA 7610.
> Petitioner questioned the trial courts decision in the CA. Appellate court affirmed
his conviction even if it found that his acts were not covered by paragraph (a) but by
paragraph (b) of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining his conviction although it found
that he did not rape AAA. For him, he should have been acquitted since there was
no rape. He also claims that he and AAA were sweethearts and their sexual
intercourse was consensual?

2.
Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of
written or oral advertisements or other similar means;
3.
Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child
as a prostitute;

RULING:

4.
Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as
a prostitute; or

NO. THE OFFENSE STATED IN THE INFORMATION WAS WRONGLY

DESIGNATED.

5.
Giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit
to a child with intent to engage such child in prostitution.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. Pursuant thereto, the complaint or information
against him should be sufficient in form and substance. A complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of
the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense and the
place where the offense was committed.

(b)
Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape
and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for
rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, that the penalty
for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age
shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period;

The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the
statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense and specify its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference
shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. The acts or
omissions constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language
used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
The designation of the offense in the information against petitioner was changed
from violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 to violation of Section 5(a), Article
III thereof. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provide:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children,
whether male or female, who, for money, profit, or any other consideration
or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge
in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed upon the following:
(a)
Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child
prostitution which include, but are not limited to, the following:
1.

Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;

The information against petitioner did not allege anything pertaining to or connected
with child prostitution. It did not aver that AAA was abused for profit. What it charged
was that petitioner had carnal knowledge or committed sexual intercourse and
lascivious conduct with AAA; AAA was induced and/or seduced by petitioner who
was her professor to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct and AAA
was a 17-year old minor. These allegations support a charge for violation of
paragraph (b), not paragraph (a), of Section 5, Article III, RA 7610.
THE REAL NATURE OF THE OFFENSE IS DETERMINED BY FACTS ALLEGED
IN THE INFORMATION, NOT BY THE DESIGNATION.
The designation in the information of the specific statute violated is imperative to
avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his
defense accordingly. However, the failure to designate the offense by statute, or to
mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the
law violated does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts
constituting the crime charged. What controls is not the title of the information or the
designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the information. In other
words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature
of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the information.
The facts stated in the amended information against petitioner correctly made out a
charge for violation of Section 5(b), Article III, RA 7610. Thus, even if the trial and
appellate courts followed the wrong designation of the offense, petitioner could be
convicted of the offense on the basis of the facts recited in the information and duly
proven during trial.

LAZARTE, JR vs SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
> National Housing Authority (NHA) awarded the original contract for the
infrastructure works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project, to A.C. Cruz
Construction.
> A.C. Cruz Construction commenced the infrastructure works, the complainant
Candido M. Fajutag, Jr. was designated Project Engineer of the project.
> The contractor failed to comply with the work instruction. It was established that
there was no actual excavation and road filling works undertaken by A.C. Cruz
Construction.
> Project Office recommended the termination of the infrastructure contract with A.C.
Construction.
> The NHA General Manager through a letter informed the contractor of the
rescission of his contract for the development of the said project.
> Despite the rescission notice, the contractor continued working intermittently with
very minimal workforce until such time as the award of remaining infrastructure
works is effected by NHA to another contractor.
> NHA Board of Directors, approved the mutual termination of the A.C. Cruz
Construction contract and awarded the remaining work to Triad Construction and
Development Corporation.
> Thereafter, Triad discovered that certain work items that had been in under the
inventory report as accomplished and acceptable were in fact non-existent. Fajutag,
Jr. brought these irregularities to the attention of the Commission on Audit (COA).
> COA uncovered some anomalies, among which, are ghost activities, specifically
the excavation of unsuitable materials and road filling works and substandard,
defective workmanship.
> Accuses ROBERT P. BALAO, FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR., VIRGILIO V.
DACALOS, JOSEPHINE O. ANGSICO, JOSEPHINE T. ESPINOSA, NOEL H.
LOBRIDO AND ARCEO C. CRUZ for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (e) of REPUBLIC
ACT No. 3019, AS AMENDED (THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT).
> Petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information raising the following grounds: (1)
the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense; (2) the information
does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (3) the constitutional rights of
the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against them
have been violated by the inadequacy of the information;
> Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution denying petitioners motion to
quash.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Information filed before the Sandiganbayan insufficiently
averred the essential elements of the crime charged as it failed to specify the
individual participation of all the accused?

RULING:
NO. The Court affirms the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
At the outset, it should be stressed that the denial of a motion to quash is not
correctible by certiorari. Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a
criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari but for petitioners to
go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion
to quash. Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to
quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed. The evident reason for this rule is to
avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single court.
This general rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying
the motion to dismiss or motion to quash acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. And in the case at
bar, the Court does not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed grave abuse of
discretion.
The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged and enable the court to know the proper judgment. The Information must
allege clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by
reference to the definition and elements of the specific crimes.
The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity
as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The
raison detre of the rule is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.
Another purpose is to enable accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The use of derivatives or synonyms or
allegations of basic facts constituting the offense charged is sufficient.
The Court finds that the Information in this case alleges the essential elements of
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Information specifically alleges that
petitioner, Espinosa and Lobrido are public officers being then the Department
Manager, Project Management Officer A and Supervising Engineer of the NHA
respectively; in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to the office and
while in the performance of their official functions, connived, confederated and
mutually helped each other and with accused Arceo C. Cruz, with deliberate intent
through manifest partiality and evident bad faith gave unwarranted benefits to the
latter, A.C. Cruz Construction and to themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the
government. The felonious act consisted of causing to be paid to A.C. Cruz
Construction public funds in the amount of P232,628.35 supposedly for excavation
and road filling works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in Bacolod City
despite the fact that no such works were undertaken by said construction company
as revealed by the Special Audit conducted by COA.

PEOPLE vs VALDEZ
FACTS:
> The accused were tried for and convicted of three counts of murder. They were
penalized with reclusion perpetua for each count by RTC.
> On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC.
> The accused came to the Court to seek acquittal.
> However, accused Edwin Valdez filed a motion to withdraw appeal, which the
Court granted, thereby deeming Edwins appeal closed and terminated. Hence, the
Court hereby resolves only the appeal of PO2 Eduardo Valdez.
> In this appeal, PO2 Valdez assails the credibility of the States witnesses by
pointing to inconsistencies and weaknesses in their testimonies; challenges the
finding of conspiracy between the accused; and contends that the State did not
establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction of murder is proper as alleged in the
information of the offense?
RULING:
NO. It is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three
homicides, instead of three murders, on account of the informations not sufficiently
alleging the attendance of treachery.
It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or
information.
For complaint or information to be sufficient, every element of the offense must be
stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of
the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the
information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so
as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the
accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused with intent to
kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did
xxx assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the victims by then and
there shooting [them] with a gun, hitting [them] on various parts of their bodies

which [were] the direct and immediate cause of [their] death[s] did not sufficiently
set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the
killings.
To discharge its burden of informing him of the charge, the State must specify in the
information the details of the crime and any circumstance that aggravates his liability
for the crime. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the
accused of the nature and cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to
prepare his defense. It emanates from the presumption of innocence in his favor,
pursuant to which he is always presumed to have no independent knowledge of the
details of the crime he is being charged with. To have the facts stated in the body of
the information determine the crime of which he stands charged and for which he
must be tried thoroughly accords with common sense and with the requirements of
plain justice.
That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else,
should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he
commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he
perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set
forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of
substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute.
The designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from the facts
alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the
designation of the crime the accused never has a real interest until the trial has
ended. For his full and complete defense he need not know the name of the crime at
all. It is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial rights. The
real and important question to him is, Did you perform the acts alleged in the
manner alleged? not Did you commit a crime named murder. If he performed the
acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is
and fixes the penalty therefor. It is the province of the court alone to say what the
crime is or what it is named.
A practical consequence of the non-allegation of a detail that aggravates his liability
is to prohibit the introduction or consideration against the accused of evidence that
tends to establish that detail. The allegations in the information are controlling in the
ultimate analysis. Thus, when there is a variance between the offense charged in the
information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged included in the offense
proved.31 In that regard, an offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved
when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
information, constitute the latter; an offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of
those constituting the latter
We now fix the penalty for each count of homicide.

PEOPLE vs BERIALES
FACTS:
> Accused, RICARDO BERIALES BENEDICTO CUSTODIO and PABLITO
CUSTODIO, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping and aiding
one another, with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, strike and stab the
person of SATURNINA PORCADILLA, without giving the latter sufficient time to
defend herself, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused her
death.
> Appellants' counsel moved for a reinvestigation.
> The trial court postponed the hearing in view of the City Fiscal's motion "for a
deferment of the hearing or trial until such time the REINVESTIGATION shall have
been terminated for which the result of said reinvestigation will be submitted to this
Honorable Court for its resolution in the premises.
> The trial court, however, relying on the mandate of the New Constitution that "All
persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies" re-scheduled the hearing, Special Counsel
Rosario R. Polines, in representation of the City Fiscal, manifested that the private
prosecutor, Atty. Procadilla, be authorized to conduct the case for the prosecution.
> The trial court, however, insisted in arraigning the appellants. When arraigned, the
three appellants declined to plead, saying: "I am not going to answer the question
because the Fiscal is not yet around." Thereupon, the trial court entered a plea of
"Not Guilty" for each of them.
> Appellants counsel again manifested that the City Fiscal was absent and that they
could not go to trial without the fiscal and his report on the reinvestigation conducted
by him. Nonetheless, the trial court, ordered the presentation of evidence by the
private prosecutor since he had been previously authorized by the City Fiscal to
handle the case.
> Thereafter, the private prosecutor rested the case for the prosecution and the court
called for the evidence of the defense.
> Appellants counsel manifested that the accused were not in conformity with the
promulgation of the decision on the ground that they did not agree to the trial of the
case. Nonetheless, the trial court promulgated its judgment on the same day.
> The appellants interpose this appeal, upon the principal ground that they were
denied due process of law. The Solicitor General agrees with such contention and
recommends that the judgment under review be set aside and the case remanded to
the lower court for another arraignment and trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused have been denied of the due process?

RULING:
YES. Under the Rules of Court, "All criminal actions either commenced
by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the fiscal." In the trial of criminal cases, it is the duty of the public
prosecutor to appeal for the government. As stated by this Court, "once a public
prosecutor has been entrusted with the investigation of a case and has acted
thereon by filing the necessary information in court he is by law in duty bound to take
charge thereof until its finally termination, for under the law he assumes full
responsibility for his failure or success since he is the one more adequately prepared
to pursue it to its termination." While there is nothing in the rule of practice and
procedure in criminal cases which denies the right of the fiscal, in the exercise of a
sound discretion, to turn over the active conduct of the trial to a private prosecutor,
nevertheless, his duty to direct and control the prosecution of criminal cases requires
that he must be present during the proceedings. Thus, in the case of People vs.
Munar this Court upheld the right of the private prosecutor therein to conduct the
examination of the witnesses because the government prosecutors were present at
the hearing; hence, the prosecution of the case remained under their direct
supervision and control.
In the present case, although the private prosecutor had previously been authorized
by the special counsel Rosario R. Polines to present the evidence for the
prosecution, nevertheless, in view of the absence of the City Fiscal at the hearing on
December 13, 1974, it cannot be said that the prosecution of the case was under the
control of the City Fiscal. It follows that the evidence presented by the private
prosecutor at said hearing could not be considered as evidence for the plaintiff, the
People of the Philippines. There was, therefore, no evidence at all to speak of which
could have been the basis of the decision of the trial court.
Moreover, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General, "to permit such prosecution of
a criminal case by the private prosecutor with the fiscal in absentia can set an
obnoxious precedent that can be taken advantage of by some indolent members of
the prosecuting arm of the government as well as those who are oblivious of their
bounden duty to see to it not only that the guilty should be convicted, but that the
innocent should be acquitted a duty that can only be effectively and sincerely
performed if they actively participate in the conduct of the case, especially in the
examination of the witnesses and the presentation of documentary evidence for both
parties.