Estrada vs Sandiganbayan

Is the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being vague?

Held: As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section
2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or
forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and
particularity. X x x
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who
are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity would be
sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending
one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of
the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the
assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten
wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in
Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have
committed x x x. We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous as there
is obviously none that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof,
these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood
and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the
prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the
accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of
the terms combination and series in the key phrase a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word pattern in Sec. 4. These
omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being
impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due
process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and
void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms
without defining them; much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is
no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and
every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will,
and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the
vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be
gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is
evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.
The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and
lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.
Thus, Websters New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted
definition of the words combination and series. Combination the result or product of
combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close

relationship as to obscure individual characters. Series a number of things or events of the

same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words combination and series to be understood in their
popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which
eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law x x x. Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of
combination, it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories or
enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d),
subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government
under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3). On the other hand, to constitute a series there must be
two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found
in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of
which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical
or distinctive meaning for combination and series, it would have taken greater pains in
specifically providing for it in the law. As for pattern, we agree with the observations of the
Sandiganbayan that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d),
and Sec. 2 x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a pattern consists of at least a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to
(6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal
acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public
officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must
either be an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to achieve said common goal. As
commonly understood, the term overall unlawful scheme indicates a general plan of
action or method which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with
him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such
overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt
or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
Xxx
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioners reliance
on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced.
Xxx
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is
vague and overbroad do not justify a
facial review of its validity The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the
first essential of due process of law. (Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 70
L. Ed. 328 [1926] cited in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Assn. v. City Mayor, 20
SCRA 849, 867 [1967]) The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that a
governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. (NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307,
12, 2 L. Ed 325, 338 [1958]; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231 [1960])
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. The theory is that [w]hen
statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as
a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on
overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate

that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.
(Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521, 31 L. Ed. 2d 408, 413 [1972] [internal quotation
marks omitted]) The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speed to go
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be
deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of
overly broad statutes. This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is
allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the
area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrine then have special application only to free speech
cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court
put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, we have not recognized an overbreadth
doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment. In Broadwick v. Oklahoma
(413 U.S. 601, 612-613, 37 L Ed. 2d 830, 840-841 [1973]), the Court ruled that claims of
facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only spoken words and, again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at
all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct. For this reason, it has been held that a facial challenge to a
legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger
must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.
(United States v. Salerno, supra.) As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may
challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. A plaintiff
who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness
of the law as applied to the conduct of others. (Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95, 71 L Ed. 2d 362, 369 [1982])
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that one
to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on
the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other
situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. (United States v. Raines, 362
U.S. 17, 21, 4 L. Ed. 2d 524, 529 [1960]. The paradigmatic case is Yazoo & Mississippi Valley
RR. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 57 l. Ed. 193 [1912]) As has been pointed out,
vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically
produce facial invalidation, while statutes found to be vague as a matter of due process
typically are invalidated [only] as applied to a particular defendant. (G. Gunther & K.
Sullivan, Constitutional Law 1299 [2001]) Consequently, there is no basis for petitioners
claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, on its face invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the
ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are
constitutionally protected (Id. at 1328). It constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without
concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts (Constitution, Art. VIII, Sections 1
and 5. Compare Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158
[1936]). But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris (401 U.S. 37, 52-53,
27 L. Ed.
2d 669, 680 [1971]; others omitted.)
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring
correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an

appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, x
x x ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional
questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, on its face invalidation of statutes has been described as manifestly
strong medicine, to be employed sparingly and only as a last resort, (Broadwick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. at 613, 37 L.Ed.2d at 841; National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,
524 U.S. 569, 580 [1998]) and is generally disfavored (FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493
U.S. 223, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 [1990]; Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
G.R. No. 135385, 6 December 2000 [Mendoza, J., Separate Opinion]). In determining the
constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been
violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is
charged (United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33, 9 L.Ed.2d 561, 5656 [1963])
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder
Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real.
Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the
statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law.
Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other
part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched
presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot
feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted
for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by
the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his
affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional
anchorage. (Joseph Ejercito Estrada v. Sandiganbayan [Third Division], G.R. No.
148560, Nov. 19, 2001, En Banc [Bellosillo])
Quick Facts : Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively
fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the
constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it
suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in
criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable
under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses.
Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the
petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.

Ligot vs Republic
Anti-Money Laundering Act; freeze order cannot be issued for an indefinite period.
The Court of Appeals (CA), via its September 20, 2005 resolution, extended the
freeze order over the Ligots various bank accounts and personal properties until
after all the appropriate proceedings and/or investigations being conducted are
terminated. By its very terms, the CA resolution effectively bars the Ligots from
using any of the property covered by the freeze order until after an eventual civil
forfeiture proceeding is concluded in their favor and after they shall have been

adjudged not guilty of the crimes they are suspected of committing. These periods
of extension are way beyond the intent and purposes of a freeze order which is
intended solely as an interim relief; the civil and criminal trial courts can very well
handle the disposition of properties related to a forfeiture case or to a crime
charged and need not rely on the interim relief that the appellate court issued as a
guarantee against loss of property while the government is preparing its full case.
The term of the CAs extension, too, borders on inflicting a punishment to the Ligots
in violation of their constitutionally protected right to be presumed innocent
because the unreasonable denial of their property comes before final conviction.
Ret. Lt. Gen. Jacinto C. Ligot, et al v. Republic of the Philippines represented by the
Anti-Money Laundering Council, G.R. No. 176944, March 6, 2013.
Anti-Money Laundering Act; freeze order cannot be made effective for more than six
months unless extended by the court upon motion of the Republic. A freeze order is
both a preservatory and preemptive remedy and meant to have a temporary effect;
it was never intended to supplant or replace the actual forfeiture cases where the
provisional remedy which means, the remedy is an adjunct of or an incident to the
main action of asking for the issuance of an asset preservation order from the
court where the petition is filed is precisely available. Thus, as a rule, the effectivity
of a freeze order may be extended by the CA for a period not exceeding six months.
Before or upon the lapse of this period, ideally, the Republic should have already
filed a case for civil forfeiture against the property owner with the proper courts and
accordingly secure an asset preservation order or it should have filed the necessary
information. Otherwise, the property owner should already be able to fully enjoy his
property without any legal process affecting it. However, should it become
completely necessary for the Republic to further extend the duration of the freeze
order, it should file the necessary motion before the expiration of the six-month
period and explain the reason or reasons for its failure to file an appropriate case
and justify the period of extension sought. The freeze order should remain effective
prior to the resolution by the CA, which must resolve this kind of motion for
extension with reasonable dispatch. Ret. Lt. Gen. Jacinto C. Ligot, et al v. Republic of
the Philippines represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council, G.R. No.
176944, March 6, 2013.
Anti-Money Laundering Act; requisites for issuance of freeze order. Based on section
10 of R.A. 9160, as amended by R.A. 9194, there are only two requisites for the
issuance of a freeze order: (1) the application ex parte by the Anti-Money
Laundering Council (AMLC) and (2) the determination of probable cause by the
Court of Appeals (CA). Ret. Lt. Gen. Jacinto C. Ligot, et al v. Republic of the
Philippines represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council, G.R. No.
176944, March 6, 2013.
Anti-Money Laundering Act; requisites for issuance of freeze order. The probable
cause required for the issuance of a freeze order refers to such facts and

circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet, prudent or cautious man to

believe that an unlawful activity and/or a money laundering offense is about to be,
is being or has been committed and that the account or any monetary instrument or
property subject thereof sought to be frozen is in any way related to said unlawful
activity and/or money laundering offense. In other words, in resolving the issue of
whether probable cause exists, the CAs statutorily-guided determinations focus is
not on the probable commission of an unlawful activity (or money laundering) that
the Office of the Ombudsman has already determined to exist, but on whether the
bank accounts, assets, or other monetary instruments sought to be frozen are in
any way related to any of the illegal activities enumerated under R.A. 9160, as
amended. Otherwise stated, probable cause refers to the sufficiency of the relation
between an unlawful activity and the property or monetary instrument which is the
focal point of section 10 of RA No. 9160, as amended. Ret. Lt. Gen. Jacinto C. Ligot,
et al v. Republic of the Philippines represented by the Anti-Money Laundering
Council, G.R. No. 176944, March 6, 2013.
Anti-Money Laundering Act; requisites for issuance of freeze order. From AMLCs
verified allegations in its ex parte application and the Ombudsmans complaint, it
can be gleaned that Lt. Gen. Ligot himself admitted that his income came from his
salary as an officer of the AFP. Yet, the Ombudsmans investigation revealed that the
bank accounts, investments and properties in the name of Lt. Gen. Ligot and his
family amount to more than P54,000,000.00. Since these assets are grossly
disproportionate to Lt. Gen. Ligots income, as well as the lack of any evidence that
the Ligots have other sources of income, the CA properly found that probable cause
exists that these funds have been illegally acquired. Ret. Lt. Gen. Jacinto C. Ligot, et
al v. Republic of the Philippines represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council,
G.R. No. 176944, March 6, 2013.
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari wherein Ligot et al claim that the Court of
Appeals (CA) acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it issued its resolution extending the freeze order issued against
the Ligots properties for an indefinite period of time.
Lt. Gen. Ligot argues that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it extended the freeze order issued
against him and his family even though no predicate crime had been duly proven or
established to support the allegation of money laundering. He also maintains that
the freeze order issued against them ceased to be effective in view of the 6-month
extension limit of freeze orders provided under the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases.
The CA, in extending the freeze order, not only unduly deprived him and his family
of their property, in violation of due process, but also penalized them before they
had been convicted of the crimes they stand accused of.

Ang vs CA

Facts: The herein petitioner, Rustan Ang and the private respondent, Irish Sagud
were lovers during their college days in Wesleyan University in Maria Aurora
Province of Aurora. Eventually, Irish heard that Rustan has a live-in-partner whom
Rustan got pregnant. Because of this, Irish decided to broke up with Rustan. The
latter asked Irish to elope with him, since he does not love the other girl, to which
Irish refused. To pressure Irish to get back with him he send multimedia messages
to Irish, bearing a picture of a naked woman, who spread her legs with a face of Irish
superimposed on it. Rustan even added in the text message that it is easy for him
to spread those pictures in the internet. Because of this scenario, Irish, asked help
from the Vic-Mayor of the municipality, to which coordination with the local police
was made. Entrapment operation was conducted and arrested Rustan.
Issue: Whether or not Rustans contention that the multimedia messages should
not be made admissible for the basic reason that such was not properly
authenticated as provided by the Rules on Electronic Documents?

Held: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:

Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message
constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of
an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on
Electronic
Evidence
(A.M.
01-7-01-SC).
But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene
picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since
he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time
it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such
ground for objection.
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on
Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and
administrative
proceedings.
Indeed the assertion of Rustan will not be given merit for the basic reason that such
contention was only raised before this court to which the latter had a presumption
that Rustan has waived his right to question the authenticity of the pictures.
Moreover, the court avers that such assertion of Rustan cannot be made possible in
criminal case; such can only be made before, civil and administrative actions.

The high court denied the petition.

JUDGE ANGELES VS. GAITE DIGEST

FACTS:
It appears that sometime in June 1999, petitioner was charged of child abuse by her
grandniece Maria Mercedes Vistan. The preliminary investigation of the complaint
was assigned to State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (respondent Velasco) of the
Department of Justice (DOJ). In a Resolution dated June 20, 1999, respondent
Velasco filed a case against petitioner for 21 counts of Child Abuse under Republic
Act (RA) No. 7610. Petitioner filed a petition for review with the DOJ Secretary who,
in a Resolution dated April 4, 2000, ordered the withdrawal of the Information
against petitioner. On July 7, 2000, petitioner filed with the DOJ an administrative
complaint for Gross Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, Incompetence and
Manifest Bad Faith against respondent Velasco, which the DOJ subsequently
dismissed. On reconsideration, Velasco submitted a comment which contained
statements pertaining to Judge Velascos sexuality.
On the basis of the above statements which petitioner claimed to be a direct attack
on her character and reputation as a public servant, she filed a Complaint for four
counts of libel against respondent Velasco before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila. It was dismissed. Petitioner Judge was clearly undaunted, as she filed a
petition for review with the DOJ of the dismissal. The petition was, again, dismissed,
even upon reconsideration.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Reviewbefore the OP questioning the DOJ
Resolutions dismissing her petition. The OP dismissed the Petition for Review,
stating that under Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 58 dated29 May 2003, no appeal
from or petition for review of the decision or resolution of the Secretary of Justice on
preliminary investigation of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the
President, except those involving offenses punishable byreclusion perpetuato death.
Petitioner thereafter filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 assailing
the OP order. In denying the petition, the CA applied the doctrine laid down
inCarpio v. Executive Secretary regarding the power of control of the President over
all executive branches of the government, in relation to the doctrine of qualified
political agency. The CA then ruled that the OP, relying on MC No. 58, dismissed
petitioner's petition for review and exercised its prerogative not to disapprove or
overturn the DOJ Secretarys resolutions, thus, approving the acts or decision of the
DOJ Secretary, being her alter ego.

The CA also held that the OP's outright dismissal of petitioner's Petition for Review
was valid and binding, and was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. It found
that the DOJ resolutions dismissing petitioner's petition for review became final
and executoryafter petitioner failed to elevate the said DOJ resolutions directly with
the CA in a petition forcertiorariwithin the 60-dayreglementary period provided for
under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the CA was erroneous in applying the doctrine of
qualified political agency
2. Whether or not the petition before the CA was filed on time
HELD:
The petition is denied.
POLITICAL LAW: Qualified political agency.
First issue: The Court referred to Angeles v. Gaite, and explained that:
"The President
himself
set
the
limits
of
his
power
to
review
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in order to expedite the
disposition of cases. Petitioner's argument that the Memorandum Circular unduly
expands the power of the Secretary of Justice to the extent of rendering even the
Chief Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or abuses the former may
commit in the exercise of his discretion is purely speculative to say the least.
Petitioner cannot second-guess the President's power and the President's own
judgment to delegate whatever it is he deems necessary to delegate in order to
achieve proper and speedy administration of justice, especially that such delegation
is upon a cabinet secretary - his own alter ego.
REMEDIAL LAW: Prohibited petitions before the OP.
Second issue: Filing an action with the OP was fatal to the petitioners case, since MC
No. 58 prohibits the filing of such petition with the OP. Petitioner's filing of the
petition for review with the OP, which is prohibited, did not toll the running of
the reglementaryperiod for filing a petition with the CA.Accordingly, the DOJ
resolutions became final and executory after the lapse of the period for assailing the
same in the CA.
Petition is DENIED.