LEVI JONES M.

TAMAYO
SUCCESSION-CASE DIGEST
REMEDIOS NUGUID vs. FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID
17 SCRA 449
Facts: Petitioner filed in Court a holographic will executed by her sister,
Rosario Naguid, praying that said will be admitted to probate and the
administration of the estate be issued in her favor. Felix and Paz Salonga
Nuguid, the legitimate father and mother of the deceased, questioned the
probate of the will. Oppositors alleged that by the institution of petitioner as
universal heir, they were preterited as compulsory heirs of the deceased in
the direct ascending line, thus making the institution void.
Issue: Whether or not the institution is void and intestate succession
ensues.
Held: The will is void. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line
her parents, and the will completely omits both of them: They thus received
nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime;
neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition,
hence Rosario Nuguid died intestate.
ART. 854 states that The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they
are not inofficious.

In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria

Julian.
FELIX BALANAY, JR.

vs. HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ

64 SCRA 452

Facts: Leodegaria Julian died leaving a will stating that it was her desire that
her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's
lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her
properties. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands, and disposed of
in the will her husband's one half shares of the conjugal assets. In that will
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on
the ground of preterition. Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition,
attached thereto an affidavit of Felix Balanay, Sr. wherein he withdrew his
opposition to the probate of the will and affirmed that he was interested in its
probate.
The lower court declared the will void, and converted the testate proceeding
into an intestate proceeding.
Issue: Whether or not the will is void.
Held: The will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given
effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. It is true
that she could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170,
Civil Code) but since the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, had assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal
estate, such partition has become valid, assuming that the will may be
probated.

In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His
preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to
his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights. .

CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

GR No. 72706
Facts: Constantino Acain filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late
Nemesio Acain. Nemesio Acain died leaving a will stating that all his shares
in the properties, house, lands and money which he earned jointly with his
wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given to his brother Segundo Acain. It is
further stated in the will that in case Segundo Acain pre-deceased Nemesio,
all the properties, which constitute his share shall be given to the children of
Segundo. Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo
who are claiming to be heirs.
The oppositors, respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted
daughter of tile deceased and the latter's Widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de
Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the following ground that the widow and
the adopted daughter have been pretirited.
Issue: Whether or not private respondents have been pretirited.
Held: Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may
not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she
is a compulsory heir. However, the same thing cannot be said of the other
respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has
not been questioned by petitioner.

It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of
the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at
least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly
disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted
child.

RAFAEL and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR NO. L-57848

Facts: Clemencia Aseneta, single, died and left a holographic will declaring
that Dra. Soledad L. Maninang shall inherit all her real and personal
properties. The will further states that she does not consider Nonoy,
Bernardo Aseneta, as her adopted son, and that the latter has made her do
things against her will.
Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will of the decedent. Bernardo
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the holographic
will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was
preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue.
Issue: Whether under the terms of the decedent's will, Bernardo Aseneta
had been preterited or disinherited.
Held: The conclusion of the trial court that respondent Bernardo has been
preterited is not indubitable.

Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts. Preterition consists

in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them.
Disinheritance,

in

turn,

is

testamentary

disposition

depriving

any

compulsory heirs of his share in the legitimate for a cause authorized by law.
Pretention under Article 854 of the New Civil Code shall annul the institution
of heir. This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition,
testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In disinheritance
the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited
heirs have been illegally deprived.

RUBEN AUSTRIA, et al. vs. HON. ANDRES REYES

GR NO. L-23079

Facts: Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed a petition for probate, ante mortem,
of her last will and testament. The bulk of the estate of Basilia was destined
under the will to pass on to the respondents Perfecto, Benita, Isagani,
Alberto, and Luz Cruz-, all of whom had been assumed and declared by
Basilia as her own legally adopted children.
Petitioners filed in the same proceedings a petition in intervention for
partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and
that the five respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., had not in fact been adopted
by the decedent in accordance with law, in effect rendering these
respondents mere strangers to the decedent and without any right to
succeed as heirs.

Issue: Whether or not such institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the
event there exists proof that the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent
is false.
Held: The validity or invalidity of the adoption is not material nor decisive on
the efficacy of the institution of heirs; for, even if the adoption in question
were spurious, the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., will nevertheless
succeed not as compulsory heirs but as testamentary heirs instituted in
Basilia's will. This ruling apparently finds support in article, 842 of the Civil
Code.
The institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code.
The decedent's will, which alone should provide the answer, is mute or at
best is vague and uncertain. Moreover, so compelling is the principle that
intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator allowed to prevail,
that we could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of giving it
effect. A probate court has found, by final judgment, that the late Basilia
Austria Vda. de Cruz was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last
will executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence. In this
situation, it becomes our duty to give full expression to her will.
BEATRIZ L. GONZALES vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA
GR NO. L-34395

Facts: Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died
and was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children:
four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons
named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.
The real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three
equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his

deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F.

Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate. Her sole heiress was her mother,
Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. Mrs. Legarda executed two handwritten
identical documents wherein she disposed of the properties, which she
inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito,
Alejandro and Jose.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the
testatrix, filed a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate
the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on
the ground that the said properties are reservable properties which Mrs.
Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to
the exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons
Issue: Whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable
properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree to
the exclusion of the reservees in the second degree, her three daughters and
three sons.
Held: Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be
inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree. Legarda could
not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the
reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena
because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate. The
reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties
as long as the reservees survived the reservor.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the
reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and,
consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a

glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be

allowed.

CATALINA BUGNAO vs. FRANCISCO UBAG

14 PHIL 163

Facts: A document purporting to be the last will and testament of Domingo

Ubag was probated. The instrument was propounded by his widow, Catalina
Bugnao. Appellants, brothers and sisters of the decease contend that the
evidence of record is not sufficient to establish the execution of the alleged
will in the manner and form prescribed in section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure; and that at the time when it is alleged that the will was executed,
Ubag was not of sound mind and memory, and was physically and mentally
incapable of making a will. Further, the statements of the witnesses in the
execution of the will were inconsistent. Differences in the signature of the
testator was also noted.
Issue: Whether or not the will was made in strict conformity with the
requisites prescribed by law; and that, at the time of its execution, the
deceased was of sound mind and memory, and executed the instrument of
his own free will and accord.
Held: All this evidence of physical weakness in no wise establishes his
mental incapacity or a lack of testamentary capacity.
A slight lapse of memory on the part of one or the other witness, as to the
precise details of an unimportant incident, to which his attention may not
have been particularly directed, is not sufficient to raise a doubt as to the
veracity of these witnesses, or as to the truth and accuracy of their
recollection of the fact of the execution of the instrument
It is true that the signature which appears in the document offered for
authentication discloses that at the time of writing the subscriber was more
deliberate in his movements, but two facts must be acknowledge: First, that
the testator was seriously ill, and the other fact, that for some reason which
is not stated the testator was unable to see, and was a person who was not
in the habit of signing his name every day.

These facts should sufficiently explain whatever difference may exist

between the two signatures, but the court finds that the principal strokes in
the two signatures are identical.
JULIANA BAGTAS vs. ISIDRO PAGUIO
22 PHIL 227

Facts: The last will and testament of Pioquinto Paguio y Pizarro was admitted
for probate. The will was propounded by the executrix, Juliana Bagtas, widow
of the decedent, and the opponents are a son and several grandchildren by a
former marriage, the latter being the children of a deceased daughter.
The basis of the opposition to the probation of the will is that the same was
not executed according to the formalities and requirements of the law
touching wills, and further that the testator was not in the full of enjoyment
and use of his mental faculties and was without the mental capacity
necessary to execute a valid will. That the testator suffered from a paralysis
of the left side of his body; that his hearing became impaired and that he lost
the power of speech. However, he retained the use of his right hand and was
able to write fairly well. Through the medium of signs he was able to indicate
his wishes to his wife and to other members of his family.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid.
Held: The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well
established, and the testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged
insane by a court of competent jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and
it is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to overcome this legal
presumption by proper evidence, which they have failed to do.
Courts have repeatedly held that mere weakness of mind and body, induced
by age and disease do not render a person incapable of making a will. To
constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind shall

be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease or otherwise, or

that the testator should be in the full possession of his reasoning faculties.

SANTIAGO GALVEZ vs. CANUTA GALVEZ

26 PHIL 243
Facts: Counsel for Santiago Galvez petitioned the Court for the probate of
the will, which it was alleged Victor Galvez executed in the dialect of the
province in presence of the witnesses Juan Dimanlig, J. Leoquinco, and
Nazaria Galvez. This instrument appears also to have been signed by the
witness Lorenzo Galvez, below the name and surname of the testator.
Further on in the same record, pages 6 to 7, there appears another will
written in Tagalog and executed on the same date by Victor Galvez in
presence of the witnesses Cirilo Paguia, Florentino Sison, and Juan Menodoza.
Canuta Galvez, the testator's daughter, alleged that her father, owing to his
very serious sickness with cholera, lacked the intellectual capacity and clear
judgment requisite for making a will.
Issue: Whether or not Victor Galvez was incapable to execute a will.
Held: In order to hold that Victor Galvez, on account of serious sickness, it is
necessary that the proceedings disclose conclusive proof of his mental
incapacity and the lack of reason and judgment at the time he executed his
will. The witnesses positively affirmed that Victor Galvez, on executing his
will showed that he was in full possession of his intellectual faculties and was
perfectly cognizant of his acts.

Besides the attestation of the aforesaid subscribing witnesses, the contents

of the will and the testator's positive determination to rectify the error he
incurred in the execution of his first will, show that Victor Galvez was in his
sound mind and was perfectly aware of his duties in respect to the legal,
inviolable rights of his daughter and sole heir, Canuta Galvez.
The conclusion is inevitable that Victor Galvez, in executing his will, did so
with a sound mind and the full use of his mental faculties; therefore, the will
must be admitted to probate.

SERAPIA DE GALA vs. APOLINARIO GONZALES and SINFOROSO ONA

53 PHIL 104

Facts: Severina Gonzales executed a will in which Serapia de Gala, her

niece, was designated executrix. The testatrix died leaving no heirs by force
of law, and Serapia presented the will for probate. Apolinario Gonzales, a
nephew of the deceased, filed an opposition to the will on the ground that it
had not been executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2645. The principal points
raised by the appeal are (1) that the person requested to sign the name of
the testatrix signed only the latter's name and not her own; (2) that the
attestation clause does not mention the placing of the thumb-mark of the
testatrix in the will; and (3) that the fact that the will had been signed in the
presence of the witnesses was not stated in the attestation clause but only in
the last paragraph of the body of the will.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid.
Held: The will is valid. When, therefore, the law says that the will shall be
'signed' by the testator or testatrix, the law is fulfilled not only by the
customary written signature but by the testator or testatrix' thumb-mark. A
statute requiring a will to be 'signed' is satisfied if the signature is made by
the testator's mark.
it is not mentioned in the attestation clause that the testatrix signed by
thumb-mark, but it does there appear that the signature was affixed in the
presence of the witnesses, and the form of the signature is sufficiently

described and explained in the last clause of the body of the will. It maybe
conceded that the attestation clause is not artistically drawn and that,
standing alone, it does not quite meet the requirements of the statute, but
taken in connection with the last clause of the body of the will, it is fairly
clear and sufficiently carries out the legislative intent; it leaves no possible
doubt as to the authenticity of the document.
The contention of the appellants Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales that
the fact that the will had been signed in the presence of the witnesses was
not stated in the attestation clause is without merit; the fact is expressly
stated in that clause.

Estate of the deceased Paulino Diancin.

TEOPISTA DOLAR vs. FIDEL DIANCIN, ET AL.
55 PHIL 477

Facts: The will of the deceased Paulino Diancin was denied probate in the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo on the sole ground that the thumb marks
appearing thereon were not the thumb marks of the testator. A thumb mark
appears at the end of the will and on the left hand margin of each of its
pages in the following manner: "Paulino Diancin, Su Signo, Por Pedro
Diamante." The witnesses to the will were the same Pedro Diamante,
Inocentes Deocampo, and Juan Dominado. The will is detailed in nature, and
disposes of an estate amounting approximately to P50,000.
For comparative purposes, a document of sale containing an admittedly
genuine thumb mark of Paulino Diancin, was presented. Photographs of the
thumbmarks on the will and of the thumb mark on Exhibit 8 were also
offered in evidence. One, Carlos J. Jaena, attempted to qualify as an "expert,"
and thereafter gave as his opinion that the thumbmarks had not been made
by the same person.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid.
Held: The requirement of the statute that the will shall be "signed" is
satisfied not only the customary written signature but also by the testator's
or testatrix' thumb mark. Expert testimony as to the identity of thumbmarks

or fingerprints is of course admissible. The three instrumental witnesses

united in testifying concerning the circumstances surrounding the execution
of the will. That the thumb marks appearing on the will were those of Paulino
Diancin, and that he saw Paulino Diancin make these impressions. The
testimony of a witness called by both parties is worthy of credit.