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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT'\

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA


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Dr. Orly Taitz, PRO SE '§
29839 Santa Margarita Parkway, STE 100 3
Rancho Santa Margarita CA 92688 §
Tel: (949) 683-54 11; Fax (949) 766-7603 9 Civil Action: 10-CV-00151

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STRUNK'S DECLARATION IN REPLY DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO


THE MOTION TO INTERVENE
I, Christopher-Earl: Strunk in esse, declare and say under penalty of pejury with 28 USC 9 1746:
1. Declararantis the petitioner who has a pending Notice of Motion to Intervene as an Ex-

relator Intervener-Plaintiff with FRCvP Rule 19(a)and 24 in the Quo Warranto matter with

FRCvP Rule 8 1 (A) (2) as the USA and ex-relator plaintiff.

2. That on January 27,2010 before Declarant decided to intervene was the process server

upon the Defendant Obama by certified mail with return receipt confirmed delivered by the

United States Postal Service ,and in person service of Eric Holder the US Attorney General and

Channing Phillips the U.S. Attorney for Washington DC in person as shown in the Docket record.

by affidavit submitted to the court on January 27,2010;


3. On December 24, 2009, that Defendant Obama nominated Ronald C. Machen Jr. to serve

as United States Attorney for the District of Columbia to replace Channing Phillips. On

Thursday, February 11, 2010, the United States Senate confirmed Mr. Machen as the new United

States Attorney for the District of Columbia and he was sworn in on February 18, 2010.

4. On February 6, 2010, Declarant had one (1) copy of the Plaintiff’s Summons with

Verified Petition Complaint and one (1) copy of Strunk’s Motion to Intervene as an Ex-relator

Intervener-Plaintiff served by registered mail upon in care of the White House at Washington DC

20500 for Defendant Barack Hussein Obama delivered at 4:31 AM on February 19, 2010 by the

United State Postal Service that was notified the delivery by Email confirmation to the process

sever who then on February 22, 2010 declared and certified the registered service complete (See

Exhibit 1).

5. Declarant makes this reply with LCvR 7(d) that appears due March 9, 2010 within 7 days

from the response filed March 2, 2010 or as the court may direct, and by separate submission

accompanied by the Notice of Cross Motion to Intervene declared March 7, 2010 as an Ex-

Relator Interpleader-Defendant as an Ex-Relator Interpleader-Defendant with an Interpleader

Verified Cross Complaint affirmed March 4, 2010 with FRCvP Rule 22 as a Interpleader and the

Notice of Cross Motion declared March 8, 2010 for Partial Summary Judgment with FRCvP

Rule 56(d) as all are in support of the Interpleader and Plaintiff application for a preliminary

injunction in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss the case filed February 26, 2010 by Assistant

United States Attorney Alan Burch with a correction filed March 1, 2010, that arguably are due

by March 12, 2010, however rightfully filed within the March 9, 2010 deadline.

6. That Mr. Burch in his response in opposition to Declarant’s motion to intervene alleges that

Intervener lacks standing to seek relief sought which Declarant denies is true, has no cognizable

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interest in the outcome of plaintiffs claims, that Strunk’s claimed interests have same

jurisdictional problems as Plaintiff, that Strunk cannot show a specific injury fairly traceable to

Defendant’s actions, that the court cannot redress the injuries claimed, Strunk’s claimed interest

raise a non-justiciable political question committed in the first instance by the electorate and

thereafter congress, Strunk somehow relies on the FOIA which is in no way true I already have

the facts necessary for a Declaratory Judgment with FRCvP Rule 56(d);

7. That on or about October 27, 2008 Strunk filed a verified complaint Strunk v. Paterson et

al. including the NYS Board of Elections for a breach of fiduciary duty and 42 USC 1983 civil

rights violation as state action under color of the 2008 General Election active election law case

before the Honorable Justice David I. Schmidt who directed Strunk to obtain information in a

FOIA case from the US Department of State that would allow the State case to proceed and to

date the information there is stayed by District Judge Leon in case Strunk v DOS et al. DCD 08-

cv-2234, and stayed per se because the proposed Quo Warranto conversion there was not

possible in a FOIA matter as it is now before this court.

8. That Strunk merely requires a partial summary judgment as explained separately and an

explanation by the US Department of Homeland Security of the veracity of the birth record

obtained from Kenya in February 2009 and filed under penalty of perjury by Lucas Smith, no

further discovery is required by Strunk, if the record proves to be false, but if valid then requires

further investigation of the fraudulent misrepresentation injuring Strunk with a Special Master

appointed to investigate ( as neither Taitz nor Strunk are admitted to the Washington DC bar)

foreign donations to the various Obama Campaigning committees as explained in the

Interpleader Verified Cross Motion annexed to the Cross Motion for Interpleader.

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9. That Strunk is an “interested person” defined with the Quo Warranto Act in that as of

January 23, 2009 Strunk was the only person in the country to duly fire Defendant Obama for

cause in that he had not shown he was eligible to serve as the Chief Law enforcement Officer,

administration and trustee of Strunk’s power of Attorney and private account at the Department

of treasury and as such is the only person ibn the country individual entitled to refer to Defendant

Obama as the usurper he is. Further, because the Usurper action(s) are thus void ab initio as to

the incapacity to effect the duties of the POTUS, Ex-relator(s) requires a Writ of Mandamus

directive to the Congress and the President of the Senate Joseph Biden as to Article 2 Section 1

Clause 6 and 25th Amendment of Article 7 under the separation of powers doctrine; and

10. further, notwithstanding the FRCvP Rule 56(d) Declaratory Judgment, Ex-relator(s)

Strunk requires with 28 USC §1361 a writ of mandamus of:

(i) DHS to ascertain the facts of Obama’s alleged born in Mombasa Kenya under penalty

of perjury by Lucas Smith;

(ii) FEC / DOT ascertain facts of foreign contributors to any and all Obama campaign

committees including Obama for America, Obama Victory Fund, and others;

(iii) FEC / DOT ascertain facts for a full accounting on all monies paid to Obama, the

various Campaign committees, agents and or John Does(s) Jane Doe(s) and or XYZ

entities conspiring as defined with 42 USC §1971, 42 USC §1983, §1985, §1986, the

False Claims Act with 31 U.S.C. § 3729–3733 and related law in entirety; and

(iv) with FRCvP Rule 65 and LCvR 65.1 a TRO restraining Defendant Obama, the

Supplemental Defendants Obama for America, Obama Victory Fund and or agents use of

any account(s) to be placed under the control and investigation of a court appointed

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special master with FRCvP Rule 53(a)(b) to ascertain facts of wrong doing for a jury trial

on Plaintiff and Interpleader injuries, complains of Defendants with:

11. That on or about February 2, 2009 the Usurper violated Strunk’s right to due process in

the FOIA case Strunk v DOS et al. DCD 08-cv-2234 before Judge Leon when the US Attorney

assistant was replace by Eric holder’s assistant without due notice injuring Strunk and being a

cause of action with direct personalized injury complained of here among the other matters

including the Usurper’s wasting of Strunk’s asset as complained of on May 20, 2009 in the

Verified Complaint shown attached to the Motion to Intervene and that the Usurper is acting

without Strunk’s consent and as duly served upon the Defendant Obama , Eric Holder the US

Attorney General and Jeffrey Taylor the U.S. Attorney for Washington DC by certified mail with

return receipt confirmed delivered by the United States Postal Service and that on or about May

29, 2009 Jeffrey Taylor resigned from his office and neither the Usurper Holder or any of the US

Attorney replacement have responded thereby enabling Strunk to act as the USA and Ex-relator

accordingly.

12. That all though Ms. Taitz in April 2009 had filled a request for a Quo Warranto action

with the US Taylor and US Attorney General Holder with no response, her action before District

Judge Carter in California was not the proper venue for which to proceed according to both the

US Attorney out there and the Judge in his motion to dismiss thereby leading to the present filing

here in DC.

13. Declarant has spoken with Plaintiff several times in regards to the different civil rights

injuries individually sustained with State Action under color of law as are barred by the 14th

Amendment that with use of 42 USC §1983 herein for relief and recovery of various damages

individually Declarant in New York as to suffrage and liberty and Plaintiff in California has also

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been injured elsewhere as the result of Defendant Obama’s actions under color of law with a 42

USC §1985 conspiracy operating with his campaign committees and other yet named in each

State of the several States in two phases: first in the conspiracy going into the 2008 General

Election; and then such Civil Rights and misprision injuries and damages inflicted under color of

Law in Washington District of Columbia after January 20, 2009 as a clear distinction since the

District of Columbia for the purposes of Court Jurisdiction herein is deemed to be a State with 28

USC § 1343.

14. Further, self-represented Plaintiff and Declarant have remarkable differences in regards

to the presentment of various issues of fact to the court and jury, as well as the immediate

availability of remedies for relief of injury as time is of the essence with an on going irreparable

harm and that the claims involved against Defendant Obama from various sources of monies that

will resolves the wide range of damages on both a personal and public basis involved in the

complex matter; and in which Declarant contends must in an efficient way in assistance to the

court join supplement defendants and appoint a special master for resolution of the case.

15. As for the alleged lack of Standing Strunk denies the allegation and argues as follows:

16. Standing as a doctrine to limit judicial review has gone through different phases. Its

history shows that standing really does not have any one constitutional standard and that its

standard may change over time given the existing political and social environment. See Richard

J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 1741, 1788 (1999). The Warren

Court developed what it believed was a relaxed view of standing. Association of Data

Processing Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1979). The Burger Court then made it

more difficult to establish standing. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). Then the early

Rehnquist Court made it even more difficult to prove standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

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504 U.S. 555 (1992) (plurality opinion). Under the influence of Justice Kennedy, the Rehnquist

Court in its later years opened the court's door somewhat. Defenders of Wildlife, (Kennedy, J.,

concurring); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998). Today, under the Roberts Court, the law of

standing is not so clear. Compare Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 2553 (2007) (granting

standing), with Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (denying

standing)).

17. What is really behind standing is separation of powers. As Justice Scalia stated before

joining the Court, "the judicial doctrine of standing is a crucial and inseparable element of

[separation of powers], whose disregard will inevitably produce ... an over-judicialization of the

processes of self-governance." Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element

of the Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 881 (1983) [hereafter Scalia]. Relying on the

separation of powers doctrine, the courts have said that they cannot dictate the methods used by

the executive to enforce the laws for to do so would be interfering with the President's

responsibility to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,

761 (1984). On the court's proper role, Justice Scalia stated: "[T]he law of standing roughly

restricts courts to their traditional undemocratic role of protecting individuals and minorities

against impositions of the majority, and excludes them from the even more undemocratic role of

prescribing how the other two branches should function in order to serve the interests of the

majority itself." Scalia, at 881.

18. The major separation of powers concerns voiced in modern standing cases is the freedom

of the executive branch (see, M., Lujan, 504 U.S. 555; Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438

(2007) and the potential creation of a nation of undifferentiated Interpleader and Plaintiff. See, ~

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, 127 S.Ct.

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2553 (2007). However, as we shall see, these problems are not present in the case filed by

Interpleader and Plaintiff.

19. "Generalizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such." Ass'n of Date

Processing Servo Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970). Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555 (1992), shows that the issue of standing is highly fact sensitive. ENDNOTE 3. All a

litigant must do to demonstrate standing is "allege personal injury fairly traceable to the ...

allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief." Allen v. Wright,

468 U.S. 737,750 (1984) (cited and quoted in U.S. v. Local 560 (I.B.T.), 974 F.2d 315, 340 (3rd

Cir. 1992). The current-day test for Article III standing was established in Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (plurality opinion), where the Court stated:

“First, the plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact' -- an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of - the injury has to be fairly ... trace[ able] to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not ... the result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the
court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at 560-61 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Given the factual allegations of their complaint/petition and the current state of the law of
standing, the Court should have found that Plaintiff have alleged sufficient facts in their
complaint/petition to show they have standing to bring their causes of action. This Court's
threshold inquiry into standing in no way depends on the merits of Plaintiff' contentions.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (citations omitted).”

20. Interpleader and Plaintiff' action has nothing to do with their personal satisfaction about

whether Obama is a "natural born Citizen" and everything to do with whether Obama meets the

requirements of Article II that a presidential contender must be a "natural born Citizen" to be

eligible for that position. It is clear from the complaint/petition and Interpleader and Plaintiff

argued that Article II of the Constitution provides in pertinent part that no person may be

President unless he/she is a "natural born Citizen" and that the objective definition of that clause

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may be found in legal authorities of the Founding era and in the subsequent decisions of the

United States Supreme Court. Interpleader and Plaintiff also argued it is this objective

Constitution standard that must be respected and satisfied regarding presidential eligibility

requirements. Interpleader and Plaintiff never presented any case suggesting that Interpleader

and Plaintiff have some subjective need to satisfy themselves that the president is "truly" a

"natural born citizen."

21. In the words of Chief Justice Waite in Minor v. Happersett:

“There cannot be a nation without a people. The very idea of a political community, such as a
nation is, implies an association of persons for the promotion of their general welfare. Each
one of the persons associated becomes a member of the nation formed by the association. He
owes it allegiance and is entitled to its protection. Allegiance and protection are, in this
connection reciprocal obligations. The one is a compensation for the other; allegiance for
protection and protection for allegiance. “ Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875).

Chief Justice Waite again instructs in United States v. Cruiksahank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875):

“We have in our political system a government of the United States and a government of each
of the several States. Each one of these governments is distinct from the others, and each has
citizens of its own who owe it allegiance, and whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it must
protect. ... Citizens are the members of the political community to which they belong. They
are the people who compose the community, and who, in their associated capacity, have
established or submitted themselves to the dominion of a government for the promotion of
their general welfare and the protection of their individual as well as their collective rights. In
the formation of a government, the people may confer upon it such powers as they choose.
The government, when so formed, may, and when called upon should, exercise all the powers
it has for the protection of the rights of its citizens and the people within its jurisdiction; but it
can exercise no other. The duty of a government to afford protection is limited always by the
power it possesses for that purpose. “

***

He owes allegiance to the two departments [state and federal government], so to speak, and
within their respective spheres must pay the penalties, which each exacts for disobedience to
its laws. In return, he can demand protection from each within its own jurisdiction. Id. at 549-
51. In Corfield v. Coryell, W6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230), we learn:

The privileges and immunities which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments
include protection by the government ... with the right to acquire and possess property of

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every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such
restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.

22. Declarant can see that the Supreme Court and other courts have said that a citizen has a

right to receive protection and safety from the government in return for which he gives

allegiance to that government. As Justice Waite in Cruiksahank said, the right to receive

protection is not only a right that belongs to the collective society but also to the individual. It is

the individual's right to receive protection from the government, which was the reason that the

Founders constituted the new federal Constitutional Republic, believing that the individual

would be better, protected if there were a unified national government to provide that protection.

23. Citizenship determines allegiance. A citizen entrusts his/her allegiance to the government

in exchange for its protection, which includes the government providing for the person's safety,

security, and tranquility. Under the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment, a person

is entitled to life, liberty, and property and cannot be deprived of those rights by the government

without due process of law. Hence, under the Constitution, a person is entitled to receive from

the government its protection of his/her life, liberty, and property. These components necessarily

include the right to safety, security, and tranquility.

24. Can one reasonably deny that persons should have a right to protect themselves? The

Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendment recognize that citizens have the right to vote for their

representatives and protect that right. Citizens exercise their right to protect themselves by voting

for representatives in whom they entrust their life, liberty, and property and expect these

representatives to best protect their safety, security, and tranquility. Hence, if persons are

expected to vote for those representatives whom they believe will best protect them and that right

is protected by the Constitution, a person also has a constitutional right to bring an action under

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the Fifth Amendment against the federal government and/or its agents to demand that the

government continue to provide him/her with the protection he is entitled under the Constitution.

25. The sovereign power in our Constitutional Republic lies with the people and the

Constitution they established to limit the power of the Federal government and thus the Congress

and its members who are part of that government. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419

(1793) (explains that it is the people who are sovereign in our Constitutional Republic). Any

party to a contract as standing to enforce it.

26. The U.S. Constitution is a contract or social compact between the people, the states, and

the federal government that defines and limits the role of the federal government and the rights

of the states and the people. It is the Constitution as a social compact and the citizenship contract

itself between a citizen and the government that provides the citizen individually with that right

to protection, safety, security, and tranquility. Hence, the right to receive protection, safety,

security, and tranquility from the government is a personal contractual right that belongs to one

who is a citizen of the United States. Interpleader and Plaintiff, as citizens of the United States

and part of the people thereof, are parties to this contract. They therefore have standing to

enforce the requirements of Article II "natural born Citizen" clause when they have suffered an

injury in relation thereto.

27. For sure, Obama, if he were a legitimate President and regardless of whether they voted

for him or not, would have the constitutional duty under the Fifth Amendment to provide for the

Interpleader and Plaintiff' protection, safety, security, and tranquility. In return, being assured

that he was a "natural born Citizen" and otherwise eligible for his office, they would trust him

and therefore consent to submit to his legal authority over them. That legal authority is

substantial and affects every aspect of their lives. See Dept. Of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518

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(1988) (explains how the President has authority over our military and national security affairs

and is central to protecting our national security and our highly sensitive national security

information so that it does not get into the hands of our enemies; and how an agency of the

Executive Branch can remove an employee from government employment for lack of retaining a

security clearance and the risk he poses to the national security interests of the United States).

28. The President and Commander in Chief as the Chief Law Enforcement Officer

Administrator and Trustee wields enormous power over the Interpleader and Plaintiff' lives. He

is the Chief Executive and Commander of all the military force. As such, he has the

constitutional obligation to protect them from enemies both foreign and domestic. Hence, given

that the President regularly makes life and death decisions, it cannot be denied that Interpleader

and Plaintiff are personally and directly affected in a concrete way by everything the President

does and does not do. The Court can take judicial notice of former Vice President, Dick Cheney's

actual words regarding Obama's administration's request to move the trial of the 9/11

conspirators to New York City. Cheney's words were: "I think it's likely to give encouragement,

aid, and comfort to the enemy."

29. Concerning Obama, we are not attacking the wisdom or soundness of government action

or asking the Court to assume any authority over some other co-equal branch of government.

Interpleader and Plaintiff' action against him is not an action against the government. We are not

suing him because Interpleader and Plaintiff do not like him, because of a generalized feeling of

discomfort about his occupying the Office of President, or because Interpleader and Plaintiff

have suffered undefined psychological harm. Rather, Declarant maintains that he does not meet

the textual "natural born Citizen" eligibility requirements of Article II, a requirement that he

must meet prior to executive power legitimately vesting in him under Article II, Section 1,

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Clause 5. He must meet this objective constitutional requirement regardless of what the

Interpleader and Plaintiff may personally believe or how the Interpleader and Plaintiff may feel

about him.

30. Regarding Congress, in its ministerial duty by the Vice President Counting the Electoral

votes under the 12th amendment President Cheney failed to ascertain whether or not Obama were

qualified by polling those house / senate members gathered as if it were optional when it is a

mandatory ministerial duty that in fact was breached under the Twentieth Amendment by failing

to make sure that Obama meets that textual eligibility requirement of the "natural 'born Citizen"

clause of Article II which provides protection to Interpleader and Plaintiff' lives, liberty and

property by assuring them that the person to occupy the Office of President will have the loyalty

and allegiance needed to adequately protect their safety, security, and tranquility.

31. Obama's allegiance and loyalty to the United States determines how he exercises his duty

to protect the citizen Interpleader and Plaintiff. If Obama is not an Article II "natural born

Citizen," Interpleader and Plaintiff cannot trust him to protect them. In such a case, Interpleader

and Plaintiff have a right under the Fifth Amendment to bring an action against both Obama and

Congress in which they seek to protect their own life, liberty, and property, including their

safety, security, and tranquility, and to have Obama removed from office because he is not a

"natural born Citizen." These are real and concrete life and death needs that the Interpleader and

Plaintiff have. Any injury to these rights is indeed a concrete Injury.

32. The Interpleader and Plaintiff' Injuries Are Particularized as to them. Because there is an

overlap between the concreteness and particularity tests, Declarant relies on our argument that

Interpleader and Plaintiff meet the concreteness test to also support our argument that they meet

the particularity test. Declarant also adds the following.

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"[P]articularized" "mean[s] that the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual
way." Lujan, at 504 U.S. at 560 n.l. Thus, the injury cannot be merely a generalized grievance
about the government that affects all citizens or derives from an interest in the proper
enforcement of the law. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11,23 (1998); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74; see
also Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 ("[W]hen the asserted harm is a 'generalized grievance' shared in
substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not
warrant exercise of jurisdiction.").

33. Have other Americans also suffered an injury as the Interpleader and Plaintiff have? By

what standard is required to evaluate what harm all these other Americans allegedly suffered?

"All" these other American citizens were surely are not before the Court to be examined about

whether they even care about Obama's eligibility for the Office of President let alone to

determine if they suffered deprivation of their 1st, 5th, and 9th Amendment rights as the

Interpleader and Plaintiff alleged they have. Have these other millions of Americans asserted to

Congress their 1st Amendment right for a redress of grievances? Have they suffered a

deprivation of their 5th Amendment rights to substantive and procedural due process and equal

protection? What evidence do we have that they have suffered these injuries as Interpleader and

Plaintiff have? On the contrary, is it not true that there are millions of Americans who welcome

Obama to continue to be sitting as President regardless of whether he is eligible for the office?

34. All the Americans who supported Obama and who continue to support him surely do not

perceive themselves as the Interpleader and Plaintiff do as having had their constitutional rights

violated by his illegitimately occupying the Office of the President. The countless people who

work for his government probably do not perceive themselves to have suffered any violation of

their constitutional rights regarding Obama's eligibility to hold office. We cannot possibly

contend that these other millions of Americans have been injured by Obama's lack of eligibility

and Congress's allowance of Obama to occupy that Office of President when he is not

constitutionally qualified to do so.

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35. More importantly, is Declarant to accept a standing policy that provides that it is

acceptable for elected officials to violate the constitution as long as those violations harm

everyone? Where is the soundness or logic of a judicial concept as expressed by the court, which

provides that if you suffer an injury alone, the court can help you, but if you suffer that same

injury with "all other American citizens," "people," or "residents," the court cannot. Is it

controlling on the question of standing and whether a specific party has a right to judicial relief

that other persons have also been injured by the defendant's conduct? If someone suffers an

injury, does that injury lose its concrete character or become not particularized because others

may also suffer the same injury? Does a cut on one's arm caused by a defendant become not

concrete and not particularized because the defendant has also caused the same cut on the arm of

a million other people? If someone is a victim in a mass fraud or mass tort situation, does that

person lose his right to bring a legal action because a million other people also share the same

harm? Does not the law allow an individual injured by an unsafe product to sue the manufacturer

in products liability and recognize that he/she has standing even though whether the product is

safe affects in a substantial way millions of other consumers and users who may benefit from the

results of the law suit?· That Obama as the President represents a broad national interest does not

control the question of whether he has specifically harmed the Interpleader and Plaintiff by

refusing to conclusively prove that he is an Article II "natural born Citizen," for harm to the

whole does not mean that there is no harm to the parts making up the whole.

36. One can only wonder how a standing concept as expressed by a Court that can be

consistently and honestly applied by all the Courts to the myriad of public interest law suits that

are brought before it. Such a notion is not a correct statement of the law of standing, for how can

such a position be correct if the Interpleader and Plaintiff are themselves injured but due to no

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fault of their own they also happen to be among the injured? On the contrary, case law shows

that Interpleader and Plaintiff have standing even if they are also among the injured.

37. A party who adequately shows his own injury is entitled to establish standing even

though the court's judgment may benefit others collaterally or even if it is an injury shared by a

large class of other possible litigants. Applied from Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499,501

(1975). As long as Interpleader and Plaintiff adequately show their own injury, it is also perfectly

acceptable for them to "invoke the general public interest in support of their claim." rd. at 501.

38. Interpleader and Plaintiff have not filed a "citizen suit" per se that interferes with the

executive's authority under Article II. Their action is not about political accountability by the

executive and legislative branches that belongs in the political process. There is no risk here of

judicial usurpation of executive or congressional powers. Interpleader and Plaintiff suit is not

about a policy disagreement with the executive and legislative branches but rather about their

violation of the Presidential eligibility requirement found in Article II. Because of their need to

protect their fundamental liberty, Interpleader and Plaintiff want to assure themselves that the

person occupying the Office of President is an Article II "natural born Citizen."

39. Interpleader and Plaintiff' action is a direct attack against Obama, claiming he is not

qualified to be President. Interpleader and Plaintiff are not challenging any actions that he may

have so far taken as President. Hence, Interpleader and Plaintiff' cause of action in no way

implicates any executive power under Article II. Interpleader and Plaintiff are not requesting that

the executive branch fulfill its constitutional or statutory obligations by more vigorously

enforcing the law. They are not requesting that the Court to become a monitor of the soundness

of executive or congressional branch actions. Interpleader and Plaintiff are not asking the Court

to review any executive administrative rule or the failure of any such agency to enforce any such

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rule. Interpleader and Plaintiff' action in no way implicates the executive's constitutional duty

that it "take care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Art. II, Sec. 3. The Court is not being

asked to assume authority over any other branch of government. Interpleader and Plaintiff are

not challenging any executive program or conduct for carrying out the will of Congress. Rather,

Interpleader and Plaintiff are challenging Obama's lack of Article II "natural born Citizen" status

and the Congress refusal to perform their ministerial duty to assure that Obama has such status.

40. Individual rights as opposed to a questionable collective set of rights requires application

of the Ninth Amendment claims to the United States Constitution guarantees to the People rights

not granted in the Constitution to the Federal government and reserves to the People certain

rights as they were understood at the time that Constitution was adopted in 1789. The guarantee

of those rights is a matter of compact or contract between the Federal government and the People

of the United States one person at a time as of the time that the compact or contract with the

United States was agreed upon and adopted by the People in 1789.

41. Quo warranto is an ancient common law writ, which existed at the time the Constitution

was adopted. The Ninth Amendment, which preserves for the People their ancient common law

remedies and writs, along with the common law and principles of equity therefore complements

the D.C. Code statute in giving plaintiffs a right to seek declaratory, injunctive, mandamus, and

quo warranto remedies through the judicial and legislative branches working together. The

Declarant argues that the issues of injury in fact, causation, and redressability equally apply each

of Declarant’s causes of action under the Ninth Amendment and as an individual Declarant relies

upon individual justice rather than a collective social justice that subsumes the individual.

42. Declarant contends that were the Court to appoint a special master of our choosing and

Declarant does have a prestigious person now in mind, in that Interpleader and Plaintiff does

- 17 -
have a basis to share in the Ex-Relator / Whistleblower status in that we each have a direct and

particularized knowledge and personal efforts with the law associated with the direct challenge

of the Defendant usurpation of the Office of the POTUS who acts as if he were the Chief Law

Enforcement Officer, Trustee Administrator of the Executive and the USA, whose actions are

void ab initio and an urgent matter of ongoing acts of misprision that are a grave National

Security threat during this war on terror, financial brinksmanship and conspiracy with a global

regionalism cabal demand to not only outrageously give amnesty to 20 to 40 million tourists at

will, who either overstayed a visa or didn’t have one in the first place, but dismantle the

Constitution to deliver the People into poverty and slavery.

43. That as an example of the continued escalation of Defendant Obama’s misprision, which

now is a subject of an original proceeding to be filed at the District of Columbia Circuit by

March 15, 2010, about Defendants’ effort to impose an amnesty for 40 million persons without

each individual enumeration of the 2010 Census done without asking the question “Are you a

Citizen?” and or “Are you a permanent resident alien?”; moreover, that census data already

obscured without such compelling State Interest questions asked as matter for each State of the

several States, no matter how vague the statistics are, Defendant Obama and his seditious agents

act to suspend use of the Patriot Act, the nation's main counterterrorism law.

44. As to standing individualized civil rights injury, as with whistleblower status Declarant’s

unique firing of Obama for actual cause on January 23, 2009 as the only person in the Country to

do so combined with the misprision injury to Declarant sustained when Eric Holder replaced the

Attorney in the FOIA case without due process that was the first civil right injury after January

20, 2009 combined with Plaintiff’s efforts as an attorney being personally injured by Defendant’s

agents use of sabotage and injury to her as will be proven by the writ of mandamus of DHS to

- 18 -
investigate Lucas Smith admission n under penalty of perjury of having obtained a copy of the

Mombasa Kenya birth certificate through bribery of public officials and the actions then taken to

subvert those findings in conjunction with others, absolutely is a civil rights injury to Taitz after

January 20, 2009 by state action under color of Law in Washington District of Columbia.

45. That on February 18, 2010 even the Rasmussen organization now reports

(http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics/february_2010/only_

21_say_u_s_government_has_consent_of_the_governed) that “Only 21% Say U.S. Government

Has Consent of the Governed “ and cite that the founding document of the United States, the

Declaration of Independence, states that governments derive “their just powers from the consent

of the governed.” Today, however, just 21% of voters nationwide believe that the federal

government enjoys the consent of the governed.

46. That the new Rasmussen Reports national telephone survey finds that 61% disagree and

say the government does not have the necessary consent. Eighteen percent (18%) of voters are

not sure. However, 63% of the Political Class think the government has the consent of the

governed, but only six percent (6%) of those with Mainstream views agree. Seventy-one percent

(71%) of all voters now view the federal government as a special interest group, and 70% believe

that the government and big business typically work together in ways that hurt consumers and

investors. That helps explain why 75% of voters are angry at the policies of the federal

government, and 63% say it would be better for the country if most members of Congress are

defeated this November. Just 27% believe their own representative in Congress is the best person

for the job.

47. Among voters under 40, 25% believe government has the consent of the governed. That

compares to 19% of those ages 50 to 64 and 16% of the nation’s senior citizens.

- 19 -
48. Those who earn more than $100,000 a year are more narrowly divided on the question,

but those with lower incomes overwhelming reject the notion that today’s government has the

consent from which to derive its just authority. Those with the lowest incomes are the most

skeptical.

49. Seventy-eight percent (78%) of Republicans say the government does not have the

consent of the governed, and that view is shared by 65% of voters not affiliated with either of the

major parties. A plurality of Democrats (44%) agrees, but 32% of those in President Obama’s

party believe the government has the necessary consent.

50. From an ideological perspective, most moderate and conservative voters say the

government lacks the consent of the governed. Liberals are evenly divided; and in his new book,

In Search of Self-Governance, Scott Rasmussen observes that the American people are “united in

the belief that our political system is broken, that politicians are corrupt, and that neither major

political party has the answers.” He adds that “the gap between Americans who want to govern

themselves and the politicians who want to rule over them may be as big today as the gap

between the colonies and England during the 18th century.”

51. That Strunk has inalienable individual rights as described by the Declaration of

Independence of 1776 that pre-existed the creation of the United States’ Constitution.

52. That Strunk is the creator of the United States’ Constitution nunc pro tunc now of his

Creation as an inheritance upon birth as a natural born-citizen.

53. That Strunk’s sovereign authority to protect his inalienable individual rights creates the

Federal government and to define express limited rights for the government to operate by.

54. That there are four political branches of government: the three who govern with the

consent of the people granted to The Congress, The Executive, The Judiciary and the fourth most

- 20 -
important branch The People who are resident in a respective State of the several States.

55. There is an overriding Constitutional question of first impression historically ignored

since June 1912 that even with enactment of the interim measure of 13 USC §141 to re-balance

the electoral college for the people of each State of the several States in 1929 still is contrary to

the required House decennial enlargement as to the actual population in Article I section 2 that

each House member represent only with the consent of the people among the 30,000 persons in

each member district, that now is somewhere around say one House member per say 690,0000

persons, and as such remains a festering cancer upon the national government that according to a

recent Rasmussen survey 61% of the people say the government acts ultra vires without consent.

56. The first political branch, The Congress, has not followed the requirement of the U.S.

Constitution in so far as enlargement since 1912, that representative government has fatally

weakened the guarantee of a republican form of government, especially as it applies to the

second political branch, The Executive, dependent upon the Electoral College election process in

each state of the several states to appoint POTUS; and

57. Further, that since 1928 the Office of POTUS without the equal protection provision of

decennial enlargement of the first Branch has evolved into a cult of tyranny that will only worsen

without a representative sized electoral college commensurate with the increase of the people to

select the chief magistrate, (i.e. in New York in 1960 with 12.5 million residents had 45 electoral

college votes now in 2010 with say 19.5 million residents based upon the 2000 Census now only

has 31 electoral college votes schedule to loose two more with the 2010 Census); and

58. Further, one hundred years later without an enlargement of the electoral college more

than ever before the chief law enforcement officer must have no appearance of impropriety or

even the slightest question of allegiances as with the Usurper Obama, who is the epitome of the

- 21 -
fears of the framers as to undue foreign influence in Article II Section 1 in use of the express

eligibility mandate of any candidate shall be a natural-born citizen without dual allegiance; and

59. Further, without enlargement The Congress has become a tyrannical dictatorship

disconnected from the people who are restrained by an every increasing difficulty in running for

office or participating with a reasonable expectation of success, and as evidenced now with the

Usurper who operates under a continuous state of arbitrary and capricious declared emergencies;

that will only chronically worsen every ten years without the required U.S. House size

reasonably reflecting the consent of the people, in that the House increasingly operates for a

cabal of special interest contributors whose surreptitious campaign funding violations of laws

and side deals operate without the consent of the people, and as such the House increasingly

lacks the ability to as a regular expectation of their duties to impeach high crimes and

misdemeanors in the executive, and especially members of the judiciary who rather than report

on the law make the law with impunity so much so that the people now fear the judiciary for

being arbitrary and capricious in a chronic corruption as seen with Alcee Hastings who even

after soliciting bribes from the bench left by an impeachment process only then to become a

U.S. House member from South,Miarniin Florida.

60. In Conclusion, Declarant wishes the Court grant intervention based upon an Interpleader
status and that Plaintiff be granted a preliminary injunction conference to work at the details to

proceed herein for further and different deemed necessary by the Court .

Dated: March 6
, 2010
Brooklyn, New York
@$k&&G &
Christopher-Earl: Strunk in esse
-
593 Vanderbilt Avenue #28 1
Brooklyn., New York 11238
(845) 90 1-6767 Email: chris@strunk.ws
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
&EL W t l l i 8 m V a n A t l e n , d e c l ~ a n d c e r t i i j l u n d a r ~ o f p e r j u r y ~ b 2 8
USC § 1746:

That on Februery 6,2010, I duly served one (1) copy ofthe SUMMONS AND

J m 25,2010with e x b t i dBt~.& d (1) oapy ofthe CMRISTWHER-

EARL: S"IRUNRIN ESSE NOTICE OF MOTLON TO JNTERVENE AS A EX-


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with AfMa+it in Support

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sect&m04ourTra&&Ccmfitmsiteat
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
in re Taitz v. Obama, 10-cv-0015 1 (RCL)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On March 8,2010, I, Christopher-Earl: in esse, under penalty of pejury pursuant to 28 USC

Declarant caused the service of five (5) complete sets of STRUNK'S DECLARATION IN
REPLY DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO THE MOTION TO INTERVENE with Exhibit
annexed declared March 8,20 10, and did place each of four (4) complete sets in a sealed folder
properly addressed with proper postage to be served by USPS mail upon:

Dr. Orly Taitz, D.D.S., J.D. Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney General
29839 Santa Margarita .Parkway, STE C/OBrigham John Bowen, AUSA
100 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF NSTICE
20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Rancho Santa Margarita CA 92688
Washington, DC 20530
Ronald C. Machen, Jr. United States Attorney
C/Oof Counsel Alan Burch, AUSA Barack Hussein Obama in esse
Office of the U.S. Attorney for the C/OThe White House
I Washington District of Columbia 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20500
I
555 4th St., N.W.
I Washington, D.C. 20530

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and hand delivery of one courtesy copy to:
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United States District Judge for the er =o
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I do declare and certifL under penalty of perjhP$:

Dated: March - 1S 2010


Brooklyn, New York

593 Vanderbilt Avenue - #28 1


Brooklyn New York 11238
Phone: (845) 90 1-6767
Email: chris@,strunk.ws

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