SC dismisses Anakpawis members case vs Arroyo

October 18, 2012 5:02pm

Tags: gloriaarroyo, anakpawis, supremecourt
The Supreme Court has cleared former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in a case filed by a member
of the group Anakpawis asking for the issuance of writs of habeas data and amparo regarding the alleged
inclusion of his name in the militarys order of battle.
In a 19-page resolution written by Associate Justice Bienvenido Reyes, the Court en banc dismissed with
finality the motion for reconsideration filed by Francis Saez seeking to reverse its August 2010 decision,
which turned down his request for protection.
The Supreme Court defines the writ of habeas data as a remedy available to anyone whose life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened through the gathering of information regarding him or his family; and the
writ of amparo as a remedy available to those whose right to life, liberty and security "is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission," including extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearance or the threat of them.
The Court of Appeals had earlier junked Saezs petition for lack of basis and for his failure to prove his
claim that there was threat to his life, liberty, and security from the military.
The Supreme Court ruled that the evidence Saez presented failed to support his claims, also ruling that
Saez failed to establish then-President Arroyo's accountability in the matter as commander-in-chief of the
armed forces.
Saez had also named former Armed Forces Chief of Staff Hermogenes Esperon Jr. and former PNP
Director Gen. Avelino Razon Jr. in his petition.
In March 2008 Saez, alleging that he was under surveillance as his name was included in the order of
battle and other government records connecting him to the Communist Party of the Philippines, filed the
petition before the SC.
The High Court issued a writ of amparo, commanding the respondents to make a verified return, and
referred the case to the CA.
On July 9, 2008, the appellate court denied on formal and substantial grounds the reliefs prayed for in the
petition and dropped Arroyo as respondent.
On August 31, 2010, the CA denied the petition for review, causing Saez to file a motion for
reconsideration. BM, GMA News
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G.R. No. 163193

June 15, 2004

SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., petitioner,

JOSE CONCEPCION, JR., JOSE DE VENECIA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, DR. JAIME Z. GALVEZ-TAN, FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, FRISCO SAN JUAN, NORBERTO M. GONZALES, HONESTO M. GUTIERREZ, ISLETA, AND JOSE A.
BERNAS, Petitioners-in-Intervention,
vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Facts:
Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System including the assailed resolution, Resolution 6712, which
provides for the electronic transmission of advanced result of unofficial count. Petitioners claimed that the resolution would allow
the preemption and usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and VicePresident and would likewise encroach upon the authority of NAMFREL, as the citizens accredited arm, to conduct
the "unofficial" quick count as provided under pertinent election laws. Comelec contended that the resolution was
promulgated in the exercise of its executive and administrative power "to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections Comelec added that the issue is beyond judicial determination.

Issue:
Whether or not Comelec's promulgation of Resolution 6712 was justified.

Ruling:

The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing Resolution 6712. The issue
squarely fell within the ambit of the expanded jurisdiction of the court.

Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further bolstered by RA 8436, vest upon Congress the sole and exclusive authority to
officially canvass the votes for the elections of President and Vice-President. Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by
Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, solely authorize NAMFREL, the duly-accredited
citizens arm to conduct the unofficial counting of votes for the national or local elections. The quick count under the
guise of an unofficial tabulation would not only be preemptive of the authority of congress and NAMFREL, but would also be
lacking constitutional and/or statutory basis. Moreover, the assailed COMELEC resolution likewise contravened the
constitutional provision that "no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law." It being unofficial, any disbursement of public fund would be contrary to the provisions of the
Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the 2003 General Appropriations Act.

The Omnibus Election Code in providing the powers and functions of the Commission subjects the same to certain conditions with
respect to the adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices, to wit: (1)consideration of the area and

available funds (2) notification to all political parties and candidates. The aforementioned conditions were found to
have not been substantially met.

ESTRADA VS DESIERTO; ARROYO

Posted by kaye lee on 2:48 AM
Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2 2001

[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy]

FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal
gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on
December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more
serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only
stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in
suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was
thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President
Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd
at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this
election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that
Estrada constructively resigned his post. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the
presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left
Malacaang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It
sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in
cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment
confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.

ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.

2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.

3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:

1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I

EDSA II

exercise of the people power of

revolution which overthrew the
whole government.

exercise of people power of

freedom of speech and
freedom of assemblyto petition
the government for redress of
grievances which only affected the
office of the President.

extra constitutional and the

legitimacy of the new government
that resulted from it cannot be the
subject of judicial review

presented a political question;

intra constitutional and the

resignation of the sitting President
that it caused and the succession
of the Vice President as President
are subject to judicial review.
involves legal questions.

The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution
require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art
II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII.
The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They
also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both
were present when President Estrada left the Palace.

Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing

material relevant issuesPresident Estrada is deemed to have resigned constructive
resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by
his leaving Malacaan Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he
was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President
(without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same
service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resignmust be accompanied by act of relinquishmentact or omission before,
during and after January 20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed
H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed
HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated.
It is clear is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear
in that recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the
Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and
addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he
did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery
and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially
plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a
non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to

commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is
that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally
is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also,
since our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and
legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court
also said that Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the
trial has influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court
said that the cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the
publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the
prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with prosecution.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1, Estrada vs Arroyo Case Digest, Estrada vs Desierto Case
Digest

CASE DIGEST: ESTRADA V DESIERTO

MARCH 3, 2014 MCMPELAGIO LEAVE A COMMENT

Facts
After Estradas impeachment proceedings were aborted and his resignation from the
Presidential post, a cluster of legal problems started appearing. Several cases
previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion
including among others, bribery and graft and corruption, plunder, perjury, serious
miscounduct, malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds. A special
panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to
investigate the charges against the petitioner.Petitioner filed with this Court a
petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to
enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in any
other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of
petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted Petitioner also contends
that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the
investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial
publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed
bias and is all set to file the criminal cases in violation of his right to due process.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined
due to prejudicial publicity
Held
No. Then and now, we now rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not
incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an
accuseds right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always
been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in
the criminal field x x x. The press does not simply publish information about trials
but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors,
and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair

trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-togavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of
the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. Our judges are learned in the law and
trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a
litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per
se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial
judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of
the case. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and
proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be,
by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial
judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive
media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances
of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of
prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented
during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden. The court recognizes that pervasive and prejudicial publicity
under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair
trial.However,petitioner needs to show more weighty social science evidence to
successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision.
Thus the petition was dismissed.

Civil Liberties Union VS. Executive Secretary

FACTS:

Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David
for petitioners in 83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions
were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C.
Aquino on July 25, 1987.
Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the
Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. The pertinent
provisions of EO 284 is as follows:
Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
appointive officials of the Executive Department may in addition to his primary
position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.
Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they
must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in
rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his
primary position.
Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should
either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
The petitioners are challenging EO 284s constitutionality because it adds
exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided in the constitution.

According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or
employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The
Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2
of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.

Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.

Decision:

No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared
null and void.
Ratio:
In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No.
284 is unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet
members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition their
primary position to not more that two positions in the government and government
corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in
direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
The phrase unless otherwise provided in this constitution must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution
itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.

CASE DIGEST: ESTRADA VS. ARROYO; ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO

G.R. No. 146738 Estrada vs. Arroyo
G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto
March 2, 2001
FACTS:
Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice
President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit Singson, a close friend the President, alleged that he had personally given
Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as Jose Velarde a grassroots-based numbers game.
Singsons allegation also caused controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives filing of an
impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint.
The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as
presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded not guilty.
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by students from
private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and other bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their support for Estrada
and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and maintains that he will not resign.
He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional
and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.

OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his
post. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the
14th president of the Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as president, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his
family later left Malacaang Palace.
A heap of cases then succeeded Estradas leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition for prohibition with a prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases
filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring
respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not petitioner Estrada was a presidenton-leave or did he truly resign.
2.) Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.
HELD:
The Court defines a political issue as those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.
The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The Court said that while the
Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution,
overthrowing the old government entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government exercising under
the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the president was affected. In the former, it The question of whether the
previous president (president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal
and not political.
For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts
of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore,
the quoted statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estradas implied resignation On top of all these, the press
release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its legality and
his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use
of the totality test: prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance
on the issue.
As to the issue of the peitioners contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that petitioner is no longer entitled to
absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public
office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal
acts committed while a sitting President. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the
president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure(the term during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his
term (time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents
shall succeed one another).

Marcos vs. Manglapus, [G.R. # 88211 September 15, 1989 ]

Post under case digests, Political Law at Sunday, February 26, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency and was forced into
exile. Corazon Aquinos ascension into presidency was challenged by failed coup
attempts as well as by plots of Marcos loyalists and the Marcoses themselves.
Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die.
But President Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return
has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
Hence, this petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the
respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members
of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their
return to the Philippines.
Issues: Whether or not the President has the power to bar the return of Marcos to
the Philippines. Assuming that she has the power to bar, was there a finding made
that there is a clear and present danger to the public due to the return? And have
the requirements of due process been complied with in the making of the finding?

HELD: Petition Dismissed.

The request of the Marcoses must not be treated only in the light of constitutional
provisions, it must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those
residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in to the paramount
duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. Such request
or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the
President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
It is found by the Court that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral
arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein
petitioners and respondents were represented, that there exist factual bases for the
President's decision. Hence, this act cannot be said to have been done arbitrarily or
capriciously. Further, the ponencia (the coups, the communist threat, peace and order
issues especially in Mindanao, Marcos loyalists plotting) bolsters the conclusion that
the return of Marcos will only exacerbate the situation in the country.
Another reason of the Court...We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country
is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of
the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives,
many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country,
while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to
recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign
jurisdictions.

Matibag vs Benipayo
GR No. 149036
April 2, 2002
Maria J. Angelina G. Matibag questions the constitutionality of the appointment by President Arroyo of Benipayo
(Chairman of the Commission on Elections), and Bora and Tuason (COMELEC Commissioners). She questions the
legality of appointment by Benipayo of Velma J. Cinco as Director IV of the Comelecs EID and reassigning her to the
Law department.
Issues:
1. Instant petition satisfies all requirements
2. Assumption of office by Benipayo, Bora and Tuason; ad interim appointments amounts to a temporary
appointment prohibited by Sec 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution
3. Renewal of ad interim violated the prohibition on reappointment under Sec 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution
4. Benipayos removal of petitioner is illegal
5. OIC of COMELECs Finance Services Department acting in excess jurisdiction
Matibags Argument:
1. Failure to consult for reassignment
2. Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No 7; transferring and detailing employees are prohibited
during the election period beginning January 2 until June 13, 2001

3. Reassignment violated Sec 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258
4. Ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Bora and Tuason violated the constitutional provisions on the
independence of the COMELEC
5. Illegal removal or reassignment
6. Challenges the designation of Cinco
7. Questions the disbursement made by COMELEC
8. No ad interim appointment to the COMELEC or to Civil Service Commission and COA
9. Sec 1 (2) of Article IX-C; an ad interim appointee cannot assume office until confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments
Benipayos Argument:
1. Comelec Resolution No. 3300
2. Petitioner does not have personal interest, not directly injured
3. Failure to question constitutionality of ad interim appointments at the earliest opportunity. She filed only after
third time of reappointments
4. Ad interim is not the lis mota because the real issue is the legality of petitioners reassignment.
Rules of Court:
1. Real issue is whether or not Benipayo is the lawful Chairman of the Comelec
2. Petitioner has a personal and material stake.
3. It is not the date of filing of the petition that determines whether the constitutional issue was raised at the
earliest point. The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleading.
4. Questioned the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments which is the earliest opportunity for pleading
the constitutional issue before a competent body.
5. Ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn. It is not the nature of appointment but the manner on which appointment was made. It will avoid
interruptions that would result to prolonged vacancies. It is limited the evil sought to be avoided.
6. Termination of Ad interim appointment (Sword of Damocles); (1) disapproval (2) recess
7. Two modes of appointment: (1) in session (2) in recess
8. By-passed appointments (1) lack of time/failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize, (2) subject of
reconsideration, (3) can be revived since there is no final disapproval
9. Four situations in for a term of seven years without replacement: (1) serves his full seven-year term, (2) serves
a part of his term and then resigns before his seven-year term, (3) served the unexpired term of someone who died
or resigned, (4) served a term of less than seven years, and a vacancy arises from death or resignation. Not one of
the four situation applies to the case of Benipayo, Borra or Tuason
10. Reappointment cannot be applied; (1) appointed by president, (2) confirmed by Commission on Appointments
11. Without reappointment means: (first phrase) prohibits reappointment of any person previously appointed for a
term of seven years (second phrase) prohibits reappointment of any person previously appointed for a term of 5 or
3 years pursuant to the first set of appointees
12. Reasons for prohibition of reappointments: (1) prevent second appointment (2) not serve beyond the fixed term
13. Two important amendments: (1) requiring the consent by Commission of Appointments (2) prohibition on
serving beyond the fixed term of 7 years
14. Twin Prohibition (ironclad): (1) prohibition of reappointments (2) prohibition of temporary or acting appointments
15. Third issue not violation because the previous appointments were not confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments.
16. Benipayo is the de jure COMELEC Chairman. He is not required by law to secure the approval of the COMELEC en
banc.
17. The petitioner is acting only temporary because a permanent appointment can be issued only upon meeting all
the requirements.
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 refers only to COMELEC field personnel not to head office personnel.

Pimentel vs. Ermita

Post under case digests, Political Law at Friday, March 09, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: This is a petition to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President
Arroyo) through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita (Secretary Ermita) to Florencio B. Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael T.
Defensor, Joseph H. Durano, Raul M. Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C. Villa, and Arthur C. Yap (respondents) as acting
secretaries of their respective departments.
On August 2004, Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments.
Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. On 23 September 2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to
respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity.
Issue: Is President Arroyos appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments while Congress is in session, constitutional?
Held: Yes. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this
executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on the executive power

toappoint are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope of the legislatures interference in the executives power
to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an
office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any
particular person to an office.
However, even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its powers is executive
and not legislative. The Commission on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its power to give or withhold consent to
presidential appointments.
Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have appointed respondents as acting secretaries because in case of
a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary.
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a
limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of
the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as
acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her
temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the
guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter
ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very nature
of the office of a department secretary, the President mustappoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress
is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting
appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states
that [t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to
perform the functions of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not
yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.
Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to abuse. Petitioners fail to consider
that acting appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292. The
law has incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments.
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon
acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be
extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments
for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a
way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyos issuance of ad
interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.

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Case Digest on Integrated Bar Of The Philippines v. Zamora

G.R. NO. 141284 (August 15, 2000)

November 10, 2010

FACTS: The petitioner argues that the order of the President for the Philippine National Police and the Philippine
Marines to carry out joint visibility patrols to prevent and restrain crime, violated the principle of supremacy of civilian
authority over the military and the civilian character of the police force.
HELD: The participation of the Philippine Marines constitutes a permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The civilian character of the police force is also not affected by this participation. The members of the
PNP are the ones in charge of the operations. They are the ones who will direct and supervise the deployment of the
Philippine Marines.

IBP v. Zamora
9/17/2014
0 Comments

Constitutional Law. Political Law. Fundamental Principles and State Policies. Article II, Section 3. Civilian
Supremacy.
IBP v. ZAMORA
338 SCRA 81
FACTS:
The President ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime
prevention and suppression. On Januray 17, 2000, the IBP filed the instant petition to declare the
deployment of Philippines Marines unconstitutional thus null and void alleging that no emergency situation
would justify the employment of soldiers for law enforcement work and that the same is in derogation of
Article II Section 3 of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the joint visibility patrols violate the Constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over
the military
HELD:
The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian
enforcement and that it does not contravene Section 3, Article II of the Constitution. The limited
participation of the Marines is evident in the LOI itself which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of
the Marines authority. The deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. The real authority in these operations is lodged with the head of a civilian
institution and not with the military. What is in here is mutual support and cooperation between the military
and the civilian authorities, not derogation of civilian supremacy. Wherefore, the petition is hereby
dismissed.

People vs. Patriarca, Jr. G.R. No. 135457, September 29, 2000
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr., a member of the NPA, was found
guilty

by the

trial court

of

the

crime

of

murder

for

the

death

of AlfredoArevalo and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Accused-appellant
Accused-appellant

appealed
applied

the

decision

of

the

for amnesty under Proclamation No.

RTC.

724.

His

application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board concluding

that

his

activities

Issue: What

were

done

in

pursuit

of

his

political

beliefs.

is the effect of the grant of amnesty to the conviction of the

accused-appellant?

Held: Amnesty commonly

denotes a general pardon to rebels for their

treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign
grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law
of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the
offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is
charged, that the person released by amnestystands before the law precisely as
though

he

had

committed

no

offense.

Paragraph 3 of Art. 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal

liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the
penalty

and

all

its

effects.

The grant of amnesty serves to put an end to the appeal. Accused-appellant is

acquitted of the crime of murder.
NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE
M ARC H 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project

in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of
China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified
that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the
NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was
interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed
him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive
privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the communications between GMA
and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent
committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and
jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of
legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by
the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the
repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of
powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The
judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need,
such that the information sought likely contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials
necessary in her executive and policy decision-making process and, that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential
communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the
presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the
President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into
executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can
be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional
provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if
petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where
he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the
Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

G.R.No. 180643, March 25 2008 [Executive Privilege]

FACTS:
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to
conduct an investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was

then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the
COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of the
NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed him
not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed
about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In
particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President
Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to
prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a result, the
Senate cited him for contempt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by
executive privilege.
RULING:
The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential communications
privilege. It pertains to communications, documents or other materials that reflect
presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes
should remain confidential. Presidential communications privilege applies
to decision-making of the President. It is rooted in the constitutional principle of
separation of power and the Presidents unique constitutional role.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of
inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President,
such as the area of military and foreign relations. The information relating to these
powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Elements of presidential communications privilege:
1)
The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and nondelegable presidential power. - i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement
with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2)
The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close
advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor
must be in operational proximity with the President.
3)
The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege
that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information
sought likely contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. - there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1, Executive Privilege, G.R. No. 180643

Clinton vs jones
Facts. The Respondent filed a complaint against the Petitioner alleging that the Petitioner made
unwanted sexual advances towards her when he was the Governor of Arkansas. The Petitioner
filed motions asking the district court to dismiss the case on grounds of presidential immunity
and to prohibit the Respondent from re-filing the suit until after the end of his presidency. The
district court rejected the presidential immunity argument, but held that no trial would take place
until the Petitioner was no longer president. Both parties appealed to the United States
Supreme Court (Supreme Court), which granted certiorari.
Issue. Whether the President can be involved in a lawsuit during his presidency for actions that
occurred before the tenure of his presidency and that were not related to official duties of the
presidency?

Held. Affirmed.
The President of the United States can be involved in a lawsuit during his tenure for
actions
not
related
to
his
official
duties
as
President.
It was an abuse of discretion of the District Court to order a stay of this lawsuit until after
the Presidents tenure. The District Courts decision to order a stay was premature and
a lengthy and categorical stay takes no account whatsoever of the Respondents
interest
in
bringing
the
suit
to
trial.
Concurrence. It is important to recognize that civil lawsuits could significantly interfere
with the public duties of an official. The concurring judge believed that ordinary casemanagement principles were likely to prove insufficient to deal with private civil lawsuits,
unless supplemented with a constitutionally based requirement that district courts
schedule proceedings so as to avoid significant interference with the Presidents
ongoing discharge of his official responsibilities.
Discussion. A sitting President of The United States does not have immunity from civil lawsuits
based on the Presidents private actions unrelated to his public actions as President. The
doctrine of separation of powers does not require federal courts to stay all private actions
against the President until he leaves office. The doctrine of separation of powers is concerned
with the allocation of official power among the three co-equal branches of governme