Professional Documents
Culture Documents
*From PPT
*Shaded portions: From Pointers ni Sir
*From Audio
*From Codal
*Included in Syllabus but not in both audio and powerpoint
AGRARIAN REFORM
I. History and Legal Basis
PRE-SPANISH PERIOD
DAR did not elaborate on this one. But what I can surmise is
that probably no one was concerned about ownership. Gamay
rag tao at that time. I think the keyword there is access.
Walay limitation ba.
SPANISH PERIOD
Rural Program Administration, created March 2,1939purchase and lease of haciendas and their sale and lease to
the tenants.
JAPANESE
OCCUPATION
peasants and workers organizations grew strength.
peasants took up arms
Anti- Japanese group, the HUKBALAHAP (Hukbo ng Bayan
Laban sa Hapon)
not much during this time
PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC
Executive Order No. 355 issued on October 23,1950 -Replaced the National Land Settlement Administration with Land
Settlement Development Corporation (LASEDECO)
Republic Act No. 1400 (Land Reform Act of 1955) Created the
Land Tenure Administration(LTA)
Take note of this under Magsaysay, 1199, just for our consumption
although it has been superseded.
Before Magsaysay, the relationship was concentrated on share tenancy
but during this time there was another system that came out, and whats
that? LEASEHOLD. If before share tenancy was about sharing 50/50,
then 70/30, and now share tenancy is kelangan ikaw land owner imung
ipa eject you should follow the reasons to eject.
No arbitrary ejectment those are the concerns during Magsaysay but
here comes another concern and that is LEASEHOLD and in fact under
the law the tenant has the option, why the option?
Because this was changed in the time of Macapagal under R.A. 3844.
Under Macapagal there is no more option, no more share tenancy,
we will only adopt leasehold
Whats the difference between share tenancy and leasehold? You will
note in share tenancy, the concerns are sharing and ejectment.
What are in share tenancy that is not in leasehold?
If a tenant dies under share tenancy the children of the deceased cannot
succeed but under leasehold the descendants automatically become
tenants as well. Once a tenant, father or mother dies, a land owner
cannot say since I cannot eject you tenant I will just sell this
land. Under leasehold, the transferee or the purchaser of the land is
bound by the relationship. In short, the Land owner has no escape. This
was the option before during the time of Macapagal. With this law
R.A.3344, share tenancy was abolished and it was only leasehold.
Macapagal was even called the father of Agrarian Reform.
President Carlos P. Garcia (1957-1961)
Continued the program of President Ramon Magsaysay.
President Diosdado Macapagal(1961-1965):
Republic Act No. 3844 of August 8,1963 Abolished shared
tenancy, institutionalized leasehold.
2
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CARPER
the
3
the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign
competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of
the country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. Private
enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective
organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden the base of their
ownership.
ARTICLE XVIII
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
Section 22. At the earliest possible time, the Government shall
expropriate idle or abandoned agricultural lands as may be defined by
law, for distribution to the beneficiaries of the agrarian reform program.
ARTICLE XIII
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for
the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and
disposition of property and its increments.
Section 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment
to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and selfreliance.
AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers who are
landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case
of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this
end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention
limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of
just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect
the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives
for voluntary land-sharing.
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legislation: Equalization of Forces. If you own a parcel of land, why the
need of having another parcel of land?
Another issue is this: RETENTION LIMITS. Ill give you an overview so that
at least you will understand when we talk about agrarian reform.
Agrarian Reform program is basically taking away parcels of land by the
state from those owners of the agricultural lands. If you own 60 hectares,
you wont own anymore 60 hectares. You will only be able to retain a
certain number of hectares. Who determines the number? CONGRESS.
Under CARL, landowners can retain up to 5 hectares. So, if you own 60
hectares, you will retain 5 hectares. That is agrarian reform; that is
equalization of forces. Why? Because you have landowners who own
parcels of land and you have tenants who till the land but dont own any
parcels of land. How will they become equal? The government will take
away parcels of land and give it to the land owners.
But, that does not end there because that TAKING is what you call
Expropriation of Eminent Domain. Thats why in Sec. 4, there is a
provision there subject to the Payment of Just Compensation. This is not
simple because if you own vast hectares of land, you dont have to give it
away and receive a compensation nga ang mu.valuate kay ang
government kay normally gagmay. Pero, base rapud na sa imong sayop.
Ngano man? Under Sec. 17, one of the factors that will affect the
computation of just compensation is the Assessed Value. And ang
landowner nga gusto makasave, dili mudeclare sa sakto na assessed
value. Ang ideclare sa tax declaration, gamay ra kaayo kay aron gamay
rag bayran nga real property tax. Without knowing, ang iyang yuta
kuhaon diay to sa gobyerno unya ang iyang yuta, bayran ra base sa
botbot niya na assessed value.
Sec 4 talks about retention limits. It qualifies retention limits. Reasonable
retention limits. That has not been questioned, so right now the limit is
fixed at 5 hectares. Children of landowners will also retain, subject to this
2 qualifications:
1.
2.
Sec. 5. The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers, and
landowners, as well as cooperatives, and other independent farmers
organizations to participate in the planning organization, and
management of the program, and shall provide support to agriculture
through appropriate technology and research, and adequate financial,
production, marketing, and other support services.
Sec. 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or
stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the
disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the
public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject
to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of
indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its
own agricultural estates which shall be distributed to them in the manner
provided by law.
Take note of Sec. 6, still in the constitution. While the framework is:
Acquisition subject to payment of just compensation, the program must
respect (1)prior rights, (2)homestead rights, and (3)the rights of
indigenous communinities. So if you are a holder of homestead patent,
your land is not covered by the agrarian reform program. But, there is a
BUT. Here, in sec. 6, there is no qualification. It just mentioned subject
to prior rights, homestead rights. But you know what happened to the
law? The law qualifies it. Qualifies it in a sense that if you are a grantee
of a homestead patent, gitagaan kag yuta sa DENR para naa kay
ikabalay, but wala ka nagpuyo or actually till sa yuta, the law says that
you are not qualified for the exemption. But, section 6 does not qualify.
Sec. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen,
especially of local communities; to the preferential use of the communal
marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide
support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research,
adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other
services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such
resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of
subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive
a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing
resources.
Sec. 8. The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the
proceeds of the agrarian reform program to promote industrialization,
employment creation, and privatization of public sector enterprises.
RA 3844
BENEFICIARIES
Tenant Farmers
During the Time of Diosdado Macapagal and it was this law that
ABOLISHED SHARE TENANCY and UPHELD LEASE HOLD. Before this
was RA 1199 where the tenant is given the choice whether the tenant
would love to go to share tenancy or lease hold. If you have read 1199
the meaning or the concept of share tenancy and lease hold are the
same.
With respect to parties: Parties are the land owner and the tenant
although in the case of leasehold the tenant is technically called lessee.
There is a contribution of the land owner and that contribution is in the
form of a land. The contribution of the tenant or lessee is labor. And the
tenant/lessee is supposed to plant, cultivate, harvest and when there is
production, divide the share. The same concept share tenancy and
leasehold.
But why is it that leasehold is preferred over share tenancy?
Why leasehold?
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LO because if that is the case that that can be an
excuse then futile ang balaod.
Po vs Dampal
- talks about redemption, the right of the lessee to redeem a property
that was foreclosed by the bank. But the law even mentions about the
right of pre-emption if ibaligya gani sa tag-iya ang yuta dunay
katungod nga e.offer ngadto sa lessee ang yuta.
Sec. 12 on legal redemption Farm lots foreclosed by the bank due
non-payment of a loan. Po is the highest bidder in the auction. The
previous owner, the mortgagor and the tenant filed a Civil Case against
the bank for annulment of mortgage. Meanwhile the tenant filed a
complaint for legal redemption with DAR.
Subject of this case is the case of legal redemption not the annulment of
mortgage. Because Dampal wants to redeem the land from the bank.
But PO said you have no right of redemption because it is already beyond
the period as provided under sec. 12. Sec 12 provides 180 days from
notice in writing.
DARAB said no more right to redeem because it has prescribed. But you
have to know under sec. 12, it provides for a reckoning point, and the
reckoning point is a NOTICE IN WRITING. Who shall give the notice?
It is the vendee, supposed to be the bank that shall serve notice
on all the lessees including Private Respondent Dampal because
he is affected by the sale. Not only the lessees but also including
DAR.
-There was no notice served. So SC said, the lack of written notice does
not start the running of the prescriptive period.
- Contention of PO, the highest bidder Dampal, when you filed an
action against the bank for nullity of mortgage you were aware that there
was non-payment of the loan and the bank is to foreclose the property. It
was foreclosed that is why you are seeking the nullity of the mortgage.
Therefore you are considered to have a constructive knowledge. SC
said, this contention fails because of the express requirement under the
law that it has to be in WRITING.
One of the important provisions of the law is w/ respect to grounds to
dispossess. Take note: dispossess here means removal/ejectment
from the land. So you will note among the grounds that has been
listed, dili pwede ma.rakrakan ang tenant ug pusil. The land owner
still has to comply with this. This law still applies. (on grounds for
ejectment)
SIR: Under the current law, CARL, there is no provision on ejectment! So
which one will you consult? This law (RA 3844). There is no provision
under CARL regarding the rights and obligations, you have to consult this
law. Thats why this one is still very applicable with respect to leasehold.
Grounds to dispossess a lessee: TOP-FNS
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Employed a sublessee
Normally the grounds are last two grounds, under 3844, there
is an express provision that the lessee will allow a sublessee.
If they are agricultural workers under RA 3844, they are under
Bill Of Rights, they are entitled to minimum wage law, among
others.
Agricultural lessee vs Civil lessee
To distinguish lessee under Civil Code and under Agrarian Law
1.
Grounds to eject - AL 3844 while CL Civil Code
2.
Where will you file the ejectment case agri lessee DAR
while civil lessee in regular courts
Lessee has substantial rights, you dont have to allege , you
have to support.
Allegation only is not sufficient
Extinguishment of relation vs dispossession
a.
Extinguishment no court approval, voluntary act
(abandonment of land without knowledge of lessor or
voluntary surrender by lessee) or an act of God
b.
Dispossession with court order, premise of lessee
Sta. Anna vs Carpo, the issue is non-payment of the rentals. You will
note there are different rulings of the DAR.
ABBREVIATIONS USED: PARAD is the provincial adjudicator. Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator PARAD. The DARAB is the central office in
Manila. So any decision of the PARAD goes to DARAB and from the DARAB
being a quasi-judicial agency under the rules of Court, goes to CA.
Now SC discusses first about BURDEN OF PROOF. NOTE: According to the
SC under sec. 37 the burden of proof to show the existence of a
cause of rejectment is upon petitioner land owner. That means we
are talking about all the grounds to dispossess. It is the LO who has the
burden to prove the ground.
SC qualified that non-payment must be willful and deliberate. That
means di lang failure, it could be failure but if there was negligence on
the part of the lessee to pay that may not be taken against the lessee,
because it has to be WILLFUL and DELIBERATE non-payment.
So according to the court the lessee executed an affidavit that the LO
refused to receive the respective lease rentals and for another year the
lessee wrote two notices to the LO informing him of the availability of the
lease rentals pero wa kuha.a sa LO. That means there was no willful
and deliberate non-payment of the rentals due.
Sec. 37 talks about dispossess. There is a difference between
extinguishment of the relation as against dispossession.
DISPOSSESSION there has to be a court order. Dili ni order
referring to civil court on the aspect of Civil law relationship, it
is in the context of the Department of agrarian reform.
There is an ejectment under civil law, there is also an
ejectment under agrarian reform. The jurisdiction for one is
different from the other.
Im sure youve heard cases about LO filing cases on ejectment
against occupants. Normally from squatters, in a parcel of
land. And its normal for lawyers to file the case under the civil
law concept. Not agrarian law. WHY? Its hard ang agrarian
and its difficult to the part of the LO. Why? If you file
ejectment under agrarian law you are bound by
whatever rights of the occupants may have on the
parcel of land. Bound ka especially under RA 3844 that
means you cannot eject unless your ground falls under any of
those grounds and unsa may kasagaran mahitabo sa yuta?
Diba naa sa yuta mo.kalit nalang ug turok ang mga tawo bisag
wa gitanum? Wa mo kabantay ana? Murag mushroom diba?
Tan.aw nimu nag.tulda lng, pagkahuman ni balay na, nya nipa
hut, nya nag.scene na jud. so you dont file it normally at the
agrarian court. Why? Unsa man imu e.ground? and besides if
you file it there, you recognize that there is relationship
of LO and Lessee. Remember TENURIAL STATUS. Bisag
mamatay na na cya di ghapon na nimu mapahawa kay naa
may nag.sunod. So what LO would do is to file it under
the civil concept mao na nga nay rule 70. Forcible entry
and unlawful detainer. Of course it may not fall under
forcible entry, WHY? One year mana from the time of entry,
normally wa man ka diha. So imu buhaton ngadto ka sa
unlawful detainer and the allegation normally was that there
was TOLERANCE. You tolerate ang ila occupation with the
understanding nga hoy ug pahawaon gani moh, hawa
na. That is the civil law concept.
Jurisdiction is different, civil law concept you file to civil court,
agrarian ejectment you file ari sa agrarian Court /PARAD. So
when we mention here about court order we are referring to
the order coming from the agrarian court and the offense is
premised on the grounds under the law.
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(1)Right to self-organization;
For the purpose of this and the preceding Section, it shall be the duty
of the farm employer or manager to allow the farm workers, labor
leaders, organizers, advisers and helpers complete freedom to enter
and leave the farm, plantation or compound at the portion of the same
where said farm workers live or stay permanently or temporarily.
SECTION 42.Right to Minimum Wage. Notwithstanding any provision
of law or contract to the contrary, farm workers in farm enterprises
shall be entitled to at least P3.50 a day for eight hours'
work: Provided, That this wage may, however, be increased by the
Minimum Wage Board as provided for in Republic Act Numbered Six
hundred and two.
SECTION 43.Right to Eight Hours' Work. Notwithstanding the
provision of existing laws to the contrary, farm workers shall not be
required to work for more than eight hours daily. When the work is not
continuous, the time during which the farm worker is not working and
can leave his working place and can rest completely shall not be
counted.
Work may be performed beyond eight hours a day in case of actual or
impending emergencies caused by serious accidents, fire, flood,
typhoon, epidemic, or other disaster or calamity, or in case of urgent
work to be performed on farm machines, equipment or installations in
order to avoid a serious loss which the farm employer or manager
would otherwise suffer, or some other just cause of a similar nature,
but in all such cases the farm workers shall be entitled to receive
compensation for the overtime work performed at the same rate as
their regular wages, plus at least twenty-five per centum additional,
based on their daily wages.
No farm employer or manager shall compel a farm worker to work
during Sundays and legal holidays: Provided, however, That should the
farm worker agree to work on said days, he shall be paid an additional
sum of at least twenty-five per centum of his regular
compensation; Provided, further, That the farm employer or manager
shall not be held liable for any claim for overtime work which he had
not previously authorized, except if the work rendered was to avoid
damages to crops, produce, work animals or implements, buildings or
the like.
Any agreement or contract between the farm employer or manager
and the farm worker contrary to the provisions of this Section shall be
null and void.
SECTION 44.Right of Action for Damages. Notwithstanding the
provisions of existing laws to the contrary, Act Numbered Eighteen
hundred and seventy-four, as amended, entitled "An Act to extend and
regulate the responsibility of employers for personal injuries and death
suffered by their employees while at work", shall apply to farm
workers insofar as it may be applicable.
SECTION 45.Right to Compensation for Personal Injuries, Death, or
Illness. Notwithstanding the provisions of existing laws to the
contrary, Act Numbered Thirty-four hundred and twenty-eight, as
amended, entitled "An Act prescribing the compensation to be
received by employees for personal injuries, death or illness
contracted in the performance of their duties", shall apply to farm
workers insofar as it may be applicable.
SECTION 46.Right Against Suspension or Lay-Off. The landowner,
farm employer or farm manager shall not suspend, lay-off or dismiss
any farm worker without just cause from the time a farm workers'
organization or group of farm workers has presented to the landowner
a petition or complaint regarding any matter likely to cause a strike or
lockout and a copy thereof furnished with the Department of Labor, or
while an agricultural dispute is pending before the Court of Agrarian
Relations. If it is proved during the said period that a worker has been
suspended or dismissed without just cause, the Court may direct the
reinstatement and the payment of his wage during the time of his
suspension or dismissal, or of any sum he should have received had he
not been suspended or dismissed, without prejudice to any criminal
liability of the landowner, farm employer or farm manager as
prescribed by Section twenty-four of Commonwealth Act Numbered
One hundred and three, as amended. cdasia
SECTION 47.Other Applicable Provisions. All other existing laws
applicable to non-agricultural workers in private enterprises which are
not inconsistent with this Code shall likewise apply to farm workers,
farm labor organizations and agrarian disputes as defined in this Code,
as well as to relations between farm management and farm labor and
the functions of the Department of Labor and other agencies.
SECTION 48.Exceptions to Preceding Section. The preceding
Sections of this Chapter, except Sections forty, forty-one, forty-two
and forty-three shall not apply to farm enterprises comprising not
more than twelve hectares
SUPPLETORY EFFECT (nothing sa slides or sa records, but apil sa syllabus,
idk asa sa law dapit enlighten meeee) wala pud ang Reyes vs. Reyes
GR 140164 (read case nalang)
IMO: This law has suppletory effect on CARL based on the
grounds to dispossess/eject since wala man dawn na sa CARL
(believe at your own risk!!)
TENANTS
EMANCIPATION
(Pres. Decree no.27.) Marcos decree
BENEFICIARIES
DECREE
The tenant farmer- whether in land classified as landed estate (i.e., with
an area of 24 hectares or above) or not, shall be deemed owner (subject
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to certain requirements and conditions) of a portion constituting a family
size of five (5) hectares, if not irrigated and three (3)hectares, if irrigated.
Lands transferred to tenant-farmers under the Decree will revert to the
government and not to the landowners in case where the tenant
abandons his tillage or refuses to take advantage of his rights under the
laws.
Note that the Decree does not apply to lands owned by the
government or government-owned corporation.
DIFFERENCE:
Difference between PD 27 (Tenants Emancipation Decree) and RA
6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law)
Purpose
Land
Covered
Effect in
Impleme
nting
Land
Reform
Program
Number
of
hectares
that a
tenant or
farmer
can own
Ownershi
p of the
land that
can be
retained
PD 27
RA 6657
Abolish
leasehold
in
tenanted lands.
It made the tiller
of the land the
amortizing
owner
of
the
land he tills.
Main purpose is to
provide land for the
landless
through
acquiring
and
distribution of lands and
providing
support
facilities and system for
the
benefit
of
the
farmers.
Covers all public and
private
agricultural
lands including other
lands of public domain
suitable for agriculture
regardless of tenurial
arrangement
and
commodity produced.
Main governing law of
Agrarian Land Reform
here in the Philippines.
Private
lands
which
are
devoted to rice
and corn ONLY.
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present case, no such "willful failure" has been demonstrated. Quite the
contrary, respondent has continued to claim dominion over the land.
No Valid Reallocation
Furthermore, even if respondent did indeed abandon his right to possess
and cultivate the subject land, any transfer of the property may only be
made in favor of the government. In Corpuz v. Grospe,19 the Court held
that there was a valid transfer of the land after the farmer-grantee had
signed his concurrence to the Samahang Nayon Resolution surrendering
his possession of the landholding. This voluntary surrender to the
Samahang Nayon constituted a surrender or transfer to the government
itself.
In the present case, there was no valid transfer in favor of the
government. It was petitioner himself who requested the DAR to cancel
respondents CLT and to issue another one in his favor. 21 Unlike in the
above-cited case, respondents land was not turned over to the
government or to any entity authorized by the government to reallocate
the farmholdings of tenant-farmers who refuse to become beneficiaries
of PD 27. Petitioner cannot, by himself, take over a farmer-beneficiarys
landholding, allegedly on the ground that it was abandoned. The proper
procedure for reallocation must be followed to ensure that there was
indeed abandonment, and that the subsequent beneficiary is a qualified
farmer-tenant as provided by law.
to
promote
industrialization
Land Bank of the Phil. vs. Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz, G.R. No.
175175, September 29, 2008
Facts:
Case is regarding the valuation to the land of the respondents of which
the area was placed by the government under the coverage of the
operation land transfer program under PD 27.
The LBP, petitioners herein, valued the land in accordance with the
guidelines set forth under PD 27 and EO No. 228 and pegged the value of
the land amounting to P106,935.76 per hectare. Respondents rejected
petitioners valuation and insist on claiming that the said land is worth
between P150,00 to P200,000 per hectare.
The Cagayan Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) however
valued the land at P80,000 following the factors set under RA 6557
(CARL) and of which such value, as just compensation to the respondent,
was approve by the lower court (RTC) setting as Special Agrarian Court
(SAC).
Issue:
Whether or not PD 27 or RA 6557 is the applicable law in determining the
value of the land which was taken under PD 27 or before RA 6557 was
enacted.
Held:
The Court laid down in Paris v. Alfeche the applicability of P.D. No. 27 and
E.O. No. 228 in relation to R.A. No. 6657 in the matter of the payment of
just compensation. There the Court explained that while under P.D. No.
27 tenant farmers are already deemed owners of the land they till, they
are still required to pay the cost of the land before the title is transferred
to them and that pending the payment of just compensation, actual title
to the tenanted land remains with the landowner.
In Paris, the application of the process of agrarian reform was still
incomplete thus, the Court held therein that with the passage of R.A.
No. 6657 before its completion, the process should now be
completed under R.A. No. 6657, with P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No.
228 applying only suppletorily.
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based
on the guideline provided by PD No. 27 and EO 228 considering the
DARs failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable
length of time. That just compensation should be determined in
accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially
imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the
equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.
The land therefore should be valued under RA 6657 following the
guidelines set in DAR AO no. 5, series of 1998 and not under PD 27.
Land Bank v. Heirs of Cruz:
-The determination of just compensation should be based on
RA 6657 for lands covered under PD 27. PD 27 applies only
suppletorily.
Although this was not discussed in any of the case: ngano nindot man
ang under 6657 and not under PD 27? Just by analysis. There are more
factors under 6657. So the factors are more reasonable and just insofar
as the owner and the government is concerned.
One of the factors considered under just compensation is the tax
declaration.
DAR actually has a ratio for that admin order no. 9 in the succeeding
case: one animal is entitled to 1 hectare of land, 1 cattle. And then 1.7
something hectares thats good for 21 heads insofar as infrastructure is
concerned.
Those that will exceed or portions which will not be covered by this will
have to be covered under CARP, the purpose should be for the growth of
cattle industry but if the filing of the exclusion is in response to notice of
CARP coverage, DAR shall deny due course if the application is filed 60
days after date of receipt of notice. That means you have to be fast do
not wait for DAR to be able to send you a notice of CARP coverage.
Before DAR should serve that, you have to already apply for a petition for
exclusion. Only exclusion petitions fully supported shall be accepted.
On June 24, 1993, TCT No. T-12635 covering Lots 1454-A & 1296 was
cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines under RP T-16356. On February 7, 1994, petitioner through its
President, Salvador N. Lopez, Jr., executed a letter-affidavit addressed to
the respondent-Secretary requesting for the exclusion from CARP
coverage of Lots 1454-A and 1296 on the ground that they needed the
additional area for its livestock business. On March 28, 1995, petitioner
filed before the DAR Regional Director of Davao City an application for
the exemption from CARP coverage of Lots 1454-A and 1296 stating that
it has been operating grazing lands even prior to June 15, 1988 and that
the said two (2) lots form an integral part of its grazing land.
Now what is the implication of Luz farms case and the amendment made
by congress per RA 7881?
Supreme court and congress are saying that lands devoted to
live stock are not to be covered under CARP.
Issue:
Whether or not the lands are covered under CARL
Held:
In contrast, the Limot lands were found to be agricultural lands devoted
to coconut trees and rubber and are thus not subject to exemption from
CARP coverage.
In the Report dated 06 April 1994, the team that conducted the
inspection found that the entire Limot lands were devoted to coconuts
(41.5706 hectares) and rubber (8.000 hectares) and recommended the
denial of the application for exemption. 30 Verily, the Limot lands were
actually, directly and exclusively used for agricultural activities, a fact
that necessarily makes them subject to the CARP. These findings of the
inspection team were given credence by the DAR Regional Director who
denied the application, and were even subsequently affirmed by the DAR
Secretary and the Court of Appeals.
In the 07 February 1994 Letter-Affidavit addressed to the DAR Secretary,
SNLABC requested the exemption of the Limot lands on the ground that
the corporation needed the additional area for its livestock business. As
pointed out by the DAR Regional Director, this Letter-Affidavit is a clear
indication that the Limot lands were not directly, actually and exclusively
used for livestock raising. SNLABC casually dismisses the clear import of
their Letter-Affidavit as a "poor choice of words." Unfortunately, the
semantics of the declarations of SNLABC in its application for exemption
are corroborated by the other attendant factual circumstances and
indicate its treatment of the subject properties as non-livestock.
Verily, the MARO itself, in the Investigation Report cited by no less than
SNLABC, found that the livestock were only moved to the Limot lands
sporadically and were not permanently designated there. The DAR
Secretary even described SNLABC's use of the area as a "seasonal
extension of the applicant's 'grazing lands' during the summer."
Therefore, the Limot lands cannot be claimed to have been actually,
directly and exclusively used for SNLABC's livestock business, especially
since these were only intermittently and secondarily used as grazing
areas. The said lands are more suitable and are in fact actually,
directly and exclusively being used for agricultural purposes.
10
SIR: Upon the report of the MARO there was no livestock farming but in
the adjacent property there were 43 heads of cattle, in the area adjacent.
The area is not owned by the land owner of the subject property because
the land owner leased the area from another person.
The contention of the land owner: he did not use the subject property for
this 43 head of cattle because according to him there were occupants of
the said property who harmed the 43 head of cattle. Thats why he
allegedly transferred the cattle to the area adjacent and leased the
adjacent area from another person. That means in the subject property,
there is no livestock found. The subject property was not devoted to
livestock raising.
11
SC: The fact that you are leasing another ranch for raising of your own
livestock, that is fatal to your cause. Even if you have alleged that the
occupants of the subject property harmed its cattle, you did not submit a
police or a barangay report to amplify your argument and the supreme
court accorded respect to the inspection of MARO that the 43 cows while
owned by petitioner were actually pastured outside of the subject
property. So what is the implication if there was no devotion to the
subject property to live stock raising? The property is not excluded from
CARP coverage.
Agricultural Land (Section 3 c)
Sec. 3 (c) Agricultural land land devoted to agricultural
activity & not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land.
2 elements:
Devoted to agricultural activity
Not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial
Held:
Respondent DARs failure to observe due process in the acquisition of
petitioners landholdings does not ipso facto give this Court the power to
adjudicate over petitioners application for conversion of its haciendas
from agricultural to non-agricultural. The agency charged for conversion
is the DAR.
The petition is granted in part and the acquisition proceedings over the
three haciendas are nullified for respondent DARs failure to observe due
process therein. In and the applicable administrative procedure, the case
is hereby remanded to the respondent DAR for proper acquisition
proceedings and determination of petitioners application for conversion.
Take note: there is a cut-off date (June 15, 1988) in passing a zoning
ordinance (changing the classification from agricultural). Sec 4 of CARP
covers all private and public lands so you need to present proof that
there was classification
Natalia Realty v. DAR 1979 (Leading case)
Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land
located in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as
townsite areas to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis which
were designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The NATALIA
properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite
reservation. NATALIA properties later became the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision. Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of the
Antipolo Hills Subdivision which consisted of roughly 90.3307 hectares.
NATALIA immediately registered its objection to the Notice of Coverage
SC:
They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of the reservation.
Lands previously converted by government agencies, other than DAR, to
non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL were outside the
coverage of that law. Ruling not confined solely to agricultural lands
located within townsite reservations, but applied also to real estate
converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL.
NOTE:
DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990 and the case of Natalia
Realty, Inc opine that with respect to the conversion of agricultural land
covered by R.A. No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of the
DAR to approve such conversion may be exercised from the date of its
effectivity, on June 15, 1988. Thus, all lands that are already classified as
commercial, industrial or residential before June 15, 1988 no longer need
any conversion clearance.
However, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural uses
shall not operate to divest tenant-farmers of their rights over lands
covered by PD 27, which have been vested prior to June 15, 1988.
In order to implement the intent and purpose of the
provisions of the aforecited laws, the DAR has issued guidelines through
AO No. 4, Series of 2003.
(Please refer to the attached files together with this reviewer The
important provisions there are only the DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION,
APPROVING AUTHORITIES, EFFECT ON PRE-EXISTING CARP COVERAGE
and PROTESTS).
There was already a presidential proclamation reserving lands (for
squatters) in antipolo, san mateo and montalban as townsite areas, the
areas proclaimed as townsite reservation. (Relate this case with Alangilan
case below)
DAR AO No. 4 (Rules on exemption) - all lands already classified as
commercial, industrial or residential before June 15,1988 no longer need
conversion clearance
SC: As early as April 26, 1971, the Tala Estate (including the
disputed lots) was reserved under Presidential Proclamation
No. 843, for the housing program of the National Housing
Authority, the same has been categorized as not being
devoted to the agricultural activity contemplated by Section 3
(c) of R.A. No. 6657, and is, therefore, outside the coverage of
the CARL. Verily, the assailed Orders of the respondent Court
declaring the lots under controversy as "agricultural land" and
restraining the petitioner from involving the same in its
housing project thereon, are evidently bereft of any
sustainable basis
12
Presidential proclamation reserving the disputed lands for housing
programs by the state. Although nakalahi lang puro presidential
proclamation. Ang usa, local government unit.
Advincula-Velasquez vs. CA,et al., G.R. No. 111387, June 8,2004
The petitioners were the agricultural lessees of a Riceland located in
Paraaque Metro Manila.
In 1978, Sps. Nery and the Lorenzo sold the property to the Delta Motors
Corporation (DMC). Petitioner Velasquez, in his capacity as leaseholder
agricultural tenant, filed an action for the redemption of the said property
before the Court of Agrarian Relation. The CAR dismiss the petition for
lack on the part of the petitioner to redeem the property in its acquisition
price in the amount of 2,319,210 pesos but directing the defendant to
maintain the petitioner as agricultural lessee to the land in question.
Petitioner Velasquez and the defendants appealed the decision of the
CAR to the Intermediate Appellate Court who affirmed the decision of the
CAR. Petitioner Velasquez filed a petition for review to the Supreme Court
who issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the CARs decision
pending the out come of the petition.
In 1981, the land in question was reclassified as residential zone under
the ordinance issued by the city of Manila. Later, the land in question
was mortgage by the DMC to the PNB as a security for its obligation who
later foreclose it because of the failure of the DMC to pay its account. The
PNB in 1986 executed a deed of sale of the said land in favor of the
Remman Enterprise Inc. who decided to develop it in to a residential
subdivision.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court issue a decision on the petition for review
filed by the petitioner Velasquez affirming the decision of the IAC stating
that the case had become moot and academic with regards the claim of
the petitioner against the DMC considering that the property had been
foreclose by the PNB declaring however that the petitioner may redeem
the property from the PNB and its transferee. The record was remanded
to the PARAD or the Provincial Agrarian Adjudication for the petitioner to
exercise there right of redemption but since the case had become moot
and academic, the PARAD denied the action of the petitioner to recover
the property against the DMC since the land in question is now a
residential land. The right of the petitioner as an agricultural lessee was
terminated and the property was now in the possession of the Remman
Enterprise, Inc. The petitioner filed a motion before the DARAB or the
Department of Agrarian Adjudication Board who reverses the decision of
the PARAD stating that the land in question is an agricultural land and
uphold the right of the petitioner as an agricultural lessee to recover the
said land .The Remman Enterprise filed an appeal before the CA who
reverses the decision of the DARAB because the land in question was
already reclassified as residential land as early as 1981 converting it
from agricultural land in to non-agricultural land. The petitioner filed a
motion to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the land was an agricultural land or a
residential land.
Held:
According to the Supreme Court, agricultural land was defined under RA.
6657 as those land devoted to agricultural activities and not classified as
forest, minerals, residential and industrial land.
The records show that as early as 1981, the landholding was reclassified
as a low density zone under Metro Manila Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01,
Series of 1981 before Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect on June 15, 1998. It
has been considered as early as that time for residential purposes thus
not within the ambit of CAR.
13
respondents' landholdings were situated in Barangay Bibincalan * within
the Poblacion area of the Municipality of Sorsogon; and
e.Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, stating that a
parcel of land was considered non-agricultural, and, therefore, beyond
the coverage of the CARP, if it had been classified as residential,
commercial, or industrial in the City or Municipality Land Use Plan or
Zoning Ordinance approved by HLURB before the effectivity of R.A. No.
6657 on June 15, 1988.
1.
2.
Issue:
Whether or not the land is covered under RA 6657
Held:
In ruling that the respondents' landholdings were not devoted to cattle
raising, the DAR relied on DAR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 9, series
of 1993, which required that properties should be considered excluded
from the coverage of the CARL only if it was established that as of June
15, 1988, the date of effectivity of the law, there existed the minimum
ratio of one head of cattle to one hectare of land, and one head of cattle
to 1.7815 hectares of infrastructure.
According to the DAR, only 15 heads of cattle were found within
hectares sought to be excluded based on the semestral
conducted in Sorsogon by the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics
period from 1988 to 1992, which was in contravention of DAO
series of 1993.
the 58
survey
in the
No. 9,
The CA found, however, that heads of cattle were really being raised in
the landholdings of the respondents. This finding was not disputed by the
DAR. In view of the finding of the CA, we cannot now hold differently, for
we are bound by the finding of fact of the CA. Verily, the insufficiency of
the number of heads of cattle found during the semestral survey did not
automatically mean that the landholdings were not devoted to the
raising of livestock. We concur with the CA that there could be several
reasons to explain why the number of cattle was below the ratio
prescribed under DAO No. 9 at the time of the survey, including
pestilence, cattle rustling, or sale of the cattle.
Resolution No. 5, passed on March 12, 1981 by the Sangguniang Bayan
of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, showed that the limits of the poblacion area of
the municipality included Barangay Bibincahan, where the respondents'
landholdings were situated.
There is no dispute that as early as 1981, the respondents' landholdings
have been part of the poblacion of Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Consistent with
Hilario and Natalia, holding that the respondents' landholdings were nonagricultural, and, consequently, outside the coverage of the CARL, was
fully warranted. In fact, the excerpt from the Comprehensive
Development Plan of Sorsogon, Sorsogon showed that Barangay
Bibincahan was within the Central Business District of the municipality.
Actually involving same fact and ruling in so far as classification is
concerned but this one gives us a principle that DAR has to establish that
the land holdings were agricultural. It is incumbent upon DAR to
establish.
Alangilan v. Office of President
The reasoning there that the term reserve does not change
the nature of the land from agri to none agri, SC was talking
about nature of the land, agricultural to non agricultural. But
the question is: isnt it a fact that there are (2) elements for
agri land: devoted to agri activity and not classified as mineral,
forest, etc. This issue answers the first element not the second
element.
Second the law uses the word classified. If we are to abide
by the ruling of the court, is the court saying that before a
zoning ordinance is passed there is already actual use of the
land by the people residing in the city or conducting business?
Not necessarily, because a city or an LGU can have a
projection. It can project. (It can say na oi kini na yuta bare pa.
wala pa gigamit we want to use this land as industrial para mo
daghan ang mga factory we will project.) So we will pass an
ordinance classifying this as industrial even in the absence of
actual use. It can be classified already. But the SC was referring
to the nature of the land from agri to non agri. For me you can
still make a classification even if the intended land used is not
yet to be.
Did that case (Alangilan) overturn the other (Natalia)? No. There was no
issue. What Alangilan should have done is to raise that issue in Natalia
and other cases (because it is not only in Natalia) that the word reserved
was used.
Heirs of Deleste vs Leviste
Facts:
The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria Tabuclin (Hilaria)
were the owners of a parcel of agricultural land located in Tambo, Iligan
City, consisting of 34.7 hectares (subject property). Said spouses were
childless, but Gregorio had a son named Virgilio Nanaman (Virgilio) by
another woman. Virgilio had been raised by the couple since he was two
years old. Gregorio also had two daughters, Esperanza and Caridad, by
still another woman. 3
When Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria and Virgilio administered the subject
property. 4 On February 16, 1954, Hilaria and Virgilio sold the subject
property to Dr. Jose Deleste (Deleste) for PhP16,000. 5 The deed of sale
was notarized on February 17, 1954 and registered on March 2, 1954.
Also, the tax declaration in the name of Virgilio was canceled and a new
tax declaration was issued in the name of Deleste. The arrears in the
payment of taxes from 1952 had been updated by Deleste and from then
on, he paid the taxes on the property. 6
On May 15, 1954, Hilaria died. 7 Gregorio's brother, Juan Nanaman, was
appointed as special administrator of the estate of the deceased
spouses. Subsequently, Edilberto Noel (Noel) was appointed as the
regular administrator of the joint estate.
On April 30, 1963, Noel, as the administrator of the intestate estate of
the deceased spouses, filed before the Court of First Instance, Branch II,
Lanao del Norte an action against Deleste for the reversion of title over
the subject property, docketed as Civil Case No. 698. 9 Said case went up
to this Court in Noel v. CA, where We rendered a Decision 10 on January
11, 1995, affirming the ruling of the CA that the subject property was the
conjugal property of the late spouses Gregorio and Hilaria and that the
latter could only sell her one-half (1/2) share of the subject property to
Deleste. As a result, Deleste, who died in 1992, and the intestate estate
of Gregorio were held to be the co-owners of the subject property, each
with a one-half (1/2) interest in it. 11
Notably, while Civil Case No. 698 was still pending before the CFI,
particularly on October 21, 1972, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was
issued. This law mandates that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought
under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program and awarded to farmerbeneficiaries. Thus, the subject property was placed under the said
program. 12 However, only the heirs of Gregorio were identified by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as the landowners. Concomitantly,
the notices and processes relative to the coverage were sent to these
heirs. 13
In 1975, the City of Iligan passed City Ordinance No. 1313, known as the
"Zoning Regulation of Iligan City," reclassifying the subject property as
commercial/residential. 14
Eventually, on February 12, 1984, DAR issued Certificates of Land
Transfer (CLTs) in favor of private respondents who were tenants and
actual cultivators of the subject property. 15 The CLTs were registered on
July 15, 1986.
In 1991, the subject property was surveyed. 17 The survey of a portion of
the land consisting of 20.2611 hectares, designated as Lot No. 1407, was
approved on January 8, 1999. 18 The claim folder for Lot No. 1407 was
submitted to the LBP which issued a Memorandum of Valuation and a
Certificate of Cash Deposit on May 21, 2001 and September 12, 2001,
respectively. Thereafter, Emancipation Patents (EPs) and Original
Certificates of Title (OCTs) were issued on August 1, 2001 and October 1,
14
2001, respectively, in favor of private respondents over their respective
portions of Lot No. 1407.
On February 28, 2002, the heirs of Deleste, petitioners herein, filed with
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a
petition seeking to nullify private respondents' EPs. 21 This was docketed
as Reg. Case No. X-471-LN-2002.
On July 21, 2003, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)
rendered a Decision 22 declaring that the EPs were null and void in view
of the pending issues of ownership, the subsequent reclassification of the
subject property into a residential/commercial land, and the violation of
petitioners' constitutional right to due process of law.
Subsequently, the DARAB, in DARAB Case No. 12486, reversed the ruling
of the PARAD in its Decision 25 dated March 15, 2004. It held, among
others, that the EPs were valid as it was the heirs of Deleste who should
have informed the DAR of the pendency of Civil Case No. 698 at the time
the subject property was placed under the coverage of the OLT Program
considering that DAR was not a party to the said case. Further, it stated
that the record is bereft of any evidence that the city ordinance has been
approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), as
mandated by DAR Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 1990, and held
that whether the subject property is indeed exempt from the OLT
Program is an administrative determination, the jurisdiction of which lies
exclusively with the DAR Secretary or the latter's authorized
representative. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied by the DARAB in its Resolution 26 dated July 8, 2004.
Held:
We agree with petitioners that the subject property, particularly Lot No.
1407, is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program in view of
the enactment by the City of Iligan of its local zoning ordinance, City
Ordinance No. 1313.
You have the zoning ordinance (1982) and you have an approval HLURB
on 1983.
Likewise, it is not controverted that City Ordinance No. 1313, which was
enacted by the City of Iligan in 1975, reclassified the subject property
into a commercial/residential area.
Then came the amendatory issuance, Proclamation 1637 dated April 18,
1977, thereby increasing the size of the reservation, designated as
"Lungsod Silangan Townsite" (LS Townsite), by 20.312 hectares and
revising its technical description so as to include, within its coverage,
other lands in the municipalities of San Mateo and Montalban, Rizal to
absorb "the population overspill in Greater Manila Area," but again
"subject to private rights, if any there be,"
Issue:
Whether the land is covered under agrarian reform
15
Whether or not CA erred in gave retroactive effect or application to
Proclamation Nos. 1283 & 1637 resulting in the negation of "full land
ownership to qualified farmer-beneficiaries covered by P.D. No. 27
Held:
Several basic premises should be made clear at the outset. Immediately
prior to the promulgation of PD 27 in October 1972, the 1,645-hectare
Doronilla property, or a large portion of it, was indisputably agricultural,
some parts devoted to rice and/or corn production tilled by Doronilla's
tenants. Doronilla, in fact, provided concerned government agencies with
a list of seventy-nine (79) 30 names he considered bona fide "planters"
of his land. These planters, who may reasonably be considered tenantfarmers, had purposely, so it seems, organized themselves into
Samahang Nayon(s) so that the DAR could start processing their
applications under the PD 27 OLT program. CLTs were eventually
generated covering 73 hectares, with about 75 CLTs actually distributed
to the tenant-beneficiaries. However, upon the issuance of Proclamation
1637, "all activities related to the OLT were stopped."
To restate a basic postulate, the provisions of RA 6657 apply only to
agricultural lands under which category the Doronilla property, during
the period material, no longer falls, having been effectively classified as
residential by force of Proclamation 1637. It ceased, following Natalia
Realty, Inc., to be agricultural land upon approval of its inclusion in the LS
Townsite Reservation pursuant to the said reclassifying presidential
issuance. In this regard, the Court cites with approval the following
excerpts from the appealed CA decision:
The above [Natalia Realty, Inc.] ruling was reiterated in National Housing
Authority vs. Allarde where the Supreme Court held that lands reserved
for, converted to, non-agricultural uses by government agencies other
than the [DAR], prior to the effectivity of [RA] 6657 . . . are not
considered and treated as agricultural lands and therefore, outside the
ambit of said law. The High Court declared that since the Tala Estate as
early as April 26, 1971 was reserved, inter alia, under Presidential
Proclamation No. 843, for the housing program of the [NHA], the same
has been categorized as not being devoted to agricultural activity
contemplated by Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 6657, and therefore outside the
coverage of CARL.
GONZALO PUYAT & SONS, INC.vs RUBEN ALCAIDE
Facts:
Petitioner Gonzalo Puyat and Sons, Inc. is the registered owner of 14
parcels of land.
n April 14, 1998, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) issued a
Notice of Coverage over the subject landholding informing petitioner that
the subject properties were being considered for distribution under the
government's agrarian reform program. 4 Thereafter, on November 15,
1998, the corresponding Notice of Valuation and Acquisition 5 was issued
informing petitioner that a 37.7353-hectare portion of its property is
subject to immediate acquisition and distribution to qualified agrarian
reform beneficiaries and that the government is offering P7,071,988.80
as compensation for the said property.
Petitioner then filed a Petition 6 before the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), wherein it argued that the properties were bought from
their previous owners in good faith; that the same remains uncultivated,
unoccupied, and untenanted up to the present; and, that the subject
landholdings were classified as industrial, thus, exempt from the
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Petitioner prayed, among other things, that the Notice of Coverage and
Notice of Acquisition be lifted and that the properties be declared exempt
from the coverage of CARP.
Respondents 8 on their part countered, among other things, that the
classification of the land as industrial did not exempt it from the
coverage of the CARP considering that it was made only in 1997; the
HLURB 9 certification that the Municipality of Bian, Laguna does not
have any approved plan/zoning ordinance to date; that they are not
among those farmer-beneficiaries who executed the waivers or voluntary
surrender; and, that the subject landholdings were planted with palay.
On June 8, 2001, then DAR Secretary Hernani A. Braganza, issued an
Order 11 in favor of the respondent declaring that the subject properties
are agricultural land.
Issue:
Whether or not the land is exempted.
Held:
As aptly found by the Office of the President, the importance of
conducting an ocular inspection cannot be understated, since it is one of
the steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative
due process. The Office of the President stressed this in its Decision, to
wit:
In other words, before the MARO sends a Notice of Coverage to the
landowner concerned, he must first conduct a preliminary ocular
inspection to determine whether or not the property may be covered
under CARP. The foregoing undertaking is reiterated in the latest DAR AO
No. 01, s. of 2003, entitled "2003 Rules Governing Issuance of Notice of
Coverage and Acquisition of Agricultural Lands Under RA 6657." Section
1 [1.1] thereof provides that:
"1.1Commencement by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)
After determining that a landholding is coverable under the CARP, and
upon accomplishment of the Pre-Ocular Inspection Report, the MARO
shall prepare the NOC (CARP Form No. 5-1)." (NOC stands for Notice of
Coverage)
Found on the records of this case is a ready-made form Preliminary
Ocular Inspection Report (undated) signed by the concerned MARO.
Interestingly, however, the check box allotted for the all-important items
"Land Condition/Suitability to Agriculture" and "Land Use" was not filled
up. There is no separate report on the record detailing the result of the
ocular inspection conducted. These circumstances cast serious doubts on
whether the MARO actually conducted an on-site ocular inspection of the
subject land. Without an ocular inspection, there is no factual basis for
the MARO to declare that the subject land is devoted to or suitable for
agricultural purposes, more so, issue Notice of Coverage and Notice of
Acquisition.
The importance of conducting an ocular inspection cannot be
understated. In the event that a piece of land sought to be placed from
CARP coverage is later found unsuitable for agricultural purposes, the
landowner concerned is entitled to, and the DAR is duty bound to issue, a
certificate of exemption pursuant to DAR Memorandum Circular No. 34, s.
of 1997, entitled "Issuance of Certificate of Exemption for Lands Subject
of Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) and Compulsory Acquisition (CA) Found
Unsuitable for Agricultural Purposes."
More importantly, the need to conduct ocular inspection to determine
initially whether or not the property may be covered under the CARP is
one of the steps designed to comply with the requirements of
administrative due process. The CARP was not intended to take away
property without due process of law (Development Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA 245. [1996]). The exercise of
the power of eminent domain requires that due process be observed in
the taking of private property. In Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
321 SCRA 106 [1999], the Supreme Court nullified the CARP acquisition
proceedings because of the DAR's failure to comply with administrative
due process of sending Notice of Coverage and Notice of Acquisition of
the landowner concerned.
Considering the claim of appellant that the subject land is not agricultural
because it is unoccupied and uncultivated, and no agricultural activity is
being undertaken thereon, there is a need for the DAR to ascertain
whether or not the same may be placed under CARP coverage. 47**
AcICHD
Thus, the question of whether or not petitioner's properties could be
covered by the CARP has not yet been resolved. Until such
determination, it follows that petitioner's landholdings cannot be the
proper subject of acquisition and eventual distribution to qualified
farmer-beneficiaries. However, these involve factual controversies, which
are clearly beyond the ambit of this Court. Verily, the review of factual
matters is not the province of this Court. The Supreme Court is not a trier
of facts, and is not the proper forum for the ventilation and
substantiation of factual issues.
Puyat and sons vs. Alcaide is about ocular inspection. Its about the first
element, whether it is devoted to agricultural purposes.
You have a preliminary ocular inspection report form signed by the MARO
but the checkbox for this one land condition suitability to agriculture,
land use was not filled. So according to the SC it is not clear whether
there was an ocular inspection, so it was remanded to DAR for the
conduct of ocular inspection. Why important? Because you cannot find if
the land is suitable or unsuitable for agricultural purposes in the absence
of an ocular inspection.
AGRARIAN DISPUTE [Section 3(d)]
tenancy relationship
Different sections where the words agrarian dispute is used: Sec 47,
53, 54
BARC Barangay agrarian reform committee
16
If you are familiar with katarungang pambarangay, before you can file a
case generally you need to secure certificate to file action. Generally
under DAR you need to secure a certification from BARC before you can
file a case before DAR. Of course there are exceptions
ESSENTIAL REQUISITIES: PSC-PPS
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
All requisites must concur, absence of one does not make one
a tenant.
SIR: When you read the cases involving agrarian dispute take note that
parties are related to consent because I think they are inseparable.
Another issue is this subject matter is agri land.
Isidro v. CA
Private resp is owner of land. Sister of private respondent
allowed Isidro to occupy swampy portion subject to condition
to vacate upon demand. Failure to vacate, unlawful detainer
was filed against Isidro. RTC dismissed bec land is agricultural
and so agrarian.
SC:
SUPLICO v. CA
Sps. Zerna were charged with qualified theft for the taking of
coconuts owned by petitioner. They were acquitted but
required Zerna to return P1,100 to Monsanto on the ground
that Monsanto did not consent to harvest of coconut. Who is
entitled to P1,100 proceeds of copra sale. This falls under
DARAB
17
Court found that there was no tenancy relationship between the parties.
There was no proof that Malabanan and the Bejasas shared the harvests.
Candelaria never gave her consent to the Bejasas stay on the land .
There was no proof that the Dinglasans gave authority to the Bejasas to
be the tenant of the land in question. Not all the elements of tenancy
were met in this case. There was no proof of sharing in harvest. While
Bejasa testified, SC said only Bejasas word was presented to prove this.
Besides testimony was suspicious because of inconsistency Bejasa
testified that he agreed to deliver 1/5 of harvest as owners share, yet at
one time, he also mentioned that 25% was for Malabanan and 50% for
owner. Moreover, landowners never gave consent, citing Chico vs. CA ,
284 534 self serving statement are inadequate, proof must be
adhered. Even assuming
that landowner agreed to lease it for
P20,000per year, such agreement did not prove tenancy . Consideration
should be harvest sharing.
Candelaria is the owner, malabanan is the lessee. It was malabanan who
hired Bejasa. Very obvious, no consent from the owner. There was no
proof that malabanan and Bejasa shared the harvest. Candelaria never
gave consent to Bejasa. There was no consent, and so there was no
tenancy relationship. The point is, if there are occupants in the property
claiming to be tenants, the land is agricultural, they are cultivating, they
allege sharing of the harvest, but the owner proves there was no
consent, then the occupants cannot claim tenancy relationship. The
tenants can be ejected. How do you prove sharing? There has to be a
receipt, or any other similar evidence. Is it possible? No because the
receipt can be used against the owner. Normally, in the absence of
receipt, the evidence of the tenant can be an affidavit because the
proceedings before is submission of position paper. You attach affidavits.
Can you submit your own affidavit if you are a tenant? Yes, but the court
will normally say that it is self-serving. You have to prove through
independent evidence affidavits of neighbours or other tenants.
VALENCIA v. CA
FACTS:
Valencia is the owner of land, she leased the property for five
(5)years to Fr. Andres Flores under a civil law lease concept;
lease with prohibition against subleasing or encumbering the
land without Valencias written consent. During the period of
his lease, private respondents were instituted to cultivate
without consent of Valencia. After lease, Valencia demanded
vacate but refused; Private respondents were later awarded
with CLTs after they filed application with DAR; CLTs were
upheld by Exec Sec and CA.
Valencia is the owner, Flores is the lessee, it was flores who allowed the
private respondents. No tenancy, again no consent. Tenancy relationship
cannot be presumed. The lessee did not have the authority to sublease
because there was a prohibition to sublease.
ALMUETE v. ANDRES (Issue on Ownership)
Facts:
Almuete was in exclusive possession of subject land. Unknown
to Almuete, Andres was awarded homestead patent due to
investigation report that Almuete was unknown and waived his
rights; Andres also represented that Almuete sold the property
to Masiglat for radiophone set and that Masiglat sold to him for
a carabao and P600. Almuete filed an action for recovery of
possession and reconveyance before trial court. Issue is who
between 2 awardees of lot has better right to property.
SC:
This is controversy relating to ownership of farmland so, beyond the
ambit of agrarian dispute. No juridical tie of landowner and tenant
was alleged between petitioners and respondent. RTC was
competent to try the case.
The issue is whether there is an agrarian dispute. No. The issue was
about ownership so it is beyond the ambit of agrarian dispute. There was
no juridical tie.
PASONG BAYABAS v. CA : no evidence
Development of land: converted from agricultural to residential
as approved by DAR. Petitioners, claimed they are actual tillers
of land, they filed a complaint for damages alleging
surreptitious conversion; priv resp denied cultivation & waiver
of rights was executed by some.
SC : no tenancy
HEIRS OF JUGALBOT V. CA
FACTS:
Jugalbot was issued EP; EP was challenged by Heirs of priv resp
before DARAB and seek cancellation of title and recovery possession; on
appeal, DARAB upheld but CA reversed.
SC:
Absence of tenancy relationship. The taking of property violated
due process (CA was correct in pointing out that Virginia A. Roa was
denied due process because the DAR failed to send notice of the
impending land reform coverage to the proper party); no ocular
inspection or any on-site fact-finding investigation and report to verify
the truth of the allegations of Nicolas Jugalbot that he was a tenant of the
property. By analogy, Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals applies to the
case at bar since there was likewise a violation of due process. No
concrete evidence of cultivation; No proof was presented except for their
self-serving statements. Independent evidence, aside from self-serving
statements, is needed. Plus CA findings- Jugalbot was soldier of US Army
and migrated to US and returned only in 1998, wife and daughter were
residents of California. Land involved is residential and not agricultural
because of zoning ordinance. Coverage Section 4: All alienable and
disposable public lands. All private lands devoted to or suitable to
agriculture Schedule of implementation Sec. 5 The distribution xxx
shall be implemented immediately and completed within ten years from
effectivity hereof. Sec. 63: The initial amount needed to implement this
Act for the period of ten years upon approval hereof shall be funded from
the Agrarian Reform Fund created under Sections 20 and 21 of Executive
Order No. 299. xxx.. RA 8542: amended Sec. 63 as follows: The amount
needed to implement this Act until 2008 shall be funded from the
Agrarian Reform Fund. RA 9700, Sec. 21:
The amount needed to further implement the CARP as
provided in this Act, until June 30, 2014, upon expiration of funding under
Republic Act No. 8532 and other pertinent laws, shall be funded from the
Agrarian Reform Fund and other funding sources in the amount of at
least One hundred fifty billion pesos (P150,000,000,000.00)
Normally it is the tenant who will file a case because when the landowner
sends a demand letter to the occupant to vacate, the occupant or the
tenant would normally file an action before DAR.
This one is different, Jugalbot was granted a title emancipation patent.
He was granted a title because of his claim that he is a tenant. The title
was challenged by the heirs of the landowner, so the heirs filed and
sought the cancellation of the title of jugalbot and wanting recovery of
possession. The issue: is jugalbot really a tenant and therefore entitled to
the emancipation patent? There was no proof of cultivation and per
findings of CA, jugalbot was a soldier of the US army, he migrated to the
US and returned only in 1998. Kanus-a gi-issue ang title? It was in 1997,
so he was not here in pinas. His wife and daughter were residents of
California plus the land was residential. Meaning there was no tenancy
relationship between jugalbot and the landowner, so the title was
cancelled.
NICORP case (found it in the later part go go)
SPOUSES JESUS FAJARDO and EMER FAJARDO, vs. ANITA R.
FLORES
Facts:
Leopoldo delos Reyes owned a parcel of land located in Barangay
Sumandig in Hacienda Buenavista, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. In 1963, he
allowed petitioner Jesus Fajardo to cultivate said land. The net harvests
were divided equally between the two until 1975 when the relationship
was converted to leasehold tenancy. Per Order 2 from the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), Regional Office, Region III, San Fernando,
Pampanga, rent was provisionally fixed at 27.42 cavans per year, which
Jesus Fajardo religiously complied with. From the time petitioner
cultivated the land, he was allowed by Leopoldo delos Reyes to erect a
house for his family on the stony part of the land, which is the subject of
controversy.
On January 26, 1988, Leopoldo delos Reyes died. His daughter and sole
heir, herein respondent Anita Flores, inherited the property. On June 28,
1991, Anita Flores and Jesus Fajardo executed an agreement,
denominated as "KASUNDUAN NG PAGHAHATI NG LUPA AT PAGTATALAGA
NG DAAN UKOL SA MAGKABILANG PANIG." 3 This was followed by
another agreement, "KASUNDUAN SA HATIAN SA LUPA," executed on July
10, 1991, wherein the parties agreed to deduct from Lot No. 2351 an
area of 10,923 sq m, allotting the same to petitioner. Apparently, there
was a conflict of claims in the interpretation of the Kasunduan between
Anita Flores and Jesus Fajardo, which was referred to the DAR, Provincial
Agrarian Reform Office, Baliuag, Bulacan. 4 In the Report and
Recommendation dated May 3, 2000, the Legal Officer advised the
parties to ventilate their claims and counterclaims with the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Malolos, Bulacan.
On December 22, 2000, a complaint for ejectment was filed by herein
respondent Anita Flores, assisted by her husband Bienvenido Flores,
against petitioners with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), San Ildefonso,
Bulacan. In the complaint, she alleged that, as the sole heir of the late
Leopoldo delos Reyes, she inherited a parcel of land consisting of stony
land, not devoted to agriculture, and land suitable and devoted to
18
agriculture located in Barangay Sumandig, San Ildefonso, Bulacan; that,
sometime in the 1960s, during the lifetime of Leopoldo delos Reyes,
Jesus Fajardo requested the former to allow him to work and cultivate
that portion of land devoted to agriculture; that Jesus Fajardo was then
allowed to erect a house on the stony part of the land, and that the use
and occupation of the stony part of the land was by mere tolerance only;
and that the land, which was divided equally between the two parties,
excluded the stony portion. In February 1999, respondent approached
petitioners and verbally informed them of her intention to repossess the
stony portion, but petitioners refused to heed the request.
Issue:
Whether or not MTC or the DARAB which has jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise,
over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to
compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers,
tenants, and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. It relates to any controversy
relating to, inter alia, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture.
Undeniably, the instant case involves a controversy regarding tenurial
arrangements. The contention that the Kasunduans, which allegedly
terminated the tenancy relationship between the parties and, therefore,
removed the case from the ambit of R.A. No. 6657, is untenable. There
still exists an agrarian dispute because the controversy involves the
home lot of petitioners, an incident arising from the landlord-tenant
relationship.
"Indeed, section 21 of the Republic Act No. 1199, provides that 'all cases
involving the dispossession of a tenant by the landlord or by a third party
and/or the settlement and disposition of disputes arising from the
relationship of landlord and tenant . . . shall be under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.' This jurisdiction
does not require the continuance of the relationship of landlord and
tenant at the time of the dispute. The same may have arisen, and
often times arises, precisely from the previous termination of such
relationship. If the same existed immediately, or shortly, before the
controversy and the subject-matter thereof is whether or not said
relationship has been lawfully terminated, or if the dispute springs or
originates from the relationship of landlord and tenant, the litigation is
(then) cognizable by the Court of Agrarian Relations . . ."
In the case at bar, petitioners' claim that the tenancy relationship has
been terminated by the Kasulatan is of no moment. As long as the
subject matter of the dispute is the legality of the termination of the
relationship, or if the dispute originates from such relationship, the case
is cognizable by the DAR, through the DARAB. The severance of the
tenurial arrangement will not render the action beyond the ambit of an
agrarian dispute.
This one will disturb landowners. If you are a landowner and you dont
want the court to pass upon your relationship assuming you recognize
that person occupying as a tenant, landowners may want to pay money
to their tenants and let them work, or possible, what happened is this,
the tenant was given a portion of the land. There was an agreement
here, the tenant was given a portion of the land. Nasayop ang abogado,
y man? It was not clear which portion of the land was given that is why
there was a conflict of claims in the interpretation. The landowner is
saying that the tenants house is erected on the owners lot while the
tenant is saying it is on the land that was given to him. The court said
there is agrarian dispute. As long as the subject matter is the legality of
the termination, if the dispute originates from such relationship that is
tenancy relationship. Example, you have a waiver executed by a tenant
saying that out of financial grant of the landowner or from person A, he
no longer has a right over the land and he has waived it etc. If the tenant
will question it and say that he was not fully apprised of his right with
respect to that and probably was not able to read. It has something to
do with that relationship, then the landowner will have a problem. If the
dispute originates from such relationship, it is a tenancy relationship.
VICENTE ADRIANO vs. ALICE TANCO
Facts:
On December 18, 1975, respondent Alice Tanco (Alice) purchased a
parcel of land consisting of 28.4692 hectares located in Norzagaray,
Bulacan. The land was devoted to mango plantation. Later on, it was
partitioned among the respondents.
Controversy arose when Alice sent to Vicente a letter 6 dated January 16,
1995 informing him that subject landholding is not covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). She asked him to
vacate the property as soon as possible.
Seeing the letter of Alice as a threat to his peaceful possession of subject
farmland which might impair his security of tenure as a tenant, Vicente
filed before the regional office of DARAB in Region III a Complaint for
Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. He averred that in
1970, Arsenio Tanco (Arsenio), the husband of Alice, instituted him as
tenant-caretaker of the entire mango plantation. Since then, he has been
performing all phases of farm works, such as clearing, pruning,
smudging, and spraying of the mango trees. The fruits were then divided
equally between them. He also alleged that he was allowed to improve
and establish his home at the old building left by Ang Tibay Shoes
19
Issue:
Whether or not there was a tenancy relation between Pastor Samson and
Macario Susano and in binding herein petitioner.
Held:
We find in favor of petitioners. Applying our pronouncement in Levardo v.
Yatco, 51 we rule that the subject land cannot be subject to the OLT
program of P.D. No. 27 for two reasons: first, the subject land is less than
seven hectares; and second, respondents failed to show that Pastor
owned other agricultural lands in excess of seven hectares or urban land
from which he derived adequate income, as required by Letter of
Instruction (LOI) No. 474. 52
Moreover, the DAR Memorandum on the "Interim Guidelines on Retention
by Small Landowners" dated July 10, 1975 is explicit:
5.Tenanted rice and/or corn lands seven (7) hectares or less shall not be
covered by Operation Land Transfer. The relation of the land owner and
tenant-farmers in these areas shall be leasehold . . . 53
However, while the disputed landholding which had an original aggregate
area of only 1.0138 hectares is not covered by the OLT program, the
same may still be covered by P.D. No. 27, albeit under its Operation Land
Leasehold (OLL) program. The OLL program placed landowners and
tenants of agricultural land devoted to rice and corn into a leasehold
relationship as of October 21, 1972. 54 But the fact that Macario,
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, was a de jure tenant must be
established.
In the case at bar, while the RARAD, DARAB and the CA are unanimous in
their conclusion that an implied tenancy relationship existed between
Pastor Samson and Macario Susano, no specific evidence was cited to
support such conclusion other than their observation that Pastor failed to
protest Macario's possession and cultivation over the subject land for
more than 30 years. Contrary to what is required by law, however, no
independent and concrete evidence were adduced by respondents to
prove that there was indeed consent and sharing of harvests between
Pastor and Macario.
It has been repeatedly held that occupancy and cultivation of an
agricultural land will not ipso facto make one a de jure tenant.
Independent and concrete evidence is necessary to prove personal
cultivation, sharing of harvest, or consent of the landowner. Substantial
evidence necessary to establish the fact of sharing cannot be satisfied by
a mere scintilla of evidence; there must be concrete evidence on record
adequate to prove the element of sharing. To prove sharing of harvests, a
receipt or any other credible evidence must be presented, because selfserving statements are inadequate. Tenancy relationship cannot be
presumed; the elements for its existence are explicit in law and cannot
be done away with by conjectures. Leasehold relationship is not brought
about by the mere congruence of facts but, being a legal relationship,
the mutual will of the parties to that relationship should be primordial.
For implied tenancy to arise it is necessary that all the essential
requisites of tenancy must be present.
The affidavits executed by three of respondents' neighbors are
insufficient to establish a finding of tenancy relationship between Pastor
and Macario.
Principle: affidavits of the tenant or persons claiming to be a tenant are
self-serving.
This case deals with affidavits executed by the neighbors of the
occupants. SC considered the affidavits as insufficient because of lack of
details.
Lesson: you can use affidavits of neighbors for as long as it has the
specific details which are:
how the agreement was implemented
how much was given
when and where the payments were made
whether they have a witness when the landowner is receiving
the share.
JUAN GALOPE vs. CRESENCIA BUGARIN
Facts:
Respondent owns a parcel of land. Petitioner farms the land.
In Barangay Case No. 99-6, respondent complained that she lent the land
to petitioner in 1992 without an agreement, that what she receives in
return from petitioner is insignificant, and that she wants to recover the
land to farm it on her own. Petitioner countered that respondent cannot
recover the land yet for he had been farming it for a long time and that
he pays rent ranging from P4,000 to P6,000 or 15 cavans of palay per
harvest. The case was not settled. 5
Represented by Celso Rabang, respondent filed a petition for recovery of
possession, ejectment and payment of rentals before the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), docketed as DARAB Case
No. 9378. Rabang claimed that respondent lent the land to petitioner in
1991 and that the latter gave nothing in return as a sign of gratitude or
monetary consideration for the use of the land. Rabang also claimed that
petitioner mortgaged the land to Jose Allingag who allegedly possesses
the land.
Provincial Adjudicator dismissed the petition and ruled that petitioner is a
tenant entitled to security of tenure. The Adjudicator said substantial
evidence prove the tenancy relationship between petitioner and
respondent. The Adjudicator noted the certification of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) that petitioner is the registered farmer of the
land; that Barangay Tanods said that petitioner is the tenant of the land;
that Jose Allingag affirmed petitioner's possession and cultivation of the
land; that Allingag also stated that petitioner hired him only as farm
helper; and that respondent's own witness, Cesar Andres, said that
petitioner is a farmer of the land.
The DARAB found no tenancy relationship between the parties and
stressed that the elements of consent and sharing are not present. The
DARAB noted petitioner's failure to prove his payment of rentals by
appropriate receipts, and said that the affidavits of Allingag, Rolando
Alejo and Angelito dela Cruz are self-serving and are not concrete proof
to rebut the allegation of nonpayment of rentals. The DARAB added that
respondent's intention to lend her land to petitioner cannot be taken as
implied tenancy for such lending was without consideration.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a tenancy relationship
Held:
The matter of rental receipts is not an issue given respondent's
admission that she receives rentals from petitioner. To recall,
respondent's complaint in Barangay Case No. 99-6 was that the rental or
the amount she receives from petitioner is not much. 14 This fact is
evident on the record 15 of said case which is signed by respondent and
was even attached as Annex "D" of her DARAB petition. Consequently,
we are thus unable to agree with DARAB's ruling that the affidavits 16 of
witnesses that petitioner pays 15 cavans of palay or the equivalent
thereof in pesos as rent are not concrete proof to rebut the allegation of
nonpayment of rentals. Indeed, respondent's admission confirms their
statement that rentals are in fact being paid. Such admission belies the
claim of respondent's representative, Celso Rabang, that petitioner paid
nothing for the use of the land.
Respondent's act of allowing the petitioner to cultivate her land and
receiving rentals therefor indubitably show her consent to an unwritten
tenancy agreement. An agricultural leasehold relation is not determined
by the explicit provisions of a written contract alone. Section 5 18 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, recognizes that an agricultural leasehold relation may exist
upon an oral agreement.
Thus, all the elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are present.
Respondent is the landowner; petitioner is her tenant. The subject matter
of their relationship is agricultural land, a farm land. 19 They mutually
agreed to the cultivation of the land by petitioner and share in the
harvest. The purpose of their relationship is clearly to bring about
agricultural production. After the harvest, petitioner pays rental
consisting of palay or its equivalent in cash. Respondent's motion 20 to
supervise harvesting and threshing, processes in palay farming, further
confirms the purpose of their agreement. Lastly, petitioner's personal
cultivation of the land 21 is conceded by respondent who likewise never
denied the fact that they share in the harvest.
One of a kind case!!! (LO was very honest)
Landowner filed a complaint at the barangay because she would want
the occupant to vacate the property. Reason: gigamyan sa renta the
rent was insignificant, she wants to recover the land to farm it on her
own so that she can gain more profits.
SC used her own admission that she received rentals from the petitioner.
This is a confirmation that indeed rentals were paid and that this is an
agrarian dispute.
SUTTON VS. LIM
FACTS: On December 7, 1993, private respondents applied for the
issuance of a CLOA over a parcel of land before the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary. Upon the recommendation of the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), the application was granted
and they were issued CLOA. Subsequently, on January 31, 1994, the
Register of Deeds of Masbate issued the corresponding OCT.
On November 23, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for the cancellation of
the said CLOA and title before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), assailing the validity of the said issuances
on the ground that the subject parcel of land is a private land devoted to
cattle raising which she inherited from her deceased father, Samuel
Sutton, who, in turn, previously bought the subject parcel of land from
Romanito P. Lim and his wife. Petitioner also claimed to have been denied
due process for not receiving any notice of private respondents'
application proceedings for CLOA. The petition was amended to include
the MARO, PARO and the Register of Deeds of Masbate as additional
respondents.
Private respondents averred that, being the actual occupants and
qualified beneficiaries of the subject lot which formed part of the
alienable and disposable portion of the public domain, the DAR Secretary
correctly issued the CLOA in their favor. While admitting having sold a lot
in favor of Samuel Sutton from whom petitioner purportedly inherited the
subject parcel of land, they asserted that the lot sold was different from
Lot No. 1493. Moreover, they interposed the defense of prescription since
the petition for cancellation was filed after the subject title became
indefeasible.
On the other hand, the MARO and PARO, in their Answer with Motion to
Dismiss, invoked the presumption of regularity in the performance of
their official functions in issuing the CLOA. They also clarified that the
subject parcel of land has been classified as Government Owned Land
(GOL) or Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK) areas pursuant to
Presidential Proclamation No. 2282, hence, subject to the Comprehensive
20
Agrarian Reform Program's immediate coverage (CARP coverage).
Moreover, petitioner was not able to prove that she is the registered
owner of the subject parcel of land and that it is exempt from the CARP
coverage.
21
Petitioner never alleged that he had any agreement with the
landowner of the subject property. Indeed Ladano's Complaint did not
assert any right that arises from agrarian laws. He asserted his rights
based on his prior physical possession of the two-hectare property and
on his cultivation of the same in good faith. The issues that he wanted
resolved are who between himself and the respondents have a better
right to possess the property, and whether he has a right to be
compensated for the improvements he introduced on the property.
Clearly, the nature of the case he filed is one for forcible entry 72 and
for indemnification, 73neither of which is cognizable by the DARAB,
but by the regular courts. While neither of the parties challenged the
jurisdiction of the DARAB, the Court can consider the issue of
jurisdiction motu proprio.
Still a question about evidence.
In Isidro, the pronouncement of the SC that even if the land was agri,
that does not automatically become an agrarian dispute.
In the same manner, even if the person is occupying and cultivating,
that does not ipso facto make that person a tenant. 6 requisites must
be satisfied. Even if there is harvest or cultivation, but there is no
consent, there is no agrarian dispute.
Chapter II (Coverage)
Recap on difference between PD 27 and CARL:
PD 27: rice and corn
CARL: everything is covered subject to certain exceptions (prawn
farming, fishpond, livestock, etc., under sec. 10) but generally all land,
public and private lands.
Common denominator: devoted to or suitable to agriculture
Why is there such an element?
These lands are supposed to be acquired by the government
to be given to farmer beneficiaries. Purpose: they will improve,
(to cultivate the land and for the land to be developed)
Actual cases: LO will allege that lands are suitable for ECOTOURISM so
that it will not be suitable for agriculture.
Proof needed to show ecotourism suitability: certification from
department of agriculture.
(there was an issue on Roxas application for exemption) but SC said that
this issue has to be determined by DAR, not us.
Dissenting opinion of Ynares Santiago in Roxas and Company: There was
a certification from DA certifying that the land is not suitable for
agriculture. So why should we refer this to DAR when there is already a
certificate?
HOMESTEAD GRANTEES (Sec.6) Very important
THIRD ASPECT
22
area. Tenant will not acquire any parcel of land but
he continues to be a tenant on the retained area
and to be governed by Chapter 3 of the law.
2 CASES UNDER HOMESTEAD:
Alita vs. CA, 170 SCRA 706
Facts:
Two parcels of land in Tungawan, Zamboanga del Norte were
acquired by private respondents predecessors-in-interest through
homestead patent under the provisions C.A. No. 141.
Private respondents/owners Enrique Reyes, et al. herein are
desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners/tenants
Gabino Alita refuse to vacate, relying n the provisions of PD 27 and PD
316 and appurtenant regulations issued by the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform.
Held:
whatsoever in its coverage. Nowhere therein does it appear that the lots
obtained by homestead patents are exempt from it operation.
Petitioners claimed entitlement to retain 7 hectares is also
untenable. PD 27, which provides the retention limit, states:
In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more than 7
hectares if such landowner is cultivating such area or will now cultivate
it.
Clearly, the right to retain an area of 7 hectares is not
absolute. It is premised on the condition that the landowner is cultivating
the area sought to be retained or will actually cultivate it upon effectivity
of the law.
In the case at bar, neither of the conditions for retention is
present. As admitted by petitioner herself, the subject parcels are fully
tenanted; thus, she is clearly not cultivating them, nor will she personally
cultivate any part thereof. Undoubtedly, therefore, she has no right to
retain any portion of her landholdings.
Even under the current primary law on agrarian reform,
Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, to which the application of PD 27 is
suppletory, petitioner's lands are subject to land reform. The said Act lays
down the rights of homestead grantees under Sec. 6 thereof.
Indisputably, homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can
own and retain the original homesteads, only for "as long as they
continue to cultivate" them. That parcels of land are covered by
homestead patents will not automatically exempt them from the
operation of land reform. It is the fact of continued cultivation by the
original grantees or their direct compulsory heirs that shall exempt their
lands from land reform coverage.
Neither petitioner nor her heirs are personally cultivating the
subject homesteads. The DAR and the CA found that respondents were
the ones who had been cultivating their respective portions of the
disputed properties.
However, petitioner can retain five (5) hectares in accordance
with Section 6 of RA 6657, which requires no qualifying condition for the
landowner to be entitled to retain such area.
Petitioner's heirs, however, are not entitled to awards of three
(3) hectares each, since they are not actually tilling the parcels or
directly managing the farm.
PARIS v. ALFECHE (2001)
23
-
(b)
(c)
Even if the farmer beneficiary is given the CLOA, he still has to pay the
government 30 annual amortizations with interest. (that is how long the
farmer pays the government for the just compensation)
DAEZ v. CA
Issuance of EPs/CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar
landowner from retaining the area. In fact, EP or CLOA may be cancelled
if land covered in later found to be part of landowners retained area. In
this case, CLTs of private respondent were leased w/o according Daez her
right of choice. So DAR was ordered to fully accord Daez her rights under
Sec.6 of RA 6657.
Where to file
reserves,
grounds,
Filipino citizen;
3.2
3.3
Actual tillers or one directly managing the farm as of June 15,
1988 up to the time of the conduct of field investigation of the
landholding under CARP. Direct management shall refer to the
cultivation of the land through personal supervision under the system of
labor administration. It shall be interpreted along the lines of farm
management (this one is more difficult) as an actual major activity
being performed by the landowner's child from which he/she derives
his/her primary source of income.
SECTION 4. Rights and Obligations. The children-awardees shall have
the following rights and obligations:
4.1
All children-awardees shall exercise diligence in the use,
cultivation and maintenance of the land including the improvements
thereon. Unauthorized sale of the land, or negligence or misuse of the
land and support extended to children-awardees, and other violations
under existing guidelines shall be grounds for the forfeiture of their right
as such;
4.2
Lands awarded to qualified children of landowners may not be
sold, transferred or conveyed except through hereditary succession or to
the government, or to the LBP, or to other qualified beneficiaries for a
period of ten (10) years; Provided, however, that the children or the
spouse of the transferor shall have a right to repurchase the land from
the government or the LBP within a period of two (2) years from the date
of transfer; and
4.3
The children-awardees may avail of any support services being
provided by the government in agrarian reform areas.
Exemptions from coverage (Section 10)
Sec. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions from coverage of CARL
(a) Lands ADE used for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish
sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves (exempt);
(b) private lands ADE used for prawn farms and fishponds (exempt)
(c) lands ADE used and found to be necessary for national defense,
school sites and campuses including experimental farm stations, seeds
and seedlings research, church sites and convents, mosque sites,
communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and farms and
all lands with 18% slope and over (exempt)
CENTRAL MINDANAO v. DARAB
24
-
are now located in the area. Thus, praying for the exemption of the said
parcels of land for the compulsory acquisition under CARP.
Held:
The disputed land is classified as PARK and subsequent
studies and survey showed that the parcel of land in question forms a
vital part of a watershed. Article 10 of RA 6657 expressly states that
Lands actually, directly and exclusively used for parks, wildlife, forest
reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds,
watersheds and mangroves shall be exempt from the coverage of this
Act.
Another factor that needs to be mentioned is the fact that
during the DARAB hearing, petitioner presented proof that the Casile
property has slopes of 18% and over, which exempted the land from the
coverage of CARL. R. A. No. 6657, Section 10, provides:
"Section 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. xxx..and all lands with
eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already developed
shall be exempt from coverage of this Act."
Hence, during the hearing at DARAB, there was proof showing that the
disputed parcels of land may be excluded from the compulsory
acquisition coverage of CARP because of its very high slopes.
NICORP MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.
LEONIDA DE LEON
Facts:
On August 26, 2004, respondent filed a complaint before the Office of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Region IV-Province of
Cavite, praying that petitioners Salvador R. Lim and/or NICORP
Management and Development Corporation (NICORP) be ordered to
respect her tenancy rights over a parcel of land located in Barangay
Mambog III, Bacoor, Cavite, registered under TCT No. T-72669 in the
name of Leoncia De Leon and Susana De Leon Loppacher (De Leon
sisters), who were likewise impleaded as parties-defendants in the suit.
Respondent alleged that she was the actual tiller and cultivator of the
land since time immemorial with full knowledge and consent of the
owners, who were her sisters-in-law; that sometime in 2004, petitioners
circulated rumors that they have purchased the property from the De
Leon sisters; that petitioners ignored respondent's requests to show proof
of their alleged ownership; that on August 12, 2004, petitioners entered
the land and uprooted and destroyed the rice planted on the land and
graded portions of the land with the use of heavy equipment; that the
incident was reported to the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO)
which issued a Cease and Desist Order 5 but to no avail.
Respondent thus prayed that petitioners be ordered to respect her
tenancy rights over the land; restore the land to its original condition and
not to convert the same to non-agricultural use; that any act of
disposition of the land to any other person be declared null and void
because as a tenant, she allegedly had a right of pre-emption or
redemption over the land.
Petitioner Lim denied that respondent was a tenant of the subject
property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). He
alleged that respondent is a septuagenarian who is no longer physically
capable of tilling the land; that the MARO issued a certification 7 that the
land had no registered tenant; that respondent could not be regarded as
a landless tiller under the CARP because she owns and resides in the
property adjacent to the subject land which she acquired through
inheritance; that an Affidavit of Non-Tenancy 8 was executed by the De
Leon sisters when they sold the property to him. DTIaCS
Moreover, Lim claimed that respondent and her family surreptitiously
entered the subject land and planted a few crops to pass themselves off
as cultivators thereof; that respondent tried to negotiate with petitioner
Lim for the sale of the land to her, as the latter was interested in entering
into a joint venture with another residential developer, which shows that
respondent has sufficient resources and cannot be a beneficiary under
the CARP; that the land is no longer classified as agricultural and could
not thus be covered by the CARP. Per certification issued by the Office of
the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of Bacoor, Cavite,
the land is classified as residential pursuant to a Comprehensive Land
Use Plan approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Issue:
Whether or not the land is exempted.
Held:
In the instant case, there is no substantial evidence to support the
appellate court's conclusion that respondent is a bona fide tenant on the
subject property. Respondent failed to prove the third and sixth elements
cited above. It was not shown that the De Leon sisters consented to a
tenancy relationship with respondent who was their sister-in-law; or that
the De Leon sisters received any share in the harvests of the land from
respondent or that the latter delivered a proportionate share of the
harvest to the landowners pursuant to a tenancy relationship.
The affidavits did not mention at all that the De Leon sisters received a
portion of the harvests or that respondent delivered the same to her
sisters-in-law. The affidavits failed to disclose the circumstances or
details of the alleged harvest sharing; it merely stated that the affiants
have known respondent to be the cultivator of the land since time
immemorial. It cannot therefore be deemed as evidence of harvest
sharing.
That respondent was allowed to cultivate the property without
opposition, does not mean that the De Leon sisters impliedly recognized
the existence of a leasehold relation with respondent. Occupancy and
continued possession of the land will not ipso facto make one a de jure
tenant.
Finally, the sale of the subject land to petitioners did not violate Sections
65 33 and 73 34 (c) of R.A. No. 6657. There was no illegal conversion of
the land because Sec. 65 applies only to lands which were covered by
the CARP, i.e., those lands beyond the five-hectare retention limit
allowed to landowners under the law, which were distributed to farmers-
25
beneficiaries. In the instant case, it was not shown that the subject land
was covered by the CARP. Neither was it shown that the sale was made
to circumvent the application of R.A. 6657 or aimed at dispossessing
tenants of the land that they till
The evidence that was mentioned by the SC was a letter. In this letter, it
was found that there was no tenancy relationship, because of the use of
the word kasama. The word kasama would be taken in varying context,
not necessarily in relation to agricultural leasehold agreement. It was not
also clear the word kasama referred to the tenant.
(Sec. 11) : COMMERCIAL FARMS
Commercial farms private agricultural lands devoted to saltbeds, fruit
farms, orchards, vegetable and cut-flower farms and cacao, coffee and
rubber plantations. They are subject to compulsory acquisition and
distribution after 10 years from effectivity.
SIR: I think Del Monte falls under this classification. Im not sure.
LUZ FARMS
To be approved by DAR
Direct payment scheme: if they can agree na ang property will
have to be transferred to the farmer beneficiary and the
farmer beneficiaries will be paying the landowner for the land.
To be approved by DAR
Petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been
exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It
has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.
The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid,
administrative rules and regulations must be issued by authority of a law
and must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution. The rulemaking power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge
the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be
used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the
scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with
respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by
administrative agencies and the scope of their regulations In the case at
bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it
contravenes the
Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including
them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum
retention limit for their ownership.
However the deliberations of the
1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia,
all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The
Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultryraising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of
agriculture or agricultural activity. The raising of livestock, swine and
poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an
agricultural, activity.
DAR v. SUTTON :
Land devoted to cow & calf breeding. Lands under VOS before
CARP. After CARP & Luz Farms case, Sutton filed withdrawal of VOS. DAR
issued A.O #9 (1993) which provide that only portions of land used for
raising of livestock, poultry & swine shall be excluded. DAR partially
exempted portion but ordered acquisition the rest.
SC: AO is invalid as it contravene Constitution since livestock ,
swine/poultry raising do not fall under agriculture & agricultural
activity
DAR Adm. Order No. 7-2008
Policy Guidelines:
1. Private agricultural lands or portions therof actually, directly or
exclusively used for livestock purposes other than agricultural like cattle
raising as of june 15, 1988 and continuously and exclusively utilized or
devoted for such purpose up until the time of inventory shall be excluded
from CARP coverage.
2. Conversely, landholdings or any portions thereof not actually, directly
and exclusively used for livestock raising are subject to CARP coverage if
one or more of the following conditions apply:
2.1 if there is agricultural activity in the area, i.e cultivation of the soil,
planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, including the harvesting of such
products, and other farm activities and practices, whether done by a
natural or juridical person and regardless of the final use or destination of
such agricultural products
2.2 the land is suitable for agriculture and it is presently occupied and
tilled by farmer/s.
5. in case of any of the conditions under items 2.1 and 2.2 are evident,
the PARO shall immediately proceed with the issuance of NOTICE of
COVERAGE on the subject landholding or portions thereof
8. any act of the landowner to change or convert his agricultural land for
livestock raising shall not affect the coverage of his landholdings under
CARP. Any diversification or change in the agricultural use of the
landholdings, or shift from crop production to livestock raising shall be
subject to the existing guidelines on land use conversion.
Adm. Order #7 (2008)
(Guidelines per Sutton Case (livestock raising)
26
Luisita headed by GMA was also as a defense? (dili
maklaro seri) against Aquino
Take note: VOS, there is a cut-off date under RA 9700. (Right now you
cannot avail of this)
Without any notice from DAR, the landowner proposes to the
government.
VLT is not anymore an option under the present law (RA 9700)
VLT is an option by the landowner that after receiving the
notice of acquisition from DAR, the landowner offers.
Under RA 9700, what will remain is COMPULSORY ACQUISITION.
Note: That is consistent with the thrust of the government, that by 2014,
everything should have been offered compulsorily, without waiting
whether the landowner will offer or not.
Under Sec 12, DAR is mandated to determine and fix the lease rentals.
And this is shown in Admin Order No. 02-06.
DAR Adm. Order No. 2-06
RA 6389 automatically converted share tenancy throughout the country
into agricultural leasehold relationship
1. abolition of share tenancy now covers all agricultural landholdings
without exceptions
2. the conversion of share tenancy into leasehold is mandated by law.
3. All share-crop tenants were automatically converted into agricultural
lessees as of june 15, 1988 whether or not a leasehold agreement has
been executed
4. Leaseholders security of tenure shall be respected and guaranteed.
IV.
GOVERNING POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES
Pursuant to Section 12 of R.A. No. 6657, and in order to fully implement
the provisions of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, on agricultural leasehold,
the following policies and principles are hereby issued:
1.
Agricultural leasehold shall be based on a tenancy
relationship. The following are essential elements of agricultural
tenancy:
1.1.
1.2.
land;
1.3.
There is consent freely given either orally or in
writing, express or implied;
1.4.
The purpose of the relationship is agricultural
production;
1.5.
1.6.
There is consideration given to the lessor either in
a form of share of the harvest or payment of fixed amount
in money or produce to or both.
2.
Agricultural leasehold relation shall not be extinguished
by mere expiration of the term of period in a leasehold contract
nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of
the land. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or
transfers the legal possession of the landholding, purchaser or
transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and
substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor as
provided for under Sec. 10, R.A. 3844, as amended.
xxx
4.
The consideration for the lease shall not be more than the
equivalent of 25% of the average normal harvest (ANH) during
the three (3) agricultural years immediately preceding the date
the lease was established. If the land has been cultivated for less
than 3 years, the initial consideration shall be based on the
average normal harvest of the preceding year/s when the land
was actually cultivated.
27
Sec. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of
the President shall, except as otherwise provided for
by special laws, become final after the lapse of
fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof by
the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration
thereof is filed within such period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one
party shall be allowed and entertained, save in
exceptionally meritorious cases. (Emphasis ours).
It is further provided for in Section 9 that "The Rules of Court
shall apply in a suppletory character whenever practicable.
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23, 1997
declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one
has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office
had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision.
Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more
authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the
assailed "Win-Win" Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18
and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only
one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the
Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for
reconsideration was permitted to be filed in "exceptionally meritorious
cases," as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still
the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the
first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby
allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the
act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially
modifying its March 29, 1996 Decision which had already become final
and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept
that accord finality to administrative determinations.
Fortich vs. Corona : intervenors claimed that they are farmworkers &
so intervened in case.
SC: There is no ruling yet from DAR whether intervenors are
beneficiaries, so they have no standing yet to intervene in the case.
DAR safeguards the list of ARB & provide IDs as proof of being
bonafide beneficiaries
LAND ACQUISITION
SEC. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands.- For purposes of
acquisition of private lands, the following procedures shall be followed:
(a) After having identified the land, the landowners and the
beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire the land to the
owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post the
same in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall
of the place where the property is located. Said notice shall contain the
offer of the DAR to pay a corresponding value in accordance with the
valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other pertinent provisions
hereof.
But it was not clear in the law about how identification is determined
this was filled up by DAR through an Admin Order.
- talks about notice to acquire: In the case of CONFED vs. DAR, SC talks
about two notices
1. Notice of coverage: More or less Preliminary: WHY?
- because while it notifies that the property shall be placed
under CARP, the landowner is entitled to retention.
- notifies the landowner about the public hearing about the
results of field investigation, land evaluation and other
pertinent matters
- the landowner will be informed that the field investigation of
his landholding shall be conducted. After that comes the
notice of acquisition.
2. Notice of acquisition:
- the area subject of compulsory acquisition has to be stated.
WHY? It is based already on the field investigation
- plus the amount of just compensation offered by DAR
How is the notice to be done? Personal delivery, registered mail and
posting
Note in the case of CONFED: Notice shall contain the offer of DAR
- OFFER: offer of the government to the landowner as to how much the
government will pay the landowner corresponding to the land to be
acquired.
- Discuss this in relation to par. (e): It is the deposit that is the key to the
immediate possession and issuance of a title
(b) Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written notice by
personal delivery or registered mail, the landowner, his administrator or
representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the
offer.
(c) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall pay the
landowner the purchase price of the land within thirty (30) days after he
executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the Government and
surrenders the Certificate of Title and other muniments of title.
If landowner accepts no problem
If landowner rejects or fails to reply summary admin proceedings
Take NOTE: the purpose of this is compensation. With respect to just
compensation, RTC has jurisdiction.
Reiterate: there are only 2 instances where RTC has jurisdiction insofar as
CARP is concerned:
1.
just compensation
2.
criminal offenses
then why is it that the law in par. (d) talks about determination of just
compensation? It was determined by the SC in CONFED, that this
determination is only PRELIMINARY. Meaning that the landowner (as also
shown in par. (f)) can still resort to court IF he disagrees with the decision
referred in par. (d).
- So they bring the matter to court of proper jurisdiction for
the FINAL determination of just compensation.
(d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct
summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation of
the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties
to summit evidence as to the just compensation for the land, within
fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the
above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR
shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for
decision.
Notice in par. (e), par (d) would give you 30 days to respond. You have to
inform DAR whether you accept or reject it.
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or in
case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit
with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in
cash or LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take
immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register
of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the
redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
How do we know the amount to be deposited? Should it be based on par.
(d) after summary admin proceedings or par. (a) that is contained in the
notice to acquire? CONFED CASE
Why was this added? Because Sec. 16 doesnt only talk about
acquisition, it also involves distribution of lands.
28
copy (owners duplicate copy) to the buyer, so that the buyer can go to
RD, and be issued a new title in favor of the purchaser. But here it is
different.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Under par. (e), Registry of Deeds can cancel the title of the LO
on the basis of the deposit, certification from land bank which
will be annotated to the title and RD will issue a new title in
favor of the Republic of the Philippines.
The title is cancelled even without the surrender of the owners
copy
RDs copy of the LOs title is cancelled even if the owners copy
is subsisting
(f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the
court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
Sec. 16 outlines the procedure for acquisition of private land
determination. For example, the allegation that the DAR is subjecting the
sugar lands to the coverage of RA 6657 without first ascertaining
whether there are regular farmworkers therein and whether they are
interested to own, directly or collectively, the land they till, allegedly
requires factual determination. Considering that the Court is not a trier of
facts, the Land Bank argues that these matters are better threshed out in
a trial court.
HELD:
DAR's compulsory acquisition procedure is based on Section 16 of RA
6657. It does not, in any way, preclude judicial determination of just
compensation
Contrary to the petitioners' submission that the compulsory acquisition
procedure adopted by the DAR is without legal basis, it is actually based
on Section 16 of RA 6657. Under the said law, there are two modes of
acquisition of private agricultural lands: compulsory and voluntary. The
procedure for compulsory acquisition is that prescribed under Section 16
of RA 6657. TCDcSE
In Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 41 the Court painstakingly
outlined the procedure for compulsory acquisition, including the
administrative orders issued by the DAR in relation thereto, in this
manner:
In the compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the
landowners and the farmer beneficiaries must first be identified. After
identification, the DAR shall send a Notice of Acquisition to the
landowner, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in a
conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the
place where the property is located. Within thirty days from receipt of the
Notice of Acquisition, the landowner, his administrator or representative
shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer. If the
landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor
of the government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty
days from the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the landowner
rejects the DAR's offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts
summary administrative proceedings to determine just compensation for
the land. The landowner, the LBP representative and other interested
parties may submit evidence on just compensation within fifteen days
from notice. Within thirty days from submission, the DAR shall decide the
case and inform the owner of its decision and the amount of just
compensation. Upon receipt by the owner of the corresponding payment,
or, in case of rejection or lack of response from the latter, the DAR shall
deposit the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible
bank. The DAR shall immediately take possession of the land and cause
the issuance of a transfer certificate of title in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines. The land shall then be redistributed to the farmer
beneficiaries. Any party may question the decision of the DAR in the
regular courts for final determination of just compensation.
The DAR has made compulsory acquisition the priority mode of land
acquisition to hasten the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP). Under Section 16 of the CARL, the first step in
compulsory acquisition is the identification of the land, the landowners
and the beneficiaries. However, the law is silent on how the identification
process must be made. To fill in this gap, the DAR issued on July 26, 1989
Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989, which set the operating
procedure in the identification of such lands. The procedure is as follows:
"II.OPERATING PROCEDURE
A.The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, with the assistance of the
pertinent Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), shall: EDATSI
1.Update the master list of all agricultural lands covered under the CARP
in his area of responsibility. The master list shall include such information
as required under the attached CARP Master List Form which shall include
the name of the landowner, landholding area, TCT/OCT number, and tax
declaration number.
2.Prepare a Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title
(OCT/TCT) or landholding covered under Phase I and II of the CARP
except those for which the landowners have already filed applications to
avail of other modes of land acquisition. A case folder shall contain the
following duly accomplished forms:
a)CARP CA Form 1 MARO Investigation Report
b)CARP CA Form 2 Summary Investigation Report of Findings and
Evaluation
c)CARP CA Form 3 Applicant's Information Sheet
d)CARP CA Form 4 Beneficiaries Undertaking
e)CARP CA Form 5 Transmittal Report to the PARO
The MARO/BARC shall certify that all information contained in the abovementioned forms have been examined and verified by him and that the
same are true and correct. IEHTaA
3.Send a Notice of Coverage and a letter of invitation to a
conference/meeting to the landowner covered by the Compulsory Case
Acquisition Folder. Invitations to the said conference/meeting shall also
be sent to
the prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the BARC
representative(s), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) representative
and other interested parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the
property. He shall discuss the MARO/BARC investigation report and solicit
the views, objection, agreements or suggestions of the participants
thereon. The landowner shall also be asked to indicate his retention area.
The minutes of the meeting shall be signed by all participants in the
conference and shall form an integral part of the CACF.
29
4.Submit all completed case folders to the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer (PARO).
B.The PARO shall:
1.Ensure that the individual case folders are forwarded to him by his
MAROs.
2.Immediately upon receipt of a case folder, compute the valuation of
the land in accordance with A.O. No. 6, Series of 1988. The valuation
worksheet and the related CACF valuation forms shall be duly certified
correct by the PARO and all the personnel who participated in the
accomplishment of these forms. TCASIH
3.In all cases, the PARO may validate the report of the MARO through
ocular inspection and verification of the property. This ocular inspection
and verification shall be mandatory when the computed value exceeds
500,000 per estate.
1.Within three days from receipt of the case folder from the PARO,
review, evaluate and determine the final land valuation of the property
covered by the case folder. A summary review and evaluation report shall
be prepared and duly certified by the BLAD Director and the personnel
directly participating in the review and final valuation.
2.Prepare, for the signature of the Secretary or her duly authorized
representative, a Notice of Acquisition (CARP CA Form 8) for the subject
property. Serve the Notice to the landowner personally or through
registered mail within three days from its approval. The Notice shall
include, among others, the area subject of compulsory acquisition, and
the amount of just compensation offered by DAR.
Petitioner LBP filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision but
the same was denied on September 4, 2002.
Petitioner LBP filed a petition against private respondent for judicial
determination of just compensation before the Special Agrarian Court,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum City, docketed as DAR Case No. 782002, which is the subject of this petition.
Private respondent, on the other hand, filed a similar petition against
DAR before the same Special Agrarian Court docketed as DAR Case No.
79-2002, to which petitioner LBP filed its answer and moved for the
dismissal of the petition for being filed out of time.
3.Should the landowner accept the DAR's offered value, the BLAD shall
prepare and submit to the Secretary for approval the Order of
Acquisition. However, in case of rejection or non-reply, the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB) shall conduct a summary administrative
hearing to determine just compensation, in accordance with the
procedures provided under Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1989.
Immediately upon receipt of the DARAB's decision on just compensation,
the BLAD shall prepare and submit to the Secretary for approval the
required Order of Acquisition.
CONFED
vs. DAR
Compulsory Acquisition
Notice of Acquisition
First step: identification of the land, the landowners and the
beneficiaries.
Law is silent
Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989
Valid implementation , two notices
DAR A.O. No.12, Series of 1989, amended in 1990 by DAR A.O.
No.9, Series of 1990 and in 1993 by DAR A.O No.1, Series of
1993
LBP vs Trinidad
Facts:
30
deposit in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) the landowner is sent a notice of
valuation to which he should reply within a specified time, and in subparagraph (c) when the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR/LBP as
compensation for his land. Sub-paragraph (d) provides for the
consequence of the landowner's rejection of the initial valuation of his
land, that is, the conduct of a summary administrative proceeding for a
preliminary determination by the DARAB through the PARAD or RARAD,
during which the LBP, landowner and other interested parties are
required to submit evidence to aid the DARAB/RARAD/PARAD in the
valuation of the subject land. Sub-paragraph (e), on the other hand,
states the precondition for the State's taking of possession of the
landowner's property and the cancellation of the landowner's title, thus
paving the way for the eventual redistribution of the land to qualified
beneficiaries: payment of the compensation (if the landowner already
accepts the offer of the DAR/LBP) or deposit of the provisional
compensation (if the landowner rejects or fails to respond to the offer of
the DAR/LBP). Indeed, the CARP Law conditions the transfer of
possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by
the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit of the
compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank.
Question was on the correct amount of provisional compensation which
LBP was required to deposit.
-is it the amount stated in par. (a) which is supposed to be contained in
the notice of acquisition?
- or is it the amount based on par. (d) after the conduct of summary
proceedings?
- there is a difference there in actual practice
LBP: says that it is our offer under par. (a) which is P1M only.
Respondent: it is the amount after the summary admin proceeding to be
undertaken by PARAD, RARAD and DARAB which is P10M.
SC: subpar. (e) should be related to subpar (a), (b), and (c) considering
that the taking of possession by the state is the next step after DAR, and
LBP supplied with the notice requirements.
In effect the SC is saying: it is the offer of the LBP that will determine
that that is the correct amount to be deposited not the amount after the
determination of just compensation in a summary administrative
proceeding
reasoning: if the DAR will wait for the summary admin
proceedings this will hamper land redistribution process
Note that: par (a) precedes over par. (d) on the determination of the
correct amount to be deposited.
Reiterated in the case of Pagayatan.
LBP vs Pagayatan
Facts:
On October 21, 1972, the 3,682.0286-hectare Suntay Estate, consisting
of irrigated/unirrigated rice and corn lands covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-31(1326) located in the Barangays of Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo,
Sta. Lucia, and San Nicolas in Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, was
subjected to the operation of Presidential Decree No. 27, under its
Operation Land Transfer (OLT), with the farmer-beneficiaries declared as
owners of the property. However, a 300-hectare portion of the land was
subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
instead of the OLT. Thus, Certificates of Landownership Award were
issued to the farmer-beneficiaries in possession of the land. 5 Such
application of the CARP to the 300-hectare land was later the subject of a
case before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board
(DARAB), which ruled that the subject land should have been the subject
of OLT instead of CARP. The landowner admitted before the PARAD that
said case was pending with this Court and docketed as G.R. No. 108920,
entitled Federico Suntay v. Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, the owner of the land remained unpaid for the property. Thus,
Josefina S. Lubrica, in her capacity as assignee of the owner of the
property, Federico Suntay, filed a Petition for Summary Determination of
Just Compensation with the PARAD, docketed as Case No. DCN-04050022-2002. Thereafter, the PARAD issued its Decision dated March 21,
2003, the dispositive portion of which reads: ECSHID
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1.Fixing the preliminary just compensation for 431.1407 hectare property
at P166,150.00 per hectare or a total of P71,634,027.30.
2.Directing the Land Bank of the Philippines to immediately pay the
aforestated amount to the Petitioner.
3.Directing the DAR to immediately comply with all applicable
requirements so that the subject property may be formally distributed
and turned over to the farmer beneficiaries thereof, in accordance with
the Decision of the DARAB Central in DARAB Case No. 2846.
The LBP then filed a Petition dated March 4, 2004 with the RTC docketed
as Agrarian Case No. 1390, appealing the PARAD Decision. In the Petition,
the LBP argued that because G.R. No. 108920 was pending with this
Court in relation to the 300-hectare land subject of the instant case, the
Petition for Summary Determination of Just Compensation filed before
the PARAD was premature. The LBP argued further that the PARAD could
only make an award of up to PhP5 million only. The PARAD, therefore,
could not award an amount of PhP71,634,027.30. The LBP also
contended that it could not satisfy the demand for payment of Lubrica,
considering that the documents necessary for it to undertake a
preliminary valuation of the property were still with the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR).
ISSUE:
31
The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as
follows:
"SECTION 16.Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. . . .
(e)Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in
case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit
with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in
cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take
immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register
of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash"
or in "LBP bonds." Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the
deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include
a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have
been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared
from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In
sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an
expanded construction of the term "deposit."
LBP vs Honeycomb
Facts:
Honeycomb Farms Corporation (Honeycomb Farms) was the registered
owner of two parcels of agricultural land in Cataingan, Masbate.
The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), as the agency vested with the
responsibility of determining the land valuation and compensation for
parcels of land acquired pursuant to the CARL, 6 and using the guidelines
set forth in DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 17, series of 1989, as
amended by DAR AO No. 3, series of 1991, fixed the value of these
parcels of land.
When Honeycomb Farms rejected this valuation for being too low, the
Voluntary Offer to Sell was referred to the DAR Adjudication Board,
Region V, Legaspi City, for a summary determination of the market value
of the properties.
HELD:
As a final point, we have not failed to notice that the LBP in this case
made use of trust accounts to pay Honeycomb Farms. In Land Bank of
the Phil. v. CA, 29 this Court struck down as void DAR Administrative
Circular No. 9, Series of 1990, providing for the opening of trust accounts
in lieu of the deposit in cash or in bonds contemplated in Section 16 (e)
of RA 6657. We said: CSDcTH
It is very explicit . . . [from Section 16(e)] that the deposit must be made
only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds." Nowhere does it appear nor can it be
inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the
intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit,
that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought
to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust
account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA
6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit."
xxx xxx xxx
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to
enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9.
There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of
the landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore
discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must
be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds." In the same vein, petitioners
cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these
implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law.
Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in striking down
Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and void.
Compulsory acquisition and notice requirements (Section 16)
DLR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 04-05
PROCEDURES
1.
Commencement
1.1.
Commencement by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO)
After determination by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)
of the agricultural landholdings coverable under CARP in his area of
jurisdiction, he shall submit the list of these agricultural landholdings to
the PARO who shall prepare and send, through the MARO, the NOC
(CARP-LA Form No. 7) to the concerned LO.
1.2.
Commencement by a party Any person may commence the
proceedings herein by filing a petition for coverage before the
Department of Land Reform (DLR) Central Office (DLRCO), DLR Regional
Office (DLRRO), DLR Provincial Office (DLRPO) or DLR Municipal Office
(DLRMO) of the region/province or municipality where the subject
landholding is located. The DLR office which received the petition for
coverage shall transmit or forward the same to the PARO of the province
where the subject landholding is located. The DLRPO, through the MARO,
shall validate the petition and shall issue the NOC, if warranted. In the
event that the result of the validation/evaluation by the DLRMO/DLRPO is
such that an NOC is not warranted, the DLRPO shall forward its findings
or that of the DLRMO to the DLRRO for evaluation and issuance of an
Order, treating the petition as an Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI)
case.
2.
The MARO shall post copies of the NOC for at least seven (7) days
in the bulletin boards or any conspicuous places in the municipality/city
and the barangay where the property is located and thereafter issue the
corresponding Certification of Posting Compliance (CARP-LA Form No. 5).
3.
3.1.
Upon receipt of a copy of the NOC and upon instruction by the
PARO (CARP-LA Form No. 8), the MARO where the subject landholding is
located or any DLR personnel officially authorized by the PARO shall
cause the service of the NOC to the LO in accordance with these rules.
3.2.
If the LO's residence is outside the Philippines or unknown, the
MARO of the place where the subject landholding is located shall submit
a report of such fact or failure to notify the LO through the regular mode
of service to the PARO, and shall request the latter to cause the
publication of the NOC in a newspaper of general circulation.
4.
4.1.
General rule The NOC shall be addressed to and received by
the LO.
4.2.
Service upon co-owners In case of co-ownership, the NOC shall
be served upon each and every co-owner, unless one is specifically
authorized to receive for the other co-owners. AHEDaI
4.3.
Service upon minors or incompetents When the LO is a minor,
insane or otherwise incompetent, service shall be made upon him
personally and to his legal guardian if he has one, or if none, upon his
guardian ad litem whose appointment shall be applied for by the DLR. In
the case of a minor, service may also be made on his father and/or
mother.
4.4.
Service upon entity without juridical personality When the LOs
who are persons associated in an entity without juridical personality are
sued under the name by which they are generally or commonly known,
service may be effected upon all the LOs by serving upon any one of
them, or upon the person in charge of the Office or place of business
maintained in such name. Such service shall not bind individually any
person whose connection with the entity has, upon due notice, been
severed before the proceeding was brought.
4.5.
Service upon domestic private juridical entity When the LO is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the
Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, in-house counsel or administrator.
4.6.
Service upon LO whose identity or whereabouts is unknown In
any proceeding where the LO is designated as an unknown owner, or the
like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may be effected upon him by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for
such time as the DLR may order.
4.7.
Extraterritorial service When the LO does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines, or when the LO ordinarily resides within the
Philippines but is temporarily out of the country, service may be made by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for
such time as the DLR may order.
5.
Modes of Service:
5.1.
Personal Service This is made by handing a copy of the NOC to
the LO in person, or if the LO refuses to receive and sign the NOC for
whatever reason, by tendering the same to him/her.
5.2.
Substituted Service If personal service of the NOC cannot be
served directly to the LO within a reasonable time, service may be made
by leaving copies of the NOC at the LO's:
5.2.1. residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing
therein; or
5.2.2. office or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.
5.3.
Service by Registered Mail if personal or substituted service is
not practicable, service by registered mail will be made to the last known
address of the LO. The registered mail envelope shall be marked
"DELIVER TO ADDRESSEE ONLY" and "RETURN TO SENDER" if addressee
has: MOVED OUT, UNKNOWN ADDRESS, REFUSED TO ACCEPT OR
INSUFFICIENT ADDRESS.
5.4.
Service by publication If any of the preceding three (3) modes
of service fails, the NOC will be published once in a newspaper of general
circulation. A "RETURN TO SENDER" stamped on the mailing envelope
will serve as proof that the NOC was not received by the LO. The
publication need not state the entire contents of the NOC but only the
following essential particulars:
5.4.1. Complete name/s of the LO/all LOs and last known address, if
available;
5.4.2.
Address or location of the subject landholding (barangay,
municipality/city, province);
5.4.3. The number of the Original or Transfer Certificate of Title (OCT or
TCT) or latest Tax Declaration (TD) covering the subject landholding;
5.4.4. A declaration that the Republic of the Philippines shall cover the
subject landholding under CARP;
5.4.5. A reasonable period of thirty (30) days from publication date
within which the LO must file a response to the NOC, with a warning that
failure to do so within the period shall mean waiver of the right/privilege
to: apply for exemption/exclusion or choose the retention area; nominate
child/ren as preferred beneficiaries or submit evidence for determining
just compensation.
6.
Proof of Service
6.1
Personal or substituted service The proof of service of the NOC
shall consist of:
6.1.1. Written admission of the LO served, or;
32
6.1.2. Official Return of the MARO or affidavit of the DLR personnel
serving, stating the following: the date, place and manner of service, the
papers, if any, which have been served with the process and name of the
person who received the same.
6.2
Proof of service by registered mail If service is made by
registered mail, proof may be made by the affidavit of the DLR personnel
effecting the mail and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office.
The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the
sender or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter marked "RETURN TO
SENDER" stamped by then post office concerned or together with the
certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the
addressee.
6.3
Proof of service by publication If the service has been made by
publication, service may be proved by the following: 1) the unclaimed or
returned/unopened envelope referred to in paragraph 5.4 hereof; and 2)
an affidavit of publication by the publisher or authorized official together
with a copy of the newspaper where the NOC appeared.
7.
Voluntary appearance The LO's voluntary appearance in the
proceedings shall be equivalent to service of NOC.
8.
Confed v. DAR
on
the
procedure
of
compulsory
acquisition
Roxas case : CLOA was not properly issued, DAR should be given
chance to validate (correct) proceedings.
-the violation does not give the court the power to nullify CLOA already
issued
Fortich case: CLOA was illegal & should be cancelled for being in
violation of law.
SIRs opinion: ROXAS should be controlling because the issue and the
ruling are in point. Fortich, in my opinion, is an obiter dictum because
there was already a judgment that became final and executor and this
was challenged before the SC. They have already reached a win-win
resolution and because of that, there was just one or two sentences that
talked about cancelling the illegal CLOA. But this conclusion was pursuant
to that final judgment.
Notice of Coverage:
Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the
subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program;
hence, their right to due process of law was violated.
Notice of Acquisition:
33
of Deleste. Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property
are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are nonetheless "good
indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right
mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or, at
least, constructive possession."
Petitioners' right to due process of law was, indeed, violated when the
DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the subject property under
the coverage of the agrarian reform program.
Failure to notify owners violating section 16.
-Spouses Gregorio and Hilaria, childless. But the husband had a son
name Virgilio by another woman but was raised by the couple. Gregorio
also had two daughters, Esperanza and Caridad by still another woman.
Gregorio died. Hilaria and Virgilio sold the land to Jose Deleste. Sale was
notarized, registered, declaration was cancelled and tax declaration was
issued in the name of Deleste.
-DAR notified the heirs of Gregorio meaning that Deleste was not
notified.
SC: it was incumbent upon DAR to notify Deleste, he was the landowner,
sale was registered and tax declaration was already in the name of
Deleste.
- petitioners right to due process was indeed violated, DAR failed to
notify them.
- There can be no valid transfer of title should the CLTs are void,
cancellation of TCTs and OCTs are clearly warranted.
There was also another case where SC sanctioned the cancellation of the
title for violating Sec. 16.
1
CHAPTER VI COMPENSATION
Just Compensation:
The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are
present, relevant and applicable.
Note:
1. PD 27: uses average crop harvest as a consideration;
RA 6657: factors for consideration in determining just compensation.
2. RA 6657 for lands covered by PD 27 and just compensation has not
been determined at the time of passage of RA 6657 applies because PD
27 and EO 228 have only suppletory effect.
Take into account the nature of land (i.e., irrigated), market value,
assessed value
at the time of the taking, location (i.e., along
highway) and the volume and value of its produce, like:
(a)
prevailing market value of in the area and
adjacent areas;
(b)
presence and availability of an irrigation system to
augment and increase agricultural production;
(c)
available comparable sales in the area;
(d)
average harvests per hectare.
34
valuation from DAR which offers P315, 307 for 3.195 hec. DAR
Adjudication Board affirmed the compensation and valuation and
declared that LBP fully complied with the criteria set forth by CARP.
Petitioners sought reconsideration but was denied. Petitioner filed a
petition for determination of Just Compensation before RTC. RTC acting as
Special Agrarian Court (SAC), citing appraisal report decided
P7,978,750.00 as just compensation and ordered LBP to pay.
Petition for review by LBP to CA and found that the SAC made
a wholesale adoption of the valuation of the appraisal company and did
not consider the other factors set forth in R.A. No. 6657 even though the
appraisal company admitted that it did not consider as applicable the
CARP valuation of the property. Hence, this petition.
Held:
The Court took note:
These factors have already been incorporated in a basic formula by the
DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of R.A. No.
6657. AO No. 5 precisely filled in the details of Section 17, R. A. No. 6657
by providing a basic formula by which the factors mentioned therein may
be taken into account. This formula has to be considered by the SAC in
tandem with all the factors referred to in Section 17 of the law. The
administrative order provides:
A. There shall be one basic formula for the valuation of lands covered by
VOS or CA:
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
Where:
LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula shall be used if all three factors are present, relevant,
and applicable.
No:
(a) because DAR may continue to alienate the lots during the
pendency of protest;
(b) Sec. 57 of RA 6657 states that SAC has orig and exclusive
jurisdiction.
A1. When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the
formula shall be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A2. When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable,
the formula shall be:
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A3. When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable,
the formula shall be:
LV = MV x 2
In no case shall the value of idle land using the formula MV x 2 exceed
the lowest value of land within the same estate under consideration or
within the same barangay or municipality (in that order) approved by LBP
within one (1) year from receipt of claimfolder.
--Where:
CNI=
(AGPxSP) - CO
.12
AGP= Average Gross Production corresponding to the latest available 12
months gross production immediately preceding the date of FI (field
investigation)
SP= Selling Price (the average of the latest available 12 months selling
prices prior to the date of receipt of the CF (claim folder) by LBP for
processing, such prices to be secured from the Department of Agriculture
(DA) and other appropriate regulatory bodies or, in their absence, from
the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics. If possible, SP data shall be gathered
for the barangay or municipality where the property is located. In the
absence thereof, SP may be secured within the province or region.
CO = Cost of Operations
Whenever the cost of operations could not be obtained or verified, an
assumed net income rate (NIR) of 20% shall be used. Landholdings
planted to coconut which are productive at the time of FI shall continue
to use the assumed NIR of 70 %. DAR and LBP shall continue to conduct
joint industry studies to establish the applicable NIR for each crop
covered under CARP.
0.12 = Capitalization rate
The Court finds that the factors required by the law and
enforced by the DAR Administrative Order were not observed by the SAC
when it adopted wholeheartedly the valuation arrived at in the appraisal
report. The Court repremands the case to the RTC acting as a Special
Agrarian Court for the determination of just compensation in accordance
with Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657.
Sps. Lee v. LBP
Case remanded.
Land Bank of the Phils. vs. Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz,
Facts:
Landholding of the respondents was placed under the
coverage of the land transfer program of P.D. 27. Petitioner pegged the
value of the acquired landholding at P106,935.76 based on the
guidelines set forth under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. 228. Respondents
35
compensation, as in the case at bar, the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 on
just compensation control.
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based
on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR's
failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of
time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with
RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering
that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being
real, substantial, full and ample.
LBP vs Livioco
Facts:
Respondent Enrique Livioco (Livioco) was the owner of 30.6329 hectares
of sugarland 6 located in Dapdap, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Sometime
between 1987 and 1988, 7 Livioco offered his sugarland to the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for acquisition under the CARP at
P30.00 per square meter, for a total of P9,189,870.00. The voluntaryoffer-to-sell (VOS) form 8 he submitted to the DAR indicated that his
property is adjacent to residential subdivisions and to an international
paper mill.
The DAR referred Livioco's offer to the LBP for valuation. Following
Section 17 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 and DAR Administrative Order
No. 17, series of 1989, 11 as amended by Administrative Order No. 3,
series of 1991, 12 the LBP set the price at P3.21 per square meter or a
total of P827,943.48 for 26 hectares. Livioco was then promptly informed
of the valuation 14 and that the cash portion of the claim proceeds have
been "kept in trust pending [his] submission of the [ownership
documentary] requirements." 15 It appears however that Livioco did not
act upon the notice given to him by both government agencies. On
September 20, 1991, LBP issued a certification to the Register of Deeds
of Pampanga that it has earmarked the amount of P827,943.48 as
compensation for Livioco's 26 hectares.
It was only two years later 17 that Livioco requested for a reevaluation of
the compensation on the ground that its value had already appreciated
from the time it was first offered for sale. 18 The request was denied by
Regional Director Antonio Nuesa on the ground that there was already a
perfected sale.
Unable to recover his property but unwilling to accept what he believes
was an outrageously low valuation of his property, Livioco finally filed a
petition for judicial determination of just compensation against DAR, LBP,
and the CLOA holders.
In this Petition before us, LBP assails the CA's assent to the valuation of
Livioco's property as a residential land. It maintains that it is not the
State's policy to purchase residential land. Since the property was
acquired under the CARP, it had to be valued as an agricultural land.
Issue
Was the compensation
accordance with law?
for
respondent's
property
determined
in
HELD:
For purposes of just compensation, the fair market value of an
expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the
time of taking. 68 There are three important concepts in this definition
the character of the property, its price, and the time of actual taking.
The lower courts erred in ruling that the character or use of the property
has changed from agricultural to residential, because there is no
allegation or proof that the property was approved for conversion to
other uses by DAR. It is the DAR that is mandated by law to evaluate and
to approve land use conversions 73 so as to prevent fraudulent evasions
from agrarian reform coverage. Even reclassification 74 and plans for
expropriation 75 by local government units (LGUs) will not ipso facto
convert an agricultural property to residential, industrial or commercial.
Thus, in the absence of any DAR approval for the conversion of
respondent's property or an actual expropriation by an LGU, it cannot be
said that the character or use of said property changed from agricultural
to residential. Respondent's property remains agricultural and should be
valued as such. Hence, the CA and the trial court had no legal basis for
considering the subject property's value as residential.
Respondent's evidence of the value of his land as residential property
(which the lower courts found to be preponderant) could, at most, refer
to the potential use of the property. While the potential use of an
expropriated property is sometimes considered in cases where there is a
great improvement in the general vicinity of the expropriated property, it
should never control the determination of just compensation (which
appears to be what the lower courts have erroneously done). The
potential use of a property should not be the principal criterion for
determining just compensation for this will be contrary to the well-settled
doctrine that the fair market value of an expropriated property is
determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, not its
potential uses. If at all, the potential use of the property or its
"adaptability for conversion in the future is a factor, not the ultimate in
determining just compensation." 77
The proper approach should have been to value respondent's property as
an agricultural land, which value may be adjusted in light of the
improvements in the Municipality of Mabalacat. Valuing the property as a
residential land (as the lower courts have done) is not the correct
approach, for reasons explained above. It would also be contrary to the
social policy of agrarian reform, which is to free the tillers of the land
from the bondage of the soil without delivering them to the new
oppression of exorbitant land valuations. Note that in lands acquired
under RA 6657, it is the farmer-beneficiaries who will ultimately pay the
valuations paid to the former land owners (LBP merely advances the
payment). 78 If the farmer-beneficiaries are made to pay for lands valued
as residential lands (the valuation for which is substantially higher than
the valuation for agricultural lands), it is not unlikely that such farmers,
unable to keep up with payment amortizations, will be forced to give up
their landholdings in favor of the State or be driven to sell the property to
other parties. This may just bring the State right back to the starting line
where the landless remain landless and the rich acquire more
landholdings from desperate farmers.
LO tried to prove that lot was residential not agricultural for higher just
compensation. There were several evidences presented by owner;
certification from the municipal planning office, zoning, HLURB, etc.
SC: No clearance from DAR. No allegation or proof that there was a
conversion clearance from agri to residential. That means that the land
has to be valued as agricultural land, NOT residential.
DISCUSSION: Do you need conversion clearance? SIR: IMO, no more.
You need conversion clearance for purposes of real property
tax in LGU
Or assurance from DAR that your land is not covered under
DAR because the use is not anymore for agricultural activity
Under sec. 17, no factor of conversion but actual use of the
land
LBP vs Honeycomb
HELD: We reiterated the mandatory application of the formula in the
applicable DAR administrative regulations in Land Bank of the Philippines
v. Lim, 24 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz, 25 and
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Barrido. 26 In Barrido, we were explicit in
stating that:
While the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial
function vested in the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court, the judge
cannot abuse his discretion by not taking into full consideration the
factors specifically identified by law and implementing rules. Special
Agrarian Courts are not at liberty to disregard the formula laid down in
DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998, because unless an administrative order is
declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply it. The courts cannot
ignore, without violating the agrarian law, the formula provided by the
DAR for the determination of just compensation.
Valuation and Payment (Section 18)
FORMS OF PAYMENT
SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. - The LBP shall
compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by
the landowner and the DAR and LBP or as may be finally determined by
the court as just compensation for the land.
The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes at the
option of the landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:
(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is
concerned - Twenty-five percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in
government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(b) For lands above twenty-four hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares Thirty percent (30%) cash, the balance to be paid in government
financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below - Thirty-five percent
(35%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments
negotiable at any time.
(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations,
LBP preferred shares, physical assets or other qualified investments in
accordance with guidelines set by the PARC;
(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;
(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:
(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. Ten
percent (10%) of the face value of the bonds shall mature every year
from the date of issuance until the tenth (10th) year: Provided, That
should the landowner choose to forego the cash portion, whether in full
or in part, he shall be paid correspondingly in LBP bonds;
(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used by the
landowner, his successors-in-interest or his assigns, up to the amount of
their face value for any of the following:
(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government,
including assets under the Assets Privatization Program and other assets
foreclosed by government financial institution in the same province or
region where the lands for which the bonds were paid are situated;
(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or controlled
corporations or shares or stock owned by the government in private
corporations;
(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of
accused persons, or for performance bonds;
(iv) Security for loans with any government financial institution, provided
the proceeds of the loans shall be invested in an economic enterprise,
preferably in a small and medium-scale industry, in the same province or
region as the land for which the bonds are paid;
(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to the government: Provided, That
the use of these bonds for these purposes will be limited to a certain
percentage of the outstanding balance of the financial instrument:
Provided, further, That the PARC shall determine the percentages
mentioned above;
36
(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original
bondholder in government universities, colleges, trade schools and other
institutions;
(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder
in government hospitals; and
(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow.
In case of extraordinary inflation, the PARC shall take
appropriate measures to protect the economy.
LO can withdraw
LBP vs Darab
the valuation made by PARAB was rejected by the
landowners, After re-computation upon order of PARAD, a revaluated
amount was made but Los still found it low. Los appealed to DARAB,.
Pending resolution of their appeal Los interposed a Motion to Withdraw
Amended Valuation seeking the release to tem of the amount
representing the difference between the initial value.
SC- the need to allow the landowners to withdraw immediately the
amount deposited in their behalf, pending final determination of what is
just compensation for their land
it is a an oppressive exercise of eminent domain if you do not
allow withdraw
it is unnecessary to distinguish
between provisional
compensation under Section 16 (e) and final compensation under Section
18 for the purposes of exercising the landowners right to appropriate the
same. The immediate effect in other situations in the same, the
landowner is deprived of the use and possession of his property for which
he should be fairly and immediately compensated.
SC invalidated LBPs practice of opening trust accounts in favor of the
landowner.
In case the amount has already been deposited, even if the landowner
questions the accuracy or the validity of the amount deposited and will
thereafter file with the RTC for determination of just compensation, the
LO can withdraw the amount deposited. Part of his right to just
compensation
It should be deposited in the name of the landowner, not trust accounts
(trust accounts not expressly stated in Sec. 18)
Heirs of Lorenzo vs. LBP
Petitioner are owners of land; first valuation was rejected but
upon re-computation and order of RRAD, the revaluation was accepted
by owners LBP filed MR but denied, LBP filed an opposition for
determination of JC with the RTC
Petitioner submit that LBP has no legal personality
SEC 18, clearly states there should be a consensus among
LBP is an indispensable party in expropriation proceedings
under RA 6657 and thus has the legal personality to question the
determination.
There are cases where LBP is the plaintiff of an RTC Case.
FACTS: LBP did not agree with the computation of RARAD. Landbank filed
the case in RTC. Challenged by the petitioners that LBP has no legal
personality to institute the agrarian case.
Is it possible that LBP and DAR cannot agree with the evaluation? YES
WHY? Implementation of the program is with DAR in the
EXECUTIVE aspect. There is another aspect of DAR which is
quasi-judicial.
Probably, LBP coordinates with DAR in the implementation
aspect but LBP cannot dictate the quasi-judicial aspect
SC: these are the parties involving just compensation under Sec. 18.:
Landowner, DAR, and LBP. LBP is not merely a nominal party but is
indispensable, independent of DAR.
DAR vs Heirs of Domingo
Facts:
The late Angel T. Domingo (Domingo) is the registered owner of a
70.3420-hectare rice land situated at Macapabellag, Guimba, Nueva
Ecija, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-97157.
On October 21, 1972, Presidential Decree No. 27 2 (P.D. No. 27) was
issued, pursuant to which actual tenant farmers of private agricultural
lands devoted to rice and corn were deemed as full owners of the land
they till. The land transfer program under P.D. No. 27 was subsequently
implemented by Executive Order No. 228.
On April 26, 2000, Domingo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija a complaint for determination and payment of just
compensation against the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and DAR.
Domingo opposed the said valuation and claimed that the just
compensation for the subject land should be computed using the
parameters set forth under Republic Act No. 6657 4 (R.A. No. 6657).
The LBP and DAR disputed Domingo's valuation and claimed that the
determination of just compensation should be governed by the provisions
of P.D. No. 27 in relation to E.O. No. 228.
ISSUE:
Whether the method set forth under R.A. No. 6657 in the computation of
just compensation may be applied to private agricultural lands taken by
the government under the auspices of P.D. No. 27 in relation to E.O. No.
228.
HELD:
Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process
is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private
respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of Republic
Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) before the completion of this process, the just
compensation should be determined and the process concluded under
the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and EO
228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our ruling in Paris v.
Alfeche.
xxx xxx xxx
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based
on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR's
failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of
time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with
RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering
that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being
real, substantial, full and ample.
Same Principle with Dumlao Case: Based on RA 6657 not PD 27: Basis:
Equity
Content and manner of compensation
Sec. 18 speaks of cash or shares of stock, tax credits, or LBP bonds
Is this not violation of usual way of payment in cash?
No, because revolutionary kind and also practicality (Gov.
will go bankrupt if we rely on the ordinary expropriation which
is all in cash)
Cash usually only 25-30%
LBP bonds usually spreads/matures in 10 years. (gives the Gov
time)
Assoc. of small landowners vs Hon. Sec.
We do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent
domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific
property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from
its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we deal with
here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation. The expropriation before us
affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever
kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits
allowed their owners. Such a program will involve not mere millions of
pesos. The cost will be tremendous.
The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his
option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of
stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things
of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.
Therefore, payment of the just compensation is not always required to be
made fully in money.
Parties Involved (Section 18)
Land Bank v. CA:
The parties are DAR, landowner and LBP. The law does not
mention the participation of farmer-beneficiary.
So consent of farmer-beneficiary is not required in
establishing proper compensation.
37
- association of small landowners: revolutionary kind of expro:
justification of the SC
- sec. 16: procedure on compulsory acquisition (heirs of Trinidad: correct
payment of deposit)
- Livioco: Landowner tried to prove that land is residential. There were
several evidences, etc SC: no clearance from DAR. Land is valued as
Agricultural land.
- sec. 6 homestead (note the important qualifications) (cases: Alita and
Paris vs. Alfeche)
- Dumlao case: just compensation PD RA 6657: computed on the basis
of the present law
- landbank of the phil: whether it has legal personality to file a case
before RTC involving just compensation?
- Ways of distribution of lands to qualified beneficiaries (Chapter 3):
voluntary offer (sec.20), compulsory (Sec. 16), non-land transfer
schemes (SDO, Leasehold operation- sec.12)
- type: 60 (mcq) -40
38
After the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) directed payment, LBP
approved the payment of P265,494.20, exclusive of the advance
payments made in the form of lease rental amounting to P75,415.88 but
inclusive of 6% increment of P191,876.99 pursuant to DAR Administrative
Order No. 13, series of 1994.
On 1 December 1994, the respondents instituted Civil Case No. 94-03 for
determination and payment of just compensation before the Regional
Trial Court.
LBP filed its answer, stating that rice and corn lands placed under the
coverage of Presidential Decree No. 27 7 were governed and valued in
accordance with the provisions of Executive Order No. 228 8 as
implemented by DAR Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1987 and
other statutes and administrative issuances; that the administrative
valuation of lands covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive
Order No. 228 rested solely in DAR and LBP was the only financing arm;
that the funds that LBP would use to pay compensation were public funds
to be disbursed only in accordance with existing laws and regulations;
that the supporting documents were not yet received by LBP; and that
the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order
No. 228 was already settled.
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing
interest on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the time
petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and "took" the property
in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be
the value of the property as of the time of the taking computed, being an
effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue
of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over
time.
SEC. 23. Distribution Limit. - No qualified beneficiary may own more than
three (3) hectares of agricultural land.
AWARD TO BENEFICIARIES
39
provide the would-be beneficiaries, an intermediate document
to evidence that they have been identified and have qualified
as agrarian reform beneficiaries under the CARP. Moreover,
aside from attesting to the inchoate right of the identified
beneficiary to be awarded the land or portion thereof, the CBC
issued shall entitle the recipient to receive support services
under the CARP.
PAYMENT BY BENEFICIARIES
(1)Lands awarded pursuant to the Act shall be paid for by the
beneficiaries to the LBP in thirty (30) annual amortization at 6% interest
per annum subject to the following rules:
(a) The payments for the first three (3) years after the award may
be at reduced amounts as established by the PARC.
(b) The first five (5) annual payments may not be more than 5% of
the value of the annual gross production as established by the DAR.
(c) Should the scheduled annual payments after the fifth year
exceed 10% of the annual gross production and the failure to produce
accordingly is not due to the beneficiarys fault, the LBP may reduce the
interest rate or reduce the principal obligation to make the repayment
affordable.
(2) The LBP shall have a lien (i.e., prior right) by way of mortgage on the
land awarded to the beneficiary; and this mortgage may be foreclosed by
the LBP for non-payment of an aggregate of three(3) annual
amortization. The LBP shall advice the DAR of such proceedings and the
latter shall subsequently award the forfeited landholding to other
qualified beneficiaries. A beneficiary whose land has been foreclosed
shall thereafter be permanently disqualified from becoming a beneficiary
under the Act. (Sec. 26.)
TRANSFERABILITY OF AWARDED LANDS (Sec. 27)
(1) Lands acquired by beneficiaries under the Act may not be sold,
transferred or conveyed except through hereditary succession, or to the
government, or to the LBP or to other qualified beneficiaries for a period
of ten (10) years. However, the children of the spouse of the transferor
shall have a right to repurchase the land from the government or LBP
within a period of two (2) years. Due notice of the availability of the
land shall be given by the LBP to the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee (BARC) of the barangay where the land is situated. The
Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM) shall, in
turn, be given the due notice thereof by the BARC.
Land titles: one year repurchase from registration; here, it is two years
(2) If the land has not yet been fully paid by the beneficiary, the rights to
the land may be transferred or conveyed, with prior approval of the DAR,
to any heir of the beneficiary or to any other beneficiary who, as a
condition for such transfer or conveyance, shall cultivate the land
himself.
Lebrudo vs Loyola
Facts:
Respondent Remedios Loyola (Loyola) owns a parcel of land located in
Barangay Milagrosa, Carmona, Cavite, awarded by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) under Republic Act No. 6657 4 (RA 6657) or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. This lot is covered by
Certificate of Land Ownership 5 (CLOA) No. 20210 issued in favor of
Loyola on 27 December 1990 and duly registered on 14 March 1991
under Transfer of Certificate of Title (TCT)/CLOA No. 998.
On 27 June 1995, petitioner Julian S. Lebrudo (Lebrudo), now deceased
and represented by his son, petitioner Reynaldo L. Lebrudo, filed with the
Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Trece
Martires City, Cavite, an action 6 for the cancellation of the TCT/CLOA in
the name of Loyola and the issuance of another for the one-half portion
of the lot in Lebrudo's favor.
In a Decision 7 dated 18 December 1995, the PARAD dismissed the case
without prejudice on the ground that the case was filed prematurely. On
11 March 1996, Lebrudo re-filed the same action. 8
Lebrudo alleged that he was approached by Loyola sometime in 1989 to
redeem the lot, which was mortgaged by Loyola's mother, Cristina Hugo,
to Trinidad Barreto. After Lebrudo redeemed the lot for P250.00 and a
cavan of palay, Loyola again sought Lebrudo's help in obtaining title to
the lot in her name by shouldering all the expenses for the transfer of the
title of the lot from her mother, Cristina Hugo. In exchange, Loyola
promised to give Lebrudo the one-half portion of the lot. Thereafter,
TCT/CLOA No. 998 was issued in favor of Loyola. Loyola then allegedly
executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay 9 dated 28 December 1989, waiving
and transferring her rights over the one-half portion of the lot in favor of
Lebrudo. To reiterate her commitment, Loyola allegedly executed two
more Sinumpaang Salaysay 10 dated 1 December 1992 and 3 December
1992, committing herself to remove her house constructed on the
corresponding one-half portion to be allotted to Lebrudo.
Thereafter, Lebrudo asked Loyola to comply with her promise. However,
Loyola refused. Lebrudo sought the assistance of the Sangguniang
Barangay of Milagrosa, Carmona, Cavite; the Philippine National Police
(PNP) of Carmona, Cavite; and the Department of Agrarian Reform to
mediate. However, despite steps taken to amicably settle the issue, as
evidenced by certifications from the PNP and the barangay, there was no
amicable settlement. Thus, Lebrudo filed an action against Loyola.
In her Answer, Loyola maintained that Lebrudo was the one who
approached her and offered to redeem the lot and the release of the
CLOA. Loyola denied promising one-half portion of the lot as payment for
the transfer, titling and registration of the lot. Loyola explained that the
lot was her only property and it was already being occupied by her
children and their families.
ISSUE:
40
corporation or association shall be subject to periodic audit by certified
public accountants chosen by the beneficiaries;
(b) Irrespective of the value of their equity in the corporation or
association, the beneficiaries shall be assured of at least one (1)
representative in the board of directors, or in a management or executive
committee, if one exists, of the corporation or association;
(c) Any shares acquired by such workers and beneficiaries shall have the
same rights and features as all other shares; and
(d) Any transfer of shares of stocks by the original beneficiaries shall be
void ab initio UNLESS said transaction is in favor of a qualified and
registered beneficiary within the same corporation.
If within two (2) years from the approval of this Act, the land or stock
transfer envisioned above is not made or realized or the plan for such
stock distribution approved by the PARC within the same period, the
agricultural land of the corporate owners or corporation shall be subject
to the compulsory coverage of this Act.
HLI vs PRAC
BASIC Facts:
THE HACIENDA COMPRISED 6,443 HAS. IN 1957 TABACALERA SOLD THE
LAND TO TADECO OWNED BY THE COJUANCOS. GSIS FINANCED THE
PURCHASE ON CONDITION THAT THE LAND WILL ULTIMATELY BE
SUBDIVIDED AND SOLD TO THE TENANTS.
IN 1980 GOVT FILED AT RTC MANILA CASE AGAINST TADECO FOR IT TO
SURRENDER THE HACIENDA TO MAR (NOW DAR) SO THE LAND WILL BE
DISTRIBUTED TO FARMERS. MANILA RTC RULED AGAINST TADECO.
TADECO APPEALED TO CA. IN 1988 CA DISMISSED THE APPEAL SUBJECT
TO REVIVAL IF TADECO FAILS TO GET APPROVAL OF FARMERS OF STOCK
DISTRIBUTION OPTION (SDO) AND IF OPTED BY FARMERS TADECO FAILS
TO IMPLEMENT SDO.
IN 1988 TADECO CREATED HACIENDA LUISITA INC (HLI) AND TADECO
BOUGHT SHARES OF HLI IN EXCHANGE OF THE HACIENDA LAND. THE
TOTAL SHARES WERE 400,000,000 WITH PAR VALUE OF P400,000,000.00.
150,000,000 SHARES WERE FOR FARMERS AND 250,000,000 SHARES
FOR OTHER STOCKHOLDERS. FARMERS AND HLI ENTERED INTO STOCK
DISTRIBUTION OPTION AGREEMENT (SDOA) WHICH PROVIDES THAT
FARMERS AGREE BECAUSE SUCH SDO WILL IMPROVE THEIR LIVES AND
THEY WILL GET GREATER BENEFITS. DAR APPROVED SDOA.
IN 1995 HLI APPLIED TO CONVERT 500 HAS TO INDUSTRIAL USE.
CONVERSION WS APPROVED. THEN IT TRANSFERRED THE 500 HAS TO
CENTENNARY HOLDINGS INC WHICH TRANSFERRED IT TO LUISTA
INDUSTRIAL PARK CORP OR LIPCO. LIPCO CONVEYED SOME LANDS TO
RCBC AS PAYMENT FOR LOANS. IN ADDITION TO THE 500 HAS SOLD TO
LIPCO, 80.51 HAS WAS EXPROPRIATED FOR USE OF SCTEX.
IN 2003 FARMER GROUPS FILED CASE AT DAR FOR EITHER
RENEGOTIATION OF SDOA OR ITS REVOCATION ON GROUND THAT THEIR
LIVES DID NOT IMPROVE AND THEY DID NOT GET FAIR SHARES IN THE
SALE OF LANDS TO LIPCO AND FOR SCTEX USE. DAR CREATED TASK
FORCE WHICH RECOMMENDED TO PARC (PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN
REFORM COUCIL) THAT THE PREVIOUS ORDER APPROVING THE SDO BE
REVOKED.
IN 2005 PARC REVOKED THE SDO AND ORDERED THE COMPULSORY
ACQUISITION OF THE HACIENDA FOR DISTRIBUTION TO FARMERS. HLI
WENT TO THE SC AND ASKED FOR TRO TO STOP IMPLEMENTATION OF
PARK ORDER. IN 2006 SC ISSUED TRO. HENCE THE CASE.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
ISSUE:
HLI ARGUES THAT PARC IS WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO REVOKE THE STOCK
DISTRIBUTION PLAN (SDP). THE LAW GIVES PARC THE POWER TO
APPROVDE SDP. BUT THE LAW DOES NOT PROVIDE THAT IT CAN
DISAPPROVE THE SDP. IS HLIS ARGUMENT CORRECT?
NO. IF PARC WAS GIVEN POWER TO APPROVE SDP, IT HAS THE POWER TO
REVOKE IT BY THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION. OTHERWISE
PARC WOULD BE A TOOTHLESS AGENCY.
On the postulate that the subject jurisdiction is conferred by law, HLI
maintains that PARC is without authority to revoke an SDP, for neither RA
6657 nor EO 229 expressly vests PARC with such authority. While, as HLI
argued, EO 229 empowers PARC to approve the plan for stock distribution
in appropriate cases, the empowerment only includes the power to
disapprove, but not to recall its previous approval of the SDP after it has
been implemented by the parties.[13][93] To HLI, it is the court which
has jurisdiction and authority to order the revocation or rescission of the
PARC-approved SDP.
HELD
We disagree.
Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority to
approve the plan for stock distribution of the corporate landowner
belongs to PARC. However, contrary to petitioner HLIs posture, PARC also
has the power to revoke the SDP which it previously approved. It may be,
as urged, that RA 6657 or other executive issuances on agrarian reform
do not explicitly vest the PARC with the power to revoke/recall an
approved SDP. Such power or authority, however, is deemed possessed
by PARC under the principle of necessary implication, a basic postulate
that what is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as that which is
expressed.[14][94]
We have explained that every statute is understood, by implication, to
contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object
and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction
which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences
as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms.[15][95] Further,
41
FARM asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords
the corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock
distribution, an arrangement which, to FARM, impairs the fundamental
right of farmers and farmworkers under Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the
Constitution.[33][106]
To a more specific, but direct point, FARM argues that Sec. 31 of RA 6657
permits stock transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer; in fine,
there is stock certificate ownership of the farmers or farmworkers instead
of them owning the land, as envisaged in the Constitution. For FARM, this
modality of distribution is an anomaly to be annulled for being
inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian reform ingrained in Sec.
4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.[34][107]
Reacting, HLI insists that agrarian reform is not only about transfer of
land ownership to farmers and other qualified beneficiaries. It draws
attention in this regard to Sec. 3(a) of RA 6657 on the concept and scope
of the term agrarian reform. The constitutionality of a law, HLI added,
cannot, as here, be attacked collaterally.
The instant challenge on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 and
necessarily its counterpart provision in EO 229 must fail as explained
below.
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review
over, and pass upon the constitutionality of, acts of the executive or
legislative departments, it does so only when the following essential
requirements are first met, to wit:
(1)
there is an actual case or controversy;
(2)
that the constitutional question is raised at the earliest possible
opportunity by a proper party or one with locus standi; and
(3)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.[35][108]
Not all the foregoing requirements are satisfied in the case at bar.
While there is indeed an actual case or controversy, intervenor FARM,
composed of a small minority of 27 farmers, has yet to explain its failure
to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 3l of RA 6657, since as early as
November 21, l989 when PARC approved the SDP of Hacienda Luisita or
at least within a reasonable time thereafter and why its members
received benefits from the SDP without so much of a protest. It was only
on December 4, 2003 or 14 years after approval of the SDP via PARC
Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, 1989 that said plan and
approving resolution were sought to be revoked, but not, to stress, by
FARM or any of its members, but by petitioner AMBALA. Furthermore, the
AMBALA petition did NOT question the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA
6657, but concentrated on the purported flaws and gaps in the
subsequent implementation of the SDP. Even the public respondents, as
represented by the Solicitor General, did not question the
constitutionality of the provision. On the other hand, FARM, whose 27
members formerly belonged to AMBALA, raised the constitutionality of