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G.R. No. 160172

February 13, 2008

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,

vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.
DECISION

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This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of

Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166,2 declaring that (1)
Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the
petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent
court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.

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Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in

1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied for a
marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual
relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly
engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the
Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already
expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu
of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13
March 1995 stating that they had been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got
married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe,
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the
ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their

respective homes and did not live together as husband and

wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child
named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the childs birth,
respondent has been the one supporting her out of her
income as a government dentist and from her private
practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support
against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City (trial court.3 In her complaint, respondent alleged that
she is married to petitioner and that the latter has "reneged
on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as
his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child."4
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming
that their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was
facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely
prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract
to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative
prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not
able to get parental advice from his parents before he got
married. He also averred that they never lived together as
husband and wife and that he has never seen nor
acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the trial court ruled
that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not
valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license.
However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the
child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the
lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on
the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to
provide support to the child when the latter is not, and could
not have been, his own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the
rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a
judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate
court declared that the child was born during the subsistence
and validity of the parties marriage. In addition, the Court of
Appeals frowned upon petitioners refusal to undergo DNA
testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his
refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal
knowledge with respondent, saying that petitioners
"forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him
of his obligation and reward him of his being

irresponsible."6 Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the

affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein
he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the
child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an
action for support, it was improper for the trial court to
declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null
and void in the very same case. There was no participation
of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to
see to it that there is no collusion between the parties, as
required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of
nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the
marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that
can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in
the instant proceedings. The proceedings before the trial
court should have been limited to the obligation of petitioner
to support the child and his wife on the basis of the marriage
apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and
respondent.7 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision
dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, National Capital Judicial Region,
Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with
theMODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia
A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the
appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the
marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant
and the appellee valid until properly annulled by a
competent court in a proceeding instituted for that
purpose. Costs against the appellant.8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion
was denied by the Court of Appeals.9 Hence this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly
annulled his marriage with respondent because as shown by
the evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage
was celebrated without a marriage license. He stresses that
the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license,
contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he
and respondent never lived together as husband and wife.
The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a
substitute to fill the absence of a marriage
license.10 Petitioner additionally argues that there was no
need for the appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this
case because it is only an ordinary action for support and not
an action for annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the trial court

had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their marriage

since it was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the
instant action for support. Citing several
authorities,11 petitioner claims that a void marriage can be
the subject of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity
to institute another independent proceeding for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between the parties.
The refiling of another case for declaration of nullity where
the same evidence and parties would be presented would
entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be timeconsuming for the parties, and would increase the burden of
the courts.12 Finally, petitioner claims that in view of the
nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous
denial of the childs paternity and filiation, the Court of
Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate
child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required
respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to
file their respective comments on the petition.13
In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition
is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the decision of
the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the
appellate court, she argues that the legitimacy of their
marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only be
repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought
for that purpose. With regard to the filiation of her child, she
pointed out that compared to her candid and straightforward
testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in
answering questions about their sexual encounters.
Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and
from the trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being
subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation.15
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that it was improper for the trial court to declare null
and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the
action for support. Citing the case of Nial v. Bayadog,16 it
states that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in
an action for support, since the right to support from
petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid marriage.
Moreover, the evidence presented during the proceedings in
the trial court showed that the marriage between petitioner
and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license,
and that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it concludes the
trial court correctly held that the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is not valid.17 In addition, the OSG agrees

with the findings of the trial court that the child is an

illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to support.18
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the
trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for
support and second, whether the child is the daughter of
petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage
may be collaterally attacked.19 Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, we
held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage,
no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes,
such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court
may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the same so
long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. This is without prejudice to any issue that
may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary
even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the
Family Code connotes that such final judgment
need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.20
Likewise, in Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario,21 the Court ruled
that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the
validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim
for death benefits. Reiterating Nial, we held that the Court
may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a marriage an absolute nullity.22
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential
or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall

render the marriage voidable.23 In the instant case, it is clear

from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent
did not have a marriage license when they contracted their
marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that
they had been living together for more than five
years.24 However, respondent herself in effect admitted the
falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during crossexamination, thus
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not
been living together as husband and wife for the
last five years on or before March 13, 1995, you
signed the Affidavit, is that correct?
A

25

Yes, sir.

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere

irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man
and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage
due to the publication of every applicants name for a
marriage license.26 In the instant case, there was no
"scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and
respondent executed so they could push through with the
marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of
paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage
license renders their marriage void ab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioners
illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in
the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through
the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned, or the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.28

The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as

the father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving
additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted
that he is the father of the child, thus stating:
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA
A. DE CASTRO who was born on November 3,
1995 at Better Living, Paraaque, Metro Manila;30
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings
of the trial court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent
with the petitioner is supported not only by the
testimony of the latter, but also by respondents
own admission in the course of his testimony
wherein he conceded that petitioner was his
former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he
used to visit petitioner at the latters house or
clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to have
sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances,
petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led to
their marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled.
While respondent claims that he was merely
forced to undergo the marriage ceremony, the
pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise
(Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1" and "C-2,"
"D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2" and "H," "H-1"
to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1"
and "D-2"), defendant is seen putting the wedding
ring on petitioners finger and in another picture
(Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent is seen in
the act of kissing the petitioner.31
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR
CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the
Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No.
4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.

Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital

Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice
Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated
September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No.
1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her
Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of
the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the
United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972;
that, after the marriage, they established their residence in
the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4,
1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties
were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that
petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against
petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's
business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is
conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that
private respondent be declared with right to manage the
conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous
judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada
Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and
petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982.
The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the
mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is
located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no
bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this
certiorari proceeding.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of

Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is

interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and
Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety
of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a
grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the
lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it
devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to

exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error

committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be
useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the
proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case
within the exception, and we have given it due course.

You are hereby authorized to accept

service of Summons, to file an Answer,
appear on my behalf and do an things
necessary and proper to represent me,
without further contesting, subject to the
following:

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the

parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on

the ground of incompatibility.

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying

claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the
representation he made in the divorce proceedings before
the American Court that they had no community of property;
that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal
funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior
judgment.

2. That there is no community of

property to be adjudicated by the Court.

For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree

issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national
policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court
cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy,
divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters
within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to
determine whether the property relations between petitioner
and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon
absolute or relative community property, upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal
fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had
obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person
before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained
jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address
as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California,
authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt
Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility
in the understanding that there were neither community
property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in
the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of
KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to
represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx

3. 'I'hat there are no community

obligations to be adjudicated by the
court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada
divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree
is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in
this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public
policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public police and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme
Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed.
794, 799:

a wife, or a wife without a husband, is

unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty. that
the guilty party shall not marry again,
that party, as well as the other, is still
absolutely freed from the bond of the
former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing
to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before
said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our
laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should
not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent
Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in
Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la
Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

The purpose and effect of a decree of

divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
court of competent jurisdiction are to
change the existing status or domestic
relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage
tie when thus severed as to one party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where
one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains
a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry,
can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine
law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the
Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel
question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails
the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial
Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for
reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein
respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.
The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second
paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the
divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife,
the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the
Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are
as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros
M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was
blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V.
Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing
along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his
wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a
certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him
currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel,
California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for

authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
sought reconsideration but it was denied.

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there

must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must
be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that
the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.8

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article

26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one
later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree,
and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties
are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State
asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while
respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his
capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal
interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for
judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent
remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the
validity of his second marriage.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY

UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it
only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The
proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for
annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG
argues there is no law that governs respondents situation.
The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of
judicial determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly
applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized
alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her
to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law
pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to
remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a
petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1,
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested
under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or
whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may,
before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question
of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his
rights or duties, thereunder.
...

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of

Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of
respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this
provision had come about in the first place, and what was
the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into
law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article
26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original
Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed
into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in

accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to
govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems
to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the
marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce
granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried
an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the
Family Code, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the
Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those
whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad.
These spouses who are divorced will not be able to remarry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce
them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of
divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign
spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered
to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose
that this be deleted and made into law only after more
widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien

spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married

to the Filipino spouse.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the

application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the

1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree
validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated

between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of

the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case
of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as
in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife
became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained
a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way
of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized
foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and
can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as
if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of
a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead
to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of
the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit
and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the
law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within
the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within
its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case
must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse

capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an
American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would
have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a
valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are
both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced"
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the
proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a
petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation.
Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this
particular case, not even feasible, considering that the
marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of
validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a
sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie;
hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still
remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent
evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the
divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It
is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must
prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an
American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law
must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice
of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be
alleged and proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also

show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to

remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise,
there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is
capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209,
as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow
a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who
had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry. However, considering that in the present petition
there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we
are unable to declare, based on respondents bare
allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated
to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly
upon respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in
his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the
Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May
15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional
Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are
hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.

24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December

11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito
and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986
stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a
marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption
that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would
affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of
action since they are not among the persons who could file
an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the
Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of
Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after
finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure,
insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action
against defendant in asking for the declaration of
the nullity of marriage of their deceased father,
Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the
time of the filing of this instant suit, their father
Pepito G. Nial is already dead;

basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the

petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an
unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under
Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon
motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal
and reinstated the petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable
law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the
law in effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of
the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation
to Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage
license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which
the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from
the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family
as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the
Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social
institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be
protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code
considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent
union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure but
a lifetime commitment." 13

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the

declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed
the action to declare null and void their father's marriage to
respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47
of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the
persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court
grounded on a pure question of law.

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil

Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of
which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before
the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in
such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license.
The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage
such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve
peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of
public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising
from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise
to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that
requirement.

Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September

26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance

with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to

respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that

SO ORDERED.

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of

plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null
and void ab initio;
G.R. No. 133778

March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad

Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL,
ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from

assailing the validity of the second marriage after it
was dissolved due to their father's death. 1

"they have attained the age of majority, and, being

unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, and that we now desire to marry each
other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to
what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76
of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year
period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both
parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year
continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which
impediment may have either disappeared or intervened
sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have
lived together as husband and wife for five years without the
benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and
wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of
marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year
common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back
from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period
of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be
a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity
meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5
years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five years, then the law
would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to
have common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as
such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded
any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and
later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived
escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It
should be noted that a license is required in order to notify
the public that two persons are about to be united in
matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge

of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it

known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons
having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. .
..
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged
impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar
shall forthwith make an investigation, examining
persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall
request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil
registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any
impediment known to the local civil registrar or
brought to his attention, he shall note down the
particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the
application for a marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present,
absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages
by the same person during the same period. Thus, any
marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the
first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the
exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage
was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code
complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or
more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are
considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and
adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage,
it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding
day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to
the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their fiveyear period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect

union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only
by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting
with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with
each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from
his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even
where there was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by
either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband
and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this
case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence
of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the
personality to file a petition to declare their father's marriage
void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the
Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second
ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial
court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment
suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is
inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and
persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to
who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage
that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the
court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered
as having never to have taken place21 and cannot be the
source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or
confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other
can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be
assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a
void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently,
void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either,
in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if
the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the
action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a
voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested
party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no
legal effects except those declared by law concerning the
properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or

ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect

on the children born to such void marriages as provided in
Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51,
53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property
regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal
partnership and the children conceived before its annulment
are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's
father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him
and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds
from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that
was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their
marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed
at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial
decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial
decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to
make the marriage void but though no sentence of
avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake
of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all
concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage
should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court
of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances,
the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the
conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no
marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good
for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any
proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material,
either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any
parties at any time, whether before or after the death of
either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere
proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be
disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is
not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally
attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the
lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab
initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides
that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into
a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based
only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same
reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party
would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for

defense, then the same cannot be considered

imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity.1wphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if
the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch
59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167684

July 31, 2006

JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,

vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, in
Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O.
Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969,
through machinations, duress and intimidation employed
upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father,
retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the

Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila

and they were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D.
Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said
date, the father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to
sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the
Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage
license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did
they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry,
consequently, no marriage license was presented to the
solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime,
and claims that she and Jaime were married civilly on 19
May 1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May
19695 at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City.
Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry of
Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped
from invoking the lack of marriage license after having been
married to her for 25 years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime]
testified that on May 19, 1969, he and defendant
[Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo
D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the city
hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage
Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A certain
Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an
aide of defendant's father accompanied them, and
who, together with another person, stood as
witness to the civil wedding. That although
marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in
San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in
the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for
he never applied for any marriage license, (Ibid.,
p. 11). Upon verifications made by him through his
lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil Registry
of San Juan, a Certification dated March 11, 1994
(Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr.,
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no
marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by
said office." On May 31, 1969, he and defendant
were again wed, this time in church rites, before
Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most Holy
Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon
City, where they executed another marriage
contract (Exh. "F") with the same marriage license
no. 2770792 used and indicated. Preparations and
expenses for the church wedding and reception

were jointly shared by his and defendant's parents.

After the church wedding, he and defendant
resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their first
son, Jose Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his
parents continued to support him financially, he
and defendant lived in Spain for some time, for his
medical studies. Eventually, their marital
relationship turned bad because it became difficult
for him to be married he being a medical student
at that time. They started living apart in 1976, but
they underwent family counseling before they
eventually separated in 1978. It was during this
time when defendant's second son was born
whose paternity plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff
obtained a divorce decree against defendant in the
United States in 1981 and later secured a judicial
separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff,
himself manifested that when his service was
engaged by plaintiff, and after the latter narrated to
him the circumstances of his marriage, he made
inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of San
Juan where the supposed marriage license was
obtained and with the Church of the Most Holy
Redeemer Parish where the religious wedding
ceremony was celebrated. His request letters
dated March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994
(Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March
11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent to and received
by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in reply
thereto, issued Certifications dated March 4, 1994
(Exh. "I"), and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and
September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no marriage
license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that
office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer
Parish Church issued him a certified copy of the
marriage contract of plaintiff and defendant (Exh.
"F") and a Certificate of Marriage dated April 11,
1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it noted that it was a
"purely religious ceremony, having been civilly
married on May 19, 1969 at the City Hall, Manila,
under Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at
San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969."
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the
Local Registry of San Juan, identified the
Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994
and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael Aliscad,
Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their

office failed to locate the book wherein marriage

license no. 2770792 may have been registered
(TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she
and plaintiff had a steady romantic relationship
after they met and were introduced to each other
in October 1968. A model, she was compelled by
her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty
pageant when plaintiff who was afraid to lose her,
asked her to run away with him to Baguio.
Because she loved plaintiff, she turned back on
her family and decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio.
When they came back to Manila, she and plaintiff
proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton Hills
where plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not
to worry. Her parents were hostile when they
learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla
convinced them that she will take care of
everything, and promised to support plaintiff and
defendant. As plaintiff was still fearful he may lose
her, he asked her to marry him in civil rites, without
the knowledge of her family, more so her father
(TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a
minister and where she was made to sign
documents. After the civil wedding, they had lunch
and later each went home separately. On May 31,
1969, they had the church wedding, which the
Sevilla family alone prepared and arranged, since
defendant's mother just came from hospital. Her
family did not participate in the wedding
preparations. Defendant further stated that there
was no sexual consummation during their
honeymoon and that it was after two months when
they finally had sex. She learned from Dr.
Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one of their
wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing
psychiatric therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p.
15) for some traumatic problem compounded by
his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has unusual
sexual behavior by his obsession over her knees
of which he would take endless pictures of.
Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in
between the knees which she called "intrafemural
sex," while real sex between them was far and
between like 8 months, hence, abnormal. During
their marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird sexual
behavior which defendant attributed to plaintiff's
drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A
compulsive liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who

breaks things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took

drugs like amphetamines, benzedrine and the like,
"speed" drugs that kept him from sleep and then
would take barbiturates or downers, like
"mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep
plaintiff away from drugs but failed as it has
become a habit to him. They had no fixed home
since they often moved and partly lived in Spain
for about four and a half years, and during all
those times, her mother-in-law would send some
financial support on and off, while defendant
worked as an English teacher. Plaintiff, who was
supposed to be studying, did nothing. Their
marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff
physically and verbally abused her, and this led to
a break up in their marriage. Later, she learned
that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in
the United States.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that
he was not aware of the civil wedding of his
daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter and
grandson came to stay with him after they
returned home from Spain and have lived with him
and his wife ever since. His grandsons practically
grew up under his care and guidance, and he has
supported his daughter's expenses for medicines
and hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister,
testified and corroborated that it was plaintiff's
family that attended to all the preparations and
arrangements for the church wedding of her sister
with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the
couple wed in civil rites some time prior to the
church wedding. She also stated that she and her
parents were still civil with the plaintiff inspite of
the marital differences between plaintiff and
defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff
testified that because of irreconcilable differences
with defendant and in order for them to live their
own lives, they agreed to divorce each other; that
when he applied for and obtained a divorce decree
in the United States on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"),
it was with the knowledge and consent of
defendant who in fact authorized a certain Atty.
Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p.
21). During his adverse testimony, plaintiff

identified a recent certification dated July 25, 2000

(Exh. "EE") issued by the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, that the marriage license no. 2770792,
the same marriage license appearing in the
marriage contract (Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus
appears to be fictitious.6
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of
the marriage of the parties, the trial court made the following
justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the
validity of the marriage, the lack or absence of a
license renders the marriage void ab initio. It was
shown under the various certifications (Exhs. "I",
"E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of the
Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of San
Juan, and the more recent one issued on July 25,
2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage license no.
2770792 was ever issued by that office, hence,
the marriage license no. 2770792 appearing on
the marriage contracts executed on May 19, 1969
(Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was
fictitious. Such a certification enjoys probative
value under the rules on evidence, particularly
Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, x x x.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil
marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita
N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D.
Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May 19, 1969
as well as their contract of marriage solemnized
under religious rites by Rev. Juan B. Velasco at
the Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969,
NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite marriage
license. Let the marriage contract of the parties
under Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the registry book
of the Local Civil Registry of Manila be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the
proper civil and property registries in accordance
with Article 52 of the Family Code. Likewise, let a
copy hereof be forwarded the Office of the Solicitor
General for its record and information.7

Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a

Decision dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals
disagreed with the trial court and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025,
February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained
that: "The presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The
presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome
by no less than clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is
rebutted, it becomes conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita
Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan
testified that they "failed to locate the book
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is
registered," for the reason that "the employee
handling is already retired." With said testimony
We cannot therefore just presume that the
marriage license specified in the parties' marriage
contract was not issued for in the end the failure of
the office of the local civil registrar of San Juan to
produce a copy of the marriage license was
attributable not to the fact that no such marriage
license was issued but rather, because it "failed to
locate the book wherein marriage license no.
2770792 is registered." Simply put, if the pertinent
book were available for scrutiny, there is a strong
possibility that it would have contained an entry on
marriage license no. 2720792.
xxxx
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the
parties' marriage on the basis of a mere
perception of plaintiff that his union with defendant
is defective with respect to an essential requisite
of a marriage contract, a perception that ultimately
was not substantiated with facts on record.8
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January
2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution
dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
He raises the following issues for Resolution.

1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was

issued in accordance with law to the parties herein
prior to the celebration of the marriages in
question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly
applied and relied on the presumption of regularity
of officials acts, particularly the issuance of a
marriage license, arising solely from the contents
of the marriage contracts in question which show
on their face that a marriage license was
purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry of
San Juan, Metro Manila, and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly
invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of a
marriage arising from the admitted "fact of
marriage."9
At the core of this controversy is the determination of
whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License No.
2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties
was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null
and void ab initio.
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in
force at the time of the marriage of the parties are Articles
53,10 5811 and 80.12
Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an
essential requisite for the validity of marriage. The marriage
between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.
At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as
one involving a marriage that is null and void on the ground
of absence of a marriage license based on the certifications
issued by the Local Civil Registar of San Juan. As ruled by
this Court in the case of Cario v. Cario13:
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of
such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of
Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as

in the present case, the certification issued by the

local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he
being the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all date relative to the issuance of a
marriage license.

not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be

found in the register despite diligent search. Such
certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of
record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court:

Such being the case, the presumed validity of the

marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been
sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden
of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid
and that they secured the required marriage
license. Although she was declared in default
before the trial court, petitioner could have
squarely met the issue and explained the absence
of a marriage license in her pleadings before the
Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner
conveniently avoided the issue and chose to
refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her
case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of
their marriage cannot stand.

Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. a written
you our full force locating the above problem.
statement signed by an officer having the custody
of an official record or by his deputy that after
San Juan, Metro Manila
diligent search, no record or entry of a specified
tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
September 20, 1994
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his
office contain no such record or entry.
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications
by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan in connection with
The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:
Marriage License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing
requirements and deserved to be accorded probative value.
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage

between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the
necessary marriage license, and not being one of
the marriages exempt from the marriage license
requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the
certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar should be
read in line with the decision in the earlier case of Republic
v. Court of Appeals,14 where it was held that:

The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of

San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated 11 March 1994. It reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic)
ever issued by this Office. With regards (sic) to
Marriage License Number 2880792,16 we exert all
effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give
you our full force locating the above problem.

This is to certify that no marriage license Number

2770792 were ever issued by this Office with
regards to Marriage License Number 2880792, we
exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.

This is to certify that according to the records of

this office, no Marriage License Application was
filed and no Marriage License No. 2770792
allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this
Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS.
CARMELITA CARDENAS-SEVILLA.
This is to further certify that the said application
and license do not exist in our Local Civil Registry
Index and, therefore, appear to be fictitious.

This certification is being issued upon the request

The above Rule authorized the custodian of
of the interested party for whatever legal intent it
San Juan, Metro Manila
documents to certify that despite diligent
may serve.
search, a particular document does not exist in
his office or that a particular entry of a
March 11, 1994
San Juan, Metro Manila
specified tenor was not to be found in a
register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the duty,
July 25, 2000
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
inter alia, of maintaining a register book where
Local Civil Registrar
they are required to enter all applications for
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
marriage licenses, including the names of the
The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994
Local Civil Registrar
applicants, the date the marriage license was
and provides:
issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
"hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil
full force locating the above problem." It could be easily
Registrar must categorically state that the document does
implied from the said statement that the Office of the Local

Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and
determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792
due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both certifications failed to
state with absolute certainty whether or not such license was
issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the
representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot
locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in charge
of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the
testimony of the said person was not presented in evidence.
It does not appear on record that the former custodian of the
logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony
could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to
locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein,
had been exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were
required to bring to this Court among other things
the register of application of/or (sic) for marriage
licenses received by the Office of the :Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal, from
January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did you bring with
you those records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of
the request for subpoena?
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .

maintains as required by the manual of the office

of the Local Civil Registrar?
COURT
May I see that book and the portion
marked by the witness.

COURT
Why don't you ask her direct question
whether marriage license 2880792 is
the number issued by their office while
with respect to license no. 2770792 the
office of the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan is very definite about it it was
never issued. Then ask him how about
no. 2880792 if the same was ever
issued by their office. Did you ask this
2887092, but you could not find the
record? But for the moment you cannot
locate the books? Which is which now,
was this issued or not?
A The employee handling it is already retired,
sir.19
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the
effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the
logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have
been entered, the presumption of regularity of performance
of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the
certifications, is effectively rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed is among the disputable presumptions.

Q Why not?
In one case, it was held:
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only
book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of
marriage of marriage applications that your office

The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted

by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty.22
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty
is disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as in
the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively
defeated by the tenor of the first and second certifications.

xxxx

Q Did you bring that with you?

A No, sir.

official act or duty has been regularly performed. x

x x.21

A disputable presumption has been defined as a

species of evidence that may be accepted and
acted on where there is no other evidence to
uphold the contention for which it stands, or one
which may be overcome by other evidence. One
such disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an

Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof

of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can
also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the
logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of
diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot
easily accept that absence of the same also means nonexistence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or
fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon
this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly
repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great
weight.24
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage.25
The parties have comported themselves as husband and
wife and lived together for several years producing two
offsprings,26 now adults themselves. It took Jaime several
years before he filed the petition for declaration of nullity.
Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in
1991.27 We are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring
the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in
the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and
perfidy.28
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening
the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is
based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but
a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The
State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and
happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social

and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern

of the family members alone.29
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is
x x x marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil
contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established
by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into
a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio Always presume marriage."30
This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on
the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into
a lawful contract of marriage.31
By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not
trifling with his emotion or deepest sentiments. As we have
said in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably, there
are situations like this one, where neither law nor society can
provide the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition
is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20
December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005
are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely,

controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is
Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July
1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the
instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into
fore the above provision which is now invoked by
him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a
quo 1 and the Court of Appeal, 2 Leouel persists in
beseeching its application in his attempt to have
his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of
First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The
meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and
Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows
before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of
Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding.
Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia
Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave
birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos,
Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to
happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent
interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family
affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel"
over a number of other things, like when and where the
couple should start living independently from Julia's parents
or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's
spending a few days with his own parents.

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA
ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of

America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so
dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01
January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long
distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the
expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When
Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he
underwent a training program under the auspices of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25

August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow

get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel
filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch
30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of
the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814).
Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through
counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations,
claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact,
been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree
of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had
repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia
ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither
appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit. 3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed
the decision of the trial court. 4
The petition should be denied not only because of its noncompliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification
of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at
the very least to communicate with him, for more than five
years are circumstances that clearly show her being
psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his
own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no
affection for (him) because respondent
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all
these years to communicate with the
petitioner. A wife who does not care to
inform her husband about her
whereabouts for a period of five years,

more or less, is psychologically

incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological
incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the
Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the
Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the
provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be
void from the beginning:

"That contracted by
any party who, at
the time of the
celebration, was
psychologically
incapacitated to
discharge the
essential marital
obligations, even if
such lack of
incapacity is made
manifest after the
celebration."

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration,
was wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally
incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted
from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.)
Reyes suggested that they say "wanting
in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo)
Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the
sufficient use." On the other hand,
Justice Reyes proposed that they say
"wanting in sufficient reason." Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that the
idea is that one is not lacking in
judgment but that he is lacking in the
exercise of judgment. He added that
lack of judgment would make the
marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia
Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of
judgment is more serious than
insufficient use of judgment and yet the
latter would make the marriage null and
void and the former only voidable.
Justice Caguioa suggested that
subparagraph (7) be modified to read:

Justice Caguioa explained that the

phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of
reason of judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage" refers to
defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea in
subparagraph (7), but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since
"insanity" is also a psychological or
mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only
a ground for annulment and not for
declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice
Caguioa explained that in insanity, there
is the appearance of consent, which is
the reason why it is a ground for
voidable marriages, while subparagraph
(7) does not refer to consent but to the
very essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in
subparagraph (7), the word "mentally"
be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa
concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers
to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that
subparagraph (7) refers to psychological
impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno
stated that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but
not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-)
Luciano said that it is called selective
impotency.

Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the

confusion lies in the fact that in inserting
the Canon Law annulment in the Family
Code, the Committee used a language
which describes a ground for voidable
marriages under the Civil Code. Justice
Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there
are voidable marriages under the Canon
Law, there are no voidable marriages
Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the
reason why they should make a
distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon
Law, the defects in marriage cannot be
cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the
problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground
for void ab initio marriages? In reply,
Justice Caguioa explained that insanity
is curable and there are lucid intervals,
while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno
suggested that the phrase "even if such
lack or incapacity is made manifest" be
modified to read "even if such lack or
incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity,
at the time of the marriage, it is not
apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are
two interpretations of the phrase
"psychological or mentally
incapacitated" in the first one, there is
vitiation of consent because one does
not know all the consequences of the
marriages, and if he had known these
completely, he might not have
consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor
of making psychological incapacity a
ground for voidable marriages since

otherwise it will encourage one who

really understood the consequences of
marriage to claim that he did not and to
make excuses for invalidating the
marriage by acting as if he did not
understand the obligations of marriage.
Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way
of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point
is that in the case of incapacity by
reason of defects in the mental faculties,
which is less than insanity, there is a
defect in consent and, therefore, it is
clear that it should be a ground for
voidable marriage because there is the
appearance of consent and it is capable
of convalidation for the simple reason
that there are lucid intervals and there
are cases when the insanity is curable.
He emphasized that psychological
incapacity does not refer to mental
faculties and has nothing to do with
consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof.
(Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they
do not consider it as going to the very
essence of consent. She asked if they
are really removing it from consent. In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that,
ultimately, consent in general is effected
but he stressed that his point is that it is
not principally a vitiation of consent
since there is a valid consent. He
objected to the lumping together of the
validity of the marriage celebration and
the obligations attendant to marriage,
which are completely different from each
other, because they require a different
capacity, which is eighteen years of age,
for marriage but in contract, it is
different. Justice Puno, however, felt that
psychological incapacity is still a kind of
vice of consent and that it should not be

classified as a voidable marriage which

is incapable of convalidation; it should
be convalidated but there should be no
prescription. In other words, as long as
the defect has not been cured, there is
always a right to annul the marriage and
if the defect has been really cured, it
should be a defense in the action for
annulment so that when the action for
annulment is instituted, the issue can be
raised that actually, although one might
have been psychologically
incapacitated, at the time the action is
brought, it is no longer true that he has
no concept of the consequence of
marriage.

Judge Diy proposed that they include

physical incapacity to copulate among
the grounds for void marriages. Justice
Reyes commented that in some
instances the impotence that in some
instances the impotence is only
temporary and only with respect to a
particular person. Judge Diy stated that
they can specify that it is incurable.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the term
"incurable" has a different meaning in
law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated
that "psychological incapacity" can also
be cured. Justice Caguioa, however,
pointed out that "psychological
incapacity" is incurable.

Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the

question: Will not cohabitation be a
defense? In response, Justice Puno
stated that even the bearing of children
and cohabitation should not be a sign
that psychological incapacity has been
cured.

Justice Puno observed that under the

present draft provision, it is enough to
show that at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, one was
psychologically incapacitated so that
later on if already he can comply with
the essential marital obligations, the
marriage is still void ab initio. Justice
Caguioa explained that since in divorce,
the psychological incapacity may occur
after the marriage, in void marriages, it
has to be at the time of the celebration
of marriage. He, however, stressed that
the idea in the provision is that at the
time of the celebration of the marriage,
one is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital
obligations, which incapacity continues
and later becomes manifest.

Prof. Romero opined that psychological

incapacity is still insanity of a lesser
degree. Justice Luciano suggested that
they invite a psychiatrist, who is the
expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa,
however, reiterated that psychological
incapacity is not a defect in the mind but
in the understanding of the
consequences of marriage, and
therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a
help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same
manner that there is a lucid interval in
insanity, there are also momentary
periods when there is an understanding
of the consequences of marriage.
Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit
remarked that the ground of
psychological incapacity will not apply if
the marriage was contracted at the time
when there is understanding of the
consequences of marriage. 5
xxx xxx xxx

Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however,

pointed out that it is possible that after
the marriage, one's psychological
incapacity become manifest but later on
he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice
Caguioa opined that the remedy in this
case is to allow him to remarry. 6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article
as follows:

Art. 37. A marriage

contracted by any
party who, at the
time of the
celebration, was
psychologically
incapacitated, to
comply with the
essential
obligations of
marriage shall
likewise be void
from the beginning
even if such
incapacity becomes
manifest after its
solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if"
be substituted with "although." On the
other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that
the clause "although such incapacity
becomes manifest after its
solemnization" be deleted since it may
encourage one to create the
manifestation of psychological
incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out
that, as in other provisions, they cannot
argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also
include mental and physical
incapacities, which are lesser in degree
than psychological incapacity. Justice
Caguioa explained that mental and
physical incapacities are vices of
consent while psychological incapacity
is not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said
on the matter in the minutes of their
February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third
ground, Bishop
Cruz indicated that
the phrase
"psychological or
mental impotence"
is an invention of

some churchmen
who are moralists
but not canonists,
that is why it is
considered a weak
phrase. He said that
the Code of Canon
Law would rather
express it as
"psychological or
mental incapacity to
discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they
deleted the word "mental" precisely to
distinguish it from vice of consent. He
explained that "psychological incapacity"
refers to lack of understanding of the
essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members
that, at the last meeting, they have
decided not to go into the classification
of "psychological incapacity" because
there was a lot of debate on it and that
this is precisely the reason why they
classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked
that, since there having been
annulments of marriages arising from
psychological incapacity, Civil Law
should not reconcile with Canon Law
because it is a new ground even under
Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With
this common provision in Civil Law and
in Canon Law, are they going to have a
provision in the Family Code to the
effect that marriages annulled or
declared void by the church on the
ground of psychological incapacity is
automatically annulled in Civil Law? The
other members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired
if Article 37 should be retroactive or
prospective in application.

Justice Diy opined that she was for its

retroactivity because it is their answer to
the problem of church annulments of
marriages, which are still valid under the
Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice
Reyes and Justice Puno were
concerned about the avalanche of
cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the
issue to a vote, which the Committee
approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and
Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean
Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director
Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put
in the prescriptive period of ten years
within which the action for declaration of
nullity of the marriage should be filed in
court. The Committee approved the
suggestion. 7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision
Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with
less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the
law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme.
Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code
Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N.
Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13
June 1994); thus: 8
The Committee did not give any
examples of psychological incapacity for
fear that the giving of examples would
limit the applicability of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis.
Rather, the Committee would like the
judge to interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by

experience, the findings of experts and

researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals
which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect
since the provision was taken from
Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law, 9 which reads:

of a grave psychosexual anomaly (ob

gravem anomaliam
psychosexualem)
are unable to
contract marriage
(cf. SCH/1975,
canon 297, a new
canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:

Canon 1095. They are incapable of

contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of
discretion of judgment concerning
essentila matrimonial rights and duties,
to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological
nature are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all
that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the
jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the
code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as
impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the
interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an
account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been
framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon
does not leave any doubt that the
legislator intended, indeed, to broaden
the rule. A strict and narrow norm was
proposed first:
Those who cannot
assume the
essential
obligations of
marriage because

. . . because of a grave psychological

anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon
1049);
then the same wording was retained in
the text submitted to the pope
(cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological
nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psychosexual to psychological anomaly, then
the term anomaly was altogether
eliminated. it would be, however,
incorrect to draw the conclusion that the
cause of the incapacity need not be
some kind of psychological disorder;
after all, normal and healthy person
should be able to assume the ordinary
obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity"
defies any precise definition since psychological causes can
be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage,"
written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy
Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following:
(a) a true inability to commit oneself to
the essentials of marriage. Some

psychosexual disorders and other

disorders of personality can be the
psychic cause of this defect, which is
here described in legal terms. This
particular type of incapacity consists of a
real inability to render what is due by
the contract. This could be compared to
the incapacity of a farmer to enter a
binding contract to deliver the crops
which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this
inability to commit oneself must refer to
the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and
love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of offspring;
(c) the inability must be tantamount to a
psychological abnormality. The mere
difficulty of assuming these obligations,
which could be overcome by normal
effort, obviously does not constitute
incapacity. The canon contemplates a
true psychological disorder which
incapacitates a person from giving what
is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R.
Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the
marriage is to be declared invalid under
this incapacity, it must be proved not
only that the person is afflicted by a
psychological defect, but that the
defect did in fact deprive the person, at
the moment of giving consent, of the
ability to assume the essential duties of
marriage and consequently of the
possibility of being bound by these
duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr.
Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese
of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must
be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.

It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing

disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself,
that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all
such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by
some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio
Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code
and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the
Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's
"Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the
Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently
of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in
our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the
other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under
Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere
grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not
necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree
and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are

established, every circumstance that may have some
bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that
incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is
peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of
psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in
psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.

Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide

all the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 151867

Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We

should continue to be reminded that innate in our society,
then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible
in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of
permanent union between a man a
woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino
family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State.
(Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the
basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and
they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at
all, can come close to the standards required to decree a
nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel
stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.

January 29, 2004

DAVID B. DEDEL, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL
a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM, Respondents.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz
Dedel while he was working in the advertising business of
his father. The acquaintance led to courtship and romantic
relations, culminating in the exchange of marital vows before
the City Court of Pasay on September 28, 1966.1 The civil
marriage was ratified in a church wedding on May 20, 1967.2
The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane,
born on September 18, 1968;3 Stephanie Janice born on
September 9, 1969;4 Kenneth David born on April 24,
1971;5 and Ingrid born on October 20, 1976.6 The conjugal
partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither property nor debt.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out
to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She
had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the
Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian
national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for
treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist.
Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not
stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian national named
Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had
two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the
country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two
children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even

considered the two illegitimate children as his own.

Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned
petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children.
Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on
special occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon,
petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the
declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the
Family Code, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 149. Summons was effected by publication in the
Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general circulation in
the country considering that Sharon did not reside and could
not be found in the Philippines.7
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified
that she conducted a psychological evaluation of petitioner
and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a
perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects completed up
to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he
does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was
suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by
her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several
indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing
with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with
petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling
the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and
abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social
Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity
to perform the essential obligations of marriage.8
After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and
church marriages between DAVID B. DEDEL and SHARON
L. CORPUZ celebrated on September 28, 1966 and May 20,
1967 are hereby declared null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to
perform the essential obligations of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing
between the parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof a regime
of complete separation of property between the said
spouses is established in accordance with the pertinent

provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to rights

previously acquired by creditors.

petitioner falls short to prove psychological incapacity

suffered by respondent.

Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper

civil and property registries in accordance with Article 52 of
the Family Code.

The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality

of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated. More
specifically, does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent
adverted to by petitioner fall within the term "psychological
incapacity?"

SO ORDERED.9
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, appealed alleging that
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
THE PETITION DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A
VALID GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT THE CHURCH MARRIAGE BETWEEN
PETITIONER IS NULL AND VOID.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A
DECISION WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION HAVING
BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
AS REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of
the trial court and ordered dismissal of the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage.10
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated January 8, 2002.11 Hence, the instant
petition.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused
its discretion and manifestly erred in its conclusion that the:
(1) respondent was not suffering from psychological
incapacity to perform her marital obligations; (2)
psychological incapacity of respondent is not attended by
gravity, juridical antecedence and permanence or
incurability; and (3) totality of evidence submitted by the

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,12 it was ruled:

x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68
of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment
of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision,
upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have
sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit
under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere
grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are
established, every circumstance that may have some
bearing on the degree, extent and other conditions of that
incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and

evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is

peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinion of
psychiatrists, psychologists and persons with expertise in
psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.13

Regrettably, there are circumstances, like in this case, where

neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to
every individual problem.19 While we sympathize with
petitioners marital predicament, our first and foremost duty
is to apply the law no matter how harsh it may be.20

The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a

personality disorder is a very complex and elusive
phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition. In
this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as
being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she
could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption
thereof.14 It appears that respondents promiscuity did not
exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in
fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its
celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which
produced four children.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is

DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No.
97-467 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
149, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and

abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.
Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
be equated with psychological incapacity.15 It must be shown
that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make respondent completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not
merely due to her youth, immaturity16 or sexual promiscuity.

G.R. No. 136490

We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial

court has no jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of
petitioner and respondent. The authority to do so is
exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the
Roman Catholic Church.
All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the
appellate court.1wphi1 We cannot deny the grief, frustration
and even desperation of petitioner in his present situation.

"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B.

Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on
September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab
initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal
properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with
Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles
50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the]
parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor
children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the
visitation rights of respondent.

SO ORDERED.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was
solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office,
Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for
their appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
October 19, 2000

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are

grounds for legal separation under Article 5517 of the Family
Code. However, we pointed out in Marcos v. Marcos18 that
Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation in which
the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity
but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction,
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like. In short, the evidence presented
by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not
for declaring a marriage void.

Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity

of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence
presented. There is no requirement, however, that the
respondent should be examined by a physician or a
psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
55588, which disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the
marriage between the parties is hereby declared valid."2
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA
Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration.

"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were
married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was
solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal
Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was
solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command
Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in
Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage,
five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the
Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the
Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the
Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other
hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the
Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both
of them sought a discharge from the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were
assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of
Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President
Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they
became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.

"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at

No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing
unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development
Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military
service in 1987 and then engaged in different business
ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always
urged him to look for work so that their children would see
him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good
provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful
employment, they would often quarrel and as a
consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even
force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He
would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight
mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them.
Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would
leave their house. In 1992, they were already living
separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling
"magic uling" and chickens. While she was still in the military,
she would first make deliveries early in the morning before
going to Malacaang. When she was discharged from the
military service, she concentrated on her business. Then,
she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and
construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction
Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on
October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they
were already living separately, she did not want him to stay
in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in
their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He
then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even
on her mother who came to her aid. The following day,
October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and
sought refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical
examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her
injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records,
153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters
and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to
look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got
mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected

presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat]

her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children
were renting a house in Camella, Paraaque, while the
appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C.
Millan, the children described their father as cruel and
physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A.
Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY,
Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other
hand, did not.

prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally
or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital
obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him
or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered
testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not
psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his
supposed incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor
medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or
sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no
evidence at all that would show that the appellant was
suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological or
mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have
known the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity
[was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was]
incurable."4
Hence, this Petition.5

"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically

incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly
because of his failure to find work to support his family and
his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, x x
x."3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological
incapacity had not been established by the totality of the
evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the
root cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity which
should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently
proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The
incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume
the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles
68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and
such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be
alleged in the petition, established by evidence and
explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to
any psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The
psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist
Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews
conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to

Issues
In her Memorandum,6 petitioner presents for this Court's
consideration the following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals
could set aside the findings by the Regional Trial
Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent
in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
simply because the respondent did not subject
himself to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence
presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses
should be the basis of the determination of the
merits of the Petition."7
The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or
psychological examination of respondent is not a
requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented
does not show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of
various tests that were submitted to determine respondent's
psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of

marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court

of Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those
tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have
realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but
to rely on other sources of information in order to determine
the psychological capacity of respondent, who had refused
to submit himself to such tests.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at

'the time of the celebration' of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The
manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

In Republic v. CA and Molina,8 the guidelines governing the

application and the interpretation of psychological
incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code9 were
laid down by this Court as follows:

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be

medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like
the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.

"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the

marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the
nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,'
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to
be 'protected' by the state.
xxx

xxx

xxx

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity

must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to
limit the application of the provision under the
principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring

about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated
in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the

Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,

should be given great respect by our courts.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting

attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date
the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor
vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095."10
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements
earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals:11 "psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified." What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of
the person concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the
evidence presented in the present case -- including the
testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's
sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a
finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently
convinced that respondent failed to provide material support
to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already

present at the inception of the marriage or that they are

incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the
fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed
for a period of more than six years. It was during this period
that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material
and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to
said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally
important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is
incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a
taxi driver.1wphi1
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before
the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and
so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. These marital obligations are those provided under
Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in
which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.12 At
best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage
void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient
divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural
requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however,
has not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the
marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe
the guidelines outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed
Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal
medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding
of psychological incapacity. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a
marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are
seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been
placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created
all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife
against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of
the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to
respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which
affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and
correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a
resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial
court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals 1 its decision
are as follows:

There, they slept together on the same bed in the

same room for the first night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her
expectations, that as newlyweds they were
supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual
intercourse, with each other, the defendant just
went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned
his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual
intercourse between them during the first night.
The same thing happened on the second, third
and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private
place where they can enjoy together during their
first week as husband and wife, they went to
Baguio City. But, they did so together with her
mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew.
They were all invited by the defendant to join
them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4)
days. But, during this period, there was no sexual
intercourse between them, since the defendant
avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta
time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located
at the living room. They slept together in the same
room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988
until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there
was no attempt of sexual intercourse between
them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her
husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for
medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a
urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on
January 20, 1989.

Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married

the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . .
Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage
Contract. (Exh. "A")

The results of their physical examinations were

that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while
that of her husband's examination was kept
confidential up to this time. While no medicine was
prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed
medications for her husband which was also kept
confidential. No treatment was given to her. For
her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return
but he never did.

After the celebration of their marriage and wedding

reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and
proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent,

a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis.
She said, that she had observed the defendant

From the evidence adduced, the following acts

were preponderantly established:

using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the

cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according
to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen,
to acquire or maintain his residency status here in
the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her
husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant
that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage
with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1)
that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no
defect on his part and he is physically and
psychologically capable; and, (3) since the
relationship is still very young and if there is any
differences between the two of them, it can still be
reconciled and that, according to him, if either one
of them has some incapabilities, there is no
certainty that this will not be cured. He further
claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured
by the intervention of medical technology or
science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage
on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March
15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between
them. But, the reason for this, according to the
defendant, was that everytime he wants to have
sexual intercourse with his wife, she always
avoided him and whenever he caresses her
private parts, she always removed his hands. The
defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have
sex with him only once but he did not continue
because she was shaking and she did not like it.
So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the
defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against
him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she
will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his
mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant,
will consummate their marriage.

The defendant insisted that their marriage will

remain valid because they are still very young and
there is still a chance to overcome their
differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical
examination. His penis was examined by Dr.
Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out
whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr.
Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report.
(Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no
evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is
capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to
masturbate to find out whether or not he has an
erection and he found out that from the original
size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the
penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch
and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the
defendant had only a soft erection which is why
his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable
of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the
defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse
with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that
there is no collusion between the parties and that
the evidence is not fabricated." 2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by
the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at
the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate
Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt.
Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a
copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be
furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals
erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that
there was no sexual intercourse between the
parties without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to
have sexual communion with petitioner is a
psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof
thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the
petitioner and the private respondent to have sex
with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage
between the parties decreed by the lower court
without fully satisfying itself that there was no
collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No.
Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of proving the
allegations in her complaint; that since there was no
independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus
between the parties, there remains no other basis for the
court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that
public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage
and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the
conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and
confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the
course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a
product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of

marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall

always be proved. 3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where
an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse
party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in
actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the
pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is
annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision
was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When
private respondent testified under oath before the trial court
and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and
was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby
presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such
evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon
petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their
marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March
15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why,
as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no
judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88
and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such
annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does
not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that
there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner
admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have
never had sexual contact with each other, he must have
been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant
portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity
by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed
by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts.
The issue of whether or not the appellant is
psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic
marital obligation was resolved upon a review of

both the documentary and testimonial evidence on

record. Appellant admitted that he did not have
sexual relations with his wife after almost ten
months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is
not suffering from any physical disability. Such
abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to
consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of
a serious personality disorder which to the mind of
this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage' within the meaning of
Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4,
1995). 4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in
holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the
private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the
failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about
the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth
analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be
necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there
might have been other reasons, i.e., physical disorders,
such as aches, pains or other discomforts, why private
respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from
May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10
months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the
respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner
and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with
the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never
been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e.,
even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who
refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on
record to show that any of the parties is suffering from
phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he
wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason
for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but
physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have
discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing
her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted
to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least,
there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find

out or discover what the problem with his wife could be.
What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical
Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is
capable of erection. 5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the
reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on
the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon
him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply
refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal
is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the
prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a
sign of psychological incapacity. 6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the
Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant nonfulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless
and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above
marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that
the husband's plea that the wife did not want
carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief.
Since he was not physically impotent, but he
refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire
time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that
he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out
of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be
doubted for not having asserted his right seven
though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111
Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330).
Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was
suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant
did not go to court and seek the declaration of
nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted
by the wife whose normal expectations of her
marriage were frustrated by her husband's
inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the
Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would
expose her private life to public scrutiny and

fabricate testimony against her husband if it were

not necessary to put her life in order and put to
rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that
what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or
lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is
not phychological incapacity, and which can be
achieved "through proper motivation." After almost
ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the
husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the
sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love
very dearly, and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged
approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation,
and of a serious personality disorder that
constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge
the basic marital covenants within the
contemplation of the Family Code. 7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is
actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order"
(Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless
unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island,
the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not
have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the
natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which
enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between
petitioner and private respondent. That is a shared feeling
which between husband and wife must be experienced not
only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a
time it is needed by the other can go a long way in
deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not
for children but for two consenting adults who view the
relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice
and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of
its value as a sublime social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in

which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can
do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent
appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is
hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.

Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with

Villareyes.1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another
marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge
German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage,
she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed
married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,3Villareyes
confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her
husband.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150758

February 18, 2004

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the
effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or
subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological
incapacity, on an individuals criminal liability for bigamy. We
hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not
retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar
as the Philippines penal laws are concerned. As such, an
individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable
for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that
the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted
marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April
10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr.
of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and
Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption
until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas
that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda
Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas
a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and
Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner
thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against

petitioner.4 The Information,5 which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously
united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without
the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or
subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential
requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first
marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with
Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children.
However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly
married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony
took place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he
signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the
allotment from his office in connection with his work as a
seaman.8 He further testified that he requested his brother to
verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was
any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there
was no record of said marriage.9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapulapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and
sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one

(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the

Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of
merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following
assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS
CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT A QUO CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY,
DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST
MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY
DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL
AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL
FORCE AND EFFECT.11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no
cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements
of the crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all
the essential requisites for validity.12
Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered
defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first
marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of

the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of

psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that
his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for
validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage
was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the
elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for
his acquittal.14

This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage

contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was
admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The
marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was
celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November
10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents.

Petitioners defense must fail on both counts.

Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification

issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995
and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on
February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document
attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage
celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B.
Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents
merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no
record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the
absence of a record is quite different from documentary
evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or
documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes.

First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both

documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first
marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary
evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a
marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated
November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was
solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres,
a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from
Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas
that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner
presented (1) a certification issued by the National Statistics
Office dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued
by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3,
1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective
issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated
between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on
November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense
cannot adequately assail the marriage contract, which in
itself would already have been sufficient to establish the
existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public
documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to
public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the
marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a
public record. When the original of a document is in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its
contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the
public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).

The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves

as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given
greater credence than documents testifying merely as to
absence of any record of the marriage, especially
considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law
that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil
registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a
marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists
does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for
its validity are present.19 There is no evidence presented by
the defense that would indicate that the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart
from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself.
Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes letter,
Ancajas testimony that petitioner informed her of the
existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioners own
conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first
marriage had all the requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to
verify the non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by
requesting his brother to validate such purported nonexistence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued
by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of
Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997,
respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the

accuseds marriage to his second wife, private respondent in

this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence
presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second
requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects
of the subsequent judicial declaration20 of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage to
Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to
Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime
of bigamy was not committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the
nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What
petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States
penal laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab
initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological
capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during
the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently,
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of
contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was
celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the
valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for

distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null

and void purely because it is a second or subsequent
marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on
the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as
criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The States penal
laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition
of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between
spouses, and punish an individuals deliberate disregard of
the permanent character of the special bond between
spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an
indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity
of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into
essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their
consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing
officer)23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer,
marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the
parties personally declare their agreement to marry before
the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two
witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or
female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under
any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 3725 and
3826 may contract marriage.27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the
validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas.
Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily
contracted the second marriage with the required license
before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of
Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the
date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant
to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among
these effects is that children conceived or born before the
judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition
written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void
ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among
these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for
bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal
laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in
some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of

contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of

hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the
crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on
record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his
marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still
subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of
the accuseds guilt for purposes of this particular case, the
act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the
sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on
such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key
characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual
manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of
the States basic social institution, the States criminal laws
on bigamy step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
the penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which
has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner
shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which
has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the
decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant
petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting
petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173614

September 28, 2007

LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND
TRINIDAD CATLI-MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY
VILMA M. ARTICULO, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assails the Order,1dated 3
May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri,
Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057, granting
reconsideration of its Order,2 dated 11 October 2005, and
reinstating respondents Complaint for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage.
On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio
B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli
(Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico.
Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio
and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo,
Cagayan.3 They begot seven children, herein respondents,
namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle
and Joseph Lloyd.4 On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died.5 On 26
August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal
Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan.6 Six months later, or on 10
February 2005, Eulogio passed away.7
In impugning petitioners marriage to Eulogio, respondents
averred that the same was entered into without the requisite
marriage license. They argued that Article 348 of the Family
Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been
living together for at least five years without any legal
impediment from securing a marriage license, was not
applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because they could not
have lived together under the circumstances required by
said provision. Respondents posited that the marriage of
Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latters
death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely three months
from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore,
petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years. To further their
cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack of
marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which
made its performance impossible.

In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio

lived together as husband and wife under one roof for 21
years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from
the requirement of a marriage license. From their union were
born Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, all surnamed
Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30 October 1991,
respectively. She further contended that the marriage
ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo,
Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an
affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action
on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while
living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order,9 granting the
dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of action. It cited
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,10 dated 7 March 2003, promulgated
by the Supreme Court En Banc as basis. The RTC
elucidated on its position in the following manner:
The Complaint should be dismissed.
1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by
the Supreme Court which took effect on March 15, 2003
provides in Section 2, par. (a)11 that a petition for Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife. The language of this rule is plain
and simple which states that such a petition may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife. The rule is clear and
unequivocal that only the husband or the wife may file the
petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage.
The reading of this Court is that the right to bring such
petition is exclusive and this right solely belongs to
them. Consequently, the heirs of the deceased spouse
cannot substitute their late father in bringing the action to
declare the marriage null and void.12 (Emphasis supplied.)
The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:
WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an
affirmative defense in the answer is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Complaint filed by the [respondents] is
hereby DISMISSED with costs de officio. 13
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
Following the filing by petitioner of her Comment to the said
motion, the RTC rendered an Order14 dated 3 May 2006,
reversing its Order of 11 October 2005. Hence, the RTC
reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed

Order ignored the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog,15which was on

the authority for holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse
have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the
death of the latter. It held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-1120-SC, which provides that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife, applies only where both parties to a
void marriage are still living.16 Where one or both parties are
deceased, the RTC held that the heirs may file a petition to
declare the marriage void. The RTC expounded on its
stance, thus:
The questioned Order disregarded the case of Nial vs.
Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000) in which the
Supreme Court, First Division, held that the heirs of a
deceased person may file a petition for the declaration of his
marriage after his death. The Order subject of this motion for
reconsideration held that the case of Nial vs. Bayadog is
now superseded by the new Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Marriages (hereinafter referred to as the Rule)
because the Supreme Court has rejected the case of Nial
vs. Bayadog by approving the Rule on Nullity of Void
Marriages. The Order further held that it is only the husband
or the wife who is (sic) the only parties allowed to file an
action for declaration of nullity of their marriage and such
right is purely personal and is not transmissible upon the
death of the parties.
It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the
case of Nial vs. Bayadog and Section 2(a) of the Rule. In
view of this, the Court shall try to reconcile the case of Nial
vs. Bayadog and the Rule. To reconcile, the Court will have
to determine [the] basic rights of the parties. The rights of the
legitimate heirs of a person who entered into a void marriage
will be prejudiced particularly with respect to their
successional rights. During the lifetime of the parent[,] the
heirs have only an inchoate right over the property of the
said parents. Hence, during the lifetime of the parent, it
would be proper that it should solely be the parent who
should be allowed to file a petition to declare his marriage
void. However, upon the death of the parent his heirs have
already a vested right over whatever property left by the
parent. Such vested right should not be frustrated by any
rules of procedure such as the Rule. Rules of Procedure
cannot repeal rights granted by substantive law. The heirs,
then, have a legal standing in Court.
If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage
entered by their parent, especially when the marriage is
illegal and feloniously entered into, it will give premium to

such union because the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at

all, ask for the annulment of the marriage. Such void
marriage will be given a semblance of validity if the heirs will
not be allowed to file the petition after the death of the
parent.
For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the
Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage is
applicable only when both parties to a (sic) void marriage are
still living. Upon the death of anyone of the guilty party to the
void marriage, his heirs may file a petition to declare the the
(sic) marriage void, but the Rule is not applicable as it was
not filed b the husband or the wife. It shall be the ordinary
rule of civil procedure which shall be applicable.17
Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May
2006 states:
In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for
reconsideration dated October 31, 2005 and reinstate this
case.18
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the foregoing Order; however, on 1 June 2006, the RTC
denied the said motion on the ground that no new matter
was raised therein.19
Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure on the sole question of whether the case
law as embodied in Nial, or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of
the Supreme Court applies to the case at bar.
At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated
route to this Court, countenancing the hierarchy of courts.
We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court
has the concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and
the RTCs (for writs enforceable within their respective
regions), to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition or
certiorari, the litigants are well advised against taking a direct
recourse to this Court.20 Instead, they should initially seek
the proper relief from the lower courts. As a court of last
resort, this Court should not be burdened with the task of
dealing with causes in the first instance. Where the issuance
of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or the RTC, litigants
must observe the principle of hierarchy of courts.21 However,

it cannot be gainsaid that this Court has the discretionary

power to brush aside procedural lapses if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction.22 Moreover,
notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant Petition for its
failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, this
Court will proceed to entertain the case grounded as it is on
a pure question of law.
Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the
instant case. A contrario, respondents posit that it is Nial
which is applicable, whereby the heirs of the deceased
person were granted the right to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death.

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no

room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family
Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.24
Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March
2003, following its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there is
no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
with the ruling in Nial, because they vary in scope and
application. As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines,
and is prospective in its application. The marriage of
petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on 26 August 2004, and
it squarely falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

We grant the Petition.

In reinstating respondents Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion.
While it is true that Nial in no uncertain terms allowed
therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent after
the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling
for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The
Court in Nial recognized that the applicable law to
determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein
is the Civil Code, which was the law in effect at the time of
their celebration.23 What we have before us belongs to a
different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void
was entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code. As
can be gleaned from the facts, petitioners marriage to
Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.1wphi1
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as
contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to
wit:
Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern petitions for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of
the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section

2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which provides:
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife. (n) (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil
expositore non indiget. When the language of the law is
clear, no explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the husband or
the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage.
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders
explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for
annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by
the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the
State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for
annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.

The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal

right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have
only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor,
and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of
the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in
the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the
State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.25 (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the
court a quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any
recourse under the law. They can still protect their
successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the
Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II4057 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri,
Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without
prejudice to challenging the validity of the marriage of Lolita
D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the
validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased
SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death benefits is now the

subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he

married. 1wphi1.nt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking
to set aside the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case
No. Q-93-18632.

collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the

marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab
initio because the same was solemnized without the required
marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented:
1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner
which bears no marriage license number; 5 and 2) a
certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads

During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he

contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969,
with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as
Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely,
Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second was on
November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario
(hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no
children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way
back in 1982.

This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage

license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and
SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on
June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true
copy or transcription of Marriage License number from the
records of this archives.

In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden

due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He
passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of
Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses.
Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary
benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased
from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao
was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI,
PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig, 3 while
respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from
GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS). 4

On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of

respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:

On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the

instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner
Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to
return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six
thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as
death benefits which she (petitioner) received from MBAI,
PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Despite
service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer,
prompting the trial court to declare her in default.

On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter

affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the
instant petition, contending that:

Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the

deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without
first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased. She, however,
claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage
and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the
deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself
as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for

This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan

Yee Cario for whatever legal purpose it may serve. 6

WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the

plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of the amount which
was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the
death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, plus attorneys fees in
the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7

I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA.
DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO
THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE
INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND

UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY

CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE
OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE
BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN
ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE
FAMILY CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from
legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. 9 However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but
not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court
may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death
of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted
to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. 10 In such
instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not
be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void. 11
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient
authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages in
this case, as the same is essential to the determination of
who is rightfully entitled to the subject death benefits of the
deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was
solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage, 12 and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions, 13 renders the marriage void ab initio. 14

In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of

petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the
marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage
license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their
marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the
marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no
marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no
record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a certification is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license.
Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present
case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law
to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage
of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently
overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove
that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required
marriage license. Although she was declared in default
before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the
issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her
pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But
petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to
refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in
jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage
cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not
being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage
license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however,
that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
declared void ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny
would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To
reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes
of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration
of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a
party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the
second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of
the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan
Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the
deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that

their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a

judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of
respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void
ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is
the separation of the property of the spouses according to
the applicable property regime. 16 Considering that the two
marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime
would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of
property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles
147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of
Unions Without Marriage.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the
property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubine,
relationships where both man and woman are married to
other persons, multiple alliances of the same married
man, 17 ... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the
parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong
to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each
party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too,
contributions in the form of care of the home, children and
household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in
this regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and
the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been
solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage
then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the
deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit
Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and
PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits
from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a
police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof
to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed
money, property or industry in the acquisition of these
monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by

respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased

alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the
same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of
the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent,
not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This
article applies to unions of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other
reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147
of the Family Code reads Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired
while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of
the household.
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good
faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership
shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case
of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children
or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party.
In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination
of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages
and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation
shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be
divided equally between them, even if only one party earned
the wages and the other did not contribute

thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed death benefits

were earned by the deceased alone as a government
employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect
thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As
there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both
parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith.
Thus, one-half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny
shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime,
and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by,
intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children
with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of
Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de Consuegra v.
Government Service Insurance System, 20 where the Court
awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the deceased
to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding
that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been
dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership
established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the
first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of
her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in
his estate upon his death should she survive him.
Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still
subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an
interest in the husbands share in the property here in
dispute.... And with respect to the right of the second wife,
this Court observed that although the second marriage can
be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while
the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for
judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the
conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was
dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, [t]he only
just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize
the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the
property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the
other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the
first marriage. 21
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision
is premised on the rule which requires a prior and separate
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason
why in the said case, the Court determined the rights of the
parties in accordance with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court,
construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a prior
and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all

important condition precedent only for purposes of

remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married
wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to
obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void,
before he or she could contract said second marriage,
otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same
rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void
because the parties are not free to determine for themselves
the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for
purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for
collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed
to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of
nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present
evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that
the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid.
Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the
issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage
involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in
accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence.
Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it
is essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When
such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code
connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only
for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of
P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case
No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement
as to costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

A. MARRIAGE LICENSE

1. Sevilla vs. Cardenas,

G.R. No. 167684, 31 July
2006
2. Ninal vs. Bayadog, G.R.
No. 133978, March 14,
2000
3. De Castro vs. De Castro,
G.R. 160172, February
13, 2008

B. ARTICLE 26
1. Van Dorn vs. Romillo,
G.R. No. 68470, October
8, 1985
2. Republic vs. Obrtecido
III, G.R. 154380,
October 5, 2005
C. ARTICLE 36
1. Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, 240 SCRA 20

2. Dedel vs. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No.
151867, January 29,
2004
3. Marcos vs. Marcos,
G.R.136490, October
19, 2000
4. Tsoi vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. 119190,
January 16, 1997
5. Tenebro vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No.
150758, February 18,
2004
D.
ONLY THE PARTY
TO THE MARRIAGE MAY
RAISE ITS NULLITY
1. Enrico vs. Heirs of
Medinaceli, G.R. No.
173614, September 28,
2007

E. VOID MARRIAGE
MAUST BE DECLARED
VOID
1.

Susan NicdaoCarino vs.

Susan Yee Carino
G.R. 132529, February
2, 2001