Albano Magic

Magic Areas in Remedial Law
2014 Bar
Dean Ed Vicente S. Albano
JURISDICTION
1. CONCEPT
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2. ESTOPPEL TO QUESTION JURISDICTION

Tijam v. Sibonghanoy
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure
affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain
such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136
Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it
was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of
the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such
cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the
judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but
for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated obviously for
reasons of public policy.
Freviela v. Banayad
can be raised anytime
Despite the pendency of this case for around 18 years, the exception laid
down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy and clarified recently in Figueroa v. People
cannot be applied. First, because, as a general rule, the principle of estoppel
by laches cannot lie against the government. No injustice to the parties or to
any third person will be wrought by the ruling that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the instituted probate proceedings. Second and most
important, because in Tijam, the delayed invocation of lack of jurisdiction has
been made during the execution stage of a final and executory ruling of a
court. In Figueroa, the Court has emphasized that estoppel by laches only
supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu in Tijam.
Clearly, then, in Tijam, the issue of lack of jurisdiction has only been raised
during the execution stage, specifically when the matter of the trial courts
denial of the suretys motion to quash the writ of execution has been brought
to the appellate court for review. Here, the trial courts assumption of
unauthorized jurisdiction over the probate proceedings has been discovered
by the Court during the appeal stage of the main case, not during the
execution stage of a final and executory decision. Thus, the exceptional rule
laid down in Tijam cannot apply.
3. DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY
DBP v. Gatal
There being no litis pendentia, the Court of Appeals likewise erred in applying
the doctrine of non-interference between courts of equal rank. Under the
said doctrine, a trial court has no authority to interfere with the proceedings of
a court of equal jurisdiction.[12] When Branch 47 issued the writ of
possession, it did not interfere with the jurisdiction of Branch 4 in the
injunction case. It merely exercised its ministerial function of issuing the
writ of possession.
Santos v. Bayhon
The general rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the
judgments or decrees of another court with concurrent or coordinate
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jurisdiction possessing equal power to grant injunctive relief, applies only

when no third-party claimant is involved. When a third-party, or a stranger
to the action, asserts a claim over the property levied upon, the claimant may
vindicate his claim by an independent action in the proper civil court which
may stop the execution of the judgment on property not belonging to the
judgment debtor.
4. REAL ACTION
Republic v. RCAM
assessed value
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and whether the tribunal has
jurisdiction over such action are to be determined from the material
allegations of the complaint, the law in force at the time the complaint is filed,
and the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to all or some of the claims averred. 20 Jurisdiction is not affected by
the pleas or the theories set up by defendant in an answer to the complaint or
a motion to dismiss the same.21
In the present case, the material averments, as well as the character of the
relief prayed for by petitioners in the complaint before the RTC, show that
their action is one for cancellation of titles and reversion, not for annulment of
judgment of the RTC. The complaint alleged that Lot Nos. 43 to 50, the
parcels of land subject matter of the action, were not the subject of the CFIs
judgment in the relevant prior land registration case. Hence, petitioners pray
that the certificates of title of RCAM be cancelled which will not necessitate
the annulment of said judgment. Clearly, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court on
annulment of judgment finds no application in the instant case.
The RTC may properly take cognizance of reversion suits which do not call
for an annulment of judgment of the RTC 22 acting as a Land Registration
Court. Actions for cancellation of title and reversion, like the present case,
belong to the class of cases that "involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein"23 and where the assessed value of the
property exceeds P20,000.00,24 fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
**
5. PERSONAL ACTION; SUM OF MONEY

Totality Rule
Soriano v. Mendoza
Section 19(8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No.
7691, states the pertinent law.
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds
XXXXX
But relatedly, Administrative Circular No. 09-94 expressly states:
The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in
determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19(8) and
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Section 33(1) of BP Blg. 129, as amended by RA No. 7691,

applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a
consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases
where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one
of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
(Underscoring supplied.)
Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts, as in this case, are primarily and
effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of money for the damages for tortious
acts. In this case, respondents claim of P929,006 in damages and P25,000
attorneys fees plus P500 per court appearance represents the monetary
equivalent for compensation of the alleged injury. These money claims are the
principal reliefs sought by respondents in their complaint for damages.
Consequently then, we hold that the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
possessed and properly exercised jurisdiction over the case.
Padlan v. Dinglasan (J. Peralta)
From the Complaint, the case filed by respondent is not simply a case for the
cancellation of a particular certificate of title and the revival of another. The
determination of such issue merely follows after a court of competent
jurisdiction shall have first resolved the matter of who between the conflicting
parties is the lawful owner of the subject property and ultimately entitled to its
possession and enjoyment. The action is, therefore, about ascertaining which
of these parties is the lawful owner of the subject lot, jurisdiction over which is
determined by the assessed value of such lot.20
In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege
the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest
thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action.
**
To reiterate, where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to

real property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the
assessed value of the property subject thereof. 23 Since the amount alleged in
the Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC
and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in
the RTC are null and void.
6. BEYOND [NO] PECUNIARY ESTIMATION
Villena v. Payoyo
A case for breach of contract is a cause of action either for specific
performance or rescission of contracts. 13 An action for rescission of contract,
as a counterpart of an action for specific performance, is incapable of
pecuniary estimation, and therefore falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC. 14 In
the present case, the averments in the complaint show that Payoyo sought
the cancellation of the contracts and refund of the downpayments since
Villena failed to comply with the obligation to deliver the appliances and install
the kitchen cabinets subject of the contracts. The court then must examine
the facts and the applicable law to determine whether there is in fact
substantial breach that would warrant rescission or cancellation of the
contracts and entitle the respondent for a refund. While the respondent
prayed for the refund, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the
rescission or cancellation of the contracts.
Bautista v. Lindo (2014 Case)
action to enforce right to repurchase
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Settled jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable of pecuniary

estimation, viz:
1. Actions for specific performance;
2. Actions for support which will require the determination of the civil
status;
3. The right to support of the plaintiff;
4. Those for the annulment of decisions of lower courts;
5. Those for the rescission or reformation of contracts;
6. Interpretation of a contractual stipulation.
The Court finds that the instant cause of action to redeem the land is one for
specific performance.
The facts are clear that Bautista sold to respondents his lots which were
covered by a free patent. While the deeds of sale do not explicitly contain the
stipulation that the sale is subject to repurchase by the applicant within a
period of five (5) years from the date of conveyance pursuant to Sec. 119 of
CA 141, still, such legal provision is deemed integrated and made part of the
deed of sale as prescribed by law. It is basic that the law is deemed written
into every contract. Although a contract is the law between the parties, the
provisions of positive law which regulate contracts are deemed written therein
and shall limit and govern the relations between the parties. Thus, it is a
binding prestation in favor of Bautista which he may seek to enforce. That is
precisely what he did. He filed a complaint to enforce his right granted by law
to recover the lot subject of free patent. Ergo, it is clear that his action is for
specific performance, or if not strictly such action, then it is akin or analogous
to one of specific performance. Such being the case, his action for specific
performance is incapable of pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the RTC.
BARANGAY CONCILIATION
7. NATURE OF THE RULE; RESIDENCE
Angel Boleley v. Villanueva
In procedural law, however, specifically for purposes of venue it has been
held that the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation or his actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.
Nevertheless, the complaint clearly implies that the parties do not reside in
the same city or municipality. The venue of the action is not affected by the
filing of defendants (respondents) motion to dismiss stating that he also
resided in Baguio City. That is not decisive to determine the proper venue.
Consequently, we rule that there is no need of prior referral of the dispute to
the barangay lupon or pangkat in the absence of showing in the complaint
itself that the parties reside in the same city or municipality.
Pascual v. Pascual
**
B.E.G.
Where the parties are not actual residents in the same city or municipality or
adjoining barangays, there is no requirement for them to submit their dispute
to the lupon as provided for in Section 6 vis a vis Sections 2 and 3 of P.D.
1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law).
8. COMPROMISE IN THE BARANGAY

2014 Bar
Catedrilla v. Launon (PERALTA)

can rescind if violated; 2037, 2041, CC
Indeed, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides that an
amicable settlement reached after barangay conciliation proceedings has the
force and effect of a final judgment of a court if not repudiated or a petition to
nullify the same is filed before the proper city or municipal court within ten
(10) days from its date. It further provides that the settlement may be
enforced by execution by the lupong tagapamayapa within six (6) months
from its date, or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond
the six-month period. This special provision follows the general precept
enunciated in Article 2037 of the Civil Code, viz.:
A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata;
but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial
compromise. Thus, we have held that a compromise agreement which is not
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs is a valid
contract which is the law between the parties themselves. It has upon them
the effect and authority of res judicata even if not judicially approved, and
cannot be lightly set aside or disturbed except for vices of consent and
forgery.
However, in Heirs of Zari, et al. v. Santos, we clarified that the broad precept
enunciated in Art. 2037 is qualified by Art. 2041 of the same Code, which
provides:
If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other
party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist
upon his original demand.
In exercising the second option under Art. 2041, the aggrieved party may, if
he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand, as
if there had never been any compromise agreement, without bringing an
action for rescission. This is because he may regard the compromise as
already rescinded by the breach thereof of the other party.29
While the amicable settlement executed between Maximo and respondent
Margie before the Barangay had the force and effect of a final judgment of a
court, it appears that there was non-compliance thereto by respondent Margie
on behalf of her parents which may be construed as repudiation. The
settlement is considered rescinded in accordance with the provision of Article
2041 of the Civil Code. Since the settlement was rescinded, petitioner, as a
co-owner, properly instituted the action for ejectment to recover possession of
the subject lot against respondents who are in possession of the same
CAUSE OF ACTION (RULE 2)
9. cause of action; elements; splitting; effect
Oco v. Limbaring
Interest within the meaning of the Rules means material interest or an interest
in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved. 31 One having
no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the
plaintiff in an action.32 When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the
case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.
Ferrer v. Bautista
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Facts: Petitioner has no cause of action against the defendants because the
Patent title issued in favor of the Firmalos (defendants here) by the Director of
Lands is by now already indefeasible due to the lapse of one year following
the entry of the decree of registration in the records of the register of deeds
SC: The Director of Lands has no authority to grant a free patent over land
that has passed to private ownership and which has thereby ceased to be
public land. Any title thus issued or conveyed by him would be null and void.
The nullity arises, not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is no
longer under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands, the latter's authority
being limited only to lands of public dominion and not those that are privately
owned. Herein private respondents, therefore, acquired no right or title over
the disputed land by virtue of the free patent since at the time it was issued in
1966, it was already private property and not a part of the disposable land of
the public domain.
***
Although, ordinarily, a title becomes incontrovertible one year after it is issued

pursuant to a public grant, the rule does not apply when such issuance is null
and void. An action to declare the nullity of that void title does not prescribe; in
fact, it is susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral, attack
10. misjoinder of cause of action
Unicapital Inc. v. Consing
effect
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Besides, even on the assumption that there was a misjoinder of causes of

action, still, such defect should not result in the dismissal of Consing, Jr.s
complaint. Section 6, Rule 2 of the Rules explicitly states that a "misjoinder of
causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action" and that "a
misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the
court, be severed and proceeded with separately."
11. complexing of cause of action
Rule
Ada v. Baylon
exception
Nevertheless, while parties to an action may assert in one pleading, in the
alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as they may have against
an opposing party, such joinder of causes of action is subject to the condition,
inter alia, that the joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by
special rules.31
Here, there was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action for partition filed
by the petitioners could not be joined with the action for the rescission of
the said donation inter vivos in favor of Florante. The variance in the
procedure in the special civil action of partition and in the ordinary civil action
of rescission precludes their joinder in one complaint or their being tried in a
single proceeding to avoid confusion in determining what rules shall govern
the conduct of the proceedings as well as in the determination of the
presence of requisite elements of each particular cause of action.
Nevertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal.
Indeed, the courts have the power, acting upon the motion of a party to the
case or sua sponte, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action to
be proceeded with separately.33 However, if there is no objection to the
improper joinder or the court did not motu proprio direct a severance, then
there exists no bar in the simultaneous adjudication of all the erroneously
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joined causes of action
***
It should be emphasized that the foregoing rule only applies if the court trying
the case has jurisdiction over all of the causes of action therein
notwithstanding the misjoinder of the same. If the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over a misjoined cause of action, then such misjoined cause of
action has to be severed from the other causes of action, and if not so
severed, any adjudication rendered by the court with respect to the same
would be a nullity
PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS (RULE 3)
12. parties
Real Parties in Interest
Indispensable Parties
Necessary Parties
Goco v. CA
An action for annulment of certificates of title to property into the issue of
ownership of the land covered by a Torrens title and the relief generally
prayed for by the plaintiff is to be declared as the lands true owner. The real
party in interest in such action therefore is the person claiming title or
ownership adverse to that of the registered owner
The petitioners demand the annulment of respondent Catlys titles because
they allege that these included portions belonging to the Municipality of
Calapan. This allegation is a clear recognition of the Municipalitys
superior interest over the lot. In instituting the action for annulment of
respondent Catlys titles, what the petitioners are asserting is a right
that is not personal to them, but to that of the local government. That
they are lessees who were granted by the Municipality of Calapan the option
to purchase the portion they occupy does not suffice to constitute as parties
with material interest to commence the action.
Salvador v. CA
Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all persons interested in
the land sought to be partitioned must be joined as defendants in the
complaints. All co-owners and persons having an interest in the property are
considered indispensable parties and an action for partition will not lie without
the joinder of said persons. 39 It has been held that the absence of an
indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings
subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment.
Insofar as the partition of Maria Yabo's estate is concerned, Jose is an
indispensable party. Strictly, the rule on indispensable parties may bar a
partition of Maria's estate. Considering, however, that such estate or its
partition are but incidents in Civil Case No. 5000 and Civil Case No. 5174,
and the parties have not offered any objection to the propriety of the
determination and partition of her estate, then in the light of Section 11 of
Rule 3 (Misjoinder is not a ground for dismissal) and Sections 1 and 5, Rule
10 (Amendment of Pleadings to Conform with evidence) of the Rules of
Court, and following the rulings of this Court in the 1910 case of Alonso vs.
Villamor 43 and the 1947 case of Cuyugan vs. Dizon, 44 an amendment of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 5174 to implead Jose Yabo as party plaintiff would
be in order.
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Arcelona v. CA
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.
Petitioners are co-owners of a fishpond. Private respondent does not deny
this fact, and the Court of Appeals did not make any contrary finding. The
fishpond is undivided; it is impossible to pinpoint which specific portion of the
property is owned by Olanday, et al. and which portion belongs to
petitioners. Thus, it is not possible to show over which portion the tenancy
relation of private respondent has been established and ruled upon in Civil
Case D-7240. Indeed, petitioners should have been properly impleaded as
indispensable parties.
Stronghold Inc. v. Cuenca (BERSAMIN)
Accordingly, a person, to be a real party in interest in whose name an action
must be prosecuted, should appear to be the present real owner of the right
sought to be enforced, that is, his interest must be a present substantial
interest, not a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest.30
Where the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the ground for the motion to
dismiss is lack of cause of action. The reason for this is that the courts ought
not to pass upon questions not derived from any actual controversy. Truly, a
person having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of
the court as the plaintiff in an action. Nor does a court acquire jurisdiction over
a case where the real party in interest is not present or impleaded.
The purposes of the requirement for the real party in interest prosecuting or
defending an action at law are: (a) to prevent the prosecution of actions by
persons without any right, title or interest in the case; (b) to require that the
actual party entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the action; (c) to
avoid a multiplicity of suits; and (d) to discourage litigation and keep it within
certain bounds, pursuant to sound public policy.
Boston Equity Resource Corp. v. CA
On the other hand, a "person is not an indispensable party if his interest in the
controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other
parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a
decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an
indispensable party if his presence would merely permit complete relief
between him or her and those already parties to the action, or if he or she has
no interest in the subject matter of the action." It is not a sufficient reason to
declare a person to be an indispensable party simply because his or her
presence will avoid multiple litigations.
Applying the foregoing pronouncements to the case at bar, it is clear that the
estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to the collection case, for the
simple reason that the obligation of Manuel and his wife, respondent herein,
is solidary. It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the
applicable provision in this matter. Said provision gives the creditor the right to
"proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously." The choice is undoubtedly left to the solidary creditor to
determine against whom he will enforce collection. It is not mandatory for him
to have the case dismissed as against the surviving debtors and file its claim
against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor, For to require the creditor
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to proceed against the estate, making it a condition precedent for any

collection action against the surviving debtors to prosper, would deprive him
of his substantive rights provided by Article 1216 of the New Civil Code.
Parties may be either plaintiffs or defendants. In order to maintain an action in
a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is, he,
she or it must be a person in law and possessed of a legal entity as either a
natural or an artificial person, and no suit can be lawfully prosecuted save in
the name of such a person.
The rule is no different as regards party defendants. It is incumbent upon a
plaintiff, when he institutes a judicial proceeding, to name the proper party
defendant to his cause of action. In a suit or proceeding in personam of an
adversary character, the court can acquire no jurisdiction for the purpose of
trial or judgment until a party defendant who actually or legally exists and is
legally capable of being sued, is brought before it. It has even been held that
the question of the legal personality of a party defendant is a question of
substance going to the jurisdiction of the court and not one of procedure.
***
Indeed, where the defendant is neither a natural nor a juridical person or an

entity authorized by law, the complaint may be dismissed on the ground that
the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action or for failure to
state a cause of action pursuant to Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court, because a complaint cannot possibly state a cause of action against
one who cannot be a party to a civil action.
13. misjoinder; non-joinder of parties
Mescina v. Fian
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such
times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the
initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the
complaint for the plaintiffs failure to comply with the order.The remedy is to
implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.x x x (Emphasis Ours.)
Thus, the dismissal of the case for failure to state a cause of action is
improper. What the trial court should have done is to direct petitioner Norman
Mesina to implead all the heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr. as defendants within a
reasonable time from notice with a warning that his failure to do so shall mean
dismissal of the complaint.
14. substitution of parties
Sumalyag v. CA
The reporting issue that goes into the core of this case is whether counsel
properly gave the court the name and address of the legal representative of
the deceased that Section 16, Rule 3 specifies. We rule that he did not. The
legal representatives that the provision speaks of, refer to those authorized
by law the administrator, executor or guardian[19] who, under the rule on
settlement of estate of deceased persons,[20] is constituted to take over the
estate of the deceased. Section 16, Rule 3 likewise expressly provides that
the heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator . . .. Significantly, the person now the present petitioner - that
counsel gave as substitute was not one of those mentioned under Section 16,
Rule 3. Rather, he is a counterclaim co-defendant of the deceased whose
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proferred justification for the requested substitution is the transfer to him of

the interests of the deceased in the litigation prior to her death.
Boston Equity Resource Corp. v. CA
Substitution is proper only where the party to be substituted died during the
pendency of the case, as expressly provided for by Section 16, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court.
Here, since Manuel was already dead at the time of the filing of the complaint,
the court never acquired jurisdiction over his person and, in effect, there was
no party to be substituted.
Death of Party
action that survives
Cruz v. Cruz
- action for annulment of sale survives
**
We rule that it was error for the RTC to dismiss the case. As mentioned
earlier, the petition for annulment of deed of sale involves property and
property rights, and hence, survives the death of petitioner Memoracion.
The RTC was informed, albeit belatedly,13 of the death of Memoracion, and
was supplied with the name and address of her legal representative, Edgardo
Cruz. What the RTC could have done was to require Edgardo Cruz to appear
in court and substitute Memoracion as party to the pending case, pursuant to
Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, and
established jurisprudence.
15. class suit
Oposa v. Factoran
Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original
defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter.
Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit.
The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just
to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the
parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible,
to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs
therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection
of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid
class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present
both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an
incident to the former.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations,
file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm
and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such
rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and
other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.
10
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
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preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
Citizen Suit under Writ of Kalikasan
**
VIP
VENUE OF ACTIONS (RULE 4)

16. agreement; etc.
Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. v. CA
Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit
may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the
parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the
places fixed by law (Rule 4, specifically). As in any other agreement, what is
essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the
matter.
Since convenience is the raison d'etre of the rules of venue, it is easy to
accept the proposition that normally, venue stipulations should be deemed
permissive merely, and that interpretation should be adopted which most
serves the parties' convenience. In other words, stipulations designating
venues other than those assigned by Rule 4 should be interpreted as
designed to make it more convenient for the parties to institute actions arising
from or in relation to their agreements; that is to say, as simply adding to or
expanding the venues indicated in said Rule 4.
On the other hand, because restrictive stipulations are in derogation of this
general policy, the language of the parties must be so clear and categorical
as to leave no doubt of their intention to limit the place or places, or to fix
places other than those indicated in Rule 4, for their actions.
Marcos Araneta v. CA
Sec. 2 of Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that when there is more than one
plaintiff in a personal action case, the residences of the principal parties
should be the basis for determining proper venue. According to the late
Justice Jose Y. Feria, the word principal has been added [in the uniform
procedure rule] in order to prevent the plaintiff from choosing the residence of
a minor plaintiff or defendant as the venue. Eliminate the qualifying term
principal and the purpose of the Rule would, to borrow from Justice
Regalado, be defeated where a nominal or formal party is impleaded in the
action since the latter would not have the degree of interest in the subject of
the action which would warrant and entail the desirably active participation
expected of litigants in a case.
The Court can concede that Irenes three co-plaintiffs are all residents of
Batac, Ilocos Norte. But it ought to be stressed in this regard that not one of
the three can be considered as principal party-plaintiffs in Civil Case Nos.
3341-17 and 3342-17, included as they were in the amended complaint as
trustees of the principal plaintiff. As trustees, they may be accorded, by virtue
of Sec. 3 of Rule 3, the right to prosecute a suit, but only on behalf of the
beneficiary who must be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed
to be the real party-in-interest. In the final analysis, the residences of Irenes
co-plaintiffs cannot be made the basis in determining the venue of the subject
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suit. This conclusion becomes all the more forceful considering that Irene
herself initiated and was actively prosecuting her claim against Benedicto, his
heirs, assigns, or associates, virtually rendering the impleading of the trustees
unnecessary.
And this brings us to the final point. Irene was a resident during the period
material of Forbes Park, Makati City. She was not a resident of Brgy. Lacub,
Batac, Ilocos Norte, although jurisprudence has it that one can have several
residences, if such were the established fact. The Court will not speculate on
the reason why petitioner Irene, for all the inconvenience and expenses she
and her adversaries would have to endure by a Batac trial, preferred that her
case be heard and decided by the RTC in Batac. On the heels of the
dismissal of the original complaints on the ground of improper venue, three
new personalities were added to the complaint doubtless to insure, but in vain
as it turned out, that the case stays with the RTC in Batac.
Spouses Rigor v. Financial Leasing Corp.
doctrine of complementary contracts construed together
There is no dispute that the words shall only preceding the designation of
venue in the promissory note, standing alone, is mandatory and restrictive.
However, the deed of chattel mortgage executed to secure the loan obligation
provides alternative venues. Should we disregard the venue provision in the
deed of chattel mortgage as mere surplusage as contended by petitioners?
The chattel mortgage constituted over the two dump trucks is an accessory
contract to the loan obligation as embodied in the promissory note. Provisions
of an accessory contract such as a surety bond must be read in its entirety
and together with the principal contract between the parties. The promissory
note and the deed of chattel mortgage must be construed together.
The rules on venue are intended to assure convenience for the plaintiff and
his witnesses and to promote the ends of justice. As correctly pointed out by
private respondent, Dagupan City is the more convenient venue for both
parties considering that private respondent has a branch office in the city
while petitioners reside in nearby Tarlac. From this standpoint, petitioners
futile insistence on an exclusive venue in Makati City smacks of a dilatory
tactic to evade or at the very least, prolong the payment of a just obligation.
The case has been pending for four years on account of the question of
venue to the detriment of private respondent which is simply collecting on an
outstanding loan obligation.
Davao Light & Power Corp. v. CA
corporation
The plaintiff being a private corporation undoubtedly Banilad, Cebu City is the
plaintiffs principal place of business as alleged in the complaint and which for
purposes of venue is considered as its residence.
In Clavecilla Radio System v. Antillon, this Court explained why actions
cannot be filed against a corporation in any place where the corporation
maintains its branch offices. The Court ruled that to allow an action to be
instituted in any place where the corporation has branch offices, would create
confusion and work untold inconvenience to said entity. By the same token, a
corporation cannot be allowed to file personal actions in a place other than its
principal place of business unless such a place is also the residence of a coplaintiff or a defendant.
The same considerations apply to the instant case. It cannot be disputed that
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petitioners principal office is in Cebu City, per its amended articles of

incorporation and by-laws. An action for damages being a personal action,
venue is determined pursuant to Rule 4, section 2 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:
Venue of personal actions.All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a nonresident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Rodulf Leitz Holdings v. Register of Deeds of Paranaque
In the case at bar, the lands are located in Paraaque City, as stated on the
faces of the titles. Petitioner, thus, also correctly filed the petition in the place
where the lands are situated, pursuant to the following rule:
Venue of real actions. --- Actions affecting title to or possession of real
property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court
which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a
portion thereof, is situated.
Petitioner, however, named as respondent the Register of Deeds of Pasay
City, under the mistaken impression that it was still the custodian of the titles
to lands in Paraaque. Later, petitioner learned that a Register of Deeds for
Paraaque City had taken over the record and custody of titles therein.
Petitioner, thus, promptly moved for leave of court to amend its petition. This,
to our mind, was justified. In preparing its amended petition, petitioner
likewise corrected its allegation on the location of the lands involved.
Venue v. Jurisdiction
A distinction between the two must be drawn. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law. It may not be conferred
by consent or waiver upon a court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of an action. On the other hand, the venue of an
action as fixed by statute may be changed by the consent of the parties, and
an objection on improper venue may be waived by the failure of the defendant
to raise it at the proper time. In such an event, the court may still render a
valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or
agreement of the parties. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence
may be waived. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than
restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial
UNIFORM PROCEDURE IN TRIAL COURTS (RULE 5)
17. prohibited pleadings & motions
Go v. CA
- doctrine of procedural void
Clearly, private respondent cannot appeal the order, being interlocutory. But
neither can it file a petition for certiorari, because ejectment suits fall under
the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, Section 19 (g) of which considers
petitions for certiorari as prohibited pleadings. Based on the foregoing, private
respondent was literally caught "between Scylla and Charybdis" in the
procedural void observed by the Court of Appeals and the RTC. Under these
extraordinary circumstances, the Court is constrained to provide it with a
remedy consistent with the objective of speedy resolution of cases.
As correctly held by Respondent Court of Appeals, "the purpose of the Rules
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on Summary Procedure is "to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive

determination of cases without regard to technical rules." (Section 36,
Chapter III, BP Blg. 129)" Pursuant to this objective, the Ruler prohibit
petitions for certiorari, like a number of other pleadings, in order to prevent
unnecessary delays and to expedite the disposition of cases. In this case,
however, private respondent challenged the MTCC order delaying the
ejectment suit, precisely to avoid the mischief envisioned by the Rules.
Thus, this Court holds that situations wherein a summary proceeding is
suspended indefinitely, a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of
discretion may be allowed. Because of the extraordinary circumstances in this
case, a petition for certiorari, in fact, gives spirit and life to the Rules on
Summary Procedure. A contrary ruling would unduly delay the disposition of
the case and negate the rationale of the said Rules.
Afdal v. Carlos
Clearly, a petition for relief from judgment in forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases, as in the present case, is a prohibited pleading. The reason
for this is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the
cases subject of summary procedure. A petition for relief from judgment, if
allowed by the Rules and not a prohibited pleading, should be filed with and
resolved by the court in the same case from which the petition arose.
In the present case, petitioners cannot file the petition for relief with the MTC
because it is a prohibited pleading in an unlawful detainer case. Petitioners
cannot also file the petition for relief with the RTC because the RTC has no
jurisdiction to entertain petitions for relief from judgments of the MTC.
Therefore, the RTC did not err in dismissing the petition for relief from
judgment of the MTC.
The remedy of petitioners in such a situation is to file a petition for certiorari
with the RTC under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the MTC over the person of petitioners in view of the absence of
summons to petitioners. Here, we shall treat petitioners petition for relief from
judgment as a petition for certiorari before the RTC.
Velez v. CA
no reply
First of all, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the allegation made by
RUDECON that VELUZ was guilty of forum shopping was unrebutted since
VELUZ failed to file a reply to the comment is erroneous.
**
B.E.G.
Under Section 10, Rule 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any new
matter alleged by way of defense in the answer (or comment as in this case)
is deemed controverted should a party fail to file a reply thereto. Except in
cases where the answer alleges the defense of usury in which case a reply
under oath is required otherwise the allegation of usury is deemed admitted,
or is based on an actionable document in which case a verified reply is
necessary otherwise the genuineness and due execution of said actionable
document is generally deemed admitted, the filing of a reply is merely optional
as the new matters raised in the answer are deemed controverted even
without a reply. Considering that the allegation that VELUZ was guilty of
forum-shopping is a new matter raised in RUDECONs comment, such
allegation should have been deemed controverted when the petitioners did
not file a reply thereto and it should not, as ruled by the Court of Appeals,
have been deemed unrebutted.
MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS IN PLEADINGS (RULE 8)
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18. allegations of actionable documents

**
19. denial of genuineness and due execution of actionable document;

meaning
Imperial Textile Mills v. CA
when not applicable
No rule is more settled than that in an action based on a written instrument
attached to the complaint, if the defendant fails to specifically deny under oath
the genuineness and due execution of the instrument, the same is deemed
admitted. There is no question likewise that the petitioner failed to specifically
deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note
subject of the complaint. By its omission, petitioner clearly admitted the
genuineness and due execution of the document and that the party whose
signature appears thereon had indeed signed the same and that he has the
authority to sign the same and that the agreement between the parties is what
was in words and figures in the document. Defenses which are inconsistent
with the due execution and genuineness of the written instrument are cut-off
by such admission.
Simon v. Canlas
meaning
Petitioners contend that the real estate mortgage was fraudulently executed
and there was lack of consideration but material facts relating thereto were
not fully ventilated because the RTC denied petitioners motion to reset the
hearing. They maintain that they never admitted the due execution of the real
estate mortgage, but only its execution or existence.
The admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document simply
means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily
signed the document or it was signed by another for him and with his
authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as
set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was
delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an
acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.
However, it does not preclude a party from arguing against it by evidence of
fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel and
want of consideration. Petitioners therefore are not barred from presenting
evidence regarding their claim of want of consideration.
Maunlad Savings & Loans Bank v. CA
Under Sec. 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, when the cause of action is
anchored on a document, the genuineness or due execution of the instrument
shall be deemed impliedly admitted unless the defendant, under oath,
specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts. Said
rule should be read in conjunction with Sec. 9 of Rule 130 20 of the Revised
Rules of Evidence which provides, in substance, that when the parties have
reduced their agreement to writing they have made such writing the only
repository and memorial of the truth, and whatever is not found in the writing
must be understood to have been waived or abandoned, unless he puts in
issue that there is a mistake or imperfection in the writing, or that it does not
express the true agreement of the parties, or that the agreement is invalid or
that there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. 22
20. usury under oath; effect if not
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**
21. negative pregnant / kinds of denials

Republic v. Sandiganbayan
negative pregnant
Respondents' lame denial of the aforesaid allegation was:
Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that
Respondents clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and
hid the same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities for
being false, the truth being that Respondents' aforesaid properties were
lawfully acquired.
Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on
pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the
admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not
squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was
directed at.34 Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative
expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of
some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is
alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation
as so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held that the
qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted. As
held in Galofa vs. Nee Bon Sing,40 if a defendant's denial is a negative
pregnant, it is equivalent to an admission.
Vengon v. Rural Bank of Buenavista
**
By making such an ambiguous allegation in its Answer with Counterclaims,

respondent is deemed to have admitted receiving the amount of P6,000.00
from petitioner as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 410848, which amount
under the circumstances it had no right to receive. "If an allegation is not
specifically denied or the denial is a negative pregnant, the allegation is
deemed admitted."24 "Where a fact is alleged with some qualifying or
modifying language, and the denial is conjunctive, a negative pregnant
exists, and only the qualification or modification is denied, while the fact itself
is admitted."25 "A denial in the form of a negative pregnant is an ambiguous
pleading, since it cannot be ascertained whether it is the fact or only the
qualification that is intended to be denied." 26 "Profession of ignorance about a
fact which is patently and necessarily within the pleader's knowledge, or
means of knowing as ineffectual, is no denial at all." 27
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD (RULE 9)
22. effect of default
**
VIP
23. remedies of party in default

Narciso v. Garcia
no default while MTD pending
As a consequence of the motion to dismiss that defendant Narciso filed, the
running of the period during which the rules required her to file her answer
was deemed suspended. When the trial court denied her motion to dismiss,
therefore, she had the balance of her period for filing an answer under
Section 4, Rule 16 within which to file the same but in no case less than five
days, computed from her receipt of the notice of denial of her motion to
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dismiss.
But apart from opposing defendants motion to dismiss, plaintiff Garcia asked
the trial court to declare Narciso in default for not filing an answer, altogether
disregarding the suspension of the running of the period for filing such an
answer during the pendency of the motion to dismiss that she filed in the
case. Consequently, when the trial court granted Garcias prayer and
simultaneously denied Narcisos motion to dismiss and declared her in default,
it committed serious error. Narciso was not yet in default when the trial court
denied her motion to dismiss. She still had at least five days within which to
file her answer to the complaint.
Castro v. Pena
can execute
It provides that when a complaint states a common cause of action against
several defendants, some of whom answer, and the others make default, "the
court shall try the case against all upon the answer thus filed and render
judgment upon the evidence presented by the parties in court." (Emphasis
supplied.) It is obvious that under this provision the case is tried jointly not
only against the defendants answering but also against those defaulting, and
the trial is held upon the answer filed by the former; and the judgment, if
adverse, will prejudice the defaulting defendants no less than those who
answer. In other words, the defaulting defendants are held bound by the
answer filed by their co-defendants and by the judgment which the court may
render against all of them. By the same token, and by all rules of equity and
fair play, if the judgment should happen to be favorable, totally or partially, to
the answering defendants, it must be correspondingly benefit the defaulting
ones, for it would not be just to let the judgment produce effects as to the
defaulting defendants only when adverse to them and not when favorable.
Pinlac v. CA
Finally, the conclusion that the Partial Decision of the court a quo is void finds
support in Rule 10, Section 5(c) of the then Rules of Court, which provides:
"(c) Effect of partial default. -When a pleading asserting a claim states a
common cause of action against several defending parties, some of whom
answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all
upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence
presented."
In fact, the court a quo enumerated in the Partial Decision those who filed
responsive pleadings. Considering that petitioners in their complaint stated a
common cause of action against all the named respondents, the court a quo
should have heard the case as against all respondents, the defaulted
respondents included. However, the trial court, unmindful of the above-quoted
rule, proceeded to receive evidence ex parte only against the defaulted
respondents. The trial court's disposition is not only violative of the rules but
also a clear negation of the defaulted respondents' limited rights.
Whatever defense and evidence the non-defaulted respondents may present
which would be applicable to the situation of the defaulted respondents
should inure to the benefit of the latter. The nullification of OCT 614 adversely
affected the answering respondents for they all share the same mother title.
In effect, the court a quo pre-judged the case even against the answering
respondents, for how could OCT 614, the mother title, be valid for one set of
respondents and null and void for the other respondents? In fine, the Partial
Decision was procedurally flawed.
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Heirs of Manguiat
Further, we likewise affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 60770, setting aside the partial decision of the trial court for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion. It ruled that when the trial court
declared the BUTEL in default, allowed petitioners to present their evidence
ex parte and rendered a partial decision holding that petitioners are the
owners of the subject property, such was tantamount to prejudging the case
against respondent JDC. The trial court ruled that petitioners validly acquired
the subject parcel of land without any consideration of the evidence that
respondent JDC may present to substantiate its claim of ownership over its
aliquot part of the subject property.
The trial court should have followed the Rules of Court in this situation. Sec.
3(c) of Rule 9 states that "when a pleading asserting a claim states a
common cause of action against several defending parties, some of whom
answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all
upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence
presented."
Therefore, the answer filed by a defendant inure to the benefit of all the
defendants, defaulted or not, and all of them share a common fate in the
action. It is not within the authority of the trial court to divide the case before it
by first hearing it ex parte as against the defaulted defendant and rendering a
default judgment (in the instant case, partial decision) against it, then
proceeding to hear the case, as to the non-defaulted defendant. This deprives
the defaulted defendant of due process as it is denied the benefit of the
answer and the evidence which could have been presented by its nondefaulted co-defendant.
AMENDMENT AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADING (RULE 10)
24. amendment; matter of right; matter of discretion
PPA v. WG&A
The RTC applied the old Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 3. Amendments by leave of court. after the case is set for hearing,
substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such
leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with
intent to delay the action or that the cause of action or defense is
substantially altered. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this
section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the
adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
Instead of the provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, amending
Section 3, Rule 10, to wit:\
SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the next
preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only upon
leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court
that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon
the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court,
and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
amended the former rule in such manner that the phrase "or that the cause of
action or defense is substantially altered" was stricken-off and not retained in
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**
the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10
is that under the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially
alter the cause of action or defense." This should only be true, however,
when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or
defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests
of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable
objective of the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.
25. amendment to conform to evidence
Dela Cruz v. Concepcion (PERALTA)
2 scenarios
The foregoing provision(Amendment to conform to evidence) envisions two
scenarios, namely, when evidence is introduced in an issue not alleged in the
pleadings and no objection was interjected; and when evidence is offered on
an issue not alleged in the pleadings but this time an objection was raised.
When the issue is tried without the objection of the parties, it should be
treated in all respects as if it had been raised in the pleadings. On the other
hand, when there is an objection, the evidence may be admitted where its
admission will not prejudice him.
It is noteworthy that when respondent presented the evidence of payment,
petitioners did not object thereto. When the receipt was formally offered as
evidence, petitioners did not manifest their objection to the admissibility of
said document on the ground that payment was not an issue. Apparently,
petitioners only denied receipt of said payment and assailed the authority of
Losloso to receive payment. Since there was an implied consent on the part
of petitioners to try the issue of payment, even if no motion was filed and no
amendment of the pleading has been ordered, the RTC cannot be faulted for
admitting respondents testimonial and documentary evidence to prove
payment.
Maunlad Savings & Loans Bank v. CA
The record shows that petitioner Maunlad Savings made no timely objection
when private respondent introduced parol evidence to explain the
circumstances behind the execution and issuance of the promissory note.
The rule is that objections to evidence must be made as soon as the grounds
therefor become reasonably apparent. In the case of testimonial evidence,
the objection must be made when the objectionable question is asked or after
the answer is given if the objectionable features become apparent only by
reason of such answer, otherwise the objection is waived and such evidence
will form part of the records of the case as competent and complete evidence
and all parties are thus amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects
resulting from the evidence. Thus, the objections of petitioner Maunlad
Savings on the hearing of October 12, 1998 and January 23, 1991 amounted
to no more than a belated attempt to remedy its neglectful act of prior implied
consent to the presentation of parol evidence on the terms of the agreement
between the parties.
26. amendmed and supplemental pleading
Ada v. Baylon
As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or
add something to the primary pleading. A supplement exists side by side with
the original. It does not replace that which it supplements. Moreover, a
supplemental pleading assumes that the original pleading is to stand and that
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the issues joined with the original pleading remained an issue to be tried in
the action. It is but a continuation of the complaint. Its usual office is to set up
new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the
same subject matter as the controversy referred to in the original complaint.
The purpose of the supplemental pleading is to bring into the records new
facts which will enlarge or change the kind of relief to which the plaintiff is
entitled; hence, any supplemental facts which further develop the original right
of action, or extend to vary the relief, are available by way of supplemental
complaint even though they themselves constitute a right of action.
**
A supplemental pleading may raise a new cause of action as long as it has

some relation to the originalc ause of action set forth in theoriginal complaint.
Thus, a supplemental pleading may properly allege transactions, occurrences
or events which had transpired after the filing of the pleading sought to be
supplemented, even if the said supplemental facts constitute another cause of
action.
RULE 13
27. priority of personal service
Solar Team Int. v. Ricafort
Facts: Petitioner filed a motion to expunge respondents answer because it
was not personally served.
Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such
should expedite action or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and
conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or
filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal service.
If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of
adjective rules requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of
Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as
not filed if the other modes of service or filing were resorted to and no written
explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first
place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily, consider the practicability
of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause whenever
practicable.
We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule,
and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth,
whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances
of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory.
Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other
modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as
to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In
adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the
importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein,
and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation
of Section 11. This Court cannot rule otherwise, lest we allow circumvention
of the innovation introduced by the 1997 Rules in order to obviate delay in the
administration of justice.
Returning, however, to the merits of this case, in view of the proximity
between the offices of opposing counsel and the absence of any attendant
explanation as to why personal service of the answer was not effected,
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indubitably, private respondents counsel violated Section 11 of Rule 13 and

the motion to expunge was prima facie meritorious. However, the grant or
denial of said motion nevertheless remained within the sound exercise of the
trial courts discretion. Thus, as guided by Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, which ordains that the Rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding, as well as by the
dictum laid down in Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315 [1910], the trial court
opted to exercise its discretion in favor of admitting the Answer (with
Counterclaims), instead of expunging it from the record.
28. proof of service
Prudential Bank v. Business Assistance Group
Facts: Petitioner appeal was dismissed due to late filing of appellants brief.
Petitioner argued that the notice to file the brief was not properly served to it.
SEC. 13. Proof of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof
shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance
with Section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall
be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office.
The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the
sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or
sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.
In the case at bar, the registry return card pertaining to petitioners copy of the
notice is not extant in the records of the Court of Appeals. This absence is
even admitted by the respondents in their Motion to Dismiss Appeal and
Motion to Admit Reply to Opposition. The Court of Appeals, however,
concluded that the notice was received by the banks counsel as evidenced
by the certification of Mr. Cipriano C. Pagaduan, Postmaster, Makati Central
Post Office, that a certain Mr. Arlan Cayno received the notice on 4 October
2000.
But, in his affidavit, Mr. Cayno denied that he was an employee of Gella,
Danguilan, Nabaza & Associates law firm authorized to receive legal or
judicial processes; he disclaimed knowledge of the whereabouts of the
notice. The respondents themselves admit that Mr. Cayno was an employee
of the bank. Since Mr. Cayno was not an employee of the said law firm
authorized to receive notices in its behalf, his alleged receipt of the 20
September 2000 notice is without any effect in law.
**
Hence, this Court entertains serious doubt that a copy of the notice was
indeed received by the banks counsel, considering the absence in the
records of the registry receipt, coupled with (1) Mr. Caynos claim that he was
not an employee of Gella, Danguilan, Nabaza & Associates law firm; (2)
respondents admission that Mr. Cayno was an employee of the petitioner
bank, and not of the banks counsel; and (3) the denial of the banks counsel
of having received the 20 September 2000 notice.
RULE 14
29. manner of service [of summons]
Santos v. PNOC Exploration Corp. (Sec. 14)
Facts: Petitioner claims that substituted service may be availed of only in an
action in rem
B.E.G.
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SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are

unknown. In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown
owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot
be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be
effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation
and in such places and for such times as the court may order.
The present rule expressly states that it applies [i]n any action where the
defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his
whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.
Thus, it now applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in
rem.
Service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his
foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager of
the newspaper which published the summons. The service of summons by
publication is complemented by service of summons by registered mail to the
defendants last known address. This complementary service is evidenced by
an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for
publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by
registered mail to his last known address.
The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of complementary service
be executed by the clerk of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the
mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to make the
complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the party who
resorts to service by publication.
Pua v. Deyto (Sec. 14)
Although a party is allowed to serve summons by publication there must be
prior resort to service in person on the defendant and substituted service, and
proof that service by these modes were ineffective before service by
publication may be allowed for defendants whose whereabouts are unknown,
considering that Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court requires a diligent
inquiry of the defendants whereabouts.
Sec. 15.
When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and
the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the
subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has
or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief
demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any
interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the
Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines
by:
1. Personal service as under section 6; or
2. by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places
and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the
summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to
the last known address of the defendant, or
3. In any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not
be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must
answer.
B.E.G.
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Sec. 16.
V
***
When any action is commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides

within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of
court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section.
30. substituted service [of summons]
Chu v. Mach Asia Trading Corp. (PERALTA-2013)
- requirements for substituted service of summons
Facts: Petitioner argues that there was no valid substituted service of
summons in the present case. He maintains that jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant is acquired only through a valid service of summons or the
voluntary appearance of the defendant in court. Hence, when there is no valid
service of summons and no voluntary appearance by the defendant, any
judgment of a court, which acquired no jurisdiction over the defendant, is null
and void.
It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report
indicating that the person who received the summons in the defendant's
behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence,
ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summons.
Also, impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that
efforts have been made to find the defendant personally and that such efforts
have failed. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of
the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character, hence,
may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by
statute. The statutory requirements of substituted service must be
followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other
than that authorized by statute is considered ineffective.
Clearly, it was not shown that the security guard who received the summons
in behalf of the petitioner was authorized and possessed a relation of
confidence that petitioner would definitely receive the summons. This is not
the kind of service contemplated by law. Thus, service on the security guard
could not be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of
substituted service.
AMWSLAI v. Manay
Facts: Petitioners assert that the service of the summonses and the TRO on
Ms. Liong was defective, because Ms. Liong was not duly authorized to
receive them on behalf of the COMELEC members
Personal service of summons is preferred over substituted service. Only if the
former cannot be made promptly may the process server resort to the latter.
Moreover, the proof of service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility
of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts
exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served
upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address,
or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant.
It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be
stated in the proof of service or in the officers return. The failure to comply
faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted
service renders the service of summons ineffective. 30 These requirements
are necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual
method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and may be used
only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute.
B.E.G.
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The supplemental report clearly established the impossibility of personal

service within a reasonable time. Service was made on October 13 and the
election sought to be enjoined would take place the following day. The Sheriff,
in serving the Courts processes, is not expected to wait for the arrival of all
the officers of AMWSLAI and the members of the COMELEC at the
AMWSLAI Building just to be able to effect personal service. While not
unmindful of the strict interpretation of the Rules on this matter, considering
the circumstances obtaining in the instant case at that given moment in time,
we find and so hold that the action of the Sheriff substantially complied with
the Rules. Besides, the lack of a detailed explanation in the first Sheriffs
Report on how service was made on the AMWSLAI officers was never raised
in issue, and generally, we cannot permit the petitioners to adopt a contrary
stand on the service made on the COMELEC members.
Gentle Supreme Philippines v. Consulta
officer-in-charge need not be personally authorized
Second, there is valid substituted service of summons on Consulta at his
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. According
to the sheriffs return, which is prima facie evidence of the facts it states, he
served a copy of the complaint on Canave, an authorized representative of
both Consulta and Sarayba. Besides Consultas bare allegations, he did not
present evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity on the manner that
the sheriff performed his official duty. Nor did Consulta present clear and
convincing evidence that Canave was not competent to receive the summons
and the attached documents for him.
Further, this Court has ruled that it is not necessary that the person in charge
of the defendants regular place of business be specifically authorized to
receive the summons. It is enough that he appears to be in charge. In this
case, Canave, a secretary whose job description necessarily includes
receiving documents and other correspondence, would have the semblance
of authority to accept the court documents.
It is true that this Court emphasized the importance of strict and faithful
compliance in effecting substituted service.[24] It must, however, be
reiterated that when the rigid application of rules becomes a conduit for
escaping ones responsibility, the Court will intervene to set things right
according to the rules
31. Voluntary Appearance
Sec. 20.
The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to
service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds
aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance.
32. Corporation
Banco de Brasil v. CA
Facts: BDB claims that the judgment by the lower court which ordered it to
pay is not valid because jurisdiction over its person was not acquired.
Although the suit is originally in rem as it was BDBs claim on the sunken ship
which was used as the basis for it being impleaded, the action nevertheless
became an in personam one when Urbino asked for damages in the said
B.E.G.
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amount. As such, only a personal service of summons would have vested the
court jurisdiction over BDB. Where the action is in personam, one brought
against a person on the basis of his personal liability, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the
case. When the defendant is a non-resident, personal service of summons
within the state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person.
This cannot be done, however, if the defendant is not physically present in the
country, and thus, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and
therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him.
Extrajudicial service of summons apply only where the action is in rem, an
action against the thing itself instead of against the person, or in an action
quasi in rem, where an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of
the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or loan
burdening the property. This is so inasmuch as, in in rem and quasi in rem
actions, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to
confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction
over the res.
Davao Light & Power Corp. v. CA
A corporation has no residence in the same sense in which this term is
applied to a natural person. But for practical purposes, a corporation is in a
metaphysical sense a resident of the place where its principal office is located
as stated in the articles of incorporation (Cohen v. Benguet Commercial Co.,
Ltd., 34 Phil. 526 [1916] Clavecilla Radio System v. Antillo, 19 SCRA 379
[1967]).
The Corporation Code precisely requires each corporation to specify in its
articles of incorporation the place where the principal office of the corporation
is to be located which must be within the Philippines (Sec. 14[3]). The
purpose of this requirement is to fix the residence of a corporation in a definite
place, instead of allowing it to be ambulatory.
BPI v. CA
- manager
Sec. 11, Rule 14. Service upon domestic private juridical entity When the
defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the
laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality service may be made on
the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer or in-house counsel.
Basic is the rule that a strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary
to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The officer upon whom
service is made must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise, the
service is insufficient. The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the
corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to
insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the
corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers
served on him.
Applying the aforestated principle in the case at bar, we rule that the service
of summons on BPIs Branch Manager did not bind the corporation for the
branch manager is not included in the enumeration of the statute of the
persons upon whom service of summons can be validly made in behalf of the
corporation. Such service is therefore void and ineffectual.
RULE 15, 16 & 17
B.E.G.
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33. 3-day rule; purpose

Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the
rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the
applicant. Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the
hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by
the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the
court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
**
34. omnibus motion rule

Subject to the provisions of section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading,
order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then available, and
all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.
Uy & Sons v. Valbueco (PERALTA-2013)
- prescription apparent
- file MTD; otherwise answer
Facts: Petitioner argues that it is evident on the face of the complaint and the
two contracts of conditional sale that the cause of action accrued in 1974; yet,
the complaint for specific performance was filed after 27 years. Petitioner
asserts that the action has prescribed.
(T)rial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground
of prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to
be indeed time-barred and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss or
an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense or even if the
ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for
reconsideration or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where
no statement thereof is found in the pleadings or where a defendant has been
declared in default.
What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of
the prescriptive period, be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on
the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise
established by the evidence.
Defenses and objections not pleaded whether in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings
that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the
action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court
shall dismiss the claim.
Barcelonia v. CA
10 days set; effect if not
It should be noted that the motion for reconsideration of the trial courts
resolution on January 10, 2000 was filed by the petitioners on January 31,
2000. The date and time of hearing thereof was set by the petitioners on
February 15, 2000 at 8:30 oclock in the morning. In this connection, Rule 15,
Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court on motions provides:
Section 5. Notice of hearing.- The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all
parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which
must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. (Emphasis
ours)
B.E.G.
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It is clear then that the scheduled hearing of the said motion for
reconsideration was beyond the period specified by the Revised Rules of
Court which was not later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion, or
no later than February 10, 2000. Significantly, the above provision of Rule 15,
Section 5 uses the mandatory term must in fixing the period within which the
motion shall be scheduled for hearing. A motion that fails to religiously
comply with the mandatory provision of Rule 15, Section 5 is pro forma and
presents no question which merits the attention and consideration of the
court.
35. grounds for MTD
Effect if Denied; Granted
Baez v. Concepcion (BERSAMIN-2012)
The orders that the petitioner seeks to challenge and to annul are the orders
denying his motion to dismiss. It is settled, however, that an order denying a
motion to dismiss, being merely interlocutory, cannot be the basis of a petition
for certiorari. An interlocutory order is not the proper subject of a certiorari
challenge by virtue of its not terminating the proceedings in which it is issued.
To allow such order to be the subject of review by certiorari not only delays
the administration of justice, but also unduly burdens the courts. 20
But a petition for certiorari may be filed to assail an interlocutory order if it is
issued without jurisdiction, or with excess of jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This is because as to
such order there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
The exception does not apply to this challenge. The petitioner has not
demonstrated how the assailed orders could have been issued without
jurisdiction, or with excess of jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Nor has he convinced us that he
had no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In
fact and in law, he has, like filing his answer and going to pre-trial and trial. In
the end, should he still have the need to seek the review of the decision of the
RTC, he could also even appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss. That, in
reality, was his proper remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Mendiola v. CA (BERSAMIN-2012)
-Appeal
of
Denial
of
Motion
for
Reconsideration
(R-37)
The inclusion of the order denying a motion for new trial or a motion for
reconsideration in the list of issuances of a trial court not subject to appeal
was by reason of such order not being the final order terminating the
proceedings in the trial court. This nature of the order is reflected in Section 9
of Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which declares that such
order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the
remedy being an appeal from the judgment or final order.
However, the Court has interpreted the proscription against appealing the
order denying a motion for reconsideration to refer only to a motion for
reconsideration filed against an interlocutory order, not to a motion for
reconsideration filed against a judgment or final order.
The rationale behind the rule proscribing the remedy of appeal from an
B.E.G.
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interlocutory order is to prevent undue delay, useless appeals and undue

inconvenience to the appealing party by having to assail orders as they are
promulgated by the court, when they can be contested in a single appeal. The
appropriate remedy is thus for the party to wait for the final judgment or order
and assign such interlocutory order as an error of the court on appeal.
However, the Court issued its resolution in A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC to approve
certain amendments to Rules 41, 45, 58 and 65 of the Rules of Court
effective on December 27, 2007. Among the amendments was the delisting of
an order denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration from the
enumeration found in Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
of what are not appealable.
Based on the foregoing developments, Shell and Tabangaos appeal, albeit

seemingly directed only at the October 5, 1999 denial of their motion for
reconsideration, was proper.
36. 2-dismissal rule; effect
Dael v. Beltran
Facts: Petitioner filed a Notice of Dismissal his complaint without prejudice.
However, the RTC dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
Section 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. A complaint may be dismissed
by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the
answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Upon such notice being filed,
the court shall issue an order confirming the dismissal. Unless otherwise
stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice
operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has
once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the
same claim.
Under this provision, it is mandatory that the trial court issue an order
confirming such dismissal and, unless otherwise stated in the notice, the
dismissal is without prejudice and could be accomplished by the plaintiff
through mere notice of dismissal, and not through motion subject to approval
by the court. Dismissal is ipso facto upon notice, and without prejudice
unless otherwise stated in the notice.
The trial court has no choice but to consider the complaint as dismissed,
since the plaintiff may opt for such dismissal as a matter of right, regardless of
the ground.
**
Upon the filing of the Notice of Dismissal by the plaintiff, the Motion to
Dismiss filed by respondents became moot and academic and the trial court
should have dismissed the case without prejudice based on the Notice of
Dismissal filed by the petitioner.
37. dismissal; nolle proseque
Pua v. Deyto
dismissal [due] to failure to prosecute; with prejudice; res judicata
Facts: Pua claims that the untimely demise of his counsel caused the delay in
prosecuting the case.
B.E.G.
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Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of a

case when the plaintiff fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length
of time:
SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. If, for no justifiable cause, the
plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief
on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of
time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint
may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the courts own
motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have
the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by
the court. [emphases ours; italics supplied]
Once a case is dismissed for failure to prosecute, the dismissal has the effect
of an adjudication on the merits and is understood to be with prejudice to the
filing of another action unless otherwise provided in the order of dismissal.
In this case, Pua failed to take any action on the case after summons was
served by publication on Ang. It took him more than two years to file a motion
to declare Ang in default and only after the RTC has already dismissed his
case for failure to prosecute. That Pua renewed the attachment bond is not
an indication of his intention to prosecute. The payment of an attachment
bond is not the appropriate procedure to settle a legal dispute in court; it could
not be considered as a substitute for the submission of necessary pleadings
or motions that would lead to prompt action on the case.
RULE 18
28. Appearance; nature
Eloisa Merchandising v. Banco de Oro
-A.M. No. 03-1-09 (August 6, 2004)- Rules on Pre-Trial
Under Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
it is the duty of the plaintiff, after the last pleading has been served and filed,
to promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial. On August 16,
2004, A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC (Re: Proposed Rule on Guidelines to be
Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of PreTrial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures) took effect, which provides
that:
Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must promptly
move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails
to file said motion within the given period, the Branch COC shall issue a
notice of pre-trial.
We note that when the above guidelines took effect, the case was already at
the pre-trial stage and it was the failure of petitioners to set the case anew for
pre-trial conference which prompted the trial court to dismiss their complaint.
While under the present Rules, it is now the duty of the clerk of court to set
the case for pre-trial if the plaintiff fails to do so within the prescribed period,
this does not relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to prosecute the case
diligently. This case had been at the pre-trial stage for more than two years
and petitioners have not shown special circumstances or compelling reasons
to convince us that the dismissal of their complaint for failure to prosecute
B.E.G.
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was unjustified.
*
RULE 19
39. Requisites of intervention
Asias Emerging Dragon v. DOTC
The extensive excerpts from Gingoyon demonstrate and emphasize that the
Court had already adjudged the issues raised by Baterina, which he either
conveniently overlooked or stubbornly refused to accept.
Since the issues Baterina wishes to raise as an intervenor in Case No. 040876CFM were already settled with finality in both Agan and Gingoyon, then
there is no point in still allowing his intervention. His Petition-in-Intervention
would only be a relitigation of matters that had been previously adjudicated by
no less than the Highest Court of the land. And, in no manner can the RTC of
Pasay City in Case No. 04-0876CFM grant the reliefs he prayed for without
departing from or running afoul of the final and executory Decisions of this
Court in Agan and Gingoyon.
While it is true that when this Court, in a Resolution dated 1 February 2006,
dismissed the Motions for Intervention in Gingoyon, including that of Baterina,
it also observed that the interests of the movants-in-intervention may be duly
litigated in proceedings which are extant before the lower courts. This does
not mean, however, that the said movants-in-interest were assured of being
allowed as intervenors or that the reliefs they sought as such shall be granted
by the trial courts. The fate of their intervention still rests on their interest or
legal standing in the case and the merits of their arguments.
SJS v. Atienza
We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when a
mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a
public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are
regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific
interest.19 Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in
the enforcement of the citys ordinances. Respondent never questioned the
right of petitioners to institute this proceeding.
Looyuko v. CA
Facts: FGU foreclosed on Mendozas real property. After the foreclosure
proceedings became final and executory, Mendozas creditors filed a motion
for intervention arguing that they have interest over the properties and that
they should have been impleaded in the foreclosure proceedings. Was the
motion for intervention filed by the Spouses Gutang and Looyuko et al. in Civil
Case No. 82-9760 proper considering that the case was already final and
executory?
Intervention is merely collateral or accessory or ancillary to the principal
action, and not an independent proceeding; it is an interlocutory proceeding
dependent on or subsidiary to the case between the original parties. Where
the main action ceases to exist, there is no pending proceeding wherein the
intervention may be based. Here, there is no more pending principal action
wherein the Spouses Gutang and Looyuko et al. may intervene.
In exceptional cases, the Court has allowed intervention notwithstanding the
rendition of judgment by the trial court. In Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, intervention was allowed even when the petition for review of the
B.E.G.
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assailed judgment was already submitted for decision in the Supreme Court.
Recently in Mago vs. Court of Appeals, the Court granted intervention despite
the case having become final and executory. It must be noted, however, that
in both these cases, the intervenors were indispensable parties. This is not so
in the case at bar.
A subordinate lien holder is a proper, even a necessary, but not an
indispensable, party to a foreclosure proceeding. Appropriate relief could be
granted by the court to the mortgagee in the foreclosure proceeding, without
affecting the rights of the subordinate lien holders. The effect of the failure on
the part of the mortgagee to make the subordinate lien holder a defendant is
that the decree entered in the foreclosure proceeding would not deprive the
subordinate lien holder of his right of redemption. A decree of foreclosure in a
suit to which the holders of a second lien are not parties leaves the equity of
redemption in favor of such lien holders unforeclosed and unaffected. The
failure of the mortgagee to join the subordinate lien holders as defendants in
the foreclosure suit, therefore, did not have the effect of nullifying the
foreclosure proceeding, but kept alive the equity of redemption acquired by
the purchasers in their respective execution sales.
Quinto v. COMELEC
Pursuant to the foregoing rule (Section 1, R19), this Court has held that a
motion for intervention shall be entertained when the following requisites are
satisfied: (1) the would-be intervenor shows that he has a substantial right or
interest in the case; and (2) such right or interest cannot be adequately
pursued and protected in another proceeding.
SECTION 2. Time to intervene. The motion for intervention may be filed at
any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the
pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the
original parties. (italics supplied)
This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even
beyond the period prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the higher
interest of justice. Interventions have also been granted to afford
indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard
even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court, when the petition
for review of the judgment has already been submitted for decision before the
Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has already become final
and executory. In Lim v. Pacquing, the motion for intervention filed by the
Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice
and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the
parties.
In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the
sound discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate
circumstances. We stress again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of
procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and
completely available for justice. Its purpose is not to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Sison
-no interest
Facts: The Office of the Ombudsman asserts that it has sufficient legal
interest to warrant its intervention in the proceedings, since it rendered the
subject decision pursuant to its administrative authority over public officials
and employees.
B.E.G.
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It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance of a Motion to Intervene

is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The permissive tenor of the
rules shows the intention to give to the court the full measure of discretion in
permitting or disallowing the intervention. Simply, intervention is a procedure
by which third persons, not originally parties to the suit but claiming an
interest in the subject matter, come into the case in order to protect their right
or interpose their claim. Its main purpose is to settle in one action and by a
single judgment all conflicting claims of, or the whole controversy among, the
persons involved.
To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites
must concur: (1) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and
(2) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of
being properly decided in a separate proceeding. The interest, which entitles
one to intervene, must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and
immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct
legal operation and effect of the judgment
Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman is not an appropriate party to intervene
in the instant case. It must remain partial and detached. More importantly, it
must be mindful of its role as an adjudicator, not an advocate. It is an
established doctrine that judges should detach themselves from cases where
their decisions are appealed to a higher court for review. The raison detre for
such a doctrine is the fact that judges are not active combatants in such
proceeding and must leave the opposing parties to contend their individual
positions and the appellate court to decide the issues without the judges
active participation. When judges actively participate in the appeal of their
judgment, they, in a way, cease to be judicial and have become adversarial
instead.
**
Furthermore, the Rules provides explicitly that a motion to intervene may be

filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. In the
instant case, the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was filed only on July 22,
2008, after the Decision of the CA was promulgated on June 26, 2008
RULE 26
40. request for admission; no answer; effect
Po v. CA
A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by

his pleading and concerning which there is no issue, nor should he be
required to make a second denial of those already denied in his answer to the
complaint. A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or
reiterate the allegations of the requesting party's pleading but should set forth
relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited
with the request, whose purpose is to establish said party's cause of action or
defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is, as correctly observed by the
Court of Appeals, "pointless, useless," and "a mere redundancy."
41. Written Interrogatories
Rule 25, Sec. 6.
Interrogatories may relate to any matters that can be inquired into under
section 2 of Rule 23, and the answers may be used for the same purposes
provided in section 4 of the same Rule.
B.E.G.
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Afulgencia v. Metrobank (FEB 2014)

secure first before calling adverse party to witness stand
As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the
witness stand is not allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served
upon the latter. This is embodied in Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules, which
provides
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories.
Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a
failure of justice, a party not served with written interrogatories may not be
compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a
deposition pending appeal.
One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and
needless delays; it is there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial.
It will be presumed that a party who does not serve written interrogatories on
the adverse party beforehand will most likely be unable to elicit facts useful to
its case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness stand as its
witness. Instead, the process could be treated as a fishing expedition or an
attempt at delaying the proceedings; it produces no significant result that a
prior written interrogatories might bring.
Otherwise stated, if a party cannot elicit facts or information useful to its case
through the facility of written interrogatories or other mode of discovery, then
the calling of the adverse party to the witness stand could only serve to
weaken its own case as a result of the calling partys being bound by the
adverse partys testimony, which may only be worthless and instead
detrimental to the calling partys cause.
Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the
court may limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus prevent the calling
party from straying or harassing the adverse party when it takes the latter to
the stand.
***
VIP
Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises
or harassment; it likewise prevents the calling party from conducting a fishing
expedition or bungling its own case. Using its own judgment and discretion,
the court can hold its own in resolving a dispute, and need not bear witness to
the parties perpetrating unfair court practices such as fishing for evidence,
badgering, or altogether ruining their own cases. Ultimately, such
unnecessary processes can only constitute a waste of the courts precious
time, if not pointless entertainment.
RULE 33
42. demurrer to evidence; criminal & civil
Bernardo v. CA (CRIM)
In fine, under the new rule on demurrer to evidence the accused has the right
to file a demurrer to evidence after the prosecution has rested its case.
If the accused obtained prior leave of court before filing his demurrer,
he can still present evidence if his demurrer is denied.
If he demurs without prior leave of court, or after his motion for leave
is denied, he waives his right to present evidence and submits the
case for decision on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
This power to grant leave to the accused to file a demurrer is addressed to
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the sound discretion of the trial court. The purpose is to determine whether
the accused in filing his demurrer is merely stalling the proceedings.
Judicial action to grant prior leave to file demurrer to evidence is discretionary
upon the trial court. But to allow the accused to present evidence after he
was denied prior leave to file demurrer is not discretionary. Once prior leave
is denied and the accused still files his demurrer to evidence or motion to
dismiss, the court no longer has discretion to allow the accused to present
evidence. The only recourse left for the court is to decide the case on the
basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution. And, unless there is
grave abuse thereof amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which is not
present in the instant case, the trial courts denial of prior leave to file
demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss may not be disturbed. However,
any judgment of conviction by a trial court may still be elevated by the
accused to the appellate court.
Rivera v. People
no appeal if granted
remedy Rule 65
Facts: The sole issue for resolution is whether or not the assailed decision
and resolution of the Sandiganbayan should be set aside to allow petitioner to
present evidence despite the demurrer to evidence filed. Petitioner prays that
in the interest of justice he be allowed to present evidence in view of the
severity of the penalty imposed on him which is imprisonment of about 140
years.
We recognize the importance of procedural rules in insuring the effective
enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy
administration of justice. However, the rules of procedure ought not to be
applied in a very rigid technical sense, as they are used only to help secure,
not override substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the
rules is made, their aim would be defeated. That the Court has the power to
set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in
our jurisprudence.
A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection by one of the parties in an
action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain
the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole
evidence to sustain a verdict. In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence
raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is
competent or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict
of guilt.
It appears from the aforequoted TSN of the hearing on September 29, 2003,
that counsel for accused, Atty. Belarmino, asked for leave of court to file a
demurrer to evidence but was curtly ordered to file the same even without
leave of court.
Due to the precipitate filing by the defense of the demurrer to evidence, the
Sandiganbayan determined petitioners guilt based only on the prosecutions
evidence. To our mind, the presentation of evidence by the defense would
resolve any doubt as to petitioners complicity and avoid possible miscarriage
of justice. Clearly, when transcendental matters like life, liberty or State
security are involved, suspension of the rules is likely to be welcomed more
generously. The Rules on procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice. When they are rigid and strict in application,
resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, the
B.E.G.
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Court is empowered to suspend the rules.

Salazar v. Republic
due process
After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused has the option either to
(a) file a demurrer to evidence with or without leave of court under Section 23,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or to (b) adduce his
evidence unless he waives the same. The aforecited rule reads:
Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the
court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on
its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2)
upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.
If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the
accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to
evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives his right to
present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the
evidence for the prosecution.
The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically
state its grounds and shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5)
days after the prosecution rests its case. The prosecution may oppose the
motion within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from its receipt.
If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence
within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice. The prosecution
may oppose the demurrer to evidence within a similar period from its receipt.
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or
the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before
the judgment.
In criminal cases, the demurrer to evidence partakes of the nature of a motion
to dismiss the case for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In a case where the accused files a demurrer to evidence
without leave of court, he thereby waives his right to present evidence and
submits the case for decision on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution.
On the other hand, if the accused is granted leave to file a demurrer to
evidence, he has the right to adduce evidence not only on the criminal aspect
but also on the civil aspect of the case if his demurrer is denied by the court.
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused
has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the
court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist. If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not
only granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused and acquitting him but
also on the civil liability of the accused to the private offended party, said
judgment on the civil aspect of the case would be a nullity for the reason that
the constitutional right of the accused to due process is thereby violated.
This is so because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the
accused has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects
of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution.
What the trial court should do is to issue an order or partial judgment granting
the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused; and set the case for
continuation of trial for the petitioner to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of
the case, and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of
rebuttal after which the parties may adduce their sur-rebuttal evidence as
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provided for in Section 11, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure
RULE 34 & 35 (Judgment on the Pleading & Summary Judgment)
43. Distinctions
Monterey Foods Corp. v. Esejose
- no issue
- remedy Rule 45
A summary judgment or accelerated judgment is a procedural technique to
promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain
from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on record, or for
weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation to
avoid the expense and loss of time involved in a trial. Its object is to separate
what is formal or pretended in denial or averment from what is genuine and
substantial so that only the latter may subject a party in interest to the burden
of trial. Moreover, said summary judgment must be premised on the absence
of any other triable genuine issues of fact. Otherwise, the movant cannot be
allowed to obtain immediate relief. A genuine issue is such issue of fact
which requires presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham,
fictitious, contrived or false claim.
Rule 35, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides two (2) requisites for
summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to
any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party
presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, we find that the Court of Appeals
did not commit any reversible error in affirming the assailed orders of the trial
court.
**
Clearly, the judgment finally disposed of all the reliefs sought in the
complaint. The order granting summary judgment was akin to a judgment on
the merits made after a full-blown trial. Its consequent execution, therefore,
may issue as a matter of right in favor of respondent unless appeal was
seasonably made therein, which petitioners failed to do. Instead of filing a
notice of appeal with the trial court, petitioners elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
which is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.
RULE 37
44. grounds for new trial & reconsideration
Neypes Principle
The "Neypes Rule," otherwise known as the Fresh Period Rule, states that
a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt
of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of
the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
Yu v. Tatad
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts
pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the
period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
B.E.G.
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Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:

BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is
based, makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and
in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that "[t]he period
for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of
any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the
final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from." Ubi lex
non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no
distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction.
Also, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no
substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are
concerned the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order
denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that
Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in
criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.
Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and make it
applicable only to the period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster
and encourage an absurd situation where a litigant in a civil case will have a
better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case a situation that
gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the
accused-appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment when we
favor a situation where property interests are at stake, as against a situation
where liberty stands to be prejudiced. We must emphatically reject this double
and unequal standard for being contrary to reason. Over time, courts have
recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is
not allowed in law Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non
permissum est in lege.18
RULE 38
45. petition for relief
Afdal v. Carlos
Clearly, a petition for relief from judgment in forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases, as in the present case, is a prohibited pleading. The reason
for this is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the
cases subject of summary procedure.
Moreover, Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order or other proceedings. - When
a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter
taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the
same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
(Emphasis supplied)
A petition for relief from judgment, if allowed by the Rules and not a prohibited
pleading, should be filed with and resolved by the court in the same case from
which the petition arose.
In the present case, petitioners cannot file the petition for relief with the MTC
because it is a prohibited pleading in an unlawful detainer case. Petitioners
B.E.G.
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cannot also file the petition for relief with the RTC because the RTC has no
jurisdiction to entertain petitions for relief from judgments of the MTC.
Therefore, the RTC did not err in dismissing the petition for relief from
judgment of the MTC.
RULE 39
46. execution pending appeal
Maceda v. DBP
The execution of a judgment during the pendency of an appeal is governed
by Section 2, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 2. Discretionary execution. --(a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal -- On motion
of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial
court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of
either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may
be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its
discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before
the expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending
appeal may be filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a
special order after due hearing.
This rule is strictly construed against the movant, for courts look with disfavor
upon any attempt to execute a judgment which has not acquired a final
character. In the same vein, the Court has held that such execution is
usually not favored because it affects the rights of the parties which are yet to
be ascertained on appeal.
There are three requisites for the grant of an execution of a judgment pending
appeal:
a.
b.
c.
There must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the

adverse party;
There must be a good reason for execution pending appeal; and
The good reason must be stated in a special order.
Underscoring the importance of the requisite good reasons, the Court ruled
in Ong v. Court of Appeals:
It is not intended obviously that execution pending appeal shall issue as a
matter of course. Good reasons, special, important, pressing reasons must
exist to justify it; otherwise, instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice,
it may well become a tool of oppression and inequity.
Moreover, the reasons allowing execution must constitute superior
circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages
should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment.
In the present case, the trial court, pending the appeal, ordered the immediate
release by the bank of (1) the unreleased amount of the loan agreement and
(2) the sum needed to complete the construction of the hotel, subject to the
filing of a bond of equivalent amount.
B.E.G.
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The good reason invoked by the trial court was the urgency resulting from
almost twenty years of delay and the yearly increase in costs that made the
completion of the hotel construction more difficult.
We are not convinced. There is no guarantee that petitioner can indeed
complete the project, even if the sum referred to in disposition (e) is
immediately released. It must be underscored that this was the amount
needed to finish the project way back in 1987 and was based on 1987 prices.
Equally unjustified is the release, pending appeal, of the remaining portion of
the loan in the amount of P1,952,489.10. As the trial court itself has held in
1987, the award of more than P17 million under disposition (e) was the
amount needed to finish the project. Consequently, there was no urgent need
for the unreleased portion of the loan. The said amount was relatively
minuscule compared with that needed for the remainder of the hotel project
and would have little effect on its completion.
More important, the compelling reason given by the trial court for allowing
execution pending appeal is far outweighed by the injury or damage that
private respondent would suffer if it secures a reversal of the trial courts
judgment. If the trial court is reversed on appeal, petitioners would be hardpressed to make a complete restitution to private respondent, to which they
already owe more than P5 million the amount of their original loan plus
accrued interests. In any event, we agree with the Court of Appeals that there
is no likelihood that DBP, a government-owned and -controlled corporation,
would fail to answer its obligation if the trial court Decision is affirmed.
Bell Carpets International Trading Corp. v. CA
Jurisprudence teaches us what are "good reasons" that justify a premature
execution of judgment, such as "deterioration of commodities subject of
litigation.
BF Corporation v. EDSA Shangrila
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside
the trial courts order granting execution pending appeal. We hold that it did
not.
First. Execution pending appeal is not to be granted except for good reason
to be stated in a special order. For the general rule is that only judgments
which have become final and executory may be executed. In this case, the
issuance of an order granting execution pending appeal is sought to be
justified on the plea that the [r]espondents dilatory appeal and refusal to pay
petitioner the amount justly due it had placed petitioner in actual and
imminent danger of insolvency.
The contention is without merit. As we recently held in Philippine Bank of
Communications v. Court of Appeals:[6]
It is significant to stress that private respondent Falcon is a juridical entity and
not a natural person. Even assuming that it was indeed in financial distress
and on the verge of facing civil or even criminal suits, the immediate
execution of a judgment in its favor pending appeal cannot be justified as
Falcons situation may not be likened to a case of a natural person who may
be ill or may be of advanced age. Even the danger of extinction of the
corporation will not per se justify a discretionary execution unless there are
showings of other good reasons, such as for instance, impending insolvency
of the adverse party or the appeal being patently dilatory. But even as to the
latter reason, it was noted in Aquino vs. Santiago (161 SCRA 570 [1988]),
B.E.G.
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that it is not for the trial judge to determine the merit of a decision he
rendered as this is the role of the appellate court. Hence, it is not within
competence of the trial court, in resolving a motion for execution pending
appeal, to rule that the appeal is patently dilatory and rely on the same as its
basis for finding good reasons to grant the motion. Only an appellate court
can appreciate the dilatory intent of an appeal as an additional good reason
in upholding an order for execution pending appeal which may have been
issued by the trial court for other good reasons, or in cases where the motion
for execution pending appeal is filed with the appellate court in accordance
with Section 2, paragraph (a), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
Nor does the fact that petitioner filed a bond in the amount of P35 million
justify the grant of execution pending appeal. We have held in a number of
case that the posting of a bond to answer for damages is not alone a
sufficient reason for ordering execution pending appeal. Otherwise,
execution pending appeal could be obtained through the mere filing of such a
bond.
**
47. 5-year & 10-year period

Henry O v. Jose Javier
When petitioners former counsel received in November of 1989 a copy of the
October 16, 1989 Order by registered mail, service is deemed completed.
Since they chose not to file an appeal, the October 29, 1987 Decision
became final and executory after the lapse of 15 days from the date of receipt
of the October 16, 1989 Order.
Once a judgment becomes final, it is basic that the prevailing party is entitled
as a matter of right to a writ of execution the issuance of which is the trial
courts ministerial duty, compellable by mandamus. However, the prevailing
party must comply with the time limitations in enforcing judgments. Section 6,
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court states that:
A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within
five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and
before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced
by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five
(5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred
by the statute of limitations.
The purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments
by action is to prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights.
In the instant case, the October 29, 1987 Decision became final and
executory in 1989. However, respondents moved for its execution only on
January 24, 2003. Having slept on their right to enforce the judgment for
more than 13 years, respondents are now barred by the statute of limitations
from asking for its execution. Mere presumption that petitioners filed an
appeal is not a valid excuse in failing to verify the status of the case and
assert their right to enforce judgment for more than a decade. Respondents
blind reliance on their lawyer and inaction for 13 years constitute
unreasonable delay in exercising their right to have the October 29, 1987
Decision be executed.
Villeza v. German Service Corp.
Facts: Petitioner Villeza reiterates his argument that he never slept on his
right as he pursued several remedies. Still, he insists that the interruption or
B.E.G.
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suspension granted by the MeTC must be considered in computing the period

because it has the effect of tolling or stopping the counting of the
period for execution.
The Court finds no merit in this petition. An action for revival of judgment is
governed by Article 1144 (3), Article 1152 of the Civil Code and Section 6,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years
from the time the right of action accrues:
(3) Upon a judgment
Article 1152 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of
obligations declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment
became final.
Apropos, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reads (Supra):
The rules are clear. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the
prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right by mere motion
within five years from the date of entry of judgment. If the prevailing party
fails to have the decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of five years,
the said judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be enforced by
the institution of a complaint in a regular court within ten years from the time
the judgment becomes final.
When petitioner Villeza filed the complaint for revival of judgment on October
3, 2000, it had already been eleven (11) years from the finality of the
judgment he sought to revive. Clearly, the statute of limitations had set in.
Petitioner Villeza, however, wants this Court to agree with him that the
abeyance granted to him by the lower court tolled the running of the
prescriptive period. He even cited cases allowing exceptions to the general
rule. The Court, nevertheless, is not persuaded. The cited cases are, in fact,
not applicable to him, despite his endeavor to tailor them to fit in to his
position.
Unlike the cases cited above, the records reveal that it was petitioner Villeza,
the prevailing party himself, who moved to defer the execution of judgment.
The losing party never had any hand in the delay of its execution. Neither
did the parties have any agreement on that matter. After the lapse of five
years (5) from the finality of judgment, petitioner Villeza should have instead
filed a complaint for its revival in accordance with Section 6, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court. He, however, filed a motion to execute the same which was a
wrong course of action. On the 11th year, he finally sought its revival but he
requested the aid of the courts too late.
Rita Juco v. CA
An action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action, different
and distinct from either the recovery of property case or the reconstitution
case, wherein the cause of action is the decision itself and not the merits of
the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is rendered.
However, revival of judgment is premised on the assumption that the decision
to be revived, either by motion or by independent action, is already final and
executory. Hence, the need to make a determination of whether or not the
B.E.G.
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decision in Civil Case No. 7281 has indeed become final and executory. For
if the subject decision has already reached finality, then the conclusion of the
appellate court is correct that the dismissal of the reconstitution case would
not prevent respondents from reviving and thereafter executing the said
decision.
A decision issued by a court is final and executory when such decision
disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined by the court, such as when after the
lapse of the reglementary period to appeal, no appeal has been perfected. In
the case at bar, it is an undisputed fact that when the records of the original
case were destroyed in the fire there was a pending motion for
reconsideration of the disapproval of the record on appeal filed by petitioner.
A motion for reconsideration has the effect of suspending the statutory period
after which an order, decision, or judgment, in connection with which said
motion was filed, becomes final. In effect, such motion for reconsideration
has prevented the decision from attaining finality.
***
VIP
The findings of the Court of Appeals that notwithstanding the pendency of the
motion for reconsideration, the decision in Civil Case No. 7281 has become
final and executory by reason of laches cannot be sustained. As discussed
above, the doctrine of laches cannot operate to lend finality to the decision
since petitioners failure to pursue the motion for reconsideration was not due
to her negligence or abandonment, but was rather brought upon by the
dismissal of the reconstitution case. Therefore, it is clear that the case has not
reached finality at the time the records of the case were burnt.
48. remedy of 3rd person
Santos v. Bayhon
The general rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the
judgments or decrees of another court with concurrent or coordinate
jurisdiction possessing equal power to grant injunctive relief, applies only
when no third-party claimant is involved. When a third-party, or a stranger to
the action, asserts a claim over the property levied upon, the claimant may
vindicate his claim by an independent action in the proper civil court which
may stop the execution of the judgment on property not belonging to the
judgment debtor.
Ching v. CA
exclusive property levied upon terceria
The issues for resolution are as follows: (a) whether the petitioner-wife has
the right to file the motion to quash the levy on attachment on the 100,000
shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines;
On the first issue, we agree with the petitioners that the petitioner-wife had
the right to file the said motion, although she was not a party in Civil Case No.
142729.
In Ong v. Tating,49 we held that the sheriff may attach only those properties of
the defendant against whom a writ of attachment has been issued by the
court. When the sheriff erroneously levies on attachment and seizes the
property of a third person in which the said defendant holds no right or
interest, the superior authority of the court which has authorized the execution
may be invoked by the aggrieved third person in the same case. Upon
application of the third person, the court shall order a summary hearing for the
purpose of determining whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the
B.E.G.
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performance of his duties in the execution of the writ of attachment, more

specifically if he has indeed levied on attachment and taken hold of property
not belonging to the plaintiff. If so, the court may then order the sheriff to
release the property from the erroneous levy and to return the same to the
third person. In resolving the motion of the third party, the court does not and
cannot pass upon the question of the title to the property with any character of
finality. It can treat the matter only insofar as may be necessary to decide if
the sheriff has acted correctly or not. If the claimants proof does not
persuade the court of the validity of the title, or right of possession thereto, the
claim will be denied by the court.
The aggrieved third party may also avail himself of the remedy of "terceria" by
executing an affidavit of his title or right of possession over the property levied
on attachment and serving the same to the office making the levy and the
adverse party. Such party may also file an action to nullify the levy with
damages resulting from the unlawful levy and seizure, which should be a
totally separate and distinct action from the former case. The abovementioned remedies are cumulative and any one of them may be resorted to
by one third-party claimant without availing of the other remedies. 50
**
In this case, the petitioner-wife filed her motion to set aside the levy on
attachment of the 100,000 shares of stocks in the name of petitioner-husband
claiming that the said shares of stocks were conjugal in nature; hence, not
liable for the account of her husband under his continuing guaranty and
suretyship agreement with the PBMCI. The petitioner-wife had the right to file
the motion for said relief.
49. res judicata
Requisites
Dela Rama v. Mendiola
The decisive issue posed by petitioner is whether or not the specific
performance case (Civil Case No. 97-0734) is barred by the petition for
declaratory relief case (Civil Case No 96-1725 and CA-G.R. SP No. 44094)
on the ground of res judicata.
There is res judicata where the following four essential conditions concur, viz:
(1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must
have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a
judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the two
cases, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.
It is true that the first case was a special civil action for declaratory relief while
the second case was a civil action for specific performance. However, the
difference in form and nature of the two actions is immaterial.
The philosophy behind the rule on res judicata prohibits the parties from
litigating the same issue more than once. The issue involved in the
declaratory relief case was whether respondent has rights over the property
which was reconveyed to petitioner considering that he waived all his rights
by executing the Agreement to Sell and Buy. In the specific performance
case, the issue involved was the same, that is, whether respondent was
entitled to the property reconveyed when the petitioner failed to comply with
the terms of their agreement embodied in the same Agreement to Sell and
Buy. Respondents alleged right in both cases depends on one and the same
instrument, the Agreement to Sell and Buy. Clearly, respondents ultimate
objective in instituting the two actions was to have the property reconveyed in
its favor.
B.E.G.
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When material facts or questions in issue in a former action were conclusively

settled by a judgment rendered therein, such facts or questions constitute res
judicata and may not be again litigated in a subsequent action between the
same parties or their privies regardless of the form of the latter. This is the
essence of res judicata or bar by prior judgment. The parties are bound not
only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their
claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have
been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been
adjudged in that case.
Mesina v. CA
For res Judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the requisites
are: the judgment must be final; the judgment must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; the judgment
must be on the merits; and, there must be between the first and second
actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first three requisites. Hence, the
bone of contention is reduced to whether there is identity of parties and of
causes of action between the first case and the instant proceedings. For sure,
there is identity of parties with respect to petitioner Paz Mesina who was
impleaded in the first action and again in the present case.
There is none. The first case was based on the demand letter to vacate dated
18 November 1985 for subleasing the leased premises, in express violation of
B.P. 877, whereas the present case is based on the demand letter dated 12
July 1989 for subleasing the premises after 18 November 1985 and before 12
July 1989. While the first action has already attained finality, it merely refers to
the principal lease contract and the act of subleasing the property prior to 18
November 1985. Considering that the existing contract between petitioners
and private respondent CETUS is admittedly a verbal month-to-month lease
contract which expires at the end of every thirty-day period but which is
automatically renewed for the next thirty-day period, repeating the same cycle
for the succeeding thirty-day periods until the implied lease is expressly
terminated, each thirty-day lease contract is separate and distinct from the
other thirty-day leases. Hence, a cause of action based on one thirty-day
period is separate and distinct from a cause of action based on another thirtyday period. Accordingly, there can be no identity in the causes of action
between the two cases.
Mallion v. Alcantara
Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity and the action for declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of absence of marriage license constitute
separate causes of action, the present case would not fall under the
prohibition against splitting a single cause of action nor would it be barred by
the principle of res judicata.
This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of
jurisprudence and is founded upon the following precepts of common law,
namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the
State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2) the hardship on the
individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause. A contrary
doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of
individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of
suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.
B.E.G.
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The above provision (Sec. 47, R49) outlines the dual aspect of res judicata.13
Section 47 (b) pertains to it in its concept as "bar by prior judgment" or
"estoppel by verdict," which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the
prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of
action. On the other hand, Section 47 (c) pertains to res judicata in its
concept as "conclusiveness of judgment" or otherwise known as the rule of
auter action pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly resolved
in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same
parties involving a different cause of action.14 Res judicata in its concept as
a bar by prior judgment obtains in the present case.
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites:
(1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the
merits; and (4) there is -- between the first and the second actions -- identity
of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
The instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void
because no valid celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of
a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, however, petitioner
impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in
accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged
absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been
presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are
bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or
defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which
might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could
have been adjudged in that case.
Noceda v. Directo
Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, such material fact
becomes binding and conclusive on the parties. When a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as
it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in
privity with them.13 Thus, petitioners can no longer question respondents
ownership over Lot No. 1121 in the instant suit for quieting of title. Simply put,
conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in
another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of
action.14
Cruz v. Sandiganbayan
civil case res judicata to civil case
But this Courts recent ruling in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue that Pilipinas Shell, of which petitioner
Cruz was the responsible officer, was a transferee in good faith and for value
of the same TCCs subject of the criminal casesraises the issue of whether
or not such ruling bars the prosecution of Cruz in the criminal cases subject of
this petition.
Conclusiveness of judgment or auter action pendent ordains that issues
actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot be raised anew in any
future case involving the same parties although for a different cause of action.
Where the rule applies, there must be identity of issues but not necessarily
identity in causes of action.
B.E.G.
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In the present case, the OMB charged petitioner Cruz, acting in conspiracy
with others, of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 in connection with
the transfer of fraudulently issued TCCs to Pilipinas Shell. The main issue in
this case is whether or not Cruz, Pilipinas Shells Treasury head, connived
with the officials of the One-Stop Center and others in unlawfully giving,
through manifest partiality and bad faith, unwarranted benefits to DKC by
processing and approving such transfers to Pilipinas Shell, knowing that DKC,
the transferee, had been a dormant company.
This Court resolved substantially the same issue in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.[28] There, the Court
categorically found that Pilipinas Shell, represented in its acquisition of the
TCCs in question by petitioner Cruz, was a transferee in good faith and for
value of those TCCs. This means that neither Pilipinas Shell nor Cruz was a
party to the fraudulent issuance and transfer of the TCCs. Indeed, there
existed, said the Court, no evidence that Pilipinas Shell was involved in the
processing of the One-Stop Centers approval of the transfer of those TCCs
to Pilipinas Shell.
**
The parties in the tax case and in the criminal cases are substantially the
same. Although it was respondent Task Force that investigated the
irregularities in the issuance and transfers of the TCCs, the ultimate
complainant in the criminal casethe party that suffered the injurywas the
government, represented by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The
latter also represented the government in the tax case against Pilipinas Shell.
Petitioner Cruz, on the other hand, represented Pilipinas Shell in all the
transactions in question. In short, the parties in the tax case and in the
criminal cases represent substantially identical interests. The principle of res
judicata through conclusiveness of judgment applies to bar the criminal
actions against Cruz.
APPEALS
49. when appeal deemed perfected
- meaning
- residual powers
**
50. what cannot be appealed [SEE DISCUSSIONS ABOVE]

Mendiola v. CA
- order denying MR from fraud judgment
- appeal remedy
Rule 65
**
VIP
51. modes of appeal from RTCs decision [SEE DISCUSSIONS ABOVE]

Neypes Principle 15 days
Yu v. Tatad
- Neypes applies to criminal cases
***
52. Rule 45 vs Rule 65

53. several parties; one did not appeal; effect
54. dismissal of appeal
B.E.G.
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Gonzaga v. CA
no errors assigned
It must be pointed out that petitioners invoked the certiorari jurisdiction of the
Court under Rule 65 when an appeal under Rule 45 is the proper remedy and
should have been filed. Under the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 65, the
remedy of certiorari may only be availed of in the absence of any other
remedy (no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law) in the ordinary course of law open to the petitioner. In
the instant case, the CA had already finally disposed of the case with the
issuance of the Resolution denying due course to petitioners petition for
review of the RTCs decision, and the Resolution denying petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration. Thus, the remedy of an appeal under Rule 45 was then
already available to petitioners. Petitioners then had 15 days from their
receipt of the Resolution within which to file a petition for review under Rule
45. Instead, they filed the instant Petition for Certiorari. Clearly, the proper
remedy in the instant case should have been the filing of a petition for review
under Rule 45. This Court has repeatedly ruled that reviews under Rules 45
and 65 of the Rules of Court are mutually exclusive and the remedy of
certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be made a substitute for a petitioners failure
to timely appeal under Rule 45.
Thus, under Sec. 5(f) of Rule 56, a petition for certiorari interposed when an
appeal is proper and available may be dismissed.
RULE 57
55. grounds for issuance of attachment; contemporaneous service
Davao Light case (1991)
It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to
the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of defendant, as above
indicated issuance of summons, order of attachment and writ of
attachment (and/or appointments of guardian ad litem, or grant of authority to
the plaintiff to prosecute the suit as a pauper litigant, or amendment of the
complaint by the plaintiff as a matter of right without leave of court and
however valid and proper they might otherwise be, these do not and cannot
bind and affect the defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his
person is eventually obtained by the court, either by service on him of
summons or other coercive process or his voluntary submission to the
court's authority. Hence, when the sheriff or other proper officer commences
implementation of the writ of attachment, it is essential that he serve on the
defendant not only a copy of the applicant's affidavit and attachment bond,
and of the order of attachment, as explicity required by Section 5 of Rule 57,
but also the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of the
complaint and order for appointment of guardian ad litem, if any, as also
explicity directed by Section 3, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Service of all
such documents is indispensable not only for the acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, but also upon considerations of fairness, to
apprise the defendant of the complaint against him, of the issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment and the grounds therefor and thus accord him the
opportunity to prevent attachment of his property by the posting of a
counterbond in an amount equal to the plaintiff's claim in the complaint
pursuant to Section 5 (or Section 12), Rule 57, or dissolving it by causing
dismissal of the complaint itself on any of the grounds set forth in Rule 16, or
demonstrating the insufficiency of the applicant's affidavit or bond in
accordance with Section 13, Rule 57.
Tanchan v. Allied Bank
B.E.G.
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- improvident issuance of writ of attachment

The question now is whether petitioner has a valid reason to have the writ discharged and to
claim damages.
It should be borne in mind that the questioned writ of preliminary attachment
was issued by the RTC under Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, to wit Sec. 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. - A
plaintiff or any proper party may, at the commencement of the
action or at any time thereafter, have the property of the adverse
party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that
may be recovered in the following cases:
xxxx
(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty
of a fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon
which the action is brought, or in concealing or disposing of the
property for the taking, detention or conversion of which the action
is brought;
x x x x.
Petitioners argue that the foregoing allegations are not sufficient to justify issuance of
the writ, especially in the absence of findings that they, as sureties, participated in
specific fraudulent acts in the execution and performance of the loan agreements
with respondent. There must be evidence clear and convincing that the officer committed a
fraud or connived with the corporation to commit a fraud; only then may the properties of said
officer, along with those of the corporation, be held under a writ of preliminary
attachment. There is every reason to extend the foregoing rule, by analogy, to a mere surety
of the defendant. A surety's involvement is marginal to the principal agreement between the
defendant and the plaintiff; hence, in order for the surety to be subject to a proceeding for
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, it must be shown that said surety participated in
or facilitated the fraudulent practice of the defendant, such as by offering a security solely to
induce the plaintiff to enter into the agreement with the defendant.
All that is alleged is that Foremost obtained loans from respondent but failed to pay the same,
but as the Court has repeatedly held, no fraud can be inferred from a mere failure to pay a
loan. In fine, there was no factual basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
against the properties of petitioners. The immediate dissolution of the writ is called for.
56. remedies against attachment
Metro Inc. v. Laras Gift & Dcor Inc.
- fraud as ground for attachment; bond is remedy
Petitioners raise the question of whether the writ of attachment issued by the
trial court was improperly issued such that it may be discharged without the
filing of a counter-bond.
The applicant for a writ of preliminary attachment must sufficiently show the
factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot
be inferred from the debtors mere non-payment of the debt or failure to
comply with his obligation.
We rule that respondents allegation that petitioners undertook to sell
exclusively and only through JRP/LGD for Target Stores Corporation but that
petitioners transacted directly with respondents foreign buyer is sufficient
allegation of fraud to support their application for a writ of preliminary
attachment. Since the writ of preliminary attachment was properly issued, the
only way it can be dissolved is by filing a counter-bond in accordance with
Section 12, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
B.E.G.
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RULE 58
57. period of TRO
58. requisites for issuance of preliminary injunction
MIAA v. CA
- no right
MIAA asserts that K Services has not shown any clear and unmistakable right
to the protection of a writ of preliminary injunction. MIAA argues that the effect
of the injunction is to force MIAA to extend the life of a contract that already
expired by operation of its own provisions.
The requisites necessary for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
are: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be
protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage. The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary
for the grant of an injunction are present in the case before it.
In the instant case, however, the trial courts order of was, on its face, bereft
of basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. There were no
findings of fact or law in the assailed order indicating that any of the elements
essential for the grant of a preliminary injunction existed. Absent a preliminary
finding by the trial court that K Services possessed the right to continue as
MIAAs concessionaire, MIAAs termination of K Services was not sufficient in
itself to establish that there was an invasion of K Services right.
Cagungun v. CA
with right in esse
In order to protect their rights, petitioners were forced to file the instant case
with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the foreclosure of their property. Petitioners
insist that respondent, in allowing withdrawals in their savings account without
their authority or knowledge is guilty of gross negligence to which it is liable
for moral damages.
The fact that petitioners left the custody of their passbooks to respondent,
through its employee O-I-C Ruperto Reyes, and that they entrusted to Bong
or Ding their deposits will not excuse respondent from being liable.
Petitioners did these things because they trusted and depended on
respondent to take care of their accounts with it. If respondent bank was
really strict in enforcing the banking rule that the passbook must be kept by
the depositor, why did it not do so? For its failure, any anomaly or damage
that might result therefrom should be borne by it.
(relate nalang sa requisite ng P.I)
RULE 60
59. remedies in replevin
RULE 63
60. declaratory relief; jurisdiction
Chavez v. JBC
Well settled is the rule that a petition for declaratory relied must be filed with
the RTC as a rule as there are issues or facts to be resolved. The
Constitution as the subject matter; and the validity and construction of Sec
8(1) Art. VII as the issue raised, the petition should properly be considered as
B.E.G.
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that which would result in the adjudication of rights sans the execution
process because the only relief to be granted is the very declaration of the
rights under the document to be construed. It being so, the original jurisdiction
over the petition lies with the appropriate RTC. Notwithstanding the fact that
only questions of the SC as provided in Sec. 5, Art. VIII of the Constitution.
At any rate, due to its serious implications, not only to government processes
involved, but also to the sanctity of the Constitution, the SC may deem it more
prudent to take cognizance of it. The SC could dismiss the petition but due to
the transcendental importance of the issue involved, it may take cognizance
of the case as an exception.
Republic v. Orbecido
WON PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF IS PROPER REMEDY?
YES
The action constitutes a Petition for Declaratory Relief which is granted if the
following are present:
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
(3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and
(4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination
In this case, the OSG and Orbecido are adverse parties - one for protection of
marriage while the other against it; then it is ripe for judicial determination
because if Orbecido decides to remarry, he may face litigation wherein the
validity of his 2nd marriage may be questioned.
Topacio v. Ong (QUO WARRANTO)
SC declared that the proper petition is a quo warranto proceeding, not petition
for certiorari and prohibition for the former action seeks to declare null and
void. Petitioner claims that Ongs appointment as an Associate Justice of
Sandiganbayan is being unconstitutional. The petition professes to be for
certiorari and prohibition but it shows a quo warranto aspect of the petition.
As a collateral attack on a public officers title, the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition must be dismissed. The title of a public office may be
contested directly by no less a quo warranto suit. It cannot be invoked
collaterally even by mandamus or motion to annul the order.
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the title to
a contested public office. It is brought against the person who is alleged to
have usurped, intruded into or unlawfully held or exercised the public office
and may be commenced by the Solicitor General as the case may be, or by
any person claiming to be entitled to public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another. There must be a clear right to the
contested office.
RULE 65
61. mandamus v. prohibition
Ongsuco v. Malones
In a petition for prohibition against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person
-- whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions -- who has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the
petitioner prays that judgment be rendered, commanding the respondent to
desist from further proceeding in the action or matter specified in the petition.
On the other hand, the remedy of mandamus lies to compel performance of
a ministerial duty. The petitioner for such a writ should have a well-defined,
B.E.G.
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clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act, and it must be the
clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.
In this case, petitioners primary intention is to prevent respondent
from implementing Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, i.e., by collecting the
goodwill fees from petitioners and barring them from occupying the stalls at
the municipal public market. Obviously, the writ petitioners seek is more in
the nature of prohibition (commanding desistance), rather than mandamus
(compelling performance).
Chavez v. JBC
The petition is also for prohibition under Rule 65 seeking to enjoin Congress
from sending two representatives with one full vote each to the JBC.
Uy v. Lee
- no mandamus to compel production of will
Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against
his mother Uy Kiao Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to
compel petitioner to produce the holographic will of his father so that probate
proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent
jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior
court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the
performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the
official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of
law. This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly
excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the
performance of duties in which the public has no interest. The writ is a proper
recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is
mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus
will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station.
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the
obligation involved herethe production of the original holographic willis in
the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus
cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted
that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production
of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not
prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will
whether the same is in his possession or not.
RULE 67
62. no MTD in expropriation proceedings
RA 8974 Far East International v. CA
100% zonal value; pay
RA 8974 specifically governs expropriation proceedings for national
government infrastructure projects.
The RTC correctly applied the procedure laid out in R.A. No. 8974, by
requiring the deposit of the amount equivalent to 100 percent of the zonal
value of the properties sought to be expropriated before the issuance of a writ
of possession in favor of the Republic.
B.E.G.
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FORECLOSURE
63. judicial & extrajudicial
RULE 70
64. 1-year period
65. judgment; immediately executory
City of Naga v. Asuncion
When exigencies in the case warrant it, the appellate court may stay the writ
of execution issued by the RTC in an action for ejectment if there are
circumstances necessitating such action.
La Campana Corp. v. Ledesma [PERALTA DOCTRINE]
Where supervening events (occurring subsequent to the judgment) bring
about a material change in the situation of the parties which makes the
execution inequitable, or where there is no compelling urgency for the
execution because it is not justified by the prevailing circumstances, the court
may stay immediate execution of the judgment.
Limitless Potentials Inc. v. Quilala
for defendant; not immediately executor
LPI averred that under Section 21 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, the
decision of the RTC on appeal in ejectment cases should be immediately
executory, without distinction as to in whose favor the decision is rendered.
The Court finds and so holds that the RTC did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion in denying LPIs motion for execution of that portion of the
amended decision ordering RCAM to place it in possession of the subject
areas/spaces. The execution of the judgment pending appeal is proper
only if the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant,
and not vice versa. This is in accordance with Section 19, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. If judgment
is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon
motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay
execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial
Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and
costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless,
during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the
amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined
by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he
shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use
and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate
determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of
each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be
transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of
the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.
What LPI should have done when RCAM dismantled its billboards on October
5, 1996 while the ejectment case was still pending in the MTC was to file a
motion with the said court to compel RCAM to restore the possession of the
property to it pending the resolution of the ejectment case. However, LPI
failed to do so.
66. jurisdiction over ownership; damages
B.E.G.
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Shoemart Inc. v. CA
Petitioner contends that there were four rental increases effected during the
period of unlawful detainer and during the pendency of the case, which
increases were duly proven during the trial. However, according to
respondent court, petitioner failed to present evidence on other approved and
accepted rental increases and since the supplemental complaint limited itself
only to P45,142.00, the award of damages cannot go beyond the said
amount.
Petitioner's recovery is not limited by the amount of P45,142.00 prayed for in
the supplemental complaint as increased rental effective January 1, 1979.
This is not a case of a complaint subsequently amended, the effect of which
is to render the original complaint abandoned or inexistent and let the
amendment take form as the sole substitute upon which the case stands for
trial. A perusal of the original complaint shows that it prayed, among others,
that the defendant (private respondent) be ordered to pay plaintiff (petitioner)
the monthly rental of P34,622.00 "and all other rentals and charges that may
be due until such time that defendant . . . shall have vacated the premises."
Petitioner, therefore, did not foreclose its right to demand increased rentals
that may be recovered expressed in terms of the fair rental value or the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the real property.
This is so because, unlike in an amended complaint, the original complaint
exists side by side with the supplemental complaint. In the case at bar, the
supplemental pleading merely served to aver supervening facts which were
then not ripe for judicial relief when the original pleading was filed. As
aforesaid, supplemental pleadings are meant to supply deficiencies in aid of
the original pleading, and not to dispense with the latter.
Agustin v. Bulacans Liwbawan v. Acosta
Guzman v. Guzman
determination of ownership in unlawful detainer
MTC found the petitioner to be the lawful owner of the land with a right to its
possession since the respondents had no vested right to the land sine they
are merely the petitioners children to whom no ownership or possessory
rights have passed.
Ejectment cases are summary proceedings intended to provide an
expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right of possession of
property. Title is not involved, hence, it is a special civil action with a special
procedure. The only issue to be resolved in ejectment cases is the question of
entitlement to the physical or material possession of the premises or
possession de facto. Thus, any ruling on the question of ownership is only
provisional, made solely for the purpose of determining who is entitled to
possession de facto. Accordingly, any ruling on the validity of petitioners
transfer of rights is provisional and should be resolved in a proper proceeding.
RULE 71
67. kinds of contempt
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
68. venue & jurisdiction
Jao v. CA; San Luis v. San Luis; Nitchen v. Nitchen
B.E.G.
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The estate shall be settled in the court where the deceased was residing at
the time of his death if he was a resident of the Philippines. If he was a
resident of another country, it should be settled in the court of any place
where he had an estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement
shall exercise it to the exclusion of all others. However, the place of
settlement is not a question of jurisdiction but a question of venue.
Frainela v. Banayad
The applicable law, therefore, confers jurisdiction on the RTC or
the MTCs over probate proceedings depending on the gross value of the
estate, which value must be alleged in the complaint or petition to be filed.
Nowhere in the petition is there a statement of the gross value
of Moisess estate. Thus, from a reading of the original petition filed, it cannot
be determined which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
proceedings. The RTC therefore committed gross error when it had
perfunctorily assumed jurisdiction despite the fact that the initiatory pleading
filed before it did not call for the exercise of its jurisdiction. The RTC should
have, at the outset, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Be it noted that
the dismissal on the said ground may be ordered motu proprio by the courts.
Further, the CA, on appeal, should have dismissed the case on the same
ground. Settled is the doctrine that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised by
any of the parties or may be reckoned by the court, at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Despite the pendency of this case for around 18 years, the exception laid
down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy and clarified recently in Figueroa v. People
cannot be applied. First, because, as a general rule, the principle
of estoppel by laches cannot lie against the government. No injustice to the
parties or to any third person will be wrought by the ruling that the trial court
has no jurisdiction over the instituted probate proceedings.
Second and most important, because in Tijam, the delayed invocation of lack
of jurisdiction has been made during the execution stage of a final
and executory ruling of a court. In Figueroa, the Court has emphasized
that estoppel by laches only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the
factual milieu in Tijam.
69. extent of power of probate court
Vizconde v. CA
The probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded
to determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property between
Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the subject property
between the concerned parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed
and the true intent of the contracting parties, as well as the presence or
absence of consideration, are matters outside the probate court's jurisdiction.
Nunguid v. Nunguid
The authority of the probate court is limited to the ascertainment of the
extrinsic validity of the will, the soundness of mind of the testator, whether the
will was executed freely. It cannot determine the intrinsic validity of the will
except if the preterition is apparent because it would be useless to declare the
will extrinsically valid and yet, intrinsically void as there would be waste of
time of the parties and the court. It cannot likewise determine the validity and
the nature of contracts as the same shall be decided in in an appropriate
proceeding before a court of general jurisdiction. The reason for the above is
because a probate court has limited jurisdiction.
Nepomuceno v. CA
B.E.G.
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The general rule is that the court's area of inquiry is limited to the an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. This general rule
is however not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and
may pass upon certain provisions of the will. The will itself admitted on its
face the relationship between the testator and the petitioner. The devisee is
invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a donation made between persons
guilty of adultery/concubinage at the time of the donations. Under Art, 1028 it
is also prohibited.
The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the court didn't find it
to serve a practical purpose to remand the nullified provision in a separate
action for that purpose only since in the probate of a will, the court does not
ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
Romero v. CA
- no to ownership; except if parties agree
Petitioners assert that the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a probate or
intestate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the
estate of deceased persons or the appointment of executors, but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or
ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of
ownership.
70. appointment of administrator
Santos v. Angeles
In the appointment of an administrator the order of preference is:
a. the surviving spouse or next of kin;
b. the person requested by the surviving spouse of next of kin;
c. principal creditors;
d. other person selected by the court.
The best interest of the estate shall always be considered in the appointment
of an administrator. In case of conflict between the surviving spouse and the
next of kin, the court shall apply the greater interest rule that things being
equal, like when two are competent, willing and can post a bond, the one with
greater interest shall be appointed.
71. powers of probate court
In re Vergara
The warrant of arrest stemmed from a motion filed by respondent Eleuteria P.
Bolao, as Special Administratrix of the estate of the late Anselma P. Allers,
praying that petitioners be held guilty of indirect contempt for not complying
with the probate courts order dated October 9, 1999 directing them to pay
their monthly rentals to respondent Bolao.
We find that the trial courts finding of contempt and the order directing the
imprisonment of petitioner to be unwarranted. The salutary rule is that the
power to punish to contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not
vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of
punishment. Court must exercise their contempt powers judiciously and
sparingly, with utmost self-restraint.
B.E.G.
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In the present case, petitioners, as recognized lessees of the estate of the

deceased, were ordered by the probate court to pay the rentals to the
administratrix. Petitioners did not comply with the order for the principal
reason that they were not certain as to the rightful person to whom to pay the
rentals because it was a certain Berlito P. Taripe who had originally leased the
subject property to them. Clearly, the payment of rentals is covered by the
constitutional guarantee against imprisonment.
Vizconde v. CA
72. claims against the estate
The proper procedure is for the claimant to file a claim against the estate of
the deceased where the judgment debtor dies before levy on execution of his
properties. Filing a claim against the estate is also the proper procedure for:
1. Money claims arising from implied or express contracts, due or not
due, or contingent, contracted BEFORE the death of the decedent;
2. Funeral expenses;
3. Expenses for the last sickness of the decedent.
For claims AFTER the death of the decedent, such claims may be allowed as
expenses of administration and as such, may be collected personally or by
motion in the testate or intestate proceedings without the formality and
limitations provided for money claims against the decedent.
Money claims against the estate may be allowed any time BEFORE an order
of distribution is entered at the discretion of the court and for cause and upon
such terms as are equitable. This extension of the period shall not exceed 1
month from the issuance of the order authorizing such extension.
Metrobank v. Absolute Management Corp.
The requisites of solution indebiti in the case are: first, MB acted in mistake
when it deposited the AMC checks to Ayala; second, Ayala had no right to
demand and receive the checks that were deposited to its account. This
disjunct created an obligation on the part of Ayala, through, Chua, to return
the amount of these checks to MB. This characteristic unmistakably marks
the complaint as a contingent one that must be included in the claims falling
under the terms of Sec. 5, Rule 86, of the Rules of Court.
Hilado v. CA
Statute of Non-Claims; claims against the estate The claims against the
estate are all money claims consisting of: (a) claims or money arising from
contract, express or implied; (b) funeral expenses; (c) expenses for the last
sickness of the decedent; (d) Judgment based on money.
Only money claims may be filed. Claims for damages and recovery of
property must be filed against the executor or administrator. This is because
they are claims that survive the death of the decedent.
Raquega v. CA
Villegas v. CA
Obvien case
B.E.G.
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Side Notes:
Palaganas v. Plaganas
Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad
although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the
countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our
jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is
abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according
to the formalities observed in his country.
In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed by
the court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in
mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But,
reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a
foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented for
the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by
Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners stance, since this latter
rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the
present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the
findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter
can be established.
The matters to be proven for the re-probate proceedings are:
i.
the testator was domiciled in such foreign country;
ii.
the will has been admitted to probate under its laws;
iii.
the probate court has jurisdiction over the proceedings;
iv.
the law on probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of
compliance with the same; and
v.
the legal requirements for the valid execution of a will.
Baltazar v. Lacsa
Petitioners filed an Amended Opposition asking the RTC to deny the probate
of Paciencias Will on the following grounds: the Will was not executed and
attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was
mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was
forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the
execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; that the
signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the signature to
be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did
not intend the document to be her Will.
The appellate court did not agree with the RTCs conclusion that Paciencia
was of unsound mind when she executed the Will. It ratiocinated that "the
state of being magulyan does not make a person mentally unsound so [as]
to render [Paciencia] unfit for executing a Will." The state of being forgetful
does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him
unfit to execute a Will.
It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to clearly
establish that the decedent was not of sound and disposing mind at the time
of the execution of said will. Otherwise, the state is duty-bound to give full
effect to the wishes of the testator to distribute his estate in the manner
provided in his will so long as it is legally tenable.
73. remedies if deprived of share
reopen
B.E.G.
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dont file action to annul proceeding

74. when execution will issue
75. secured obligations; effect of death

Maglasang v. Manila Bank
A obtained a loan from Manila Bank secured by a mortgage. In the meantime,
A died. What are the remedies of the bank? The bank may exercise any of
the following options:
a. it may files a claim against the estate;
b. it may foreclose the mortgage judicially;
c. it may extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage, but it has no right to ask
for deficiency from the estate.
The remedies are not cumulative. They are not alternative. The exercise of
one excludes the other remedies.
76. escheat
no relation w/n 5th civil degree of consanguinity
effect of reappearance 5 years
ADOPTION
77. qualification
78. joint adoption
79. effects
80. inter-country adoption
NAMES & CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
81. grounds for change of name
B.E.G.
103
Change of
first name
and
surname
(substantial
corrections)
Judicial
proceeding
Notice and
publication:
at least one
a week for
three
consecutive
weeks in
some
newspaper
of general
circulation
(notice
hearing)
108
Change of
first name
and
surname
(typographic
al or clerical
errors)
Judicial
summary
proceeding
(can be
converted to
an
adversarial
proceeding
if there are
substantial
changes
and the
changes
affect the
RA 9048
Change of first
name or
nickname
Administrative
proceeding
Notice and
Publication: at
least once a
week for two
consecutive
weeks (publish
whole affidavit)
The civil registrar
and the Consul
participate in the
proceeding
Venue: local civil
registrar (no
residency
requirement)
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The OSG
participates
in the
proceeding
Venue: RTC
where the
petitioner
resides
Appeal
decision
with the CA
status of an
individual)
Notice and
publication:
at least one
a week for
three
consecutive
weeks in
some
newspaper
of general
circulation
(notice
hearing)
The Civil
Registrar
participates
in the
proceeding
Venue: RTC
of city or
province
where the
correspondi
ng civil
registry is
located
Appeal
decision
with the CA
Appeal decision
to the civil
registrar General
(head of NCSO)
Republic v. Silverio
Issue on the change of first name
In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR
MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO
CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY
AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL
REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER) was passed. This law
provides that it should be the local civil registrar that has jurisdiction in
petitions for the change of first names and not the regular courts. Hence, the
petition of Silverio insofar as his first name is concerned is procedurally infirm.
Even assuming that the petition filed properly, it cannot be granted still
because the ground upon which it is based(gender re-assignment) is not one
of those provided for by the law.
Under the law, a change of name may only be grounded on the following:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted
with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously
used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or
nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the above, he merely alleged
gender re-assignment as the basis.
Issue on the change of sex
This entry cannot be changed either via a petition before the regular courts or
B.E.G.
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a petition for the local civil registry. Not with the courts because there is no
law to support it. And not with the civil registry because there is no clerical
error involved. Silverio was born a male hence it was just but right that the
entry written in his birth certificate is that he is a male. The sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no
law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex
made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
Republic v. Cagandahan
The Court ruled that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial
discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the consequences
that will follow. In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a
female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for
gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific
development showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change
in the subjects birth certificate entry is in order. The Court, in deciding the
case, considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright
denial. It noted that Cagandahan thinks of himself as a male and
considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen),
there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. It
stressed that she has let nature take its course in her development to reveal
more fully his male characteristics. The SC agrees that there is substantial
compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to
the local civil registrar. Rule 1 of the Rules of Court states that courts shall
construe the Rules liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the
parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought
before it.
Republic v. Coseteng
What entries may be subject to cancellation (Sec. 2 Rule 108)?
Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil registry may be
cancelled or corrected:
(a) births
(b) marriage
(c) deaths
(d) legal separations
(e) judgments of annulments of marriage
(f) judgments of declaring marriages void from the beginning
(g) legitimations
(h) adoptions
(i)
election, loss, recovery of citizenship
(j) civil interdiction
(k) judicial determination of filiation
(l)
change of name
The proceedings must be adversarial -- one having opposing parties,
contested as distinguished from ex parte application, one of which the party
seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the
latter an opportunity to contest it.
Republic v. Olaybar (PERALTA DOCTRINE, Feb. 2014)
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be
summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be
adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be
adopted is adversary. It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings
B.E.G.
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and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy is granted upon mere
application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary.
In this case, the wife claims that her signature was forged and she was not
the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words,
she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was
not the one who entered into such contract. A petition for correction or
cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of
the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family
Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10- SC and other related laws. Aside from the
certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the
existence of marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence
that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such
existence. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as
there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such
marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence.
Republic v. Valencia
If it refers to a substantial change which affects the status or citizenship of a
party, the matter should be threshed out in a proper action. For changes
involving the civil status of the parents, their nationality or citizenship, those
are grave and important matters which may have a bearing and effect on the
citizenship and nationality not only of said parents, but of the offsprings, and
to seek said changes, it is not only the State, but also all parties concerned
and affected should be made parties defendants or respondents, and
evidence should be submitted, either to support the allegations of the petition
or complaint, or also to disprove the same so that any order or decision in the
case may be made in the entry in a civil register that will affect or even
determine conclusively the citizenship or nationality of a person therein
involved.
Transgender case
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
82. jurisdiction; elements
territory; nature; penalty
power of SC to transfer venue
venue is a question of jurisdiction
RA 8042 MIGRANT WORKERS ACT OF 1995 AS AMENDED BY RA 10022
Santo Tomas v. Salac
- alternative venue in criminal cases
RA8042 provides that a victim of illegal recruitment has the option to file the
case in his place of residence or in the place where the crime was committed.
This is an exception to the rule that venue is a question of jurisdiction in
criminal cases. The law is intended to protect the interest of victims of illegal
recruitments.
Disini v. SB (2013)
The SB has the exclusive jurisdiction over criminal actions involving a person
notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering that his criminal
prosecution is intimately related to the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their
immediate family, subordinates, and close associates.
B.E.G.
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Republic v. Judge
meaning of in relation to office
It means that the offenseneed not be connecte with official duties. It is enough
that it is in relation to office. A public official and employee commits a crime in
relation to their office if the offense was intimately connected with the
information that the office of the offender and perpretrated while he is in the
performance of his official function. Mere allegation in the information that the
offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office is
not sufficient. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the
information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of
the accuseds official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in
order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to the public
office.
RULE 110
83. time; date
Zapanta v. People
no need to allege exact date & time
As to the sufficiency of the allegation of the date of the commission of the
offense, Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure adds:
Section 11. Date of commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to state in
the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed
except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be
alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual
date of its commission. [italics supplied; emphasis ours]
Conformably with these provisions, when the date given in the complaint is
not of the essence of the offense, it need not be proven as alleged; thus, the
complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed
at any date within the period of the statute of limitations and before the
commencement of the action.
In this case, the petitioner had been fully apprised of the charge of qualified
theft since the information stated the approximate date of the commission of
the offense through the words "sometime in the month of October, 2001." The
petitioner could reasonably deduce the nature of the criminal act with which
he was charged from a reading of the contents of the information, as well as
gather by such reading whatever he needed to know about the charge to
enable him to prepare his defense.
We stress that the information did not have to state the precise date when the
offense was committed, as to be inclusive of the month of "November 2001"
since the date was not a material element of the offense. As such, the offense
of qualified theft could be alleged to be committed on a date as near as
possible to the actual date of its commission. Clearly, the month of November
is the month right after October.
84. aggravating & qualifying circumstances
Republic v. C??don
rape bro & sis
downgrade
85. duplication of offense
Motion to quash as remedy
Republic v. Dacay
No MTQ; effect
As a rule, there should only be one offense alleged in one information as
duplicity of offenses in one information is not allowed by the rules. However,
the requirement is a mere procedural rule not jurisdictional, such that if the
B.E.G.
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accused did not object to the duplicity of the information, he can be convicted
of as many offenses as may be proven during trial.
Side Note:
-Duplication
-Remedy
-Prescription
Damasco v. Laqui
In the case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that where an
accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible within
the graver offense charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser offense if it
has already prescribed. To hold otherwise, according to the Court, would be
to sanction a circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple expedient
of accusing the defendant of the graver offense.
Hence, while it is the rule that an accused who fails to move to quash before
pleading, is deemed to waive all objections which are grounds of a motion to
quash, yet, this rule cannot apply to the defense of prescription, which under
Art. 69 of the Revised Penal Code extinguishes criminal liability. To apply the
suggestion in the aforecited memorandum could contravene said Article 89,
which is a part of substantive law. 11 This position is further strengthened by
Sec. 8, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which added extinction
of offense as one of the exceptions to the general rule regarding the effects of
a failure to assert a ground of a motion to quash.
86. amendment
Rummer v. People
-to change date; formal
-no prejudice
The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the
amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the
complaint or information as it originally stood would no longer be available
after the amendment is made, when any evidence the accused might have
would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any
evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or
information, as amended.
People v. Galvez
-4 infos., merged to one.
87. filing of criminal case; civil deemed filed; effect of acquittal

Domingo v. Colina [PERALTA DOCTRINE]
Where the court dismissed the criminal case on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove the second and third elements of BP 22, i.e., (2)
the check is applied on account or for value and (3) the person issuing the
check knows at the time of its issuance that he does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the bank for the full payment of the check upon its
presentment, the dismissal is due to the prosecutions failure to prove the
accuseds guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
However, the lack of evidence to prove the aforesaid elements of the offense
charged does not mean that petitioner has no existing debt with respondent, a
civil aspect which is proven by another quantum of evidence, a mere
preponderance of evidence. Culling from the pronouncement of the MTCC
that the prosecution failed to prove the second and third elements of the
offense charged, it can be deduced that the prosecution was able to establish
the presence of the first and fourth elements. The fact that petitioner was
B.E.G.
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proven to have drawn and issued a check and that the same was
subsequently dishonored for inadequate funds leads to the logical conclusion
that the fact from which her civil liability might arise, indeed, exists.
-No reservation
Rodriguez v. Ponferrada
1. Thus, the possible single civil liability arising from the act of issuing
a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil actions deemed
instituted with the estafa case and the BP 22 violation prosecution.
In the crimes of both estafa and violation of BP 22, Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court expressly allows, even automatically in the present
case, the institution of a civil action without need of election by the
offended party. As both remedies are simultaneously available to
this party, there can be no forum shopping.
2. Hence, this Court cannot agree with what petitioner ultimately espouses.
At the present stage, no judgment on the civil liability has been rendered
in either criminal case. There is as yet no call for the offended party to
elect remedies and, after choosing one of them, be considered barred
from others available to her.
3. Doctrine of Election of Remedies: the purpose of the doctrine of
election of remedies is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to
prevent double redress for a single wrong. It is regarded as an application
of the law of estoppel, upon the theory that a party cannot, in the
assertion of his right occupy inconsistent positions which form the basis
of his respective remedies. However, when a certain state of facts under
the law entitles a party to alternative remedies, both founded upon the
identical state of facts, these remedies are not considered inconsistent
remedies. In such case, the invocation of one remedy is not an election
which will bar the other, unless the suit upon the remedy first invoked
shall reach the stage of final adjudication or unless by the invocation of
the remedy first sought to be enforced, the plaintiff shall have gained an
advantage thereby or caused detriment or change of situation to the
other. It must be pointed out that ordinarily, election of remedies is not
made until the judicial proceedings has gone to judgment on the merits.
4. In the case at bar, the institution of the civil actions with the estafa
cases and the inclusion of another set of civil actions with the BP 22
cases are not exactly repugnant or inconsistent with each other.
Nothing in the Rules signifies that the necessary inclusion of a civil action
in a criminal case for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law precludes
the institution in an estafa case of the corresponding civil action, even if
both offenses relate to the issuance of the same check.
People v. Alferez
Nonetheless, petitioners acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove all
elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt does not include the
extinguishment of his civil liability for the dishonored checks. In case of
acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. The extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action where (a)
the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is
only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. In a number of
similar cases, we have held that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt does
not preclude the award of civil damages.
88. effect of death
89. prejudicial question
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Ras v. Rasul
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution
of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question
must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try
and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause
the suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil, it
must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which
the criminal pro. prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the
issues raised in said civil action would be necessary determinative of the guilt
or innocence of the accused.
Zapanta v. Montessa
Jurisprudence has also defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a
case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The
prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or
tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
Mercado v. Tan
The accused argued that he already obtained a judicial declaration of nullity
of his first marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it
void ab initio. He argues that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken
place at all and, hence, there is no first marriage to speak of.
Petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to
have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a lettercomplaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while
the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been
consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the
prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to
declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as
a prejudicial question in the criminal case.
Pimentel v. Pimentel
Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide against petitioner.
a.
b.
B.E.G.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before
the filing of the criminal action.
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question
that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action. The
relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in
the crime of parricide, which punishes any person who shall kill his
father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of
his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse. The relationship
between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of
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c.
parricide from murder or homicide. However, the issue in the

annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue
in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between
the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their
marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted,
will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the
time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner
could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
RULE 112
90. purpose of preliminary investigation

Arroyo v. COMELEC [PERALTA DOCTRINE]; Abalos v. De Lima;
The Constitution does not vest on the COMELEC exclusive power to
investigate and prosecute cases of violation of election laws. Under the
present law, the COMELEC and other prosecuting arms of the government,
such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and
prosecution of election offenses. (BP9369)
The creation of a joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of
concurrent jurisdiction authorized by the amendatory law.
Arroyo v. DOJ
The COMELEC and the DOJ themselves agreed that they would exercise
their concurrent jurisdiction jointly. Although the preliminary investigation was
conducted on the basis of two complaints the initial report of the FactFinding Team and the complaint of Senator Pimentel both complaints were
filed with the Joint Committee. Consequently, the complaints were filed with
and the preliminary investigation was conducted by only one investigative
body. Thus, the Court finds no reason to disallow the exercise of concurrent
jurisdiction jointly by those given such authority. This is especially true in this
case given the magnitude of the crimes allegedly committed by petitioners.
The joint preliminary investigation also serves to maximize the resources and
manpower of both the COMELEC and the DOJ for the prompt disposition of
the cases.
Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the COMELEC and the
DOJ nevertheless included a provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby
the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for election
offenses shall still be approved by the COMELEC in accordance with the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. With more reason, therefore, that we cannot
consider the creation of the Joint Committee as an abdication of the
COMELECs independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.
In this case, GMA claimed that she could not submit her counteraffidavit
within the
prescribed period because she needed to examine documents mentioned in
Senator Pimentels
complaint-affidavit. It appeared, however, that said documents were not
submitted to the Joint Committee and the only supporting documents
available were those attached to the Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team.
Admittedly, GMA was furnished those documents. Thus, at the time she
asked for the extension of time within which to file her counter-affidavit, she
very well knew that the documents she was asking were not in the record of
the case. Obviously, she was not furnished those documents because they
were not submitted to the Joint Committee. Logically, she has no right to
examine said documents. The Court cannot, therefore, fault the Joint
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Committee in consequently denying her motion for extension to file counteraffidavit as there was no compelling justification for the non-observance of the
period she was earlier required to follow.
Artillero v. Casimiro
Preliminary Investigation is not a proper trial, the rights of the parties therein
depen on the rights granted to them by law and these cannot be based on
whatever rights they believe they are entitled to or those that may be derived
from the phrase due process of law. A complainant in a P.I. does not have a
vested right to file a Reply this right should be granted to him by law. There
is no provision in Rule 112 that gives the Complainant or requires the
prosecutor to observe the right to file a Reply to the accuseds counteraffidavit.
Judge Angeles v. Gutierrez
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman specifically Section
2 of Rule II, states:
Evaluation. Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall
recommend whether it may be: a) dismissed outright for want of palpable
merit; b) referred to respondent for comment; c) indorsed to the proper
government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case; d)
forwarded to the appropriate officer or official for fact-finding investigation; e)
referred for administrative adjudication; or f) subjected to a preliminary
investigation.
Thus, the Ombudsman need not conduct a preliminary investigation upon
receipt of a complaint. That should investigating officers find a complaint
utterly devoid of merit, they may recommend its outright dismissal. Moreover,
it is also within their discretion to determine whether or not preliminary
investigation should be conducted.
In this Petition, The court does not find any grave abuse of discretion that
calls for the Courts exceptional divergence from the general rule.
91. grant of immunity from prosecution
Republic v. SB (Mercado)
Immunity statutes seek to provide a balance between state interest and the
individuals right against self-incrimination. To secure his testimony without
exposing himself to risk of prosecution, the law recognizes that the witness
can be given immunity from prosecution.
The decision to move for the discharge of Merado was part of prosecutorial
discretion in the determination of who should be used as state witness to
bolster the successful prosecution of criminal offenses. Unless made in clear
violation of the rules, this determination should be given great weight by our
courts.
Ampatuan v. De Lima
The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may
become a state witness are, namely: (a) by discharge from the criminal case
pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; and (b) by the
approval of his application for admission into the Witness Protection Program
of the DOJ in accordance with Republic Act No. 6981 (The Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Act).
Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, the discharge by the trial
court of one or more of several accused with their consent so that they can be
witnesses for the State is made upon motion by the Prosecution before
resting its case. The trial court shall require the Prosecution to present
evidence and the sworn statements of the proposed witnesses at a hearing in
support of the discharge. The trial court must ascertain if the following
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conditions fixed by Section 17 of Rule 119 are complied with, namely: (a)
there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge
is requested; (b) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) the testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points; (d) said accused does not appear to be most guilty; and (e)
said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.
On the other hand, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides:
Section 10. State Witness. Any person who has participated in the
commission of a crime and desires to be a witness for the State, can apply
and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be
admitted into the Program whenever the following circumstances are present:
a. the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined
under the Revised Penal Code or its equivalent under special laws;
b. there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
c. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed;
d. his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
e. he does not appear to be most guilty; and
f. he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude.
An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court
in order that he may be a State Witness pursuant to Section 9 and 10 of Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Court may upon his petition be admitted to the
Program if he complies with the other requirements of this Act. Nothing in this
Act shall prevent the discharge of an accused, so that he can be used as a
State Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Save for the circumstance covered by paragraph (a) of Section 10, supra, the
requisites under both rules are essentially the same. Also worth noting is that
an accused discharged from an information by the trial court pursuant to
Section 17 of Rule 119 may also be admitted to the Witness Protection
Program of the DOJ provided he complies with the requirements of Republic
Act No. 6981.
Quarto v. Marcelo
The authority to choose the individual to whom immunity would be granted is
a constituent part of the process and is essentially an executive function. RA
No. 6770 fully recognizes this prosecutory prerogative by empowering the
Ombudsman to grant immunity, subject to "such terms and conditions" as he
may determine. The only textual limitation imposed by law on this authority is
the need to take "into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court,"
i.e., Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. This provision requires that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of
the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.
RULE 113
92. arrest without warrant
Abelita v. Doria
The seizure was valid under plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain
view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The requisites of plain
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view are:
the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification
for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area;
the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and
it is immediately apparent to the police officers that the firearm may be an
evidence of a crime.
Uy v. People
Go v. CA
The constitutional proscription, that no person shall be arrested without any
warrant of arrest having been issued prior thereto, is not a hard-and-fast rule.
The Rules of Court and jurisprudence recognize exceptional cases where an
arrest may be effected without a warrant. Among these are when, in the
presence of a peace officer, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an
offense has in fact just been committed, and the arresting officer has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
In the cases at bar, the police saw the gun tucked in appellant's waist when
he stood up. The gun was plainly visible. No search was conducted as none
was necessary. Accused-appellant could not show any license for the firearm,
whether at the time of his arrest or thereafter. Thus, he was in effect
committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. No warrant of arrest
was necessary in such a situation, it being one of the recognized exceptions
under the Rules.
As a consequence of appellant's valid warrantless arrest, he may be lawfully
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of
the commission of an offense, without a search warrant, as provided in Rule
126, Section 12. This is a valid search incidental to the lawful arrest.
Sanchez v. Dimetriou
We agree with the petitioner that his arrest did not come under Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, providing as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escapes from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
It is not denied that the arresting officers were not present when the petitioner
allegedly participated in the killing of Allan Gomez and the rape-slay of Mary
Eileen Sarmenta. Neither did they have any personal knowledge that the
petitioner was responsible therefor because the basis of the arrest was the
sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan. Moreover, as the rape and
killing of Sarmenta allegedly took place on June 28-June 29, 1993, or forty-six
days before the date of the arrest, it cannot be said that the offense had "in
fact just been committed" when the petitioner was arrested.
The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal.
Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on August
26, 1993 against him and the other accused in connection with the rape-slay
cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal.
Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, we find that the
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trial court still lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
The rule is that if the accused objects to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, he may move to quash the information, but only on that ground. If, as
in this case, the accused raises other grounds in the motion to quash, he is
deemed to have waived that objection and to have submitted his person to
the jurisdiction of that court.
Colorado v. Agapito (Friday Warrant -- Grave abuse of authority for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest on a Friday to ensure complainants
incarceration for two days.)
Section 6, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that an arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day
or night.
It is of no moment that the warrant of arrest was issued by respondent
on a Friday, because it is clear from the foregoing that an arrest may be made
on any day regardless of what day the warrant of arrest was issued.
Nowhere in the Rules or in our jurisprudence can we find that a warrant of
arrest issued on a Friday is prohibited.
Granting that complainant was arrested on a Friday, he was not without
recourse, as he could have posted bail for his temporary liberty in view of
Supreme Court Circular No. 95-96[10] dated December 5, 1996, providing for
a skeletal force on a Saturday from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. primarily to act on
petitions for bail and other urgent matters. And on Saturday afternoons,
Sundays and non-working holidays, any judge may act on bailable offenses.
Thus, we agree with the OCA that respondent did not commit grave abuse of
authority for issuing the warrant of arrest on a Friday, the same not being
prohibited by law.
92. determination of probable cause for issuance of WOA
Law Firm of Chavez v. Atty. Fria
It must, however, be observed that the judges power to immediately dismiss
a criminal case would only be warranted when the lack of probable cause is
clear. In De Los Santos-Dio v. CA, the Court illumined that a clear-cut case of
lack of probable cause exists when the records readily show uncontroverted,
and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the
elements of the crime charged, viz:
While a judges determination of probable cause is generally confined to the
limited purpose of issuing arrest warrants, Section 5(a), Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly states that a judge may
immediately dismiss a case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause x x x.
In this regard, so as not to transgress the public prosecutors authority, it must
be stressed that the judges dismissal of a case must be done only in
clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish
probable cause that is when the records readily show uncontroverted,
and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of
the elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on
record shows that, more likely than not, the crime charged has been
committed and that respondent is probably guilty of the same, the judge
should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to proceed to trial.
In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of action would be to order
the presentation of additional evidence.
In other words, once the information is filed with the court and the judge
proceeds with his primordial task of evaluating the evidence on record, he
may either: (a) issue a warrant of arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b)
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immediately dismiss the case, if the evidence on record clearly fails to

establish probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to submit additional
evidence, in case he doubts the existence of probable cause.
People v. Tan (2010)
Further, accused-appellant challenges the legality of his
warrantless search and arrest for the first time in his appeal. He argues that
such was illegal, since none of the instances wherein a search and seizure
may be done validly without a warrant was present.
Such argument is untenable.
First of all, accused-appellant never raised this issue before his
arraignment. He never questioned the legality of his arrest until his appeal.
On this alone, the contention must fail. It has been ruled time and again that
an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity with regard to his
arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the
information against him on this ground before his arraignment. Any
objection involving the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea;
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
In the instant case, accused-appellant even requested a reinvestigation
during his initial arraignment, and, as a result, his arraignment was
postponed. He could have questioned the validity of his warrantless arrest at
this time but he did not. His arraignment was then rescheduled where he
entered a plea of not guilty and participated in the trial. Thus, he is deemed to
have waived any question as to any defect in his arrest and is likewise
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
RULE 114
93. bail; matter of right; discretion
94. conditions
Yap v CA
Under the circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate conditions
have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight,
particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement
that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence and of his
whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on
appeal may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at
P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial
of petitioners right to bail.
Bravo v. Borja (minor; it depends)
A minor charged with murder can be granted bail as a matter of right,
because he is entitled to a reduction of the penalty by one degree. If he is
charged under a special law, bail is not a matter of rights because he is not
entitled to the benefits of Art. 68, RPC where the penalty is reduced to one
decree. He has to file a petition for bail and prove that evidence of guilt is not
strong.
Hongkong v. Olalia
Whether or not Juan Antonio Munoz has the right to post bail when there is
nothing in the Constitution or Statutory law providing a potential extradite a
right to bail.
The Philippines committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as
value the worth and dignity of every person (Sec. 2 Art II 1987 Constitution)
have the obligation to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.
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The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the
light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for
the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the
presumption lies in favor of human liberty.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extradite,
however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for
bail, aright to due process under the Constitution.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the
Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into
with the Hongkong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with
these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose
of extradition.
Leviste v. CA
Under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by the RTC of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
Under par. 3 of the same rule if the penalty imposed is more than 6 years the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other
circumstances:
1.
that he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or

has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;
that he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification;
that he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
that the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released
on bail; or
that there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
That bail is expressly declared to be discretionary pending appeal and it
cannot be said that CA committed grave abuse of discretion. After conviction
by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly,
the constitutional right to bail ends, from then on the grant of bail is subject to
judicial discretion.
RULE 115
95. right against self-incrimination
Alejandro v. Pepito
In a case of rape, the court ordered the accused to present evidence AHEAD
of the prosecution this is not correct, because it violated the right of the
accused to be presumed innocent and the right to due process. In fact, it
violated the order of presentation of evidence.
Baseco v. PCGG
The right against self-incrimination is not applicable to juridical persons. In
fact, an officer of a company cannot refuse to produce its records in its
possession, upon plea of self-incrimination, either of himself or the company.
96. right to be informed
People v. Crisologo
The absence of an interpreter in sign language who could have conveyed to
the accused, a deaf-mute, the full facts of the offense with which he was
charged and who could also have communicated the accuseds own version
of the circumstances which led to his implication in the crime, deprived the
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accused of a full and fair trial and a reasonable opportunity to defend himself.
Not even the accuseds final plea of not guilty can excuse these inherently
unjust circumstances.
The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other
means, whether in writing or otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges
against him denied the accused his fundamental right to due process of law.
The accuracy and fairness of the factual process by which the guilt or
innocence of the accused was determined was not safeguarded. The
accused could not be said to have enjoyed the right to be heard by himself
and counsel, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him in the proceedings where his life and liberty were at stake.
Babanto v. Zosa
A conviction for the crime of qualified seduction without the allegation of
virginity would violate the petitioner's right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him
97. double jeopardy
People v. Ivler
According to the Supreme Court, the MeTC is mistaken in finding that the two
cases of reckless imprudence are entirely separate offenses using the basis
that the Second Criminal Case required proof of an additional fact which the
First Criminal Case does not.
The High Court reasoned that reckless imprudence is a single crime, its
consequences on persons and property are material only to determine the
penalty. The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single
quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such
that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting
acts.
Among several jurisprudences cited is the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA
1383 (March 29, 1968). A portion from the decision in this case reads as:
"[O]nce convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the
accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of
the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus
the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the
consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not
qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single,
whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the
offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and cannot be split
into different crimes and prosecutions."
People v. Balisacan
Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos Norte. Upon
being arraigned, he entered into a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted
y counsel. At his counsel de officio, he was allowed to present evidence and
consequently testified that he stabbed the deceased in selfdefense. In addition, he stated that he surrendered himself voluntarily to the
police authorities. On the basis of the testimony of the accused, he was
acquitted. Thus, the prosecution appealed.
The Supreme Court held that it is settled that the existence of plea is an
essential requisite to double jeopardy. The accused had first entered a plea of
guilty but however testified that he acted in complete self-defense. Said
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testimony had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo
should have required him to plead a new charge, or at least direct that a new
plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. Therefore, there has
been no standing of plea during the judgment of acquittal, so there can be no
double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.
Jacob v. SB
Given that Justice Narios verbal order dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 2592225939 is null and void, and does not exist at all in contemplation of law, it
follows that petitioners cannot invoke the constitutional right against double
jeopardy.1avvphi1
To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, the following must be
demonstrated:
(1) [A] first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first
jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be
for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to
commit the same or is a frustration thereof.
And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused.
In the instant Petition, legal jeopardy has not yet attached since there is so far
no valid dismissal or termination of the criminal cases against petitioners.
RULE 116
98. effect if accused refuses to enter plea
99. plea of guilty to lesser offense
Amatan v. Aujero
Section 2, Rule, 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, allows the accused in criminal case to plead guilty "to lesser
offense regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime
charged." The fact of death of the victim for which the accused Rodrigo
Umpad was criminally liable, cannot by simple logic and plain common sense
be reconciled with the plea of guilty to the lower offense of attempted
homicide. The crime of homicide as defined in Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code necessarily produces death; attempted homicide does not.
Concededly, hiatus in the law exists in the case before us, which could either
lead to a misapprehension of Section 2 of Rule 116 or to outright confusion.
Such a result was itself recognized by the Deputy Court Administrator when
he recommended an amendment to the provision in his Memorandum.
100. plea of guilty to grave offense
People v. Jalanjani [PERALTA DOCTRINE]
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants
plea of guilt despite insufficiency of searching inquiry into the voluntariness
and full comprehension of the consequences of the said plea.
NO. As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that "all
trial judges must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of
guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty
bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty,
he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable
conviction."We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a
searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the
rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or
duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance,
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effects, and consequences of their guilty plea.This requirement is stringent

and mandatoryNevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which
the re-arraignment was conducted or of the factual milieu surrounding the
finding of guilt against the accused. The Court observes that accused
Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty to another charge multiple
murder based on the same act relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder
charge. The Court further notes that prior to the change of plea to one of guilt,
accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt one
through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as
stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and the other via judicial
admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the foregoing circumstances, we
deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the "searching inquiry" in
this instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as the
accuseds plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment
under consideration.
People v. Balicasan (Supra)
People v. Documento
Notwithstanding the incautiousness that attended appellants guilty plea, we
are not inclined to remand the case to the trial court as suggested by
appellant. Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside
only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on
sufficient and credible evidence in finding the accused guilty, the judgment
must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea
of the accused but also on evidence proving his commission of the offense
charged.
RULE 117
101. Grounds for MTQ
The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the
following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment
for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse
or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the
offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent. (Sec. 3.)
GR: The court shall only consider grounds that are stated in the motion.
XP: lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged
GR: Failure to assert any ground shall be deemed a waiver of any
objections.
XPs: (1) do not constitute an offense;
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(2) no jurisdiction over the offense;

(3) liability has been extinguished;
(4) double jeopardy.
GR: Motion to quash can be filed at any time before a valid plea.
XPs [even after plea]: (1) do not constitute an offense;
(2) no jurisdiction over the offense;
(3) liability has been extinguished [i.e. prescription]
(4) double jeopardy.
DENIED
GR: Petitioner will go to trial,
without prejudice to reiterating the
grounds invoked in his motion to
quash.
XP: Petitioner may file a petition for
certiorari if the court acted, without
or in excess of its jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion, in
denying the motion to quash.
GRANTED
NOTE: IF the motion to quash is
based on the alleged defect [i.e. do
not constitute an offense] AND the
defect can be cured
THEN the court shall order that an
amendment be made.
IF (1) the prosecution fails to make
the amendment OR
(2) the complaint or information still
suffers from the same defect
THEN the court shall grant the
motion to quash. (Sec. 4)
GR: An order sustaining a motion
to quash is not a bar to another
prosecution.
XPs: (1) extinction of criminal
liability
(2) double jeopardy (Sec. 6)
NOTE: IF the order to file another
complaint or information is made
THEN the accused who may be in
custody shall not be discharged or
released
EXCEPT if he is admitted to bail.
Alawiya v. CA (2009)
FACTS: The accused moved to quash the information on the ground that
the officer who filed the information had no authority. The trial court denied
the motion to quash because (1) he who is at large is not entitled to bail or
other relief from court and (2) the authority of the DOJ to file an information
is shared or concurrent with the Ombudsman.
HELD: Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs
[i.e. motion to quash] other than an application for bail. However, while
the accused are not yet under the custody of the law, any question on the
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the
accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in
cases when the accused invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person.
At any rate, the accuseds motion to quash, on the ground of lack of
B.E.G.
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authority of the filing officer, would have never prospered because as

discussed earlier, the Ombudsmans power to investigate offenses involving
public officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other
similarly authorized agencies of the government.
Cudia v. CA (1998)
FACTS: Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the ground of double jeopardy.
HELD: As to the first requisite, it is necessary that there be a court of
competent jurisdiction, for jurisdiction to try the case is essential to place an
accused in jeopardy. It must be borne in mind that the question of
jurisdiction of a court over cases filed before it must be resolved on the
basis of the law or statute providing for or defining its jurisdiction. Branches
56 to 62 had jurisdiction over the respective territories as apportioned.
Consequently, notwithstanding the internal arrangement of the judges of the
Angeles City RTCs, Branch 60 indubitably had jurisdiction over instant case.
Writ large in lawbooks is the doctrine that jurisdiction is conferred by law
and not by mere administrative policy of any trial court.
With respect to the second requisite, however, it is plainly apparent that the
City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority to file the first information,
the offense having been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which
is beyond his jurisdiction. It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga,
not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare informations for offenses
committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An information,
when required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be
filed by another. It must be exhibited or presented by the prosecuting
attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire
jurisdiction.
Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of authority of
the City Prosecutor in filing the information in question is deemed a waiver
thereof. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioners plea to
an information before he filed a motion to quash may be a waiver of all
objections to it insofar as formal objections to the pleadings are concerned.
But by clear implication, if not by express provision of the Rules of Court,
and by a long line of uniform decisions, questions relating to want of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. It is a valid
information signed by a competent officer which, among other
requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the
accused (herein petitioner) and the subject matter of the accusation. In
consonance with this view, an infirmity in the information, such as lack
of authority of the it, cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or
even by express consent.
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan (2003)
Petitioner averred that THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, IN DENYING
PETITIONER SERAPIOS MOTION TO QUASH NOTWITHSTANDING
THAT (1) THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED INFORMATION
AGAINST PETITIONER DO NO CONSTITUTE THE CRIME OF PLUNDER
AND (2) THE AMENDED INFORMATION CHARGES MORE THAN ONE
OFFENSE.
HELD: In this case, the amended information specifically alleges that all the
B.E.G.
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accused, including petitioner, connived and conspired with former President

Joseph E. Estrada to commit plunder through any or a combination or a
series of overt or criminal acts or similar schemes or means. It is not
necessary to allege in the amended Information a pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy because as
Section 3 of R.A. 7080 specifically provides, the same is evidentiary and the
general rule is that matters of evidence need not be alleged in the
Information. Under the amended Information, all the accused, including
petitioner, are charged of having conspired and confabulated together in
committing plunder. When two or more persons conspire to commit a crime,
each is responsible for all the acts of others. In contemplation of law, the act
of the conspirator is the act of each of them. It is clear on the face of the
amended information that petitioner and his co-accused are charged only
with one crime of plunder and not with the predicate acts or crimes of
plunder. It bears stressing that the predicate acts merely constitute acts of
plunder and are not crimes separate and independent of the crime of
plunder.
People v. Sandiganbayan, Marcos, Benitez and Dulay (2012)
HELD: We are called to overturn a judgment of acquittal in favor of the
respondents brought about by the dismissal, for insufficiency of evidence, of
the malversation charged in the two criminal cases. As a rule, once the
court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an acquittal; any further
prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription
on double jeopardy. Notably, the proscription against double jeopardy only
envisages appeals based on errors of judgment, but not errors of
jurisdiction. Jurisprudence recognizes two grounds where double jeopardy
will not attach, these are: (i) on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and/or (ii) where there is a denial
of a partys due process rights.
A judgment of acquittal sought to be reviewed on the basis of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or on the ground of
denial of due process implies an invalid or otherwise void judgment. If
either or both grounds are established, the judgment of acquittal is
considered void; as a void judgment, it is legally inexistent and does not
have the effect of an acquittal. Thus, the defense of double jeopardy will not
lie in such a case.
Accordingly, a review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan granting an
accuseds demurrer to evidence may be done via the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65. Mere allegations of grave abuse of discretion,
however, are not enough to establish this ground; so also, mere abuse of
discretion is not sufficient.
In the present case, we find that the State was not denied due process in
the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. There was no indication that
the special prosecutor deliberately and willfully failed to present available
evidence or that other evidence could be secured.
Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Sandiganbayan is under no
obligation to require the parties to present additional evidence when a
demurrer to evidence is filed. In a criminal proceeding, the burden lies with
the prosecution to prove that the accused committed the crime charged
beyond reasonable doubt, as the constitutional presumption of innocence
ordinarily stands in favor of the accused. Whether the Sandiganbayan will
intervene in the course of the prosecution of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction, competence and discretion, provided that its actions do not
result in the impairment of the substantial rights of the accused, or of the
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right of the State and of the offended party to due process of law. The court,
in the exercise of its sound discretion, may require or allow the prosecution
to present additional evidence (at its own initiative or upon a motion) after a
demurrer to evidence is filed. This exercise, however, must be for good
reasons and in the paramount interest of justice. As mentioned, the court
may require the presentation of further evidence if its action on the demurrer
to evidence would patently result in the denial of due process; it may also
allow the presentation of additional evidence if it is newly discovered, if it
was omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or if it is intended to correct
the evidence previously offered. In this case, we cannot attribute grave
abuse of discretion to the Sandiganbayan when it exercised restraint and
did not require the presentation of additional evidence, given the clear
weakness of the case at that point.
**
102. 1yr 2yr Bar Rule

RULE: A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except (1) with the
express consent of the accused AND (2) with notice to the offended party.
(Sec. 8)
NOTE: Without complying with the two requisites, the dismissal will not
trigger the operation of the time-bar rule. (Riano)
RULE: The dismissal shall become permanent IF:
(a) the case is not revived within 1 year after the issuance of the order
(penalty for the offense not exceeding 6 years);
(b) the case is not revived within 2 years after the issuance of the order
(penalty for the offense exceeds 6 years).
People v. Lacson (2003)
The following requirements are conditions sine qua non for the application of
the time-bar rule:
(1) the prosecution with the express consent of the accused OR the
accused moves for a provisional dismissal OR both move for a
provisional dismissal;
(2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional
dismissal;
(3) the court dismisses the case provisionally;
(4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of dismissal.
The 1-year or 2-year period begins to run AFTER SERVICE OF THE
ORDER OF DISMISSAL ON THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR.
In this case, the SC held that the respondent could not benefit from the timebar rule because there was no provisional dismissal to speak of. What the
respondent filed was a motion for judicial determination of probable cause
and for examination of prosecution witness. This motion cannot be
construed as indicative of an express consent to the dismissal. Notably, the
Court found that the heirs of the victims were not even notified thereof prior
to the hearing on the motion filed by respondent.
People v. Dumlao (2009)
(not related to provisional dismissal or time-bar rule)
It can be gathered from the resolution of the Sandiganbayan that it did
consider the ground invoked by Dumlao (that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense); otherwise, it could have denied respondent Dumlaos
B.E.G.
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motion. From the reasoning given by the Sandiganbayan, it is clear that it

dismissed the case because of insufficiency of evidence [which is not one of
the grounds of a Motion to Quash]. Insufficiency of evidence is a ground for
dismissal of an action only after the prosecution rests its case. In the case
under consideration, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against
respondent for insufficiency of evidence, even without giving the prosecution
the opportunity to present its evidence. In so doing, it violated the
prosecutions right to due process.
A purely capricious dismissal of an information deprives the State of a
fair opportunity to prosecute and convict. It denies the prosecution a day in
court. It is void and cannot be the basis of double jeopardy.
B.E.G.
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We are not convinced that respondent Dumlao was unfairly discriminated

against and his constitutional right to equal protection violated. It must be
remembered that the manner in which the prosecution of the case is
handled is within the sound discretion of the prosecutor, and the noninclusion of other guilty persons is irrelevant to the case against the
accused. We find that there was no clear and intentional discrimination in
charging respondent Dumlao. A discriminatory purpose is never presumed.
Jacob v. Sandiganbayan (2004)
(not related to provisional dismissal or time-bar rule)
Even though we acknowledge the delay in the criminal proceedings, as well
as the prejudice suffered by petitioners and their co-accused by reason
B.E.G.
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thereof, the weighing of interests militate against a finding that petitioners

right to speedy trial and disposition of the cases involving them would have
justified the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939. We agree with
the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division that Justice Narios dismissal of
the criminal cases was unwarranted under the circumstances, since the
State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to prosecute the
criminal cases simply because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Office
of the Ombudsman.
Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division did not abuse its
discretion in setting aside Justice Narios verbal order, which dismissed
Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939, for not only was such order baseless, as
we had previously discussed herein; but more importantly, because it is an
utter nullity, as we had ruled in Corpuz. Section 1, Rule 120 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, mandates that a judgment must be written in
the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and
signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the
facts and the law upon which it is based. The rule applies to a final order
dismissing a criminal case grounded on the violation of the rights of the
accused to a speedy trial. A verbal judgment or order of dismissal is a
violation of the provision; hence, such order is, in contemplation of law
ineffective. Given that Justice Narios verbal order dismissing Criminal Case
Nos. 25922-25939 is null and void, and does not exist at all in contemplation
of law, it follows that petitioners cannot invoke the constitutional right against
double jeopardy. In the instant Petition, legal jeopardy has not yet attached
since there is so far no valid dismissal or termination of the criminal cases
against petitioners.
RULE 118
103. agreement at pre-trial; requisites
***
RULE: All agreements or admissions made or entered into during pre-trial

conference shall be:
(1) reduced to writing;
(2) signed by the accused AND counsel;
(3) approved by the court.
OTHERWISE, the same shall not be used in evidence against the accused.
(Sec. 2)
RULE 119
104. dicharge of the accused [to be a state witness]; effect
RULE: One or more of the accused tried jointly with the others, may
however, be discharged with their consent so that they may be witness for
the state. For this purpose the prosecutor must file a motion for the
discharge of the accused before the prosecution rests its case. (Sec. 17)
The court upon receipt of the motion shall require the prosecution to present
its evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness. The
court shall conduct a hearing in support of the discharge. The court, after
hearing, may direct that one or more of the accused be discharged, IF:
(1) there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
(2) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the
accused;
(3) the testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in
its material points;
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(4) said accused does not appear to be the most guilty;

(5) said accused has not been at any time been convicted of any
offense involving moral turpitude. (Sec. 17)
The evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form
part of the trial. (Sec. 17)
If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness,
his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence. (Sec. 17)
GR: The discharge of the accused shall amount to an acquittal and shall be
a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.
XP: The accused fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in
accordance with the sworn statement constituting the basis for his
discharge. (Sec. 18)
***
NOTE: For the discharge of the accused to amount to an acquittal, the

accused should have been arraigned. Although the requirements to be
witness under the witness protection program are the same, the application
is made before arraignment. Thus, double jeopardy will not set in because it
will not amount to an acquittal. (Salvador)
105. variance
GR: An accused can be convicted of an offense only when it is both charged
and proved. (Esguerra v. People)
XP: When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in the offense proved. (Rule 120, Sec. 4)
NOTE: The variance between the allegations of the information and the
evidence offered by the prosecution does not of itself entitle the accused to
an acquittal, more so if the variance relates to the designation of the
offended party, a mere formal defect, which does not prejudice the
substantial right of the accused. It does not even violate the right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against
him. (Albano)
***
VIP
106. effect if the accused is not brought to trial w/n a period of time
If the accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required by Section
1(g), Rule 1161 and Section 1,2 as extended by Section 6 of this rule, 3 the
1 Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the
arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The time of the pendency of a motion to
quash or for a bill of particulars or other causes justifying suspension of the arraignment
shall be excluded in computing the period.
2 After a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial.
The trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from receipt of the pre-trial order.
B.E.G.
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information may be dismissed on motion of the accused on the ground of

denial of his right of speedy trial. The accused shall have the burden of
proving the motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of going
forward with the evidence to establish the exclusion of time under section 3
of this rule.4 The dismissal shall be subject to the rules on double jeopardy.
(Sec. 9)
People v. Perez
(cannot be found; listen to lecture)
Nacional [could be Gallardo] v. Sandiganbayan
3 Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1(g), Rule 116 and the preceding section 1, for the first twelvecalendar-month period following its effectivity on September 15, 1998, the time limit with respect to the
period from arraignment to trial imposed by said provision shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the
second twelve-month period, the limit shall be one hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third twelvemonth period, the time limit shall be eighty (80) days.
4 The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must
commence:(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including but
not limited to the following:
(1) Delay resulting from an examination of the physical and mental condition of the accused;
(2) Delay resulting from proceedings with respect to other criminal charges against the accused;
(3) Delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders;
(4) Delay resulting from pre-trial proceedings; provided, that the delay does not exceed thirty (30)
days;
(5) Delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of venue of cases
or transfer from other courts;
(6) Delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a prejudicial question; and
(7) Delay reasonably attributable to any period, not exceed thirty (30) days, during which any
proceeding which any proceeding concerning the accused is actually under advisement.
(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of an essential witness.
For purposes of this subparagraph, an essential witness shall be considered absent when his
whereabouts are unknown or his whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence. He shall be
considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are known but his presence for trial cannot be
obtained by due diligence.
(c) Any period of delay resulting from the mental incompetence or physical inability of the accused to
stand trial.
(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter a charge is filed against
the accused for the same offense, any period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date
the time limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous
charge.
(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with a co-accused over whom the
court has not acquired jurisdiction, or, as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for separate
trial has been granted.
B.E.G.
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107. injunction to prevent trial
GR: The prosecution of a criminal offense cannot be subject of prohibition
and injunction.
XPs: (1) for the orderly administration of justice;
(2) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and
vindictive manner;
(3) to avoid multiplicity of actions;
(4) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights;
(5) in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or
was held invalid.
Guingona v. City Fiscal of Manila (1984)
There is merit in the contention of the petitioners that their liability is civil in
nature and therefore, public respondents have no jurisdiction over the
charge of estafa. The relationship between the private respondent and the
Nation Savings and Loan Association is that of creditor and debtor;
consequently, the ownership of the amount deposited was transmitted to the
Bank upon the perfection of the contract and it can make use of the amount
deposited for its banking operations. While the Bank has the obligation to
return the amount deposited, it has, however, no obligation to return or
deliver the same money that was deposited. And, the failure of the Bank to
return the amount deposited will not constitute estafa through
misappropriation punishable under Article 315, par. l(b) of the Revised Penal
Code, but it will only give rise to civil liability over which the public
respondents have no- jurisdiction.
RULE 120
108. Contents of Judgment
If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the legal qualification of the
offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2)
the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal,
accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the
accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or
omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is
any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has
been reserved or waived.
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the
judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist. (Sec. 2)
(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any court motu proprio, or on motion of
either the accused or his counsel, or the prosecution, if the court granted the continuance on the basis of
its findings set forth in the order that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best
interest of the public and the accused in a speedy trial.
B.E.G.
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**
109. Promulgation
The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused
and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. xxx However, (1) [when]
the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the
presence of his counsel or representative. xxx (2) [when despite due notice
to the accused or his bondsman or warden and counsel, the accused failed
to appear at the promulgation of the decision, the promulgation need not be
in the presence of the accused.]
xxx
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of
judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the
judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last
known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was
without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules
against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15)
days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender
and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state
the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves
that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of
said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice. (Sec. 6)
Villena v. People (2011)
Petitioners now argue that the CA erred in upholding the RTC in its denial of
their respective notices of appeal since they already contained the required
manifestation and information as to the cause of their non-appearance on
the scheduled promulgation on September 3, 2007, i.e., lack of
notice. According to them, their notices of appeal have substantially
complied with the requirement of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court,
and have effectively placed them under the RTCs jurisdiction. They allege
further that their motion for reconsideration should have been considered by
the CA since they have offered the explanations that their failure to appear
during the promulgation of judgment was due to the change of their
respective addresses, and that their former counsel of record did not inform
them of the need to notify the RTC thereof, much less properly advise them
of the current status of the proceedings. As regards their failure to move for
the lifting of the bench warrants issued for their arrest, petitioners
asseverate that the Rules of Court do not provide for such a requirement
before they could avail of the remedies they seek.
The petition is without merit.
While it is true that an appeal is perfected upon the mere filing of a notice of
appeal and that the trial court thereupon loses jurisdiction over the case, this
principle presupposes that the party filing the notice of appeal could validly
avail of the remedy of appeal and had not lost standing in court. In this
case, petitioners have lost their standing in court by their unjustified failure
to appear during the trial and, more importantly, during the promulgation of
judgment of conviction, and to surrender to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Petitioners insist that their failure to attend the promulgation of judgment
was due to the lack of notice of the date thereof, allegedly because they
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were transferred to another police station. Notably, however, petitioners did

not proffer any documentary and convincing proof of their supposed
transfer, not even to inform the court as to which police station they were
transferred. In contrast, their fellow accused PO3 Macalinao submitted to
the RTC a Certification issued by P/Insp. Ricardo Tibay Tangunan, Chief of
the Philippine National Police Administrative Section, evidencing his transfer
from Police Station (PS-1), Raxa Bago, Tondo Manila to Police Station 11,
Meisic in Binondo, Manila. Petitioners were duty bound to inform the RTC
of their transfer, assuming its truth, so that notices may be sent to their
respective new mailing addresses. They were remiss in the discharge of this
responsibility.
Petitioners contend that their act of filing notices of appeal was already
substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court.
Thus, the accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment
of conviction shall lose the remedies available under the Rules of Court
against the judgment(a) the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration (Rule 121), and (b) an appeal from the judgment of
conviction (Rule 122). However, the Rules allow the accused to regain his
standing in court in order to avail of these remedies by: (a) his surrender,
and (b) his filing of a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies,
stating therein the reasons for his absence, within 15 days from the date of
promulgation of judgment. If the trial court finds that his absence was for a
justifiable cause, the accused shall be allowed to avail of the said remedies
within 15 days from notice or order finding his absence justified and allowing
him the available remedies against the judgment of conviction.
Thus, petitioners mere filing of notices of appeal through their new counsel,
therein only explaining their absence during the promulgation of judgment,
cannot be considered an act of surrender, despite the fact that said notices
were filed within 15 days from September 28, 2007, the purported date
when their new counsel personally secured a copy of the judgment of
conviction from the RTC. The term surrender under Section 6, Rule 120 of
the Rules of Court contemplates an act whereby a convicted accused
physically and voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court to
suffer the consequences of the verdict against him. The filing of notices of
appeal cannot suffice as a physical and voluntary submission of petitioners
to the RTCs jurisdiction. It is only upon petitioners valid surrender, and only
after proper motion, that they can avail of the remedy of appeal. Absent
compliance with these requirements, their notices of appeal, the initiatory
step to appeal from their conviction, were properly denied due course.
What is more, the judgment of conviction against petitioners had already
acquired finality. Under Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, they had
only 15 days from the date of promulgation of judgment within which to
surrender and to file the required motion for leave of court to avail of the
remedies against the judgment. As the judgment was promulgated on
September 3, 2007, petitioners had only until September 18, 2007 to comply
with the mandatory requirement of the said rule.
110. New Trial
The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:
(a) The errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of
the accused have been committed during the trial;
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(b) The new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused
could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the
trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the
judgment. (Sec. 2)
**
111. Search & Seizure

SEC v. Mendoza (2012)
Section 14 of Rule 126 is clear. Questions concerning both 1) the issuance
of the search warrant and 2) the suppression of evidence seized under it are
matters that can be raised only with the issuing court if, as in the present
case, no criminal action has in the meantime been filed in court.
Although passed off as a petition for injunction, the action that Mendoza, et
al. filed with the Muntinlupa RTC, the object of which is to prohibit the three
agencies from using the items seized under the search warrant, is actually
an action to suppress their use as evidence. Consequently, Mendoza, et al.
should have filed it with the Makati RTC that issued such warrant.
It might be pointed out of course that since Mendoza, et al. were not parties
to the issuance of the search warrant, they had no standing to question the
same or seek the suppression of evidence taken under it. Consequently,
since they had reasons for questioning government use of the seized items
against them, they had the right to bring the injunction action before the
Muntinlupa RTC where they resided.
But the rules do not require Mendoza, et al. to be parties to the search
warrant proceeding for them to be able to file a motion to suppress. It is not
correct to say that only the parties to the application for search warrant can
question its issuance or seek suppression of evidence seized under it. The
proceeding for the issuance of a search warrant does not partake of an
action where a party complains of a violation of his right by another.
Clearly, although the search warrant in this case did not target the residence
or offices of Mendoza, et al., they were entitled to file with the Makati RTC a
motion to suppress the use of the seized items as evidence against them for
failure of the SEC and the NBI to immediately turn these over to the issuing
court. The issuing court is the right forum for such motion given that no
criminal action had as yet been filed against Mendoza, et al. in some other
court.
Parenthetically, it appears from its investigation report that the SEC kept the
seized documents and articles for months rather than immediately turn them
over to the Makati RTC. Justifying its action, the SEC said that it still needed
to study the seized items. Evidently, it wanted to use them to build up a case
against the respondents, unmindful of its duty to first turn them over to the
court. Clearly, SECs arbitrary action compromised the integrity of the seized
documents and articles.
112. Provisional Remedies
The provisional remedies in civil actions, insofar as they are applicable, may
be availed of in connection with the civil action deemed instituted with the
criminal action. (Sec. 1)
When the civil action is properly instituted in the criminal action as provided
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in Rule 111, the offended party may have the property of the accused
attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered from the accused in the following cases:
(a) When the accused is about to abscond from the Philippines;
(b) When the criminal action is based on a claim for money or property
embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to the use of the accused
who is a public officer, officer of a corporation, attorney, factor, broker, agent,
or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other person in
a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;
(c) When the accused has concealed, removed, or disposed of his property,
or is about to do so; and
(d) When the accused resides outside the Philippines. (Sec. 2)
113. deposition of witness in criminal cases
The taking of depositions in criminal cases is addressed to judicial
discretion. (People v. Hubert Webb)
Go v. People (2012)
For purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of
a prosecution witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the
testimonial examination should be made before the court. To take the
deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very
same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained
accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge
of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment and
properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the
witness' testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case.
The Webb Ruling is not on all fours with the instant case because in this
case, where it is the prosecution that seeks to depose the complaining
witness against the accused, the stringent procedure under Section 15, Rule
119 cannot be ignored without violating the constitutional rights of the
accused to due process.
EVIDENCE
114. when not necessary
The following matters need not be proven:
(1) facts subject to judicial notice;
(2) facts admitted or not denied provided they have been sufficiently
alleged;
(3) facts legally presumed;
(4) agreed and admitted facts;
(5) immaterial allegations.
Republic v. Bakunawa (2013)
Although the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the
defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on the plaintiffs side if its
evidence alone is insufficient to establish its cause of action. Similarly, when
only one side is able to present its evidence, and the other side demurs to
the evidence, a preponderance of evidence can result only if the plaintiffs
evidence is sufficient to establish the cause of action. For this purpose, the
sheer volume of the evidence presented by one party cannot tip the scales
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in its favor. Quality, not quantity, is the primordial consideration in evaluating

evidence.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing pronouncement, evidentiary
substantiation of the allegations of how the wealth was illegally acquired and
by whom was necessary. For that purpose, the mere holding of a position in
the Marcos administration did not necessarily make the holder a close
associate. A prima facie showing must be made to show that one unlawfully
accumulated wealth by virtue of a close association or relation with
President Marcos and/or his wife. It would not suffice, then, that one served
during the administration of President Marcos as a government official or
employee.
**
115. relevant and compentent

RULE: For evidence to be admissible, two elements must concur:
(1) The evidence must be relevant. It must have such a relation to
the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or nonexistence.
(2) The evidence must be competent. it must be neither excluded by
law nor by the Rules. (Regalado)
Evidence obtained in violation of defendants constitutional rights must be
suppressed from governments case in chief. (Herrera)
People v. Wagas (2013)
It is only fair that the caller be reliably identified first before a telephone
communication is accorded probative weight. The identity of the caller may
be established by direct or circumstantial evidence.
Communications by telephone are admissible in evidence where they are
relevant to the fact or facts in issue, and admissibility is governed by the
same rules of evidence concerning face-to-face conversations except the
party against whom the conversations are sought to be used must ordinarily
be identified. It is not necessary that the witness be able, at the time of the
conversation, to identify the person with whom the conversation was had,
provided subsequent identification is proved by direct or circumstantial
evidence somewhere in the development of the case. The mere statement
of his identity by the party calling is not in itself sufficient proof of such
identity, in the absence of corroborating circumstances so as to render the
conversation admissible. However, circumstances preceding or following the
conversation may serve to sufficiently identify the caller. The completeness
of the identification goes to the weight of the evidence rather than its
admissibility, and the responsibility lies in the first instance with the district
court to determine within its sound discretion whether the threshold of
admissibility has been met.
**
116. Doctrine of Equipose

People v. Lagmay (1999)
If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused
and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the
test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.
Furthermore, the equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a
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criminal case evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence

should tilt the scales in favor of the accused.
117. Documentary Evidence
Documents as evidence consist of writing or any material containing letters,
words, numbers, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression
offered as proof of their contents. (Rule 130, Sec. 2)
Best Evidence Rule
GR: When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself. 5
XPs: (1) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(2) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(3) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
and
(4) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
Heirs of Prodon v. Reyes (2013)
The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are in
issue. When the evidence sought to be introduced concerns external facts,
such as the existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without reference
to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked.
The parties were fully cognizant of the issues as defined, for none of them
thereafter ventured to present evidence to establish the terms of the deed of
sale with right to repurchase. In the course of the trial, however, a question
was propounded to Prodon as to who had signed or executed the deed, and
the question was objected to based on the Best Evidence Rule. The RTC
then sustained the objection. At that point began the diversion of the focus in
the case. The RTC should have outrightly overruled the objection because
the fact sought to be established by the requested testimony was the
execution of the deed, not its terms.
Considering that the Best Evidence Rule was not applicable because the
terms of the deed of sale with right to repurchase were not the issue, the CA
did not have to address and determine whether the existence, execution,
5 (a) The original of the document is one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical
contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or near
the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals. (Rule 130, Sec. 4)
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and loss, as pre-requisites for the presentation of secondary evidence, had

been established by Prodons evidence.
**
118. Secondary Evidence

When original document is unavailable. When the original document has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon
proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without
bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in
the order stated. (Sec. 5)
When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. If the
document is in the custody or under the control of adverse party, he must
have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after
satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document,
secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss. (Sec. 6)
Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When
the original of document is in the custody of public officer or is recorded in a
public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the
public officer in custody thereof. (Sec. 7)
**
119. Parole Evidence

GR: When the terms of an agreement (or will) have been reduced to writing,
it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
XPs: A party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors
in interest after the execution of the written agreement. (Sec. 9)
NOTE: A non-party to an instrument cannot invoke this. (Salvador)
120. Witness
GR: All persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make their known
perception to others, may be witnesses. (Sec. 20)
XPs: (a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for
examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known
their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of
perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating
them truthfully. (Sec. 21)
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People v. Ibanez (2013)
***
We cannot take Rachels testimony lightly simply because she was a mere
child when she witnessed the incident and when she gave her testimony in
court. There is no showing that her mental maturity rendered her incapable
of testifying and of relating the incident truthfully. The Rule on Examination
of a Child Witness specifies that every child is presumed qualified to be a
witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party
challenging the child's competence. Only when substantial doubt exists
regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate,
distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in
court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a
competency examination of a child. Thus, petitioners flimsy objections on
Rachels lack of education and inability to read and tell time carry no weight
and cannot overcome the clear and convincing testimony of Rachel as to
who killed her father.
124. Marital Disqualification [during marriage; any matter]
GR: During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for
or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse.
XP: In a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or
ascendants. (Sec. 22)
Alvarez Case
Arroyo Case
Husband & Wife Privilege [during or after marriage; confidential matter]
The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the marriage except in a civil case
by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one
against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants. (Sec.
24(a))
**
122. Attorney-Client Privilege

RULE: An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as
to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon
in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, nor can an
attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the
consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of
which has been acquired in such capacity. (130(b))
**
123. Priest-Penitent Privilege

A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making the
confession, be examined as to any confession made to or any advice given
by him in his professional character in the course of discipline enjoined by
the church to which the minister or priest belongs. (130(d))
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***
VIP
124. Doctor-Patient Privilege

RULE: A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics
cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to
any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have
acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which
information was necessary to enable him to act in capacity, and which would
blacken the reputation of the patient.
Chan v. Chan (2013)
The physician-patient privilege communication rule essentially means that a
physician who gets information while professionally attending a patient
cannot in a civil case be examined without the patients consent as to any
fact which would blacken the latters reputation. This rule is intended to
encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history
of his ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling the physician to
make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure.
Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to court
and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might
prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at risk.
To allow the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records
would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the
patients consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the
patients records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the
physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the
patient without the latters prior consent.
***
125. res inter alios acta

GR: The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another. (Sec. 28)
XPs: (1) Admission by co-partner or agent. The act or declaration of a
partner or agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during the
existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against
such party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a
joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party.
(Sec. 29)
(2) Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence
against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than such act of declaration. (Sec. 30)
(3) Admission by privies. Where one derives title to property from
another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title,
in relation to the property, is evidence against the former. (Sec. 31)
***
VIP
126. Dying Declaration

The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an
impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the
subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances
of such death. (Sec. 37)
B.E.G.
GR: A witness can

testify only to those
facts which he knows
of
his
personal
knowledge; that is,
which are derived
from
his
own
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Belbis v. People (2012)
perception. (Sec. 36)
A dying declaration is a statement made by a person after a mortal wound

has been inflicted, under a belief that death is certain, stating the facts
concerning the cause and circumstances surrounding his/her death. As an
exception to the hearsay rule, the requisites for its admissibility are as
follows: (1) the declaration is made by the deceased under the
consciousness of his impending death; (2) the deceased was at the time
compentent as a witness; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; and (4) the declaration
is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarants death is the subject of
inquiry.
The fact that the victim was stabbed on December 9, 1997 and died only on
January 8, 1998 does not prove that the victim made the statement or
declaration under the consciousness of an impending death. The rule is
that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in
inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the
belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of
fact that renders the dying declaration admissible. It is not necessary that
the approaching death be presaged by the personal feelings of the
deceased. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of
survival and looked on death as certainly impending. As such, the CA
incorrectly ruled that there were dying declarations.
***
127. Part of Res Gestae

Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So, also,
statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving
it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae. (Sec. 42)
People v. Sace (2010)
Appellants statements infront of the prosecution witnesses are admissible
for being part of the res gestae. A declaration is deemed part of the res
gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when
the following requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a
startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. All
these requisites are present in this case. Appellant had just been through a
startling and gruesome occurrence, AAAs death. His admission was made
while he was still under the influence of said startling occurrence and before
he had an opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. In addition, he was still
under the influence of alcohol at that time, having engaged in a drinking
spree from 1:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. that day. His confession concerned the
rape and killing of AAA. Appellants spontaneous statements made to private
persons, not agents of the State or law enforcers, are not covered by the
constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation and, as res
gestae, admissible in evidence against him.
**
128. Independenly Relevant Evidence

People v. Maliburin
B.E.G.
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**
129. Authentication of Documents

For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either
public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last will and
testament; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, or private documents by law to be
entered therein.
All other writings are private. (Rule 132, Sec. 19)
Ancient Documents
Where a private document is more than thirty years old, is produced from
the custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is
unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other
evidence of its authenticity need be given. (Rule 132, Sec. 21)
Kummer v. People (2013)
he chemistry report showing a positive result of the paraffin test is a public
document. As a public document, the rule on authentication does not apply.
It is admissible in evidence without further proof of its due execution and
genuineness; the person who made the report need not be presented in
court to identify, describe and testify how the report was conducted.
Moreover, documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein.
In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that it was Captain Benjamin
Rubio who was presented in court to identify the chemistry and not the
forensic chemist who actually conducted the paraffin test on the petitioner,
the report may still be admitted because the requirement for authentication
does not apply to public documents. In other words, the forensic chemist
does not need to be presented as witness to identify and authenticate the
chemistry report. Furthermore, the entries in the chemistry report are prima
facie evidence of the facts they state, that is, of the presence of gunpowder
residue on the left hand of Johan and on the right hand of the petitioner. As
a matter of fact, the petitioner herself admitted the presence of gunpowder
nitrates on her fingers, albeit ascribing their presence from a match she
allegedly lighted. Accordingly, we hold that the chemistry report is
admissible as evidence.
*
VIP
130. Offer & Objection to Evidence

People v. Marcos
B.E.G.
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People v. Wagas (2013)

The letter of Wagas did not competently establish that he was the person
who had conversed with Ligaray by telephone to place the order for the rice.
The letter was admitted exclusively as the States rebuttal evidence to
controvert or impeach the denial of Wagas of entering into any transaction
with Ligaray on the rice; hence, it could be considered and appreciated only
for that purpose. Under the law of evidence, the court shall consider
evidence solely for the purpose for which it is offered, not for any other
purpose. Fairness to the adverse party demands such exclusivity. Moreover,
the high plausibility of the explanation of Wagas that he had signed the letter
only because his sister and her husband had pleaded with him to do so
could not be taken for granted.
*
131. Mentally Retardate

People v. Calango (2009)
***
A mentally retardate may be qualified to testify. Human experience teaches

that every mentally deficient persons or individuals having low intelligence
can still narrate their ordeals in detailed manner and recall painful
experiences like any average individual could. Here, the victim notably could
not even recall feeling anything after appellant supposedly penetrated her
private part.
132. Confessions & Admissions
People v. Lauga (2010)
Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in
the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the local government unit
to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the
barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by
Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities
delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct a
custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related
function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his
constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the
Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was
taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.
***
VIP
133. Hearsay Evidence

Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends on the
competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom
it is sought to produce. (Estrada v. Desierto)
Hearsay evidence is inadmissible because such evidence was not given
under oath or solemn affirmation and was not subject to cross-examination.
(Gilbert)
What is the remedy for the admission hearsay evidence?
***
VIP
134. Dead Mans Statute

Enrique Razon v. Indeterminate Appellate Court (1992)
B.E.G.
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Petitioner Enrique Razon assails the appellate court's decision on its alleged
misapplication of the dead man's statute rule under Section 20(a) Rule 130
of the Rules of Court. According to him, the "dead man's statute" rule is not
applicable to the instant case.
The rule delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a
case against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a
claim against the estate of the deceased person.
In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of
the defendant (petitioner herein) to the affect that the late Juan Chuidian,
(the father of private respondent Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the
estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan
Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned
by the defendant unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same
which never happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate
of the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc.
allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian.
It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the
prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the administrator of
the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate.
**
135. Adoptive Admission

3rd Partys admission is admission of another embracing or espousing it.
**
136. Vallejo Standards in Assessing Probative Value of DNA Evidence

People v. Vallejo (2002)
Vallejo adopted the following guidelines to be used by courts in assessing
the probative value of DNA evidence:
(1) how the samples were collected;
(2) how they were handled;
(3) the possibility of contamination of samples;
(4) the procedure followed in analyzing the samples;
(5) whether the proper standards and procedure were followed in
conducting the tests;
(6) the qualification of the analyst who conducted the test.
137. 1-day Examination of Witness
138. TV Live Link Testimony

In ciriminal cases where a child is victim or witness, the prosecutor, counsel
or guardian ad litem may apply at least 5 days before the trial date for an
order that the testimony of the child be taken in a room outside the
courtroom and be televised to the courtroom by live-link television.
The court may order such if there is a substantial likelihood that the child
would suffer trauma from testifying in the presence of the accused, his
counsel or the prosecutor as the case may be.
The testimony of the child shall be preserved which shall be made part of
the court record and shall be subject to a protective order. (Sec. 25)
B.E.G.
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139. Rape Shield Protection

GR: The following evidence is not admissible in any criminal proceeding
involving alleged child sexual abuse:
(1) evidence offered to prove that the alleged victim engaged in other
sexual behavior; and
(2) evidence offered to prove the sexual predisposition of the alleged
victim.
XP: Evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim
to prove that a person other than the accused was the source of the semen,
injury, or other physical evidence shall be admissible. (Sec. 30)
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
140. Coverage
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party. (Sec. 1)
**
Gamboa v. Chan (2012)

FACTS: Gamboa was included in a report of the enumeration of individuals
who maintain a private army. This report was later broadcasted and
published. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her
reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance
of a writ of habeas data against respondents.
HELD: In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but
emphasized its confidential nature. That it was leaked to third parties and
the media was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be
stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible
for this unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs available
to her to address the purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to
the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and
improper.
Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through
substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining
PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to
increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently
explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to
the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they
enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling
PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa,
especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information
against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the
writ of habeas data must be denied.
WRIT OF AMPARO
B.E.G.
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141. Coverage
The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof. (Sec. 1)
Tapuz v. Del Rosario (2007)
The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the

extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances,
and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address
these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or
as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect
concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we
shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo in line with the extraordinary character of the writ
and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands requires that
every petition for the issuance of the Writ must be supported by justifying
allegations of fact.
On the whole, what is clear from these statements both sworn and
unsworn is the overriding involvement of property issues as the petition
traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed
by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty
can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past
violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is
alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments implied from the
presence of armed men bare to the waist and the alleged pointing and
firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly
show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners
is imminent or is continuing.
WRIT OF KALIKASAN
142. Concept
The writ of kalikasan is a remedy available to natural or juridical persons on
behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more provinces.
Citizens Suit
**
143. Writ of Continuing Mandamus

A writ directing any agency or instrumentality of government or officer
thereof to perform an act or series of act decreed by final judgment which
B.E.G.
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shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied.

Paje Case
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

144. What are covered?
In Relation to Custody of Child
**
Cases
JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE

145. Coverage
The rule shall apply to all actions, proceedings, and incidents requiring
reception of evidence before, as a rule, all courts in the Philippines.
*
146. Criminal Cases
The judicial affidavit rule applies in criminal cases when:

(1) the maximum of the imposable penalty does not exceed 6 years;
(2) the accused agrees to the use of judicial affidavits, irrespective of
the penalty involved; or
(3) with respect to the civil aspect of the actions, whatever the
penalties involved are. (Sec. 9)
147. Effect of Failure to Submit
If a party fails to submit the required affidavits and exhibits on time, he shall
be deemed to have waived their submission. The court may, however, allow
only once the late submission of the same provided, the delay is for a valid
reason, would not unduly prejudice the opposing party, and the defaulting
party pays a fine of not less than P 1,000 nor more than P 5,000, at the
discretion of the court. (Sec. 10)
DNA EVIDENCE
148. Relevance
**
Estate of Rogelio Ong v. Diaz (2007)

From among the issues presented for our disposition, this Court finds it
prudent to concentrate its attention on the third one, the propriety of the
appellate courts decision remanding the case to the trial court for the
conduct of DNA testing Considering that a definitive result of the DNA
testing will decisively lay to rest the issue of the filiation of minor Joanne, we
see no reason to resolve the first two issues raised by the petitioner as they
will be rendered moot by the result of the DNA testing.
Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the trial court, petitioner
questions the appropriateness of the order by the Court of Appeals directing
the remand of the case to the RTC for DNA testing given that petitioner has
B.E.G.
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already died. Petitioner argues that a remand of the case to the RTC for
DNA analysis is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind,
the alleged impossibility of complying with the order of remand for purposes
of DNA testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioners argument is without
basis especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of
DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any person who has
a legal interest in the matter in litigation. Even if Rogelio already died, any of
the biological samples as enumerated above as may be available, may be
used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility
of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the
conduct of DNA testing.
149. No Violation of
- equal protection clause
- search and seizure clause
- self-incrimination
Agustin v. CA
Tijing v. CA
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

*
150. Autonomy in Arbitration

Party autonomy is the freedom of the party to make their own
arrangements to resolve their disputes. (Sec. 2, ADRA) It is the freedom of
the parties to determine the rules/laws governing the mode of resolving their
dispute, provided that the terms of the contract are not contrary to law,
public policy, or pubic order. (Autea)
151. Principle of Competence-Competence

Principle of competence-competence means that the arbitral tribunal may
initially rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to
the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement or any condition
precedent to the filing of a request for arbitration. (2.2(B), SAR)
The counterpart of this principle in conventional litigation is when the court
would dismiss the case based on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal is defined in the arbitration agreement.
Thus, it shall be the arbitral tribunal who can determine whether or not the
arbitration agreement is existent or valid. (Autea)
Where the court is asked to make a determination of whether the arbitration
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed,
under this policy of judicial restraint, the court must make no more than a
prima facie determination of that issue.
Unless the court, pursuant to such prima facie determination, concludes that
the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed, the court must suspend the action before it and refer the parties
B.E.G.
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to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement. (Rule 2.4, SAR)

The policy behind competence-competence is judicial restraint. Even if there
has been no constituted arbitration yet, the court can prima facie rule on the
jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal. This ruling is prima facie because the
arbitration tribunal can still reverse it. (Autea)
Where the arbitral tribunal defers its ruling on preliminary question regarding
its jurisdiction until its final award, the aggrieved party cannot seek judicial
relief to question the deferral and must await the final arbitral award before
seeking appropriate judicial recourse.
A ruling by the arbitral tribunal deferring resolution on the issue of its
jurisdiction until final award, shall not be subject to a motion for
reconsideration, appeal or a petition for certiorari. (Rule 3.20, SAR)
152. Separability Clause
The principle of separability of the arbitration clause, which means that said
clause shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of
the contract of which it forms part. A decision that the contract is null and
void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause. (Rule
2.2(B), SAR; Art. 16, Model Law)
Gonzales v. Climax Mining (2007)
The doctrine of separability enunciates that an arbitration agreement is
independent of the main contract. The arbitration agreement is to be treated
as a separate agreement and the arbitration agreement does not
automatically terminate when the contract of which it is part comes to an
end. The separability of the arbitration agreement is especially agreement to
the determination of whether the invalidity of the main contract also nullifies
the arbitration clause. Indeed, the doctrine denotes that the invalidity of the
main contract does not affect the validity of the arbitration agreement.
Irrespective of the fact that the main contract is invalid, the arbitration
clause/agreement still remains valid and enforceable.
Cargill vs. San Fernando (2011)
Applying the Gonzales ruling, an arbitration agreement which forms part of
the main contract shall not be regarded as invalid or non-existent just
because the main contract is invalid or did not come into existence, since
the arbitration agreement shall be treated as a separate agreement
independent of the main contract. To reiterate a contrary ruling would
suggest that a party's mere repudiation of the main contract is sufficient to
avoid arbitration and that is exactly the situation that the separability
doctrine sought to avoid. Thus, we find that even the party who has
repudiated the main contract is not prevented from enforcing its arbitration
clause.
153. Remedies
how to enforce
award
B.E.G.
DOMESTIC
petition to
confirm
INTERNATIONAL
petition to
recognize and
enforce
FOREIGN
petition to
recognize or
enforc
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period of filing
how to prevent
enforcement
period of filing6
**
At any time
after the lapse
of 30 days from
receipt by the
petitioner of the
arbitral award.
At any time from receipt of the

award.
If a timely petition to set aside an

arbitral award is filed, the opposing
party must file therein and in
opposition thereto the petition for
recognition and enforcement of the
same award within the period for
filing an opposition.
petition to
petition to set
petition to
vacate
aside
refuse
recognition
Not later than
Within 3 months
Within 3
30 days from
from the time the
months from
the receipt of
petitioner receives
the time the
the arbitral
a copy thereof.
petitioner
award.
receives a
copy thereof
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
MCC Industrial Sales v. Ssangyong Corporation (2007)

Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented
by respondent Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their supposed contract
of sale are inadmissible in evidence and do not fall within the ambit of R.A.
No. 8792, because the law merely admits as the best evidence
the original fax transmittal. On the other hand, respondent posits that, from a
reading of the law and the Rules on Electronic Evidence, the original
facsimile transmittal of the pro forma invoice is admissible in evidence since
it is an electronic document and, therefore, the best evidence under the law
and the Rules. Respondent further claims that the photocopies of these fax
transmittals are admissible under the Rules on Evidence because the
respondent sufficiently explained the non-production of the original fax
transmittals.
To be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be
considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the
Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an "electronic data
message" or an "electronic document."
We conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic
document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not
include
a
facsimile
transmission.
Accordingly,
a facsimile
transmissioncannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the
functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not
admissible as electronic evidence.
Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an
"electronic document," and cannot be considered as electronic evidence by
the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not
electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoice
6 Belated filing of the petition to confirm will not give a new period for the losing party to file a petition
to vacate. In other words, if a petiton to confirm is filed but the period to file a petition to vacate has
already lapsed, the subsequent filing of the former will not renew the latter.
B.E.G.
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Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"),

which are mere photocopies of the original fax transmittals, are not
electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both the trial and the
appellate courts.
Maliksi v. COMELEC (2013)

The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are
regarded as the equivalents of the original official ballots themselves. In
Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, the Court
held that "the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the
PCOS, are likewise official ballots that faithfully capture in electronic form
the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369. As
such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots
filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of
votes in an electoral protest."
That the two documentsthe official ballot and its picture imageare
considered "original documents" simply means that both of them are given
equal probative weight. In short, when either is presented as evidence, one
is not considered as weightier than the other.
But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and
the Electoral Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally resort to the printouts of
the picture images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them without
notice to the parties. Despite the equal probative weight accorded to the
official ballots and the printouts of their picture images, the rules for the
revision of ballots adopted for their respective proceedings still consider the
official ballots to be the primary or best evidence of the voters will. In that
regard, the picture images of the ballots are to be used only when it is first
shown that the official ballots are lost or their integrity has been
compromised.
154. Leading & Misleading Questions
A question which suggests to the witness the answer which the examining
party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed, except:
(a) On cross examination;
(b) On preliminary matters;
(c) When there is a difficulty is getting direct and intelligible answers from a
witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a
deaf-mute;
(d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or
(e) Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing
agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association
which is an adverse party.
A misleading question is one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified
to by the witness, or contrary to that which he has previously stated. It is not
allowed. (Rule 132, Sec. 10)
*
155. Character Evidence

GR: Character evidence is not admissible in evidence.
XPs:
B.E.G.
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In Criminal Cases:
(1) the accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent
to the moral trait involved in the offense charged;
(2) the prosecution, as rebuttal evidence, may prove the bad moral
character of the accused when the latter opens the issue by
introducing evidence of his good moral character;
(3) the offended partys good or bad moral character may be proved as
long as it tends to establish the probability or improbability of the
offense charged.
XPs to the XPs: (1) proof of bad moral character of the victim in a
murder case is not admissible if the crime committed was through
treachery and premeditation (2) in prosecutions for rape, evidence
of complainants past sexual conduct, opinion thereof of his/her
reputation shall not be admitted unless and only to the extent that
the court finds that such evidence is material and relevant to the
case.
In Civil Cases evidence of the good moral character of a party in a civil
case is admissible only when pertinent to the issue of character involved in
the case.
As To Witnesses The bad moral character of a witness may be proved by
either party, but evidence of good moral character of a witness is not
admissible unless such character has been impeached.
**
156. Disputable Presumptions

RULES OF COURT
Except for purposes of succession,
when two persons perish in the
same calamity, such as wreck,
battle, or conflagration, and it is not
shown who died first, and there are
no particular circumstances from
which it can be inferred, the
survivorship is determined from the
probabilities resulting from the
strength and the age of the sexes,
according to the following rules:
CIVIL CODE
If there is a doubt, as between two
or more persons who are called to
succeed each other, as to which of
them died first, whoever alleges the
death of one prior to the other, shall
prove the same; in the absence of
proof, it is presumed that they died
at the same time and there shall be
no transmission of rights from one
to the other.
1. If both were under the age of

fifteen years, the older is deemed
to have survived;
2. If both were above the age sixty,
the younger is deemed to have
survived;
3. If one is under fifteen and the
other above sixty, the former is
deemed to have survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under
sixty, and the sex be different, the
male is deemed to have survived, if
the sex be the same, the older;
B.E.G.
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**
5. If one be under fifteen or over

sixty, and the other between those
ages, the latter is deemed to have
survived.
157. Conclusive Presumptions
The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led to another to believe a particular thing true,
and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such
declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it;
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.
Borre v. Court of Appeals (1988)
The rule on estoppel against tenants is subject to a qualification. It does not
apply if the landlord's title has expired, or has been conveyed to another, or
has been defeated by a title paramount, subsequent to the commencement
of lessor-lessee relationship. In other words, if there was a change in the
nature of the title of the landlord during the subsistence of the lease, then
the presumption does not apply. Otherwise, if the nature of the landlord's
title remains as it was during the commencement of the relation of landlord
and tenant, then estoppel lies against the tenant.
Not one of the circumstances referred to above exists in this case.
Petitioners do not claim that from the time they entered into a lease
agreement with Manotok to the time the complaint was filed, the latter's title
was transferred or conveyed or had expired. Petitioners' claim is that the
property they have been occupying and which they leased from Manotok
has all along been part of the public domain. In other words, in asserting
that the land they leased from Manotok belongs to the State, the petitioners
as lessees now deny the title of the lessor from the commencement of their
tenancy relationship. This the Rules of Court does not permit.
In view of their express admission that they leased the property from
Manotok, petitioners are now estopped from asserting that there is a title
better than their landlord's outstanding in another person.
Santos v. NSO (2011)
"[W]hat a tenant is estopped from denying x x x is the title of his landlord at
the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. If the title
asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the
commencement of that relation, the presumption will not apply." Hence, "the
tenant may show that the landlord's title has expired or been conveyed to
another or himself; and he is not estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has
been ousted or evicted by title paramount."
While petitioner appears to have already lost ownership of the property at
the time of the commencement of the tenant-landlord relationship between
him and respondent, the change in the nature of petitioner's title, as far as
respondent is concerned, came only after the commencement of such
relationship or during the subsistence of the lease. This is precisely because
at the time of the execution of the second and third contracts of lease,
B.E.G.
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respondent was still not aware of the transfer of ownership of the leased
property to China Bank. It was only in November 2003 or less than two
months before the expiration of said contracts when respondent came to
know of the same after it was notified by said bank. This could have been
the reason why respondent did not anymore pay petitioner the rents for the
succeeding months of December 2003 and January 2004. Thus, it can be
said that there was a change in the nature of petitioner's title during the
subsistence of the lease that the rule on estoppel against tenants does not
apply in this case. Petitioner's reliance on said conclusive presumption
must, therefore, necessarily fail since there was no error on the part of the
CA when it entertained respondent's assertion of a title adverse to petitioner.
158. Voire Due Examination of Witness
to determine competency of witness
preliminary inquiry
159. Impeachment of Witness

A witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called, by
contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth,
honestly, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present, testimony, but not by evidence of
particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of
the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an
offense. (Rule 132, Sec. 11)
To be an adverse witness, it must be declared first as such. (Albano)
B.E.G.
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Magic Areas in Remedial Law

2. ESTOPPEL TO QUESTION JURISDICTION

Magic Areas in Remedial Law

jurisdiction possessing equal power to grant injunctive relief, applies only

5. PERSONAL ACTION; SUM OF MONEY

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Section 33(1) of BP Blg. 129, as amended by RA No. 7691,

To reiterate, where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to

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Settled jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable of pecuniary

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Catedrilla v. Launon (PERALTA)

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Although, ordinarily, a title becomes incontrovertible one year after it is issued

Besides, even on the assumption that there was a misjoinder of causes of

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joined causes of action

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to proceed against the estate, making it a condition precedent for any

Indeed, where the defendant is neither a natural nor a juridical person or an

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proferred justification for the requested substitution is the transfer to him of

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VENUE OF ACTIONS (RULE 4)

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Magic Areas in Remedial Law

petitioners principal office is in Cebu City, per its amended articles of

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on Summary Procedure is "to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive

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18. allegations of actionable documents

19. denial of genuineness and due execution of actionable document;

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21. negative pregnant / kinds of denials

By making such an ambiguous allegation in its Answer with Counterclaims,

23. remedies of party in default

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Magic Areas in Remedial Law

Magic Areas in Remedial Law

Magic Areas in Remedial Law

A supplemental pleading may raise a new cause of action as long as it has

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indubitably, private respondents counsel violated Section 11 of Rule 13 and

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SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are

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When any action is commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides

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The supplemental report clearly established the impossibility of personal

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33. 3-day rule; purpose

34. omnibus motion rule

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Magic Areas in Remedial Law

interlocutory order is to prevent undue delay, useless appeals and undue

Based on the foregoing developments, Shell and Tabangaos appeal, albeit

Magic Areas in Remedial Law

Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of a

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Magic Areas in Remedial Law