University of Wrocaw

Faculty of Social Sciences

Institute of International Studies

Matej Cota

War-making in NATOs strategic culture:

the transformation of modern Western strategy

Doctoral thesis supervised by:

Prof. dr hab. Elbieta Stadtmller and Dr ukasz Fijakowski

Wrocaw 2015

Uniwersytet Wrocawski
Wydzia Nauk Spoecznych
Instytut Studiw Midzynarodowych

Matej Cota

Dziaania zbrojne w kulturze strategicznej NATO:

przemiany we wspczesnej zachodniej strategii

Praca doktorska pod kierunkiem

prof. dr hab. Elbiety Stadtmller i dr ukasza Fijakowskiego

Wrocaw 2015

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABBREVIATIONS 5
INTRODUCTION.. 7
PART I: WAR-MAKING IN NATOS STRATEGIC CULTURE. 30
Chapter 1: Strategy and War..... 30
1. What is strategy. 30
1.1. Introduction to strategic thinking. 30
1.2. Evolution of strategic studies... 33
1.3. Nature of strategy. 40
1.4. Strategic culture... 45
1.5. Dimensions and levels of strategy... 51
1.6. Strategic positioning in correlation with strategic levels. 63
1.6.1.

Case study: Imperial Japan in World War II. 64

2. What is war... 73
2.1. Evolution of modern western warfare.. 85
2.2. Trends in modern warfare 93
Chapter 2: Direct and Indirect strategies 111
1. Introducing the concept of direct and indirect strategy.. 111
2. Direct strategies.. 119
3. Indirect strategies 143
4. Barbarism 165
Chapter 3: Alliances and NATO. 184
1. Military alliances in general 184
2. NATO objectives, structure and decision making process. 197
3. Factors which influence NATO strategy-making... 205
4. Variables which repeatedly influence NATOs behavior... 213
PART II: TRANSFORMATION OF MODERN WESTERN STRATEGY. 214
Chapter 4: First group of case studies. 214

Chapter 5: Second group of case studies 240

CONCLUSION... 288
BIBLIOGRAPHY... 296
LIST OF TABLES, DIAGRAMS AND MAPS. 329
SUMMARY 331
STRESZCZENIE 332

ABBREVIATIONS
ACO Allied Command Operations
ACT Allied Command Transformation
AGS Alliance Ground Surveillance (NATO)
ANDSF Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
ArBiH Armija Bosne i Hercegovine (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
AU African Union
CNN - Cable News Network (American based international broadcasting company)
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization
EU European Union
FLN Front de Libration Nationale (National Liberation Front Algeria)
HV Hrvatska Vojska (Croatian Army)
ISAF - International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014)
KFOR Kosovo Force (NATO-led international peacekeeping force Kosovo)
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army
MAD Mutually Assured Destruction
NAC North Atlantic Council
NAEW&CF NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCS NATO Command structure
NPG The Nuclear Planning Group (NATO)
RAF Royal Air Force (United Kingdom)

RSS Regional Security System (Caribbean Islands Alliance)

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SS Schutzstaffel (Protection Squadron Nazi Germany)
STRIKFORNATO Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO
UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Uppsala University Sweden)
UK United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN United Nations
UNITAF Unified Task Force (United Nations in Somalia 1992-1993)
UNOSOM I, II United Nations Operation in Somalia I and II (1993-1995)
UNPROFOR United Nations Protective Force (Bosnia 1992-1995)
USA United States of America
USAN Union of South American Nations
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

INTRODUCTION
The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to
safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.
Sun Tzu (544 BC-496 BC)
The title of the dissertation is War-making in NATOs strategic culture: the transformation of
modern Western strategy. I observe modern western warfare to find the patterns of strategy which
shapes it. Segments of the dissertation include discussion in theory of strategy and war with
historical observations of modern warfare which analyzes repeating factors in western strategic
conduct. Also dissertation briefly reflects on theory of alliances. NATO alliance is the dominant
subject but from a strategic angle. In the focus of the dissertation is the strategic culture which
shaped NATO formation, continued existence and possible future development. Reason why
western and why NATO is because modern world is dominated by USA and its global military,
economic, cultural and political influence.
RESEARCH PROBLEM AND ITS CONCEPTUALIZATION
World is full of armchair generals and there is a well-known animosity between those who have
actually fought and saw destruction, and those who have not. Those who have, know just how
much war is a foggy business. In a real war there is so much uncertainty and fear of the unknown
that it could seem that any kind of military theory is doomed to fail from the start. However a
decision maker needs to have as much as possible theoretical preparation for the conflict, because
it just might be the only thing between life and death. To deeply understand war and peace, and to
be in a position to influence strategy to go either in one direction or another is now more crucial
than ever. Today, more than ever before everybody is a soldier, whether is aware of the fact or not.
In the world of weapons of mass destruction, we all need theory and science. Its essential purpose
is to help us understand and imagine things which are bound to happen.
And modern war, unlike few other things in this world, is immensely hard to understand. Rapid
development of technology and communications have made strategy and warfare a very
complicated matter. In this extensive research area I have identified the question of analysis and
predictability of future strategic conduct as my primary interest. And in this I have concentrated
on the NATO alliance as it is the worlds strongest military organization. No other known
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collective of actors can match its political, economic, technologic and military potential. However,
each of the worlds strongest actors has such military potential to destroy the entire planet.
Therefore the planet itself has become a too small battlefield for war.
In this situation, in which the world is locked into a military stand-off, new and clever strategies
have emerged. Actors have grouped into alliances for protection. USA is the leader of the NATO
alliance but it cannot demand blind obedience from its members. Especially not from the most
prominent ones such as United Kingdom or France. However USA needs these other actors not
for military protection but for a political one. And these three countries belong to the same western
culture of war-making. For this reason I do not only observe USA, but the whole of the NATO
alliance because its strategic decisions as a collective are dominated by western culture of warmaking.
I started to observe the strategy behind western conduct and asked the question: Which kind of
strategies is NATO alliance likely to employ in the future? In other words, how is it going to
behave in conflict?
To give an answer I examined several important aspects. What is modern strategy? What is modern
war? How is NATO alliance structured? How strong are the connection between the members?
How are decisions made within this organization? Which is the dominant parameter that influences
NATOs strategy making? How did the western actors behave in modern and contemporary
conflicts since the end of the WWII?
To all of these questions I have offered a hypothesis which states that:
NATO alliance will in the future employ only those strategies which will be cost effective in
achieving its strategic objectives.
This hypothesis I have developed by observing repeating features in pattern of behavior which
characterized Western style of warfare since the end of WWII:

With the introduction of nuclear weapons wars cannot be led directly against other major
(nuclear) powers as the casualties would be too high potential gain from such a conflict
could never compensate for potential losses. World is locked in a military standoff, in

which direct confrontation between strong actors will result in planets destruction. Only
wars against smaller powers can be made, and only with non-nuclear means.

No military action can be done without the knowledge and some sort of involvement from
USA, as no known military organization can match its military potential. Other strong
actors can make world politics of their own, but only as long as it does not interfere with
US interests. If it does, than USA is likely to make political and economic pressure on
those actors.

For a western actor to take military action international context must be favorable.
Opposition of strong Eastern actors (Russia and China) must be politically neutralized in
some way.

Western strategies and tactics are made in such a way to minimize casualties. Actors rely
on their technologic superiority over the enemy. Casualties of western powers are smaller
than those of their enemies, except if enemy uses asymmetry.

Western actors are more likely to resort to barbarism if fighting against culturally different
actors, and usually as a response to their barbarism.

Public opinion is crucial and it is very important to have moral high ground for military
action.

Strong western actors conduct offensive operations as a part of their strategic defensive
and maintaining its influence on the highest strategic levels.

Dissolution of the Soviet Union did not also meant the elimination of threat. It still exists in the
form of strong Eastern actors, primarily Russia and China. Other Western actors such as United
Kingdom and France coordinate their military activities in accordance with US global political
interests. NATO and/or USA will conduct military operations only if there is no other form of
strategy to protect their interests. Only weak actors are potential targets for a military strike. Before
any military operation against them takes place these will first be politically isolated and further
weakened by using other kinds of strategies. When conducting military operations, NATO and
USA use only those strategies and tactics which will minimize their own casualties. Public opinion
of western countries does not tolerate high casualty levels among their own troops. It will also be
9

attempted to keep enemys civilian casualties at minimum because it could deny moral high ground
for the operation. Western public is more supportive of the war effort and even barbarism if their
own sense of security is jeopardized. Interventions will be conducted in such a way to increase
NATOs international prestige level. USA and NATO will try to ally itself with other actors within
the conflict zone, and use their troops as ground fighting force. USA and NATO prefer to stay in
supporting role in the form of political influence, logistics and employment of advanced weapon
systems. However if it happens that Western power is forced to retreat, its smaller allies will be
left behind. NATO and USA are more likely to use indirect strategies against their enemies. Only
if political situation demands that military victory must be achieved rapidly, then they will use
direct strategies. Essential features of these will be employment of advanced weapons systems and
highly trained troops. In both direct and indirect scenario, USA-NATO will devise these strategies
in such a way which will conserve its own troops. Public opinion is crucial factor in strategy
creating. Western war-making culture demands minimization of its own casualties. Decision to
use direct or indirect strategy depends on the estimation of potential losses. USA and NATO will
use those kind of strategies which will minimize their losses in every aspect, not just casualties.
To further develop these premises I divided the dissertation into several parts.

STRUCTURE AND RESEARCH STEPS

Dissertation is divided in two main parts. First part is about strategy, war and NATO alliance, and
second part is made up of case studies from modern warfare. There are five chapters, three in the
first part and two in the second.
In the first chapter I write about strategy and war. First is a segment dedicated to strategy and this
I elaborated in detail. It is crucial for my case that the reader has deep insight into this matter. My
objective is to present the logic of strategy and detail definition of strategy, levels and types of
strategies with representative examples. I explain the nature of strategy for the reason to give
insight into the way strategy operates. Without this knowledge it is not possible to understand the
way a strategist thinks. Because what is visible in strategy are short-term consequences of longterm strategic planning. The nature of strategy does not follow linear logic and the reader could
easily fall into a trap to see some well-known facts differently than a strategist would. Because in
strategy things are often not how they seem to be. For this reason I explain the concept of strategic
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loss and strategic gain, as to understand them is in the core of our hypothesis. My key objective is
to make strategy, a very complex matter, understandable in the simplest possible way. Dissertation
does not only answer the concrete question of NATOs future conduct, it also tries to make some
progress in theory of strategy. In this dissertation when I use the word strategy I do not refer (unless
specifically stated) to either political, economic or military strategy. I refer to a higher, overall
level of organizations strategy which includes all of these and many other elements. It is
consciously done so because I build my case on the premise that strategy of a specific society
encompasses all the different segments of this entity.
Following this is a second segment of the first chapter devoted to the concept of war. In this section
I write about the nature of war, changes in warfare and culture of war-making. It is deliberately
focused on these parameters because I do not see war as a manifestation of other elements such as
economic, political or social. In my opinion war is primarily a manifestation of strategy. Decision
to wage war and the nature of this war both depend on the war-making culture. A culture which
every society has defined for itself under numerous various influences. In this section I examine
war and warfare for the purpose to give insight into specific, NATOs war-making culture.
Dominant feature of this culture is Western war-making and this is why during the course of the
whole dissertation I move easily between examples of strategies of USA, France, UK and other
distinctively Western actors. Further part of this section I use to explain the present global strategic
situation in which NATO operates and technologic change which also resulted in a significant
change in warfare. It is important to explain this new environment because old rules of warfare
simply no longer apply in the modern world.
Chapter number two is devoted to the concept of direct and indirect strategy. In this I found some
similarities with the thoughts of French general Andre Beaufre, but the understanding according
to which I am presenting direct and indirect strategy is new. This section of the dissertation is
important to be explained because on the understanding of direct and indirect strategy we can
observe the thing border between war and peace. In fact the realm of strategy is so paradox that
sometimes wars are led to keep the peace, and also the other way round. Peace can be a disguise
for an actual war on the highest levels of intensity. In this chapter I am backing the idea of direct
and indirect strategy with classifying some known strategic concepts into one category or another.
For example Blitzkrieg I have placed into direct strategy, and Bloodletting into indirect one. A
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third, special category of strategy I called barbarism, and in this category I included actions of
violence against non-combatants. This category could be considered controversial as barbarism
can be a product of strategic planning, but it also can be a spontaneous reaction of one of the actors.
However in both cases, I see barbarism as a direct result of the strategic culture of the actor
undertaking it. In fact in the dissertation this cultural factor emerged as being crucial for
understanding western actions and warfare in general.
Third chapter is devoted to alliances, and this I use to explain the basic concept of what is an
alliance and basic classification of alliances. This I deliberately keep at basic level and do not go
deeper into the matter, because it is not of crucial significance for the study. In the focus of the
dissertation is strategy, not relations or structure of NATO itself. This segment focuses on the
decision making process within the NATO alliance. More specifically the most important aspect
which influences this decision process. I see alliances as symbiosis type of relations formed out of
necessity. Strategy which is formed within such organisms is subjected to constant change
influenced by many variables of which culture (the very nature of behavior) is the dominant one.
Second part of the dissertation I use to prove my hypothesis. This is done by two-tier approach. In
first section of the second part, chapter number four, I present the first group of case studies which
are prototypical with some references to exceptional ones. After this, by using the same method in
chapter six, I once again test the hypothesis on the second group of case studies, which are more
recent (present-day) wars. Both first and second groups of case studies I deliberately chose to be
culturally homogenous and to belong to Western war-making culture. This is because I want to get
as close as possible to the matter which is under observation and this is NATO alliance. 1 In all of
the case studies I am searching for repeated factors to see how western actor behaves in a modern
war. Once I have found them I observed similarities between different actors and concluded that
we can speak of western style of war-making. Because NATO is an alliance dominated by western
culture we can apply conclusions from the case studies on the projection of future NATOs strategy
choosing.

All of the NATO members (except Turkey) rest on western war-making culture norms. Generally speaking
Western warriors are not willing to go to war in which there no personal or national profit to be gained. They can
force themselves to kill and risk to be killed if there was something to be gained from it. To most of them, bloodshed
for the bloodshed itself is not an acceptable behavior. This kind of thinking is a typical feature of Western warmaking and it is founded on ancient Greek civilization.

12

These main points from case studies I discuss in the final segment of conclusions. There I confirm
the hypothesis and also give my view of the way culture is connected with strategy, a factor which
emerged during the research and is linked to the hypothesis. Also I offer my predictions for the
future development of NATOs strategy and general direction in which modern warfare and
strategic thinking are could to take turn.
Throughout the dissertation I give a general insight into the new environment in which modern
warfare is conducted. It is important to do so, because one should be aware that old understanding
of warfare no longer applies. Even studies written just a few decades ago, are becoming obsolete.
The most important factor for this dissertation is to familiarize the reader with strategy and its
nature. When it comes to strategy, in this dissertation I rely on several premises:

Modern political, economic and military strategy are inseparably intertwined, probably
more than in any other period of history.

Strategy is an intelligent matter which interacts with other intelligent matter. As such it is
subject to change both by itself and by interaction.

Strategy is not following a linear pattern of thinking.

Nature of strategy has not changed since its creation and is following the same pattern of
behavior.

Strategy can be studied but not mastered simply by doing so as it is an intelligent matter
which requires intelligence and creativity.

Strategy can be divided to direct and indirect, based on the way it achieves its objectives.

Results of strategy cannot be accurately predicted by our present technology.

NATO is an alliance dominated by United States of America USA can make actions
outside NATO, but other NATO members cannot make actions without US involvement
or consent. For this reason, I see NATO strategy making as inseparably connected with
USAs strategic interests.

These premises are not widely agreed nor a common understanding of the matter. They are a result
of my observation through strategic-understanding lenses. Strategy despite being as old as human
kind is not researched enough to have an overarching theoretical basis. This research is in semicharted waters when it comes to this aspect. Science exists to explain the world but for sciences to
exist as a professional human activity, is a strategic decision. In this understanding strategy is
13

above sciences, but as all other matter, strategy is no exception and is subjected to scientific
apparatus. For me it is crucial to make strategy understandable to the reader, as without this we
cannot answer the main question of the dissertation: Which kind of strategies can we expect NATO
to choose in the future? Other aspects of dissertation which have strong theoretical basis, are the
one based on history and political science. For this reason I back statements about strategy with
various different historical and contemporary examples. Most of these are well known and
historically well analyzed topics and have the advantage that I can reference them by works of
prominent authors. Some examples are so contemporary that can only be referenced by media. But
both of them serve my purpose as this dissertation is not about presenting new data. I primarily
attempt to find a pattern of behavior, and then follow this pattern of behavior to make assessments
about the future.
In the dissertation I also include list of abbreviations linked to the matter of study and used in the
text. Generally I use two types of footnotes. First are the references to sources and second are
comments and further explanations. I attempt to write in such a way to make the matter clear and
leave space for additional debate and progress in theoretical research. It is my intention that the
reader is not just presented with a set of finished facts, but also to participate in the process of
thought. In this way I hope to open prospects for new ideas and further research within the area of
strategy. Some examples in the text are atypical and this is done on purpose this way. Text in some
segments is written by using historical narration to give context to various different terms and to
connect them. Bibliography is presented at the end, organized into categories and by alphabetical
order.

FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES

In the second part of dissertation I am analyzing of two groups of case studies. First group are
armed conflicts fought during the Cold War era (1945-1991).2 Timeframe of Cold War has been a
matter of debate among historians. D. Miller suggests signing of the NATO Treaty in 1949 as start

In my view Cold War started right after the end of WWII. Even before during WWII, Allies did not seem to be in a
hurry to challenge Germany directly until its backbone was broken on the Eastern front. The purpose seemed to be
to exhaust the Soviets as much as possible.

14

and Fall of Berlin Wall in 1989 as the end. 3 Others like J. Gaddis point out the writing of essay
You and the Atom Bomb by George Orwell in 1945 and long telegram of George Kennan in
1946.4 Leffler and Painter state December 1991 and dissolution of the Soviet Union as the end
date.5 Historians would agree to disagree that it is difficult to mark the start and end date of the
Cold War as there were no troops pouring over anyones borders. This was an unprecedented war
in human history and as such has many possible events to mark its beginning and end. Division of
Germany into occupational zones, W. Churchills speech on the Iron Curtain, long telegram of
G. Kennan, signing of NATO Treaty and Fall of the Berlin Wall, First partially free elections in
Poland, dissolution of the Soviet Union etc. History tends to look for events to mark beginnings
and ends, a culmination point in some process which was taking place. Strategy is interested in the
opposing wills and means to support this will. For the purpose of this dissertation I will use the
timeframe 1945-1991. Reasons for this are the change in technology of warfare and political
environment in which wars have been fought.
Second group of case studies are armed conflicts fought after the end of the Cold War (1991) and
into the present-day. The reason why case studies are armed conflicts and not some other types of
less intensity conflicts is that it is clearer to observe behavior in an armed conflict. Secrecy, as
with any strategy is present but in an armed conflict is easier to trace the source of violence and
find the pattern of its behavior which is in the focus of this dissertation. These two historical
frames I have chosen because of the change in warfare. As the world entered into nuclear era
warfare changed, and with the First Gulf War warfare changed once again. It entered into space of
US political domination, geospatial revolution and cyberspace. In order to analyze strategic
behavior of NATO alliance we need to see the most relevant examples and as close as possible to
this matter. So an example of a war which a western actor fought during or before mentioned
periods could be applied in terms of cultural similarities, as they take much longer to be changed
but it would not be appropriate in other terms, such political, social and technologic changes. If
we would compare two wars, lets say Napoleonic era and French operations in War on Terror
(2001-ongoing) strategic behavior and the culture of war-making would be very different.
Surprisingly if we would compare modern wars with wars waged by ancient Greeks and later

Miller D., The Cold War: A Military History, St. Martins Press, 1998, p. 2.
Gaddis J., The Cold War, Penguin Books, 2005, pp. 16, 43.
5
Leffler M., Painter D. (eds.), Origins of the Cold War: An International History, Routledge, 1994, p. 335.
3
4

15

Byzantium, we would see many common features. But it is not possible to effectively use
comparative analysis on events which happened so long from one another. 6 Results cannot be
accurate if we were to examine the wrong matter, old understandings of warfare simply no longer
apply. Therefore I analyze behavior of major NATO actors during and after the Cold War.
Both first and second group of case studies I selected according to the following conditions:

War in which a significant actor was directly involved with its armed forces engaged
substantially. In this context significant means that it is to be a state actor which has the
military and political power significant enough to be placed among the Worlds strongest
powers. In the period of Cold War these great powers7 were USA, UK, France, Soviet
Union and PRC (after 1971). In the era of modern warfare, since 1991, great powers are
considered to be USA, UK, France, Russia, China, Japan and India. 8 Word substantially is
referred not so much to the numbers of the troops involved but to the overall commitment
of the actor to force his will on the enemy.

Liddell Hart for example was comparing ancient Greek warfare and indirect approach. See in Hart L. B., The
Strategy of Indirect Approach: 1st edition, Faber and Faber Ltd., 1941.
7
World power, major power or great power is defined as a nation, organization, or institution so powerful that it is
capable of influencing or changing the course of world events. See world power, Dictionary.com, Random House
Inc. Link: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/world power (20/12/14).
J. Mearsheimer based his definition of power on material capabilities, specifically the sum of military and latent
power. Not equivalent to outcomes of conflict because tautological, and non-material factors often influence
outcome. He differentiated military power and latent power, the latent power being defined as the states ability to
translate assets of population and wealth into military power. See in Mearsheimer J. J., The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics, W. W. Norton & Company, 2003.
8
Some academics such as Zbigniew Brzezinski regard India as a major or great power and up to an extent I support
this view. See Brzezinski Z., Strategic Vision: America & the Crisis of Global Power, Basic Books: Perseus group
books, 2013, pp. 43-45.
I would also suggest Germany to be on this list but its military component is too closely connected to the ones of
USA and France. Israel is almost never included on the lists of great powers, only regional ones but I see it as a great
power capable of effectively projecting its power in every corner of the globe. However Israel is focused primarily
on its regional security.
B. Buzan and O. Wver have suggested the definition of Bull and Watson that modern great powers are those
states which have the capabilities to play a major role in international politics with respect to security related issues.
In this understanding modern great powers are USA, Russia, Germany, Britain, France, China and Japan. They also
point out another definition from Lake which states that great powers possess global military reach, they have the
ability to project force around the globe, and as a result, they can intervene in regional security complex whenever it
suits their interest. Furthermore they discuss the problematics of regional bipolarity and what differentiates a great
power from simply a regional power (not necessarily major powers). Regional powers are the ones which if
undisturbed have the potential to become great powers. Status of India to be a great power is being checked by
bipolar environment in which their main threat is a regional power of Pakistan. Buzan B., Wver O., Regions and
Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 33-56.

16

War in which one of the combatants was a western actor in the sense that its culture is
predominantly western. Meaning that they belong to the same political and ideological
hemisphere. Since the end of WWII there was no war between western actors9 so all of the
case studies in both groups, are the ones in which a western actor was fighting a culturally
different enemy.

War in which the western actors military involvement was fought outside his home
territory and was perceived as some form of aggression.

This narrows down the choice within wars of USA, UK, France or NATO as a whole since 1945
and 1991.And even though there are differences and sometimes tensions between these allies
they continue to share common interests10, culture and distinctive war-making features. NATO
consists of 28 member countries, but only USA, UK and France are world powers, so the influence
of any of them is dominant in NATO decision making. It is the purpose of our dissertation to
discover the pattern of their strategic thinking because this is the way NATO is thinking too.
First group are: First Indochina War (1946-1954), Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), Korean War
(1950-1953), Mau Mau Uprising (1952-1960), Algerian War (1954-1962), Vietnam War (19551975), Suez Crisis (1956), Bizerte crisis (1961), Portuguese Colonial War (1961-1974),
Multinational Force in Lebanon (1982-1984) and United States invasion of Panama (1989-1990).
Second group are: First Gulf War (1990-1991), War in Somalia (1992-1993), NATO operations
in Bosnian War (1993-1995), NATO operations in Kosovo War (1999), NATO War in

Exception are the three Cod Wars (1958, 1972-1973 and 1975-1976) between UK and Iceland, but there was few
casualties and it was finally politically resolved. See in Welch A., The Royal Navy in the Cod Wars: Britain and
Iceland in Confllict, Maritime Books, 2006.
This behavior some authors like B. Russet could see as a part of democratic peace theory which states that
democracies are hesitant to engage in armed conflict with other identified democracies. Iceland and UK did not fight
a war with the desire to inflict casualties. On the other hand British war with Argentina was fierce and it too was a
war of democracies. See Russet, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World, Princeton
University Press, 1994, pp. 12-14.
I believe that this phenomenon has not so much to do with political systems as with culture. Both Yugoslavia
(Republics of Serbia and Montenegro, Autonomus regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo) in 1991 and Slovenia, Croatia
and Bosnia were all governed by elected democracies representing the wills of its people. Milosevic was elected two
times and was far from dictator. Yet the wars were particularly brutal. See in LeBor A., Milosevic: A Biography,
Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012. A more realistic approach would suggest that wars between Britain and Iceland and
Britain and Argentina were different in brutality also because the stakes were not the same different. Also Serbian
aggression in Slovenia was short and less brutal as Slovenia was of less interest than was Croatia. Finally Bosnia
was the most brutal because Serbs saw it as their national space and Muslims as their archenemy.
10
Up to a point, but not against each other.

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Afghanistan (2001-2014), Coalition of the willing invasion of Iraq (2003) and Iraq War (20032011-ongoing), NATO operations in Libyan Civil War (2011) and French intervention in Northern
Mali conflict (2013-2014).
Among these case studies there is one exception and this is the Portuguese Colonial War. Reason
why is that it was a war in which Portugal fought a culturally different enemy in accordance with
its own western culture. This is to show that a smaller western actor followed the same strategic
pattern of behavior as were the more significant ones. Similar to this example were the ones of the
Dutch which fought to maintain its colonial empire against the Indonesian National Revolution
(1945-1949), or the South African Border War against Angola, Cuba and Nambia (1966-1989).11
Also from the list it is excluded Falklands War (1982) which is historically important and included
Bizerte crisis which is much less known or significant. This is done consciously for the reason that
war for the Falklands was fought primarily for political reasons and prestige by both sides.
Argentinian military junta to divert attention from its economic problems and British conservative
party to restore national pride and confirm its status as one of the big world powers. Historically it
was significant, however strategically speaking the gain was not measurable in the frame of
conventional resources rather in terms of gained political prestige for United Kingdom. But even
as such it can be viewed as classic western strategic behavior which fights wars for profit. 12 On
the other hand, Bizerte Crisis was a brief incident which showed that France choose to retreat from
a conflict in which the potential loss was bigger than potential gain. But retreat in such a way to
confirm its military power over the enemy. In the era of modern warfare which starts with the
forming of an unprecedented Coalition of nations to liberate Kuwait from Baathists Iraq in 1991
there could be included two smaller exceptions. Israel and Croatia are smaller western actors
which have independently and successfully fought against culturally different enemies in a costeffective way. But in their case the stake was/is their own survival as independent political entities.
As such, both of these countries have followed the same western logic of strategy, but they are not

11

These wars are not included in the examples, for the purpose of the dissertation it is enough to have one
exceptional case study.
12
On the causes of Falkland War see in Anderson D., The Falklands War 1982, Osprey Publishing, 2014.
However recently evidence suggest that perhaps it was more than just prestige for what UK was fighting for
Falklands. Big reserves of oil and natural gas have been found there. Stanley J. B., Oil and gas in the Falklands:
Treasure islands?, The Economist, 28 February 2014.

18

discussed in detail in this context.13 Because in all of the case studies14 Western actors were
perceived as aggressors. This is an important difference as I am observing strategic behavior in the
context of human losses and related public opinion. Both Israel and Croatia have fought defensive
wars and for this reason their public opinion was more supportive and ready to accept losses.
For any historical or contemporary example I use in this dissertation it is rarely explicitly stated
anywhere, which strategy and which kind of strategy is it. To place the case studies in their
belonging category I first determine to which, if any, known strategic concept they belong to. If
they are not within the frame of any known strategic concept, then I place them to a new category
according to this strategys specific features. Second, I observe the most important variable, which
influenced the creation of the specific strategy in that case study. Finally, we see a pattern of
behavior which is repeated in all of the first group case studies.
All of the wars which were made by great western powers since the end of WWII and perceived
as aggression were in fact defensive moves. Strategy is paradoxical and we have to observe these
wars in the context of the actual but cold conflict between East and West. First the Soviet Union
and Communist expansion and since its dissolution modern Russia and its natural resources, and
China and its growth. West, which has neither the mass of people nor the resources, naturally feels
its power on the decline. For this reason every aggressive move its prominent members make can
only be seen as to maintain the prestige and defend its influence on the highest strategic levels. In
the last five centuries we have witnessed undisputed rise of the western civilization, but recently

13

In general Croatia is included as example on several places in this dissertation for couple of reasons. First as I am
Croatian and I have personal memories of the war. Second I was also able to make personal inquiry with some of its
actual decision makers and participants. Also this war was against not one but two culturally different enemies,
Bosnian Muslim (CroatBosniak War in Central Bosnia 1992-1994) and Serbian Orthodox. What is more significant
was that it was a war against a very clever enemy which during the entire period of the Cold War was at least a
second rate actor whose military and diplomatic segments were regarded with considerable prestige by both blocs.
In both Croatian War of Independence and in Bosnian War level of skill employed in destruction was high. This was
a modern war between actors employing modern techniques in every aspect. Furthermore the scale of barbarism
employed clearly demonstrates that cultural aspects continue to be a dominant factor in strategy making regardless
of technologic development. On the contrary, technology merely becomes a new tool of savagery. Finally Croatian
military has evolved into a competent fighting force which in 1995 was capable of the most complex military
operations. For all of these reasons I find Croatian military history not only interesting enough but also relevant to
be mentioned in this dissertation.
14
Except in First Gulf War to some extent because it can be argued that Coalition forces were perceived as liberators
of Kuwait.

19

this role has been challenged. 15 It is long known that it is hard for one to get on the top but even
harder to remain there.

IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM

The pattern of behavior which repeatedly and crucially influenced NATO alliances decisions is
dominated by overall strategic culture of its prominent members. My hypothesis is offering an
understanding of this pattern of behavior.16 The alliance is made-up of many different nations, and
each of them has its own views on national security. Their military expenditure and national
defense strategies are often not devised in cost effective way. With careful planning a nation can
save itself a lot of resources which could then be invested into other sectors, such as strengthening
the economy.
Modern politicians have neither the time nor the training to effectively answer questions of
national security. On the other hand military personnel which is subject to political authority in
Western societies, does not have adequate knowledge or training to answer the questions of
politics. 17 Both politics and modern war making have become so complicated that it is simply too
difficult to find experts in both fields. In modern societies sectors of business, politics and military
are closely intertwined, but people from each of them have a tendency to view matters only from
their own perspective. Effective strategic decisioning combines political, military, economic,
technological, cultural and social aspects to make accurate planning crucial for nations fate. And
all of these aspects are subject to constant and rapid change. What is not a changeable factor is the
nature of strategy the nature of war the nature of humans. Precisely for this reason I present a
variable that is crucial for any future action of USA, UK and France Western alliance. Other
NATO allies in order to effectively respond to their next joint action should understand how they
behave. This is a crucial factor if they want to maximize their response within a cost effective
frame.

15

See in Ferguson N., West and the Rest, Penguin Books, 2012.
And with this understanding interested decision makers from NATO countries such as for example Poland or
Croatia, could then know in which direction the alliance is likely to go and how can they participate in it.
17
See in Cimbala S. J., Civil-Military Relations in Perspective: Strategy, Structure and Policy, Ashgate Publishing,
2013.
16

20

For example Poland is increasing its investments in the military by 7% in 2013, and plans to spend
43 billion US dollars within the next decade for its armed forces. 18 To compare with it Netherlands
from which it is roughly three times bigger in population and seven times in surface, Poland still
spends approximately the same around 9 billion US dollars a year. Saudi Arabia spends every
year 57 billion $ on military which is more than Poland plans to spend within the next decade. In
2012 Poland spent 2% of its GDP and Saudi Arabia 9%.19 So why doesnt Poland spend the same
as for example Saudi Arabia? From it Poland is smaller in surface but bigger in population so if
we were to follow this logic Saudis should spend less or the same. But it is not so for the obvious
reason strategy follows a different pattern than logic, a question which I later elaborate in detail.
For now let us just say that The Netherlands, Poland and Saudi Arabia all exist within the same
hemisphere and are all one way or another allied with USA, but each of them has different security
issues and economic potential to meet it. Different strategies.
In order to understand this processes and how much should a country invest in its military an
answer cannot be given from the political, business, military or cultural sector. It cannot be given
by the angry mob protesting on the streets. Because each of these groups has its own interests and
specific way of thinking regardless of the fact that they all whish the very best for the success of
its country. Questions such as How big should armed forces be?, Which kind of forces should
we give priority to? and How should these be equipped and organized? Decision makers
political leaders, can answer these difficult questions only from a strategic point of view. And to
make wise strategic decisions one must have two crucial things:
-

Up to date intelligence data

Understanding of the pattern of behavior

Information is the job of intelligence branch of military which every country has, or should have.
And after a certain amount of time passed from an event, this data becomes available for research
purposes. Researchers than can analyze what has happened from various points of view and try to
make assessments for the future. And here we come to the next crucial factor, how can anything
be predicted if one doesnt know the nature of the subject? Because unlike sciences that research
Cienski J., Poland set for biggest-ever increase in military spending, Financial Times, 19 May 2013.
SIPRI database of military expenditures. Link: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database
(7/12/13).
18
19

21

inanimate, we here are dealing with an object that is both reacting and changeable. An individual,
organized group of individuals, countries and groups of countries universally have something in
common. To survive they must change adapt, and at the same time their nature remains
unchanged. Both factors are natural and great historic figures which have understood this in-depth
have been able to outsmart their enemies.
With this study I try to offer an explanation of a pattern of behavior based on recent historical
examples. Since its creation, NATO alliance has followed a certain pattern of behavior which
crucially influenced its actions. With this study I find and explain this pattern of behavior. Valuable
publications have been made by various authors on the subject of the future of NATO alliance. 20
The key questions which was in the focus of these was how the NATO itself will be shaped
which form will it take? I on the other hand say that NATO will certainly continue to exist, and
am providing with an answer how it will behave?
One of the main problems in present day NATO is a threat from within. Economic conditions on
both sides of the Atlantic will likely force NATO to make some tough choices. NATOs smart
defense initiative seeks to improve alliance efficiencies by encouraging members to cooperate in
developing and maintaining military resources. For a military alliance like NATO which is
composed of many countries, defense spending without consultation between them leads to the
fielding of incompatible equipment, non-economic production, and military forces that cant
function together.21 Whether NATO is able to adapt to new security challenges, many of them
unconventional is a central question for its future. NATOs current Strategic Concept, adopted in
Lisbon in 2010, provides a vision for confronting this future by addressing problems such as
cybersecurity, weapons proliferation, terrorism, and missile defense. Member states agreed in
Lisbon to integrate existing ballistic missile defense capabilities in order to defend U.S. and
European populations against attacks from states like Iran. 22 Recent NATO missions exposed
significant problems in allied military capabilities. Demands from some members for faster
transition away from combat operations in Afghanistan and the fact that no more than 14 of 28

For example Sloan S. R., NATOs Future: Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain, Diane publishing, 1985;
Duignan P., NATO: Its Past, Present, Future, Hoover Press, 2000 or Goldgeier J. M., The Future of NATO, Council
on Foreign Relations, 2010.
21
Haddick R., This Week at War: What Is NATO Good For? The U.S. pivot to Asia could give the military alliance
a chance to find a new identity, Foreign Policy, 3 February 2012.
22
Masters J., The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Council on Foreign relations, 17 May 2012.
20

22

allies participated in the Libya operation have also encouraged many observers to question
NATOSs solidarity and to express doubts about its appetite for future.23 In his final policy speech
as U.S. defense secretary in June 2011, Robert Gates criticized the weak involvement of some
NATO members, saying that:
Many of those allies sitting on the sidelines do so not because they do not want to participate,
but simply because they cant. The military capabilities simply arent there. He also reiterated
his fears of a two-tiered alliance, where some members specialize in soft humanitarian
missions and others in hard combat roles. This is no longer a hypothetical worry, we are there
today. And it is unacceptable.24

LIMITATIONS WITHIN THE RESEARCH

My principal objective is to make closer to the reader the way of thinking between different levels
of strategy. To explain the nature of war and nature of strategy. Science can only make accurate
conclusions based on the solid facts. But because strategy always works in secret, only its results
are visible. And most often not right away. This is why it is difficult to understand strategy and to
put seemingly unconnected things into the right context. The solid evidences are hidden in the
logic of strategy itself, but to accurately interpret the facts which are known one must understand
the nature of strategy. Otherwise the results will be illogical and will not make any sense. They
will be unscientific. Furthermore, strategy moves very fast so by the time a researcher finds all the
needed facts and connects them the situation has already changed and the results have already
became outdated. By the time this dissertation is published some of the data presented here will
already be obsolete. Modern warfare is changing so rapidly that was true yesterday, is probably
being doubted today, only to be outdated tomorrow. However what is there to stay as the result of
this research, is the clear pattern of behavior of the object. The nature of the matter which we study
is not going to change and based on this nature we can make predictions about its future conduct.
Like this all the data which will be obsolete could be replaced with new ones and still fit to confirm
the hypothesis.
Belkin P., CRS: NATOs Chicago Summit, Council on Foreign relations, 14 May 2012.
US Department of Defense, Transcript of Secretary of Defense Robert Gatess speech on the future of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, 10 June 2011. Link: http://nato.usmission.gov/mission/speeches/gates_qa_sda.html
23
24

23

As there is no overarching theory of strategy, the one which would provide with exact definitions
and norms I have made some definitions myself. These are by no means intended to be dogmas
but simply to serve the purpose of this dissertation. My hope is that these definitions and
classifications made here will be a contribution in development of theory of strategy. However
during the whole research I have consulted with extensive literature of which the most influential
authors have been repeatedly mentioned in the text. Their views on the matter have had a
considerable influence on my own classifications and theories.
Also an important limitation of which I am aware is the social segment of every conflict. People
are not machines and do not behave in this way. Many actions throughout history have in fact
happened as a result of an emotional response of the actors. These kind of actions could be
explained by various demographic and economic influences. But what is undeniable is that
emotional response of any group of people is very difficult to predict or control. Indeed some
things happen by hazard, but when it comes to higher levels of strategy masses of people are in
fact always attempted to be controlled. Sometimes with success and sometimes without. I see this
process as the one between different conflicting strategies. One which tries to control the public in
one direction, and the other which tries in the other. Because strategy is aware of the specific nature
of human psychology in mass and employs a set of complex techniques to influence it. Since public
opinion has always been important, and in modern times has even became the crucial factor on
which nations act, both totalitarian and democratic systems alike invest great resources to keep
masses acting according to demands of strategy. Limitation to this research is that these processes
are difficult to accurately study or find solid evidence to support any kind of claims. As I state
before, proof is often within the nature of strategy itself. Evidence which we can see is the
manifested result of any public action. Next what we need to discover (and it is sometimes almost
impossible) is which actor has profited from this action in the long run. Because there will be the
possible source of strategy which has influenced the action.

STATE OF ART
Some of the topics which are related with this dissertation are already well-researched by other
authors. For example: strategy, modern warfare, anthropology of war, alliances, military history,
NATO alliance and so on. I will list some useful works also used in this study for further reading.
24

This is of course not a complete list, some relevant books and authors are not included here but
were used for this dissertation. However these works can be found in references and bibliography.
To start with, an in-depth analysis of the NATO alliance can be found with the following authors.
Sloan in NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain
Challenged25 offers a discussion on the relationship between North Atlantic and European parts of
the NATO alliance. In this dissertation I too raise the question whether in the future we will see a
development of European armed forces independent of NATO. Collins in NATO: A Guide to the
Issues26 covers the organization from its founding in 1949 and examines the changes which took
place within the NATO. He explores some key features of NATO which have remained constant
such as decision making by consensus and participation by capabilities. Deni in Alliance
Management and Maintenance27 offers a perspective on alliance management and maintenance.
He discusses how NATO will fight in the future and is its structural organization sufficient for
providing security to its members. Walt in The Origins of Alliance28 asks the question how
alliances are made? His book first published in 1987 is still the most influential study on alliance
formation. His balance of threat theory expands the view of balance of threat theory, offering an
explanation that state also form alliances to balance threats. Walt also discusses the role of
ideology, foreign aid and transnational penetration in formation of alliances.
Publications on strategy which have influenced my thoughts the most are from Edward Luttwak.
In his books Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace; The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy;
The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire and The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From
the First Century A.D. to the Third29 Luttwak establishes himself as probably the most prominent
author on strategy matters in the world of today. He reveals the specific logic of strategy level by
level, from grand strategy to tactics. He shows that in conflict and strategy the only constant is its
paradoxical nature. Criticism of Luttwak include his seeming overconfidence and occasional lack

25

Sloan S. R., NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged,
Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.
26
Collins B. J., NATO: A Guide to the Issues, ABC-CLIO, 2011.
27
Deni J. R., Alliance Management and Maintenance: Restructuring NATO for the 21st Century, Ashgate
Publishing, 2013.
28
Walt S. M., The Origins of Alliance, Cornell University Press, 2013.
29
Luttwak E., Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Harvard University Press, 2001; The Rise of China vs. the
Logic of Strategy, Harvard University Press, 2012; The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, Harvard University
Press, 2009; The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third, JHU Press, 1979.

25

of solid sources however this author, unlike the most, is a field operative who not only writes
about strategy but also actively participated in it. Therefore his thoughts reveal a specific mode of
thinking which a strategist has.
Handel in War, Strategy and Intelligence30 teaches us among other things, that no matter how
much it would be convenient to have an overarching theory of strategy it is almost an impossible
task due to the fact that modern war has become so immensely complicated. However his
classifications and observations I also use as guidelines for my own theories presented in this
dissertation. I support his views on strategy as a matter which cannot be entirely put into a
theoretical box. The matter is simple too complicated to be classified and then studied in a purely
scientific way. For this reason a quote from Rebecca West is included in the beginning of his study:
Before a war military science seems a real science, like astronomy; but after a war it seems more
like astrology.31
French general Andre Beaufre in Introduction la stratgie32 has proven to be one of the most
advanced strategic thinkers of the 20th century. Ironically, he also had to be on the loser side of the
French wars in that same period. But despite and perhaps of this, his studies on strategy are
probably the most valuable written work made by a military man. Since 1960s his study remains
an important material for counterinsurgency combat and deep understanding of war in the context
of nuclear armament.
Other valuable publications on strategy, war and warfare which I have used for this dissertation
include Gray, Modern Strategy; Jordan (ed.), Understanding Modern Warfare; Lonsdale,
Understanding Contemporary Strategy; Brodie, Strategy as a science and Baylis, Strategy in the
Contemporary World33 These authors have explained theoretical aspects of strategy and war
continuing on the work of Brodie who called for strategy to be studied as a science. However they
have also pointed out that because of its immense complicity war and strategy cannot possibly be
studied purely as science within the existing scientific apparatus. Their definitions and conclusions

30

Handel M. I., War, Strategy and Intelligence, Routledge, 2012.

Irish critic, journalist, & novelist (1892-1983).
32
Beaufre A., Introduction la stratgie, Pluriel, 2012.
33
Gray C. S., Modern Strategy, Oxford University press, 1999; Jordan D., Kiras J. D. (eds.), Understanding Modern
Warfare, 2008; Lonsdale D. J., Kane T. M., Understanding Contemporary Strategy, Routledge, 2012; Brodie B.,
Strategy as a science, World Politics, Vol. 1: No. 4, Cambridge University Press, July 1949, pp. 467-488; Baylis
J. (ed.), Strategy in the Contemporary World, Oxford University Press, 2013.
31

26

I discuss in this dissertation and offer my own view of matters in relation to current theoretical
development. To develop these I have started with the classics of strategy and war from antiquity
which are still actual today such as Sun Tzu, Art of war; Carl von Clausewitz, On War and
Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War. These classics have set a foundations for my study as they
are historys most important works which explain the nature of war and nature of humans. Some
of their attitudes and conclusions are of course outdated, but what is useful for us today was their
far seeing wisdom of the nature of humans in general. And these philosophers from the past have
shaped modern strategy thinking in all of its aspects.
From a historians point of view I have consulted with the works of two prominent British military
historians. My education is also in history and therefore I have a tendency to observe any process
which is currently taking place in relation with its historical background. Black in Why Wars
Happen and Keegan in A History of Warfare34 analyze the question of war. Black examines the
causes of war within the three main types of war between cultures, within cultures, and civil war.
Keegan too examines conflict of diverse societies and cultures and offers an in-depth analysis of
warfare throughout history. He uses many various examples to follow different ways of making
war. However, both of them fails to provide with a satisfactory answer to the question of why
different cultures fight wars differently and why are wars being fought? In this dissertation I offer
an explanation of causes of war and nature of war to lie within the strategic culture of every
society.35
Many of the conclusions of this research I have made based on observing western warfare in
history. This could be an advantage which a historian has compared with a researches coming from
the domain of political sciences. On the other hand a disadvantage is that a historian does not have
an in-depth understanding of relations within the present. A combination of these backgrounds is
probably the most efficient way to understanding strategy. Some of the studies which I would point
out to be used in study of western warfare are from Parker, The Cambridge Illustrated History of
Warfare: The Triumph of the West; Connaughton, The Changing Face of Conflict, from the

34

Black J., Why Wars Happen, Reaktion books, 2005; Keegan J., A History of Warfare, Hutchinson, 1993.
Different cultures fight wars differently because of their overall strategic culture. See more detailed in my paper:
Cota M., Cultural differences in war-making in Piotr Mickiewicz (ed.) Rocznik Bezpieczestwa
Midzynarodowego, Dolnoslaska Szkola Wyzsza Wroclaw, Vol 8: No 2, 2014.
35

27

Falklands to Afghanistan and Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change
and Military Conflict from 1500 to 200036
Cambridge History of Warfare provides a unique account of western warfare from antiquity to
today. The book discusses the development of ground combat, sea and air; weapons and
technology; strategy and defense; discipline and intelligence; mercenaries and standing armies;
mobile warfare, guerilla and nuclear weapons. It examines some key events in the history of
western warfare and analyzes the question of who pays for war and how the returns of this
investment can be measured. This book raises the question which I expand later in the dissertation,
the one of strategic loss and gain, and cost-effectiveness which is in the core of western warfare.
Connaughton in A Brief History of Modern Warfare examines modern wars and presents the
tremendous change which took place in just a few decades. Paul Kennedy in The Rise and Fall of
the Great Powers made a colossal study about global powers in the five centuries of postRenaissance period. He makes case studies of great Empires which rose and fell as a consequence
of their overexpansion or inner breakdown. Kennedys work offers an in-depth understanding of
dynamics of great powers but it also lacks the widening of the causes for their fall because it puts
too much stress on economic aspects. His study is valuable in the sense that it explains how great
powers behave but strategy is a much more complex matter which cannot be explained simply by
economy. Therefore I find his book useful for this study, but with awareness that its conclusions
can be applied primarily in the case of United States of America. I believe that strategic culture is
the dominant factor in strategic decisioning and behavior. In the case of US, its strategic culture is
dominated by the relation between economy and war and therefore Kennedys study can be
applied. However this notion is not universal.
Now what is new in this dissertation is that for the first time I attempt not only to analyze NATO
alliances behavior in certain historical episodes, but to find a pattern of behavior according to
which it will be possible to predict its future conduct. Also I give answers to a question which has
not yet been given answer in a structured, universal form which it could then be applied on other
cases as well. Why do different societies and organizations fight wars differently? The dominant

36

Parker G. (ed.), The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West, Cambridge University
Press, 2008; Connaughton R., The Changing Face of Conflict, from the Falklands to Afghanistan, Constable &
Robinson, 2013; Kennedy P., The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from
1500 to 2000, Vintage Books-Random House publishing, 1989.

28

feature of my research which emerged spontaneously is the cultural segment. I explore the link
between overall strategic culture of the NATO alliance and its behavior.
***

All the views expressed here unless explicitly stated and referenced are mine. Also any mistake
which could have taken place during the research or writing process is mine too. I have paid great
attention not to misuse anybodys idea and work. If any mistake has happened during this process
it has been so entirely by accident. I would like to use this opportunity to express my deepest
gratitude to the people who have significantly contributed to this PhD project.
To my parents Anita and Paul who encouraged me to take this journey.
To Dr. Andrzej Dybczyski who gave a clear direction in which the research should go.
To Dr. ukasz Fijakowski for his valuable advices and contributions.
To Prof. dr hab. Ebieta Stadtmuller for her professionalism and support when I needed it the most.
To my wife Marion who carried both myself and this project on her shoulders when it seemed that
it could not possibly go any further.

29

PART I: WAR-MAKING IN NATOS STRATEGIC CULTURE

Chapter 1: Strategy and War
No battle plan survives contact with the enemy.
Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (1800-1891)
1. What is strategy?
To answer this simple question I must give an extensive and progressive introduction to the
concept. This is because even though many of us encounter the word on a daily basis, if one would
set out to ask for a definition the answers would be more than different. Therefore to explain this
complex matter I start with a simple and atypical example.

1.1. Introduction to strategic thinking

In the world of Disneys animated movie Lion King we see an environment dominated by lions.
Power is concentrated in institution of a lion king, named Mustafa which rules and protects this
environment. Both military and political powers are concentrated in his person. All other animals
respect this as a natural order of things and on the beginning of the movie, we can see them joining
to greet the birth of his son Simba confirming the legitimacy of him as a successor. However
Mustafas brother, Scar is the second in line for the throne and is set to overtake it from Mustafa.
It is obvious that Mustafas power as the king is consolidated among his subjects, as he is both
stronger and more respected than Scar. So how does Scar becomes king instead of Mustafa when
it is seemingly impossible?
Answer is strategy. Scar devises and executes a strategic plan. His strategic objective is to become
king. For this purpose he first allies himself with hyenas. Then preforms strategic concept called
deception to lure Mustafa into a pre-set death trap, using an incentive of Simba being in mortal
danger. Mustafa is killed, Simba exiled, and other lionesses have little choice but to submit to the
new rule of Scar supported by hyenas.
This childrens movie teaches us how Scar from initially being a weaker actor in every aspect
achieved his strategic objective of becoming a king, by using a cunning strategy. But it also teaches
30

us how his strategy failed when adult Simba reappeared stronger and more motivated to claim his
power. Scars alliance with hyenas and rule over its subjects were not politically and militarily
consolidated enough to withstand such an assault. 37
Intelligent beings use strategy in order to direct, project and manage their power in an environment.
Intellectual is used when the physical itself cannot achieve the desired objective. Scar could have
never been able to defeat Mustafa in a head on fight. But by using clever strategy he puts himself
in a position in which Mustafa is clinging on a rock and is especially vulnerable. Scar easily kills
him by pushing him down the cliff. And here we encounter another crucial element of strategy
its morality. Important is to notice that in strategy morality plays a crucial role not because it
diverts strategy in the parameters right and wrong, but because it enables strategy or
counterstrategy to take place based on the moral high ground. However this factor of morality
often is subjected to the demands of the instinctive nature. In my view, strategy in its crude,
essential form is basically an art of survival.
Apart from humans, other known intelligent life forms such as whales and dolphins use strategic
thinking to hunt for food. It even goes as far that some of them join up their strategies with the
humans. In Laguna, Brazil dolphins every year hunt fish together with the humans. Fishermen and
dolphins communicate and execute strategy from which both sides have mutual benefit. By using
appropriate methods (tactics) these two intelligent predators form an alliance, against which fish
doesnt stand a chance. As the fish approaches, the dolphins signal to the humans by rolling at the
surface, or slapping the water with their heads or tails. The nets are cast, and the fish is snared.
Dolphins chase the fish into shallow water where fishermen are organized and waiting to close the
net. Some of the fish manages to escape, but in breaking formation, it is an easy prey for the
dolphins. 38 Indeed dolphins and whales are one of the few life forms on the planet which uses
strategic thinking to achieve its objectives. This behavior has so far been recognized only by India
which in 2013 made a law to explicitly state that cetaceans are non-human persons, and as such
have fundamental rights. To be free; to live; to move freely; not to be captives; and for their culture

37

Hahn D., Lion King, Walt Disney Pictures, 1994.

This animated movie bases its story on Shakespeares Hamlet (written around 1600) and both represent culturally
significant works of art, each in its category.
38
Yong E., Dolphins that help humans to catch fish form tighter social networks, Discover magazine, 1 May
2012.

31

not to be disrupted.39 But when these fundamental rights of cetaceans are violated by other humans
which hunt them annually in places such as Faroe Islands, Denmark or Taji, Japan these
fishermen are also using strategy, but far superior than the one of the cetaceans. Certainly in this
conflict it is the dolphins who have the moral high ground, as the fishermen hunting them possess
superior technology, organization and strategic thought. Furthermore, dolphins being friendly
creatures as they are, do not pose a threat for humans which can easily obtain other sources of
food. But humans do hunt them, and since there is no effective counterstrategy by either cetaceans
or any other outside actor (such as other humans) fishermens strategy to hunt dolphins is
unopposed. But if one day, for example other humans in large numbers, would decide to stop
cetacean hunting out of moral reasons, then certainly this activity would come to an end. Because
for strategy itself morality is not important. As strategy does not recognize right from wrong it will
follow its behavioral pattern, regardless of its moral aspects as long as it is unopposed. And if a
counterstrategy eventually interacts with it, then it will either adapt to overcome it, or cease to
exist. This, as I see it is the natural law of strategy. 40
Because brute force is rarely the best course of action, when intelligent life forms are trying to
survive and utilize their strengths in the most efficient way, they start to use strategic thinking.
This process is known to humanity at least since the first days of writing. From those days have
reached us in written form, some attempts to define and structure this behavioral phenomenon.
Ancient Greeks used the word strategia, strategos which means leader, leadership and
generalship, and in Antiquity it stood for generals skill in military and political affairs. Strategos
is both a military and political leader of a city-state, province or a nation. 41 Close to this term are
stratagems, and they stand for a set of cleverly conceived tricks used in warfare to deceive and
outwit the enemy. 42 Stratagems are the equivalent of a ruse, meaning a deceptive move, a trick
used to fool someone. Derived from French ruse de guerre which stands for tricks used to deceive

Ketler A., India Declares Dolphins & Whales As Non-Human Persons, Collective Evolution, 17 September
2013.
40
To go back to my first example, Scars strategy would not by itself one day realize that he is not in the right, by
mendaciously pretending on the throne, and consequently gave up by itself. Only a more powerful counterstrategy
the one of Simba, is what caused Scars strategy to vanish. Morality will not do anything by itself, but it is an
important factor because moral high ground gives a jumping point for other strategies to take action.
41
Liddell H. G., Scott R., A Greek-English Lexicon, strategos, Tufts University project. Link:
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu (07/02/15).
42
Merriam-Webster Online: Dictionary and Thesaurus, stratagem. Link: http://www.merriam-webster.com/ (2013).
39

32

your enemy and exploit it to win a war. 43 In ancient world stratagems were much studied field
among nobility (prospective political and military leaders of the ancient world), for example the
ancient books: Thirty-six Stratagems from China or Stratagems written by Roman general
Frontinus. But strategy is much more than just employing tricks to outwit and defeat your enemy
during an armed conflict.
It took the rebirth of the global Western domination in the eve of industrial revolution for the
prominent strategic thinkers to emerge and start analyzing this vast, complex and crucial human
activity.

1.2. Evolution of strategic studies

The fathers of the modern western strategic thought are two German (Prussian) military thinkers
Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) and Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (1800-1891). The more
prominent one of them being Clausewitz and his epic work On War, first published in 1832. Each
of them has crucially influenced the development of modern strategic theory. After WWI and
especially after WWII, faced with practical problems which had to be solved by means other than
brute force, strategy more and more left the narrowness as something being studied primarily by
the military for the military. It became a very interesting matter for scholars from different fields
which have all attempted to define the matter (see table 1).
Table 1: Different views on strategy
Carl von Clausewitz

Strategy (is) the use of engagements for the object of war.

Helmuth von Moltke

Strategy is the practical adaptation of the means placed at a generals

disposal to the attainment of the object in War.

Liddell Hart

Strategy is the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill

the ends of policy.

Andr Beaufre

Lart de la dialectictique des volontes employant la force pour

rsoudre leur conflict.

43

Merriam-Webster Online dictionary, ruse.

33

Strategy is the art of the dialectic of force or, more precisely, the art
of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their
dispute.
Gregory D. Foster

Strategy is ultimately about effectively exercising power.

Joseph Caldwell

Strategy is a plan of action designed in order to achieve some end; a

Wylie

purpose together with a system of measures for its accomplishment.

Williamson Murray

Strategy is a process, a constant adaptation to the shifting conditions

and Mark Grimsley

and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, and

ambiguity dominate.

Robert Osgood

Strategy must now be understood as nothing less than the overall plan
for utilizing the capacity for armed coercion - in conjunction with
economic, diplomatic, and psychological instruments of power to
support foreign policy most effectively by overt, covert and tacit
means.

Colin S. Gray

Strategy is the application of military power to achieve political

objectives, theory and practice of the use, and threat of use, of
organized force for political purposes.

Merriam-Webster

Strategy is a method or a plan chosen to bring about a desired future,

dictionary

such as achievement of a goal or solution to a problem. It is the art of

planning and marshalling resources for their most efficient and
effective use. It includes combining and employing the political,
economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation (state), group
of nations (alliance) or any other military organization to afford the
maximum support to adopted policies in both peace and war. When in
war, strategy refers to the art of military command exercised to meet
the enemy in combat under advantageous conditions.

David. J. Lonsdale

I.

Strategy is the process that converts military power into

policy effect.

34

II.

The art of using military force against an intelligent foe(s)

towards the attainment of policy objectives.

Herv Coutau-Bgarie

La stratgie introduit laction de lintelligence.

Strategy introduces the action of intelligence.

Edward Luttwak

The application of method and ingenuity in use of both persuasion and

force.

Peter Paret

Strategy is the use of armed force to achieve the military objectives

and, by extension, the political purpose of the war.

Lawrence Freedman

Strategy is the creative element in any exercise of power. Strategies

and Srinath Raghavan

may be understood as falling under three broad categories along a

spectrum. A consensual strategy involves the adjustment of strategic
choices with others without the threat or use of force. By contrast, a
controlling strategy involves the use of force to restrict anothers
strategic choice, for example, by defending disputed territory against
any attempted seizure. A coercive strategy (or strategic coercion)
involves deliberate and purposive use of overt threats of force to
influence anothers strategic choices.

Field Marshal Alan

Strategy is to determine the aim, which should be political: to derive

Brooke

from that aim a series of military objectives to be achieved: to assess

these objectives as to military requirements they create, and the preconditions which the achievement of each is likely to necessitate: to
measure available and potential resources against the requirements
and to chart from this process a coherent pattern of priorities and a
rational course of action.

Royal Air Force

The object of strategy is to achieve and maintain freedom of action

whilst limiting that of the opponent with the purpose of gaining his
submission. Military strategy aims to create a desired pattern to events
where the ends, ways and means are brought into balance despite the
efforts of the opponent to disrupt that balance.

35

Villiam Kruger-

Strategy is a process which translates political vision into attainable

Klausen and Liselotte

objectives by applying available resources within a defined space for

Odgaard

action.

Sources: Baylis J., Strategy in the Contemporary World (4th edition), Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 5; Jordan D.,
Kiras J. D., Understanding Modern Warfare Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 23; Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary; Coutau-Bgarie H., Trait de stratgie, Economica, 1999, p. 54; Sadeh E. (ed.), Space Strategy in the
21st Century: Theory and Policy, Routledge, 2013, p. 17; Williams P. D. (ed.), Security Studies: An Introduction,
Routledge, 2008, p. 217; Peach S. W. (ed.), British Air Power Doctrine (3rd edition), United Kingdom Ministry of
Defense publication, 1999, p. 12; Odgaard L. (ed.), Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World, Palgrave
Macmillan, 2014, p. 13.

Since the field of strategy is so vast and it significantly touches so many different areas of scientific
research it is no wonder that contribution to the literature has been given by scholars from different
disciplines, such as mathematics (Albert Wohlstetter), history (Henry Kissinger), political science
(Bernard Brodie) and physics (Herman Kahn). 44 The question arose: How to study the matter?
Because scholars inevitably fall into the trap to observe things from their angle of research and the
problems still persists there is no overarching theoretical frame for strategy, no colossal academic
work which could encompass strategy and all its complexities.
As Lonsdale noticed: Thankfully, at the same time the challenge of strategy has intensified,
intellectual enquiry has also increased. It took the invention of nuclear weapons, and in particular
the very real threat of global Armageddon, for man finally to take up the mantle handed down by
Sun Tzu in a more systematic fashion. The novelty of nuclear weapons, allied to their
destructiveness, meant that the military was no better placed than anyone else to comprehend the
new epoch. Thus, civilian academics from a wide range of disciplines turned their thoughts to the
challenges of modern strategy. And, hence, strategic studies began to develop, drawing inspiration
and influence from various fields, including economics, history, anthropology and philosophy.45

44

Herman Kahn is best known for his book on thermonuclear war and his work with the RAND Corporation. Since
the 1950s US government turned to non-military personnel for strategic advice. RAND research has advised US
policy decisions on many issues such as the space race, nuclear arms confrontation with the Soviet Union, the
creation of the Great Society social welfare programs, the digital revolution, and national health care. Its ideas have
also contributed to creation of internet.
45
Lonsdale, Understanding Contemporary Strategy, p. 4.

36

After WWII, Brodie in his essay Strategy as Science46 has called for strategy to be studied
scientifically, and since then we can speak of modern strategy studying. However, research
studying of strategy has sometimes went too far in conceptualizing it with economic theories and
models. For example Paul Kennedy in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, has created an
important work but put too much in focus the economic segment.47 Strategy simply cannot be
studied in this way, as a semi-mathematical form and without deep knowledge of history, laws of
physics and political sense. 48 Therefore most of the modern authors on strategy are very much
aware of all the different components of strategy and the complex unpredictability of its realm.
But because authors on strategy essentially deal with war and destruction their works have often
been subjected to criticism by the rest of scientific community. Strategy is sometimes viewed as a
form of pseudo-science which cannot be accurate in its observations. Strategists view of the world
is conflict-oriented and strategic authors have a tendency to ignore the more co-operative, peaceful
aspects of world politics. Baylis suggested that for this reason critics of strategy claim that
strategists have a distorted and negative, rather than realistic, view of the way the world is. Some
strategists might be even fascinated by violence, and find a grim satisfaction in describing the
darker side of humanity. 49 In my opinion strategy is certainly not a discipline which unravels the
worst for the worst but quite the opposite, by studying violence and all its aspects strategy is in
fact the strongest force to make possible the dream of a better world. 50 For this reason I argue that
strategy should be included as University subject and studied in-depth. This is because strategy in
its essence is not destructive but creative it wants to live. However, due to the destructive
potential which such knowledge represents it should be approached with great care to whom is it

46

Brodie, pp. 467-488.

See more in Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.
48
However I agree with Gray in his observation that when studying strategy, experiences from history can also be a
trap. Historical experience and its interpretation belong to dimension of strategic culture: What has been
experienced and who has experienced it? See in Gray, Modern Strategy, p. 25.
49
Baylis, p. 12.
50
Colin Gray: The study of strategy in Universities may be defended on several different, yet complementary,
grounds. In strictly academic terms, the subject poses sufficient intellectual challenge as to merit inclusion in, or
even as, a course of study fully adequate to stretch mental resources. In, and of itself, that argument is sufficient to
justify the inclusion of strategic studies in University curricula, but one can, and should, proceed to argue that the
study of strategy is socially useful. Many views are defensible concerning the proper and appropriate duties of a
university. This author chooses a liberal, permissive perspective. He sees value in a field of study that seeks truth
and may have relevance to contemporary policy and, as a consequence, may contribute to the general well-being.
Taken from Baylis, p. 15.
47

37

made available to. This line of thinking goes against academic transparency but it is my belief that
in the world dominated by the power of information, some should indeed be carefully distributed.
As in 21st century warfare has become dominated by terms such as terrorism, irregular and nonstate actors, we have seen a development of security studies. Bailys offers an explanation to the
connection between security studies and strategy. In his view strategy is part of security studies,
and security studies is part of international relations, which itself is part of political science (see
diagram 1).
Diagram 1: Relationship between security studies and strategy

political
science

international
relations

security
studies

strategy

Source: Baylis, p. 14.

Security studies deal with a variety of questions and generally speaking it is more concerned with
peace than with violence. If we would see strategy as primarily a military (violence) orientated
discipline, than it would be just one part of security questions. However I would leave such a view
open to discussion, as strategy, on its highest levels and in its essence, is also about peace, not war.
The ultimate goal of strategy is victory, an environment of peace in which all the objectives are

38

secured and no other strategy is jeopardizing this security. In the words of strategic theorist Liddell
Hart the object of war is a better state of peace. 51
Since the second part of the 20th and the beginning of 21st century, strategy is more and more in
the interest of scientific community. Prominent researchers have started to publish groundbreaking
studies about strategy and their work has often found a practical application. After all, strategy is
a practical discipline and nowadays it is more studied by academic than by military personnel. One
of the reasons for this is the change in warfare which has taken place since the beginning of nuclear
era. Modern strategy has simply became too advanced to address only military questions.
Following the advice of Sun Tzu, great writer on strategy from ancient China: the art of war is
of great importance to the state, it is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin.
Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.52 Furthermore, as
Clausewitz teaches us, theory cannot offer a formula for success but can it can give the mind an
insight into the great mass of phenomena and of their relationship, then leaves it free to rise into
the higher realm of action. To put it simply like Lonsdale, theory enables us to ask the right
questions, it trains the mind.53 The goal of theory in any field is to improve our understanding
of reality, and our ability to act effectively.54 Without hesitation, I would agree with Brodies
statement that strategy is theory for action a how to do it study, a guide to accomplishing
objectives and attaining them effectively.55
Modern strategy has evolved significantly due to development of communication and technology.
Weapons of mass destruction, power of media and the complexities of modern economy, mean
that there is much more at stake than ever before in known history. There is a necessity to study
strategy and to develop strategic theory. However due to the nature of strategy and its relationship
with environment to be properly explained it requires a much more advanced scientific
apparatus than mere numbers and charts. I agree with the thoughts of Clausewitz, Lonsdale and
others when they qualify strategy mostly as an art. The fact that strategy is more and art than a

51

Baylis, p. 62.
Sun Tzu, Art of War: Chapter I.
53
Lonsdale D., Understanding Contemporary Strategy, p. 23.
54
Daniel Moran, taken from Jordan (ed.), Understanding Modern Warfare, p. 41.
55
Baylis, p. 5.
52

39

science doesnt mean that we cannot study it systematic fashion. Instead, theory of strategy is made
up of concepts and considerations rather than of fixed laws. 56
Strategy, being a product of imagination requires natural talent. 57 This is why some individuals
have been successful leaders even if they could not even read and write. On the other hand the
ones who have had both natural and theoretical background in strategic thought have been
remembered as the most successful commanders in history. In his book Alexander the Great:
Lessons in strategy (2007), Lonsdale makes the connection how theoretical education, received
from his father Phillip II and Aristotle (one of the first genuine scientists in history), in fact shaped
Alexanders strategic mastermind. Strategy cannot be thought, Alexander was naturally born for
it but theoretical background influenced his own strategic approach to real-time problems of his
days.
In my view strategy is a universal intellectual force which operates in the realm of intangible
as an art of planning and marshalling resources in order to achieve pre-set objectives of vital
importance.58 Ultimate goal of strategy is to ensure security of those objectives and in this process
only the consequences of strategy are visible, the intellectual current which drives them is hidden. 59
Strategy often operates in conflict but it is not about conflict, it is about achieving objectives.

1.3. Nature of strategy

One of the reasons why we can speak of antiquity and modern warfare in the same sentence, and
make connections between thousands of years and thousands of kilometers between people who
have nothing to do with each other is because of the essential nature of strategy. Strategy never
changes its nature and always follows the same pattern of behavior. This is why the greatest
writings on the matter are quite old but still actual: Art of War (Sun Tzu), and On War (Clausewitz).

56

Ibid, p. 63.
Strategy, the same as imagination, is natural to intelligent life forms as they are using strategy naturally because it
is often the only way to achieve essential life requirements of prosperity and security.
58
These are a set of desired long term objectives that are clearly set by organizations. What does one want? Strategic
objectives once achieved have the purpose to improve the positioning of a certain organization. For example,
objectives of a military organization could be to gain more economical resources, conquer territory, obtain
technology or pursue any other desired political objective. Once strategic objectives are defined, this organizations
planners devise strategy to determine the best course of action towards achieving these goals.
59
All of our definitions on strategy are different but we would all probably agree on the essential thought that
strategy is something invisible which is the force that directs the visible.
57

40

Nature of strategy did not change the same as nature of car production or a nature of a person has
not changed at all. If we were to look at all the car models since they first appeared a hundred years
ago it is obvious that they have changed the way the look, the way they are made and even the
material from which they are made of. But a car from 1913 and a car from 2013 are both still cars.
They both have all the elements that makes a car car. Wheels, body, chassis, engine, steering etc.
and they are both made to serve the same purpose transport the people from point A to B. The
famous Hollywood actor Harrison Ford has in the last 50 years of his acting career changed many
hairstyles, clothes and shoes according to fashion trends of every decade. In fact he set some of
those trends. But he is still an actor and his profession still has the same purpose. Humans during
their lifetime change every single cell in their body and yet they are still the same persons, of the
same nature.
People which lived millenniums ago had completely different set of beliefs and values than the
ones of today, they were different in so many things but they were still people. And people follow
the exact same nature of thought. Cyrus the Great, Richard Lionheart, Petar Berislavi, Napoleon
Bonaparte and David Petraeus were all different people, which lived in different times, waged war
in different environments and against different enemies but to be successful they all had to follow
the same pattern of thinking. And for this reason I base my research on the premise that nature of
strategy and nature war are not changeable variables.
If one organization seeks to achieve its objectives against another organization, the other will react
by trying to stop it or thwart it. For this reason strategy cannot entirely be a matter of calculations
or scientific approach it can use it only to calculate approximate probabilities of a possible
outcome. 60 Regardless of how much we would like to have it, there can never be a scientific
certainty in strategy. This is because, one of the primary conditions for any science is to have an
unchanged test environment, the one in which it could verify its results by using various
methodologies. But the environment in which strategy operates is constantly changing and it is
precisely this variability what makes it so complex and unpredictable. Clausewitz argued that
essential difference is that war is not an exercise of the will directed at inanimate matter, as is
the case with mechanical things. In the war the will is directed at an animate object that reacts.

60

Systems analysis, RAND Corporation. Link: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM1829-1.html

(28/3/13)

41

For this reason it must be obvious that the intellectual codification used in arts and sciences is
inappropriate to such an activity.61 Since Clausewitzs death, development of modern technology
has added a new dimension of uncertainty to war, focusing the contemporary scientific community
to develop an all-encompassing scientific theory more than ever.62
So strategy cannot be studied purely as a science but more as a phenomenon, a pattern in the stream
of decisions which repeats itself throughout history. Sometimes these plans and decisions are put
into reality and sometimes not. But because strategy is consistent of the conduct and consequences
of human relations in the context of actual or possible armed conflict, it is only to some minor
extent classified as a science and mostly as an art. Strategy can use statistical data to calculate
probabilities, but no more than this is possible in its realm, because every strategic situation is
different and specific. 63 In strategy there is always an element of uncertainty about the future it is
almost never a fixed plan, but more about a set of options and gaining; or being prepared to gain a
position of advantage over adversaries or best exploiting emerging possibilities. 64 As the former
US secretary of Defense and prominent modern strategist Donald Rumsfeld put it at one occasion:
Now what is the message there? The message is that there are no knowns. There are thing we
know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say there are things that we now know
we dont know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we dont know we dont
know. So when we do the best we can and we pull all this information together, and we then say
well thats basically what we see as the situation, that is really only the known knowns and the
known unknowns. And each year, we discover a few more of those unknown unknowns. It sounds
like a riddle. It isnt a riddle. It is a very serious, important matter.65
To predict anything in strategy is very difficult, perceive the situation from all sides in the
conflict.66 Successful strategic thinkers are the ones who can use the available data (information),

61

Clausewitz C., On War, Wilder Publications, 2008, p. 116.

Because strategy is a matter of will directed at animate object it is highly unpredictable.
62
Handel, p. 20.
63
Luttwak, Strategy: Logic of War and Peace, p. 90.
64
See definitions: strategy in Greiman V., Megaproject Management: Lessons on Risk and Project Management
from the Big Dig, John Wiley & Sons, 2013.
65
NATO HQ, Speeches, Press Conference by US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, 6 June 2002. Link:
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020606g.htm
66
Green K., Armstrong S., Role thinking: Standing in other peoples shoes to forecast decisions in conflicts,
International Journal of Forecasting, 2011.

42

alongside their natural talent to choose and devise the best course of action in every specific
situation. The only way to make predictions is by experts who know enough information about the
variables, pattern of behavior and natural talent to have that gut feeling about the outcome.
Sometimes they are wrong and sometimes they are almost right.
Like in the weather forecast, experts are using computer systems to interpret data and predict
weather. But as everybody knows the accuracy of forecast is decreased as it goes further into the
future. Will it rain tomorrow or not is never a certainty, as there are simply too many variables in
the equation. Weather forecasting is a science, but weather itself and its nature are not.
Furthermore, unlike the weather, strategy is dealing with an intelligent matter which will not only
change its course of action by interacting with other matter it will also change by itself. And
strategy is more about dealing what will happen in twenty years, then with what will happen next
week. As far as we know, there is no such technology as crystal balls to predict the future. It simply
cannot be predicted with certainty, especially in a conflict, the situation in which even the oldest
of values will be changed in order to survive. One can do everything possible to make accurate
assessment of the situation, but there will always be a few of those unknown unknowns. 67
Therefore strategy cannot be based entirely on principles but must always be flexible. Its results
cannot be accurately predicted as there are just too many variables for our present technology to
calculate. It can be studied but it cannot be learned and mastered simply by doing so, as it requires
natural talent and instinct.68 Strategy, this pattern in the stream of decisions on how to achieve

67

To further back this I use a seemingly bizarre example from history.

There is no doubt that Alexander the Great was one of historys most talented and most innovative and successful
military strategists. On one occasion in the Battle of Jaxartes (329 BC), on Syr Darya River in the area between
modern borders of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, his forces clashed with the Scythians.
Alexanders army crossed the river, while the enemy on the other side was firing projectiles on it and awaiting in
full strength. This is a situation of one of the most complex military maneuvers. And Alexander took victory there as
well. After successfully crossing, the Macedon decisively defeated steppe horsemen in their own terrain, making
Alexander the first and one of the few generals in history to do so. 67 But nobody could predict the events which took
place the day before the battle: Several silver shields came from the sky spitting fire around the rims and repeatedly
diving at Alexanders army, causing men, horses and elephants to panic and refuse to cross the river. These strange
craft returned to the sky from which they came. So an unknown technology from an unknown force with unknown
intentions influencing a battle in 329 BC!? Who could have expected for something like this to happen? But it did.
Alexander took a strategic decision based on all the known knowns and known unknowns, but crucial was the factor
of unknown unknowns. (See in Ashley J. R., The Macedonian Empire: the era of warfare under Philip II and
Alexander the Great, McFarland & Company, 2004, p. 304. for the battle, and Edwards F., Stranger than science, L.
Stuart, 1959, p. 198 for the silver shields).
68
In the words of great Anatole France: En art comme en amour, linstinct suffit.

43

strategic objectives, affects all known life forms whether they understand its logic or not. 69 Point
is that there is no logic to understand in a conventional way, as strategy is illogical. Science
demands to follow logic, a linear pattern but strategy is out of its realm and this makes it very
difficult to study. However not impossible. For this reason I rely extensively on history and other
social sciences and their apparatus to help me understand strategic processes. Mathematical logic
loves order, strategy is chaos. The few lords of chaos as retired Croatian Admiral Domazet-Loso
called them, understood this nature and behavioral pattern, and who had the ambition to shape the
world around them with luck to be in the right time in the right place, went down in history as
great leaders.70 Morality and specific circumstances were the factors which influenced those
individuals planning and decision making. Some of them did it for the benefit of others, some for
benefit of just some, and some for the benefit of but a few.
Tendency in developed democratic societies is to make national strategies by studying strategic
theory and brainstorming between various experts, to propose the best course of action. Advanced
computers and up to date intelligence help with these processes. But final decision is made by one
political entity. 71 How wise will these decisions be, is always based on natural instinct. And
sometimes, as all great strategist know dumb luck. Sound strategic planning tends to achieve
long term strategic objectives with as little as possible engagement of ones own resources. Every
military organization which seeks to realize its long term objectives uses strategy as a mean to
materialize them. When discussing strategy, the only thing that has not changed through history is
that the only successful strategy is the one that has always managed to find a way to victory by
constant adaption to new changing circumstances and technology. Nature of strategy apart from
being changeable is also paradoxical. This is a concept perhaps best explained by prominent author
Edward Luttwak. I confirm his observations that strategy is indeed paradoxical and does not follow
a linear logic pattern. Defeat can lead into victory and victory into defeat. Longest route can in fact

Mintzberg H., Patterns in Strategy Formation, Management Science, Vol. 24, No. 9, May 1978, pp. 934-948.
See in Domazet-Loso D., Gospodari Kaosa (eng. Lords of Chaos), Detecta, 2005.
71
As Winston Churchill expressed in his famous quote: Wars highest solution must be evolved from the eye and
brain and soul of a single man. Nothing but genius, the demon in man, can answer the riddles of war, and genius
though it might be armed, cannot be acquired, either by reading or by experience. Quoted by Michael Carver,
Chapter 8: Montgomery in Keegan J., Churchills Generals, Hachette, 2012, p. 139.
69
70

44

be the shortest, and shortest can lead in nothing but a disaster. All of us, our decisions and lives
indeed depend on such paradoxical logic. 72

1.4. Strategic culture

Colin Gray, understanding that strategic culture is a deeply contested concept, wrote: strategic
culture consists of the socially constructed and transmitted assumptions, habits of mind, traditions,
and preferred methods of operation that is, behavior that are more or less specific to a
particular geographically based security community.73 Machines too are in fact product of a
culture and often represent distinctive features of that culture. Jordanova argued that in fact all
history is cultural history, since there can be no processes, whether social, economic or political,
which are not mediated through ideas, concepts, theories, images or languages.74 In my view
strategic culture should not be contested but accepted as an important segment of strategy making
but I observe it as the dominant parameter in all strategic decisioning. Individuals, groups and
organizations all make strategic plans according to their cultural view of the world. It is not
necessarily just one, a society can have several cultural backgrounds. Depending on the specific
situation one can prevail over the other. In this process the interaction with the enemy must not be
disregarded too, because fighting a culturally different enemy will almost certainly evoke a
strategic culture which is not always the main one.75 Apart from Gray, authors who have been
writing on the topic: David Lonsdale, John Baylis, Edward Luttwak, Edward T. Hall, Paul
Williams and French authors like Michel Ligeois and Admiral Pierre Lacoste, were all very much
aware of the fact. In Cambridges textbook Understanding Modern Warfare by the group of

72

See in Luttwak, Strategy: Logic of War and peace.

Gray, Modern Strategy, p. 28. I agree with his statement that no one exists beyond culture.
74
Ludmila Jordanova, quoted in Tim Harris Problematizing Popular culture, taken from Gray, Modern Strategy,
p. 29.
75
Germans on the WWII Eastern Front did not fight in the same way as they did on the Western. American
administration in Vietnam tried to hide the fact that they were often using savage methods to fight a savage enemy.
When two different cultures of war making meet at the battlefield, this cultural factor becomes evident more than
ever. Example during the Bosnian war (1992-1995), a Croatian armys (HV) Special unit Frankopan Battalion, was
caught in engagement with Bosniak Muslim radicals. Croatian commander, Bruno Zorica-Zulu, in a conversation
retold the event. He, a former French Legion officer and drill instructor with 19 years in the Legion, has never seen
anything like it. Muslims were charging and shooting towards his men, followed by Allahu-Akbar battle cry. Since
Croatians were on good defensive position, and since it was an elite battle hardened unit Muslim assault did not
stand a chance. But still, they kept on coming, without taking any cover until they were all killed or wounded.
Croats were both terrified and angry for such a waste of life: This is not the way you attack, it is madness said
Zulu. Personal notes of the author taken in October 2010.
73

45

prominent authors, strategic culture is emphasized as an important element: Indeed there is no

mode of warfare, conducted in any geographical environment, wherein the enemys strategic
culture is of no importance.76
I would define strategic culture (following the work of Edward Luttwak) as a permanent posture
of leaders and other decision making segments in the society, which are aware of the strategic
processes (forces) around them and have a common attitude on how to achieve long term
objectives of strategic importance for their political entities.
As Gray pointed out, strategic culture (among other things) is determined geographically. In this
dissertation I will focus on the Western strategic culture, as it is the key to understand the
hypothesis. However there are other distinctive cultures and variations between them. Small
organizations and countries, obviously do not have the same strategic posture as the big ones. For
example Israel is a small country dominated by Western strategic culture. However Israel is
geographically placed in the middle of another culture, that of the Muslim World. Because it is
small and because it is on the frontline with a culturally different enemy, Israel to survive had to
develop a distinctive strategic culture which rests on maintaining a permanent aggressive deterrent
posture. USA, leader of the Western World within this culture maintains a posture of a Global
Police Officer. So what is it exactly that defines a strategic culture? According to which general
characteristics can we make the distinction?
Western civilization is a part of the world which has its cultural origins in Greco-Roman presence
in Europe and West-Roman Christianity. Starting from the early 1500s this Western World has
embarked on a voyage of expansion to dominate the rest of the World down to the present-day.
On the way to this success the West has effectively defeated and assimilated most of the world. In
his book Civilization: West and the Rest (2011), prominent historian Niall Fergusson analyzed
the success of the West and identified six, as he calls them killer apps which made the West more
successful than the rest. These are competition, science, modern medicine, democracy,
consumerism and work ethics. Despite Chinese technological and cultural superiority during the
early Ming dynasty and times of exploration of admiral Zeng-He (1405-1433) it was not ancient
China that became the leading force in the World but the West. Just how did it happen that then76

Gray C. S., Irregular enemies and the essence of strategy, Strategic Studies Institute, US Government publication,
2006, p. 34.

46

backward countries in every respect such as Portugal and Spain, England and France, set sail and
went to dominate the planet for the next five centuries?
In my view it was the Wests strategic culture which was superior to the Rest. Fergusons six
killer apps, I would summarize to call general features of Western strategic culture. 77 As he put
it, when the Chinese reached shores of Africa, they were looking for some interesting animals like
giraffes, to bring back to the emperor. On the other hand, when Portuguese Vasco da Gama reached
those same shores almost a century later, he was looking how to make money out of it. 78 In my
view, this cost effectiveness, the connection between remunerative and war, was the crucial
element which established Western civilizations domination. Expansion at the end of which there
must be a personal reward for every individual involved is a motivation which drives people to
undergo tremendous efforts. A nobody in the Old World could become somebody in the New
World. In my view, our Western civilization mark II, as Ferguson calls it 79, rests on the idea that
war must pay off in some way. Warring organization must promise personal gain to the individual
warrior and do its best to keep him alive. Because the individual has political rights reckless
waste of his life is unacceptable. This is the core of Western strategic culture. I will focus on two
repeating factors in American way of war which were (among others) identified by Gray and in
my view are a direct consequence of Western strategic culture. First is high sensitivity to casualties
and second exploitation of machinery. Both are to serve the purpose of saving lives of American
soldiers.80
In my view, the key component in determining the features of Western strategic culture, apart from
the remunerative is this relationship between the individual and the state. In the Western culture,
individual is above the state, as the state is a creation which serves the individual and he is
submitting to its power for his own well-being. Liberty, democracy and the rule of law are the
founding pillars of this civilization. On the other hand, cultures which put the interests of the state,
religion, tribe or despots in front of the safety for the individual have other core ideas behind
their strategic culture.

77

Competition, property owning, science, medicine, consumerism and work ethic.

See in Ferguson, Civilization: The West and the Rest.
79
Hellenistic states and Roman Empire being the mark I.
80
Gray, Irregular enemies and the essence of strategy, pp. 35-47.
78

47

Muslim World, East, Latin America and Africa all fight wars differently which is a consequence
of their strategic cultures. So far these cultures have proven inferior to the West.81 In the Muslim
World religion plays the dominant role and because of this, organizations under its influence have
little regard for the individual and fight wars which in general have little regard for the value of
human life. In the East, Russian and Chinese strategic culture have for a long time maintained a
posture that even huge human loss in acceptable, as long as the country (and its despotic system)
thrive. In Africa, for many cultures, the tribe is the most important factor which by far surpasses
the needs of the state. For this reason sacrifice of human life is accepted as long as it brings glory
to the tribe.
And finally in Latin America we have a complex strategic culture which emerged from the heritage
of Spanish colonialism. What the Spanish failed to do in South America is to give land to the
people. They have conquered this huge and rich continent, but its riches were only reserved for the
minority elite. So even today most of Latin American population is struggling in poverty because
the low class does not own sufficient land. It is all concentrated in the hands of few powerful
landowners which often can trace their ancestral origins to conquistadores. On the contrast, in
North America colonists were given right to own their land which motivated them to endure
hardships and work hard to create a competitive and prosperous economic society. In Latin
America the individual is in form at least guaranteed rights, but a society which does not give the
opportunity for the individual to economically prosper is the one doomed to vicious circle of
poverty and injustice. 82

81

However in the last decades we are seeing an unprecedented pace of economic progress of Asian countries such as
Japan, South Korea and the awakening of the sleeping giant China, which are all increasingly copying the killer
apps which made the West strong.
82
One of the most radical examples of strategic culture dominated by religion is the one of the pre-Columbian South
American Empires. The individual was served as a sacrifice to the gods and everything in the society was subjected
to this idea to please the gods.

48

Map 1: The Western world

Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2f/Clash_of_Civilizations_map.png
(see more in Huntington S. P., The Clash of Civilizations?, Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University,
1993).

To put it shortly, strategy (art) and strategic culture (style), like any other work of art has distinctive
features which define each of the different cultures. The same as in painting, architecture or
writing, every strategic culture also has its own sub-directions. But unlike the fine arts, strategy is
an art of conflict and as such will adapt and change in numerous ways. Lantis and Howlett consider
sources of strategic culture to be: geography, climate and resources, history and experience,
political structure, the nature of organizations involved in defense, myths and symbols, key texts
that inform actors of appropriate strategic action, transnational norms, generational change, and
the role of technology. Also, they add strategic culture may be influenced by current international
norms.83

83

Baylis, p. 83.

49

Table 2: Definitions on strategic culture

Alastair Iain Johnston

Strategic culture is the ideational milieu that

limits behavioral choices, from which one
could

derive

specific

predictions

about

strategic choice.
Peter Rosen

Strategic culture is comprised of beliefs and

assumptions that frame choices about
international military behavior, particularly
those concerning decisions to go to war,
preferences for offensive, expansionist or
defensive modes of warfare, and levels of
wartime casualties that would be acceptable.

Source: Baylis, p. 80

Development of western strategic thinking in the last two centuries, has been dominated by two
authors Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. First is a product of Western military thinking and second is
an exception. Sun Tzu is of course not a Western man. The fact that he has influenced Western
strategic thinking, actually confirms the key features of Western strategic culture. Modern West
will have no problem to incorporate achievements of other cultures if it suits it as something
valuable.84 Works of Sun Tzu have been praised in the East for thousands of years, but it was in
the West where he found his true audience. It is in fact remarkable how Clausewitz and Sun Tzu
have both reached many similar conclusions about war and strategy, even though they were very
far away in terms of culture, historic era and geographic placement. They both grasped its essential
nature. However Clausewitzs line of thinking in its puts faith in brute force. As such it had the
indirect consequence World War I and II which caused great destruction and loss of life.
Clausewitzs idea: Kind-hearted people might of course think that there was some ingenious way
to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine that this is the true
goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a
dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst. 85 was a
84

We can find parallel of this behavior with the Western civilization mark I, as both Hellenism and Rome were
masters in incorporating achievements of others into their own culture if it was something useful to them.
85
Baylis, p. 65.

50

product of the Napoleonic era doctrine which rested on concentration of firepower and physical
destruction of the enemys army. As technology progressed into the early 20 th century, western
military thinkers followed this logic investing themselves into finding new ways on how to achieve
critical concentration of force to punch through the line or the opposite, how to protect its army
from this concentrated firepower. However with the end of WWII, era of Clausewitz was over too.
Technologic progress and subsequent development of nuclear weapons put Sun Tzu into the focus.
Because war became something from which there is no possible gain. Logic of Sun Tzu was what
the West needed to win the Cold War. The objective is not to annihilate the enemy but to
(sometimes) let him go. While Clausewitz sees the best way to win as to destroy enemys army,
Sun Tzu sees the best way as to attack the strategy, than allies and third the army. 86 He teaches us
the opposite of Clausewitz: To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme
of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.87 Modern Western strategic
culture has transformed into an art of finding other ways on how to defeat the enemy. Exactly in
this way can we interpret the words of NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General Jamie Shea who
stated: Rather than wait for threats to arrive at its borders, the Alliance has chosen to confront
them at a strategic distance In short, NATO has evolved from a defense into a security
organization.88

1.5. Dimensions and levels of strategy

According to Colin Gray, strategy can be analyzed through several aspects: geographical (land,
sea, air, cyberspace, space), weapons and technologies (strategic consequences of armored forces,
computers, and nuclear weapons), or with a focus on different levels of violence and characters of
wars (general war, limited war, irregular warfare and terrorism). 89 Because strategy in its nature is
multidimensional and operates in many realms, he developed a more detailed concept, following

86

Ibid, p. 61.
Sun Tzu, Art of War: Chapter III.
Other similar thoughts include: Battles are dangerous affairs; Those skilled in war subdue the enemy without
battle. They capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations;
They conquer by strategy; Do not put premium on killing and He who struggles for victory with naked blades
is not a good general. See in McNeilly M., Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern Warfare, Oxford University Press,
2014, pp. 15-16.
88
Masters, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
89
Gray, Modern Strategy, p. 23.
87

51

the works of Michael Howard and Clausewitz before him, to analyze strategy in dimensions.
According to Gray there are three broad categories and seventeen detailed dimensions of strategy.

People and politics: people, society, culture, ethics, politics.

War preparation: economics and logistics, organization, military administration,

information and intelligence, strategy theory and doctrine, technology.

War proper: military operations, command, geography, friction, the adversary, time. 90

I would agree with this approach but not stop just there. In my view strategy cannot be observed
like a machine, of which all of the components must work and work well for the machine to be
effective. Only one small, often completely unpredictable and trivial matter can put the entire
strategy out of balance. Strategy operates in more than these dimensions (as Gray would certainly
agree), in fact it operates in as many dimensions as it can. If it could move into another dimension
to achieve its objectives it would. I observe strategy in a more philosophical way: it is like a
current of energy which fluctuates through time and space until either the source of energy is
depleted or it meets another opposing current which alters or diminishes its course. For this reason
if strategy encounters an obstacle, it will try to surpass it in any other dimension possible. But by
no means do I consider the approach of Gray to be mistaken. On the contrary, it shows insight to
just how much the matter of studying and understanding strategy is complex and how much more
work and debate will have to be done in order to frame it theoretically. 91Another writer on strategy
matters from the times of Clausewitz, Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779 1869) divided strategy into
four levels of analysis: statesmanship, strategy, grand tactics and minor tactics. 92His classification
is not without logic, even though modern strategy is far more complex. In Understanding modern
warfare authors classify strategy similarly to Jominis concept.

90

Ibid, p. 24.
If such a thing is even possible?
92
Bowdish R. G., Military Strategy: Theory and Concepts, University of Nebraska, 2013, p. 63.
The reason why I have excluded Jomini from the list of important contributors to strategic studies is because his
works mostly stayed in his time. Unlike Clausewitz who wanted to grasp the essence of strategy and because of it he
is still actual today Jomini based his work more on the idea that strategy (with the emphasis on the military
segment) is a system of rules, which if followed will ensure victory. His ideas I do not find relevant or actual enough
to put more emphasis in this study.
91

52

Table 3: Levels of strategy

Grand strategic level

The application of national resources to

achieve national/alliance policy objectives.

Military strategic level

The application of military resources to help

achieve grand strategic objectives.

Operational level

The level at which campaigns and major

operations

are

planned,

sequenced

and

directed.
Tactical level

The level at which battles and engagements are

planned and fought.

Source: Jordan D., Understanding Modern Warfare, p. 10.

David J. Lonsdale in Alexander the Great: Lessons in Strategy explained these factors in the
following way:
The highest level in the taxonomy of strategy is policy. Policy is simply the overall
objective that is sought. It is important to understand the policy objectives, because it is
these that should determine the methods used in the campaigns. Once policy has been
established the political leadership must then devise a grand strategy through which to
pursue the objectives sought. Grand strategy encompasses all the instruments at the states
disposal: diplomatic; intelligence assets; military and economic. As Basil H. Liddell Hart
notes, the role of grand strategy higher strategy is to coordinate and direct all the
resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of
the war the goal defined by fundamental policy.93 The key challenge in grand strategy
is choosing the right instrument, or the right balance of instruments, necessary to fulfil the
policy requirements. This decision will be influenced by a wide array of factors, including
the policy itself, available resources, and nature of potential enemies, strategic culture, and
the geopolitical environment, to name just five.
One element of grand strategy is military strategy. Once a military strategy has been
decided upon (i.e. a plan has been developed in which military force will be used to serve

93

Lonsdale D. J., Alexander the Great: Lessons in Strategy, Routledge, 2007, p. 6.

53

the ends of policy) it must be put into practice. This is achieved at the lowest level by
tactics. Tactics simply refers to actions on the battlefield in the face of the enemy. So, for
example, tactics is concerned with how forces are deployed, how they engage the enemy,
and how the various units interact with one another. In this sense, tactics is very much
about the details of combat. Each battle or contact with the enemy represents a tactical
event that occurs in a distinct time and place. Of course, ideally one aims to be successful
in every tactical event. However, to have a successful overall military strategy a
commander must link his tactical engagements together, so that they serve the broader
purpose. This is where the operational level comes into play. The operational level links
tactical engagements with the overall military strategy. Or, as Edward Luttwak describes
it: this operational level governs the consequences of what is done and not done
tactically.94
The operational level can be thought of in both conceptual and material terms.
Conceptually, it links tactical engagements together in the service of military strategy.
Materially, we can think in terms of a geographic area of operations, within which the
operational-level commander moves his forces from objective to objective. The operational
level contains a whole range of factors essential to the success of a military campaign.
Amongst the most important are logistics and lines of communication, movements of the
enemy, and decisive points in the theatre of operations such as cities and key terrain
characteristics. This description of the levels of strategy, although valid and useful, does
little to reflect the complexity and nonlinear nature of strategy.95

94
95

Ibidem.
Ibid, p. 7.

54

Diagram 2: Relationship within the strategic realm

Policy

Grand strategy

Military strategy

Operational strategy

Tactics
Source: Lonsdale, Understanding Contemporary Strategy, p. 13.

Strategy encompasses many levels and it is active both during peace and wartime. Purpose of using
strategy is to achieve strategic goals. These are a set of desired long term objectives that are clearly
pre-set by organizations. Strategic objectives once achieved have the purpose to improve the
positioning of a certain organization. For example, objectives of a military organization could be
to gain more economical resources, conquer territory, obtain technology or pursue any other
desired political objective. Once strategic objectives are defined, organizations planners devise
strategy to determine the best course of action towards achieving these goals. However strategy
making is a very complicated matter. Imagine the number of interests conflicting powerful
individuals, companies, corporations, non-government groups, regions, nations, states, alliances
of states. In a more repressive societies such as Stalins Soviet Union it was his opinion the only
one that mattered. Modern Russia is not a totalitarian society anymore but a vast federation with
many influential voices and interests. Yet still Russia has its oligarchs and USA has its magnates.96
Democratic societies, in principle at least, operate differently and decisions are being made after

96

Private interests can significantly influence national strategies. For example United Fruit Company was heavily
involved in Central American crisis and US military interventions in Latin America during the 1980s.

55

many voices are heard and they make strategies according to this philosophy. I agree with M.
Handel in his observation that in reality western strategy making is in fact not always a result of a
rational and the best course of action decisioning process, but more of a compromise between
various involved interests.97 Long term strategic objectives on a grand scheme, although simple,
are usually accomplished by complicated methods, using various other lower strategies. Because
secrecy is essential, only a minority of decision makers knows the true long term objectives on a
grand scheme.
Grand strategy is a term used to describe a strategy which encompasses all levels of
society which constitute a certain military organization, and the pursuit of an entire
political/military organization as single entity toward its objectives. Nations technology, culture,
science, religion, politics and economy are all in the service of Grand strategy. Every great power
in history has devised such strategy to achieve its long term strategic objectives which were of
importance to the entire entity. Because the eventual success or failure of this strategy, will
decisively impact every individual at every level of society. For example both Roman and
Byzantine Empires had long term strategic objectives which were being achieved over the course
of even a several centuries. Roman Empire would never have survived as the world superpower if
it had not deeply understood the elements of grand strategy. There were other strong empires, but
it was the Roman Empire that made its presence memorable. Because Roman decision makers
understood that if this Empire was to last they cannot count exclusively on their military victories.
In the paradoxical realm of strategy too many victories will eventually lead to a defeat. So the
Roman army conquered, but it was the Roman political elites strategic culture of inclusion and
co-optation that secured the legitimacy that long preserved the Empire. This is because repression,
being itself in the realm of strategy, cannot maintain loyalty of a conquered territory with its people
for long without it eventually leading to a defeat.98
For Rome the most important strategic objective was securing its continental borders by territorial
expansion on the line Elbe-Danube rivers. So when a major rebellion broke out in provinces of
Dalmatia/Pannonia (6-9 AD), followed by destruction of three Roman legions in Teutoburg forest
(9 AD), it is no wonder that Emperor Augustus suffered a nervous breakdown after. He was all too

97
98

See more in Handel, War, Strategy and Intelligence.

Luttwak, Strategy: Logic of War and Peace, p. 84.

56

aware that the most important strategic objective which could ensure long term security for his
Empire will never be accomplished. Indeed all later attempts of conquering Germania to the Elbe
have failed, the moment was lost and Roman Empire was eventually forced to turn into defense.
For Rome to be closed behind this costly and strategically unfavorable limes led to eventual
Roman Empires both political and military breakdown in 476 AD. 99 On the other hand, its
remnant the Eastern Roman Empire (also known as the Byzantine Empire) has learned much
from its former Western half. 100 In fact this society has developed a far superior strategic culture
that fully understood the complexities of grand strategy and the intertwined connection between
the politics, culture, economy and military. Various emperors came and went as centuries past, yet
still Byzantine Empire with its farsighted strategies managed not to overshoot its culminating point
of success and survive surrounded by the sea of enemies, as the richest and most advanced
political/military entity of its time. But as it happens with all great powers, it too eventually
collapsed under immense pressure of both internal and external factors. 101
Indeed many of the historys greatest empires fell as the victims of their own success; Alexander
the Greats Empire disintegrated after his death into several Hellenistic empires which were
immediately on each others throats; Mongol Empire being one the largest empire in history fell
apart under its sheer size and suffered a military defeat; Chinese Empire exhausted itself in bloody
civil conflicts only to be overtaken by a technologically inferior, but determined barbarians; Aztec
Empire broke to a handful of power hungry European conquerors; Russian Empire, Swedish
Empire, Spanish Empire, German Reich... They all became victims of their own success because
it is the paradox of strategy.
Victory on grand strategic level can only be achieved if secured on both political and military
levels otherwise it will inevitably lead to defeat. Same goes with major alliances, a total victory
of an alliance over the enemy can mean a total defeat for the alliance itself. For example the Allies
won in the Second World War, but immediately after, they fell apart and became bitter rivals. This
marked the beginning of NATO and we cannot speak of NATO without USA. Today we live in
the world of US political, cultural and military world-wide domination. It is not so by accident.

99

See in Luttwak, Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire.

This distinction between Western and Eastern Roman Empire is an invention from more recent times. Byzantines
saw themselves exclusively as Romans even up to their final days in 1453.
101
See in Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire.
100

57

There is a strong strategic culture among US elite, which is set on to defend its position of the
sole world superpower. If we were to closely observe USAs pattern of behavior in the last decade
we were to conclude that it is on strategic defensive. In the terms of grand strategy of course. No
doubt that USA is making offensive moves, but I see this as a part of its defense on grand strategic
level against other emerging powers.
One of them, China in the last few decades has achieved tremendous technological, economic and
military development. This Asian awaken giant can produce more of everything and it can do that
faster and cheaper. Such military potential cannot be ignored. Even in the 1957, before China had
performed its first atom bomb test, Mao Zedong made it clear that he is not afraid of nuclear
assault: Even if the country loses half of its population it will not be a great loss, we will produce
more people.102 This cold way of thinking is a good example of the way strategists think
(strategists like Mao). It cannot be denied that it was under his leadership that China was set on
the path of becoming one of the worlds most dominating powers. However by the logic of
strategy, it is exactly Chinas rapid success what could eventually lead to its downfall? 103
For the purpose of this dissertation I will limit the strategic level on grand strategy being the
highest. It is clear to me that major powers have expanded into space, but space exploration
effectiveness is limited by the conflict which they have with each other. Hirst argued that in the
future, however, battles are unlikely to be confined to planet Earth as the US in particular will be
forced to militarize space in an effort to protect the satellites upon which its communication and
information systems depend. 104 Therefore I believe that we cannot yet speak of a real space
strategy. For such a thing to happen this planet would have to operate as a single political entity.
Earths human civilization has not effectively expanded its presence to other planets and systems.
So I will continue with a lower manifestation of strategy, under the grand strategy which is called
theater strategy. The reason why I will explain theater strategy but I have not included it in the
table, is because only great powers (which are just a few) can have theater strategies.
Theater level of strategy we could define as one which encompasses multiple operational
ones. On this level it is not only the question of disposition of troops and supplies but also of

102

Zhi-Sui L., The Private Life of Chairman Mao, Random House, 2011, p. 125.
See in Luttwak, The Rise of China.
104
Hirst quoted in Williams P. (ed.), Security Studies: An Introduction, Routledge, 2008, p. 154.
103

58

political consequences which can determine the fate of a military organization. Only the major
World powers can fight on several strategic theaters. Smaller political entities do not have enough
space or resources to expand their influence over such a wide area. To explain the difference
between operational and theater level we will use the example of Axis offensive on France and
Low countries (1940). With constructing the Maginot line, which was one of the most extensive
defensive fortification in the known history, the French have neutralized German offensive
potential on both tactical and operational levels. 105 Because every German frontal attack on such
a formidable and state of the art defenses would surely result in a failure and heavy casualties.
Taken into account that Germany at the time did not possess any superior technology to counter
it. In that time it was in fact Germany which was considered to be military inferior to France. 106
For these reasons France could be assured that it ensured it safety by achieving superiority over
Germany in both tactical and operational levels. Because a major German offensive through
Ardennes was considered impossible and combined British, French, Belgian and Dutch forces
were surely able to stop any attack through the Low Countries. So from a logical point of view,
the French were right to believe that their defensive strategy is solid. But when Blitzkrieg strategy
simultaneously pushed through wooded Ardennes and Low countries (diversionary assault) thus
completely bypassing the Maginot line, German offensive has nullified French advantage both on
tactical and operational levels.
This is because they have achieved a decisive victory on a theater level. Their rapid advance and
operational superiority once they have past the Maginot line had not caused French complete
military breakdown, but it caused a political one. France has surrendered and British retreated to
the safety of their island. In the paradox of strategy Maginot line has in fact caused French defeat
because it was so successful. No one would ever dare to attack on such a strong defense. So
Germans have devised a new strategy that simply bypassed it. 107 Theater level of strategy cannot
ignore political consequences of its conduct. France had military and economic strength to
continue fighting Germany but it had no more political will and its people opted for surrender. 108

105

See in Luttwak, Strategy: Logic of War and Peace.

Blatt J., The French Defeat of 1940: Reassessments, Berghahn Books, 2000, p. 10.
107
Luttwak, Strategy: Logic of War and Peace, p. 144.
108
France had considerable troops left and enough strategic depth to continue the struggle. The Free French forces
which escaped the Fall of France in 1940 continued the fight against the Germans and their numbers reached
550,000 (1944) and grew up to 1,300,000 (1945).
106

59

Depending on how crucial is a certain theater for a military organization and its population behind
it, we can observe how important the consequences will be. As we have seen France lost and
retreated from French Indochina (1954) and Algeria (1962). Both of them were defeats on theater
levels. But these defeats did not cause surrender of France as the defeat in 1940 did. That specific
strategic theater facing Germany was simply too important to lose in the scheme of French Grand
strategy.
During the WWII the Axis suffered a defeat in North Africa theater of operations but this also did
not cause their surrender. Only invasion (Italy in 1943) and utter destruction followed by military
defeat (Germany in 1945) of their home territories have forced the Italian and German nations to
admit defeat on a grand scheme. This is because these theaters (their homelands) were too
important to lose. Even a military victory on a theater level doesnt necessarily have to mean that
it will be followed by a political victory in that same theater. For example both French and
Americans have achieved military victories in Algeria and Vietnam, but they still had to retreat
from those theaters. Their enemies have won politically. And in the paradox of strategy it can work
both ways. A defeat on the operational level can in fact be a victory at theater level. Modern
example of such a scenario is Croatian War of Independence (1991-1995) in which Serbs managed
to achieve many military victories and put under their control more than one third of Croatian
territory. With its economy dropped by more than a quarter; huge numbers of refugees; defeated
in major battles (such as Vukovar); followed by daily bombings of every major city it would be
expected that Croats would surrender.109 But quite the opposite happened.
By losing territory, Croatian logistic lines became shorter which meant that they could supply and
move their outnumbered troops with greater speed, maintaining an active defense. To see their
cities destroyed and their countrymen expelled from their homes, in fact lifted Croatian morale
and stiffened their resistance. Furthermore by prolonged engagement of considerable Serbian
forces in the Battle of Vukovar, Croatia gained itself precious time in which it armed itself and
raised international support for its cause. Serbs failed to turn their military victory of 1991 into a

109

Axon A., Brett D. (ed), World of Information: Europe Review, Walden Publishing, 2003, p. 75.

60

political one and it was just a matter of time when Croatia would make a counteroffensive to regain
full sovereignty over its territory. This it achieved militarily in 1995 and politically in 1997. 110
Successful theater strategy counts on both political and military methods to not only the enemy
but its population as well. Examples of this are from WWII in the form of Axis employment of
naval forces to destroy convoys en route to British islands, and Allied use of air forces to
strategically bomb Germany. Both of these strategies, each in its own strategic theater, had the
purpose to hurt enemys population, break its will to fight and thus achieve a political victory.
Great powers which have the capability to operate in more than one strategic theater have a Grand
strategy. Lower than the theater level is operational.
Operational level of strategy is the lowest level which uses strategic thinking to achieve
its objectives and is subjected to the paradoxical nature of strategy. 111 To define operational level
of strategy is somewhat difficult to precisely determine. But roughly we could frame it in
geographical terms. For example it can be an area encompassing a city and its surroundings a
province or several provinces, a region. Such a wider area requires more complex troop and
resources movement than just tactics. Luttwak suggested that when single types of forces and their
specific tactics no longer determine the outcome by themselves, because other types of forces and
other kind of tactics are also involved we have reached operational level. 112 A primitive tribe
whose entire force consists of warriors identically armed with shields and spears and always

Similar thing happened in the more distant Croatian past. During the Hundred Years CroatianOttoman War
(1493-1593), Kingdom of Croatia suffered many military defeats under the Ottoman invasion on Europe. Croatian
territory by the end of 16th century was so small that it included only the few cities and forts around its capital. It
was called reliquiae reliquiarum olim inclyti regni Croatiae - remnants of the remnants of the once great and
glorious kingdom of Croatia. But still Ottomans were not able to subdue the entire political entity of medieval
Croatia and pursue their conquest towards Central Europe via this route. They had to make a bypass every time they
marched on Vienna. Answer for this Croatian success was in their flexible strategy. Croatian nobility used the
shorter lines, superior tactics, psychological warfare and small size highly mobile units to mount limited offensives,
counter-offensives and raids deep into enemy territory. By constantly changing its style of war making, from small
skirmishes to full-scale battles with major Ottoman armies where they were necessary Croatian kingdom managed
to fight off and survive Ottoman invasion, and even achieve a decisive victory in the major battle for strategic city of
Sisak (1593). Eventually it will prevail over the Ottomans as a constitutional part of the Habsburg Empire. See in
Russell J., Cohn R. (ed.), Battle of Sisak, Book on Demand, 2012.
111
There are numerous examples in history when a defeat actually turned into victory, and other way around, a
victory to defeat simply because of the nature of strategy. And this nature which shapes our world, has remained
unchanged whether the leaders and military planners were aware of them or not. Some of the expressions that best
explain the paradox in strategy are ancient proverbs such as: He who defends all, defends nothing or If you want
peace, prepare for war. These statements are not logical but they make perfect sense in the paradoxical realm of
strategy.
112
Infantry tactics, submarine tactics, artillery tactics etc.
110

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positioned in a single formation has the tactical, operational and strategic levels all combined. It
cannot suffer a tactical defeat that is also not a strategic one. 113 But in more complex military
operations such as for example, continental warfare on the Western front in Europe (1944), US
forces could suffer both tactical defeats and achieve tactical victories within the same operational
level.
This level combines different types of forces (land, air, naval, airborne, special etc.) and can use
various different tactics to achieve victory. For example Germans in the African campaign (19411943) were badly outnumbered, outgunned and undersupplied, yet still with skilled leadership and
by relying on superior tactics and rapid troop movements they were able to achieve many
operational victories over the British in the North Africa desert. But during this process ItaliansGermans have passed their culminating point of success. Meaning that they have dangerously
overstretched their supply lines and their outnumbered troops could not effectively control this
vast territory nor to match the British who were superior both in troops and equipment. So a series
of stunning German victories actually speeded up their defeat because after every battle they have
lost men and resources which could not be replaced. For the victory on operational level they have
paid the price of defeat on the higher theater level. It could even be said that Rommel would
actually have been better off by not taking any offensive actions. In fact this is what Hitler
instructed him to do before he dispatched him to North Africa. 114
Such is the paradoxical nature of strategy in which numerous victories on both tactical and
operational levels can, and in this case did speed up the process of defeat on theater level.
Because no matter how many times this small German force could defeat the British in battles, on
the theater level of North Africa the British simply had more troops and logistics. The only
conclusion is that eventually they would prevail by sheer numbers of men, equipment and material
just as they did. Because superior German leadership could inflict defeats on the mediocre British
leadership only on operational level, but this would still not defeat the British who were superior
on a theater level of strategy. 115 Germans were tactically superior to the British and this why they
could inflict smaller defeats on them.

113

Luttwak, Strategy: Logic of War and Peace, p. 113.

See in Windrow M., Rommels Desert Army, Osprey Publishing, 1976.
Rommel was attacking because he saw that he could, he was following the logic of Clausewitz.
115
Luttwak, Strategy: Logic of War and Peace, p. 258.
114

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Tactical level is the lowest manifestation of strategy. Tactics are a part of strategy, but not
in the sense that they follow the same logic, or that they use the same way of thinking. Tactical
level is dominated by linear logic, and strategy is paradoxical. On the tactical level each of the
military organizations that clash in an armed conflict will use different tactics to best position and
direct its troops. Tactics are both art and science of fighting battles. 116 It is a science because it can
calculate economy of force in correlation with technical possibilities of the weapons and
geographical features. And it is an art because it must use creative thinking to best position every
type of weapons and units to maximize their effect on the enemy. Tactics are dealing with the
approach to combat, placement of troops, use made of weapons, vehicles, ships, or aircraft, and
execution of movements for attack or defense. In short, tactics are concerned with the conditions
encountered in actual combat. Tactical level is the one which to coordinates personnel with the
existing weapons technology and apply both to the terrain and enemy forces in a way that uses the
fighting force to best advantage.117 Tactics are trying to position each type of weapon where it can
do the most damage to the enemy or provide the most protection to ones own forces. Successes
of a certain tactic employed extensively depend on the elements such as timing, surprise and
direction.118 For example if two military organizations clash in a battle and one side has more
troops (numerically superior) and better supplied (logistically superior), but the other has better
armed (technology), trained (combat knowledge) and motivated (will to fight) troops. The side
that is numerically and logistically superior can be defeated by the use of superior tactics that will
exploit advantages offered by the terrain, weather, direction or timing. But as we said, as strategy
is paradoxical in nature and does not follow a linear pattern, a victory on a tactical level can mean
defeat on operational level.

1.6. Strategic positioning in correlation with strategic levels

In order to understand why some powers seek to expand and others choose to maintain we must
define what it means to be strategically weak or strong. What is a strategically good position? To
understand this we must look at the specific situation in which a military organization finds itself,
and to explain it. To do this I find the clearest example to be the one of Imperial Japan just before
116

The Science of War: Strategies, Tactics, and Logistics, Britannica Educational Publishing, 2011, p. 32.
Britannica Concise Encyclopedia, Britannica Educational Publishing, 2008, p. 1861.
118
Merriam-Webster dictionary, tactics.
117

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the outbreak of WWII. Japan at this time was by no means a civilization which rested on Western
strategic culture. In fact quite the opposite, the way Japan waged war was deeply rooted in its
bushido code heritage and strong religious sentiment of duty towards the Empire of the Rising
Sun. The reasons why I write about Japan in this context are several: first, because it wanted to
incorporate western culture to become more prosperous; second, because of its immensely
complicated strategic position; and finally, because its strategy was not able to cope with it and
ultimately suffered defeat.

1.6.1. Case study: Imperial Japan in World War II

Imperial Japan used to be a major military force in the world. As one of the winners of WWI, it
possessed advanced technology, cohesive national unity, strong military and developed economy
followed by significant scientific and cultural achievements. These are some of the factors which
we examine when we want to determine is a military organization strong or not. Most importantly
Japan had plenty of educated and able bodied people and this is the main strategic resource for any
military organization. But its strategic position as a major power was fragile because it didnt have
enough resources to sustain its people and the rapid pace of development. By mid-1930s Japan
has reached a point at which it had to conquer territories of other countries in order to obtain these
resources. And as a consequence, it inevitably came into conflict with other major military
organizations. Foremost Britain and USA which both saw Japan, if allowed to obtain these
resources and continue development, as a potential threat to their own positions. So Japan was
faced with a decision either to stop this path of progress or to wage war on its enemies. Because
of its cultural understanding of the world and war-making, Japan opted for war. On the other hand
Britain and USA (with its embargos) were indirectly pushing Japan towards this aggression. They
were strategically superior and could count that in the inevitable conflict they would eventually
win. So how exactly did they know that? In strategy it is not possible to precisely calculate, but
more to estimate who is the stronger side. So we will observe some of the factors separately.
Japan in 1941 had a population of 73 million and an army of 6 million (wartime). 119 US had a
population of 132 million and an army of 16 million (wartime).120 Britain (island) had a population
119
120

Gruhl W., Imperial Japans World War Two: 1931-1945, Transaction Publishers, 2010, p. 62.
Cromwell S., GI Joe in World War II, Capstone, 2008, p. 7.

64

of 48 million and in 1941 had 2.2 million men in the army. 121 But the British Empire was much
more considerable in size than just British Isles and it could count on many millions more from its
colonies and dominions such as Canada, Australia, British India, etc. as they were all, one way or
another, bound to fight for British Crowns interests. Even more important, USA and Britain both
had all the resources and technology to supply a more numerous and better equipped armed force
than Japan ever did. It became obvious during the war that Japanese were so short of even the most
essential provisions for its armed forces that Japanese soldiers resorted to cannibalism of Allied
prisoners on many occasions. 122
In 1941 Japan had the third largest naval force in the world and also a powerful air force to combine
with it.123 But it could still not compete with joint naval and air strength of British Empire and
USA. Both of these major powers once fully mobilized, to support the war effort, could outclass
Japan in terms of numbers, material, technology, training and leadership. Japans strategic decision
to strike first, came out of desperation because of the unfavorable strategic situation. It did not
expand because it was stronger, but precisely because it was weaker. A paradox of strategy. By
opting for offensive Japan hoped that element of surprise would temporarily turn the tide in its
favor. And in this is exactly what happened as in 1941 Japanese achieved a set of stunning
victories. But Japanese victories were limited to the scale of theater strategy. It managed to defeat
USA and Britain in Pacific theater, but for these distant countries that specific theater was not so
important to force their surrender. If Japan wanted to win on a grand strategic scheme there was
no other way but to directly invade British Isles and USA. For this Japan never possessed the
resources or even the plans. Military and political organization called Japan was in a strategically
dangerous position prior to the 1941 because it could not further sustain the pace of its development
without obtaining more resources. So it became a victim of its own economic and military success.
To obtain much needed resources, Japan inevitably came into conflict with other powers which
were to see that it doesnt get it, because Japan would then become too dangerous for their own
strategic position. So Japan used the strategic resources that it already had. First was a powerful
army and second was strategy. In this case it was an offensive type of strategy called preventive
French D., Raising Churchills Army: The British Army and the War against Germany 1919-1945, Oxford
University Press, 2000, p. 64.
122
Gruhl, p. 84.
123
See in Evans D., Peattie M., Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 18871941, Naval Institute Press, 1997.
121

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war which I will further elaborate in a later section. These two elements, army and strategy
provided Japan with tools to wage war on USA and British Empire. Strategy enabled Japan to gain
initial advantage and bypass its own strategic inferiority towards these two powers. But in the
realm of strategy nothing can be gained without sacrificing something else. Japan achieved victory
but only in the Pacific theater. This strategy was not devised for Japan to win on the grand strategy
level. Once they fully mobilized all of their strategic resources such as men, production,
intelligence, leadership, technology, etc. USA and British Empire went on the offensive. From
that moment on it was just a matter of time before Japan would suffer ultimate defeat, because
both of these military organizations had more strategic resources than Japan ever did. So let us
once again on a coherent example see the different levels of strategy. I use table 4 to give visual
approach to the matter.
Table 4: Example of levels of strategy of Japan in WWII
Strategic

Pacific war

Grand strategy

theater

Operation
Invasion
Greater

East

Asia

Co-

Prosperity
sphere
Theater

of

Southeast Asia

operations

Southwest

Western

Theater

Asia

Pacific

strategy

Operation
campaign

ocean
Operation

Guadalcanal

Iwo Jima

Midway

Operational
strategy

Troop
movement

Tactics

Operation
battle
Operation
engagement

66

Source: prepared by author.

I explain them one at the time. In a war called World War II, one of the strategic theaters was
called Pacific war. This strategic theater refers to the part of the world within Japanese direct
influence zone. In this strategic theater Imperial Japan had a grand strategic objective to create the
so-called Great East Asia Co-Prosperity sphere. To achieve that objective Japan launched an allout invasion in the Pacific strategic theater. Within that strategic theater there were several
different theaters of operations: Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia and Western Pacific ocean. In
each of those theaters of operations Japan conducted several operations which on this level are
called campaigns. These campaigns followed various, often different theater strategies. Every
campaign in each of those theaters saw lower levels of operations which resulted in battles.
Examples of battles are Iwo Jima, Midway, and Guadalcanal. These operations were following
operational strategies. And in every of those battles there were numerous troop movements which
resulted in engagements with enemys forces. These engagements were guided by tactics and no
longer used strategic thinking to achieve its objectives. As explained before, military strategy
begins when other types of units and other types of tactics are also involved and influence the
outcome. Traditionally is considered that brigade is the smallest strategic unit, because every unit
smaller than a brigade cannot exist independently on the battlefield, without the support of other
kinds of units.

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Map 2: Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity sphere

Source: Wikimedia online database,

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b3/Japanese_Empire_orthographic_projection.svg

68

Map 3: Far East and Pacific 1941, major Japanese war objectives and planned opening attacks

Source: United States Military Academy West Point, Department of History,

http://www.westpoint.edu/history/SiteAssets/SitePages/World_War_II_Pacific/WWIIAsia04.gif

Gartner described strategy as implementation of a policy by devised by organizations to pursue

desired strategic goals. 124 In my view sound strategic goals are long term objectives whose
outcome is to ensure stability and prosperity of the organization and its population. 125 These goals
are identified by organizations policy makers and a strategy which is then chosen is designed to
achieve them, and is based on probability assessments such as: With how much resources does
an organization already dispose?, How much it could/is willing to sacrifice in order to pursue

124
125

Gartner S. S., Strategic Assessment in War, Yale University Press, 1999, p. 163.
Allow me to emphasize once more that in sound strategic planning, war is about the peace it will shape.

69

these goals? and Will the gained resources compensate for those which will be lost during the
war? To win either war or peace, one must devise a sound strategy. The one that can always adapt
to always changing environment, and the one which identifies clear objectives for whose
achievement there are sufficient resources. Old Roman proverb by Publilius Syrus teaches us of
this logic Its a bad plan that cannot be changed.126
During the course of WWII it became obvious that overall Japanese strategy is neither far-seeing
enough neither flexible enough to counter the Allied response. In 1941 Japan identified expansion
in the Pacific area as its main strategic objective, because in this area it could exploit resources
such as oil, energy and food needed for its economic growth. But since Japan lacked sufficient
resources to achieve these objectives it launched a surprise attack on USA and Britain to gain
another important strategic resource time. By using this time in which its enemies were
insufficiently prepared, it captured valuable territories which with its resources would ensure
Japans future prosperity. But when this gained time was spent, USA and Britain retook these
territories and enforced ultimate defeat and complete breakdown of a military organization called
Imperial Japan. This is because strategy which Japan devised and executed in 1941 was simply
not good enough. It was designed to achieve Japans immediate strategic needs, but it was far from
ultimately defeating its enemies. And it is what would be a reasonable and most important strategic
objective. In strategy will is directed against an enemy that will try to stop it or divert it. As long
as enemys will is not neutralized either by political or military means, strategy will only be
efficient while there is enough resources to support it. When these resources are spent and cannot
be replaced, than we have left the realm of strategy. There is no more will against other will,
because one of them has lost its maneuver space. Benito Mussolini in an interview in January 1945
made a statement which describes such a situation:
Seven years ago, I was an interesting person. Now, I am little more than a corpse Yes, madam,
I am finished. My star has fallen. I have no fight left in me. I work and I try, yet know that all is
but a farce I await the end of the tragedy and strangely detached from everything, I do not feel
any more an actor. I feel I am the last of spectators.127

126
127

The Quotations page, Quotation #24383. Link: http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/24383.html (18/5/14).

Colley R., The Rescue of Mussolini a summary, History in an hour, 12 September 2013.

70

Japan too, in the final year of the war was only a spectator. Once its powerful navy has been
destroyed, once its formidable air force was unable to effectively intercept Allied bombings on its
infrastructure and population, once its fearless army was starving and without useable weapons
Japan was finished. No matter that there were still millions of troops and people willing to fight.
Other resources needed to support them have been spent and USAs will to bring Japan in surrender
could not anymore be thwarted by any effective counterstrategy. What Japan tried and what almost
became effective, was the bombing of mainland USA by using inflammable air balloons. These
were carried from Japan via a natural air current across thousands of kilometers of Pacific Ocean
and descended into western USA causing fires and destruction. This strategy of using natural
phenomenon to deliver destruction directly to USA was a potent weapon. But Japan had no
intelligence data on whether is this strategy successful or not. So the strategy was formidable but
could not be effectively used without combining with other resources as Japan didnt had them.
For this reason it remains just an interesting attempt, because on the grand scheme of things it
made no effect on the outcome of Japans fate. Japan simply had no more strategic resources that
could be used against USA, especially when it showed technological superiority and dropped
nuclear weapons on its mainland. Its leaders were faced with a simple option admit defeat or
suffer utter destruction of its people. Japan had to change its own cultural understanding of war to
survive. 128
Strategic position - conclusion
Strategically superior side is considered to be the one that has more strategic resources at its
disposal and as a consequence is more likely to prevail in the conflict. As I wrote earlier, everything
what can be used to achieve objectives can be considered strategic resource. Even if, for example
one military organization has more material resources, the other might have considerable
advantage in technology and therefore it is strategically superior. There is no universal rule on how
Military strategy is highly complex due to the fact that only ones innovative capabilities, social posture or lack
resources can limit its strategic thinking. Almost anything could be a strategic resource. It depends purely on the
strategy chosen to achieve important objectives. For example in (ex-?)Ukrainian128 city of Sevastopol, there is an
important center of marine biology research. In particular, studying and training of dolphins has been conducted in
the city since the end of World War II. It was first conducted as a secret naval program to use the animals for special
undersea operations. Bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncates), who naturally inhabit the Black Sea, were chosen as
future subversives, set to infiltrate enemy lines, mine warships and counteract military swimmers. For that purpose
dolphins were properly armed with knives and underwater pistols fixed on their heads and specially designed baldric
for mine carriage. So when we speak of strategic resources in this dissertation reader should know that really
everything is a potential resource. It is only a matter is it or not important for a certain strategy. Strategy will be as
innovative as are the planners behind it.
128

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can we determine who is in a more favorable strategic position, because it varies in every specific
situation. Generally speaking we could examine who has stronger economy; more numerous armed
forces, better trained and equipped, logistical and organizational skills, technological development,
will to fight (national unity), diplomatic relations etc. Few have put it in words better than one of
historys most prominent strategist, US general William Tecumseh Sherman at the outbreak of US
Civil War (1861-1865):
You people of the South dont know what you are doing. This country will be drenched in blood,
and God only knows how it will end. It is all folly, madness, a crime against civilization! You
people speak so lightly of war; you dont know what youre talking about. War is a terrible thing!
You mistake, too, the people of the North. They are a peaceable people but an earnest people, and
they will fight, too. They are not going to let this country be destroyed without a mighty effort to
save it. Besides, where are your men and appliances of war to contend against them? The North
can make a steam engine, locomotive, or railway car; hardly a yard of cloth or pair of shoes can
you make. You are rushing into war with one of the most powerful, ingeniously mechanical, and
determined people on Earth right at your doors Only in your spirit and determination are
you prepared for war. In all else you are totally unprepared, with a bad cause to start with. At first
you will make headway, but as your limited resources begin to fail, shut out from the markets of
Europe as you will be, your cause will begin to wane. If your people will but stop and think, they
must see in the end that you will surely fail.129

129

Foote S., The Civil War: A Narrative: Volume 1: Fort Sumter to Perryville, Random House LLC, 2011, p. 59.

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2. What is war?
You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will. War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it.
W.T. Sherman
When we speak of war, the same as with strategy, it is difficult to define it. In this section will
briefly discuss war from different points of view and conclude with my own definition from a
strategic perspective.
Taking into consideration numerous definitions of war, I will first mention Correlates of War. Project established by Singer and based on his book with Small, The wages of war, 1816-1965: a
statistical handbook first identified the classification of war as being organized armed violent
conflict with at least 1000 battle-deaths per calendar year.130 This project also was the first to
differentiate conflicts as being interstate, intrastate and extra state (colonial). 131 In defining the
concept of war Singer and Small used the terms of wars severity (total battle deaths), its magnitude
(duration) or its intensity (battle deaths per year). 132 Modern publications like Correlates of War,
Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and Royal Air
Force will make synonymous the terms of armed conflict and war. 133 Other institutions like United
States Strategic Studies Institute defined war not necessarily as an armed conflict but as a range
of hostile actions designed to weaken a state.134 This is a more strategic orientated definition
towards which I would be most prone. However war according to this kind of definition would be
a category which is difficult to measure and classify.

130

Ivan Arreguin-Toft also accepts this definition of a war being an armed conflict with more than 1000 battle
deaths per year. Arreguin-Toft I., How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, Cambridge University
Press, 2005, p. 94.
131
See in Singer J. D., Small M., The wages of war, 1816-1965: a statistical handbook, Wiley, 1972.
Originally authors used terms of civil war and extra-systemic war, which they replaced with a new typology naming
them intrastate wars and extra state wars. Sarkees M., Wayman F., Singer D., Inter-State, Intra-State, and ExtraState-Wars: A Comprehensive Look at Their Distribution over Time, 18161997, International Studies Quarterly
47, International Studies Association, Blackwell publishing, 2003, p. 49.
132
Correlates of War Project, State System Membership List Codebook Version 2011, University of Illinois-The
Pennsylvania State University, 2011, p. 8. Link: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/state-systemmembership/state-codebook-2011
133
SIPRI identifies war with major armed conflict. See Habrom L., Walensteen P., Appendix 2A: Patterns of major
armed conflicts 1999-2008, SIPRI project 2009, p. 76.
134
This may take the form of cyber-attacks from unidentified sources, engineered economic crises, or even
pandemics. Thus, the argument goes, a nation may be at war without knowing it. Metz S., Cuccia P. (eds.), Defining
War for the 21st Century, 2010 Strategic Studies Institute Annual Strategy Conference Report, SSI publication,
2011, p. 9.

73

The approach developed at Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research sees war within
the term of political conflict. Institute in its annual publication Conflict Barometer 2013 report
defines war as a positional difference, regarding values relevant to the society the conflict items
between at least two decisive and directly involved actors, which is being carried out using
observable and interrelated conflict measures that lie outside established regulatory procedures
and threaten core state functions, the international order or hold out the prospect to do so.135 War
is the highest on the intensity level political conflict form. Scale of political conflict can be
observed through the aspects of conflict actors, conflict measures and conflict items. Conflict
actors are defined as either an individual, a state, an international organization or a non-state
actor. Collective conflict actors are distinguished from one another through their internal cohesion
and internally shared goals. An actor is regarded as decisive if his existence, actions and
communications considerably alter the practices of at least one other conflict actor pertaining
conflict items.136 Conflict items are material or immaterial goods pursued by conflict actors via
conflict measures. And conflict measures are actions and communications carried out by a conflict
actor in the context of a political conflict. Heidelberg Institute distinguishes political conflict
between disputes, non-violent crises, violent crises, limited wars and wars. 137 The key factor is the
level of violence involved. Disputes and non-violent crises are classified as non-violent. Violent
conflicts, limited wars and wars are violent conflicts. Violent crisis is a medium intensity conflict
and limited war and war are high intensity political conflicts. Between limited war and war, the
latter is higher in the scale of intensity, involved personnel and destruction caused by violence.
Another study of war is Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), housed at Department of Peace
and Conflict Research of the Uppsala University in Sweden. This data collection project on
organized violence, refers to war as an armed conflict with more than 1000 battle deaths per year.
Armed conflicts are referred to as dyads and are made up of two armed and opposing actors. They
are a consequence of a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory. 138
135

Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, Conflict Barometer 2013 report, No. 22, Heidelberg
University, 2013, p. 8. Link: http://hiik.de/de/downloads/data/downloads_2013/ConflictBarometer2013.pdf
136
Ibidem.
137
Ibid, p. 9.
138
Incompatibility concerning government and incompatibility concerning territory are both state-based.
Incompatibility which is concerning government is concerning the type of political system, the replacement of the
central government or the change of its composition. Incompatibility which is concerning territory is concerning the
status of a specified territory, for example the change of the state in control of a certain territory, secession or
autonomy. Link: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/#incompatibility (19/02/15).

74

Incompatibility is a stated (writing, verbal) incompatible position between parties for which an
armed conflict is fought.139 Incompatibility can be between different states and between states and
non-states. Armed conflicts are fought with arms which can be any material means varying from
manufactured weapons to sticks and stones. These armed conflicts can vary in terms of intensity
level, geographical region and type in relation to a state. When it comes to intensity main parameter
is the number of battle related deaths. According to which armed conflicts are regarded either as
major, with more than a 1000 battle related deaths, or a minor with less than a 1000. If it is more
than a 1000 it is classified as war. Minimum battles deaths per calendar year to be classified as
conflict is 25.140 Two main categories of conflicts can be distinguished as being state and nonstate. State conflict is the one in which one of the actors is a government of a state, and non-state
conflict is the one in which none of the warring parties are a government. Interstate conflicts
describe armed conflicts between two or more governments. Intrastate conflicts are those in which
one of the parties is a state and other is non-state. 141
Furthermore, Royal Air Force measures wars by a simple categorization of conflicts based on their
intensity. General war between major powers is viewed as the highest form of intensity. This type
of conflict includes the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Lower on the scale
is limited conflict or limited war which stands for an international conflict short of general war.
Lowest is regional conflict or regional war which describes a conflict arising over regional issues.

139

The incompatibility criterion is only applicable to state-based conflicts and is not a prerequisite for non-state
conflicts and one-sided violence. Armed conflicts are only those in which one of the actors is a state. If none of the
engaged parties are classified as a state then this conflict is referred to as non-state.
Link: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/#incompatibility_2 (05/02/15).
140
UCDP differentiates four categories, war and minor conflict, non-state conflict and peace. Peace is referred
within the concept of a peace agreement which is defined a formal agreement between warring parties, which
addresses the disputed incompatibility, either by settling all or part of it, or by clearly outlining a process for how the
warring parties plan to regulate the incompatibility. Link:
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/#Peace_agreement (19/05/15).
For complete definitions and data of the UCDP see in UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook1, Version 42014a presented in Themnr L., Wallensteen P., Armed Conflict: 1946-2013, Journal of Peace Research, 51:4,
2014. For all definitions from the UCDP visit the website http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/
(05/02/15).
141
Intrastate conflicts may be further subdivided into: civil wars, which are fought for control of an existing
government; state-formation/secessionist conflicts, which are fought between a government and a territorially
focused opposition group that is seeking to redraw the borders of the existing state. Other categories of conflict
include: internationalized intrastate armed conflict between the government of a state and internal opposition groups
but with additional intervention from other states in the form of troops; extra-state armed conflict between a state
and a non-state group outside that states territory; and non-state armed conflicts which stands for organized,
collective armed violence where a recognized government is not one of the parties. Examples might include violent
intercommunal conflicts or fighting between warlords and clans. Williams, Security Studies, p. 158.

75

Other types of conflicts are classified as civil wars, insurgency and terrorism. 142 Types of legally
permitted operations to resolve conflicts are described in table 5.
Table 5: Types of operations to resolve conflicts according to RAF
Preventative Diplomacy

Diplomatic action taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent

or limit violence.

Conflict Prevention and

Deployment of operational forces possessing sufficient deterrence

Defense Diplomacy

capability to avoid a conflict.

Peace Support

Multi-functional operations conducted impartially in support of an

Operations

appropriate legal authority, involving military forces and diplomatic

and humanitarian agencies.

Peacekeeping

Operations which are generally undertaken under Chapter VI of the

UN Charter with the consent of all the major parties to a conflict.
Peacekeeping operations may involve the requirement to monitor
and facilitate the implementation of a peace agreement.

Peace Enforcement

Operations which are coercive in nature and undertaken under

Chapter VII of the UN Charter when the consent of any of the
major parties to the conflict is uncertain. They are designed to
maintain and re-establish peace or enforce the terms specified in the
mandate.

Post-Conflict Activity

Actions which support political, economic, social, and military

and Peace Building

measures and structures, aiming to strengthen and solidify political

settlements in order to redress the causes of conflict.

Humanitarian

Operations which are conducted to relieve human suffering.

Operations
Source: Prepared by author using the classification of Peach S. W. (ed.), British Air Power Doctrine (3rd edition):
Chapter 1, The Nature Of Conflict, United Kingdom Ministry of Defense publication, 1999, pp. 7-10.

142

Peach S. W. (ed.), British Air Power Doctrine (3rd edition): Chapter 1, The Nature Of Conflict, United Kingdom
Ministry of Defense publication, 1999, pp. 5-7.

76

L. Malone in International Law also identified armed conflict and war to be different terms for the
same phenomenon. But has also suggested that in a legal understanding there are different
approaches regarding war and armed conflict. In a narrow sense war is a category which occurs
only in circumstances when at least one of the states involved actually declares a war. A broader
term could involve any armed activities between states or citizens in the same state. Armed conflict
also could encompass a hostility which is not intensive enough to be classified as war. More often
armed conflict describes any state of armed hostilities including declared wars. 143
R. Glossop in Confronting War (1983) offered a definition containing four elements according to
which a conflict is determined to be war: a) large-scale violent conflict, b) between organized
groups, c) which are or aim to be governments, and d) over some territory. According to these
conditions war is a large scale violent conflict between organized groups which already are
governments or which seek to establish their own government over some territory. 144 He
differentiates war to be only limited for civilized societies, those which have some form of
government. In Glossops understanding government is an acknowledged political authority which
makes and enforces laws. Conflicts between primitive societies he classifies as primitive warfare
which serve more ritual than actual purpose and does not consider to be war.145
International humanitarian law defined by Geneva conventions (1949, 1977) identifies three
different types of war or armed conflicts: a) international armed conflicts; b) wars of national
liberation between a colonial power and people fighting for self-determination; c) noninternational armed conflicts between a state and at least one rebel group, or between rebel
groups. International armed conflict exists when two states participate in war and this includes
intervention of a state into a territory of another state which is fighting a rebel group on its own
territory.146
H. Bull in The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics (1977) defined war as
organized violence carried out by political units against each other. Violence is not war unless it
is carried out in the name of a political unit; what distinguishes killing in war from murder is its
143

Malone L. A., International Law, Aspen Publishers Online, 2008, p. 127.

Glossop R. J., Confronting War: An Examination of Humanitys Most Pressing Problem (4 th edition), McFarland,
1983, p. 10.
145
Ibidem.
146
Doria J., Peace and Justice in Angola in Fischer H., McDonald A. (eds.), Yearbook of International
Humanitarian Law, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 19.
144

77

vicarious and official character, the symbolic responsibility of the unit whose agent the killer is.
Equally, violence carried out in the name of a political unit is not war unless it is directed against
another political unit.147
From an anthropological point of view, R. Kelly in Warless Societies and the Origin of War (2000)
defines war as an act of lethal violence which has seven elements: a) it is collectively carried out;
b) it is collectively sanctioned by the community; c) it is morally justified by the participants; d)
its participants are esteemed by members of their community; e) the acts are organized, planned
and premeditated; f) the acts serve an instrumental objective; and g) the principle of social
substitutability applies to the targets. Social substitutability is the idea that any member of the
enemy group is legitimate target for revenge or retaliatory blood vengeance.148 Another
anthropologist K. Otterbein defined war as armed combat between political communities. 149
Armed combat is fighting with weapons and political community is an organization which has a
territory and a leader (formal or informal). For Otterbein key aspect in war is culture, term
describing a particular group of people which share the same way of life. 150 He differentiates two
types of war, internal and external war. Internal war is the one fought by political communities
which belong to the same culture, and external war between different cultures. 151
Q. Wright in A Study of War (1964) defined war in the broadest sense as a violent contact of
distinct but similar entities.152 Starting from the definitions of Clausewitz which states that war is
an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will, Ciceros contending by
force and Grotius legal condition between juridical equals that is declared and which regulates
the way those contending by force behave - Wright continued to examine war from four different
points of view. Legalistic, technological, sociological, psychological, deterministic and

147

Bull H., The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (4th edition), Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p.
178.
Violence employed by the state in the execution of criminals or the suppression of pirates does not qualify according
to Bull because it is directed against individuals. To this I would not agree as in my view, actions of the state against
organized crime are also eligible to be called war. Examples could include wars of the Italian state versus Mafia in
1960-80s and present-day Mexican drug war.
148
Kelly R. C., Warless Societies and the Origin of War, University of Michigan Press, 2000, pp. 2-5.
149
Otterbein K. F., How War Began, Texas A&M University Press, 2004, p. 10.
150
Furthermore he identifies culture to be the same as a language in the sense that if a political community speaks
the same language they belong to the same culture, but with this segment I disagree as it cannot be universally
applied.
151
Otterbein K. F., The Anthropology of War, Waveland Press, 2009, pp. 37-39.
152
Wright Q., A Study of War, University of Chicago Press, 1983, pp. 5-7.

78

voluntaristic view developed Wrights narrow definition of war being a state of law and form of
conflict involving a high degree of legal equality, of hostility, and of violence in the relations in
organized human groups, or simpler the legal conditions which permits two or more hostile
groups to carry on a conflict by armed force.153
M. Sheehan in Collins (ed.), Contemporary Security Studies identified several key points
concerning war. First, that it remains a legitimate instrument of national policy for states. Second,
war between the major powers risks consequences that have dramatically reduced its
attractiveness. Third, technological and doctrinal changes may be driving a revolution in military
affairs.154 And final, since 1991 the dominant form of warfare has been intrastate rather than interstate.155
From a philosophical point several views could be pointed out. Historicism suggests that war and
conflict in general are catalysts of change, and without it humanity could not progress. 156
Metaphysical philosophy sees the need for the human body to be involved in a war which will end
all wars and possibly bring about a golden age of prosperity. 157 Eschatological philosophy revolves
around the idea that history, or at least some portion of history, will culminate in a final war leading
to the revelation of some grand design divine, natural, or human. Cataclysmic philosophy sees
war as a catastrophe that befalls some portion of humanity or the entire human race. According to
political philosophy war is compared to a game of strategy, like chess. 158 Existentialism sees war
as the product of human choices.159 Christian philosophy finds the causes of war in human
imperfection and sinful nature.160 Platonic philosophy observes war through prism of human
dualistic nature of which one strives towards perfection and the other falls into darkness and
destruction. According to it war is irrational and a consequence of troublesome nature of the human

153

Ibid, pp. 108-115.

See section Trends in modern warfare of the dissertation.
155
Sheehan M., Military Security in Collins A. (ed.), Contemporary Security Studies, Oxford University Press, 2013,
pp. 151-152. If, during a conflict, an insurgent group manages to establish control over an area of territory which
achieves recognition as a sovereign state, the nature of the conflict can change from intra-state to inter-state. For
example, the recognition of Croatia in 1992 changed the nature of the conflict in the Former Republic of
Yugoslavia. Peach, British Air Power Doctrine, p. 3.
156
Moseley A., A Philosophy of War, Algora Publishing, 2007, p. 215.
157
Ibid, p. 219.
158
Williams, Security Studies, pp. 152-154.
159
Moseley, p. 53.
160
Ibid, p. 60.
154

79

soul. 161 Unlike Plato, Marxist philosophy does not accept dualist human nature, instead it relates
around the idea that man is a product of his social class and in turn his class is a product of
economic system. This system governs the manner and content of his thought. War is a product of
class antagonism, a struggle between the classes. The abolition of war, according to Marx can only
come through the collapse of class systems through communist revolution. 162
S. Malasevic in The Sociology of War and Violence abandoned the approach to interpreted war
and other forms of organized violence in biological, cultural, individualist or collective rationalist
terms. 163 Instead he shifted the focus towards the role of organization and ideology. More
specifically, he analyzed the relationship between war, violence and the social through the prism
of two historical processes which in his view are paramount in accounting for the dramatic rise of
organized violence in modernity. Crucial are the cumulative bureaucratization of coercion and the
centrifugal (mass) ideologization. Thus building on the sentence of A. Collins if it were not
socially well organized, wide-participation fighting would not be possible.164 Furthermore
Maleevi in his studies points out that: historically speaking, it was warfare that gave birth to,
and consequently depended on the existence of, large-scale social organizations. This process of
bureaucratization which in its rudimentary form emerged with the birth of warfare in the late
Mesolithic era has been constantly expanding since. He explained that the coercive power of social
organizations, most recently taking the dominant form of nation-states, has increased over the last
10,000 years and has dramatically intensified over that last 200 years. Not only have the modern
social organizations, such as states, managed to monopolize the use of violence over huge stretches
of their territory thus eventually covering most of the globe, but they have also gradually become
capable of mobilizing and recruiting entire societies for warfare and have spectacularly multiplied
the numbers of those killed in conflicts.165 Maleevi calls this process bureaucratization of
coercion, and identifies its cumulative nature. States have the ability to cumulatively increase the
organizational capability for destruction. Also this process entails ever-expanding bureaucratic
rationalization in the Weberian sense, which originate from the military domain. And finally
bureaucratization of coercion is coercive since it involves not only the control and employment of

161

Ibid, p. 57.
Ibid, pp. 61-62.
163
Like Moseley in A Philosophy of War did for example.
164
Maleevi S., The Sociology of War and Violence, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 5.
165
Ibid, p. 6.
162

80

violence and the waging of wars, but it is also able to internally pacify social order by establishing
the monopolistic threat on the use of violence. 166 Institutions of the state originate in the needs of
war.167 According to Maleevi, classics of sociology were already aware that to understand and
explain the origins and function of state, private property and social stratification one needs to take
a careful analytical look at warfare. He concludes that is war that gave birth to state and it is war
that was decisive for the proliferation of social inequalities.168
J. Keegan in A History of Warfare started his first sentence as war not being the continuation of
policy by other means169 immediately disagreeing with Clausewitzs famous thought. Instead,
Keegan defined war as not only warfare, but also as a cultural entity, whose practice is not linked
to any single type of political organization or society. According to him war is the universal
phenomenon whose form and scope is defined by the society that wages it.170 Warfare looks
different and conjures up different meanings depending on where and when in human history the
analyst decides to look. As Keegan concludes war is always an expression of culture, often a
determinant of cultural forms, in some societies the culture itself.171
Up to a certain point, Keegan is right. That is if we were to simplify Clausewitzs sentence and try
to in a way copy/paste it into every single war that has happened. However I do not see the
statement War is the continuation of Politik by other means172 as necessarily false. A deeper,
more philosophical approach to the matter leaves me with a conclusion that Clausewitz is in fact
right (once again) and Keegan mistaken. The key question is what is hiding behind the expressions
of Politik and other means? Let us for a moment try to imagine things this way: Politik is
the idea; strategy is the plan on how this idea will be achieved; and various resources are the power
(other means), a current of energy which goes on where strategy leads it. When this current
reaches an obstacle it will behave intelligently guided by strategy it can overcome this obstacle
by force, bypass it or perish. When it decides to overcome an obstacle by force a whole new
violent nacre emerges. This is why the essence of war cannot be qualified as anything else than

166

Ibid, pp. 7-8.

Maleevi S., Sociological Theory and Warfare, Swedish National Defense College, Department of Leadership
and Management publication, 2011, p. 6.
168
Ibid, p. 16.
169
Keegan, A History of Warfare, p. 1.
170
Ibid, pp. 3-12.
171
Williams, Security Studies, p. 157.
172
Intentionally used word Politik.
167

81

hell. For those who have experienced war first hand this is precisely what it is about. Clausewitzs
other means, are in fact violent powers materialized in such a way to impose the will by force.
Where Keegan could be right, is in the observation that war indeed goes on even when there is no
will to oppose it. Such examples are massacres and other barbaric warfare methods.173 This is still
war, it is just that one will (strategy) in the violent equation has no resources to defend itself against
the massacre.174 And the others strategic culture has formulated such a strategy to harm noncombatants, either for political or economic reasons.
J. C. Garnett in Baylis (ed.), Strategy in the Contemporary World (2013) argued that: No clear
authoritative answer has emerged, and perhaps one never will, to the question Why War? One of
the reasons for this is that the word war is a blanket term used to describe diverse activities. There
are total wars and limited wars, regional wars and world wars, conventional wars and nuclear
wars, high technology wars and low-technology wars, interstate wars and civil wars, insurgency
wars and ethnic wars. In recent years, wars have also been fought by coalitions on behalf of the
international community. It would be very surprising if these widely different activities linked
only by the fact that they involve organized military violence could be explained in the same
way.175 Furthermore he points out that even if war is not caused by human nature but by human
behavior therefore it can be modified. Garnett continues with the argument that nuclear deterrent
strategist hardly care why wars occur, for them it is enough the fact that people prefer to live than
to die. Therefore if the potential consequence of waging war are so bad, nobody will dare to make
an aggressive move.176 And with this concept I can easily agree. Is the human nature fatally flawed
or is it simply the behavioral circumstances which drives people to war? I am not qualified to
answer this question, but I would like to think it is the latter. In the world where others are behaving
badly and violently sometimes the only way to survive is to behave violently too. Turning the other
cheek is seldom an option.177

173

One-sided violence according to Uppsala Conflict Data Program.

For example UCDP does not qualify one-sided violence as war.
175
Baylis, p. 22.
176
Ibidem.
177
Ibid, p. 26.
174

82

Table 6: Different views on war

M. T. Cicero

War is a contention by force.

Hugo Grotius

War is a state of contending parties, considered as such.

Denis Diderot

War is convulsive and violent disease of the body public.

Karl von Clausewitz

War is a continuation of political intercourse with the intermixing of

other means.

Risieri Frondizi

War does not exist, what exists are wars, in the plural, ranging from
tribal skirmishes to World War II.

Alexander Moseley

War is a state of organized open-ended collective conflict.

John Keegan

War is not a continuation of policy with other means, but a violent

expression of culture which every society has defined for itself.

Conflict Barometer

War within the term of political conflict, is as a positional difference,

Report project

regarding values relevant to the society the conflict items between

at least two decisive and directly involved actors, which is being
carried out using observable and interrelated conflict measures that lie
outside established regulatory procedures and threaten core state
functions, the international order or hold out the prospect to do so.

L. Themnr and P.

War is an armed conflict with more than 1000 battle deaths per year.

Wallensteen

Armed conflict are dyads made up of at least two armed and opposing
actors. They are a consequence of a contested incompatibility that
concerns government and/or territory.

Linda Malone

War in a broader sense is a category which occurs only in

circumstances when at least one of the states involved actually declares
a war.

Ronald Glossop

War is a large scale violent conflict between organized groups which

already are governments or which seek to establish their own
government over some territory.

Hedley Bull

War is organized violence carried out by political units against each

other. Violence is not war unless it is carried out in the name of a
political unit; what distinguishes killing in war from murder is its

83

vicarious and official character, the symbolic responsibility of the unit

whose agent the killer is. Equally, violence carried out in the name of a
political unit is not war unless it is directed against another political
unit.
Keith Otterbein

War is an armed combat between political communities.

Quincy Wright

War is a violent contact of distinct but similar entities.

War is a state of law and form of conflict involving a high degree of
legal equality, of hostility, and of violence in the relations in organized
human groups, or simpler the legal conditions which permits two or
more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by armed force.

Alastair Finlan

War is a social environment characterized by a state of armed conflict

or sustained military action between nation-states/groups of people.

William T. Sherman

You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will. War is cruelty and
you cannot refine it.
War is hell.

Sources: Moseley A., A Philosophy of War, Algora Publishing, 2007, pp. 13-14; Keegan J., A History of Warfare,
Hutchinson, 1993, p. 1; Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, Conflict Barometer 2013 report, No.
22, Heidelberg University, 2013, p. 8; Themnr L., Wallensteen P., Armed Conflict: 1946-2013, Journal of Peace
Research, 51:4, 2014; Malone L. A., International Law, Aspen Publishers Online, 2008, p. 127; Glossop R. J.,
Confronting War: An Examination of Humanitys Most Pressing Problem (4th edition), McFarland, 1983, p. 10; Bull
H., The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (4 th edition), Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 178;
Otterbein K. F., How War Began, Texas A&M University Press, 2004, p. 10; Wright Q., A Study of War, University
of Chicago Press, 1983, pp. 5-7, 108-115; Sherman W. T., William T. Shermans personal narrative of his march
through Georgia, Beehive Press, 1974, p. 4; Tomes R., Smith G. B., The War with the South: A History of the Late
Rebellion, with Biographical Sketches of Leading Statesmen and Distinguished Naval and Military Commanders
Volume 3, Virture & Yorston, 1862, p. 408; Finlan A., Contemporary Military Strategy and the Global War on Terror:
US and UK Armed Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq 2001-2012, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014, p. 1.

My view of strategy and war does not quite fit into any of these explanations. I find another
Clausewitzs sentence much more suitable and similar to my view of war and strategy. He wrote
that war is a battle of wills, a struggle in which each party uses physical force in an attempt to
bend the will of the others to its own. 178 Also Angstrom and Widen in Contemporary Military

178

Kubiak J. J., War Narratives and the American National Will in War, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 6.

84

Theory: The Dynamics of War have identified war as duel of opposing wills where it is vital to
impose ones will on the adversary. 179 And following this line of thinking I define war as a state
of violent manifestation of conflicting strategies. With this I am offering a possible explanation
to all the different kinds of wars and why war? This manifested violence does not have to be
between materially opposing strategies, some strategies do not have the resources to support this
opposition, and war can also be one-sided violence, a manifestation of strategy of barbarism. It is
still war and in its most savage form. I can accept the logic behind classifications developed by the
Heidelberg Institute disputes, non-violent, violent, limited war and war. But from a strategic
point of view, there is little difference between war and peace (or anything in between these two)
if there is a conflict of strategies present. These are just different sides of the same coin. The only
question which remains to measure the intensity of war is how much an actor will invest to
accomplish his strategy? And I see this parameter to be determined by culture.

2.1. Evolution of modern western warfare

Modern war has changed its face.
After every big conflict change becomes evident. In the course of the last one hundred years human
civilization saw three global wars among world powers. Each of those wars was fought differently
and followed a different pattern. Last of them being the Cold war in which two superpowers fought
for domination in a very narrow arena. I say narrow because it was limited by fear of mutually
assured destruction (MAD). And sometime during the final days of the Cold War era it became
obvious that war has, once again changed. Most of the scientific and decision making body has
noticed the change but not all have understood it. Technological advancement went so far that old
rules and doctrines simply no longer applied.
War consists of many factors of which (in my view) the most important ones are technological,
social and political. And all of these aspects are subject to constant change over time. But the
crucial aspect of war its nature, has remained the same since the dawn of humans. War is still as
ugly as it always was. It is still about causing destruction and imposing will by force of one to

179

Angstrom J., Widen J. J., Contemporary Military Theory: The Dynamics of War, Routledge, 2014, p. 54.

85

another. It is still the most challenging of all human activities and still the most tragic one.
Clausewitz teaches us that all wars are things of the same nature.180
So what exactly has changed about war?
Wars manifestation warfare, has changed. Warfare is the act of making war. War is a
relationship between two or more states or, if a civil war, two or more groups. Warfare is only a
part of war, although the essential part.181 But there is more to war than warfare. War is about the
peace it will shape. 182 Modern military capabilities have progressed in terms of technology,
organization and doctrine, but the general nature of war has not changed at all. War is still the
same and it is likely to remain such in the future. Wars social, cultural and political contexts have
seen significant changes just in the course of the last one hundred years. Each of the three major
wars183, World War I, World War II and Cold War brought new elements into war making. As
Thucydides put it in words, the motivation to go to war is fear, honor or interest.184 And the priority
between this triad has changed with each of the mentioned major wars. It could be said that in
WWI nations went primarily out of honor, interest and fear; in WWII out of interest, honor, and
fear; and to Cold War out of fear, interest and honor.185
Every previous war learned the surviving generation about the future. The most valuable lesson,
not to go to war at all, has apparently been learned in the Cold War. Because the two blocks clashed
in almost every context except in warfare. If war is about the peace it will shape, and what peace
would it be for human civilization to destroy itself? In the case of the Cold War fear was the
primary motivation to go to war, far greater than any sense of pride, honor or interest which either
side could gain. However fear of MAD was also the primary reason why not to go to war, or better
said avoid warfare at all costs. Technological advancement has become so great that both sides
180

Clausewitz, p. 606.
Browning P., The Changing Nature of Warfare: The Development of Land Warfare from 1792 to 1945,
Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 2.
182
Gray C. S., How Has War Changed since the End of the Cold War, Parameters, Vol. 35, 2005, p. 21.
I believe this to be true except if the war is being conducted by a warlike society which cannot exist in a state of
peace, and it sees war as a mean to perpetuate its own cultural existence. As previously stated by Keegan, war is
sometimes the culture itself.
183
Major War is a war in which great powers are involved, that is fought on the highest level of intensity and where
there is a strong possibility that one of these great powers may be eliminated as a sovereign state. For methodology
of definition of a major war see in Copeland D. C., The Origins of Major War, Cornell University Press, 2001, p. 27.
184
Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, 431 BC, translation by Richard Crawley. Link:
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/7142/7142-h/7142-h.htm (13/1/13).
185
See in Lebow R. N., A Cultural Theory of International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 2008.
181

86

had weapons so terrible that they would nullify all other advancements in doctrine, training,
organization and leadership of conventional armed forces.
WWI was planned as mobile warfare only to be quickly realized by all parties that technology has
advanced in the terms of destruction but not protection of ones own forces. Millions of youth in
their prime years were killed due to the fact that doctrine and protection did not catch up with
technological advancement. Armies, to save their soldiers, went in trenches from which neither
side was able to effectively make any rapid advance without heavy losses.
WWII was prepared by most to be another trench conflict only to be proven otherwise by the
Germans. Their doctrinal and technological development surpassed everyone elses, but
overestimation of their own capabilities by their leader, seriously backfired on them. WWII was
fought between nations and people who had very much different views on what is war and how
should it be fought. For this reason WWII saw a huge destruction of life after the war was over.
Atrocities committed by the Soviets and other Communist armies, such as Yugoslav partisans,
almost surpassed the ones committed by Fascist regimes and armies during the war. And for the
first time in recent history the World saw what happens when different cultures clash. Clausewitz
witnessed a slaughter of defeated French troops by Cossacks and he was disgusted by it. What he
failed to see that it is not an isolated event due to the bestiality of people in cold and inhospitable
Russia. 186 It is the way they make war. He was in the mind frame of European way of war making.
In his view it was horrible what he witnessed, but why would it be less horrible to make war in
any other way? It is just different culture of war making, manifested in another, more savage
manner.
Fascist regimes organized mass killings and concentration camps in which millions lost their lives.
It was in accordance to their social and political beliefs. Communists unleashed unprecedented
rape, loot and slaughter of an already defeated and broken enemy. This too was in accordance of
their social and political beliefs of war making. From a moral point of view, was it more human:
when Napoleons soldiers shoot captured Spanish guerrillas or when these same French were
slaughtered by Cossacks when they were already a broken army? Was it more just for the British

186

Keegan, A History of Warfare, p. 6-8.

87

and Americans to allow and up to an extent participate, in the mass slaughter committed by their
Communistic allies?187 War has many faces and neither of them is kind.
It is precisely because West saw the extent of brutality with which Soviet Union wages war, that
it became afraid of the possibility of such a war. And this fear led the West to start technological
and economical race to deterrent any hostile ideas coming from the Eastern bloc. In the terms of
warfare every new major war is different than the previous one. Cold War was initiated by fear so
great that it changed war making up to a point in which warfare itself became obsolete. But still it
was a war whose nature was exactly the same as many other wars fought before it. Technology
and social development change war making and war understanding, but not war itself.
One of the few differences which come with technologic development, is that every new war sees
more and more killing being possible to commit on a distance. Since the invention of spear, sling,
bow and arrow to the present day drones and guided missiles killing on distance heavily
influences war making. It is psychologically easier to kill on distance. How effective will it be,
depends on how advanced and accurate is the technology.
Also nothing has changed when it comes to morality of war. Media brings images of war to our
homes on a daily basis, and despite apparent disgust still people are willing to hurt the other, still
many are willing to go to war. Humans and war still have the same nature as they did at the dawn
of their civilization. I offer the following formula to define morality of war (see diagram 3).

187

Disarming and returning the POWs only to be massacred by the Communists, as in the example of Bleiburg
massacre 1945.

88

Diagram 3: Formula on the morality of war

prestige

sense of security
make war
yes/no

sense of fear

interest

Source: Developed by the author.

And as long as people are feeling comfortable in their own safety, they will judge and protest
against the violence which someone else, somewhere else, is committing in their name. But as
soon as fear creeps into peoples homes and disrupts their own peace comfort it becomes evident
that they are much more tolerant when it comes to hurting someone somewhere.
Therefore nations are likely to opt for war if their security is violated. This violation can be either
that they are under attack from another actor or that they see the potential of improving their
security status by being the aggressive side. In the second case, the attacker is improving its own
sense of security by going to war to eliminate the potential threat and ensure resources. I believe
that current debelicization of the West will shatter like a tower of cards once the times of strategic
insecurity come back. As stated before, it was primarily out of fear, then interest and finally honor,
that after the end of WWII and destruction of the Third Reich and its allies the World was divided
into two huge political blocs. Each of them identified the other as its principal threat. NATO was
formed as a direct response to sense of shaken security of Western Europe by rapid Soviet political
and military expansion. Nations grouped because the group offers protection.

89

From the point of view of US General George S. Patton, USA should have attacked Soviet Union
immediately after capitulation of Third Reich. Certainly his idea was not without logic as the
Western Allies had troops already battle hardened and stationed in Europe to do it. In addition to
their own they would have probably been able to count on of what was left of Wehrmacht troops,
as they would likely fight alongside their yesterdays enemy, to expel the Soviets from their
country. Germans and British shared common war making understanding. It was on the Eastern
front where German civilizational norms disappeared under shear weight of brutality with which
war was led. Pattons views on the matter were far thinking. He was stating that:
We promised the Europeans freedom. It would be worse than dishonorable not to see they have
it. This might mean war with the Russians, but what of it? They have no Air Force anymore, their
gasoline and ammunition supplies are low. Ive seen their miserable supply trains; mostly wagons
draw by beaten up old horses or oxen. Ill say this; the Third Army alone with very little help and
with damned few casualties, could lick what is left of the Russians in six weeks. You mark my
words. Dont ever forget them. Someday we will have to fight them and it will take six years and
cost us six million lives. If we have to fight them, now is the time. From now on, we will get weaker
and they will get stronger. Russia knows what it wants. World domination. And she is laying her
plans accordingly. We, on the other hand, and England, and France to a lesser extent, dont know
what we want and get less than nothing as the result. Lets keep our boots polished, bayonets
sharpened, and present a picture of force and strength to the Russians. This is the only language
that they understand and respect. If you fail to do this, then I would like to say that we have had a
victory over the Germans, and have disarmed them, but we have lost the war. I have never seen in
any army at any time, including the German Imperial Army of 1912, as severe discipline as exists
in the Russian Army. The officers, with few exceptions, give the appearance of recently civilized
Mongolian bandits. The men passed in review with a very good imitation of the goose step. They
give me the impression of something that is to be feared in future world political
reorganization.188
Following this logic Operation Unthinkable was a devised by the British to invade Central Europe
and bring into Western wing those territories, primarily Poland its abandoned ally. 189 Anglo188

Province C. M., The unknown Patton, Hippocrene Books, 1983, p. 100. This quotation is unusually long, but I
consciously kept it as only in this form it illustrates the full thought of the great commander.
189
See in Walker J., Operation Unthinkable: The Third World War, The History Press, 2013.

90

American intervention would save many millions in those areas from Soviet atrocities. But it was
not a charity operation, and from the cold and calculated perspective it was obvious that there were
several major obstacles. First of all US were moving its troops towards the Pacific. In order to
deliver a final blow to Japan it was crucial that they remain allied with Soviet Union, as Soviets
had to join the attack in Manchuria. Second, Soviet Union at that time in Europe had deployed
more forces than Western Allies, and as a result had a 4:1 advantage in soldiers and 2:1 in tanks. 190
Third, Europe was tired of fighting. Fourth, what moral high ground did the West had to invade
Soviet Union? And final, what Patton probably didnt know, in summer that same year first the
Japanese and then the rest of the World learned of the new US weapon the atom bomb.
Even though at that point of development, just the bomb itself could not win a war with Soviet
Union, its deployment for the first time once again changed the rules of war.191 USSR made its top
priority to make this weapon and as soon as it did in 1949, the war without warfare became a
reality. Because if two technologically advanced superpowers wage a total war on each other, then
the outcome could only be devastation of such an extent that victory, and peace shaped by this war
would become meaningless. So the only reasonable, self-preserving way was to fight with the
enemy without directly confronting its military. And as the years progressed and technology
advanced with space race it was more than clear that in case of a full scale armed conflict,
subsequent peace would not only be too costly but the whole civilization would cease to exist.
Weapons such as hydrogen bomb, were so advanced that the planet became too small theatre for
military engagement which would include their use. Therefore both sides made sure that they had
enough firepower to destroy the other if attacked, but avoided direct confrontation. Since the
beginning of the Cold War onwards, it was always obvious that it is the USA and NATO who had
technological superiority. Over the span of 45 years Western powers managed to exhaust,
economically and politically, the Soviet Union to finally cause its dissolution in 1991. Warfare
and World have changed once again.
Since then USA has emerged as a single dominant world superpower. Even though modern great
powers such as Russia, China or the EU all possess advanced space and military technologies, no

190

Reynolds D., From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 1940s,
Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 376.
191
The bomb itself could not win the war with Japan either, but a combination of ground and air operations forced
Japan into surrendering.

91

country can even closely match the military power of USA. All the countries combined do not
invest in military as much as USA does. 192 For this reason modern warfare, since 1991 onwards
depends on the military of USA, all wars against USA can only be asymmetric. 193 On one way or
another, no war on the planet can take place without USA to know about it and involve in some
form. 194 Its military and political power have the ability to influence decisions of every state in
the world. But not control, despite the efforts of US to play world police officer. Major powers
such as Russia, China, Britain and France have enough power to deterrent US and make influences
of their own. Other strong actors like Canada, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea all possess
nuclear weapons, and are dominant forces in their own geographical areas. 195 So far the World is
wise enough to hold back from waging a war with these horrible weapons, but this wisdom is
heavily backed by fear. As long as all actors fear mutual destruction they will seek to explore other
possibilities to protect their interests.
To further explain this I use the example of the Wild West era in 19th century USA. If all the settlers
are armed with revolvers then peace is established on a balance of fear. In this environment the
undisputed superpower is US Cavalry. Nobody can match its organizational, technological and
logistical superiority. Major powers are armed gangs of professional gunfighters. Powers are
armed cowboys and settlers. Third rate powers are Indians. Main difference between the Wild West
and todays world is tremendous technologic development. So if any of the strong actors would
pull out their strongest weapons, it would result in planets destruction.

192

Military Expenditure Database and IMF, World Economic Outlook database. Link: http://milexdata.sipri.org/
(13/1/14).
193
Baylis, p. 138.
194
Not involvement is also involvement.
195
Canada officially does not have nuclear weapons anymore, but it can easily develop them if needed. Canadas
nuclear and military power is closely aligned with US policy. However we must keep in mind that Canada has
interests of its own. In this context we observe her refusal to participate in 2003 US invasion of Iraq.
Israel never officially confirmed that it has a nuclear arsenal. However statement from Martin van Creveld gives a
hint that it is true. We possess several hundred atomic warheads and rockets and can launch them at targets in all
directions, perhaps even at Rome. Most European capitals are targets for our air force. Let me quote General
Moshe Dayan: Israel must be like a mad dog, too dangerous to bother. I consider it all hopeless at this point. We
shall have to try to prevent things from coming to that, if at all possible. Our armed forces, however, are not the
thirtieth strongest in the world, but rather the second or third. We have the capability to take the world down with
us. And I can assure you that that will happen before Israel goes under. See The war game, The Observer, 21
September 2003.
South Africa is the only nation that developed nuclear weapons program and then voluntarily (under US political
pressure) abandoned it.
Russia inherited nuclear arsenals of ex-Soviet republics.

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2.2. Trends in modern warfare

War has not changed in its nature, only in its form. In my observation modern warfare in the last
two decades is following these trends:

Wars are fought between asymmetric powers

Interstate wars are diminishing and intrastate war are increasing in number 196

NATO does not employ its full military potential in operations

nations are less willing to go to war
CNN effect
fear of wide scale conflict that would lead to their destruction
resource saving, cost-effectiveness
relying on superior technology to defeat weaker actors

No modern war can be fought without some sort of interference from USA 197

Distinction between land, air and naval warfare is no longer appropriate as wars are always
fought in combined warfare manner

Wars are fought by alliances, organized for political and military protection

Development of information technology, networking and cyber warfare

tremendous technological development led to creation of military-theoretical
hypothesis called Revolution of Military Affairs

Technology makes everything move faster. There is less time to prepare a response to a
situation198

Increased trend of counterinsurgency warfare

196

In 2013 there was 337 intrastate conflicts and 77 interstate ones, see Conflict Barometer 2013, Heidelberg
Institute, p. 17.
197
Quite a bold statement, but a realistic one if we take into account US asymmetrical power over all other World
actors. Simply the existence (presence) of the US economy, policy, diplomacy, information and armed forces make
it a significant actor which influence any conflict, even if USA does not directly involve.
198
In geography this process which took place since the industrial revolution is called time-space convergence.

93

Privatization of security

Let me further explain these statements.

Asymmetry
Arreguin-Toft defined asymmetric warfare as a way of fighting a war between parties whose
relative military power significantly differs from one another.199 But to this I would add that it is
not only military power which is involved, but power in general. Diplomacy, economy, materiel,
manpower, leadership, technology and all other strategic resources enter the equation when
determining the level of asymmetry between actors. Asymmetry is also used to describe
significantly different military strategy (war plan) and tactics (methods) on which warfare between
actors is based. And also actors can be asymmetric in terms of legal status, non-state actors dont
have the same capabilities comparing to state.200 In different words, asymmetric warfare, is warfare
between US cavalry (superpower) and Indians (third rate power). To have any chance of victory
asymmetric (significantly weaker) but resilient opponent chooses asymmetric (significantly
different) military strategy and tactics. Since no known military organization can or is willing to
challenge the power of USA directly, every manifested war that USA by itself or within NATO
has fought since Cold War, was a war against third rate actors Indians.
NATO employs its military arsenal in a limited fashion
NATO alliance was formed to counter Soviet threat, and since it has won in this conflict it would
be natural to expect its dissolution. However it is not so for couple of reasons:
First, NATO could not defeat Soviet bloc by attacking its military, as such an attack would result
in the destruction of the planet. What it could do and what it has done, was to defeat it politically
and economically. But as a result Soviet military power has remained largely intact and was
inherited by modern Russia. It (apparently) does not have the same political aspirations as its
Soviet predecessor, but Russia is still powerful enough to pose a mortal threat to all the NATO
countries. And even though it is avoided to be clearly stated by any party, Russia to this day
remains NATOs principal threat.201 Second threat is China and NATO countries by grouping
ensure not only their military, but also their political protection in pursuing common interests.
199

See in Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars.

But not always, example of failed states.
201
And we can see this more and more clearly since the last few years and events in Libya, Syria and Ukraine.
200

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Second, nations of the NATO countries are less and less willing to go to war. Primarily due to the
comfort of safety which their societies enjoy, followed by sense of moral righteousness not to wage
aggressive wars. But what is not clear to most of them, is that the peace they live in depends
precisely on their countries potential to wage destructive war on anyone who would dare to
obstruct it. So the NATO countries can only count on a small portion of their societies, which, out
of various reasons, are actually willing to go and wage an aggressive war. Great effort is being
used by western governments to portray such wars of interest, as wars of justice to gain the much
needed moral high ground and political permission to conduct it. Therefore these countries jointly
go to wars which protect their interests (primarily those of the USA) with minimum possible troops
and combine their arsenals for maximum effect. During this process tendency is to prevent human
loss as much as possible due to intolerance of their publics to casualties. This is one of the results
of the so-called CNN effect. However as T. Farrell noticed it is a double edged sword:
The fact that the US pulled the plug on its Somali intervention after the loss of eighteen US
Rangers in a fire-fight in October 1993 indicates how capricious public opinion is. Televised
images of starving and dying Somalis had persuaded the out-going Bush administration to launch
a humanitarian rescue mission, but once the US public saw the consequences of this in terms of
dead American being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, the Clinton administration was
forced to announce a timetable for the withdrawal of all US forces from Somalia. What this case
demonstrates is that the CNN factor is a double-edged sword: it can pressurize governments into
humanitarian intervention, yet with equal rapidity, pictures of casualties arriving home can lead
to public disillusionment and calls for withdrawal.202
Since its existence NATO has (to this day) intervened five times, in Bosnia (1995), Serbia (1999),
Afghanistan (2001-2014), Gulf of Aden (2009-ongoing) and Libya (2011). In all of these
interventions we can notice the trend that when NATO goes to war it relies on chirurgical
precision bombing of its high-tech weaponry. Also it does not employ its full military arsenal, but
only restrained means to achieve its objectives.

202

T. Farrel in Baylis, Strategy in the Contemporary World, p. 294.

95

In this context McInnes in Williams (ed.), Security Studies has called this phenomenon spectatorsport wars and has identified several characteristics in close relation to some of the parameters
presented in this dissertation:

These wars are expeditionary, fought away from the Western homeland

The enemy is narrowed down to a regime or a leader rather than the entire society

Fight with the main body of enemy forces is no longer desirable

Minimizing collateral damage, only small portion of the enemy society is a legitimate
target

Force protection, priority is minimizing the risk to Western forces for the purpose to avoid
the body bag syndrome which might damage domestic support for the war, and to protect
the Wests investment in its military professionals

Wests contemporary wars dont involve high levels of societal participation but are instead
fought by a small number of its professional representatives

Because West fight wars of choice rather than survival, even a relatively small number of
casualties can have dramatic political repercussions203
No war is fought without some sort of interference from USA

As the Worlds sole superpower USA has worldwide interests, and with its superior technology it
protects those interests in every corner of the globe and beyond. If any of the major powers would
wage war on anybody, USA would immediately interfere in some way to protect its position. It
would not allow it unless it suits its interests, or doesnt conflict with them. USA and NATO
(specifically UK, France) possess small (compared with its populations) but technologically
extremely potent armies whose power can be projected at any corner of the globe at the shortest
possible time frame. These quick response groups are constantly on the move around various
points of the planet to protect their countries interests. France, UK and USA all control such
points.

203

McInnes C. in Williams (ed.), Security Studies, p. 168.

Mc Innes sees low tolerance of casualties as related to the fact that the wars waged by Western states in places like
Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo and Sierra Leone have been wars of choice to help achieve liberal policy objectives rather
than wars of survival. When core national security interests are perceived to be on the line, as in Afghanistan or Iraq,
tolerance of casualties will be much higher. Ibid, p. 161.

96

 Combined warfare
There is no more strict distinction between various types of forces conducting various types of
warfare. For example NATO states that its response force (NRF) is a coherent, high-readiness,
joint, multinational force package of up to 25,000 troops that is technologically advanced, flexible,
deployable, interoperable and sustainable.204 Sailors, airmen, ground troops and specialist forces
are trained and deployed to act in combined warfare manner. Each type of force is trained to use
its own technology and tactics and they cooperate in combat. To develop each of the types of
forces, and for those forces to be superior to any other matching force from potential enemies is
very costly. Only the most developed countries of the NATO have this ability. Since it is difficult
and costly, countries develop some of types of forces and combine them with others from other
countries of the NATO alliance. For example a French paratroop battalion, Greek airmobile and
Belgian commando units supported by British aircraft and US ships. And in this manner each of
the countries with minimum investment achieves its national goals. This is another crucial reason
for the alliances existence.
Modern wars are fought by alliances
Since the defeat and dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 there have been several major wars.
First Gulf War, Breakdown of Yugoslavia (Slovenian War of Independence, Croatian War of
Independence, Bosnian Civil war, Kosovo conflict), War in Afghanistan, Second Gulf War (Iraq
War) and Libyan Civil War.205 Alliances were formed both officially by written agreements and
by non-official support. In every one of these USA was present in some sort and in every one
them, USA (superpower), UK and France (major powers) formed alliances with other countries
(powers) to jointly conduct military operations. 206
In First Gulf War USA led an United Nations coalition and in the Second Gulf War (Iraq War) it
formed an ad hoc alliance called Coalition of the willing. In both times USA played a delicate
political game with Russia to insure its non-interference into the conflict. In Iraq War the principal
justification for invasion was that Saddam had WMD. As it later became evident that the weapons

204

NATO A-Z, The NATO Response Force.

Other major wars are Israels war on Lebanon and Hezbollah in 2006 and Syrian Civil War (2011 ongoing). In
the first, which some consider a proxy war with Iran, Israel secured international non-interference. In the second
NATOs intervention, so far, is deterred by Russia and China. Mexican drug war (2006-present) is an armed conflict
led by the state of Mexico with US support, against various Mexican drug cartels.
206
France had different interests in this region and did not participate in the Iraq war.
205

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are not there, the suspicion is that those weapons either never existed or that the weapons were
helped removed by Russian Special Forces disguised as civilians.207 Russia (seemingly) does not
have the same worldwide aspirations as USA has but it actively protects its vital national interests.
Depending on its political strength in the last two decades is its ability to deterrent US and NATO
activities. There is no more open hostilities between USA-NATO and Russia, however a hidden
political conflict is causing that there can be no US intervention anywhere within Russias zone of
influence, without at least Kremlins opinion on the matter.
Even right after USSR dissolution, when Russia was weak, as the traditional ally of Serbia it used
what was left of its political influence in the 1990s to protect Serbian wars of expansion. Later
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were led only after US politically secured Russias non-intervention.
War in Libya was opposed but not stopped by Russia and China. But their reaction was firm when
it came to possibility of USA-NATOs intervention in Syrian Civil War and US threats made
against Iran. USA is the sole World superpower but major powers which are not its allies; foremost
Russia and China have their own interests which they are protecting despite US global
domination.208 In this dangerous game of World domination and survival, countries group in
alliances for protection. USA leads NATO alliance which is the Worlds most powerful military,
economic and political alliance. Its enemies China and Russia so far do not openly form a strong
and declared alliance that could match NATOs strength. However the conflict between NATO
and these two powers is evident in terms of economy and political influence. And in the last
decades Russia and China have more than once taken a common attitude against US actions.
Since all of the major powers involved have such potent military arsenals, no side would dare to
go to an open military conflict with the other as it would cause their destruction. For this reason
they are using other ways other strategies and counterstrategies, to gain the upper hand in this
struggle. This is the main topic of our dissertation and this is why we should know the pattern of
NATOs military behavior. If we know this and if we make accurate analysis of how NATO fights
wars then we will be able to make reliable predictions for the future. These can then be used
towards the most accurate solutions. This dissertation is not so much about data, as it is about a
way of thinking.

207
208

Russia tied to Iraqs missing arms, The Washington Times, 28 October 2004.
Hayoun M., China, Russia congratulate each other on Syria at APEC, Al Jazeera America, 9 October 2013.

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 Development of technology
Crucial factor in modern warfare is the development of information technology. This has become
so important that thanks to it, modern armies have significantly improved their doctrines and
organizational behavior. Every major power in the World; USA, China, Russia, UK and France
have geographically dispersed forces connected with informational network. If this network,
stationed at command and control centers, is keeping their military arsenal and troops well
informed with accurate and up to date intelligence, then their response and combat effectiveness
will be significantly improved. Furthermore all of the main actors have space technology which
enables

worldwide

information

obtaining

(spy

satellites)

and

destruction

potential

(intercontinental ballistic missiles). Apart from these they also possess advanced secret
technologies either to obtain data, influence planets biosphere or cause mass destruction (WMD).
Because information technology warfare has expanded to another dimension, aside traditional
land, naval, ground and space we now speak of cyber warfare, which became the essential part
of modern war. At first, the possibility of cyber-attack was considered by many to be science
fiction, but as the developed part of the world is more and more heavily relying on internet network
for business, information, research and military technology it became vital to protect these assets
from enemy intrusion.
USA as the world leading power invests the most and is the most concerned with the possibility
of a cyber-attack, as its modern technology relies on networking and advanced computer systems.
In fact military intelligence officials of this country have identified cyberwarfare as its current
primary threat.209 USA considers cyber-attack just as any other, more traditional, act of war. 210 But
other major powers are also closely following; both Russia and China have possession of advanced
information systems. China uses asymmetric information warfare and advanced spy network to
defeat USA.211 Since USA is leading in development of every other military segment, information
warfare could be the area in which its enemies could gain the upper hand. For this reason USA has
very seriously approached the problem by organizing United States Strategic Command

Dilanian K., Cyber-attacks a bigger threat than Al Qaeda, officials say, Los Angeles Times, 12 March 2013.
Sanger D. E., Bumiller E., Pentagon to Consider Cyberattacks Acts of War, New York Times, 31 May 2011;
Shackelford S. J., Managing Cyber Attacks in International Law, Business, and Relations: In Search of Cyber
Peace, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 285-286.
211
Report to US Congress, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington DC, 2009, p. 20.
Link: http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2009-Report-to-Congress.pdf
209
210

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(USSTRATCOM) whose responsibility among others is information warfare. 212 As a consequence

of the 2007 cyber-attack against Estonia, NATO established the Cooperative Cyber Defense
Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia in order to enhance the organizations cyber defense
capability. 213 One of the hardest issues in cyber counterintelligence is the problem of attribution.
Unlike in conventional warfare, determining the force behind a cyber-attack can be very difficult.
For this reason and for the reason that this form of warfare is very new, the data on the matter is
scarce. What is evident is that for the first time in known history countries are speaking about arms
control of internet based weapons such as viruses or other forms of malware. 214
Technology with which war is made has made stunning progress. USA out of all other major actors
has the most advanced military arsenal. For this reason there is an on-going debate within the
relevant scientific community about the military-theoretical hypothesis called Revolution of
Military Affairs. According to this concept technological advancement of USA has made all other
enemies insignificant.215 Meaning that their military potential is so asymmetric to US that it
requires significant transformation of the US army in organizational, doctrinal and strategic sphere.
With such destructive technology and dominant intelligence data, the key for success of the US
military is in destroying the enemy before it even reaches the battlefield. 216 However I would not
agree that there is any kind of revolution going on. Term revolution would imply that something
is being changed in its essence such a serious transformation which would have very little to do
with the conditions before. Sure the technology went on, but this is just a variable in strategy.
There is no change in the essential nature of either war or strategy. They both follow the same old
rules since forever. Remembering the words of Albert Einstein: I know not with what weapons
World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones. 217
Handel in the third chapter of War, Strategy and Intelligence analyses influence of technology in
strategy. Indeed never before as it is today has technology had such a decisive impact in strategy

212

United States Congress House, Committee on Armed Services, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, The posture of
the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), U.S. G.P.O., 1 January 2008, p. 40. Link:
https://fas.org/irp/congress/2007_hr/stratcom.pdf
213
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, About us: History. Link: https://ccdcoe.org/ (26/3/15).
214
Cyberwar, The Economist, 3 July 2010.
215
But some of them are still significant enough to take the planet down with them.
216
Baylis, p. 138.
217
BrainyQuote.com. Albert Einstein. Link: http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/a/alberteins122873.html
(26/10/14).

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and war. Because of development of rapid communications and highly potent weapons, time for
leader to make crucial decisions has been vastly reduced. In fact technology has become so
dominant that soldiers experience, a factor which is usually crucial in warfare, can be nullified by
a new, unknown and destructive technology. And I agree with Handel in these observations, but I
would like to add that this is mostly concerning strategy on lower levels. Because development of
technology can make a significant difference in grand strategic scheme but it doesnt necessarily
have to. Another example from World War II was the German development of Wunderwaffe. With
these wonder weapons it is without a question that Third Reich was the world leading power of
the time when it came to technology. Apart from program for development of nuclear weapons it
also had a wide array of potent ballistic, armor, naval and air weapon systems. One of these was
the Horten Ho 229 fighter/bomber which was the first aircraft fully powered by jet engines. It was
not only superior to any Allied aircraft of the time in terms of speed and agility, but it also had
stealth capability. Recent tests conducted on a replica built in 2009 by US weapons manufacturer
Northrop-Grumman Corporation, showed that with using the appropriate tactics this plane would
be invisible to British chain radar system of the 1940s. 218 In fact the design on this aircraft was so
advanced that its principle features can be seen on modern US stealth bomber weapon system B-2
Spirit, built by that same Northrop-Grumman. My point from this example is that technology, in
order to be effective, must be produced in sufficient numbers and followed by development of
specific tactics. Since Germany could not produce any of these weapon systems in sufficient
numbers, its technological development made no impact on the outcome in grand strategic terms.
Technology today plays a vital role, but even without it strategy can use other resources to achieve
its objectives. Key is in innovation.
Limited time to respond to situation
Because in todays world information travel from one point to another in a second, when there is
a development USs decision makers have very limited time to adequately respond to a threat. For
this reason their strategic capability constructed in such a way that they are able to project power
on any point at the shortest time frame. Decisioning in this environment is complex and this is why
commanders are being trained in many possible scenarios. Theory, which follows a different logic
of the one in reality, suggests strategic behavioral principle called Power to the edge developed by

218

Myhra D., Northrop Tests Hitlers Stealth Fighter, Aviation History, Vol. 19: No. 6, July 2009.

101

US strategist John Boyd. According to it decisions are made in the context of organizations
ability to dynamically synchronize its actions; achieve command and control agility; and increase
the speed of command over a robust, networked grid.219 Originally this was designed during the
Cold War for the operational level, but can equally be applied on the grand strategic too. Because
if every part of the organization is actively contributing not just with information and order
following, but with initiative this rapidly increases the time in which strategy is taking place.
Like this it is giving a vital advantage over the repressive apparatus systems which require just
obedience. However this concept requires a significant amount of trust among organizations
members. 220 And also there is a threat that the whole matter ends up in discussion and arguments
while precious time is passing by. This is what is happening to NATO and this organization has
recognized it as a problem. Time is the dominant parameter. Organization which understands
enemys movements and changes its strategy accordingly has the advantage, because its opponent
is caught responding to situations that have already changed.
In modern strategy a matter of seconds can be decisive. Present situation is such that if a war
happens between major world powers than it will be launched in a moment when one of the
actors achieves such technological advantage to effectively nullify enemys destructive potential.
To destroy the enemy and to make sure that there will be no repercussions. Without any
announcement in the media or political preparation to achieve surprise. Once the weapons of
mass destruction are on their way, it will be a very short time period before the war is over. For
this reason there are institutions within the NATO alliance which can perform quick and accurate
situational awareness and provide with rapid response actions. Such ability is vital for alliances
survival. Yet still while NATO is able, in theory at least, to provide with efficient defense
consensus based decision making is limiting its offensive potential. And it is becoming more
evident that if strong NATO member powers wish to keep their status, they will likely have to
make more offensive actions.
Increased counterinsurgency activity
Because USA cannot make a direct move against major enemy actors, following the logic of Sun
Tzu it concentrates its efforts on potential allies of the strong enemys. As these smaller actors
See in Alberts D. S., Hayes R. E., Power to the Edge, Command Control in the Information Age, The
Command and Control Research Program publications, 2003.
220
Trust among political decision makers and discipline among the military.
219

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are insignificant in comparison to US military potential a very complex relationship occurs. USA
for various reasons cannot (or is not willing) employ its full military arsenal but only limited
resources to fight such an enemy. And this enemy because its power is asymmetric goes to fight
asymmetrically. Meaning that they go to guerrilla, insurgency way of war-making. So the last wars
which western powers have fought are counterinsurgency wars. This is why there is a significant
revival of interest in the scientific community to study counterinsurgency wars from the modern
past. US strategy in Iraq employed by strategist David Petraeus was in fact based on the works of
the French officer David Galula. He (died in 1967) was writing on his experiences of successfully
combating the insurgents during the Algerian War (1954-1962), and principal features of his
strategy could be applied in Iraq five decades later.221 For the West to fight counterinsurgency
wars is politically very exhausting. In this context I observe increasing radical Islamism both in
the Muslim World and Western countries with substantial Muslim populations such as UK, France
or Germany.
Privatization of security
And because to fight a counterinsurgency war is politically very costly more and more functions
in the war are being taken over by private contractors essentially mercenaries. The reasons for
using private security companies instead of conventional soldiers is smaller political risk. First of
all, civilian sector is often needed to manage technology or logistics for the military. 222 Second,
the government sees private security forces who are working purely for profit as requiring less
political mobilization than when sending national troops.223 And final, if these people are killed
and injured the responsibility is on the company which hired them, not the country which hired
the company. Because in insurgency war there is no frontline, or better said the frontline is
everywhere there is limited protection for any kind of troops. All members of the occupying
force, either in combat or supporting roles, are equally exposed to become potential targets for the
insurgents. Often the economic cost for hiring contractors is higher than the conventional military
but there is nothing that western public likes less than coffins with bodies of their dead soldiers
being flown back from some distant country. So the gain is primarily political, however it has it
negative connotations.

221

See more in Galula D., Pacification in Algeria: 19561958, RAND Corporation publication, 2006.
Avant D., The Privatization of Security: Lessons from Iraq, Orbis, 2006, p. 2.
223
Ibid, p. 6.
222

103

Legally speaking the recruitment and use of mercenaries is prohibited by the United Nations. 224
Definition of what is a mercenary can be found in the United Nations International Convention
against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries. Article 1 of the convention
states that:
1. A mercenary is any person who:
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
(b) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact,
is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess
of that promised or paid to combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that
party;
(c) Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to
the conflict;
(d) Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and
(e) Has not been sent by a State which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member
of its armed forces.
2. A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation:
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in a concerted act of
violence aimed at:
(i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the constitutional order of a
State; or
(ii) Undermining the territorial integrity of a State;
(b) Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for significant private gain and is
prompted by the promise or payment of material compensation;

224

UN General Assembly, International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
Mercenaries, A/RES/44/34, 72nd plenary meeting, 4 December 1989, 44/34. Link:
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r034.htm (06/12/15).

104

(c) Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which such an act is directed;
(d) Has not been sent by a State on official duty; and
(e) Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose territory the act is undertaken.
Furthermore United Nations specify in Article 2 that: Any person who recruits, uses, finances or
trains mercenaries, as defined in article 1 of the present Convention, commits an offence for the
purposes of the Convention. 225
These international legal restrictions are the cause that US official statements are always carefully
balancing between the expressions such as private security company, private military
company or simply contractor. For all of these it could be said that it is not a mercenary. 226 P.
W. Singer in Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (2003) discusses
in-depth the phenomena of privatization of security. Starting from South African mercenaries
operations in Sierra Leone (1994), the final year of Croatian War of Independence and Bosnian
War (1995)227, peacekeeping operations in post-war Bosnia (1996) and logistic support during
Kosovo War (1999) presence of private military industry has profoundly changed modern
warfare. He points out that modern corporations are able to sell skills and services that traditionally
only military of the organized states could deploy. Products of private military companies include
225

Ibidem.
However I am aware that private security company is a broader term. It could be applied to military contractors
(private firms dealing with training, information, logistics, maintenance of equipment, etc. not necessarily combat
duties) and also to firms who are offering the services in security sphere in general (property and personal
protection). But a private security company which is given a job within a conflict zone, with difficulties can be
viewed as anything else than a mercenary especially from the perspective of the occupied population.
227
Exact extent of the role which a private military company MPRI played in training Croatian Army to execute a
NATO textbook five-pronged offensive as Singer calls it could be a matter of debate. Because Croatian Admiral
Davor Domazet-Loso who was with general Ante Gotovina, the mastermind behind the planning and execution of
Operation Storm has repeatedly stated that no American help has been involved into the planning of the operation.
Where they did help was with the political green light for the Croatian Army to go to the operation despite the
British opposition. I have been able to personally attend to the lecture of retired admiral D. Domazet-Loso, as well
as Brigadier B. Zorica-Zulu, and speaking with General M. Rajcic and Brigadier Bozo Purgaric people who were
directly involved in the planning process, and they have all confirmed the same thing. Americans were impressed
with the operation so since then a part of their media has perpetuated the story that it was them who planned it. See
more in the book from Domazet-Loso D., Klonovi nastupaju (Clones perform), Detecta, 2007, p. 388.
Croatian Army was weak in its inception at the very outbreak of the war. In this first period foreign volunteers with
military knowledge were welcomed. However after operations in 1993, it was evident that Croatian Army reached a
high standard of training and operational skill. It was a matter of national pride to resolve the Serbs by themselves.
The atmosphere in the army was such that any foreign military advisors would be greeted with skepticism. Dr.
Zoran Komar, professor of Psychology at University of Zagreb and ex-colonel of the Croatian Army, has confirmed
to me in winter 2009 that the overall psychological state of the army just before the Operation Storm was highly
confident in its own abilities.
226

105

employment of trained commando teams, engineers to strategic advisers.228 Singer managed to

identify each of the basic types of private military companies:

military providers that offer troops for tactical operations

military consultants that supply expert advice and training

military support companies that sell logistics, intelligence, and engineering 229

Since the end of war in Bosnia, private military companies are in one way or another playing a key
role in military operations made by government troops. Hiring contractors is not something
reserved only to weak governments which dont have adequate armies of their own. Ex-soldiers
around the world are joining to work for military contractors thus selling their knowledge of life
and death. Private military companies are making efforts not to be seen as mercenaries, but if we
look at their activities in comparison to the UN document with whichever name we call them, it
is hard not to regard them as mercenaries.
In a counterinsurgency campaign, such as Iraq War (2003-2011) a negative consequence of relying
on contractors, is that the occupied population is harder to be persuaded to cooperate against the
insurgents which is one of the principals of counterinsurgency strategy. They are viewing the
occupation force as cowardly, dishonorable and weak. Debelicization of the West and subsequent
intolerance of casualties have not only resulted in privatization of war but also in
professionalization of regular armies. Forced mobilization is something which belongs to the past
as it is being avoided and service in the army became reserved for those elements of the society
which are willing to do it. Being killed becomes an occupational hazard. 230

228

Singer P. W., Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, Cornell University Press, 2003.
Link: http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100946630 (24/3/15).
229
Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp. 3-18.
230
Many people who do join the army and volunteer to do service in combat zones, are doing so more for economic
prospects than out of sense of duty for the country. In a way of speaking, they are not so far from being mercenaries
too? Even though there is a factor which should not be overlooked. Soldiers are a part of a national family which
inserts pride into them, mercenaries are in it for the money or adventure, so their reliability under difficulties is
doubtful. However V. Francke and M. Boemcken came to conclusions that contrary to media dominating images of
mercenaries being ruthless and money grabbing, their sample respondents displayed attitudes similar as those of
military professionals adhering to high level of professionalism and ethical conduct. See in Franke V., Boemcken
M., Guns For Hire: Motivations and Attitudes of Private Security Contractors, Armed Forces and Society, Vol.
37: No. 4, 2011.

106

 Emergence of the so-called New Wars

M. Kaldor suggested that War in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995) became the archetypal
example of the so called new wars. This war brought huge international attention, media coverage
and redefining the role of Russia since the end of the Cold War. It also showed the inability of
European Union and United Nations to effectively resolve a humanitarian crisis and enforce a
peace solution in what is European back yard. Kaldor sees the emergence of new wars as the
result of the power vacuum which took place after the end of Cold War. In the old war there was
a solid political structure, war was an armed conflict between political organizations regardless of
it being intra-state or inter-state. Now wars are characterized by irregular warfare; ad hoc militias,
mercenaries and volunteers rather than trained regulars; disintegration of the state apparatus; using
terror to control population, and financing the war through stealing and selling local resources.
Kaldor compared new wars as being similar to Thirty Years War (1618-1648). Modern military
alliances and evolution of International laws and norms have made the world globally military
integrated, unilateral aggressions made by the state are illegal and wars are internationalized due
to UN sanctioning and Western interventions to enforce those sanctions. In old wars states emerged
as the consequence of war and eventually monopolized violence. New wars break the connection
with the past and the distinctions between combatants and non-combatants. Methods of fighting
wars have changed and new wars draw a lot from insurgency and guerrilla. However unlike
guerrilla and regular forces which fight either to control the territory or populations hearts and
minds, new warfare rests on controlling the population primarily with fear. Globalization resulted
in the fact that no part of the world is isolated and images of the war are present worldwide.
Terrorism is more about political communication directed against the enemy population that of the
realization of an actual political objective. 231 H. Mnkler too points out that new wars are fought
primarily by hastily organized militias, terrorists, warlords and its followers, child soldiers etc.
Wars became increasingly asymmetrical and cheap. Unlike a symmetrical conventional conflict in
old wars which requires extensive logistical preparation, the strategists of the new wars have
succeeded in making direct warfare cheap. New wars are fought with light and often improvised
weapons, and if used heavy weapons then these are mostly remnants of stockpiles from Cold War.
Child soldiers, defined as between eight and fourteen years old, are a favorite weapon of choice to

231

Kaldor M., New and Old Wars, Stanford University Press, 2007, pp. 1-14.

107

warlords of the new wars as they are fearless, brutal and obedient for a little more than drugs and
food. Mnkler sees crucial in the emergence of the new wars the financial aspect, because they are
being able to be financed from the effects of globalization flows of drugs and local materials.
New wars have demilitarized war as the primary targets instead of military installations have
become civilian and government structures. Private military which disappeared in a symmetrical
war between states emerged again into prominence as new wars are characterized by disintegration
of the state. While a conventional war between symmetric states is about rapid victory and
inflicting violence on a mass scale, new wars are characterized with protracted low intensity
violence and profit gained from this insecurity. 232 Within the military profession, there is a divide
between those233, who believe that war has an immutable nature and a changing character, and
those234, who believe that the nature of war is also changeable. 235 Surely developments in
technology of waging war and means of communication through which it can be accelerated have
profoundly influenced the way war is being made. Hybridization of war blended conventional
warfare with organized crime, irregular conflict, and terrorism but if we were to observe war
through the definition that war is a violent manifestation of conflicting strategies I conclude that
the essential nature of war hasnt changed at all, only warfare, the manifestation of war itself has
changed.
Actions of individual soldiers are in focus of strategy
Before the introduction of media and internet on the battlefield, tactical level would not be a
concern of higher strategic levels. However in modern warfare actions of every single soldier may
have a political impact. Asymmetric warfare has dramatically decreased necessary tactical
engagements which would have political repercussions. In a symmetrical conflict such as World
War II, there would have to be many tactical actions before they would start to have an impact on
higher strategy. But terrorist actions like assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo
(1914), or attack on World Trade Center and Pentagon 9/11 (2001) have involved but a few
individuals, and yet had decisive impacts on grand strategy and even policy. 236

Mnkler H., The wars of the 21st century, IRRC, March 2003, Vol. 85 No. 849, pp. 16-19.
Like Lieutenant General (Retired) Paul van Riper, U.S. Marine Corps.
234
Like Lieutenant General David Deptula, U.S. Air Force.
235
Metz, Cuccia (eds.), Defining War for the 21st Century, p. 7.
236
Angstrom, Widen, Contemporary Military Theory, p. 169.
232
233

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CONCLUSIONS
For both strategy and war there is no overarching theoretical study which could give definitive
answers to these two crucially intertwined subjects. Strategy has been defined by many different
authors from different domains, and not surprisingly their definitions are different. To study
strategy is only possible through multidisciplinary approach. On what most authors and strategic
thinkers would agree is that strategy is mostly an art, it involves planning and requires intelligence.
As strategy is an art it is crucially influenced by the culture of strategy makers. Luttwak observed
that its nature is paradoxical and does not follow classical liner logic. This makes strategy harder
to be studied scientifically as it is both illogical and secretive. War too has been studied by scholars
from different areas of expertise. So far there has not been one universal answer to the question:
Why wars happen? Phenomenon of war can be explained from different points of views such as
anthropology, economy, politics, sociology etc. From a strategic, somewhat philosophical point of
view I see war as a violent manifestation of conflicting strategies. There has been a tendency in
recent publications to speak of old and new wars caused by a revolution in warfare. It is true that
technology of rapid communications has caused geospatial revolution and the way we see the
world altogether, but even if warfare has profoundly changed in my view war has stayed exactly
the same. Essentially war is an act of violence and destruction which is directed under influence
of war-making culture. Present-day geopolitical situation could be best described as a military
standoff between major states which all have the possibility of unleashing unprecedented violence
on each other. Because of this, modern strategy has evolved into an art which avoids direct violent
conflict. It abandoned the principal philosophy of Clausewitz in seeking security and instead it
follows the ancient logics of Sun Tzu. In short a war without war.

109

Key points of the Chapter 1: Strategy and War

intelligent beings use strategy in order to direct, project and manage their power
in an environment

nature of war and nature of strategy are constant, only the face (style) changes

strategy operates in the realm of secret and paradox

modern strategy has effectively expanded into cyberspace but not (yet) into space

way in which a society is making war is a reflection of its strategic culture

modern warfare is asymmetric as every conflict is dominated by the mere

presence of USA and possible employment of its advanced technology

strategy is a universal intellectual force which operates in the realm of intangible

as an art of planning and marshalling resources in order to achieve pre-set
objectives of vital importance

war is a state of violently manifested conflict between strategies

110

Chapter 2: Direct and Indirect strategies

Whoever said the pen is mightier than the sword obviously never encountered automatic
weapons.
Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964)
1. Introducing the concept of direct and indirect strategy
Generally speaking military strategy is a very dangerous activity in which there are but a few rules.
Perhaps the most important one would be not to overestimate ones own strength and
underestimate enemys response. It happened so many times in history as great powers came and
went. When in 451 AD, Attila the Hun launched invasion on Western Roman Empire he perceived
it as a giant on glass legs weak and rich Empire which would make an easy prey for his massive
barbarian army. Instead what it met on Catalaunian plains was a determined force under Roman
strategist Aetius. The following battle to this day remains one of the heaviest death tolls per day
in military history.237 Fearsome Attila was defeated that night because of his false judgment of
enemys strength. Up-to-date information and their correct interpretation are two intertwined key
elements in assessing enemys power. Once military planners have identified these parameters, the
question is how to defeat an enemy? Because what is seen as the obvious and shortest route towards
achieving strategic objectives, doesnt necessarily have to be the best one. In fact it often isnt,
because there is an enemy present that will try to thwart it. For this reason strategists can use a
more complicated plan which will last over longer period of time, but in the end it will effectively
achieve its strategic objective. Strategy when it comes to the way it achieves its objectives, can be
direct or indirect. The variable I question is which exact segment of enemys organization is the
specific target? When a military organization seeks to achieve its objectives by attacking enemys
other resources, without confronting the bulk of its armed forces than we can say that it has opted
to use indirect strategy.
Now, it is important to explain the difference between direct and indirect strategy, and direct and
indirect approach. The latter term you will often find in literature, but this is not the object of my
study. Indirect Approach was introduced and developed by much quoted British author Liddell
Hart. Working in the years between the two world wars, his was the idea to find a solution for the
237

See in Hughes I., Aetius: Attilas Nemesis, Casemate Publishers, 2012.

111

costly losses of WWI. The result was development of theory of Indirect Approach. He was
suggesting that the best way to defeat an enemy is not to attack him where he is strongest but where
he is weakest. The objective was to not to attack and destroy the bulk of his forces, but more to
attack in such a way to kick him out of balance, out of equilibrium as Hart put it. In his book
The Strategy of Indirect Approach he suggested that: The art of the indirect approach can only
be mastered, and its full scope appreciated, by study of and reflection upon the whole history of
war. But we can at least crystallize the lessons into two simple maxims, one negative, the other
positive. The first is that, in face of the overwhelming evidence of history, no general is justified in
launching his troops to a direct attack upon an enemy firmly in position. The second, that instead
of seeking to upset the enemys equilibrium by ones attack, it must be upset before a real attack
is, or can be successfully, launched.238 For this purpose and in discussion with J. C. Fuller,
another prominent author from this era, Hart understood that the best suited tools for strategy of
indirect approach were the then-new weapons tanks and planes. However, even though it was the
British who developed the concept of armored warfare, Germans were the ones who carefully
followed their studies, and implemented it into development of their own strategy called the
Blitzkrieg. And this strategy, as well as the whole concept of Harts Indirect Approach (in my
view) are both in fact direct strategies. This is because Hart was following Clausewitzian thinking
which states that the best way to defeat an enemy is by direct combat and the destruction of his
armed forces.239 Strategies such as Blitzkrieg, Flank attack or Pincer movement are considered to
be indirect approach.240 Indeed there is a difference between achieving strategic objectives by
attacking the enemy in full might on his strongest points, or by exploiting its weaknesses and using
deception and economy of force. But both direct and indirect approaches (in my understanding)
are a part of direct strategy because they both seek direct confrontation with enemys armed
forces and achievement of strategic objectives within the shortest time period.

238

Hart, The Strategy of Indirect Approach, pp. 182-183.

See chapter 1 of the dissertation.
240
Reiter D., Meek C., Determinants of Military strategy 1903-1994: A Quantative Empirical test, International
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 43: No. 2, Wiley publications, June 1999 base their classification of strategy being either
maneuver, attrition or punishment. Also, Bowdish in Military Strategy: Theory and Concepts follows the logic of
strategy as either being exhaustion or annihilation. Although it is true that strategy can be, up to certain extent
classified in this way, I believe that it is a much deeper, more complex matter. For this reason I offer the concept of
direct and indirect strategies.
239

112

In explaining the idea of direct and indirect strategy, I am following the line of thinking of Sun
Tzu who wrote that: Victory may be achieved through either a direct or indirect approach241.
But I see and interpret Sun Tzus direct/indirect approach differently than Hart. And in this I
do not include only military strategy, but also strategy on the highest levels. In my view this
direct and indirect is referred not to the way enemys army will be attacked but to the object
of aggression itself. Where the concepts of Direct/Indirect strategy (as I use it) and Harts Indirect
Approach meet is in the maxim: In strategy the longest way round is apt to be the shortest way
home.242 Apart from this, they dont have much to do with each other, but it is necessary to clarify
any misunderstandings as they are similar expressions used to nominate different subjects.
Direct strategy is used when a military organization strives to achieve strategic objectives rapidly.
This means that it seeks to destroy enemys armed forces and this is to be achieved in the shortest
possible time frame. Direct strategies could be used by a strategically superior side against the
strategically inferior one, or the other way around by the inferior against superior. It can be a
part of both offensive and defensive stances. If a military organization is on the defense on the
grand scheme, it might be on the offensive on theater level using direct strategy to destroy
enemys armed forces and halt its grand strategic expansion. Or to quickly incapacitate the enemy
in one theater, because there is another front on which the bulk of the forces must be distributed.243
Every strategy is a manifestation of will to achieve objectives, and if there is a presence of enemys
will, than every strategy will have its counterstrategy. If a strategy is changing the direction of its
enemys will by itself, than it is a direct strategy and if it is doing so by using an intermediary, a
bypass way, avoiding to attack his armed forces (his tools of enforcement) then it is an indirect
strategy.
In English speaking literature there isnt much reference about this concept and it is not well
known. What I havent been able to find in English, I found in French. Author which introduced
and clarified direct and indirect strategy was a French general Andr Beaufre. This prominent

241

Quotation taken from Jordan (ed.), Understanding Modern Warfare, p. 49.

Hart, The Strategy of Indirect Approach, p. 4.
243
For example, during the Battle of the Bulge (1944) Germany employed direct strategy of Blitzkrieg on the
Western front, but at that time Germany was on the defensive on grand strategy level. They went on direct offensive
in one strategic theater because they had to quickly incapacitate Allied troops, so that Germany can gain more time
to deal with the much more perilous Soviet advance. See in Parker D., Battle of the Bulge: Hitlers Ardennes
Offensive, 1944-1945, Da Capo press, 2004.
242

113

veteran of the French 20th century wars, and contributor to develop de Gaulles post-WWII policy
of French independent nuclear armament, stated on the idea of direct/indirect strategy: The game
of strategy can, like music, be played in two keys. The major key is direct strategy, in which force
is the essential factor. The minor key is indirect strategy, in which force recedes into the
background and its place is taken by psychology and planning.244 And his line of thinking is the
most similar to the concept on which I am relying in this dissertation. 245 Another French general
and contemporary of Beaufre, Lucien Poirier described this view in the form the diagram as can
be seen in diagram 4.

On a vu que le jeu stratgique pouvait seffectuer comme la musique selon deux modes. Le mode majeur est la
stratgie directe, ou la force reprsente un facteur essentiel. La mode mineur est la stratgie indirecte ou le rle de
la force parait seffacer devant celui de la psychologie et des combinaisons. Beaufre, Introduction la Stratgie, p.
183.
245
However in his work he was more focused on the nuclear aspect of indirect strategy. He defined indirect strategy
as: I art de savoir exploiter au mieux la marge troite de libert daction chappant la dissuasion par les armes
atomiques et dy remporter des succs dcisif importants malgr la limitation parfois extrme des moyens militaires
qui peuvent y tre employs. (The art of knowing how to exploit the best the narrow margin of action freedom,
escaping into deterrence by atomic weapons, and achieve important decisive success despite the limitation
sometimes extreme of the military means which can be employed), Beaufre, Introduction la stratgie, p. 149.
244

114

Diagram 4: Relationship within strategy according to Lucien Poirier

Source: Poirier L., Stratgie thorique II, Economica, 1987, pp. 113-134.

115

Beaufre defined indirect strategy as the one which is not focused on direct conflict with enemys
army, but rather with politics, economy, negotiations etc. 246 In a way he prophesized the
emergence of indirect strategy as the main strategy in modern war. As the real conformation with
nuclear weapons would lead to unacceptable losses for all, indirect strategy became the ultimate
weapon. He wrote: The real game of the indirect strategy is to take place at the prodrome.247
What he wanted to say with this is that conflict in nuclear environment has to be decided before
the actual fight begins. And for this he developed a formula for the elements which create
(influence the creation) of strategy.
S=KFt
Source: Beaufre, Introduction la stratgie, p. 176

S is strategy, K specific factor of the actor248, F material forces, moral forces and t is time.
Each of these factors has to be strong for a strong strategy to take place. Stratgie totale, as
Beaufre called it, in itself encompasses much more than just armed forces. Its purpose is to lead
violent conflicts in all spheres simultaneously diplomacy, economy, military and politics. 249
Following this line of thinking, the very existence of French nuclear arsenal was/is an indirect
strategy of French nuclear deterrence. One intended to intimidate and dissuade the Soviet Union
from invading Western Europe. Charles de Gaulle put it like this: Within ten years we will be
able to kill 80 million Russians. Well, I dont think that anybody will light-heartedly attack
people who are able to kill 80 million Russians, even if one can kill 800 million French, that is if
there were 800 million French.250 In this understanding, conventional armed forces are a part of
direct strategy, and nuclear armed forces are to be considered as indirect strategy. Because
according to the French policy Force de dissuasion, France is not to use its nuclear arsenal

246

Beaufre, p. 63.
His teachings have had a tremendous impact on the South African struggle against communist forces trying to win
the hearts and minds of the oppressed black population. During the 1980s South African Defense Forces have
employed a wide-spread campaign in which they were aware that indirect (political) strategy is far more important
than direct combat. Beaufres ideas were introduced into SA political discourse in 1977 when Defense White Paper
argued that SA faced a total onslaught orchestrated by Soviet Union against Western world of which SA is part,
and to combat this SA would have to develop Beaufres total strategy. The one which includes both political
(indirect) and military (direct) action against the communist insurgents in Angola. See in Louw E., The Rise, Fall,
and Legacy of Apartheid, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004, p. 91.
247
Ibid. 176.
248
This can be the factor of actors strategic culture.
249
Ibid. 182.
250
Malye F., 100 Questions sur De Gaulle, La Boetie, 2014, p. 66.

116

aggressively (really/directly), but as a mean to deter (virtually/indirectly) any aggression with the
potential to inflict unacceptable losses. 251 In my understanding direct strategy is the one which is
designed to attack enemys armed forces. Contrary, indirect strategy is the one which attacks
other segments of enemys structure and resources people, infrastructure, politics, economy,
supplies etc. It is not simple to make a clear difference between direct and indirect strategy. But
when analyzing every strategy I am searching for two key elements:

Is this strategy designed to defeat the enemy quickly?

Is it aiming to destroy enemys armed forces or is it attacking its other resources?

Both direct and indirect strategies are consistent of the same general strategic components goals
(objectives), tactics (ways) and strategic culture (style), and these can be applied either on
operational, theater or grand strategic level. Essential differences between direct and indirect
strategies are the elements of time and distribution of force is the strategy designed to attack
enemys armed forces or its other resources? (See diagram 5 for visual interpretation.)
Diagram 5: Direct and Indirect strategy
DIRECT STRATEGY
STRATEGY
Influenced by strategic
culture, resources and policy
objectives

Attack enemys armed

forces and impose a quick
victory

INDIRECT STRATEGY
Source: prepared by author

Attack enemys resources

other than armed forces
We can wait until victory
is achieved

251

I agree with Beaufre on matters of strategy and I am grateful for his writing, as I have independently came to the
some similar conclusions. On nuclear deterrence see more in Beaufre, pp. 107-114.
Liddel Hart was aware of the work by Andr Beaufre as he wrote the preface to Beaufres Introduction la
strategi, and further Beaufre discusses his theory of indirect strategy as continuation of Harts work. See on pages
145-147.

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It is difficult to explicitly categorize every single strategy as they are usually intertwined. Several
direct and indirect strategies can and often are operating within the same area. Also the same type
of strategy will be differently executed in every specific situation. As at the moment there is no
overarching theory of military strategy, every author will have its own view on the matter how can
strategy be classified. 252 With this dissertation I also try to make some progress in this area. It is
important for us to understand nature and principles of strategy as it will guide us towards the
answer of this dissertation in which direction NATO will go? As mentioned before, a dominating
factor in warfare is change, unlike in war in which the dominating factor is inalterability. There
are some new terms which we frequently encounter in modern warfare such as networking,
cyberwarfare and weapons of mass destruction. Development of technology caused such a change
in warfare that what used to be the effective firepower of a US division in WWII, today can easily
be matched by a US brigade, even few battalions. It is important to understand changes in warfare,
because before the invention of firearms, warfare was consisted of maneuver and killing of
enemys forces. Since then it consists of maneuver and firepower. With the destructive potential
of modern weapons systems, death is a certainty. But strategy can adapt to this change with
another, also fixed pattern of behavior asymmetry.
Now, asymmetry is nothing new in history of warfare, it has always been present as it is often the
only solution to win. Modern warfare is dominated by asymmetric conflicts. 253 Belligerents whose
relative military power differs significantly, follow the pattern of strategic thought in asymmetric
terms when devising a plan according to which they will fight. Enemy which is weaker will
choose not to directly engage stronger military organization because it will lose. But a stronger
actor can also challenge this strategy with another counterstrategy. Basically the rule of success is
adaptation, the side which can adapt more quickly and save its resources, is the one which is more
likely to win.
As I have explained the essential differences between direct and indirect types of strategies, I list
some known strategies either as direct or indirect and provide historical examples to describe them
in detail. The by no means a complete list of strategies, as this is simply not possible, because of
unlimited number of possibilities in strategic planning. Only two things can limit the development
252

See for example in Bowdish, Military Strategy: Theory and Concepts.

See in Cordesman A. H., The Real Revolution in Military Affairs, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Aug 5, 2014.
253

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of strategic thought lack of resources or lack of innovativeness. From the array of direct and
indirect strategies a military organization can choose or devise a new one, which will provide with
the best chances of victory. 254 Since strategy is following the same natural pattern of behavior I
can use examples of conflicts from any era of military history. Therefore it is not relevant who
were the combatants nor how long ago has it been since the conflict took place. The names of
strategies I use in their existing form and the classification to direct or indirect strategy is new and
my work. Some well-known concepts I here for the first time classify as a strategy and describe
them within their respective categories.

2. Direct strategies
Air supremacy
First on my list of direct strategies is air domination. This strategy seeks to control enemys air
space. There are several levels in dominance over the enemys air space. Highest level is air
supremacy followed by air superiority, air parity, air denial and the lowest is air incapability. Air
supremacy is a military term that describes the complete dominance of the air power, of one sides
air forces over the other sides, during a military campaign. That degree of air superiority in which
the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference.255 It is the most favorable state of
control of the air and the ultimate goal of military planners.
At the dawn of air combat in World War I, both Entente and Central powers quickly saw the
potential and the necessity to achieve control over enemys air space. These military alliances
developed air forces to counter the other sides air forces. This resulted in a situation in which air
superiority shifted between Central powers and Entente several times during the war. However at
this time, due to technological limitations of these early air forces, the most important damage that
they could do is to provide with reconnaissance information and engage in a limited strategic
bombing or interdiction. But still this proved to be vital on the grand strategic level. Because of
Ententes reconnaissance flights in the first month of WWI, the so called Schlieffen plan was

254

Victory is a condition in which a military organization has achieved all of its strategic objectives and there is no
other strategy which would interfere with this outcome. Defined by author.
255
RAF official glossary of definitions, Chapter 13, Air Power Definitions and Terms.
(http//www.raf.mod.uk/raf cms/mediafiles/374F7380_1143_EC82_2E436D317C547F5B.pdf)

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discovered and countered. The entire German strategy and decision to go to war was based upon
this plan.256 Also air forces at this period were effective in psychological warfare raising the
morale of friendly forces and affecting the enemys. As it so happens in strategy once one of the
confronting military alliances developed a new strategy to use aircraft to operate in enemys air
space, the other necessarily countered it with its own. Soon the destructive potential of air forces
caught attention of military planners. And based on the condition of controlling enemys air space
emerged new strategies, both direct and indirect. War became much more mobile due to the speed
of aircraft.
More effective way to achieve air supremacy instead of fighting in the air with fighter aircraft is
to destroy enemys air force while still on the ground. Such scenarios happened both during
Operation Barbarossa (1941) and Six Days War (1967). During the first stage of the Battle of
Britain (1940) Axis forces were using tactical bombing (interdiction runway cratering) to destroy
RAFs airfields, machines, equipment and crew on the ground. All throughout WWII the methods
used to achieve air superiority were different depending on the circumstances. Some of them were
to bomb facilities such as hangars, airfields and aircraft factories and others to infiltrate commando
units like SAS (British) or Teishin Shudan (Japanese) which were trained to destroy enemys air
power in a surprise attack, while it is still on the ground. In the Cold war Soviet Union planned to
achieve air supremacy over NATOs air space by infiltrating its Spetsnaz special forces and
attacking NATOs airbases. 257 North Korea allegedly has similar plans in the case of continuation
of direct conflict with South Korea. And more recently, a successful operation to destroy aircraft
on the ground, has been made by the Taliban against ISAF during the Camp Bastion raid (2012).258
Taliban have no matching air force so they used asymmetric strategy to counter NATOs air
domination.
Classic combat in the air was only the method that best served political (propaganda) purposes.
Far more efficient was simply to use bad weather which would deny enemys disposition of air
forces. Like Germans did in the Battle of the Ardennes (1944) and Operation Spring Awakening
(1945). Any innovative technology or a tactic that could be used to deny the enemys ability to use
its own air force at will, was considered. Even the most unusual ones like Germanys secret
256

Boyne W., The Influence of Air Power Upon History, Pelican Publishing, 2003, p. 47.
Campbell E. E., The Soviet Spetsnaz Threat to NATO, Airpower Journal, Summer 1988.
258
Rubin A. J., Audacious Raid on NATO Base Shows Talibans Reach, New York Times, 16 September 2012.
257

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weapons which appeared over German skies to attack Allied bombers in late stages of WWII. 259
Since air forces were introduced into the realm of strategy, it has become essential for military
organizations and alliances to control ones own and preferably enemys air space. In post WWII
conflicts such as Korean War (1950-1953), United Nations forces made its priority that they
defeat North Korean Air force which was extensively supported by Soviet and Chinese advanced
aircraft. After some heavy fighting over Korean skies in the first months of the war, UN managed
to achieve air supremacy, and maintained it until the armistice. In this war it proved to be decisive
for the UN because it enabled the Coalition to launch offensive into the North and resist
numerically superior Chinese reinforcements. Although the Communist forces had advanced
aircraft too, they lost to UN because of their undertraining and inexperience in air combat. 260
Even if a strong actor is faced with a significantly weaker opponent who cannot hope to even
interfere, yet alone jeopardize its air supremacy, a weaker side can nullify this advantage with
asymmetry and still achieve victory on a strategic scheme. Again in Afghanistan, this time during
the Soviet intervention (1979-1989), USSR had overwhelming technological advantage in the war,
and it easily achieved air supremacy as the enemy virtually had no aircraft. Especially no advanced
ones. However this situation was challenged as the mujahedeen adopted a strategy of guerilla
warfare and tactics that made the best use of mountainous terrain and personal portable surface to
air missiles, provided by USA. In this way mujahedeen could attack Soviet aircraft, especially
ground support units, and inflict casualties which would lead to Soviets eventually abandoning
this campaign. 261 In the case of Afghanistan, despite the fact that the Soviets had almost undisputed
air supremacy, this has not been crucial for the outcome of the conflict as the mujahedeen
countered it with different strategy. They have effectively nullified Soviet advantage in technology
by simply ignoring it. In this way Soviet victory in the air actually caused their defeat on the ground
because enemy forces went into hiding. 262

259

See more in Farell J., Reich Of The Black Sun: Nazi Secret Weapons & The Cold War Allied Legend, Adventures
Unlimited Press, 2005.
260
See in Werrell K., Sabres Over MiG Alley, Naval Institute Press, 2005.
261
Tanner S., Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War Against the Taliban, Da Capo
Press, 2009, p. 266.
262
The same principle is used by modern terrorist organizations to fight against USA. Since Intelligence services of
USA have immense technological superiority, terrorists simply ignore it. For examples some terrorist cells
completely abandoned means of modern communication and switched back to paper messages dispatched by trusted
curriers.

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In another example in which NATO, the worlds strongest alliance, fought an air campaign against
once formidable, but by then (1999) a shadow of its former self, Yugoslavian air force it was
shown that air supremacy could be disputed even with outdated technology if combined with
appropriate tactics. In this war NATO lost one of its most advanced stealth aircraft to Serbian
missile system that was obsolete. 263 To lose a single aircraft might not seem much in a major air
campaign, but since this was a piece of such advanced technology it caused disturbance over
USAs technological leadership.264 In the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia there was a limited
objective force the Serbian forces to retreat from their engagement in the Kosovo war. Even
though some would argue that this has been achieved by NATOs air power alone, it was in fact
the combination of Kosovo Liberation Army (Armed Forces) plus the Republic of Albanias and
NATOs efforts both on political and military levels, which eventually stopped Serbian aggression
on Kosovo.265 Because air dominance to achieve complete victory, usually requires assistance in
the form of additional pressure from the ground forces. The most effective among direct strategies
is to incapacitate enemys armed forces.
Battle of annihilation
One of such strategies, designed to decisively incapacitate enemys armed forces, is called battle
of annihilation. This strategic methods objective is to destroy enemys army as a cohesive force
and make it unable to provide any meaningful resistance. Permanently or just temporary, in order
to force opposing military organization either to cease to exist or to sue for peace. Battle of
annihilation has many times in history been opted for as the ultimate solution to end the conflict,
but it has rarely taken place. If one military organization seeks a battle of annihilation it is not
likely that the enemy will accept to confront it in one. More often it has happened that the enemy
denied a decisive battle.266 Such battles could happen in pre-modern warfare, but since have been
avoided, because few military organizations are willing to risk its entire military capability in one
big battle. During the WWII Japan sought a decisive naval battle with the US Pacific navy, but

263

Fredriksen J., The United States Air Force: A Chronology, ABC-CLIO, 2011, p. 316.
This is because such technology can then be examined and explored for weaknesses by its rival military
organizations.
265
See in Daalder I., OHanlon M., Winning Ugly: NATOs War to Save Kosovo, Brookings Institution Press, 2000.
266
Wallach J., The dogma of the battle of annihilation: the theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and their impact on
the German conduct of two world wars, Greenwood Press, 1986, p. 42.
264

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was repeatedly denied of one. To find clear examples of such battle we must go back to more
distant times.
Battle of Gaugamela (331 BC) saw Macedon-Greek alliance and Persian Empire clash in a huge
battle where the fates of both were at stake. Either side that would win or lose in this battle, would
win or lose everything. When Alexanders smaller but operationally and tactically superior force
won this battle it has also meant that they won the entire Persian Empire with all its resources. 267
Another example was the Battle of Raphia (217 BC) in which huge Hellenistic armies of both
Ptolemaic Egypt and Seleucid Empire clashed. Either side that would win this battle would also
win the entire war. The difference between Raphia and Gaugamela, is that Raphia was not only a
strategy to seek a battle of annihilation but also a result of another strategy called counterstrike,
which will be discussed later. When Ptolemy decisively countered Antiochs strategic offensive
and both surprised and defeated him in a battle of annihilation, he won the war. The reason why
he didnt push further and captured now defenseless Seleucid Empire with its vast resources, was
that he was aware that would mean to pass his culminating point of success. Such are the laws of
strategy of which some leaders are aware and some not. Strategic victory if not secured on both
military and political levels will inevitably lead to defeat. Aware of this, notorious drunkard and
debauchee Ptolemy the IVth sobered up in a crucial moment to surprise both history and fate, by
not only defending his Egyptian Kingdom, but by also strategically securing it in such a way to be
the longest lasting of all Hellenistic states. 268
To seek battle of annihilation was also more or less typical for the Enlightenment period. Prussian
king, Frederick the Great sought to confront his enemies in a decisive battle, even if he was
outnumbered. He was counting on the tactical superiority of his armed forces. 269 This practice
continued in Napoleonic wars as well, during which Battle of Austerlitz (1805) and Jena (1806)
are examples in which French Empire decisively defeated military alliances of Austria-Russia and
Prussia-Saxony. 270 One of the last such battles in which emperors personally led their troops to
seek decisive victory in a single confrontation was the Battle of Sedan (1870). Like at the Battle
267

Tharn W., Alexander the Great: Volume 2, Sources and Studies, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 182.
Walbank F., Astin A., Frederiksen M., Ogilvie R., The Cambridge Ancient History, Cambridge University Press,
1984, p. 438.
269
Glantz D., Orenstein H., The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art, 1927-1991, Routledge, 1995, p. 12.
270
See more in Britt A., The Wars of Napoleon: The West Point Military History Series, Square One Publishers,
2003.
268

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of Gaugamela, French emperor Napoleon III led his modern, well-trained and mobile army to
confront the military alliance of German political entities led by Prussia. But unlike Gaugamela,
instead of decisive victory he found himself and his army outclassed and outmaneuvered by even
more modern, more trained and more mobile force. This battle resulted not only in a decisive defeat
on tactical, operational and theater level but also on a grand strategic one, since the emperor
himself was captured and his Empire dissolved.
On the other hand German alliance had a strategic mastermind who was one of the historys most
capable figures Prussian chancellor Otto von Bismarck. He did not allow German alliance to
pass the culminating point of success and waste itself into occupying mainland France. Germans
did have to fight a series of battles across northern France and lay a prolonged siege on Paris to
defeat the new provisional French government which did all it could to turn around Frances
misfortunes. But after achieving another decisive victory against the new French republic, the
peace treaty signed in Frankfurt in May of 1871 showed that Germany was even satisfied with just
two provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. 271 This is because Bismarck has already achieved his main
long term strategic objective unification and creation of a German Empire. Sedan was a decisive
victory achieved by employing the strategy of battle of annihilation, but Germany would see that
such a thing could not be repeated some half a century later in WWI. Technological advancement
has shown both Entente and Central powers, after counting all the dead in bloody battles that in
one big decisive battle they can only lose it all.
Similar scenario is likely to happen in present day warfare. If any of the major powers wage a
direct confrontation with each other it will result in a battle of annihilation in which it is likely that
not only belligerent military organizations, but the whole planet would be consumed. And
following the same line of strategic thinking it became obvious after WWI, that a decisive battle
was no longer a feasible option. So German military thinkers have devised a new strategy the
one which seeks a decisive and rapid victory without seeking destruction of the bulk of enemys
forces.

271

See in Badsey S., The Franco-Prussian War 1870-1871, Osprey Publishing, 2003.

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 Blitzkrieg
Blitzkrieg is a term describing all-motorized force concentration of tanks, infantry, artillery,
combat engineers and air power, concentrating overwhelming force at high speed to break through
enemy lines, and, once the lines are broken, proceeding inwards without regard to its flank.
Through constant motion, the blitzkrieg attempts to keep its enemy off-balance, making it difficult
to respond effectively at any given point before the front has already moved on.272 This way
Germany has maximized the effect of its forces which were smaller in size and technologically
slightly inferior to the ones of the Allies. After stunning German successes in the initial stages of
the WWII with the Blitzkrieg, Allies also imitated this concept later in the war to use it against the
Germans. Blitzkrieg is a strategy that has surpassed its original design rapid invasion of Poland
and defeat of Low Countries and France. Axis powers led by Third Reich temporarily bypassed
their inferiority in the frame of grand strategy and decisively defeated Poland, Netherlands,
Belgium, Luxemburg, Denmark, Yugoslavia, Greece and France with Blitzkrieg. But they have
not been successful in turning these stunning victories into a victory on a grand strategic level. By
using blitzkrieg Germany significantly improved its position on the grand scheme, but when opting
to invade the Soviet Union they rushed into a disaster. This is because Operation Barbarossa
(1941) failed to decisively defeat USSR before passing its culminating point of success. German
Blitzkrieg has achieved its maximum efficiency on the Eastern front somewhere in late October
1941. That final push towards Moscow in December 1941, was far beyond the initial momentum
of their invasion. 273 No matter how many operational victories has Germany previously achieved,
after this point it was on a downward route. Its enemies USA, British Empire and USSR were
simply too strong on a grand strategic level. And this meant that Blitzkrieg would have to achieve
many more operational victories to bring any of the Allies members to surrender, thus improving
Axis position on a grand level. Germany almost achieved this in the case of the Soviet Union, but
just almost.274 And almost does not count in strategy.
Post WWII conflict saw further development of Blitzkrieg strategy and armored offensives. Some
countries have developed this concept and based their entire military thinking on armored mobile
272

Military.com, Blitzkrieg. Link: http://www.military.com/video/operations-and-strategy/second-world-war/ww2german-forces-the-blitzkrieg/1429790341001/ (24/3/14).

On history of Blitzkrieg see in Zaloga S., Poland 1939: The birth of Blitzkrieg, Osprey publishing, 2002.
273
See in Seidler H., Baxter I., Operation Barbarossa: Hitlers Invasion of Russia, Pen & Sword Military, 2011.
274
Luttwak, Strategy, p. 23.

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warfare and coordination of units. Of the smaller powers, most advanced in this development were
Israel and Croatia.275 Both countries had no choice but to use asymmetric mobile warfare in
defense purposes, as they are both in strategically weak geographical positions.
Israel developed highly potent armed forces capable with providing its national security
surrounded with numerous enemies. In fact due to its highly trained, equipped, motivated and wellled armed forces, Israel has become a regional power, and it is feared despite its numerical
inferiority towards the real and potential enemies. 276 Croatia is an example of a military
organization that created its armed forces in the middle of the war starting from scratch. But by
1995 it was the strongest regional power and with superior doctrine based on Blitzkrieg, it defeated
Serbian forces in series of stunning operational victories such as Operation Flash (1994),
Operation Storm (1995) and Operation Mistral (1995) thus securing both political and military
victory.277
But the military organization which has developed original German Blitzkrieg into a much more
potent weapon is todays sole military superpower USA. It has successfully used Blitzkrieg
strategy combined with other strategies to rapidly invade and defeat Iraq (2003). However their
overwhelming military success was not followed by a political victory and Iraqi people formed a
resistance movement against this occupation. It is only by switching to other, indirect strategies
that US forces are bringing this prolonged insurgent conflict to a favorable end.278 Blitzkrieg is a
highly potent strategy designed for a military organization which seeks to rapidly defeat enemys
armed forces without engaging it into a decisive battle, thus lowering the probabilities for
casualties. Israel in 1967, Croatia in 1995 and Coalition of the willing in 2003 attacked their
enemies in Blitzkrieg fashion to minimize casualties and achieve a rapid military victory. Political

275

See more in Domazet-Loso D., Klonovi nastupaju (Clones preform).

See more in Cordesman A., Arab-Israeli Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War, Greenwood Publishing
Group, 2006.
277
Many voices in Croatia today, would argue that because Serbs were close to complete military breakdown,
Croatian then-president Miroslav Tuman should have proceed with military victories and retain Croatian part of
Bosnia as well. But political pressure from USA which was Croatian ally, influenced him to let go of Croatian
possessions in Bosnia in the interest of regional and global peace. It was at the time feared that Croatian capture of
Bosnia would provoke a total mobilization of Serbia and subsequent retaliation which would lead to a prolonged
conflict in which Russia would interfere militarily. Did Croatia pass its culminating point of success in 1995 from a
military point of view, we can only speculate as its advance was halted on a political level. See in Europa
Publications, Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States 1999, Taylor & Francis Group, 1999, p.
278.
278
See in Cordesman A., Davies E., Center for Strategic and International Studies, Iraqs Insurgency and the Road
to Civil Conflict: Volume 1, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008.
276

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victory is something for what Blitzkrieg is not designed. But even such potent military strategy as
the Blitzkrieg has its own counterstrategy in the form of one of the most risky direct strategies
called counterstrike.
Counterstrike
When Germany launched Operation Barbarossa in 1941, USSR almost suffered a complete
military defeat and it had no other hope of victory than to prepare and launch a strategy called
counterattack or counterstrike. 279 Another example, from sports when Mohamed Ali defeated
George Foreman in Zaire (1974) he used asymmetric thinking and employed a strategy of
counterattack. Ali was not the likely one to win this fight and Foreman had him on the ropes.
Muhammad Ali used these ropes to absorb the energy from the punches and wore Foreman down
in eight rounds to eventually win by knockout. By using asymmetry a weaker actor has defeated
the stronger one.280
On theater level of strategy counterattack describes a large scale operation by forces that had
previously successfully halted an enemys offensive by employing defensive in depth and then
launched a full scale offensive to defeat the enemy in a decisive battle. The counter-offensive is
executed after exhausting the enemys front line troops and after the enemy reserves had been
committed to combat and proven incapable of breaching defenses, but before the enemy has had
the opportunity to establish new defensive positions. Clausewitz suggested that a strong
counteroffensive is defenders most efficient way of thwarting enemys plans. 281
During the Cold War it became an imperative for NATO to devise a plan according to which it
could defend Western Europe, against anticipated Soviet invasion. At that time US strategist John
Boyd developed Counter-blitz concept at which NATOs defensive strategy was based upon. The
concept itself belongs to domain of tactics and operational strategy, but the decision to rely on it
is a higher strategic one. Essentially a blitzkrieg in reverse, this strategy attempts to channelize the
enemys movements in the desired direction while at the same time giving the impression of being

279

Both expressions in my opinion are correct and it can refer to both a tactic and a strategy.
See in Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars.
281
Phillips T. R., Brown C. (eds.), Roots of Strategy Book 3: Von Leebs Defense, von Freytag-Loringhovens The
Power of Personality in War, and Erfuths Surprise, Stackpole Books, 1991, p. 540.
280

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random.282 Among military strategists, the strategic concepts of counterattack and preemptive
strike, are considered to be the most risky military operations. 283 This is because they both count
on the element of surprise and overwhelming strike, as the key conditions for success. Another
rule for a counteroffensive is that after the initial strategic objective is completed, which is forcing
the enemy from strategic offensive into strategic defensive, that it stops before momentum is lost
not to pass beyond its culminating point of success. 284 Strategic counter-offensives have been
common throughout history. One of the most famous examples is Battle of Moscow (1941).285
In the Battle of Raphia (217 BC) Ptolemy used his forces to delay enemy offensive as much as
possible while in the same time, in the utmost secrecy he was raising a new army made of conscript
troops and foreign mercenaries. In Ptolemaic Egypt it was not allowed for the native Egyptian
population to be in the military as this was reserved only for the Macedon-Greek parts of society.
To raise a new army whose core was consisted of native Egyptian troops shows just how desperate
the situation was for Ptolemy. After several months of defensive operations which slowed down
Seleucid advance in combination with diplomatic negotiating of some respite, young Egyptian
king bought precious time. This resource of time he desperately needed to train, equip and organize
his new army in Alexandria. He has managed to do it in absolute secrecy and then to achieve
complete surprise and deprive the enemy of maneuver space. He led his army on a forced march
across the heating desert to confront Antioch the Great and his massive, at the time highly
advanced, Seleucid war machine.286 The following battle between two ancient major powers
proved to be decisive enough to not only stop enemys advance, but to bring the war into an end,
as the Seleucid armed forces were incapacitated.
Many centuries later another big battle took place. In front of Moscow (1941) Stalin sacrificed
men and material in huge numbers to wear down the last push of German Blitzkriegs momentum.
It was also vital for him to buy time as he was waiting for the crucial information on whether will
Japan attack on the Far East? Once he learned from his spy Richard Sorge that Empire of Japan

See in Boyd J., Patterns of Conflict, December 1986, Project on Government Oversight, John Boyd
Compendium, 6 December 2007.
283
Nugus Martin Productions Ltd, Battleplan: Counterstrike, 2005.
284
Ibidem.
285
Stalin has purposely waited out for the Battle of Moscow to counterattack the Germans. Glantz D., The Military
Strategy of the Soviet Union: A History, Routledge, 2001, p. 116.
286
See in Polybius, The Histories, Book V., translation by Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, Bloomington press, 1962.
282

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is going south, he could than deploy massive reinforcements from the East to throw them into
the Battle of Moscow, just as the last German offensive reserves were being depleted.287 Unlike
Raphia, Battle of Moscow was not a battle of annihilation as the great sacrifice of German soldiers
saved the Axis front from collapsing. But it marked the beginning of an end for the short lived
Axis domination of European continent.288
Other examples of a counterstrike may include Battle of Tannenberg (1914) and Yom Kippur War
(1973). Counterattack is a desperate move, an all or nothing battle plan, and very rarely does a
strong military organization choose such a strategy only when it has no other options for victory.
Heavy force
To prevent an insurgent movement to ever reach such strength after which it could challenge
conventional army and clash it directly, a military organization can opt for this strategy. Heavy
force is a counterinsurgency strategy designed to destroy an insurgency with overwhelming force
while such an action is still possible. This is a strategy that mostly relies on sheer military force
but it can be supported by political agitation as well. 289
Roman Empire was notorious for dealing with insurgents with utmost brutality to dissuade anyone
from attempting to rebel against Roman rule. But this militarily overstretched Empire found itself
in mortal danger when a major uprising, led by capable Bato, broke out in Illyrian provinces (6-9
AD). Emperor Augustus rapidly gathered a massive force to deal with this uprising while it is still
at the initial stage. He did this because on the grand scheme, Rome could not afford to lose these
provinces or to risk an attack on the city of Rome itself. If the rebels sacked Rome, for which they
had a good chance of doing because closest major Roman force was twice as many march days
away, this act could cause unrests to break out throughout the Empire - which would encourage
Romes neighboring enemies to invade its territories. Roman political victory over the new lands
in many parts of the Empire was not firmly established, and there was plenty of those who were

See in Whymant R., Stalins Spy: Richard Sorge and the Tokyo Espionage Ring, I.B.Tauris, 2007.
See more in Nagorski A., The Greatest Battle: Stalin, Hitler, and the Desperate Struggle for Moscow That
Changed the Course of World War II, Simon and Schuster, 2007.
289
Theory of heavy force developed by F. Kitson, who unlike the Romans warned against the possible abuse of
heavy force. Kitson suggested two types of intelligence to be used against the insurgency, political and operational
which are both to be gathered by the military. Bartholomees J. B. (ed.), The US Army War College Guide to
National Security Issues: Volume I, Theory of War and Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute publication, July 2010, p.
35.
287
288

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not happy with its rule. So in order to quickly and decisively defeat the rebels Augustus
redeployed the legions, raised levies, freed slaves, recalled the veterans and pretty much everyone
able to carry a sword. Such a massive armed force was to dissuade any attempt of seizing the city
of Rome and strike terror into the heart of the enemy. That winter in Siscia, modern day Sisak,
Croatia Augustus gathered 10 legions, 70 auxiliary units (cohorts), 14 cavalry units (ala), more
than 10 000 veterans and many volunteers. However due to the fact rebels were secretly organizing
this rebellion for a long time, it actually happened was that their armed force was not in a
manageable state even in the first days. The insurgency gained momentum right from the start.
Three bloody years of merciless counterinsurgency warfare followed in which Rome spared no
one, combatants and non-combatants alike.
Such was the usual Roman way of dealing with rebellions. And the next big Jewish rebellion called
Bar Kokhba revolt (132-136 AD) was no exception. Roman province of Judea was previously
known for being a troublesome one and for this reason it enjoyed a semi-autonomous position of
a vassal kingdom. So when this rebellion started Rome reacted with considerable forces in
immediate vicinity to suppress it. However the scale of it was underestimated and initial direct
counterinsurgency response failed. So in the next attempt Roman Empire took no chances and
gathered an overwhelming force of six legions supported by auxiliaries and elements of six more
legions. As usual Rome spared no one, and this insurgency resulted in a complete destruction of
many of its inhabitants, and any kind of Jewish political or religious autonomy. Kingdom of Judea
was turned into a province and renamed Syria Palaestina.290
Heavy force counts on the factor that it can bring overwhelming armed forces to break an
insurgency in its beginning. As such it relies on intelligence data to provide with accurate and up
to date information to estimate the security risks of this insurgency becoming a serious threat. In
ancient times Roman Empire had a very efficient spy network to provide with such information,
but the problem was the speed of response. As there were limited means of transport Roman
legions that were not in the immediate vicinity had to travel many days or months even, to reach
the affected territory. By that time what was a manageable insurgency would already become an
all-out rebellion. So what the Romans usually did was to send overwhelming forces. In this way

290

See in Schfer P., The Bar Kokhba War Reconsidered: New Perspectives on the Second Jewish Revolt Against
Rome, Mohr Siebeck, 2003.

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they would use their military superiority to find and kill, or enslave, all rebels with their supporting
or even potentially supporting population. This kind of brutality in combination with other political
means ensured stability of the Roman Empire.
But when a modern military organization seeks to quickly and decisively defeat an insurgency
with this direct strategy, then resorting to Roman methods is for many reasons rarely an option.
The world has changed since then and today it would have long term negative political
consequences for a military organization. Other circumstances have also changed, as todays
means of communication and transport enable quick relocation of overwhelming troops on a
desired location. During the Second battle of Fallujah (2004) Coalition forces defeated Iraqi
insurgents by using heavy force. In those two weeks of the battle, Coalition forces employed
overwhelming armed forces to destroy the insurgency while it was still in a manageable state. If
the insurgents would have won and seized control over any bigger population center, for them it
would be both a military and political victory. 291 Such an achievement could be then used for
propaganda purposes. Many more of the population might join their cause. For this reason a
strategy of heavy force is used when a rapid and decisive defeat of insurgents is required.
But even the largest insurgencies could never be a match for a strong military organization. For
such a thing to happen the main forces of a strong power must be engaged in some other theater
of operations thus leaving the path open for insurgent forces to attack its political centers. Exactly
such circumstances occurred in the first days of Batos revolt. The main Roman army was engaged
in campaign against the Marcomanni and the road to the city of Rome was open. Even in the worst
scenarios could the Romans ever imagine that a major rebellion, so close to their capital, would
break out and grew to a colossal size in such a short time period. In this case, usually always on
the alert, Romans were caught completely off guard. Still the rebels were aware that this weakness
is only temporary and the hope of victory for them was to opt for another strategy, which we call
preemptive strike.

291

Keiler J. F., Who Won the Battle of Fallujah?, The Naval Institute: Proceedings, Military.com, 2005.

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 Preemptive strike
Preemptive strike is a strategy in which one side decides to attack the other preemptively. The
attacker is doing so, because it is likely to be in disadvantageous strategic position. Therefore it
counts on the element of surprise to catch the enemy off-guard. Attack them before they attack us
is the main idea behind this concept. Such action, if properly executed, can give vital advantage
in the following conflict. However preemptive attack can only give initial advantage and
temporarily balance the power ratio. But in the long run, this transitory strategic advantage of the
attacking side, will fade and strategically stronger side will eventually prevail.
If two major military organizations are imminent to clash, then the one which is considered to be
in a strategically disadvantageous position, will seek to employ the strategy of preemptive strike
to surprise and defeat its enemy. Alongside counterattack, preemptive attack is considered to be
one the most risky of all strategies. This is because it must contain an element of a clear exit
strategy. If it does not, then the result will likely be the complete destruction of a military
organization which opted for it. Preemptive attack opens a chance for victory to the weaker actor
but it is also a potential death trap.
Such a thing happened in World War I to the Central powers. Prior to 1914 the German Empire
based its battle plans on the premises that it will be able to rapidly defeat France, before England
brings sufficient reinforcements and before tsarist Russia fully mobilizes. This will avoid the
scenario in which Germany will have to fight on two fronts. So after Entente declared war on
Austro-Hungary, German Empire hastily embarked to invade France thru the Low Countries
according to the famous Schlieffen plan. But air reconnaissance discovered operational details of
this plan. France did not fall and Russia mobilized much quicker than German military planners
estimated. This quick military response from Entente resulted in a bloody world war which will
see the end of both German and Austrian Empires. Their preemptive war plan was countered and
it did not had a backup exit strategy. Central powers exit strategy was to force surrender upon its
enemies and this premises failed in the first months of the war. To choose the strategy of
preemptive attack is always the last resort for any military organization. The one which is doing
so is choosing it out of necessity, because its enemy is strategically stronger, and this is the only
hope of victory. When Axis invaded USSR in 1941 they waged preemptive war to quickly and

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decisively eliminate the Soviet threat. Whether or not the Soviet invasion on the Third Reich was
just days away before the attack is still a matter of debate. 292 Perhaps it was a preventive war?
Preventive strike
The strategy of preventive is very similar to preemptive with only one difference. According to
Walt preemptive attack is the first strike in a forthcoming conflict, and it is used when an enemy
invasion is imminent and almost a certainty. And preventive attack is used to forestall a shift in
the balance of power. One attacks before the balance of power has the opportunity to change
towards the potential enemy. Preventive war is a strategy to attack when there is no strong evidence
that the enemy is actually planning an invasion.293
Such was the Japanese strategy in 1941. As Japan was strategically weaker than its adversaries, it
launched a preemptive strike on the US navy base in Pearl Harbor. This was then followed with
invasion of the southern Pacific which was the strategic objective of Japan in this theater.
But both preemptive and preventive strategies must contain an element of a clear exit strategy.
How does one exit from an armed conflict once it has started? One option is to force ones
adversary to surrender, but for this neither preventive nor preemptive strategies are designed. Truth
be said, preventive war does offer such a possibility. Only if it is used by a strategically stronger
side against weaker adversaries.
Examples include Poland (1939) and Iraq (2003). Both Germany and USA invaded political and
military entities weaker than them, under the pretext of reacting preemptively. The reality was that
there was not even the smallest justification of them being preventive. Neither 1939 Poland nor
2003 Iraq would ever be strong enough to challenge the strength of Germany or USA.
Preventive and preemptive attacks offer only a temporary strategic advantage. They buy time. But
if they dont have a realistic exit strategy than the result will be a defeat.
As both Axis powers, Germany and Japan lacked clear exit strategies, in their wars against USSR
and USA/GB, they have suffered destruction not only of their strategies but of their military
organizations as well. German exit strategy was to force USSR to sue for peace by repeatedly
292

See in Suvorov V., Icebreaker: who started the Second World War?, Hamish Hamilton, 1990.
Walt S. M., Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy, W. W. Norton Limited, 2006, p.
224.
293

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defeating it on the battlefield. It was a very risky expectation, however not a completely unrealistic
one. But when Blitzkrieg failed, this gamble seriously backfired on Germany. As we said, this is
what is to be expected after an unsuccessful preemptive strike.
Japan on the other hand seems to have had not even the slightest realistic exit from its preventive
war against Anglo-American forces. It based its entire plans on seeking one decisive naval battle,
against the US, in which it could crush its navy capabilities thus securing Japans new
possessions. 294 This idea actually speeded up Japanese defeat. Its formidable fleet instead of
protecting its merchant fleet, which was extensively being attacked by US submarines was
engaged into pursuing a decisive battle with US Pacific navy. Eventually Japan found its newly
expanded Empire chronically undersupplied. One of the few military leaders in Japan, who fully
understood Japans precarious strategic position in the forthcoming war with USA, was the famous
admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. Shortly before the war he stated:
Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it would not be enough
that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory
certain, we would have to march into Washington and dictate the terms of peace in the White
House. I wonder if our politicians (who speak so lightly of a Japanese-American war) have
confidence as to the final outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices.295
By the logic of strategy, it would be a more realistic expectation for USA to simply forgive the
fact that Japan has attacked and invaded them, than to expect for USA to accept a decisive naval
battle close to Japanese mainland and decisively lose in it. Because despite the unprecedented
amount of Japanese commitment, hard work and sacrifice all that they could expect was for the
laws of strategy to turn on them. Japan decided to fight with the big boys and what it got in the
end was two nuclear detonations to finish off what was left of its pride. 296 To survive Japan had to
change its spirit in its very essence. Rules of warfare have changed, rules of war have stayed the
same.

294

Paret P., Craig G., Gilbert F., Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Princeton
University Press, 2008, p. 475.
295
Prange G., At Dawn We Slept, Penguin Books, 1982, p. 11.
296
Paret, p. 735.

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 Nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction

Nuclear strategy is a strategy in which a military organization seeks employment of nuclear
weapons against its adversaries. In this category I also include other weapons of mass destruction.
As soon as USA announced its entry into the nuclear age, other military organization rushed to
obtain these weapons as well. Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France and China successfully
tested their nuclear weapons to introduce the world into a new age of warfare. War without a war
became reality, as the world found itself locked into a nuclear standoff, in which no side dared to
attack the other with nuclear arsenal in fear of retaliation. Therefore, as both sides during the
sustained military and political tension known as the Cold War (1945-1991), had their fingers on
the nuclear trigger, the strategy of a preemptive strike became the ultimate war plan. Hit them first
before they can hit us. So the primary objective for all nuclear powers became the development of
the second strike capability.
This is the sub-strategy within nuclear strategy which seeks to retaliate on the enemy, in the case
the enemy makes the first move and launches a nuclear sneak attack. If this was to happen, and the
enemy manages to destroy most of ones nuclear potential, second strike capability wants to make
sure that attacked military organization still has enough nuclear arsenal to retaliate securing the
mutually assured destruction.
Strategy which is designed to counter the MAD doctrine is called counterforce. In the case of
possible or actual nuclear attack it aims to destroy or weaken enemys nuclear strike capability.
The objective of counterforce is to attack enemys nuclear facilities such as siloes for
intercontinental ballistic missile armed with nuclear war heads, submarine bases, air bases, mobile
launch platforms or command and control centers.297
Another segment within of nuclear strategic thinking is a concept called counter-value.
This is a strategy, which in the case of possible or actual nuclear attack, uses its nuclear arsenal to
destroy enemys major population centers. If a military organization, that has nuclear weapons,
suffers a nuclear attack from another nuclear power it will seek to retaliate on enemys people.
Also if a nuclear power decides to attack first with nuclear weapons it will make the people its
297

See in Martel W., Savage P., Strategic Nuclear War: What the Superpowers Target and Why, Greenwood Press,
1986.

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primary target, instead of military installations. The purpose of this strategic concept can be either
to dissuade any possible attack, destroy the enemy or to break his will to fight. USAs nuclear
attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1945) is an example of this strategy. Bombing of these cities
psychologically broke the Empire of Japan, and faced it with harsh facts, to either seek terms or
suffer total destruction.298
Since counter-value is not designed to attack enemys military it should be regarded as indirect
strategy. However I see it as an exception, because of the sheer magnitude of destruction which
nuclear weapons deployment bring. An organization which attacks enemys population with
nuclear weapons, is doing so to quickly and decisively bring a conflict to an end. This is the first
reason why employment of nuclear, or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction, can be
considered a direct military strategy. Second reason, is the amount of political commitment of the
actor which decides to undertake such an action. Every aspect of its military and civil structure
will be affected by such a decision, as it will bear a collective moral responsibility for killing so
many people indiscriminately. Todays world has more than one military organization capable of
waging a nuclear war. So far none of them is choosing to actually employ it as it would almost
certainly result not only in their own destruction but the majority of Earths inhabitants as well.
Since nuclear weapons are then out of reach for actual use, military thinkers have devised a new
advanced strategy which can bring rapid and decisive victory to the military organization
undertaking it.
Shock and Awe
Developed by the US strategic thinkers, shock and awe, also called rapid dominance strategy
was so far been employed only once. Coalition forces used it as their overall strategic plan on
which they based their invasion of Iraq in 2003.
This strategys main elements are the use of overwhelming power, dominant battlefield awareness,
dominant maneuvers, and spectacular displays of force. According to Ullman and Wade the key
objective of Rapid Dominance: is to impose this overwhelming level of Shock and Awe against
an adversary on an immediate or sufficiently timely basis to paralyze its will to carry on. In crude

298

Kristensen H., Norris R., Oelrich I., From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the
Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons, Occasional Paper, Federation of American scientists and the Natural
resources defense council, No 7, April 2009.

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terms, Rapid Dominance would seize control of the environment and paralyze or so overload an
adversarys perceptions and understanding of events so that the enemy would be incapable of
resistance at tactical and strategic levels. An adversary would be rendered totally impotent and
vulnerable to our actions.299 Shock and awe by attacking enemys command and control centers
direct force, and thru selective denial of information, and dissemination of disinformation
supported by the use overwhelming combat force, and rapidity of action seeks quick and
decisive victory.300 Shock and awe wants to achieve overwhelming dominance in all aspects over
the enemy. The purpose of this, is to make the enemy so afraid to fight to almost entirely give up
on his defensive plans.301
Shock and awe during the invasion of Iraq in 2003 combined several different strategies. One of
the key conditions was to control Persian Gulf. Strategy which is designed for this is called
command of the sea.
Command of the sea
Military organization which employs this strategy, seeks to develop such a naval force to achieve
total control of the seas. This means that its rivals cannot directly jeopardize its naval dominance.
Total sea control may apply only to the surrounding waters of the nations territory or it can extend
far into the oceans. To have complete control of the sea enables a military organization to move
its strategic resources at will across the seas, and to neglect resources to its enemies. 302 This is a
trait of military superpowers. Both in the past and present times, only superpowers were able to
develop strong naval forces to have undisputed control of the high seas.
In ancient Greece powerful Athenian fleet made Delian League led by Athens the most prosperous
of all other rival city-states and alliances, even if some of them were militarily stronger. 303 Both
Chinese and Roman Empires had enjoyed many centuries of dominance over the high seas in their

299

Ullman H., Wade J., Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance, National Defense University, 1996, p. 25.
Ibid, p. 27.
301
See in Haney E., Thomsen B., Beyond Shock and Awe: Warfare in the 21st Century, Penguin group, 2007.
302
Palmer M., Command at Sea: Naval Command and Control since the Sixteenth Century, Harvard University
Press, 2005, p. 157.
303
Kagan D., The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Cornell University Press, 1989, p. 41.
300

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parts of the World. This enabled them to expand their influence far beyond its centers of power.
304

British Empire, probably the most famous naval power in history, based its entire grand strategy
on the element to command the seas. This key condition enabled Britain to establish worldwide
domination. Royal navy was undoubtedly the strongest naval force in the world for many centuries.
In combination with skilled employment of other military and political resources, Britain was
established as the most powerful Empire on Earth, from the end of the 17 th century until well into
the 20th century.305
Hoping to challenge this supremacy other strong Empires of the time, such as Germany, also
invested considerably into naval forces. During the First World War, British and German Empires
clashed in the Battle of Jutland (1916) off the coast of Denmark. Although the battle itself was a
victory for the Germans, they could not exploit it to break British naval dominance on a grand
strategy level. With the Royal Navy controlling access towards the German mainland through the
Northern Sea, German Empire was separated from its colonies, and could not use their resources
to support the war effort. The strategy of command of the sea employed by the British speeded up
the defeat of Central powers in WWI.
After WWII, USA emerged as the most powerful naval power in the world and together with
Britain it still dominates the worlds oceans of today. To achieve total control of the sea requires
from a military organization, to invest substantial technological and economic resources, into
developing and maintaining a powerful naval force.
USAs latest naval strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower devised in 2007,
heavily relies on the control of the worlds oceans. This key condition is of vital importance for
US security, economy and way of life. The study points out that 90% of the Worlds commerce
travels by sea; the vast majority of Worlds population lives within a few hundred miles of the
oceans; and nearly three quarters of the planet is covered by water.306 Undisputed command of the
304

Deng G., Chinese Maritime Activities and Socioeconomic Development: 2100 BC-1900 AD, Greenwood
Publishing Group, 1997, p. 11.
See in DAmato R., Imperial Roman Naval Forces 31 BC- 500 AD, Osprey Publishing, 2009.
305
See Britannica, The Royal Navy.
http// http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/511494/The-Royal-Navy (29/11/14)
306
See in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, US Navy, October 2007. Link:
http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf

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sea enables USA and NATO to project its military power across the world, far beyond its centers
of power.307 Among others, this is the reason why USA does not need to have large armed forces
within its borders any coming threat is to be deterred from a distance.
Because if a nation is separated from its enemies by the sea, than it is command of the sea strategy
which keeps this nations population relatively safe from the enemy. During WWII, North
America nations were out of reach to the bulk of Axis armed forces. 308 On the other hand
populations of Japan, Italy and Germany were not out of reach of Allied air and naval power, so
their nations were forced to wage a total war.
Total war
As WWII progressed, Axis powers found themselves hopelessly outnumbered and strategically
cornered. Soon enough it became evident that they will lose the war, so in despair, their political
leaders opted for strategy of total war.
This strategy, also called total commitment, is the one in which a warring party engages in the
complete mobilization of all of its available strategic resources.309 In total mobilization the war
becomes the absolute priority for the entire society and subsequently there is very little or no
difference between combatants and noncombatants. For this reason such a conflict results in high
casualties as the war affects the civilian population directly. Because in total war the very survival
of ones military and political organization is at stake. Strategy of total war is the ultimate solution,
in which everything what is at disposal of a military organization will be used to support the war
effort.
Examples are the French revolutionary wars/Napoleonic wars, Taiping rebellion (1850-1864),
American civil war, World War I and World War II. In all of those wars, major military powers:
France, Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, United and Confederate states of America, USSR, Germany
and Japan employed all the resources they had to win the war.

307

Palmer, p. 294.
Germans tried to counter it with submarine warfare.
309
See definitions of total war in Heuser B., The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present,
Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 139. She discusses the possibility of genocide to be observed as a part of total
war. I see genocide and massacres as deliberate employment of barbarism.
308

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Total war is characterized by full mobilization of troops, even arming civilians, which would
conventionally not be fit for military service, such as children, old men, women and disabled. It
requires employment of all industrial, cultural, scientific and technological capacities that a nation
can provide. This strategy is the ultimate request which a military organization can ask of its people
and it demands a high level of national unity. To ensure national dedication for the war effort a
military organization employs a combination of repression and propaganda. In the case of WWII
Germany and Japan total war increased their capacities to fight, but it also backfired in some
segments.
Germany employed millions of slave workers from the conquered nations to work in their
factories, but this was in a way working against their (effective) production. German military
technology was too complicated to be easily mass produced in short time. Japan, as it lacked
industrial capacities, even went as far to mobilize its unskilled civilians to produce weapons in
their homes. But these weapons were of poor quality and could not always be used by the Imperial
army. 310
In the Allied camp things were different, because they had considerably more resources and
simpler war technology. So they were able to produce and effectively employ much more weapon
systems. For example, the Soviet Union produced tanks and planes which were not as good as the
German ones, but since it required less work hours and fewer resources to make them, they could
be produced in vast numbers. To compare, German Panther tank in 1943 cost $51,600 and required
55,000 man-hours to build. On the other hand, not by much inferior, Soviet T-34/76 at the same
time cost $25,470 and took about 3,000 man hours to complete. 311 The results were clear, despite
the better tactical and organizational level of German tank crews Soviets defeated them with
sheer numbers.
I continue the list of direct strategies with a new strategy within domain of cyber-warfare.

310

Bishop C., The Encyclopedia of Weapons of WWII: The Comprehensive Guide to Over 1,500 Weapons Systems,
Including Tanks, Small Arms, Warplanes, Artillery, Ships, and Submarines, Sterling Publishing Company, 2002, p.
234.
311
Forczyk R., Panther vs T-34: Ukraine 1943, Osprey Publishing, 2007, p. 17.

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 Proactive Cyber Defense

Warfare has changed and cyberspace is its new element, but as I state before, the same rules from
the times of Sun Tzu still apply. Precisely for the reason that warfare has changed, is the
justification for considering this strategy as a part of direct strategy. Cyber-attack is an assault on
the communication and information systems of the enemy using informatic means. If such an
attack is made against civilian sector with the purpose to undermine enemys economy then I
consider it to be indirect strategy. And if it is directed on enemys military informatics installations
and research facilities, than I classify it as a direct strategy. This is because in modern warfare
weapons of mass destruction have become the primary asset which makes all other conventional
weapon systems and troops obsolete. And modern major powers control their armies via
informational network. If it would happen that a cyber-attack would successfully bring down this
network it would result in a severe incapacity of this military organization. It could not launch
its defensive systems, thus leaving its enemies an open space to attack it with WMD. So any attack
on informational grid of a modern army which extensively relies on it, is rightfully considered a
direct assault against its armed forces. It would be too late for this organization to react after the
attack, as the damage would be irreparable.
Russian cyber-attack on Estonia (2007) was an indirect strategy at which NATO reacted by
establishing Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence in 2008. It was aimed on civilian
structures. On the other hand Chinese cyber operation Titan Rain, was aimed at US defense
systems and technology. Latest publically known Chinese success was in 2013, when Chinese
hackers successfully attacked US computer systems and got vital information about the newest
secret military technology.312 This can be considered a direct strategy as it directly impacts
capabilities of the US military arsenal.
For these reasons USA, as the most advanced known military organization in the world, is
conducting preemptive and proactive defense of its civilian and military information structures.
Based on the teachings of Sun Tzu, one must never remain ignorant of the enemys condition. 313
Following this line of thought, US cannot allow itself to be jeopardized in domain of cyberspace,

Nakashima E., Confidential report lists U.S. weapons system designs compromised by Chinese cyberspies, The
Washington Post, 28 May 2013.
313
Tzu, Chapter XIII.
312

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as this would seriously hamper its defensive potential USA cyber defense must eliminate
potential threats before they materialize. In according to this understanding USA and Israel
conducted operation Olympic Games in which they successfully attacked Irans nuclear program
research facilities. Computer virus Stuxnet caused malware in Iranian computer systems, seriously
slowing down their nuclear development.314 Cyber warfare, regardless of being new, is following
the same nature as any other aspect of war. For most peoples understanding, this rapid and
constant change, is out of reach. Because they are using technology, but always according to their
nature. Modern technology has changed the warfare, but the people have not changed with it. To
wait for politicians and public to catch up with this constant radical and rapid change in warfare,
is a luxury which USA and NATO cannot afford. There is simply no time to wait for enemys first
move and then respond to it. This is why the cutting reform is not to be found in Congress but
behind closed doors in the Pentagon.315
To further explain it I use another atypical example. Publics inability to follow the change, is like
a dog barking on a postman every time he passes. Dogs, as mans best friends, have performed
wonderfully over many millennia of this human-dog symbiosis. Their natural instinct was assisting
in hunting and keeping guard against any potential harm for the human group. However modern
dogs environment has changed and the problem is that dog has not changed with it. Postman
coming to deliver mail is a part of todays human social environment, and there is nothing unusual
about it. But dogs social development has not evolved to meet this change. In order not to attack
the postman anymore, dogs behavior has to be manipulated somehow by its owner. But this
doesnt mean dog has stopped perceiving postman as a threat. Its nature does not allow it, as it is
simply the way dogs are.
Groups of people are behaving in a close to animalistic manner. It is long known that group
behavior differs from a persons one. 316 For this reason political apparatus of a powerful
democratic power, must use various manipulative techniques to get public cooperation for national
strategy. And then when these facts come out in the media people speak of conspiracies and are
angry at their governments for cheating them. But what they do not see is that there is rarely
Sanger D. E., Obama Order Speed Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, New York Times, 1 June 2012.
FAS project on Government secrecy, DoD examines preemptive Intelligence operations, Secrecy News,
Volume 2002, Issue 107, 28 October 2002.
316
See in Bon G., Psihologija Naroda, Gomila, Revolucija (Psychology of Nations, Crowds, Revolutions), Golden
Marketing-Tehnicka knjiga, 2004.
314
315

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another way to get their cooperation because strategy is so highly complex and operates in secrecy.
People do not understand why it is important for them to wage a war in Vietnam or invade Iraq.
They do not see that in modern world, the real enemy is being fought over a strategic distance. In
strategy nothing is as it seems to be, as the ones which we call friends are sometimes enemies, and
enemies are the closest things to friends. Modern technology has evolved immensely. If human
nature would be able to evolve along with it, eventually people would realize that they do not need
to fight among themselves at all. Modern warfare is dominated with the situation in which any of
the major military organizations on the planet would clash directly, it would involve weapons of
mass destruction and total commitment. This is something that military and political leaders of the
strongest powers are avoiding to do, as it would result in unacceptable losses for all sides. And this
question of losses, of what can a military organization afford to lose, is the key element in
understanding when actors choose to apply direct strategy. On the contrary, if an actor perceives
that a direct strategy would lead to unacceptable losses, either for political or military reasons, it
can opt for indirect strategy.

3. Indirect strategies
Is the kind of strategy which seeks to avoid direct confrontation with the main power of enemys
armed forces. Instead it is using an intermediary way, a bypass, to achieve its objectives. It can be
a part of both strategic offensive and strategic defensive. When it is a part of strategic offensive, it
is likely so because the side opting for it is in a strategically vulnerable position, and is avoiding
direct clash with the enemy to escape inevitable military and political defeat. In this case weaker
actor is buying time by avoiding the enemy in order to improve its strategic position. If it is the
opposite scenario and strategically stronger actor employs an indirect strategy, then it is likely
doing so to prevent wasting its resources in a direct confrontation, and can afford itself to fight
with the enemy over an extended period of time.
Specific circumstances can allow indirect strategy to defeat a direct one. Such was the example of
the Battle of Inchon (1950) during the Korean War. After the UN and South Korean forces were
being pushed into the southern tip of the Korean peninsula called Pusan Perimeter, a daring plan

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was devised to recapture Seoul and cut off North Korean supply and retreat routes further to the
north.317 The strategic concept which was used is the first on my list of indirect strategies.
Assault from the sea
Also known as Naval power projection ashore, is a strategy which uses naval firepower, air and
logistic potential to project military power ashore. Subsection of this strategy referred to as
Amphibious landing of ground troops on a beachhead, is the most complex of all military
maneuvers. Its undertaking requires the coordination of numerous military branches, including air
force, baval, ground, logistical and intelligence troops. As such it demands an extensive training
for all personnel involved. 318
Amphibious flexibility is the greatest strategic asset that a sea power possesses.
Liddell Hart319
Todays strong world armies rely on this strategy and its potential to project power on distance. A
smaller, independent naval force, with its own air and ground units can provide with a rapid
military projection to any seashore (and beyond) in the world. Such task forces are usually
consisted of aircraft carriers with its air forces escorted by other ships and submarines which are
organized to protect it. Naval and air units then provide with artillery and air cover, while
amphibious vessels deliver ground troops ashore. These are usually consisted of specialized mobile
and armored brigades. All great powers such as USA, Russia, France, Britain and since recently
China, have the ability to deploy such forces.
One of the historys first campaigns in which it was introduced the concept of specifically designed
vessels for amphibious landings, was the Battle of Pisagua (1879). Chilean navy performed a
successful amphibious landing to a port behind Peruvian/Bolivian lines, from which it could
launch further military operations in Tarapac region. 320 Similar scenario took place more than
half a century later, during the Korean War.

317

Isserman M., Korean War, Infobase Publishing, 2009, p. 45.

Bose N., Changing Concepts Of Amphibious Operations Management Essay, Essays UK, November 2013
On amphibious warfare see in Speller I., Tuck C., Amphibious Warfare: The Illustrated History from 1914 to
Present Day, Mbi Publishing Company, 2001.
319
Quote taken from Till G., Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (3rd edition), Routledge, 2013, p. 184.
320
Lisle G., The Royal Navy and the Peruvian-Chilean War 1879 - 1881: Rudolf de Lisles Diaries and
Watercolours, Casemate Publishers, 2008, p. 64.
318

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Prior to the Inchon landing in September of 1950, a small team was sent ashore to provide the UN
command with accurate and up to date intelligence on the conditions of the harbor: such as tides,
beach composition, mudflats and seawalls, mines in the sea and detailed information about enemy
troops movements and strength. Based on these, the main UN amphibious force took a series of
exercises to prepare for the assault. Because of the changing sea currents and tides, a timely and
coordinated maneuver was of the essence for a successful operation. 321 A victory at Inchon bay
opened another front behind the back of the bulk of North Korean forces. This forced their troops
engaged around Pusan Perimeter, to retreat towards their home territory. So with a usage of indirect
strategy, attack on a distant and weakly protected port of Inchon, the UN influenced a direct North
Korean offensive strategy further south. Strategy of amphibious warfare in this case achieved both
military and political success, as the UN captured Seoul and pushed North Korean army further up
on the peninsula. Large amphibious operations took place in WWII of which the most famous ones
are: Operation Weserbung (1940), Operation Torch (1942), Invasion of Sicily (1943), Salerno
(1943), Anzio (1944), D-day (1944) and Southern France (1944) or the US Pacific campaign of
island hopping which includes battles such as; Guadalcanal (1942), Tarawa (1943), Makin
(1943), Saipan (1944), Peleliu (1944), Iwo Jima (1945) or Okinawa (1945).
Amphibious operation when assaulting a defended position can cost heavy casualties to the actor
undertaking it. For this reason, apart from being the most complicated military operation, assault
from the sea also requires the absolute necessity of accurate and up to date intelligence information.
If these are not accurate, and accurately interpreted by military planners, it can result in a disastrous
failure for the operation and annihilation, as the assaulting troops have nowhere to retreat but into
the sea. Such were the operations of Gallipoli (1915), Dieppe (1942) or Bay of Pigs (1961) in
which the military organizations launching the assaults, had underestimated enemys response as
a result of inadequate or misinterpreted intelligence information. 322 All three operations ended in
a failure followed by heavy losses.
Besides executing amphibious landing successfully, from a military point of view, it could also be
important to have the support of the local population. This can provide with inside information

321

See in Clark E., Fleming T., The secrets of Inchon: the untold story of the most daring covert mission of the
Korean War, Putnams publishing, 2002.
322
See in Neillands R., The Dieppe Raid: The Story of the Disastrous 1942 Expedition, Indiana University Press,
2005.

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and initial support for the invading forces. When Allies attacked Dieppe they were not welcomed
by the local French population. Also the US backed Cuban exiles, as it was expected were not
supported by the popular uprising in Cuba. On top of that, the Cuban communist forces already
knew via their intelligence network, that an invasion will take place. 323 Failed Bay of Pigs invasion
was celebrated as a victory against US imperialism throughout South America. Similar as in the
case of Dieppe, where Nazi propaganda extensively used this Allied defeat. Hitler rewarded the
town with the release of 1500 French POWs held in German captivity and 10 million francs, to be
used to repair damage caused during the raid. 324 Battle of Gallipoli goes so far that it is a part of
modern Turkish national myth.
When a military organization makes a successful amphibious landing, it can mean a decisive
political and military defeat for the opposing forces. Such was the example of Anjouan (2008) in
which African Union successfully invaded and overthrown the regime of Mohamed Bacar from
the small island nation of Comors.325 Amphibious landing can have a primary objective of seizing
enemys resources. This was the case of Battle of Al Faw (2003). During that operation a combined
amphibious force of Coalition troops had the mission to capture gas and oil platforms on that
peninsula.326 Even though strategy of assault from the sea is an indirect strategy, it offers the
possibility of a major political victory. This political victory has the potential, to be followed by a
decisive military victory on the higher strategic levels.
Next on the list is a strategy which is designed for precisely the opposite, to buy time and delay
decisiveness in any aspect, victory or defeat.
Attrition
Attrition is the name for a strategy which uses gradual erosion of will and resources to defeat the
enemy over protracted period of time. 327 Attritional warfare fights with the enemy in such a way
to prolong the decisiveness in the conflict. In the end war is won by the side which has managed
to preserve more strategic resources in this fight. It is also called strategy of exhaustion, attrition
warfare represents an attempt to grind down an opponent piece by piece, and it represents the
323

Jones H., The Bay of Pigs, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 142.
Atkin R., Dieppe 1942: the Jubilee disaster, Macmillan, 1980, p. 264.
325
African forces invade rebel Comoros Island, Agence France-Presse, 25 March 2008.
326
Neville L., Special Operations Forces in Iraq, Osprey Publishing, 2011, p.24.
327
Kober A., Israels Wars of Attrition: Attrition Challenges to Democratic States, Routledge, 2009, p. 6.
324

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opposite of the usual principles of war. 328 In Blitzkrieg one uses maneuver, concentration of force
and surprise to win quickly. On the other hand in attrition, one wants to protract the conflict,
postpone any decisive action because this actor might be weaker in this tactical or technological
sense. Depending on the situation, attrition has used in-depth withdrawals, limited ground
offensives, frontal assaults, patrolling, careful defensives, scorched earth, guerilla warfare, air
strikes, artillery firepower or raids.329 These methods are the basis on which attrition is being
protracted, gradual and piece meal because none of them can deliver a quick decision.
Malkasian continued to argue that unlike maneuver warfare, attrition lacks one simple and
universal strategic aim, such as decisively defeating enemy on the battlefield. Attrition serves a
number of other objectives: wearing down the enemy until decisive battle is possible, compelling
concessions in negotiations, defeating an enemy attack and undermining enemys resolve to wage
war.330 Even though attrition seeks to destroy enemys armed forces, it is still an indirect strategy,
because it is not devised to achieve this in a short period of time. Yes, attrition seeks to kill enemy
soldiers, damage enemy facilities and weaken enemy morale, but it is doing so in a long run. And
because it avoids bold and direct engagement on a large scale, the chances of either a decisive
victory or defeat are low. One of the first, historically in detail recorded, major attrition campaigns
of the ancient world was the Fabian strategy during the Second Punic war (218-201 BC). After a
series of disastrous military defeats in battles, Roman republic accepted the strategy of its elected
dictator Fabius Maximus.331 He used Roman army to harass Hannibals troops, but not to engage
them in a decisive battle as Hannibal Barca would be likely to win due to his superior military
skill. After all he is widely recognized as one of the most talented tactical commanders in history.
Fabius also employed scorched earth to deny Hannibal provisions for his undersupplied troops.
Apart from these two, Romans used a combination of other indirect strategies amphibious
landings in Carthaginian possessions of Hispania and North Africa, and command of the sea,
which cut off Hannibals supply routes. With indirect strategies, the Romans have forced
Carthaginian general out of Italian peninsula and to retreat to Carthage. There, in a decisive Battle

328

Bowdish, p. 210 sees attrition and exhaustion as different names for the same strategy.
Malkasian C., A History of Modern Wars of Attrition, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002, p. 6.
330
Ibidem.
331
Attrition is sometimes called Fabian strategy.
329

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of Zama (202 BC), Hannibal was defeated by Scipio Africanus and Carthaginian senate sued for
peace, which marked the end of the 2nd Punic War.332
Terrain might be a key factor in conducting a successful campaign of attrition. After the disastrous
defeat at the Battle of Mohi (1241), the Croato-Hungarian king Bela the IVth fled to the Kingdom
of Croatia. As the Mongols chased him, from continental Croatia to the coastal cities, the Croatian
army used mountainous terrain and tricky passages to prepare ambushes and harass the invaders.
Mongols were skilled horsemen and superior military force both on tactical and strategic levels,
but their horse mobility was nullified in the mountainous terrain of coastal Croatia. This weakness
Croats exploited to delay and defeat Mongol raiders, and this campaign remains as one of the few
examples where Mongols suffered military defeats. When in the winter of 1241, Mongols attacked
formidable Croatian fortifications of Klis and Trogir, where the king fled they failed despite the
fact that they had skilled engineers brought from the Far East. Mountainous terrain offered perfect
cover for the Croatian hit and run tactics. Attritional warfare in this event, extensively relied on
terrain, and eventually achieved to stop the invasion but it took heavy toll on both sides, as
Croatia was ravaged and plundered with many of its population massacred (estimations varying
from 15 to 25%).333 However, the time that was bought with attrition strategy, was sufficient to
bring the conflict to an end as the Mongol leader gedei died in December of 1241, and
following his death, Mongols armed forces retreated to the Steppe without achieving a military
victory. To avenge for the Mongolian barbarism employed during their invasion, and probably to
secure themselves from future Mongol invasion attempts the combined Croatian-Hungarian
forces, ambushed and destroyed a big army of retreating Mongols in the Carpathian Mountains. 334
The biggest and probably the most classical example of attrition, was the European theater of
World War I. As both sides realized that casualties suffered in direct confrontations cannot be
sustained, they found themselves locked into constant low intensity trench warfare occasionally
interrupted with bloody offensives. As neither Entente nor Central powers made any significant
progress, except in the enormous losses of life and material they eventually wore each other

332

See in Nardo D., The Battle of Zama: Battles of the Ancient World, Lucent Books, 1996.
Rogers C., The Oxford Encyclopedia of Medieval Warfare and Military Technology: Volume III, Oxford
University Press, 2010, p. 34.
334
Kosztolnyik Z., Hungary in the thirteenth century, East European Monographs, 1996, p. 284.
333

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down to the point in which Central Powers sued for peace, simply because they no longer had the
political of military resources to continue the war.
Second World War saw the rapid mobile warfare as the key to success, but still some campaigns
were led by attritional methods. Such were the Soviet defensive methods during the initial stages
of Stalingrad battle (1942), and series of battles in the Rzhev salient (1941-1942). Germans also
opted for attrition in western theater during the Battle of Britain (1940), and Battle of the Atlantic
(1939-1945). Luftwaffe wrongly assessed that RAF could not sustain the loss ratio inflicted upon
it, and that thru superior numbers of men and aviation attrition would eventually neutralize its
fighting capabilities. This proved to be wrong, as the German losses were higher than it could be
afforded. In addition to that, German command decided to switch priorities in objectives and bomb
British cities. In this example attrition backfired on the Axis, and resulted in a decisive British
victory. The campaign of German submarines in the Atlantic proved to be much more effective.
Germans have employed a strategy which is a part of attrition, and it is known as tonnage war.
The objective of this strategy was to inflict damage to the Allied merchant fleet. Commander in
chief of the German U boats, Carl Donitz dispersed them across the globe, with primary objective
to search and destroy Allied merchant vessels. In this way Germany could destroy British merchant
navy, and neglect its cargo to the British war effort. Lacking the capabilities to challenge the Royal
and US navies in a direct naval battle, the Kriegsmarine waged what proved to be the longest
campaign of the war. Dnitz successfully used indirect strategy to counter Allied direct strategy
of command of the sea. Despite the fact that in this campaign Kriegsmarine inflicted serious,
almost up to a breaking point losses to the British the Allies eventually prevailed by employing
new tactics and technology, to counter German U boats. Most notably they made significant sonar
improvements and cracked the so-called Enigma code, which was essential for German military
communication.335
Other less famous examples of tonnage war strategy were the Allied submarine campaigns: against
Italian navy supplying their army in North Africa, and against Japanese on the Pacific. Although
these Allied campaigns were not deliberately planned to be a tonnage war strategy as was Donitzs,
they were still very successful. British submarines based in Malta and Allied aircraft managed to

335

See more in Milner M., The Battle of the Atlantic, History Press, 2011.

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cut of the little supplies which Rommel was receiving. 336 Starting from mid-1943 US submarines
effectively disrupted Japanese connections with the resources the newly occupied territories. By
late 1944 Japanese convoys were almost completely wiped out, and as a result Japans war
economy came to a virtual standstill. 337
Notable post WWII conflict which saw employment of attrition, was the Korean War in its last
two years. As neither UN nor North Korea and their Communist allies, could decisively defeat
each other on the battlefield without resorting to nuclear strategy they wore each other down in
a war of attrition. That scenario had no decisive ending, as an armistice was signed in 1953 which
is maintaining an uneasy truce to the day of this writing. Attrition is not conceived to offer a
decisive victory in a short time, and any military organization that opts for it must usually employs
other strategies in the hope to shorten the war.
Since the year of 2001 to the day of this writing, various Taliban and Al Qaeda insurgent groups
are waging a war of attrition to drive out NATOs ISAF forces and overthrow the government.
Because NATO has substantial strategic advantage in resources and technology, the insurgents are
employing both attrition and guerilla strategies to wear down their enemies and preserve its own
strength, with hit and run tactics. It seems that Taliban military and political organization has based
its strategy on the premises that the enemys protracted engagement in a low intensity conflict
will eventually become too costly in the terms of both political and military losses so that they
will give up and go home.338
In all of these examples, except UN in Korea, military organizations opted for attrition because a
head on clash with the enemy would likely result in their decisive defeat. But in the case of Libyan
Civil War (2011), NATO chose attrition for political reasons even though their military power was
significantly superior to Gaddafis loyalist. Reason for this was NATOs limited political
maneuver space. It could not allow itself casualties which would result from a direct clash, as it
would almost certainly result in mass protests of their populations. As NATO managed to
politically isolate Gaddafi, it was not essential for it to go in a direct assault with ground forces.

336

McCartney I., British Submarines 1939-45, Osprey Publishing, 2006, p. 34.

See in Skipper G. C., Submarines in the Pacific, Scholastic Library Pub, 1980.
338
Olsen J., Gray C., The Practice of Strategy: From Alexander the Great to the Present, Oxford University Press,
2011, p. 265.
337

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Instead NATO left the bulk of the fighting to be done by Anti-Gaddafi rebels to which it provided
naval, air and political support.339
Bait and bleed, bloodletting
These two similar strategies are manifested in an even more indirect form, almost up to a point in
which their enemies are not even aware of it. However its results are nevertheless evident. They
are designed to induce others to wage war on each other, by primarily using political and economic
means. Principal aim of bait and bleed is to lure the rival military organization to engage in a
protracted war with another power so that they are both weakened. During this time the baiter who
encouraged the conflict does not participate, thus maintaining its military strength. Bloodletting is
a strategy in which military organizations rivals go to war independently without being induced.
Then the aim is to encourage the conflict to continue as long as possible, in order to make the rival
organizations become weaker fighting each other. 340
Then-US senator Harry Trumans 1941 statement regarding the Third Reichs invasion of the
Soviet Union: If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning,
we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible.341
Vladimir Lenin, after Russias withdrawal from WWI in 1917, argued that by withdrawing from
the conflict: We rid ourselves of both imperialistic groups fighting each other. We can take
advantage of their strife and use that period when our hands are free to develop and strengthen
the Socialist Revolution.342
Historically, these strategies were used in many different ways by great powers. The principles of
bait and bleed, and bloodletting are closely connected with the Roman strategic proverb: divide et
impera.343 Strong powers can keep weaker powers weak by purposely causing inner and outside
conflicts and political instabilities. The idea, as with some other indirect strategies, is to use any
339

See in Russell J., Cohn R. (eds.), 2011 Libyan Civil War, Book on Demand, 2012.
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 153.
341
McCullough D., Truman, Simon & Schuster, 1992, p. 262.
342
Bunyan J., Fisher H., The Bolshevik Revolution 19171918: Documents and Materials, Stanford University
Press, 1965, p. 504.
343
Attributed to Philip II. Macedon. Russian response to present US strategic expansion in Syria and Ukraine rests
on this premise. In my opinion Russia encourages civil war in those two countries with the purpose to keep them out
of US control. This opinion is shared by John Mearsheimer who argued that the United States and its European
allies share most of the blame for the war in Ukraine. See in Mearsheimer J. J., Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the Wests
Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin, Council On Foreign Affairs, September/October 2014.
340

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method and encourage any process which would ensure that enemy is weakened. While at the
same time interested party stays hidden on the margins of events, waiting for the right moment to
intervene if deemed necessary.
Blockade
Another indirect strategy is called blockade. This is a strategy which tries to prevent the supplies
or communications from a particular area by force. To impose a blockade both naval and air
powers can be used. 344 Concept of a siege is similar to blockade, but it is directed against a military
force inside a city or a stronghold while a blockade is directed at the entire enemys population,
or an area that is of interest to enemy military organization. There are three types of blockades at
sea:
a) Close warships are in the sight of the blockaded coast or port, and any ship entering
or leaving is immediately intercepted. This is the most effective and the most difficult
form. 345
b) Distant the blockaders are away from the coast, and try to intercept any ships going
in or out.346
c) Loose is a blockade where the blockading ships are out of vision from the coast. The
objective of the loose blockade is to lure the enemy out, while staying close enough to
strike. 347
Loose was the Venetian blockade of Senj in Uskok War (1615-1618). Venice, Dutch republic and
England clashed with the Holy Roman Empire, Kingdom of Croatia and Spain over the issue of
Uskoci warriors in the Croatian city of Senj. Venice tried to lure out these skilled sea raiders into
the open sea to defeat them, but has suffered greatly from their sudden and surprise hit and run

344

Ronzitti N., Venturini G., The Law of Air Warfare: Contemporary Issues, Eleven International Publishing, 2006,
p. 199.
345
Till, Seapower, p. 180.
During the Second Peloponnesian War (460-444 BC), Athenian led Delian alliance imposed a prolonged close
blockade in the Corinthian gulf. Hornblower S., The Greek World: 479-323 BC, Taylor & Francis, 2011, p. 120.
346
Bnker D., Militarism in a Global Age: Naval Ambitions in Germany and the United States before World War I,
Cornell University Press, 2012, p. 142.
Such was the Battle of the Atlantic in WWII. Besides being the strategy of a tonnage war it was also a strategy of a
distant blockade, as the objective for the Axis was to block all commercial traffic in and out the British Isles.
347
Tucker S., Battles That Changed History: An Encyclopedia of World Conflict, ABC-CLIO, 2010, p. 280.

152

tactics.348 Perhaps another, classic example of a loose blockade is the Battle of Trafalgar (1805)
in which Royal Navy blockaded Spanish coast with the intention to lure out and decisively defeat
combined navies of Spain and France. 349 British navy also imposed a loose blockade on Germany,
in both WWI and WWII. Battle of Jutland (1916) was an attempt by the Kriegsmarine to break
this blockade. 350
Embargo and trade sanctions can be considered as a part of blockade strategy because they use
similar concepts weaken the enemy by denying him access to strategic resources which are
brought outside his mainland. Difference is that the embargo and sanctions are using less force as
the attacked party is usually politically isolated, and cannot employ an effective military solution.
Buffer state
A buffer state is a country between two hostile powers, which is serving as a shield (buffer) to
prevent these powers to go into conflict with one another.
Example is West Germany and Austria following their defeat in WWII. German military arsenal
was deliberately rebuild to serve as a buffer to Soviet threat. In the words of famous US strategist
George Patton: I believe that Germany should not be destroyed, but rather should be rebuilt as a
buffer against the real danger, which is Russia and its Bolshevism.351
Byzantine grand strategy is probably the most advanced example to repeatedly use this strategy.
Over its long existence Byzantine Empire maintained various smaller buffer states at its borders.
Most of them were former enemies which, once defeated by Byzantium were not occupied for the
precise reason to serve as a buffer. A buffer state was not designed to be controlled as a satellite
country, but simply to provide with space between Byzantium and whichever danger lied ahead. 352
Coup dtat
E. Luttwak defined coup dtat as the sudden deposition of a government, usually by a small group
within the existing state establishment, typically the military, to depose the extant government and

348

Wilson, p. 255.
See in Robson M., The Battle Of Trafalgar, Anova Books, 2005.
350
See in Bennett G. M., Bennett R., The Battle of Jutland, Pen & Sword Books, 2006.
351
Province, p. 100.
352
See in Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire.
349

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replace it with another body, civil or military. 353 A coup dtat is considered successful when the
usurpers establish their dominance over the governing structures. If it is not successful a civil war
or unrest can be a consequence. Coup can be sponsored by an outside actor.
For example the US sponsored Guatemalan coup in 1954. As in that country leftist were on power,
USA staged a coup to install right wing military dictators. This was followed by a period of social
unrest and starting in 1960, begun a long war in which various leftist insurgency groups fought
against government for the next 36 years. 354 Most recent example is the on-going Egyptian wide
scale social unrest which followed military coup in that country in 2013. 355
Decapitation
This strategy achieves temporary strategic paralysis by attacking enemys political leaders, his
command structure, strategic weapons and economic center points. Purpose is to decapitate
enemys military organization and create temporary confusion which can be used as an
advantage.356 Decapitation was used throughout history under different circumstances. For
example when in 1520 conquistador Hernan Cortes captured and subsequently killed Moctezuma
II, emperor of the Aztec; or when in 1996 the Russians killed Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev
with two guided missiles. 357 During the First Gulf War (1990), operation Instant Thunder aimed
to decapitate Iraqi leadership and disrupt chain of command by using precision air strikes on key
individuals and command centers.358 In 2011, USA decapitated terrorist organization of Al-Qaeda
by killing their leader Osama bin Laden.359
At the beginning of Croatian War of Independence, in Bombing of Banski dvori, Zagreb (1991),
the Yugoslav air force attempted to kill Croatian president Franjo Tuman, Yugoslavs president
Stipe Mesi and Yugoslavias prime minister Ante Markovi all three ethnic Croats. Plan was to
decapitate Croatian and then still existing Yugoslavian leadership, all with one air strike, as the
Luttwak E., Coup Dtat: A Practical Handbook, Harvard University Press, 1979, p. 24.
See more in DeRouen K. R., Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts since World War II (Volume I), ABCCLIO, 2007, pp. 385-402.
355
Fisk R., When is a military coup not a military coup? When it happens in Egypt, apparently, The Independent,
4 July 2013.
356
Sun Lee D., Power Shifts, Strategy, and War: Declining States and International Conflict, Routledge, 2008, p.
32.
357
Cimbala S., Russia and Armed Persuasion, Rowman & Littlefield, 2001, p. 185.
358
Boyne W., Air Warfare: An International Encyclopedia, Volume II, ABC-CLIO, 2002, p. 322.
359
Landau E., Osama Bin Laden: The Life and Death of the 9/11 Al-Qaeda Mastermind, Twenty-First Century
Books, 2011, p. 6.
353
354

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three of them were at the same place that day. Yugoslavian Air Forces MIGs and G4s successfully
carried out the strike on Presidents residence Banski Dvori, but the plan failed because all three
leaders were in the last moment moved to another part of the building. Did someone warned them
to move, or was it a matter of coincidence it is still unknown for certain. Some say that they were
warned to do so by then-Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev. 360
Decapitation is used to remove figures or installations of vital importance to the enemy, but another
strategy can keep these intact with the precise purpose to deceive. To deliberately plan and use
trickery to mislead and fool the enemy is called deception.
Deception
Sun Tzu wrote: All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when we are able to attack, we must
seem unable; when using our forces, we must appear inactive; when we are near, we must make
the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. 361
To confuse the enemy, a deception strategy can use all kind of disinformation, illogical troop
movements and lies. It seeks to deceive and trick the enemy and exploiting this confusion for
military advantage. Deception can use several techniques to confuse the enemy:
a) Demonstration describes a show of force used to deceive, as it happened in the Battle of
Gettysburg (1863) or in the winter of 6 BC during the Batos uprising.
b) Feint creates an impression that a military maneuver happen but actually the army will
go in another way. In the Battle of Platea (479 BC) the Greek, and in the Battle of Carrhae (58
BC) the Parthians both decisively defeated the invaders by first feinting retreat, and then
suddenly attacked, after the enemy already scattered his battle lines in pursuit. Also the
Schwarzkopfs left hook strategy used in the First Gulf War (1991) was based upon this concept.
c) Distraction can also be both a strategy and a tactic. When it is a strategy then it refers to
an action in which a part of the force attacks on one or two flanks, drawing up to a strong frontal
attack by the rest of the force. It is used to draw the enemy into exposing its weaker parts such as

HINA, Video 21. obljetnica raketiranja: Gorbaov dojavom spasio Tumana, Mesia i Markovia od atentata!
(Croatian State News Agency, 21st anniversary of rocket attack: Gorbachev saved Tudman, Mesic and Markovic
from assisination!) , Jutarnji list, 7 October 2012.
361
Sun Tzu, Art of War: Chapter I.
360

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flanks or abandoning prepared fortification. During the Croatian-Ottoman Long War, the
Ottomans decisively defeated Croatian army by using this concept in the Battle of Krbava (1493).
Probably one of the largest deception operations in history, were Allied clandestine operation
before the D-day invasion of Normandy (1944). This can be considered as classical example of a
successful deception. German high command was aware that an invasion is coming but was not
aware of exactly when and where. Even when the actual invasion took place German high
command was still not sure is it the main invasion or yet another deception. Thus by using the
strategy of deception Allies managed to mask the real objective and gain significant initial
advantage to secure their beachhead in Normandy.362 Deception is also an element of a shock
and awe strategy, and was successfully used by the Coalition forces during the invasion of Iraq in
2003.
Another very interesting form of deception strategy we can observe during Sino-Vietnamese War
(1979). Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping succeeded Mao Zedong and led China on a new path, away
from Soviet Union one which led it to become todays economic superpower. This master
strategist devised a strategy, as a part of this Soviet-Chinese tensions starting from the 1960s to
USSRs dissolution, with the objective to end Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. To do so,
Chinese launched a frontal assault on Hanoi. Idea was not to capture Hanoi itself, as it could result
in Soviet intervention against China, but to lure the Communist Vietnamese to withdraw their
troops from Cambodia to strengthen the defense of their capital. 363 The strategy eventually failed
due to Soviet Intelligence reports to Vietnamese, but it represents a good example of strategic
thinking in the world of modern warfare.
Foreign aid
A strong actor will provide economic aid to a weaker actor, to make it more dependable and
aligned. It can be done so because the weaker actor is likely to succumb under the influence of
another strong actor. Or to develop a new market which will become future buyer of strong actors
products. Most well-known example is US Marshal Plan which gave economic support to help
rebuild European economies after the end of World War II in order to prevent the spread of Soviet

362

See in Barbier M., D-day Deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion, Greenwood Publishing
Group, 2007.
363
See in Elleman B. A., Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989, Routledge, 2001.

156

Communism. 364 This plan was following the so-called Truman doctrine. USA provided substantial
economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey. At the time both countries were under threat of
Communist expansion. Stalin asked from Turkey joint control of the Dardanelles and Greece was
locked in a civil war, in which Yugoslavian supported left-wing partisans were trying to overtake
power.365 By supplying aid USA made both of these countries allies, as they joined NATO in 1952.
Fortification
In this strategy the objective is to deter a possible or actual enemy invasion by artificially made
obstacles capable of sustaining military units and providing them with tactical advantage over
superior enemy. Humans have constructed fortifications for thousands of years. 366 Examples of
huge fortification systems are the Chinese wall, French Maginot line and German Ostwall. In
modern warfare military organizations avoid the construction of huge fortification systems. Instead
the tendency is to provide protection for troops by constructing fortified army bases.
Golden bridge
Sometimes in strategy to achieve an immediate strategic objective such as completely destroying
a defeated enemy, can be less important and avoided, for a strategic objective on a grand scheme
a long lasting peace. This strategy is called the Golden Bridge. It was first described and probably
devised by famous military strategist Sun Tzu who argued that one must leave its opponent with
an escape route, in order not force him to act out of desperation. Not to completely destroy your
enemy and deliberately leaving him a chance to retreat.367 A decision to let the defeated and
surrounded enemy go, can serve both a military and political purpose because todays enemy is
a tomorrows potential ally.
Such was the posture of the Byzantine Empire. Surrounded by a sea of enemies it could not make
the same mistake as its predecessor, the Roman Empire, did. Roman posture was to destroy and
subdue all enemies of Rome, but once they defeated one enemy and conquered his territory they

Mills N., Winning the Peace: The Marshall Plan and Americas Coming of Age as a Superpower, John Wiley &
Sons, 2008, p. 109.
365
Jones H., A New Kind of War: Americas Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece, Oxford University
Press, 1997, p. 14.
366
See in Clarke G., Fortification: its past achievements, recent development, and future progress, John Murray,
1907.
367
Tzu, Chapter VII.
364

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quickly realized that there is another one just behind him, and Roman army is now exhausted to
conquer that one as well. For this reason and for most of the time, Byzantium did not waste its
elite armies on conquests that were not of strategic importance for the prosperity and stability of
the Empire. It was enough to defeat the enemy, but to keep him alive, and even make him an ally
because it can serve as a buffer between Byzantium and other enemies beyond. 368
Other examples in history of warfare, in which an enemy was deliberately allowed to retreat
include Operation Storm (1995). Croatian army, after completely defeating the rebel Serb forces
had them surrounded in Knin, but deliberately allowed them to evacuate towards Serb controlled
parts of Bosnia. Even though at first this act was described by the media as ethnic cleansing of
Serbian population from Dalmatia, it was in fact the opposite, and it was later confirmed by
verdicts of the Hague tribunal which cleared Croatian commanders on all accounts. 369 To choose
the strategy of the Golden Bridge, for the strategic planners of the Operation Storm, was the best
option because it served both a military and a political purpose. Serbs were not fighting in a
surrounded city out of desperation, the city was secured the very next day for the civilian
authorities to take control and it clearly showed to the rebel Serbs that their military and political
structure cannot provide protection. It was a wise decision to let them go, as it proved that Serbian
propaganda on its own population had taken effect, as panic and fear crept extensively into the
retreating Serbian column. Their own soldiers ran over civilians with tanks as they were panically
trying to save their remaining military equipment. Mass suicides took place as result of
desperation. For many of those who sided with the rebellion a defeat was too hard to bear. 370 But
for those Serbian people in that column who were not deeply involved into creation of Greater
Serbia, the strategy of Golden Bridge set path for their eventual return and reconciliation with
modern Croatia.
Guerrilla
Or literary small war is describing a strategy which uses its armed forces to fight the enemy
inside the occupied territory by using non-conventional warfare such as hit and run tactics. 371
368

See in Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire.

Kuzmanovic J., Freed Croatian War Generals Return Home to Heros Welcome, Bloomberg News, 16
November 2012.
370
Nazor A., Podaci iz srbijanskih izvora o stradanju srpskoga stanovnitva u Oluji za koje nisu odgovorne hrvatske
snage (II. dio), Hrvatski Vojnik, May 2011.
371
Laqueur W., Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study, Transaction Publishers, 2009, p. 16.
369

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Guerrilla does not attack the main force of the enemy but instead it conserves its fighting force by
launching surprise attacks on enemys patrols and logistics. The objective of the guerrilla is to
cause psychological and material exhaustion to the regular occupying troops up to a point in which
it grows strong enough to challenge it directly.
Such was the example of Titos partisans in WWII who semi-independently attacked, resisted and
eventually defeated Axis regional forces. 372 Other examples, also from the WWII, include Burma
and Soviet partisan activities in Axis occupied territories on the Eastern front. In both Burma and
occupied parts of the Soviet Union, the Soviets and their Western Allies sent conventional military
troops to fight behind enemy lines as guerillas. The purpose was to disrupt supply routes, and force
Germans and Japanese to divert their armed forces from the frontline to the rear.
Guerilla is a strategy that extensively relies on political means, as for its success it is vital to have
political and economic support of the local population. People who are supportive of guerillas can
add to the strength of guerilla by becoming combatants themselves or by providing with food,
shelter and information on enemys movements. To defeat guerillas which enjoys the support of a
local population has proved to be extremely difficult. 373 But not impossible as it can be done with
various counterinsurgency direct and indirect strategies, which employ both military and political
force against the guerillas and the people supporting them.
When a military organization wants to block a guerilla movement from reaching its main strategic
resource the people, than it can employ a strategy called clear and hold. This is a
counterinsurgency strategy, in which military personnel clear an area of insurgents, and then keep
this area clear while at the same time working on winning the support of the populace for the
government and its policies (hearts and minds campaign). Initially only points of higher strategic
interest are cleared and held of insurgents by the military. Once these are secured, the same process
continues to less important strategic areas, until the insurgency is defeated from this region. Once
an area has been cleared, local police force takes over control from the military.374

See in Vuksic V., Titos Partisans 1941-45, Osprey Publishing, 2003.

See in Zedong M., On Guerilla Warfare, University of Illinois Press, 1961.
374
Petraeus D., The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, University of Chicago Press, 2007,
p. 175.
372
373

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There are some problems with this strategy. In Vietnam, US soldiers didnt like to participate in
this duty, because they viewed patrolling on the streets as essentially a police, and not military
duty. Also this strategy takes time, which a government often doesnt have. Furthermore clear and
hold apart from the military also demands support from a large police forces. This is because the
operation can only be successful if it isolates the local population from the insurgents.375 Clear and
hold strategy has been used by major military organizations such as British Empire during the
Malayan emergency (1948-1960) and Mau Mau uprising (1952-1960), and by the Coalition forces
against Iraqi insurgency (2003-2011). A successful guerrilla campaign will wage war on the
enemy by attacking its weak points, in order to conserve its strength. It will do so until it reaches
such a potential in which it is ready to challenge the enemy in a direct, conventional war. Incentives
As stated before a strategy can divert enemys course of action, by using something else to
gain cooperation for realization of strategic objectives. 376 One such strategy is based upon usage
of incentives. Incentives are these somethings that motivate to perform a desired action.
According to Handel incentives can be divided into several different categories: 377
a) Remunerative or Financial paid to do
b) Moral the right thing to do
c) Coercive have to do378
d) Natural driven to do379
e) Drugs380

375

Foong-Khong Y., Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965,
Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 90.
376
See in Knorr K., Morgan P., Strategic Military Surprise: Incentives and Opportunities, Transaction Publishers,
1983.
377
Incentives according to Handel, p. 477. To his classification I add drugs.
378
For example, in 1990 Iraq demanded from Kuwait that it writes off its debts under threat of an invasion. Ministry
of foreign affairs Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook, Section 6: Middle East, 1990. Link:
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1990/1990-contents.htm (27/12/13).
379
Love, hate, friendship, curiosity, mental or physical exercise, admiration, fear, anger, pain, joy, the pursuit of
truth, the control over things in the world or people or oneself.
380
These are used in warfare since ancient times to enhance warriors aggressiveness. For example, children soldiers
in Africa and other parts of the world, are fighting primarily because of drugs. In Sri Lanka, during the Battle of
Chalai (2009), between Sri Lankan Army and Tamil Tiger rebels, a young boy came dressed in civilian clothes
among government soldiers. He then performed suicide bombing. Eyewitnesses describe his behavior as he was
drugged or severely harassed before the mission. Child suicide bomber sent to army frontline in Chalai, Ministry of

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In my Lion King example from the introduction to this chapter Scar sets the stage so that Simba
is in mortal danger to be run over by a stampede. His father Mustafa jumps among running animals
to save him. By doing so he puts himself in a perilous position which Scar uses to kill him. Without
incentive of possible Simbas death, Mustafa would have never risk to be in a position in which
Scar can defeat and kill him. Love and emotional reaction are an incentive.
But this is on a lower strategy level. On higher levels love does not (in modern times) play a role
but for example sexual incentives. These are an old practice still used today. For example, many
Muslim women from around the world are going to Syria to have sex with rebel fighters. They are
motivated to do so by their religious leaders which are presenting it as their moral duty. Soldiers
will be more motivated to fight. Jihad al-nikah or Sexual Jihad is permitting extramarital
sexual relations with multiple partners and is considered by some hardline Sunni Muslim Salafists
as a legitimate form of holy war. 381
Western armies are no exception, examples include organized prostitution which was a practice
during both Korean and Vietnam wars. It even goes as far that at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu,
French soldiers were flown in a mobile prostitution camp. 382 During siege of Sarajevo,
considerable number of UN soldiers were frequent visitors of Serbian rape camps. It is a very
unclear difference here between rape and prostitution, as UN was paying the Serbs but the
women were held captives there.383
Another sex related incentive is for a military organization to encourage homosexual relations in
a unit, in order to increase cohesiveness of this unit. An example could include the so called Sacred
Band of Thebes from ancient Greece. This unit was the elite force of Thebes in the 4th century BC,
the one which defeated Spartans in the Battle of Leuctra (371 BC).384 It is long known that when
actual fighting begins, the soldiers stay firm because of discipline and loyalty towards the unit. If
a person next you is not only a comrade, but also a lover than soldiers will endure more hardship
before reaching psychological breaking point. It can work the other way around as well. One of
the (possible) weapons within US arsenal is the so called gay bomb. The purpose of this chemical
Defense and Urban Development Sri Lanka, 30 December 2010. Link:
http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20090205_10
381
Tunisian women waging sex jihad in Syria, Agence France Presse, 20 September 2013.
382
Bartecchi C. E., A Doctors Vietnam Journal, Merriam Press, 2007, p. 35.
383
Barry K., The Prostitution of Sexuality, NYU Press, 1996, p. 125.
384
See in Russell J., Cohn R. (eds.), Sacred Band of Thebes, Book on Demand, 2012.

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weapon is to be thrown at the enemy, disrupting its moral because its soldiers will instantly become
sexually attracted to one another.385 Incentives can be various and every one of them can used by
strategy, if it will alter enemys behavior in a desired direction.
Proxy war
To engage the enemy in a proxy war, means that a military organization is using an indirect strategy
to wage war on one country with primary objective on a higher strategic level, to defeat the
political expansion of another country. In a proxy war other parties are used as replacements
instead of real enemies to fight each other directly. Powers can use other nations, violent non-state
actors or mercenaries as proxies.386 This strategy hopes that these groups can cause damage to the
enemy, without leading to full-scale war with a force behind it. Most common is for a major power
to use minor power as a proxy for a conflict with other major power.
During the 1980s Central America was a hot zone as US was fearing Communism will
eventually take over the strategically important Panama Canal. Nicaragua, El Salvador and
Guatemala saw bloody civil wars which all served as proxy war with Soviet Union. For example
Guatemalan government army received training, assistance and equipment from USA, Israel and
South Africa. 387 During both Korean and Vietnam wars, the official US politics stated that the
enemy was North Korea and North Vietnam/Vietcong. These were then engaged by UN and US
under pretext of protecting South Korean and South Vietnams strive for democracy. But the real
reason was the political conflict on a grand scheme between NATO and Soviet bloc, with each of
them indirectly protecting their interests and expanding its influences. During the entire length of
the Cold war, as both sides feared to clash directly they were using various indirect strategies to
bring the defeat each other, without employing its full military arsenal. 388 Proxy wars in both Korea
and Vietnam were both part of such strategies. Vietnam War proved that it is possible to win
against a giant as USA, but North Korea still remains a potential conflict zone. Or at least this is
what we are led to believe.

Smith M., Pentagon planned love bomb, The Telegraph, 15 January 2005.
See in Russell J., Cohn R. (eds.), Proxy War, Books on Demand, 2011.
387
Cuba was training the leftist insurgents and as South Africa won against Cuba in Angola, they were providing
Guatemalan government with military advice on how to battle with them. See in Russell J., Cohn R. (ed),
Guatemalan Civil War, Book on Demand, 2012.
388
See in Sheehan S., The Cold War, Black Rabbit Books, 2003.
385
386

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I believe that in fact North Korea is existing as a country and its nuclear program is tolerated,
because it serves USAs strategic interests. In the world of modern warfare, in which USA would
not dare to directly attack Russia or China, a seemingly unpredictable and aggressive actor like
North Korea is still serving as a proxy in undeclared war with China. Nuclear threats from
Pyongyang provide with a wonderful raison dtre for strong US military presence in South Korea
and Japan. Linear logic based on available data teaches us North Korea is an enemy, it is bad
that they have nuclear weapons and China is friend of USA for assisting in relations with this
dangerous country. But in the realm of strategy this truth no longer applies as its paradoxical nature
does not follow linear thinking pattern. Instead North Korea is a friend, and it is good that they
have nuclear weapons as it allows USA to maintain military presence nearby China, and USA
needs this power for its undeclared war with China because China remains the real enemy.
Raiding
This indirect strategy primarily uses armed forces to achieve its strategic objectives. Raiding is a
sudden attack on the enemy territory, and it has the objective to temporarily disrupt the enemy
before he can effectively respond. The purpose is to demoralize, exhaust, confuse, pillage, rescue
POW, target specific people or gather intelligence.389
Ottoman Empire during its expansion of the 15th and 16th centuries, heavily relied on raiding
campaigns to soften the enemy before the main invasion takes place. Main purpose was to gather
intelligence, motivate its irregular troops with remunerative incentives, ravage the countryside,
scare population and impose a general sense of insecurity. In their long war against the Turks,
Croatian-Hungarian army mastered this strategy and raiding eventually backfired on the
Ottomans. 390
Strategy of raiding was extensively used by many major military organizations. During WWII
Japan, Britain and Germany organized special commando units whose primary mission was to
undertake raiding operations. Raiding can also be a part of some other strategy. Coalition forces
used raiding in their 2003 invasion of Iraq during their shock and awe campaign. Some raiding
commando actions can have the purpose to hit a specific person, or a facility that is vital for

389

See in Kiras J., Special Operations And Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism, Taylor & Francis,
2006.
390
See in Turnbull S., The Ottoman Empire 1326-1699, Osprey Publishing, 2012.

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enemys command structure. If a military organization recognizes these as the target of an

operation then it is also using a strategy called decapitation.
Propaganda
Propaganda is a strategy which uses mass communication to manipulate public perception. One
uses propaganda to ensure public support for its own strategy and opposition for the enemy
strategy. Propaganda creates much needed moral high ground and motivates public to cooperate
with the government. It has been used since the beginning of warfare and its development has
followed technologic development. Modern propaganda is very sophisticated but its purpose is the
same it aims for the publics emotions, rather than reason. Successful propaganda evokes positive
emotions towards its own military and political organization, and negative towards the enemy.
Media, film, video games and literature are all used to communicate desired attitude of the
public.391
For example, Hollywood as the most successful movie industry, extensively serves US propaganda
purposes. Its culture and values, its enemies and desired friends are portrayed in any light as
strategy requires. Successful Jewish infiltration within key Hollywood positions, have enabled the
state of Israel to create strong alliance with USA. 392 Watching movies one gets the impression that
Israel, British, Australian and Canadian friendship with US is inseparable even though these
countries often have diverging interests. US enemies such as Gaddafi or Saddam have long before
their fall, been portrayed as bad guys. Also Hollywood is trying to make those kind of movies,
which will evoke warrior and superhero spirit in its citizens, to motivate their support for

See in Jowett G. S., ODonnell V., Propaganda & Persuasion, SAGE, 2011.
For example, when the film 300 was released in the USA, it sparked popular fury in Iran. 300 narrates a (largely
fictional) version of the Battle of Thermopylae between the Spartans and Persians in 480 BC. Its contemporary
relevance was the reading that Persia is Iran; that the historically inaccurate construction of the two enemy societies
(the film shows Spartans as free rather than slave-owning, the Persians as slave-owning rather than free...) is a
means of dehumanizing the new (Iranian) American enemy; that 300 is part of a social campaign, preparing
Americans and the West for a real war. Williamson, p. 504. 145 Most famous example of deliberately infiltrated
Israeli agent into Hollywood is a multi-billionaire producer Arnon Milchan which was tasked with acquiring
material and technology for Israeli nuclear program. Israeli president Shimon Peres confirmed that it was him who
recruited Milchan to work for Mossad. Peres stated that his [Milchans] activities gave us [Israel] a huge advantage,
strategically, diplomatically and technologically. Israeli plan was to infiltrate and connect itself with Hollywood
elite in order to align itself as much as possible to USA. They were successful as these two countries today are firm
allies and share interests in the Middle East. Milchan confirmed that he used his influence in Hollywood to
negatively portray South African apartheid in order to coerce their cooperation in nuclear armament of Israel. See in
Doron M., Gelman J., Confidential: The Life of Secret Agent Turned Hollywood Tycoon Arnon Milchan, Gefen
Books, 2011.
391
392

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governments action. Propaganda is a highly potent strategic weapon and its efforts dominate the
media of today. Basically journalism as an activity which simply transmits information to the
people does not exist. All the news, no matter how banal they are, serve a certain strategy and
have a motivation for some kind of political, economic or other profit.
Sea denial
Another indirect naval strategy, which is designed to deny enemys ability to use the sea, is called
sea denial. This is a less ambitious strategy than command of the sea, because it denies enemy
access to the sea without trying to control the sea for itself. This can achieved by asymmetrical
warfare, or simply by possessing a fleet which is a threat. Modern sea denial example would be an
actor using land-based missiles to strike sea targets without actually having a navy of its own.393
Both in WWI and WWII Germany pursued sea denial by relying on its U-boats. German navy did
not have the resources to clash with the British navy in a direct naval engagement, but it could
attack its merchant fleet and warships, while using the protection of being underwater and
undetected.
This strategy was also used during the Tanker War (1984-1987) as both Iran and Iraq sought to
close the Persian Gulf, but neither of them had the strength to control these seas. During the
Croatian War of Independence in the Battle of the Dalmatian channels (1991), the small Croatian
navy used coastal artillery on their islands and speed boats, to lure, ambush and decisively defeated
Yugoslav navy thus nullifying their command of the sea. As Croats didnt had sufficient naval
power to oppose Yugoslav navy in an open battle, they could not control their sea but they denied
it to the enemy as well. 394

4. Barbarism
I observe barbaric behavior of military organizations as a deliberate and planned strategy, in this
context barbarism is referred to a strategy in which a military organization will not restrain itself
from hurting non-combatants. I am including barbarism, which is a part of indirect strategy into a

393
394

Vego M., Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas, Taylor & Francis, 1999, p. 119.
Russell J., Cohn R. (eds.), Battles of the Croatian War of Independence, General Books, 2011, p. 38.

165

separate category. This kind of strategy is a reflection of the strategic culture of the organization
employing it. I define the concept of barbarism as being equivalent to a known concept called
punishment. Barbarism as a strategy primarily designed to physically destroy or to push a society
beyond its economic, social, physical and physiological breaking point. It can be employed against
an enemy which is capable of fighting back, or against one which cannot. The morally lowest form
of barbarism is the one in which it is used against an enemy which has already surrendered. There
are many sub-strategies within barbarism.
I begin with strategy called Bellum se ipset alet. This is an indirect strategy whose primary
objective is to obtain resources by relying on conquered territories to be the primary source from
which to feed and fund armies. The phrase The war will feed itself was used by the Roman
politician Cato the Elder. His objective was to save economic resources needed for feeding the
Roman army during the conquest of conquest of Hispania in Second century BC.395 This strategy
exhausts the material and food resources of occupied territories which are already under military
organizations control. Taking the food and other provisions from the local population always
causes unrest and resistance among the people. But precisely this is the point of this strategy, it is
meant to show to the people ones military superiority as soldiers can take whatever they like.
During the years of Italian occupation of province of Dalmatia in Croatia (1941-1943) this strategy
was employed by Italians, although not explicitly referred to as such. Italian taking provisions and
mistreating the local population resulted in a vast uprising that became the backbone of Titos
partisan movement.396 Explicit case, where it has been stated that this strategy is being used, is
Thirty-year war in Germany (1618-1648). In those years it was a usual practice for every army to
exploit resources from the occupied territories. As a result, German lands suffered severe
devastation and over a quarter of its population killed. 397 In WWII Eastern Europe, Nazi Germany
used the same bellum se ipset alet, as Herman Goring explicitly stated after the war.398 In early
days of Operation Barbarossa many people saw Axis as liberators from Stalins regime and

395

Roth J. P., The Logistics of the Roman Army at War: 264 BC-235 AD, Brill publications, 1999, p. 156.
Vuksic, p. 24.
397
At this time Germany was consisted of many smaller entities. Wilson P., The Thirty Years War: Europes
Tragedy, Harvard University Press, 2009, p. 1.
398
Cooper J. P., The New Cambridge Modern History: Volume 4, the Decline of Spain and the Thirty Years War,
1609-48/49, CUP Archive, 1979, p. 402; Neumarker U., Knopf V., Grings Revier: Jagd und Politik in der
Rominter Heide, Links, 2007, p. 144.
396

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welcomed the invaders, but after Nazi authorities employed this and other barbarism strategies, in
according to their political objectives they have (foolishly) deprived themselves of local support,
which could have proved vital for the outcome of the campaign and the entire war.
This strategy is probably not going to be used in modern warfare. Only smaller scale conflicts
might revert to bellum se ipset alet, but a potential world war is not likely to see employment of
hundreds of millions of troops fighting conventionally so there will be no reason for this.
Weapons of mass destruction are at the moment making this strategy obsolete. However other
forms of barbarism are not obsolete, and they were either recently employed or likely to be so in
future conflicts. Some of them include death marches, mass rape, genocide, ethnic cleansing,
mutilation of POWs and deliberate bombing of civilians. Strategy of barbarism employs methods
to kill non-combatants in order to strike terror into the heart of the enemy. It can be intertwined
with other indirect strategies but the main purpose is to hurt enemys population. It is the most
brutal of all strategies and usually serves a political rather than military goal. Rules of war, such
as Geneva Conventions, have changed through history as the social and moral values have also
changed.
Arreguin-Toft defined barbarism as the systematic violation of the laws of war in pursuit of a
military or political objective. Although barbarism includes the use of prohibited weapons such as
chemical and biological agents, its most important element is deliberate depredations against
noncombatants such as rape, murder and torture. Barbarism has been used to destroy an
adversarys will and capacity to fight by attacking enemys people. He continued by arguing that
when will is the target (in a strategic bombing campaign, for example) the strong actor seeks to
coerce its weaker opponent into changing its behavior by inflicting pain and destroying its values.
According to him historically the most common forms of barbarism include the murder of
noncombatants such as prisoners of war or civilians during combat operations; concentration
camps and strategic bombing against targets of no military value.399
I see barbarism as sometimes pre-planned and at other times as a savage result of an emotional
response towards the enemys resistance. Barbarism can be employed by a military organization
even if there is no clear objective why, simply because the cultural and political beliefs of the

399

Arreguin-Toft, pp. 101-102.

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military organization encourage it. Examples of conflicts in which a military organization used the
strategy of barbarism are numerous.
Campaigns of all famous ancient warlords contains episodes in which commanders like
Ashurbanipal I, Alexander the Great or Julius Caesar mercilessly ordered massacres of
noncombatants. Steppe raiders such as the Huns, Hungarians, Avars and Mongols were infamous
for their savagery. Some of the more known episodes include the Ottoman invasion of Wallachia,
in which its prince Vlad III the Impaler, better known as Dracula waged a terror campaign on
the Ottomans, committing terrible atrocities against POWs and civilians alike. 400
Potential of barbarism actually increased in modern times because new technologies have enabled
the vast destruction of noncombatants. Punishment has been used in counterinsurgency warfare
throughout history. Because guerrilla relies on the support of the people, so a military organization,
to deprive of this support, can employ barbarism to kill and mistreat the people. This is what British
did during South African War (1899-1902). They forced the Boer population into concentration
camps in which many died of starvation and mistreatment. 401
During the Vietnam War CIA conducted assassination program called Operation Phoenix to
destroy Vietcong in South Vietnam, in which many noncombatants were killed.402 Big and small
powers equally resort to barbarism. World War Two saw barbarism in every strategic theater, most
extensively being used in the Eastern front by both sides. Nazi Germany and Soviet Union
deliberately mistreated and killed civilian populations and POWs, as a mean to achieve their
political objectives.
A military organization can choose barbarism as a strategy because it prevents its armed forces to
reach their psychological breaking point. Such was the case of German Wehrmacht and Nazi SS.
In order to keep them fighting against vastly superior Soviet forces, German commanders (mostly)
allowed and on occasions encouraged their soldiers to commit various atrocities against local
population. This was to retain them willing to fight and not to psychologically break under
inhumane conditions of combat on the Eastern front.403 Nazi authorities organized and committed
400

Axinte A., Dracula: between myth and reality, Stanford University. Link:
http://www.stanford.edu/group/rsa/_content/_public/_htm/dracula.shtml (27/12/12).
401
Fremont-Barnes G., The Boer War 1899-1902, Osprey Publishing, 2003, p. 81.
402
See in Valentine D., The Phoenix Program, iUniverse, 2000.
403
See in Bartov O., Germanys War and the Holocaust: Disputed Histories, Cornell University Press, 2003.

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mass killings of non-Aryan people. This behavior served no military purpose but an immediate
political one.
Soviets on the other hand were also not much behind, their army killed or mistreated German
POWs, and committed numerous atrocities over the liberated population with the purpose to
secure communist control. After the war Stalin ordered a massive ethnic cleansing of Germans and
Poles, to secure new territorial changes between these two countries. Also when the Soviet forces
entered Germany, theyve conducted systematic mass rape of German women, with the purpose
to humiliate and psychologically break any resistance spirit still existing in Germany. 404
The factor of rape of women and young girls is a complicated one, and can be done out of various
reasons. It often happens that women from one military organization are supporting and
encouraging mass rape of enemy women. Especially if for some reason they perceive enemy
women as somehow more feminine then themselves. Mass rape is often pre-planned and relied
upon to provide with a political victory, like in the example of Muslim conquest of Sassanid
Empire (633-644). In more recent times, such systematic action occurred during the war in Bosnia
(1992-1995). Serbs organized many rape camps to both keep their soldiers willing to fight and
humiliate Bosnian and Croatian women. By impregnating women which were not ethnic Serbs,
Serbian political leadership tried to achieve their objective of populating Bosnia exclusively with
Serbs. On other occasions women were raped and killed, simply because they belonged to another
nation.405
This is hardly surprising if we know that Titos partisans founded Second Yugoslavia on a similar
crime. On the 15th of May 1945, near village Prevalje in modern day northern Slovenia, Battle of
Poljana took place after which, the last (considerable) Axis forces in Europe have surrendered.
They were consisted of mostly Croatian and German armed forces followed by a huge column of
civilians. In what is known as Bleiburg repatriations, Titos partisan units employed methods of
mass-rape, death marches and mass executions. In the following weeks they tortured, raped and

See in Heinemann E., The Hour of the Woman: Memories of Germanys Crisis Years and West German
National Identity, American Historical Review, 1996.
405
Allen B., Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, U of Minnesota Press, 1996.
404

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killed unknown but vast number of people. Purpose was to eliminate any political opposition in
the new communistic Yugoslavia.406
A political and military organization can deliberately organize military units to use other strategies,
but within the frames of punishment as their primary objective is either to kill or hurt the people
of the enemy military organization. Such were German bombings of England with V1 and V2
rockets and (much debated) Allied bombing of Dresden and Tokyo in 1945.
Allies applied a strategy of strategic bombing to attack these two population centers with the
purpose to kill or psychologically break the people of Japan and Germany, and force them into
surrender. These air campaigns had the pretext to slow down war production, lower enemy morale
and disrupt national unity. However they have achieved neither of these. Nor did they speed up
frontline operations. The only thing they have achieved is killing a significant number of noncombatants. It can be argued that this was in fact the real objective of the air campaigns. Therefore
I see these as barbarism strategies. Furthermore, the first and so far only application of nuclear
strategy was also used as a part of a punishment campaign to hurt Japanese people and make the
rest of them realize that surrender is the only option.
Sometimes punishment is more the result of a reaction. For example after Serbians were defeated
in Operation Flash (May 1995), they retaliated by attacking Croatian cities with rockets armed
with cluster bombs, most notably two attacks at center of Zagreb. The attack was deliberately
aiming to kill civilians. 407
Barbarism strategies highly effective in the aspect that their consequences are cut deep into a
collective memory of every population which has experienced it. The famous UNESCOs list epic
saga of Niebelung, is based on actual events of a joint Roman and Hunnish punishment campaign
in 436 AD. Roman-Hunnish forces under Flavius Aetius, attacked the people and the military alike,
as the objective of this expedition was to eliminate threat of the Burgundian tribe, both as a political
and military organization. 408 But barbarism strategy works both ways and can as well leave a deep

406

Thomas N., Axis Forces in Yugoslavia 1941-45, Osprey Publishing, 1995, p. 21.
Williams P., Scharf M., Peace with Justice? War Crimes and Accountability in the Former Yugoslavia, Rowman
& Littlefield, 2002, p. 53.
408
Noble T., From Roman Provinces to Medieval Kingdoms, Routledge, 2006, p. 71.
407

170

mark on those who have opted for it.409 Even the most advanced military and political
organizations, find it difficult to wash the moral stain off their collective memory. After the Polish
soldiers surrendered to the Red Army in 1939, they were tortured and killed in the infamous Katyn
Forrest massacre (April-May 1940).410 These events, more than seventy years ago still continue
to be a certain weight in the relations of modern Poland and Russia. Every political and military
organization should be aware of the long term political consequences which result after employing
the strategy of barbarism.
This fact does not seem to disturb modern Russia too much, because it repeatedly employed
strategy of barbarism in its recent history. During the Second Chechen War (1999-2009), in the
Battle of Komsomolskoye (2000) between Russian federal forces and Chechen separatists, the
fighting resulted in the destruction of most of the Chechen forces. Scores of Chechens were taken
prisoner by the Russians, and only a few survived. A number of civilians died from torture, and
the village was looted and completely destroyed: A Russian officer, Maj. Igor Ivannikov,
concedes his troops were furious during the first days in Komsomolskoye. At least 50 of us were
killed. There was a lot of anger, a lot of it directed at the prisoners of war. Last Saturday a
Newsweek correspondent in Komsomolskoye saw the remains of at least 11 dead Chechen fighters;
it is clear that many did not die in battle. At least one had his hands bound with heavy cable and
his head was split open with a spade; another had his tongue cut out. Three others had their ears
cut off. Russian soldier at the scene joked that they lost their ears because theyd heard too much.
Major Ivannikov, for one, understands the consequences of the brutality the Russians are inflicting
on Chechnya. Consequences that have nothing to do with the possibility of a United Nations
reprimand. Told of Said Visayevs death, he shakes his head. Why did that boy have to die? he
asks quietly. Itll just make his brothers want to take revenge.411

409

In the case of the Bleiburg repatriations, some of the units that did the killing and those who were being killed
were of Croatian ethnic. Some authors argue that it was the Serbian partisans who did most of the killing. No exact
data can be provided as the partisan units were consisted of several nations. Being as it is, it makes little difference
to the victims. What is the point, is that they came from the same territorial and language entity. Differences were
mostly political. So to this day, these killings of a surrendered army, to some extent, continue to prolong divisions
within the modern-day Croatian society. It took another war, in which the children of those people which employed
barbarism and those that have survived it, to reconcile and join for a common cause. Only by working together could
they have hoped to defeat Serbian invasion of 1991.
410
See in Sanford G., Katyn And The Soviet Massacre Of 1940: Truth, Justice And Memory, Routledge, 2005.
411
Matthews O., Four Days In Hell, Newsweek, 2 April 2000.

171

Laws of strategy apply on barbarism as equally as they do on any other strategy. It offers immediate
political victory but a long term defeat, as it leaves behind is dirty conscience and lot of bad blood.
Another subpart of punishment strategy is called denial. Although in imagined as less brutal, it can
also be harsh towards enemys population. It is designed with the primary purpose to deny the
enemy with the resources to wage war, but also to hurt civilians, as its aim is to bring the war
directly to the people.412 Such was for example Shermans March to the sea (1864) as his campaign
had the objective to both bring the horrors of war directly to the civilian population of the
Confederate States and destroy their economic resources capability to sustain their army. This
strategy sought to lower Southern national unity and force them to surrender. By successfully
executing this strategy, Sherman speeded up a direct strategy that was simultaneously in progress
frontline operations. 413
Another example of this kind of strategy is the air campaign Rolling Thunder during Vietnam War.
The objective of this strategic bombing was to destroy enemys will, infrastructure and resources
in order to coerce him to abandon his plans of dominance over South Vietnam. 414 To relentless
bombings of USAAF, Vietcong answered by employment of Punji sticks. This is a very simple
but very effective booby trap which would be placed in areas likely to be passed through by enemy
troops. Punji sticks would be camouflaged and covered with toxic plants, frogs and feces because
such an injury would likely be infected. North Vietnamese would use US soldiers tactical
knowledge against him the traps would be deployed in the areas where the surprised enemy might
be expected to take cover. American soldiers would impale themselves when jumping for cover.
But the main idea behind Punji stick was not necessarily to kill the person who stepped on it
rather, they were designed to wound the enemy and slow down his unit, because the victim would
be evacuated to field hospital. In the jungle this evacuation would have to be done by helicopter
which the Vietcong saw more damaging to the enemys resources.415 For them it was more
valuable the flight of the helicopter than human life a thinking resulted from differences in
strategic culture.

412

Mayers A., Dixie & the Dominion: Canada, the Confederacy, and the War for the Union, Dundurn, 2003, p. 24.
I can make this march, and I will make Georgia howl! William Tecumseh Sherman.
414
Taylor T., Operation Rolling Thunder, Xulon Press, 2008.
415
Lanning M. L., Cragg D., Inside the VC and the NVA, Ballantine Books, 1993.
Among many others, famous US strategist Colin Powell was also wounded by this weapon during his service in
Vietnam.
413

172

Another concept within barbarism is called human shield. Non-combatants are forcibly placed
around targets of military value to deter the attack. It has been repeatedly used during and since
World War II, both on lower and higher strategic scale. Lower examples include Vinkt massacre
(1940), Wola massacre (1944) and Warsaw uprising (1944). German SS and Wehrmacht were
using civilians as shield during military operations.416 Japanese did the same during the Battle of
Okinawa.417 Palestinians frequently used it during the fighting with Israeli army. 418 Talibans
against NATO as well. 419 During the large scale offensive of ArBiH to relieve the siege of Sarajevo
in 1995, Serbs took 377 UNPROFOR hostages. They used these hostages as human shields against
potential targets in Bosnia and Herzegovina, trying forcing NATO to end its air strikes on Serbian
positions.420 In the Battle of Vrbanja Bridge in Sarajevo, between French UNPROFOR forces and
Serbs, the Serbs took French soldiers hostage from their observation post, with the purpose to use
them as human shield. When the French commanding officer came to see why there is a radio
silence at the post, a Serbian soldier in French uniform ambushed him and tried to capture him
too.421
Examples of human shield on higher strategic level, is the Luftwaffes proposed usage of Allied
POW as shield against bombing. They were supposed to be placed in the centers of major German
cities to dissuade further bombing operations. Plan was approved but not carried out, because of
opposition from an SS officer, allegedly out of moral reasons. 422 Japanese used it as well. As US
bombers were coming closer and closer, the Japanese dispersed their major military installations
and factories throughout urban areas. USAAF stated that because of this it was not possible to
attack purely military installations. Allegedly US switched to from precision bombing to carpetbombing, which obliterated 67 Japanese cities with incendiary bombs. 423 After his invasion of
Kuwait, Saddam Husseins government imprisoned hundreds of citizens of Western countries,

416

Warsaw Uprising, Central Commission for Investigation of German Crimes in Poland, Record No. 117. Link:
http://genius.com/albums/Central-commission-for-investigation-of-german-crimes-in-poland/German-crimescommitted-during-the-warsaw-rising-of-1944
417
Frame R. R., Okinawa: The Final Great Battle of World War II, The Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 96: No. 11,
November 2012.
418
Harel A., Analysis: Stoking an appetite for revenge, Haaretz, 8 March 2004.
419
Harding T., Taliban used civilians as human shields when British attacked, The Telegraph, 18 August 2008.
420
Bucknam M., Responsibility of Command, Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 2003, p. 215.
421
Daly E., The day the Serbs went a bridge too far, The Independent, 7 June 1995.
422
Rennell T., The Last Escape: The untold story of Allied Prisoners of War in Germany 1944-1945, Penguin 2003.
423
Mavrikis P. (ed.), History of World War II: Victory and Aftermath, Marshall Cavendish Corporation, 2005, p.
817.

173

who were in Iraq to use them as human shields in an attempt to deter their nations from military
operations against him. Western hostages were filmed meeting Hussein, and kept around to him
or military and industrial installations to deter any targeted attacks.424
When one side employs barbarism it is very hard for the other to keep its cool and not respond in
the same manner. In October 1941 near Kragujevac, Serbia, Chetniks attacked Wehrmacht
soldiers. The bodies of killed Germans were found castrated with their penises cut off and inserted
into their mouths a form of mutilation typically practiced by the Chetniks. German command
was furious, which resulted in them rounding up and killing several thousands of citys
inhabitants.425
A very special form of barbarism is the deliberate development and employment of suicidal
strategies. For example since Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and the massive suicide attacks of young
Iranian children throughout the Muslim World suicide bombings (Arabic: Istishhad) have
become common weapons of various Islamist groups.426 During WWII as the Japanese warmachine was rapidly becoming aware of American superiority it employed suicide air attacks
kamikaze.427 Strategy of suicide attacks on mass scale is in deep relation with the culture of the
actor. Only a specific culture with very different norms and beliefs could employ such an action.
Last form of barbarism I will explain is terrorism. There are many different views on this subject,
I see it as barbaric strategy whose primary purpose is to hurt that those parts of the enemy which
are defenseless. Terrorism is defined as the systematic use of violence which is committed by a
person, group, or government in order to frighten people as a means of coercion to achieve a
political goal. 428 It can be employed by both state and non-state actors.

424
425

Karsh E., Rautsi I., Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography, Grove Press, 1991, p. 234.
Cohen P. J., Serbias Secret War: Propaganda and the Deceit of History, Texas A&M University Press, 1996, p.

41.
426

See in Hafez M. M., Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom, US Institute of Peace
Press, 2007, pp. 35-89; Lewis J., The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing, Naval Institute Press,
2012.
An interesting quotation from Lewis book describes the mentality of strategy of suicide attack, during the IsraelPalestinian conflict: Israel has nuclear bombs, we have human bombs. Hamas and other Islamist militant
organizations have answered to Western hi-tech weapons by suicide attacks. On the other hand the West, in the
words of US Navy researcher Bart Everett, see the answer to human suicide attacks in robot technology (drones
etc.).
427
Some elements in the Third Reich also devised a strategy of suicide air attacks late in WWII. The so-called
Leonidas squadron was consisted of young pilots who volunteered to preform suicide air missions.
428
Merriam-Webster dictionary, Terrorism. Link: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/terrorism (29/11/14).

174

According to famous defector Ion Mihai Pacepa, former head of Romanian secret service Soviet
Union has devised and executed a strategy of state sponsored terrorism, directed against its
enemies, NATO and other US allies. KGB General Aleksandr Sakharovsky allegedly said: In
todays world, when nuclear arms have made military force obsolete, terrorism should become
our main weapon.429 Operation Sionistskiye Gosudarstva (SIG) had the specific purpose to turn
Islamic world against USA. According to head of KGB, Yuri Andropov: We need to install a
Nazi style hatred for the Jews throughout the Islamic world, and to turn this weapon of emotions
into a terrorist bloodbath against Israel and its main supporter, the United States. No one within
the American/Zionist sphere of influence should no longer feel safe. Agents of Muslim origin
were recruited throughout the Soviet zone, trained and sent to Islam countries to spread this
indoctrination. 430
Barbarism has many forms and I could make more examples of this strategy, but for the purpose
of this dissertation I will conclude here that when strategically cornered, many military
organizations (civilized and uncivilized alike) will put morality aside and resort to barbarism, as
an ad hoc solution to their frustration. A strategy which I consider to have many similarities with
barbarism, and for this reason it is included into this section is to attack your enemy without the
support of international law, which makes it morally dubious.
Operations outside the frame of international law
As I wrote before modern war has changed its face. One of the factors of this change is that most
of worlds state actors are members of the United Nations. Only three internationally recognized
countries, Vatican, Kosovo and Taiwan are not members of the UN. 431 Other state actors like
Republic of Somaliland, Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic,
Republic of Abkhazia etc. have only limited recognition. Every UN country is subjected to
international law. Because the whole world is a battlefield strong actors can potentially use every
occasion in which any of them violates international law. If a certain country breaks international

Pacepa I. M., Russian Footprints, National Review, 24 August 2006.

Stroilov P., Behind the Desert Storm: A Secret Archive Stolen from the Kremlin that Sheds New Light on the
Arab Revolutions in the Middle East, Price World Publishing, 2011, p. 35.
431
Rosenberg M., Non-Members of the United Nations, About.com/Geography, 14 July 2011.
429
430

175

rules and norms, it will give moral high ground for others to act against it. Because then, strong
powers can induce UN assembly to make a resolution which will allow strategic action. 432
Where this scenario took place, was in Libyan Civil War (2011) in which, France and Britain
had proposed and got, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 to protect civilians and
civilian populated areas.433 This way NATO got the moral high ground for action. On the other
hand Coalition of the willing did not have UN support to invade Iraq in 2003. USA, UK, Australia
and Poland have invaded this sovereign country without internationally accepted moral reason.
But due to specific international circumstances they managed it anyway. 434 And according to
Amnesty International, that same Poland was one of the key European places for CIAs
Extraordinary Rendition and Detention Program.435 This is a strategy devised by USA to operate
outside international legal norms. People can be kidnaped, tortured and detained for unlimited
amount of time, without any legal responsibility for the organization undertaking such action. This
strategy enables attack on enemys key figures without direct confrontation with their military
organization. Al-Qaeda has attacked USA with asymmetric indirect strategy, so USA has also
responded with asymmetric indirect strategy making the conflict symmetric. And since USA is
a much more powerful military organization, they are likely to win in a symmetrical conflict.
Arreguin-Toft wrote that strong actors lose asymmetric conflicts when they adopt the wrong
strategy vis--vis their weaker adversaries. Same-approach interactions, whether direct-direct or
indirect-indirect, favors strong actors because they imply shared values, aims, and victory
conditions. Because nothing therefore intervenes between raw power and goals, strong actors will
win same-approach interactions in proportion to their advantage in relative power. Oppositeapproach interactions, whether direct-indirect or indirect-direct, favor weak actors because they
sacrifice values for time. This results in a significant delay between the commitment of armed

432

This is what in present time, USA is trying to do in the case of Syria. They used an incident in which (disputed)
Syrian government troops killed people with chemical weapons to give moral high ground for UN resolution,
according to which USA could then act military against Syria. But so far these efforts failed due to strong Russian
and Chinese opposition. Obama: US cannot ignore Syria chemical weapons, BBC News, 7 September 2013.
433
Security Council authorizes all necessary measures to protect civilians in Libya, UN News Centre, 17
March 2011.
434
Iraq war illegal, says Annan, BBC News, 16 September 2004.
435
Rendition and secret detention: A global system of human rights violations. Questions and Answers, Amnesty
International, 1 January 2006.

176

forces and the attainment of objectives. Time then becomes the permissive condition for the
operation of the political vulnerability.436
Strategy to use black operations and black sites removes legal responsibility, and provides political
protection for the military organization undertaking it. CIA encyclopedia defined a black operation
as a clandestine mission, with negative particulars, not attributable to the organization carrying it
out.437 These black missions are usually carried out by intelligence branches of the military
organizations or private contractors. For example Iran is strongly suspected to currently be under
attack by Israeli and US black operations. 438 Modern war has transferred to the margins. Factors
of secrecy and ability to deny political responsibility, have become important strategic assets for
military organizations.
Another approach is called forced disappearance. People are secretly abducted, tortured and finally
killed with denial from the authorities that they have any knowledge about it. The corpse too is
disposed in such a way that it is like the person vanished and nobody knows anything about it. 439
During the Operation Condor, some of the South American countries governments were involved
in forced disappearances of their citizens. Purpose was to eradicate Soviet influence and
communist resistance organizations against the regimes. 440 This became known as the Dirty War
(1974-1983) in which unknown but high, number of people disappeared without a trace. Since the
citizens of these countries were afraid of the same consequences, it resulted in wide spread denial
and pretense that everything is normal. 441 Argentinian junta was assisted by both USA and France,
as the French used similar techniques in Algerian War. 442
Similar but less sophisticated methods were used by the Soviets whose secret services committed
mass murder of Polish officers in Katyn Forrest (1940). Soviets were trying hard to conceal it and
it was the Germans who investigated this war crime, to use it in their propaganda against the
Soviets. It took exactly 50 years for Soviet official acknowledgment when Mikhail Gorbachev

436

Arreguin-Toft, p. 122.
Thomas Smith W., Encyclopedia of the Central Intelligence Agency, Infobase Publishing, 2003, p. 31.
438
Shipman T., Bush sanctions black ops against Iran, The Telegraph, 27 May 2007.
439
Henckaerts J., Doswald-Beck L., Alvermann C., Customary International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Cambridge
University Press, 2005, p. 342.
440
Klein N., Shock Doctrine, Picador, 2007, p. 126.
441
Robben A. C. G. M., Anthropology at War? What Argentinas Dirty War Can Teach Us, Anthropology News,
Volume 46, Issue 6, September 2005, p. 5.
442
Bianco A., Argentine-Escadrons de la mort: lcole franaise, Risal.info, 22 October 2004.
437

177

publically announced that Soviets were responsible. 443 Two of the scientists who were
investigating, were then-world famous Croatian forensics Eduard Miloslavi and Ljudevit Jurak.
Miloslavi escaped to USA in 1944, his country of birth where he testified to the rest of his life
that it was the Soviets who were responsible. For this he was sentenced to death in absentia by the
Yugoslavian court. Jurak was captured by the partisans after the fall of Zagreb in May 1945, and
tortured to reconsider his statements on Katyn and Vinica massacres. Since he did not, he was
secretly executed as an enemy of state of Yugoslavia. 444 In this period Yugoslavia had close ties
with Soviet Union.
It has become important for a government to conceal operations such as these, because political
consequences of their reveal will give moral high ground to the enemy. In the case of GermanSoviet and USA-Soviet conflicts, it was important for ideological reasons. In modern times major
powers may have similar ideologies but are also trying to hide their covert activities for political
safety. Following the cyber-attack on Estonia (2007) it was said that it came from Transnistria,
one of the previously mentioned unrecognized republics. 445 If it is unrecognized than how can it
be responsible? Generally speaking, the origin of any cyber-attack is difficult to trace, making it
easy to deny for the organization responsible. Many definitions that are used to explain all of these
new forms of warfare are inadequate. Garigue argued on cyberwarfare that it is difficult to talk
about something completely new using words that bring with them specific understanding and
expectancies. The early period of the automobile faced a similar situation. At one time it was called
a horseless carriage as this was the only way to define its essential quality. The car is more than a
carriage without a horse.446 So is modern warfare I would like to add.
CONCLUSIONS
With these I conclude the list of known strategies. It is by no means complete, as strategy itself
operates in creative domain and its possibilities are infinite. What I have attempted is simply to
give an insight in the way how strategy works. It has many forms, countless methods but its
nature is always the same. Strategy is both paradoxical and unpredictable. Usually several

Hamilton M., Gorbachev Documents Soviet Guilt at Katyn, Los Angeles Times, 14 April 1990.
tefan L., Ljudevit Jurak-Naa rana i ponos, Hrvatsko Slovo, 16 April 1999.
445
Coalson R., Behind The Estonia Cyberattacks, Radio Free Europe, 6 March 2009.
446
Garigue R., Information warfare: Developing a Conceptual Framework, US office of the Assistant Deputy
Minister, Defense Information Services, 1995.
443
444

178

strategies operate intertwined against the same adversary, and never in history has exactly the same
strategy been used twice. We can identify a certain strategys key features and put it into a
category, but since circumstances change all the time strategy will change as well. Counterattacks
used by Ptolemy IV in 217 BC and by Moshe Dayan in 1973, are not the same. Both commanders
followed the same line of thought but methods were different. A successful strategy will always
find a way to adapt and counter enemys reaction. Strategic area which I have left out on purpose
is space. The reason for such a decision is the fact that human strategy has not yet effectively
expanded into space. To the best of my knowledge that is, because there are many aspects in this
area which are too secret to be reliably studied. What we do know for sure is that powerful state
actors have space programs and are investing considerably into space technology. The most
advanced in this are USA, Russia, European Union Space Agency, China and Japan. Because of
the conflict between these countries, any space progress is necessarily orientated towards the Earth
itself, not outwards. Satellites are extensively used in modern military operations, information
warfare and gathering intelligence. Rockets are more to show the launching capability of nuclear
weapons than actual space research potential. However I see a more positive aspect of it too in the
form of International Space Station. Governments around the World have realized the importance
of understanding our own planet and the changes through which it is going. Also, space is infinite
and its vast resources offer numerous potentials for growth and further development. I believe the
answers for human future lie outside the borders of our planet, but to get there human civilization
will have to be united. Any kind of deep space exploration, colonization of other planets and
possible interaction with other species cannot be done without tremendous technologic
development, cooperation between all the countries and a clear united strategy. These kind of
notions seem very far in the present reality. For the time being space is just another environment
to which the conflict within the planet has expanded. But joint projects like the ISS and launching
of deep space research probes suggests the awareness of world leaders that only together can
humanity get anywhere which is the ultimate objective of strategy. 447
In the end of this chapter I would like to include a table (see table 7) which could give a more
coherent picture on the concept of direct and indirect strategy.

447

For more on theory of space strategy see a recent and complete comprehensive study made by group of authors
Eligar Sadeh (ed.), Space Strategy in the 21st Century: Theory and Policy, Routledge, 2013.

179

Table 7: Operating areas of strategies

Direct

Indirect

Air

Land Sea Air Cyberspace Politics Objective

+

++

Supremacy

Control the air space by

destroying or nullifying
enemys air forces

Naval

++

power

Attack enemys land from the

sea

projection
ashore
Battle of

++

annihilation

Destroy the enemys armed

forces in one big battle

Attrition

Weaken and destroy enemys

armed forces piece by piece

Blitzkrieg

++

Capture enemys territory and

break its armed forces
equilibrium quickly

Proxy war

++

Fight the real enemy by

fighting someone else
somewhere else who is his
potential ally

Heavy force

++

++

Trap and destroy guerrillas

armed forces by quickly
committing overwhelming
troops

Guerrilla

++

++

Fight a guerrilla war against

the enemy, exhaust him in
small scale engagements,
with hit and run tactics

180

Preemptive

++

++

++

++

Attack and incapacitate

enemys armed forces before

strike

they attack you

Bait and

++

Lure your enemies to fight

bleed,

each other

bloodletting

Wait on the sidelines for them

to exhaust each other

Preventive

++

strike

Attack and destroy enemys

armed forces which do not
pose an immediate threat but
rather a potential obstacle to
realization of strategic
objectives

Barbarism

++

Physically destroy and harm

non-combatants to either send
a political message or
exercise savage culture of war

Nuclear and

++

++

++

++

Attack enemys armed forces

other

with WMD to destroy them

weapons of

on mass scale

mass
destruction
Nuclear and

Shock and
awe

++

++

++

++

Attack enemys people and

other

infrastructure to destroy it on

weapons of

mass scale
++

++

++

++

++

Impose fear, confusion and

overwhelming force to
rapidly incapacitate, destroy
or capture enemys armed
forces

181

Blockade

++

Prevent enemys resources

from flowing

Command

++

of the sea

Establish control of the sea by

destroying or nullifying
enemys naval forces

Incentives

++

Influence enemys behavior

in desired direction by using
things which motivate

Total war

++

++

++

++

++

Use all the available

resources to fight the enemy

Raiding

++

Disturb the enemy by rapid

incursions in its controlled
space without intention to
hold it

Proactive

++

Defend against and attack

cyber

enemys computer systems

defense

and networks
Decapitation +

++

++

Destroy or incapacitate
enemys command structure

Legend: ++ largely present, + present, not present

Source: developed by the author

182

Key points of the Chapter 2: Direct and Indirect strategies

Direct and Indirect strategy is not the same as direct and indirect approach.

Following the teachings of Sun Tzu, conflicts can be won either directly or
indirectly, but not in the same meaning as interpreted by Liddell Hart.

Direct strategy attacks enemys armed forces.

Indirect strategy attacks other segments of enemys structure and resources

people, infrastructure, politics, economy, supplies etc.

Both direct and indirect strategies are consistent of the same general strategic
components goals (objectives), tactics (ways) and strategic culture (style), and
these can be applied either on operational, theater or grand strategic level.

Examples of direct strategies are: Blitzkrieg, Preemptive strike, Cyberwar,

Total war etc.

Examples of indirect strategies are: Attrition, Guerrilla, Raiding, Decapitation

etc.

183

Chapter 3: Alliances and NATO

Battles are won by slaughter and maneuver.
The greater the general, the more he contributes in maneuver, the less he demands in slaughter.
Winston Churchill (1874-1965)
Extensive literature on alliances and many authors have offered their own views and definitions
on the subject. There are different types of alliances formed for different purposes. In this
dissertation I am primarily interested in military alliances, more specifically NATO. I will not go
deeper into the subject of the NATO alliance nor the subject of alliances in general. For my study
the concept of an alliance is of marginal interest because in my focus is strategy and war. My
thinking begins with the premise that Western actors formed NATO both for the common threat
and common cultural origin. I will discuss alliances in this section consciously keeping it on a
basic level.
1. Military alliances in general
Military alliance is an alliance between armed individuals or military organizations that cooperate
towards common military interests.448 Other definitions include J. Duffield et al in Security
Studies: An Introduction which pointed out the definitions of S. Walt that alliance is a formal or
informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states and of P.
Weitsman which described alliances as bilateral or multilateral agreements to provide some
element of security to the signatories. 449 M. Sheehan in Contemporary Security Studies suggested
that states will seek membership of alliances if they believe that their own resources are
inadequate to maintain their sovereignty and security, and will make common cause with states
that share their goals or perceive similar threats.450

448

Now here the question arises, can a relationship be considered a military alliance even if partners do not employ
military means to achieve military objectives?
Dictionary definition of an alliance is that its an agreement, friendship or a pact between two or more parties, which
is made to cooperate towards common goals and to secure common interests. A relationship in which people agree
to work together. See Merriam-Webster dictionary, Alliance. Link: http://www.merriam-webster.com/alliance
(14/12/14).
449
Williams, Security Studies, p. 292.
450
Collins, Contemporary Security Studies, p. 152.

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Alliances can be formed on several basis:

Friendship mutual affection and respect, common values;

Coalition temporary joining of forces and cooperation for a common cause, each of the
actors in their own self-interest;

Pact preconditioned formal agreement between actors to work towards common

objectives. More stable and better organized than Coalitions.

The first condition for a military alliance to form, is the existence of a security threat. This is the
main variable as if it were not for the potential threat, there would be no reason to form an alliance.
Once an actor identifies a potential or immediate threat it seeks more actors which are endangered
with the same threat to form alliance. This way they increase their sense of security. Based on how
close are connected the interests between parties and to what extent each of them perceives this
security threat, it depends how close and how strongly connected this alliance will be.
Second condition is a promise. Alliances are based on the promises of actors to aid each other in
time of need. This promise can be formal pact, treaty, or informal promise of aid. Apart from
political leaders, a nation or a part of it, can join to aid someone spontaneously people demand
themselves even if it is contrary to their governments position. 451 However what is a more
451

It has happened that nations helped one another during wartime even though there was no formal alliance
between their states. For example, there is a conflict between actor A and B, and the official policy of actor C is not
to interfere. There is no agreement for actor C to help actor A. But population of actor C regards population of actor
A as a friend, and has historical, economic and cultural connections with it. People from C will spontaneously help
the A in the form of supplies, refuge shelters, weapons and even volunteer fighters.
For example during Serbian wars in the 1990s volunteers from Russia were coming to fight on the side of the Serbs,
and since the escalation of the crisis in Ukraine (2014) Serbian Chetnik groups are fighting on the side of proRussian separatists. See Mezzofiore G., Ukraine Crisis: Serb Chetniks Claim Killings of 23 Ukrainian Soldiers,
International Business Times, 26 August 2014.
Also around 20 (unknown number) Croatian volunteers have also joined this war, but on the side of Ukraine. This
was confirmed by Croatian Ministry of Foreign Relations adding that Croatians are not fighting illegally but as
military instructors and soldiers in the ranks of regular Ukrainian Army. Ukrainian authorities have declined help
from those Croatians without previous military experience from Croatian War of Independence. An interview with
Miroslav Mai, Denis eler and Ivo from Zagreb (surname not revealed) some of the volunteers, discovered the
motives not as remunerative but as from belief. I left my wife, children, a job and a thousand euro salary. So far we
have not received even the money to buy cigarettes. Our pay is 170 euros, so we are really not mercenaries. We
want to help the Ukrainians because they helped us during Croatian War of Independence. Ukrainian forces are
untrained, unequipped and unorganized. We have all been soldiers and some of us until recently in the Croatian
Army. We dont hate Russians or Serbs but we came to help a country which was attacked by a superior enemy.
Surely you will easily understand the motives. Kristovi I., Dao sam otkaz, ostavio enu i djecu te krenuo pomoi
Ukrajincima (I quit my job, left my wife and kids and went to help the Ukrainians), Vecernji List, 11 February 2015.
During the negotiations between Putin, Merkel, Hollande and Porosenko V. Putin has warned Croatia to withdraw

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common behavior is that alliances are made primarily out of interest. The main motive to form
alliance is interest either in increasing the security or prospect of gain. If a country goes to war of
conquest, others might join it to share the spoils. Also alliances can be formed during the conflict,
ad hoc, on the basis my enemys enemy is my friend. Even actors which are usually hostile to
one another, can unite to counter a common threat. But these kind of alliances are quick to dissolve,
once the threat is eliminated.452 See table 8 for reasons to form alliances.
Table 8: Formation of modern alliances
To oppose a threat
To accommodate a threat through a pact of
Modern alliances are formed (in general)

restraint
To provide the great powers with a tool of
management over weaker states

Source: Walt S., The Origins of Alliance, Cornell University Press, 2013, p.7.

Perceiving that there is a security threat is a part of a nature of war and of human group behavior.
As such it is an unchangeable variable. This threat can either be immediate and manifested,
potential and latent or sometimes completely unknown and unanticipated. A crucial variable within
threat dealing behavior is formation of security alliances. This is a pattern which repeats itself
since the beginning of history.
Every different alliance and every different type of an alliance is designed to answer a threat in its
own way. According to an older definition from Correlates of War we differentiate three types
(including two subtypes) of military alliances (see table 9).

its soldiers (which he called mercenaries) from Ukraine. Lubina K, Rusija Hrvatskoj: Povucite plaenike iz
Ukrajine! (Russia to Croatia: Pull out your mercenaries from Ukraine), Vecernji List, 12 February 2015.
452
USA/UK and Soviet Union in WWII.

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Table 9: Older classification of alliances according to Correlates of War project

Type I

Defense pact represents the highest level of military commitment, requiring

alliance members to come to each others aid militarily if attacked by a third party.

Type IIa

Neutrality pact pledges signatories that in case of conflict between either of

signatories and a third part, other members remain neutral and not interfere.

Type IIb

Non-aggression pact, similarly as neutrality pact pledges signatories not use or

otherwise support the use of force against other alliance members.

Type III

Entente, provide for the least commitment and obligate members to consult in times
of crisis or armed attack.

Source: Correlates of War Formal Alliance data. Link:

http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2_Data/Alliances/alliance.htm (17/5/13).

The problem with this definition is that is became obsolete. It might have been accurate when
Joachim von Ribbentrop and Vyacheslav Molotov in the late hours of 23 rd of August 1939, signed
the famous Third Reich-Soviet Union non-aggression pact. But it is no longer substantial to
describe modern alliance forming, such as the creation of Coalition of the willing in 2003 to invade
Iraq. Duffield et al. have pointed out that in their efforts to be comprehensive, the most complete
alliance databases have grouped together defensive alliances, offensive alliances, non-aggression
pacts, neutrality pacts and consultation agreements. However Duffield has also suggested that the
fact which is complicating the matters, is that a high percentage of these so called alliances more
than half (364 of 648) in the case of the ATOP (Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions)
dataset consist of two or more types.453
Therefore, to give a more accurate definition of what is an alliance, we must first see on which
basis nations decide to form alliances. According to The Origins of Alliances by Stephen Walt and
Alliance History and Future of NATO: What the Last 500 Years of Alliance Behavior Tells us
about NATOs Path Forward from Warren, reasons are the following:

453

Williams, Security Studies, p. 293.

For complete list and classification of alliances see ATOP (Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions) project.
Link: http://atop.rice.edu/ (25/2/15).

187

First is balancing. States which face an external threat will align with others to oppose the states
posing that threat. If a strong power emerges, then other powers will seek to ally themselves in
order to deterrent its possible ambitions towards them. They are doing so to ensure peace by
balancing the strength of actors, so that neither side dares to make aggression.
Second is bandwagoning. States which face an external threat will ally with the strongest power
that others perceive as more likely to win a conflict. Good example is Italy which in both World
Wars allied itself with Germany and when saw that they are not likely to win the conflict, they
changed camps and joined their enemies. In World War I they did so for the promise of spoils of
war in terms of territory and resources. In World War II because they wanted to save their
independence.454
Third is ideology. The more similar the domestic ideology of two or more states, the more likely
for them to be allies. NATO in its core rests on democratic-capitalistic ideology and promotes it
around the World. This is stated in the opening section of the text of North Atlantic Treaty:
determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded
on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.455
Fourth is foreign aid. The more aid provided by one state to another, the more likely that the two
will form an alliance. The more aid, the greater control over the state receiving this aid. The nation
that gives aid will make the receiving nation more dependent on it and evoke a sense of gratitude.
That is if this process is handed well by the donor. Otherwise as in any other strategy it can
backfire. The receiving nation can be too proud to accept it and might find it an insult. USA after
WWII provided yesterdays enemies with aid to revive their militaries and economies. Defeated
nations of Japan, Germany and Italy received economic aid which helped their development.
Today these countries are among the strongest US allies.
Fifth is penetration. The greater one states access to the political system of another, more the
tendency for the two to ally. This rationale is known at least since the Roman times. Barbarians
that were close to the emperor were in the position to make their tribes Roman allies. The best
454

Walt, The Origins of Alliance, p. 5.

M. Sheehan has pointed out balancing and bandwagoning. See Sheehan in Collins (ed.), Contemporary Security
Studies, p. 153.
455
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty, Washington DC, 4 April 1949. Link:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

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example in our day is USA-Israel relations. Substantial number of Jewish people living in USA,
and more importantly Jewish-Americans which occupy key positions within its cultural and
political life, made it possible that USA today is one of the closest Israels allies.
Sixth and last is dtente. This represents the voluntary development of peaceful relations to reduce
tensions. Nations that are usually hostile towards each other can start dtente process to become
friends and allies. 456
Duffield et al. point out two kinds of theories on why states form alliances: those that emphasize
international determinants and those that focus on domestic factors.457
Category of international factors on which alliances could be formed includes two theories:
balance-of-power and balance-of-threat. The realist approach from the point of view of
International Relations suggest the balance-of-power theory. This concept posits that states form
alliances to balance the power of other states, especially when they are unable to balance power
through their individual efforts. Or when the costs of such internal balancing exceed those of
alliance membership. Waltz wrote that from this perspective, unbalanced power alone represents
a threat to the survival of less powerful states. In his view two or more relatively weak states,
when confronted with a much more powerful state, will ally.458 A refinement of balance-of-power
theory is called balance-of-threat theory. Sometimes, alliances appear to be unbalanced in terms
of power. For during much of the Cold War, the alliances centered on the USA were more
powerful, as measured on a number of indices of capability, than those revolving around the Soviet
Union. States form alliances in response to common threats, not just power.459
Domestic factors include explanations which focus on similarities and differences in the culture,
ideologies and political institutions of states. Duffield et al wrote that the general argument is
that, other things being equal, states will tend to ally with states whose political orientations are
similar to their own. Similar value systems may generate common interests and common
interpretations of what constitutes a threat.460 These authors have also pointed out two processes

456

Warren P. T., Alliance History and Future of NATO: What the Last 500 Years of Alliance Behavior Tells us
about NATOs Path Forward, 21st Century Defense Initiative Policy Paper, Brookings, 2010, pp. 12-16.
457
Williams, Security Studies, p. 295.
458
Williams, Security Studies, p. 296.
459
Ibidem.
460
Ibid, p. 297.

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alliances have a tendency to do: institutionalization and socialization. Institutionalization describes

a tendency for members to create an institutional frame within which they coordinate their alliance.
Socialization is another process that can promote alliance lifespan with the socialization of political
elites and possibly the general publics of member states. Authors conclude that these alliance
related social interactions could lead to the development of more similar world views and even a
common identity. An alliance may persist because its members come to see themselves as integral
parts of a larger political community.461
Both Duffield et al and Sheehan have pointed out that forming of alliances is about security. For
them alliances are a primary tool for enhancing a states security in the face of external and
sometimes internal threats. The formation and cohesion of international alliances can have
profound effects on the security of individual states and help determine both the probability and
likely outcome of war.462 S. Bergsmann offered the following definition of the alliances:
Alliance is an explicit agreement among states in the realm of national security in which the
partners promise mutual assistance in the form of a substantial contribution of resources in the
case of a certain contingency the arising of which is uncertain.463
Another definition from B. A. Leeds et al. within the ATOP (Alliance Treaty Obligations and
Provisions) project of Department of Political Science at Rice University in USA, has offered two
definitions of alliances. First conceptual definition of alliances is that an alliance is a formal
agreement among independent states to cooperate militarily in the face of potential or realized
military conflict.464 According to ATOP there are three conditions for an alliance: first it has to
be a formal agreement; second it has to be agreement among independent states; and third that it
has to be promise of cooperation in addressing military threats.465 ATOPs second, operational
definition is that alliances are written agreements, signed by official representatives of at least
461

Ibid, p. 299.
Ibid, p. 292.
463
Bergsmann S., The Concept of Military Alliance, p. 29 in Reiter E., Grtner H. (eds.), Small States and Alliances,
Springer, 2001, p. 21.
464
Leeds B. A., Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) Codebook, Department of Political Science,
Rice University publication, 2005, p. 4.
465
The promised cooperation must extend beyond simply providing supplies, leasing territory, or sharing
information; there must be a commitment for cooperative action in the event of conflict. Thus, arms sales
agreements, military aid agreements, basing agreements, border delimitation agreements, intelligence sharing
agreements, etc., do not meet the definition of alliances unless they include additional obligations requiring
cooperation in the event of military conflict. Ibid, pp. 4-5.
462

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two independent states, that include promises to aid a partner in the event of military conflict, to
remain neutral in the event of conflict, to refrain from military conflict with one another, or to
consult/cooperate in the event of international crises that create a potential for military
conflict.466
Considering mentioned definitions, the question arises what is exactly a military alliance? Can we
even make a clear distinction between a military and non-military alliance? As we can see,
according to Bergsmann, alliances are a very broad category and many organizations which would
often not be characterized as such in fact could be considered military alliances. Following this
definition and the works of Warren, we can differentiate alliances as either collective defense,
collective security467 or multilateral (see table 10).
Table 10: Classification of alliances according to P. T. Warren
Collective defense alliance

Where all the members pledge to each others defense

against external threats.

Collective security alliance

Where all the members pledge to abide by agreed tenets and

norms, including non-aggression against one another.

Multilateral alliance

Where all the members pledge to promote agreed security

interests regionally (and often globally).

Source: Warren, p. 15.

466

Ibid, p. 5.
Following this definition, in the dataset of ATOP it is included the categories of neutrality pact and non-aggression
pact. This work is based on Correlates of War project.
467
Duffield et al. suggested a distinction between alliances, on the one hand, and collective security arrangements,
on the other, which involve fundamentally different orientations. Alliances are primarily, if not exclusively,
outwardly oriented, intended to enhance the security of their members vis--vis external parties. In sharp contrast,
collective security arrangements and related phenomena such as arms control agreements are designed to enhance
the security of their participants vis--vis each other. Duffield in Collins (ed.), p. 293.
Questions of distinction between Individual Security and Collective Security and how can this be achieved is a much
deeper one. In my view we can consider some (not all) collective security organizations as military alliances. Some
Collective security organizations such as the League of Nations have been established with the idea of maintaining
the peace. But the same as United Nations in Bosnia they were unable to provide with it. Only an organization with
a military component which is capable and willing to act can be considered also a military alliance because it is
using its military to oppose a threat, in this case against the peace. UN was unable and unwilling to force Serbian
leadership on the negotiating table but finally in 1995 and 1999 called the NATO act as the muscle. However in
some episodes UN was able and willing to organize and use military force against a threat. Examples include
Korean War and First Gulf War but keeping in mind that both wars were exercised under US leadership as UN does
not have an institution of unified command like USA or NATO.

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Taking into consideration Warrens typology, Collective defense alliance and Collective security
alliances both belong to the category of security alliances. The difference between a security
alliance and a multilateral alliance, is that members of security alliance pledge to aid one another
in case of an aggression coming from outside of an alliance. Multilateral alliances (with military
components) often conduct joint intelligence sharing, training, acquisition support and other
military activities but stop short of pledged mutual defense. 468 If we were to follow this
understanding of what is an alliance, then examples of Collective Security alliances would be the
United Nations (UN)469 and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).470 Collective defense
alliances would be NATO and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). 471 And finally

468

Warren, p. 14.
In my opinion UN, apart from being a multidimensional world organization, is also a military alliance because it
fits into Bergsmans definition of an alliance. This opinion I share with P.T. Warren who states that both European
Union and United Nations are in fact collective security alliances (Warren, p. 20).
On the other hand we clearly saw inability of the UN to act decisively and stop violence with violence. In Bosnian
War for example, this organization was unable/unwilling to utilize its vast military potential to stop the Serbian
aggression. Instead it relied on political pressure which (for most of the time) has little effect against brute military
force. For this reason it is doubtful to call UN a military alliance. In some examples yes (Korea 1950-ongoing), but
in many other cases this organization has shown little more than distribution of humanitarian aid.
With the benefit of hindsight, one can see that many of the errors the United Nations made (in Bosnia) flowed from
a single and no doubt well intentioned effort: we tried to keep the peace and apply the rules of peacekeeping when
there was no peace to keep. Knowing that any other course of action would jeopardize the lives of the troops, we
tried to create - or imagine - an environment in which the tenets of peacekeeping - agreement between the parties,
deployment by consent, and impartiality - could be upheld... None of the conditions for the deployment of
peacekeepers had been met: there was no peace agreement - not even a functioning ceasefire - there was no clear
will to peace and there was no clear consent by the belligerents... Nor was the provision of humanitarian aid a
sufficient response to ethnic cleansing and to an attempted genocide... The Bosnia Muslim civilian population thus
become the principal victim of brutally aggressive military and paramilitary Serb operations to depopulate coveted
territories in order to allow them to be repopulated by Serbs... In the end, these Bosnian Serb war aims were
ultimately repulsed on the battlefield, and not at the negotiating table. Yet the UN Secretariat had convinced itself
early on that broader use of force by the international community was beyond our mandate and undesirable. In a
report to the Security Council the Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali spoke against a culture of death, arguing that
peace should be pursued only through non-military methods. When, in June 1995, the international community
provided UNPROFOR with a heavily armed rapid reaction force, we argued against using it robustly to implement
our mandate. When a decisive action was finally taken by UNPROFOR in August and September 1995, it helped to
bring the war to a conclusion. (UN secretary general Kofi Annan 1999), source: Theo Farrell, Humanitarian
Intervention and Peace Operations in Baylis, Strategy in Contemporary World, p. 20.
470
Alliance between China and Russia, see more in Rozoff R., The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Prospects
For A Multipolar World, Global Research, 22 May 2009.
471
CSTO (Russian: Organizatsiya Dogovora o
Kollektivnoy Bezopasnosti) is an intergovernmental military alliance originating from 1992. Members are Armenia,
Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Possible candidate is Iran. For more information on
relation CSTO and SCO see in Marat E., The Military and the State in Central Asia: From Red Army to
Independence, Routledge, 2009, pp. 81-104.
469

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multilateral alliances would be the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), European Union
(EU), Union of South American Nations (USAN) and Regional Security System (RSS). 472
What is unclear is can we in fact understand some of these organizations like UN or EU as military
alliances when they do not identify themselves as such? Perhaps yes but only up to a certain level.
Because as P. Williams suggested the belligerents in contemporary armed conflicts are not just
states; political units come in many shapes and sizes. The other main actors engaged in warfare
are international organizations and a variety of armed non state actors. Various international
organizations have engaged in contemporary armed conflicts for several reasons but primarily as
a result of fielding peace operations in zones of ongoing conflict. The UN, European Union, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Economic Community of West African States, and the
African Union among others have all fielded forces that have engaged in combat.473 I believe we
can find the answer if we observe the level of military cooperation/integration between members
of the alliance. If member-states field armed forces which cooperate with each other on the
battlefield to achieve common goals, then we are unmistaken to say this is a military alliance. The
problem is that modern battlefield has changed and so has warfare itself.
The question of alliances could be further clarified by G. Snyder, who wrote that alliances are
formal associations of states for the use (or nonuse) of military force, in specified circumstances,
against states outside their own membership and that their primary function is to pool military
strength against a common enemy, not to protect alliance members from each other. 474 S. Walts
sentence confirms it: the defining feature of any alliance is a commitment for mutual military
support against some external actor(s) in some specified set of circumstances. 475

472

RSS is an international agreement for the defense and security of the eastern Caribbean region. Island nations of
Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the
Grenada. Some of these island-nation dont even have a standing professional army, so can we consider RSS a
military alliance?
473
Williams, Security Studies, p. 161.
474
Snyder G. quoted in Williams, Security Studies, p. 293.
475
Walt S. quoted in Ibidem.

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Diagram 6: Types of Modern Alliances according to P. T. Warren

Collective defense:
NATO

Multilateral: NATO,
UN, EU

Collective security:
NATO, UN

Source: prepared by author.

The most potent modern multilateral alliance is probably the European Union (EU). 476 It is a
political and economic union of 28 European countries. Beside USA and China it is the Worlds
3rd most powerful political entity and the Worlds current strongest economy. 477 Its military
component is a more complicated question. 478 As most countries which are members or EU are
also members of NATO, EUs security policy is closely attached with those of the USA. However
recent political tensions over NATOs objectives shows that EU is more and more interested in
detaching itself from US dependence. EUs military power is consisted mainly of its two out of
three of its strongest countries France and Germany. 479 So far European Union has formed its
476

European Union is not created for the explicit purpose to be a military alliance, but it has its military component
which can grow only stronger as European integration continues.
477
EU is the strongest economy in the world if we combine economic power of all of its 28 member states. See more
at Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, GDP (official exchange rate). Link:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2195.html (17/5/14).
478
Banfi F., Eurocorps: future European army or missed attempt?, The New Federalist, 13 July 2008.
479
I consider United Kingdom to be the strongest military power among European Union states. However I do not
see its military as fully committed to the project of creation of European forces because of other British strategic
interests. Also I place UK to be 4th strongest military in the world. In front of it are USA, Russia and China. France
would be on the fifth place. How to estimate military strength of a country is not possible to define clearly. However
taken into consideration British nuclear arsenal, leadership capacity and most importantly power projection ability
across the Worlds seas I believe UK to be among the top modern militaries. Compare with Bender J., The 11 Most
Powerful Militaries In The World, Business Insider, 23 April 2014.
For example most rankings would not include Israel among the top ones but its military capability is probably

194

own armed forces which are contributed by member countries. EUs Common Security and
Defense Policy rests on the premise that Europe has never been so safe or prosperous as it is
today, but also that world is full of new dangers and that no single nation is able (by itself) to
effectively tackle todays complex challenges.480 For this purpose EU has formed and it is
continuing to develop common defense forces. Its European Defense Agency (EDA) manages
multinational rapid reaction forces such as European Rapid Operational Force (Eurofor), EU
Battlegroup (EUBG) and Eurocorps.481 However the main problems with EUs military forces, is
that EU itself has not established a unified rapid military decision-making command, like NATO
has. Will the EU become political, economic and military entirely independent entity or will its
military to remain closely attached to NATO and nuclear umbrella of USA? This remains an open
question for the future.
Mentioned examples of different kinds of alliances, dont fall exclusively into just one category
collective security, collective defense or multilateral alliance. For example NATO is all three
collective defense, collective security and multilateral alliance. Because its members pledge to
defend one another if attacked (collective defense); to abide by agreed tenets and norms, including
non-aggression against one another (collective security); and to globally promote agreed security
interests (multilateral).482
M. Sheehan called NATO an unprecedented alliance in history due to the fact that it existed longer
in peacetime than in wartime.483 This is partially true depending on our understanding of war and
peace. According to the definition of war which I made (see chapter 1) we could see NATO as in
fact engaged in constant war even if it is not officially declared to be so. Neorealism or structural
realism thinking in International Relations, based on Kenneth Waltz and his book Theory of
International Politics expected NATOs demise after the elimination of the Soviet threat.484

among the strongest in the World too. I believe it is stronger than India or Brasil which are usually always pretty
high up.
480
European Security Strategy, A secure Europe in a better World, EU publication, 12 December 2003. Link:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/publications/2009/pdf/european-security-strategysecure-europe-better-world/
481
Wikipedia, Military of the European Union. Link: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_the_European_Union
(26/3/14).
482
Warren, p. 15.
483
Collins, Contemporary Security Studies, p. 153.
484
Jakobsen J., Norwegian University of Science and Technology: Neorealism in International Relations Kenneth
Waltz, Popular Social Science, 6 November 2013.

195

Because if there is no threat there is no reason for the alliance to exist. 485 I can understand the logic
of behind this approach, but I never agreed that the Russian threat was effectively eliminated as
some might have thought in the early 1990s. With the renewal of tensions between USA and Russia
starting from 2013 this now seems obvious. 486 On the other hand, neoliberal institutionalism like
has a point by expecting NATO to remain the basis for transatlantic cooperation. As McCalla
suggested it could be so if for no other reason than to reduce the cost in maintaining security and
using the existing institutions for the operations. 487 However, just institutionalism cannot explain
NATOs existence. We have to keep in mind that there are many tensions over strategic priorities
between North American and European parts of the alliance. 488
NATO alliance is often regarded as a typical example of a military alliance. However both Duffield
et al. and M. Sheehan have pointed out that NATO in fact is a very unusual alliance, completely
unlike any other in history.489 It is an alliance of (primarily) western states which was formed to
counter the existing Soviet threat during the Cold War. However during the Cold War it has never
intervened, and since the dissolution of the Soviet Union NATO has continued to exist and even
expanded its membership. The reasons behind this paradox could be numerous but in my opinion
the principal one is the existence of Soviet nuclear arsenal in Russian hands. Russia has indeed
went through some turbulent times since the end of the Cold War, but its nuclear arsenal has never
ceased to be a potential threat.

485

John Mersheimer saw the principal argument behind continued existence of NATO after the Soviet retreat from
Eastern Europe in controlling Germany and its possible ambitions. See in Mersheimer J., Back to the Future:
Instability in Europe After the Cold War, International Security, Vol. 15: No. 1, MIT Press, Summer 1990.
486
Vladimir Putin, Congress of Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia: Finally, about a war waged
against this country. Fortunately, there is no war. Let us not pay too much attention to this. There is, however, an
attempt to restrain our development by different means, an attempt to freeze the world order that has taken shape in
the past decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, with one single leader at its head, who wants to remain an
absolute leader, thinking he can do whatever he likes, while others can only do what they are allowed to do and only
if it is in this leaders interests. Russia would never agree to such a world order. Maybe some like it, they want to
live in a semi-occupied state, but we will not do it. However, we will not go to war with anyone either, we intend to
cooperate with everyone. The attempts made, including through the so-called sanctions, do not make anyone happy
in the final count, I believe. They cannot be effective when applied to such a country as ours, though they are doing
us certain harm. We have to understand this and enhance our sovereignty, including economic sovereignty.
Therefore, I would like to call on you to show understanding of what is going on and to cooperate with the state and
the Government. Speech by Vladimir Putin, Office of the Russian President, Speeches and Transcripts, 7 February
2015. Link: http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/23570#sel=16:1,17:109 (9/2/15).
487
McCalla R. B., NATOs persistence after the cold war, International Organization, Vol. 50: No. 3, World Peace
Foundation: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, summer 1996, pp. 445-475.
488
See in Thue M., Explaining NATO: Neorealism, Neoliberalism, and the Atlantic Alliance After the Cold War,
Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, 2007.
489
Collins, Contemporary Security Studies, p. 153; Williams, Security Studies, p. 301.

196

2. NATO objectives, structure and decision making process

Principal idea behind NATO alliance is that if any of the members of NATO is attacked by a force
outside of the alliance other NATO members of the alliance will come to its aid. Furthermore
between members of the alliance it is promoted good relations and peaceful solution of their
political conflicts.490 NATO is primarily USAs alliance and USA keeps the other 28 countries at
its side by the promise of security. Also by mediating good relations between all members and
other major US allies that are not members of NATO. Major US non-NATO allies are Afghanistan,
Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand,
Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand and Panama.
One of the principal problems between US Western and other non-Western allies is in the domain
of culture. Major challenge for US diplomacy has been how to mediate good relations between its
Muslim allies and Israel. In Gaza flotilla raid (2010) incident, Israeli military personnel violently
stopped Turkish humanitarian convoy to Palestinian Gaza strip, which was at the time under Israeli
blockade. 491 Tensions between two countries were very high and threatening to escalate. Before
this incident, Turkey Israel relations have always been good.492 Both countries are important
allies of USA, one within NATO and the other independently. Despite US mediation and official
apology from Israeli leaders, relations are deteriorating. 493 Especially after Israel accused Turkey
to leak intelligence secrets to Iran Israels enemy. 494 This is an example of difficulty to keep
culturally different nations in the same camp. The cultural segment can perhaps be ignored, but
when other interests interfere than it becomes almost impossible to be overlooked. In the last
decade Turkish government has not cooperated with US war in Iraq or its political campaign
against Iran. Furthermore Turkey is becoming more courageous to make global politics
independently. For example together with Brazil they have made Teheran declaration on the
subject of Irans nuclear program. 495 It is proving difficult for USA to keep these friends obedient.
This is not an easy task. Example: Greece withdrew its forces from NATOs military command structure from
1974 to 1980 as a result of Greco-Turkish tensions following the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus.
491
The true purpose of this convoy is still being disputed.
492
Turkey is the first Muslim majority nation to recognize state of Israel in 1949 and since then enjoyed close
economic, political and military connections with it. Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Relations
between Turkey and Israel, link: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-israel.en.mfa (12/12/13). This
relations were in fact severely ruined by Gaza flotilla incident in 2010.
493
Sidner S., Israel to Turkey: We apologize for deadly raid on Gaza-bound flotilla, CNN, 24 March 2013.
494
Watson I., Turkey rejects claims it blew Israeli agents cover, CNN, 17 October 2013.
495
Nuclear fuel declaration by Iran, Turkey and Brazil, BBC News, 17 May 2010.
490

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Even though it is one of the oldest members, Turkey is proving to be the most unstable member of
the NATO alliance. 496 Before finally endorsing the NATO operation in Libya, it in particular, had
voiced concerns with a Western-led intervention in the Arab World. 497 Turkey is also a dialogue
partner within Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which shows some alignment towards the
Russo-Chinese political camp. 498
However NATO alliance has four of the conditions on which alliances are made, which makes it
an alliance with a strong basis. Historically hostile European nations had consciously developed
friendly relations between themselves, to make allies and oppose an external threat. Some nations
have bandwagon with NATO because of an opportunity to prosper economically and enjoy
protection from USA. All of the NATO nations share the same ideology democracy and free
market orientation. And finally NATO was formed with a primary reason to balance Soviet
expansion. With the defeat of the Soviet Union, this threat was eliminated but other strong actors
have taken its place, although in a more latent manner. NATO alliance is still actual today as it
was 60 years ago. Two founding conditions for alliance forming keep NATO strongly together
existence of a threat and promise by allies to help if this threat materializes. Apart from this
invisible threat there are also other manifested threats in domain of terrorism and cyberwarfare.
NATOs members are (and will be) sticking together, because of fear, interest and friendship. The
same as Thucydides teaches us in his works. 499
NATO is an ideologically-based alliance given its pledge to promote liberty, rule of law and
democracy. As such its ideology belongs to the Western culture. Since the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, NATO has been involved into peacekeeping operations, counter-piracy operations,
counter-terrorism operations, humanitarian assistance operations and in the engagement efforts to
promote democratic reform of Europes former Soviet Bloc nations. Most of these activities did
not directly fight against a threat to any members territory. However, they did promote
compliance to the rule of law and respect of individual liberties, in this way supporting the

496

This way it is likely to leave it eventually if USA does not find a way to keep it inside.
Masters, NATO.
498
In this context we can observe initiation of May-August 2013 mass protests in Turkey which demanded a change
of government. The question we must ask ourselves is: are the protests entirely spontaneous and who is benefiting
from it? See more on the protests in Atak K., Flap of the Butterfly: Turkeys June uprisings in Porta D., Mattoni A.
(eds.), Spreading Protest: Social Movements in Times of Crisis, ECPR Press, 2014, pp. 253-257.
499
Kagan D., On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace, Doubleday, 1995, p. 8.
497

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development of greater stability for the Alliance, its partners and the international community. 500
All of these engagements were in fact a strategy designed to counter an indirect threat, and this is
a behavioral phenomenon characteristic for NATO.501
NATO makes decisions by consensus. 502 Consensus in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) asked
for when allied governments must formulate a joint policy on an important strategic issue.
Examples include approval of NATOs Strategic Concept503, relations with Partnership for Peace
countries, the NATO budget, deployment of forces for peace operations, and invocation of Article
V. This consensus decision making is clearly differentiated from unanimity, which NATO does
not pursue. Unanimity would demand from every member to vote in favor of a measure.504 Article
V of the NATO Charter was for the first and so far the only time invoked in 2001 after 9/11 attacks
on USA by Al-Qaeda terrorist organization.505 Article V means that if one of the member countries
is attacked than others pledge to take all means necessary to aid it:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America
shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed
attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense
recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so
attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it
deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the
North Atlantic area.506
Consensus decision-making at NATO is the fundamental principle on which the alliance is based.
All decisions are made after discussions and consultations between the member countries.
Consensus decision-making means that there is no voting at NATO. Instead continuous
consultations take place until a decision acceptable to all is agreed upon. Sometimes member
countries can only agree to disagree on a certain issue. In general, this negotiation process is fast
since members consult each other on a regular basis and therefore often know and understand each
500

Warren, p. 20.
Evolved from defense into a security organization, meets the threat on a strategic distance. See chapter 1.
502
Collins, NATO: A Guide to the Issues, p. 30.
503
NATOs document that serves as a strategic guideline.
504
Gallis P., NATOs Decision-Making Procedure, CRS Report for Congress, 5 May 2003.
505
Invocation of Article 5 confirmed, NATO Update, 2 October 2001. Link:
http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1001/e1002a.htm (29/3/13)
506
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty 1949.
501

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others positions in advance and this principle applies throughout NATO.507 As of 2015 NATO
has 28 members508 and has identified terrorism, weapons proliferation, regional and ethnic conflict,
and piracy as its primary threats.509 NATOs three primary tasks are collective defense, crisis
management, and cooperative security through partnerships with non-NATO countries.510
NATOs political component is called North Atlantic Council (NAC) and is based in Brussels,
Belgium. NAC is composed of high-level delegates and diplomats from each member state. NATO
decision making is based on consent, so this system requires approval of all of the NATO members.
Other important civilian and political bodies of NATO include the Nuclear Planning Group, the
chief authority on nuclear issues, and the Military Committee, which provides direction to NATO
Command structure (NCS) with its two Strategic Commanders. These two strategic commanders
belong to NATOs military structure. First strategic command is the Allied Command Operations
(ACO), and second is the Allied Command Transformation (ACT). The leadership of NATO
military operations is in the hands of Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Despite the unified
military command, few forces are dedicated to NATO exclusively; most remain under their
national commands until members agree to conduct joint operations. The alliance also has a
secretary general who serves a four-year term as chief administrator, consensus-builder, and
spokesperson.511 This person is a liaison between military and political component of the alliance.
What makes NATO stronger than EU or UN which have the elements of an alliance, is that NATO
has the necessary institutions of unified military command and troops which have standard training
to be integrated with each other.

507

NATO A-Z, Consensus decision-making at NATO. Link: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics.htm

(25/3/12).
508
Member state and year of joining: Albania (2009), Belgium (1949), Bulgaria (2004), Canada (1949), Croatia
(2009), Czech Republic (1999), Denmark (1949), Estonia (2004), France (1949), Germany (1955), Greece (1952),
Hungary (1999), Iceland (1949), Italy (1949), Latvia (2004), Lithuania (2004), Luxembourg (1949), Netherlands
(1949), Norway (1949), Poland (1999), Portugal (1949), Romania (2004), Slovakia (2004), Slovenia (2004), Spain
(1982), Turkey (1952), The United Kingdom (1949), The United States (1949).
509
As of early 2015 it became obvious that Russia is a primary threat to NATO security.
Also since the escalation of the crisis in Ukraine (2013) and Russian military intervention to protect its strategic
interests in Crimean peninsula (2014) Russian officials have repeatedly made statements which have identified the
enemy as the West. In turn USA and its Western allies have responded to Russian military intervention with a
combination of indirect strategies, in which the latest one seems to be to lower the World price of oil to knock out
Russian economy. See Mills L., Isachenkov V., Putin: West Is Trying to Defang the Russian Bear, Associated
Press, 18 December 2014.
510
NATO A-Z, Cooperative Security as NATOs Core Task.
511
Masters, NATO.

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Three most important NATO military institutions are NCS, ACO and ACT. First, NATO
Command Structure (NCS) is in charge of the command and control needed to address threats and,
should deterrence fail, an armed attack against the territory of any of the Allies. Second, Allied
Command Operations (ACO) is dealing with the planning and execution of all Alliance operations.
It consists of a small number of permanent headquarters, each of which has a specific role. The
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has the overall command of operations at the
strategic level and is stationed in Mons, Belgium at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe (SHAPE).512 ACO is a command with headquarters and supporting elements at the
strategic, operational and tactical level. NATO has both static and mobile headquarters, as well as
joint and combined forces. In NATO terminology joint forces are the ones from two or more
military departments working under a single command, and combined forces are ones from
different countries working under a single command. SHAPE, at the strategic level, is at the head
of six operational commands, two of which are supported by tactical level entities. 513 Third
important military institution is Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and is in charge of the
transforming the NATOs military structure, forces, capabilities and doctrine. ACT is conducting
512

In March 2015 new commander of NATO forces in Europe, American Air Force general Phillip M. Breedlove
made a phone call to invite Davor Petek, a Croatian Army NCO to be his senior NCO. Petek is the first nonAmerican officer to take this role. This is choice is signaling NATOs desire to make equal all of its soldiers.
Although the commanders on the highest strategic levels are not likely to originate from weaker NATO members
such as Croatia. In an interview following his election, Petek pointed out his role as primarily orientated towards
bypassing cultural and educational differences between various NATO forces. NCO is the backbone of the army and
his job is to be in the field implementing NATOs integration policies. Petek also recalled his war experiences as
member of Croatian elite Tigrovi brigade and training by American private military company MPRI in 1993. This
was his first experience with US military training and he continued it over the next two decades in various officer
exchange programs in USA and other NATO missions. Ivankovi D., Davor Petek: Oduvijek sam htio biti vojnik, u
Tigrove sam '93. otiao kao balavac (I always wanted to be a soldier, I joined Tigers in 1993 as an inexperienced
youth), Vecernji List, 8 March 2015.
As mentioned before, the exact role which MPRI took in training Croatian Army for its three offensives in 1995 is
not clear. Officers like Petek confirmed their training on tactical level. However senior Croatian commanders and
MPRI itself denied any cooperation in terms of strategic planning of the operations. From the two contracts which
Croatian then-minister of defense Gojko Susak signed with Carl Vuono, MPRI president author Deborah Avant
points out the intention of Croatian Army to restructure itself to become compatible with NATO standards. Croatian
NCOs were trained in democratization processes to integrate military into society based on the Western model.
MPRI activities in Croatia were politically sponsored by Clinton administration. Avant D. D., The Market for Force:
The Consequences of Privatizing Security, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 102.
Robert Mandel wrote that MPRI was advising in Croatia on military training and on how to run a military force in a
democracy with civilian controlled army. Mandel R., The Privatization of Security, Armed Forces and Society,
SAGE publications, Fall 2001, p. 142.
What is interesting for this dissertation is this process of culturally integrating different forces to become
standardized in terms of democratic education, cooperation with the locals, physical and tactical training. Croatian
army to win against the Serbs abandoned the Yugoslavian Army doctrines and embraced western warfare which is
in accordance with Croatian culture in general.
513
NATO A-Z, Allied Command Operations.

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training of commanders and staffs, experiments to assess new concepts, and promoting
interoperability throughout the NATO.514
Other military bodies which all part of the NATO Immediate Response Capability515 include:
Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO (STRIKFORNATO)
-

Rapidly available maritime headquarters

NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (NAEW&CF)

-

Immediately deployable air fleet

Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS)

-

System that provides real-time, continuous information and situational awareness516

With the increasing dependence on technology and web-based communications, NATO is

realizing the importance to confront cyber threats targeting the Alliances networks. NATOs
Strategic Concept and the 2012 Chicago Summit Declaration identified cyber-attacks and
protection of information and communications systems as a serious threat.517 For this purpose
NATO has in 2008 established cyber defense center in Tallinn, Estonia after the cyber-attacks on
this countrys systems in 2007. 518
It could be (almost) said that NATO is unnecessarily structured in such complicated way for an
alliance which has few standing troops. But we must keep in mind that it is an alliance not a
single military entity. And in times of crisis it counts on all member countries to contribute with
military assets. Furthermore all of these countries have their own independent defense systems.
The principle of consensus seems fair but it also prevents the alliance from rapidly reaching
decisions which is a must, especially in modern warfare. What NATO would need to become more
efficient is a unified strategic decisions making body, but then it would no longer be an alliance
but a single military organization, one body. Although the post-2003 operations emphasized the
cooperation between Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and political bodies of
514

NATO A-Z, Allied Command Transformation.

See in NATO A-Z, Allied Command Operations.
516
Ibidem.
517
NATO A-Z, NATO and cyber defense.
518
Bright A., Estonia accuses Russia of cyberattack, The Christian Science Monitor, 17 May 2007.
515

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NATO, strategy formation on the highest levels is always in the multilateral hands of the North
Atlantic Council.519
This is because throughout the NATO decisioning process, paramount is sovereignty. Following
the NATO Defense Planning Procedures which are based on individual state interest and
capability, once the decision for military action has been made on institutional level, and member
countries send their troops and other resources to the operation the Unitary Command Structure
of the NATO takes control over them. These national military resources remain under Allied
Command Operations (ACO), which is responsible to the NATO Military Committee. After the
operations are done, troops are returned to their countries. Every member state has the veto right
in the consensus making process. Members also can exercise their national sovereignty in relation
to the organization in the form of Silence Procedure. However nations sometimes will choose to
follow the will of the stronger actors or the collective in order to integrate more fully with their
allies.520
Permanent Representatives in the NATO create an environment that discourages isolated attitudes
of certain members from the collective tendencies of the whole NATO. These subtle diplomatic
mechanisms have the function to soften the rigidity of consensus only (essentially unanimous)
decision making. Because to make decision solely by consensus risks: delayed action, lowest
common denominator decision making, and even inaction because of disagreements.521 However,
NATOs constant consultations between the members are supposed to counter these structural

International democracy watch, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Centro Studi sul Federalismo Link:
http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/north-atlantic-treaty-organization (17/12/13).
520
Silent Procedure is process by which the NATO Secretary General distributes a referendum or resolution
outlining an organizational action or policy scheduled for implementation, conditional on the absence of explicit
member-state-objection. To voice an objection a national representative would be forced to break silence, halting the
enactment process. This is a well-documented but unofficial NATO decision making procedure that ostensibly
assumes member agreement unless the opposite opinion is expressed. The practice provides an opportunity and, to
some extent, an incentive for member countries to act in accordance with what can be viewed as the collective will
of the institution. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which no country is willing to halt a silent referendum
and risk the stigma of breaking silence against what appears to be the shared will of all other member states. Taken
further, one could imagine that as the deadline for protest approaches and silence is maintained, a potential objector
to the proposal would surely begin to assume collective institutional agreement on the given issue and therefore be
even less likely to risk national isolation through protest. The constant consultative process as well as the Silence
Procedure offers the potential for member countries to relinquish a degree of autonomy to the collective will of the
organization. See in Gallis, NATOs Decision-Making Procedure.
521
Like it happened during the first years of war in Croatia and Bosnia.
519

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flaws. Like this the decisions which made by the North Atlantic Council, have the legitimacy of
representing the collective will of all the members of NATO.522
To make decision by consensus is not a clearly defined category. It leaves a lot of room for political
manipulation between member states. The most dominant force within NATO is undoubtedly
USA. It is the most powerful military organization in the world and also the biggest contributor to
NATO in terms of economic, political and military assets. For this reason NATOs politics are
largely influenced by US politics. And if it happens that USAs initiatives for military action is not
supported by majority of NATO members, then in the future we might see more ad-hoc alliances
such as the Coalition of the willing in 2003. Long standing US allies like France, Germany, New
Zealand, and Canada did not support the invasion of Iraq. 523 On the other hand the ones who did
was UK, Denmark, Poland and Australia. 524
If we were to rely solely NATOs public statements we were to conclude that everyone is friends.
NATO members are friends, other partner countries are friends and other alliances are also friends.
Even Russia until its invasion of Ukraine was referred to as a partner country. 525 So one might ask
where is the threat? Surely the main threat is not terrorism, even the smaller states could deal
with it effectively if they were to commit their full resources.526 So if there is no threat than there
is no raison detre for NATO. But this is only on the surface hidden underneath there is a threat
and it is very real. As mentioned before Russia, China and USA have enough military potential to
destroy the world several times over. And countries must group for protection, because the world
will keep on spinning as long as there is common sense among leaders enhanced by the fear of
mutually assured destruction. Technological development of weapons caused a similar scenario to
take place in WWI. To save themselves from destruction, armies went into trenches. World of
today can also be described as a system of political trenches. Countries speak of peace and
friendship, but at the same time stick to their political trench alliance. This is the only safety
which they can find. And if it by any chance happens that some country finds itself out in the open,
on political no mans land, it quickly realizes the harsh truth of being swept away. We are not

See in NATO, Centro Studi sul Federalismo.

Freeman S., Canadas No To Iraq War A Defining Moment For Prime Minister, Even 10 Years Later,
Huffingtonpost, 19 March 2013.
524
Australia is US major non-NATO ally, and all of these other countries are NATO members.
525
NATO A-Z, Partners.
526
Non-state actors are generally speaking weaker than the state ones.
522
523

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likely, in the near future, to see wars in which countries field millions of soldiers, as they did
before. Nature of war dictates that offensive weapons technology must be followed by defensive
ones. Sword is followed by shield and gun is followed by bulletproof vest. But technology has not
yet found an effective solution to counter MAD doctrine caused by long-range WMD. Until that
happens we will continue to see the static trench (political and indirect) war between the great
powers. Piecemeal and gradually the side with more skills and resources will be the one left
standing in the end. And when we ask ourselves how strategies are chosen, this is the environment
which we must keep in mind.

3. Factors which influence NATO strategy-making

I have examined NATOs behavior since its creation and came to the conclusion that its strategy
makers are repeatedly influenced by factors in the domain of culture, economy and technology.
Also the key features which NATO decision makers must take into consideration are the quality
of armed forces, motivation of troops, public opinion, denied possibility to openly state the real
situation concerning the threat, information on the threat, international and domestic prestige and
losses. In my view the question of losses is crucial in any decision making equation.
First and in my view the most important is the cultural factor. But it is necessary to explain why
this factor is included in my list, as some might say that culture is irrelevant in modern military
strategy. I believe it is not so. Culture influences strategies whether its planners are aware of it or
not.527 In my opinion it is the dominating factor according to which any society decides to make
strategy, war and peace. 528
To start with, a military organization is more likely to align itself with culturally similar actors.
All of the member NATO countries are societies with similar cultures. All except Turkey, and
Turkeys membership is actually causing various animosities in the alliances thus limiting its
527

Jandora suggested that the factor of culture should be reintroduced into the modern conflict theory. See in
Jandora J., War and Culture: A Neglected Relation, Armed Forces and Society, Summer 1999.
528
Johnston in detail elaborated the connection between culture and strategy in NATO. He identified that NATOs
strategy to counter the Soviet threat was created by a process of socialization directed from USA to overcome
different nationalistic strategic cultures from European allies. Johnston believes that this unitary strategic culture
persists today because Europeans have accepted a new Atlanticist strategic culture in whose focus is nuclear
armament which replaced lost military prestige. Johnston A. M., Hegemony and Culture in the Origins of NATO
Nuclear First Use: 1945-1955, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 6.

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effectiveness. Apart from influencing cohesiveness of the alliance, culture also influences soldiers
conduct in areas outside its culture zone. For example NATO soldiers in Afghanistan have
difficulties understanding local social structure. Many smaller strategic decisions are being made
under influence of cultural segment such as food, entertainment and organization of forces. Rice
is easier to transport than wheat, but diet of a western soldier is not based on it. US army delivers
kosher meals to some of its soldier as it is according to their religious beliefs. A more repressive
society would simply not tolerate such differences and would not make the extra effort. But this
behavior is according to NATO, democracy and western war-making culture. If troops are far away
from their home country, than army must organize means of communication with families. Also it
does not come cheap for a famous singer to visit the frontline troops. Soldiers as well fight a war
according to collective cultural beliefs, and there are some specific features of western warmaking. In western armies things as deliberate attacks against enemy civilians or to leave wounded
fellow soldier behind, are much less likely to be tolerated.529 These things are cultural and such
strategies are not likely to be used by NATO. 530
Second factor is economy. 531 When choosing a strategy, NATO is concerned with approximate
costs and potential gains. In this segment we have intertwining interests of both the government
and the private sector. Which companies will get arms production and logistic supply contracts

529

For example it was expected from a Serbian soldier, during 1990s, that once he is wounded, and left behind by
his comrades to the enemy he takes away his own life instead of being torn apart by enemy dogs. Oath of
Serbian Special unit Crvene beretke (Red berets) also known as Jedinica (The Unit):
Jednoga dana kad bude ranjen, I ostavljen od svojih na bojnom polju, I kada dou neprijateljske ene deca i psi,
da te rastrgnu na komade, Ispali sebi metak u glavu, I umri kao heroj!
(One day when your own leave you behind wounded on the battlefield, and when enemy women, children and dogs
come to tear you to pieces, fire a bullet in your head, and die like a hero!). See more in documentary Serbian TV
production: B92, Jedinica, 2009.
In WWII it was expected from a Kamikaze pilot to sacrifice away his own life to stop the enemy.
530
When two different cultures of war making meet at the battlefield, this cultural factor becomes evident more than
ever. During Bosnian war, a Croatian armys (HV) Special unit Frankopan Battalion, was caught in engagement
with Bosniak Muslim radicals. Croatian commander, Bruno Zorica-Zulu, in a conversation retold us the event. He, a
former French Legion officer and drill instructor with 19 years in the Legion, has never seen anything like it.
Muslims came running and shooting, followed by Allahu-Akbar battle cry. Since Croatians were on good defensive
position, and since it was an elite battle hardened unit Muslim assault did not stand a chance. But still, they kept on
coming, without taking any cover until they were all killed. Croatians were both terrified and angry for such a
waste of life: This is not the way you attack, it is madness said Zulu. All should agree, that these kind of suicidal
tactics are not likely to be a part of any NATO strategy because it is contrary to its culture of war making.
531
Nissen identified factors which influence NATO strategic decisioning apart from economy to be connected with
organizational processes, bureaucratic politics, legal constraints, public opinion and media. Nissen T., Strategizing
NATOs narratives in Odgaard L. (ed.), Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World, Palgrave Macmillan,
2014, p. 167.

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Is always a politically delicate matter. And these political decisions will later significantly
influence other strategies.
Third factor connected with both culture and economy is technology. Which technology is going
to be developed, is based both on culture of war making and cost effectiveness. A strategy will be
devised depending on which kind of technology and how many of each kind of technology, a
military organization has. Since USA-NATO is technologically the most advanced force in the
known world, it is likely that their strategic thinking will extensively rely on it. But to be
technologically most advanced is no accident it is also a matter of strategic decisioning. At any
given moment NATO strategic planners take into consideration their nuclear and other weapons
systems superiority. There is no need for massive armies as in pre-WWII times, technology itself
can ensure the needed firepower.532
Fourth factor is quality of armed forces. Strategies are based on the effectiveness and reliability of
armed forces. How effective are troops going to be in a specific environment, and which factors
influence their effectiveness? How good is the connection between troops and technology?
NATO trains and equips troops to operate anywhere in the world. They must be able to fight in
any kind of environment and still be a dominant force to a more superior enemy. For this reason
NATO has specialized units, and even regular troops are trained in different tactics and with
different equipment. This equipment must be effective, minimum cost and easily integrated with
troops.
And here we have another connection with culture. NATOs (Western) culture is a one of
technology. It is far simpler for someone who grew up with computers, internet and mobile phones
to understand new weapons which are based on this technology. During both WWII and Cold
War, Soviet troops proved to be inferior to German and NATO ones. Soviet weapons technology
was not far behind, but troops themselves were thought with difficulty to operate with it as most
of them did not naturally understand technology. It is good as long as everything works, but if
something malfunctions, and it often does then they would not be able to make repairs by
themselves. Soviet equipment always had to be simpler to produce and more rudimentary.
Otherwise, neither the factory worker nor the soldier would be able to produce it, or use it.

532

See in Buteux P., The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO 1965-1980, Cambridge University Press, 2011.

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Westerners were (and to some extent still are) naturally more skilled in these matters. A Taliban
fighter who grew up in the Afghan mountains has the advantage because he knows the terrain and
other local circumstances. But NATO soldier naturally understands advanced technology better
than he ever will, and with training is able to effectively use it. His technology then nullifies
Talibans advantage. Because Taliban can effectively fight only in that specific environment.
NATO soldier can fight anywhere. When choosing a strategy NATO can (and must be able to)
count on superiority of its troops in any environment.
What is more difficult to be define is the factor of motivation of troops. This is our fifth factor.
When choosing a strategy NATO must take into account how motivated are the troops to fight.
Even if its soldiers are all well-trained and disciplined professionals, with a strong sense of duty
towards the country it will still be difficult to justify certain actions to them. An organization
can, and often does, use an array of techniques to motivate the troops for combat. It has long been
known that in a fight troops are staying firm primarily because of loyalty to their unit (to each
other). If an army collectively feels that they should not fight in this war, then it will influence
their conduct. Incentives such as drugs, fear or loot can increase their motivation, but these are
also reducing effectiveness and have negative political connotations. Modern warfare has changed
and it is difficult for people (and soldiers) to understand this change. How to explain to the troops
why they have to fight such a long way from home? The further from home in a culturally different
environment, the easier for the motivation to melt away. For this reason western armies hire more
and more contractors as they are motivated with remunerative incentives but again this is a
double-edged sword, because they are not as combat-effective as professional troops and bring
with them negative political consequences. Category of motivation, is different than morale or
willingness to fight. Troops can have low morale and still be willing to fight. US-NATO soldiers,
being the most advanced known military force, have good moral as collective, and their
willingness to fight is not likely to crack as most of their enemies are both militarily inferior and
culturally different. For this reason NATO troops are unlikely to easily surrender or give up. I see
this factor of motivation as connected with sense of righteousness. Soldiers need to believe in the

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cause of their actions, otherwise it will decrease their effectiveness and cause political defeat on
the home front.533
Sixth factor is one of public opinion and is also connected with the previous one. It is very
important for strategists to take into account public opinion. Does the nation support potential
military operation? If yes, to which extent how far are they willing to go? These questions
influence decisions on which kind of strategies will be chosen to achieve objectives. Nations can
understand modern warfare even less than their soldiers, and it is often difficult to get their support.
Public doesnt see that wars far away from home, which seem as wars of aggression, are in fact
part of defense on grand strategic level. Before the era of modern warfare, political consequences
of significance for the entire nation were not felt before theater level. But sometime during the
Cold War, following the development of mass media, political impact went on lower strategic
levels. Before a general would not concern himself with what every single unit of soldiers is doing.
He gives commands on higher strategic levels. But in modern warfare politics feel the
consequences even of tactical level. For example if unit of US soldiers commits atrocities in
Afghanistan or Iraq this will immediately be covered by media, and will have political
repercussions both domestic and international.
And further connected with this is my seventh factor. How can it be expected from public to
understand why their troops fight, when it is not possible to openly state the real situation? In

533

An example from Croatian War of Independence can help us explain this statement. A Croatian soldier was
interviewed by Croatian television during early operations on the Slavonian front. He first spoke of sadness he felt
for the domestic animals being caught in between fighting, as they dont understand what is going on and cannot
hide from danger. When asked by reporter to comment on him destroying enemy planes and tanks, the soldier
sighed and replied: This is what you get in life, I was peaceful all my life, never even got into a fight, educated in
peaceful times. Never in my life could I have imagined that something like this could happen to me. I was fed up by
watching TV and these poor people being attacked mercilessly. So I just couldnt stay home in Split anymore. 1. A
Brigada ZNG Tigrovi eletovci, HRT: Studio Osijek, 1991. This is an example in which people saw going to
war as the right thing to do. Croatian Independence War was a defensive one in which Croatian territory was
directly attacked. But even when going to Bosnia which was just across the border some Croatian soldiers did not
feel that they are fighting for their own country. So how to motivate troops to fight far away in a war in which they
are perceived as aggressors?
An episode from Second Dacian War campaign (105-106) tells us of emperors Trajan communication with his
troops. As the Dacians were giving them a hard time, Roman legionaries were becoming mutinous and were no
longer motivated to fight. On the word of this, emperor stripped his clothes in the middle of the camp and threw
himself into the mud demanding a sword to take his own life. If Roman soldiers will not follow their emperor, than
he does not want to live anymore. Legionaries were ashamed and quickly rushed to cover their emperor and
determinately continued on with conquest of Dacia. See in Bennett J., Trajan: Optimus Princeps, Routledge, 2004.
This ancient example is of course not possible to successfully be repeated in modern times, but it shows an early
example of complex communication techniques used to motivate troops.

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modern world of friends NATO cannot say who the real enemy is when officially it has (or is
trying to have) good relations with those countries. 534 Every military activity which is undertaken
by NATO must pay close attention to international reaction. First, to consolidate objectives
between USA NATO and other US allies. Second, to see how their conduct will be viewed by
other (real/potential enemy) world powers. To know this they must rely on intelligence branches,
media and diplomacy to provide with information.
This is my eight factor. Information is crucial before making any strategy. Without accurate and
up to date information, a strategy can lead to a disaster. Objective is to know all the known
unknowns, and to have as little unknown unknowns as possible.
Ninth, and final factor is prestige. Actions made by NATO must be conducted in such a way to
maintain its prestige level as the worlds most dominating force. This should be enough to keep
all the other smaller actors to continue being its friends, and all the potential enemies to think twice
before making a move against it.535
All of these factors are my opinion on how strategies are made. Other works on the topic either
exclude some of them or point out some others with which I disagree. For example Reiter and
Meek in article Determinants of Military strategy 1903-1994: A Quantative Empirical test state
that: Factors found not to affect strategy choice include terrain, the level of external threat, troop
quality, whether a state is democratizing, whether a state is a mixed regime, whether a state is a
military regime, and vicarious experiences.536 Ryan C. Hendrickson in NATOs Operation Allied
Force pointed out the relationship between NATO secretary general, different political influences
from governments and influential SACEUR commanders. Political decisions for the alliance are

534

During 2014 the political situation between NATO and Russia escalated into what can only be regarded as
another Cold War. NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow identified Russia as primary threat to the
alliance. NATO and Russia: a new strategic reality Remarks by NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador
Alexander Vershbow at the conference on NATO after the Wales Summit, Speeches & Transcripts, NATO, 2
September 2014. Link: http://www.nato.int/cps/bu/natohq/opinions_112406.htm
Likewise Vladimir Putin identified NATOs expansion into Ukraine as top security risk for Russia. Russias new
military doctrine names NATO as key risk, Reuters, 26 December 2014. As of 2015 Russia and NATO are once
again declared enemies.
535
Martin Smith suggested that the role of international prestige cannot be underestimated. Providing forces for
NATO missions has been recognized as an important way by which individual countries maintain their international
prestige and status among others and their allies. See in Smith M. A., NATO in the First Decade after the Cold War,
Springer Science & Business Media, 2013.
536
Reiter, Meek, Determinants of Military strategy 1903-1994, pp. 363-387.

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influenced by SACEUR as well. 537 Kristan Stoddart concluded that changes in military
technology, [operational] military strategy and tactics constantly influence policy and strategy
making.538 Sten Rynning in Europes emergent but weak strategic culture suggested that since
2003 and European negotiations with Iran over nuclear armament a process is taking place which
points out development of different European strategic culture towards WMDs. European policy
of non-proliferation goes against the US policy of counter-proliferation. In other words, specific
European strategic culture prefers diplomatic instead of military solutions to promote nuclear
disarmament.539 Paul Buteux has identified a common factor to the relationship between North
American and European parts of the NATO to be US nuclear umbrella. USA has used the promise
of nuclear protection to create and maintain NATO alliance as an institutional link by which this
promise could be held. 540 All of these and other authors have pointed out the relationship between
NATO strategy making and US nuclear weapons arsenal. In fact this question of nuclear arms and
its management within the NATO alliance has been the cause of political strife within the alliance,
such as French decision to maintain its own nuclear program. Modern NATO Council has since
1966 created an advisory body called The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) which is tasked with
planning of nuclear implementation. Nuclear policy of NATO is a matter of constant review as the
global situation changes. 541 However as US President H. Truman said: The atom bomb was no
great decision. It was merely another powerful weapon in the arsenal of righteousness. 542 What
Truman called righteousness could be interpreted as US strategic objectives shaped by its
strategic culture. Nuclear weapons are just another weapon like any other to serve these objectives,
but with more destructive power. The strategy of NATO is certainly influenced by their existence
but not in the way that weapons itself can direct strategy. What is the question is strategic culture
which creates and uses such weapons. During the Cold War for example it became obvious that
Soviet strategic culture is Clausewitzian and aims at physically destroying NATOs armed forces

Hendrickson R. C., NATOs Operation Allied Force in Edstrm H., Gyllensporre D. (eds.), Pursuing Strategy:
NATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 90.
538
Stoddart K., Losing an Empire and Finding a Role: Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear Weapons, 1964-70,
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 241.
539
Rynning S., Europes emergent but weak strategic culture: The case of EU, Iran and nuclear weapons diplomacy
in Engelbrekt K., Hallenberg J. (eds.), European Union and Strategy: An Emerging Actor, Routledge, 2010, p. 94.
In this context European does not include United Kingdom.
540
Buteux, p. 13.
541
NATO A-Z, The Nuclear Planning Group.
542
Harry Truman on Atom Bomb, taken from Brainy Quote. Link:
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/h/harrystrum153788.html (8/3/15).
537

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no matter what the cost.543 For this reason US strategic thinkers had to understand that strategic
culture matters, and that not all actors have the same understanding of what is a loss. MAD doctrine
had to be reshaped in such a way to ensure that Soviets get the message that in case of a nuclear
war with the West, there would be no survivors. Only this kind of deterrence could work against
their strategic culture.
Therefore I have noticed that before a decision for action is made by political leaders of NATO,
the key element which influences strategy with which objectives will be achieved is losses. How
many losses can they afford? How much they will lose and how much they will gain? I have
previously explained that on grand strategy level everything is a resource. For NATO the most
valuable resource of all, is their own people and political support which they provide. 544 This
military organization cannot afford to lose many people as it would have negative political
consequences. It has negative impact if civilians of enemy nations are killed, but its not even
comparable with the amount of publics negative sentiment if their own soldiers are killed in
some distant country. Publics of NATO countries have very little tolerance of casualties. The long
period of relative security which NATO member countries have enjoyed, has influenced their
societies to deny support for any military action which would result in unacceptable casualties. 545
What is an acceptable casualty for these societies? This largely depends on their sense of security.
The more threatened by outside force they feel, the more they will be willing to sacrifice. When a
society is threaten to be destroyed, entire nation will give everything to support the war effort,
whether they agree with government politics or not. Since public opinion of NATO countries is
mostly not aware of the threat until it comes to their doors because of change in warfare and
overall strategic situation they do not see why their soldiers should fight. The factor of losses,

543

Johnston, p. 35.
Lambeth stressed the importance of losses behind NATOs strategy to wage air war against Serbia in 1999.
NATO was not willing to risk any losses to its soldiers and was air operations were designed to reduce collateral
damage to maintain political support for the operation. However as US General Merrill McPeak, former Air Force
Chief of Staff pointed out the decision not to use ground troops at all was not welcomed by NATO airmen. Also
NATOs reluctance to use ground troops signaled to Belgrade the possibility for the Air campaign to be
unsuccessful. Lambeth B. S., NATOs Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment, Rand
Corporation, 2001, p. 245.
545
No current member NATO country has seen a war fought on its own territory since the Cold War. Exceptions are
USA (9/11/2001) and Croatia (1991-1995). Turkey is also fighting a prolonged counterinsurgency campaign against
Kurdish PKK (1984-present).
544

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and specifically human losses of their people is the key variable which influences NATOs
strategy making.

4. Variables which repeatedly influence NATOs behavior

Since the end of the Cold War NATO has for the first time engaged in military operations.
Table 11. Wars including NATOs military interventions
Armed conflict:

Period:

Bosnian War

1992-1995

Kosovo War

1999

Afghanistan War

2001-2014

Counter-piracy in Gulf of Aden

2008-present

Air operations against Libya

2011

Ukrainian War, air policing missions

2014-present

Source: NATO A-Z, NATO operations and missions. Link: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.htm

(8/3/15).

In these military operations I have noticed that there are several variables which in my opinion
repeatedly influence NATOs behavior. First variable which include NATO behavior is that
modern wars conducted by NATO are fought motivated primarily by interest, than fear and finally
honor.546 No war that NATO fought was a war of defense in the classical understanding of defense
and offense. If we understand defense in the sense that another party have violated NATOS
territory. But all of these wars have been in defense of NATOs (primarily USAs) strategic
interests. It is logical that USA, UK and France have allied themselves to protect their existence
and worldwide interests at least those on which they can agree on.547 But the obvious question
is why would such a powerful trio accept second and almost third rate powers in its camp? In my
view548 apart from obvious territorial grouping the answer is prestige. Otherwise it might be

546

To follow the logic of Thucydides.

Let us keep in mind that there are many tensions between NATO members over information sharing and
objectives.
548
There are other explanations in the form of constructivism based on socialization and neoliberal institutionalism.
547

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pointed out that this alliance is only serving imperialism. NATO alliance since the defeat of its
principal enemy Soviet Union, has transformed into an organization that protects the interests of
its most powerful members and offers safety for other smaller actors. It does not cost much for the
USA to make someone a cup of coffee and state how their (militarily insignificant) country is
an important ally. In this way USA has many other countries to support its political, economic and
cultural interests worldwide. Warfare has indeed changed and the way World works has changed
as well. NATO does not have either the moral nor military high ground from which it could launch
direct assault on its enemies Russia or/and China. On the other hand it seems that neither of these
countries shows hostile intentions. Situation is such that with the dissolution of Soviet Union,
NATO has found itself in a world in which it had no rival. But it had and still has enemies, and
those do not dare to challenge it openly. Main issue is that neither side can make a decisive move
as there is always the likelihood of planets destruction in the equation.
Second important variable to influence NATOs decisions is the constant presence of undeclared
(but real) enemies which have the potential to destroy the entire planet. It is vital for NATO and
USA to limit their strength by all means except direct confrontation, as there would be no winners
in such scenario.
Third variable is NATOs technological advancement over its rivals. Modern military doctrines
of USA heavily relies on its superior technology. USAs military is based on network centric
warfare, which means that its weapons platforms, sensors and command and control centers are
being connected through high-speed communication networks called the Global Information
Grid.549 This enables maximum efficiency of its armed forces as they are connected and informed
about the situation at all times. USA, UK and France all have highly sophisticated global
intelligence networks, because accurate and up to date information is the key for successful
decision making. Such advancement in weapons systems and information technology always
keeps NATO few steps ahead of its rivals.

On socialization see in Gheciu A., NATO in the New Europe: The Politics of International Socialization After the
Cold War, Stanford University Press, 2005; and for neoliberal institutionalism in Webber M., Sperling J., Smith M.
A., NATOs Post-Cold War Trajectory: Decline Or Regeneration, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 37-40.
However I see NATOs strategic situation in a more realistic approach.
549
Clay W., Network Centric Operations: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress, Congressional research
service, 15 March 2007.

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Fourth important variable is that of the human factor. Machines of the NATO are highly advanced
but what of their populations? We could say that USA, UK and France are at the moment
experiencing a serious social crisis within their societies. Just as in the last period of strong Roman
and Byzantine Empires thousands of years ago, Western major powers are experiencing a threat
from within. Their population has enjoyed a prolonged period of peace which resulted in cultural
and economic prosperity. This as a consequence had large immigration from other less developed
countries. Immigration was good for economic boost but now we see that their societies no longer
have the ability to assimilate immigrants as a part of their cultures.550 The alien part of the society
has become too big to be culturally overtaken by the native population. 551 Immigrants have a
culture of their own, and quite often they do not recognize the authority of the host country nor
support its policies. 552 Furthermore the native population as well, less and less support the
government and this is followed by large scale civil unrests and conflicts with the police forces. 553
Differences between those who have all the wealth and those who have nothing are becoming more
evident. Population does not support wars of interest and refuse to participate in them. 554 NATO
avoids to send ground forces as potential casualties among its troops would be very costly both
politically and economically. It is very expensive to train, equip and send a soldier somewhere.
Because if this soldier gets killed, the country will be obliged to pay remuneration to the family,
and would have to justify the reason for this soldier to be there in the first place. An average
NATOs soldier spends at least two decades years being educated and medically treated from the
moment he/she is born to the moment he/she is sent to the front. He/she grew up understanding
the way technology works. Modern equipment which Western country gives to its soldiers, they

550

Western countries like USA, Canada, Australia and South Africa were founded by immigrants so the culture of
immigration is different. However in these countries there is a difference between white Anglo-Saxon origin
immigrants and the rest.
551
Radical ISIL fighters are coming from Western countries to fight against the Western strategy with utmost
barbarism. See in Ibrahim A., Returning Isil fighters should be deported to the countries where they committed their
atrocities, The Telegraph, 3 December 2014.
552
During the hostage crisis in Dammartin-sur-Gole, 40 km north of Paris in which Kouachi brothers were holding
hostages, we could hear in a recorded conversation that they were accusing the hostages to be the enemies of Islam
just because they are paying taxes to France. These two terrorists were French born and raised Muslims which saw
France not as their country but as the enemy. Retour sur la prise d'otage Dammartin-en-Gole, RTI, 10 January
2015.
553
Mass protests against Iraq War in 2003 remain the biggest anti-war protest to this day spanning all over the
World. Cortright D., Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 172.
554
This could be one of the reasons why NATO relies on small but highly potent forces equipped and connected
with highly advanced technology. Others are budget restrictions and technological advancement which replaces
manpower.

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are able to quickly understand it. For this Western soldiers are expensive. Sense of security which
the population of NATOs leading countries enjoyed over an extensive period of time is
disappearing. One just has to walk on the streets of for example Paris to see armed soldiers and
gendarmerie patrolling. Their populations are opposing the government and are unwilling to go
and fight aggressive wars for their countrys interests. They seem to no longer connect their
personal honor and interest with the national ones.
Fifth variable is disagreements between NATO members over objectives. Every other country that
is a member of the alliance has its own interests. USAs interests come first and then everyone
elses. UK and France since they are the second and third most potent alliance members, are the
ones that can be the most influential when it comes to decision making. Other type of arguments
are between members territorial disputes, such as Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and some other
areas. NATO is USAs alliance and it is kept together primarily by the promise of US political and
military protection.
Sixth variable is that all NATOs wars must be fought against third rate actors. If a country is not
a third but a second rate power, then Western diplomacy attempts to politically and economically
weaken it before a military action. NATO will not fight against a strong enemy. Armies of NATO
are small combined forces, armed with advanced technology and organized to work in such a way
to provide rapid response solutions against smaller opponents. The kind of opponent which can be
dealt with without requiring mobilization of additional forces.
These variables are of course not a fixed list, some of the factors are rather new. For example
terrorism is a global phenomenon which intensified since 2001. And the constant fear and tension
which the possibility of a terrorist attack can bring is significantly influencing decision-making. In
the near future we will probably see some new factors becoming significant. For example global
climate change is threatening to result in depletion of resources which in turn will have to be looked
for elsewhere. Also developments in strategy and technology will pose more and more challenges
for decision-makers to make the right decisions and in a very short timeframe. Geospatial
revolution enables but also demands quick reactions.

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CONCLUSIONS
The present limitation for the NATO alliance to directly attack or the minor likelihood for it to be
directly attacked, necessarily puts into the focus the non-military aspects of this analysis. Indeed
NATO has evolved from a defense into a security organization, but the main element of this
alliance remains the component of its military potential. This is the traditionalist approach in
security studies. John Chipman in The Future of Strategic Studies wrote that the structuring
element of strategic analysis must be the possible use of force. Non-military aspects of security
may occupy more of strategists time, but the need for peoples, nations, states or alliances to
procure, deploy, engage or withdraw military forces must remain the primary purpose of strategic
analysts inquiry.555 This is also strengthened by Stephen Walts argument in The Renaissance of
Security Studies that security studies is about the phenomenon of war and that it can be defined
as the study of the threat, use and control of military force. 556 As I discussed there are many
different approaches to NATO and its existence. Duffield et al wrote that there is no puzzle to be
explained because NATO is no longer an alliance. Rather, it has been transformed into something
else, perhaps a regional collective security arrangement or what Wallander and Keohane have
called a security management institution. 557 Buzan et al also discussed three possible reasons on
to why NATO continued to exist since the elimination of the Soviet threat. First existence of Russia
and its military arsenal and terrorism. Second, Serbian wars and subsequent security threats. Third,
the unification of Germany which used NATO to reassure its neighbors of its cooperative

555

Chipman J., The future of strategic studies: Beyond even grand strategy, 1992 quoted in Buzan B., Waever O.,
Wilde J., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 3.
Buzan et al belong to the so-called Copenhagen school of Security Studies which with its securization model
developed a framework in which it included both state security and non-state security. Non-military matters also
become a question of security. Securitizing actors are the ones which initiate a move of securization through the
speech act. In the focus are the questions of the object of protection apart from the state and the source of the threat
apart from another state. Ralf Emmers has pointed out the shortcoming of Copenhagen School of Security Studies as
being Eurocentric and a blurred distinction between securization and politization. For example Tony Blair and
George W. Bush have not been able to convince the International community that Saddam Hussein is a security
threat. See in Collins, Contemporary Security Studies, pp. 136-144.
556
Walt S., The Renaissance of Security Studies, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35: No. 2, June 1991, p. 212.
557
C. Wallander and R. Keohane quoted in Collins, Contemporary Security Studies, p. 302.
States that seek to cooperate on security issues also need to devise institutions that facilitate cooperation by making
promises credible, providing information, and reducing other costs of agreement. Once successful institutions have
been developed, it is easier to adapt them to respond to change than to create entirely new ones, particularly if the
institutions have a hybrid quality, with practices that can be transferred at relatively low cost to new situations.
NATO, as such a hybrid institution, is changing from an exclusive alliance focused on threats to an inclusive
security management institution concerned chiefly with risks. Keohane R., Power and Governance in a Partially
Globalized World, Routledge, 2001, p. 12.

217

intentions. And final, the existing institutions of NATO which provide with both civilian and
military components to effectively project power, military and political. Additional explanations
to why NATO still exists include democratic reforms in new member countries and NATO
becoming a sort of military arm of the UN, the organization which can effectively use military
force to compel an actor to obey UN directives. 558 From a strategists point of view I see every
action (even if these are primarily political) made by the alliance, or its any of its prominent
members, as something which serves a military purpose. I believe that we should observe NATOs
behavior in this context. It is not an alliance which is likely to break apart.559
Key points of Chapter 3: Alliances and NATO

S. Bergsmann: Alliance is an explicit agreement among states in the realm of

national security in which the partners promise mutual assistance in the form of
a substantial contribution of resources in the case of a certain contingency the
arising of which is uncertain.

Conditions for alliance to form is the existence of a threat and a promise of aid.

Alliances are formed primarily out of interest.

Alliances can be formed on the basis: Friendship, Coalition and Pact.

Nations decide to form security alliances on the conditions: balancing,

bandwagoning, ideology, foreign aid, penetration and dtente.

558

Ibid, pp. 303-304.

Duffield et al also suggested that perhaps more important have been the broader contacts, especially those of a
transatlantic nature, that have been facilitated and nurtured by the existence of NATO over the years. The substantial
movement of goods, investments, ideas and people has created close societal ties between the two sides of the
Atlantic. But here, too, it would be almost impossible to draw a direct link between them and NATOs persistence.
559
A process which I notice that has taken place is in the differentiating interests between two axis of the NATO.
First, European led by France-Germany and second, North Atlantic by USA-UK. United Kingdom is geographically
a part of Europe but its strategic posture would suggest otherwise. Perhaps in the future we will see more
developments in the direction of independent European Unions armed forces?
P. Vennesson et al. discussed the origins in distinctions about conceptions of force employment among European
countries and between European countries and United States. According to their study the key to understand this
process is both in the military role conceptions and organizational frames of military institutions of every European
power since the end of the Cold War. See in Vennesson P. et al, Is There a European Way of War? Role
Conceptions, Organizational Frames, and the Utility of Force, Armed Forces and Society, Vol.35: No. 4, SAGE
publications, July 2009.

218

According to P. T. Warren we distinguish terms of Collective defense alliance,

Collective security alliance and Multilateral alliance.

Principal idea behind NATO alliance is that if any of the members of NATO are
attacked by a force outside of the alliance other NATO members of the alliance
will come to its aid.

NATO alliance has four of the conditions on which alliances are formed, which
makes it an alliance with a strong basis.

NATO is ideologically a western culture alliance given its pledge to promote

liberty, rule of law and democracy.

NATO makes decisions by consensus. Strategy is formed by the North Atlantic

Council, main political body of NATO. Sovereignty is paramount, every member
has veto right. To make decisions by consensus risks: delayed action, lowest
common denominator decision making, and even inaction resulting from
stalemate.

NATO is structured in a way to have an existing chain of command without many

standing troops. These are provided by member-states once the decision for
military action has taken place.

Factors which repeatedly influence NATO strategy-making are: culture,

economy, technology, quality of its armed forces, motivation of its troops, public
opinion and domestic support, political limitation to not be able to openly point
out the real situation and the real enemy, information and prestige. Crucial factor
which influences strategy making is the one of potential losses resulting from
action.

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PART II: TRANSFORMATION OF MODERN WESTERN STRATEGY

Chapter 4: First group of case studies
Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.
Sun Tzu (544 BC-496 BC)
In this, second part of the dissertation I will discuss the transformation of modern western strategy.
To do this I examine case studies in which I will test the hypothesis: Western actors and NATO
employ only those strategies which are cost effective in achieving its strategic objectives. Minimal
casualties are a paramount in its strategic behavior. This hypothesis I have developed by observing
modern western warfare since the Second World War. Reason why did I chose this time frame is
because end of WWII marked a big change in both culture and way of western war-making.560
Also, the elimination of Germany and its allies as the third powerful player on the World scene,
marked the beginning of the military standoff between East and West which continues to this day.
First group of case studies include: First Indochina War (1946-1954), Malayan Emergency (19481960), Korean War (1950-1953), Mau Mau Uprising (1952-1960), Algerian War (1954-1962),
Vietnam War (1955-1975), Suez Crisis (1956), Bizerte crisis (1961), Portuguese Colonial War
(1961-1974), Multinational Force in Lebanon (1982-1984) and United States invasion of Panama
(1989-1990). These case studies all belong to the conflicts in which one of the actors is a
distinctively western culture which fought a conventional war in the nuclear age which dominates
modern warfare. In this era (1945-1991) Communist powers have maintained global strategic
expansion in accordance with their strategic culture. Western powers were on the defensive and
waged wars against weaker actors in order to retain their global influence.

560

From a cultural point of view West has eliminated Fascism and Nazism, both cultures which had their origins in
European non-Christian side. Western World rests on achievements of ancient Greeks, Romans and Christian
philosophy. Fascist ideologies have instead in their focus put philosophies which originate in European Barbaric
heritage. Since the end of WWII, both Italy and Germany have once again embraced democracy, personal liberty,
rule of law and pan-European Christian philosophy. From a war-making aspect, the detonation of the atom bomb
demonstrated that massive firepower can be achieved without significant manpower.

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 First Indochina War (1946-1954)

French Indochina included modern-day countries of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Following the
Fall of France in 1940, this colony was under Vichy France until the fall of Vichy government in
March 1945. Japanese successfully invaded the Vichy loyal forces and established the Empire of
Vietnam until August 1945. After Japans capitulation, the new French government was set on to
reestablish its colonial rule. Ho Chi Minhs led Viet Minh used this transition period to sparkle a
revolution for Vietnams independence. This was perpetuated with the fact that Vietnam, and
mostly its northern part, was affected by famine which Viet Minh intervened to resolve. With
such actions they won the hearts and minds of the people. 561Soon open conflict broke out between
French colonial government and Viet Minh. At the early stage of the war the insurgency was
mostly in the rural areas. French forces were consisted of recruits of their then-colonial possessions
such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Indochina etc., French Foreign Legion and some French
regulars. For the French government it was important to avoid mobilization of Metropolitan France
as the war was unpopular with the public opinion. French leftist intellectuals further influenced
attitudes of the public by referring to this conflict as la sale guerre (dirty war).562
French were outnumbered, but technological superiority enabled them to remain in military control
of most the country while Viet Minh was forced to operate in remote parts of the jungle. General
Vo Nguyen Giap, commander of Viet Minh was avoiding to meet French in a head-on battle, as
guerrilla was not strong enough. After 1949 Viet Minh was supplied by Chinese and Soviet
weaponry. At this time the too, were increasingly supported USA in terms of weaponry such as
napalm bombs. In the years between 1950 and 1954, the French achieved military success, and
limited political success by proclaiming the puppet state of South Vietnam. Their strategy was to
establish a defensive so-called De Lattre line in North Vietnam to defend against Viet Minh
attacks. Offensive operations included paratroop drops into enemy controlled territory and once
perimeter is established it would be followed by ground invasion of other French forces. Once
the rebels would be defeated in that particular sector, the French would retreat. This approach gave
initiative to the French as they had the element of surprise. So in 1953 general Giap responded by
launching offensive into Laos, to further extend French defensive lines. French suffered a defeat

561
562

See in Russell J., Cohn R. (ed.), Vietnamese Famine of 1945, Book on Demand, 2012.
McLeod M. W., Nguyen T. D., Culture and Customs of Vietnam, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001, p. 32.

221

at Battle of Muong Khoua (1953) on the border with Laos, and to protect Laos from invasion by
the Communists French launched an operation to seize the valley of Dien Bien Phu. Paratroop
units which were dropped in the valley quickly assumed control. From a strategic perspective this
location was chosen by the French because it was on a Viet Minh supply route into Laos. A
ferocious battle took place for the hills around the valley, and once Viet Minh was in control of
these, the Communists brought heavy artillery to bombard French positions in the valley. This
encirclement and monsoon seasonal rain caused much difficulty for the French to supply its
soldiers. During the same time as the battle, peace talks were held in Geneva between the new
French government and Viet Minh. French at Dien Bien Phu were eventually defeated by the
superior surrounding Viet Minh forces. Peace negotiations in Geneva resulted in French
withdrawal from Vietnam and division of the country into North and South Vietnam.563
During the war France experienced a serious political instability and 14 times changed its prime
ministers. This was followed by economic inability to sustain the war effort, which was in the end
mostly financed by USA. Also US provided military equipment and secret military support by the
CIA. 564 Communist party of France was involved in sabotage against the French military.
Following the ceasefire, France and USA evacuated up to a million Vietnamese loyalists from
North to South Vietnam. 565 On the other hand, both Soviet Union and China send military advisors,
soldiers, logistics and equipment to support Viet Minh. One of the biggest problems for the French
was ability of the guerrillas to hide in Chinese sanctuaries over the border. 566 During the war Viet
Minh committed wide spread atrocities. French POW were brainwashed and tortured in communist
reeducation camps.567 Up to 150 000 civilians from North Vietnam were assassinated by Viet
Minh as a part of their strategy to eliminate enemies of communism. 568 In this war France did not
respond with systematic employment of barbarism, when it took place it was a spontaneous
reaction to enemys barbarism and frustration to low-intensity warfare.

563

See in Fall B. B., Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu, Da Capo, 2002.
U.S. Pilots Honored For Indochina Service, Embassy of France in the US, 24 February 2005. Link:
http://www.ambafrance-us.org/IMG/pdf/nff/NFF0502.pdf
565
Frankum R. B., Operation Passage to Freedom: The United States Navy in Vietnam, 1954-1955, Texas Tech
University Press, 2007, p. 36.
566
Davidson P. B., Vietnam at War: The History, 1946-1975, Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 169.
567
Association Nationale des Anciens Prisonniers Internes Deportes dIndochine. Link: anapi.asso.fr (3/1/2014).
568
Dommen A. J., The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans, Indiana University Press, 2001, p.
252.
564

222

Features of the French response:

Public opinion in France was very strongly opposed to French involvement in the war. This had
the consequence that France could not deploy its full military arsenal against Viet Minh. Instead
most of the troops were French colonial troops and Foreign Legion. Their deaths would be less
difficult for the French public to accept. Due to this public unrest, French political structures
suffered from deep divisions and instability. It was a counter-insurgency war in a very difficult
terrain favoring the enemy. This means that despite the commitment of the French troops and their
commanders, the conflict could not be quickly and decisively resolved. Furthermore, significant
part of the population had sided with guerrillas. International context favored the enemy and thanks
to it, Viet Minh managed to evolve into a conventional fighting force capable of directly
confronting the French. Also the French employed defensive strategy which was characterized by
two features. First, to establish a defensive line protecting the part of the country which was under
French military control. Second, to mount airborne assaults into enemy territory with the purpose
to deny enemy the initiative, cut his supply lines and deny him the initiative. The French
extensively relied on air power and technological superiority over the enemy. Number of casualties
among French troops and their allies, are significantly lower than those of Viet Minh. 569 French
have used strategies and tactics which were designed to minimize their casualties. French economy
could not sustain the war effort. Potential gain from the colony could not outweigh the losses, both
human and material. Once it realized that war cannot be won, France insisted to retreat from the
colony in such a way which would not significantly damage its prestige as a world power. 570
Table 12: Main features of French way of war in Indochina
Group I.
Cold War era (1945-1990)
Case study 1.

Military defeat/Political defeat

First Indochina War (1946-1954)

Proper training of troops

569

See in Clodfelter M., Vietnam in Military Statistics: A History of the Indochina Wars, 1772-1991, McFarland &
Company, 1995.
570
Investiture de M. le president du Conseil designe, Assemblee nationale, 17 June 1954. Link :
http://www.mendes-france.fr/espace-pedagogique/textes-de-reference-de-pierre-mendes-france/discoursdinvestiture-de-pierre-mendes-france-17-juin-1954/

223

Giving troops the proper equipment

Employment of special forces
Relying on soldiers which were not French nationals
Relying on air power
Relying on superior technology
Retreat if gain less than loss
Sensitive to public opinion and casualties
Resorts to barbarism as response to enemys
French casualties significantly lower
Indirect strategy of paratroop drops
Employment of those kind of strategies and tactics which
ensured minimal French casualties
Source: prepared by author

Malayan Emergency (1948-1960)

In the years following the end of WWII, British Malaya suffered from an economic crisis. Series
of protests against the British were violently suppressed by its police. This enabled Communist
party of Malaya to extend its influence. They formed Malayan Peoples Liberation Army (MPLA)
and went into hiding in the jungle areas, from which they fought a guerrilla campaign against the
British. Main objectives of their attacks were installations, rubber plantations, transportation and
infrastructure. Little more than 3 million Chinese were living in Malaya, and around 500 000 of
this population was the basis of the guerrilla movement as they were the poorest part of the
society.571 British responded by counter-insurgent strategy devised by General Sir Harold Briggs.
This plan had two key features.
First was to relocate these 500 000 people which were seen as likely to support the guerrilla. British
used similar strategy during the Boer War (1899-1902) in South Africa, during which they forcibly
transferred part of the population to concentration camps. These so called New Villages were
constructed and devised more humanely. They were fortified and surrounded with guards with the

571

See in Rashid R., A Malaysian journey, self-published, 1993.

224

purpose to keep the inhabitants in and the guerrillas out. People resented this at first, but some
soon became happy with the better living standards in the villages, as it was better than in their
homes. They were given money and ownership of the land they lived on, better sanitary conditions
and education.
Second was to deny food to the insurgents. Since the village population was forcibly removed
there was no one to give food, new recruits or information to the guerrillas. Furthermore areas in
the jungles which were cleared to provide with agriculture were destroyed by the British. So the
MPLA had to retreat deeper into the jungle to find food or steal it from other locals which turned
them against the insurgency.
Furthermore, British brought additional troops from other colonies, and reformed SAS Special
Forces units, which were patrolling the jungle in search for guerrillas. Once the insurgents
hideouts would be identified by informants, British would extensively bomb the area to force
rebels to come out in prepared ambushes. 572 Local population was being swayed to the side of the
British by hearts and minds campaign. Malaysian Chinese were given wanted political rights, food
and medicine. This was followed by general amnesty proclamation to every communist insurgent
wishing to surrender. British had around 40 000 troops stationed in Malaya which significantly
outnumbered communist insurgency. MPLA lost support of the people, Malaysia was given
independence 1957. Last serious guerrilla resistance was in 1958 which was followed by their
surrender. Insurgency was effectively over by 1960 and communist leaders escaped to China via
Thailand.573
Features of the British response:
Force resettlement of population which was suspected to be supporting the guerrillas. Conscripts
from colonies and mainland Britain alike were given jungle warfare training before being sent to
combat. Deployment of special units. Relying on superior technology and air power. British would
extensively bomb suspected guerrilla position in order to force them out of the jungle, where an
ambush was being prepared. Usage of chemical weapons to destroy parts of the jungle where

572

See in Jones T., Postwar Counterinsurgency and the SAS, 1945-1952: A Special Type of Warfare, Psychology
Press, 2001.
573
See in Ramakrishna K., Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds 1948-1958,
Routledge, 2013.

225

insurgents could grow food.574Extensive hearts and minds campaign among local population.
International context was not in favor of MPLA. They were cut off from logistic support, and
British were able to bring superior reinforcements to suppress the revolt. British public opinion
was supportive of maintaining colonial Empire and would see withdrawal as a defeat. 575British
casualties were significantly lower than those of the insurgents. British gave Malaya independence
but continued to maintain, and profit from, close political and economic relations with this country.
Table 13: Main features of British way of war in Malaya
Group I.
Cold War era (1945-1990)
Case study 2.

Military victory/Political victory

Malayan Emergency (1948-1960)

Proper training of troops
Giving troops the proper equipment
Employment of special forces
Relying on soldiers which were not British
Relying on air power
Relying on superior technology
Hearts and minds campaign
Relocation of suspected population
Indirect strategy of destroying food resources
British casualties significantly lower
Employment of those kind of strategies and tactics which
ensured minimal British casualties
Source: prepared by author

574
575

Friedman H. A., Psychological Warfare of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960. Link: www.psywar.org (4/1/14).
Ward S., British Culture and the End of Empire, Manchester University Press, 2001, p. 6.

226

 Korean War (1950-1953)576

After Japans defeat in WWII, Korea was divided at the 38th parallel, North part was administered
by the Soviets and Southern by USA. After the failed free elections in 1948 a communist
government took control of the North, and right wing of the South. Tensions rose and in 1950
North Korea attacked the South. Soviet Union boycotted the UN resolution to counter this
aggression and without the Soviet veto other UN countries (Communist China at the time was
not a member of the UN) approved for a military intervention led by USA, to protect independence
of South Korea.
North Korea was backed by China and Soviet Union both in troops and equipment. Opening phase
of the war saw Communist forces defeat UN coalition, capture Seoul, and push their forces into
southern tip of Korean peninsula called the Pusan perimeter. Once reinforced, UN coalition
launched amphibious landing operation at Inchon and breakthrough out of Pusan perimeter. Once
they recaptured Seoul, they continued to advance further north and crossed demarcation line. At
this point China involved into the war with massive reinforcements, which pushed the UN coalition
back cross the 38th parallel. Chinese employed tactics of psychological warfare and human wave
attacks. Their night operations would encircle UN troops and then the Chinese would try to overrun
them with numbers, who also had the element of surprise. Communist soldiers would use drums,
gongs and trumpets to create noise and install panic into the UN ranks, and as the result some
Coalition soldiers would run and abandon their posts and equipment.577 Chinese once again
captured Seoul. Moral of the UN was low but this was improved by energetic actions of its
commanders. Thanks to air victory against Soviet and Chinese air forces, UN established air
domination which caused serious logistical problems for the Chinese and they were eventually
pushed back north by renewed UN offensives. Parallel to the conventional operations, a communist
guerrilla force was operating in the South. These were suppressed with brutality and barbarism by
South Korean forces.578 From mid-1951 to armistice in 1953, war was characterized by fighting
around 38th parallel. Despite series of bloody battles, neither side could achieve a decisive victory.
North Korean with the help of the Chinese had the numerical superiority, but it was nullified by

576

Korean War is in fact an on-going conflict which is mostly in political domain with occasional low-intensity
actual fighting. Continued North Korean threat gives US the reason to maintain strong military presence in the area
and close to Chinese mainland.
577
Stokesbury J. L., A Short History of the Korean War, Harper Perennial 1990, p. 117.
578
Mikaberidze A., Atrocities, Massacres, and War Crimes: An Encyclopedia, ABC-CLIO, 2013, p. 755.

227

UNs technology and tactics. Air domination over North Korea enabled UN to effectively cut
enemys supply lines. 579
Features of UNs response:
International context was such that it threatened to escalate in new world war. There were tensions
over methods inside UNs military and political command. UN commander Douglas McArthur
was replaced as commander when insisted to use nuclear bomb to attack China. 580 UN was fighting
a culturally significantly different enemy. Unlike North Korean and Chinese forces, UN used those
strategies and tactics which minimized their casualties. UN heavily relied on its technological and
air superiority. Economic and human costs of the war were outweighed by political gain. South
Korea today remains a base from which US invasion of China could be launched. Public opinion
in USA was in favor of honorable armistice rather than abandoning Korea to communist forces.
Eisenhower won the presidential elections in 1953 on the promise to end Korean War. UN
casualties were significantly lower than North Korean/Chinese ones.
Table 14: Main features of UN (US-UK) way of war in Korea
Group I.
Cold War era (1945-1990)
Case study 3.

Military stalemate/Political victory

Korean War (1950-1953)

Proper training of troops
Giving troops the proper equipment
Relying on soldiers which were not American and British
Employment of special forces
Relying on air power
Relying on superior technology
Retreat if gain less than loss
Sensitive to public opinion and casualties
Indirect strategy of assault from the sea
579

Malkasian C., The Korean War, The Rosen Publishing Group, 2008.
Gen. McArthur failed to understand the full consequences of employment of nuclear weapons. This is a political
decision on the highest strategic level and it would most likely result in a new World War.
580

228

UN casualties significantly lower

Employment of those kind of strategies and tactics which
ensured minimal UN casualties
Source: prepared by author

Mau Mau Uprising (1952-1960)

This rebellion against the British colonial rule in Kenya, was initiated by anti-colonial fighters
summarily called Mau Mau. They waged a guerrilla campaign with the purpose to force the British
out, and gain independence with equitable land division. British responded by counterinsurgency
campaign which was characterized by:
Force resettlement of suspected supporters of the Mau Mau to reserves. Conditions in these were
harsh. British divide and rule policy to support one tribal group against the other. Kikuyu tribe was
fighting alongside the British and helped identify Mau Mau tribe members. Mau Mau was deprived
of food and forced out of the jungle by patrols, then these smaller groups would be destroyed.
Wide spread atrocities by both sides. Mau Mau style of atrocities was so brutal that it alienated
them to their enemies as almost inhuman. British and their African allies employed brutality to
obtain information on insurgents. In this campaign instead of hearts and mind, British employed
barbarism and repression. British heavily relied on technology and airpower to deal with guerrillas
hiding in the jungle. Cost of fighting this rebellion was higher than potential gain. British
understood that Mau Mau is suppressed but not defeated as many of those detained in reserves
were potential new rebels. British abandoned Kenya granting it its independence. British employed
those tactics and strategies which conserved their troops. Number of their casualties was
significantly lower than those of the Mau Mau.581British domestic public opinion was supportive
of maintaining the colonial Empire. 582International context was favorable for the British as it
remained a politically isolated conflict.

581
582

See in Fredi F., The Mau Mau War in Perspective, James Currey Publishers, 1989.
See in Ward, British Culture and the End of Empire.

229

Table 15: Main features of British way of war in Kenya

Group I.
Cold War era (1945-1990)
Case study 4.

Military victory/Political victory

Mau Mau Uprising (1952-1960)

Proper training of troops
Giving troops the proper equipment
Employment of special forces
Relying on soldiers which were not British
Relying on air power
Relying on superior technology
Retreat if gain less than loss
Relocation of suspected population
Systematic employment of barbarism
British casualties significantly lower
Indirect strategy of divide and rule
Employment of those kind of strategies and tactics which
ensured minimal British casualties
Source: prepared by author

Algerian War (1954-1962)

Pied-Noir was a non-Muslim population of Algeria which connected most of its national sentiment
with France. They were dominant social structure in French Algeria. Open tensions between them
and Muslim-Algerians started on 8th of May 1945, when French Police and Pied-Noirs massacred
between 6000 and 15 000 Muslim protesters which were demanding independence of Algeria.583
Next decade saw political tensions between the groups. Situation escalated in 1954 when AlgerianMuslims founded National Liberation Front (FLN), and started an armed struggle against French
rule. They employed a strategy of coordinated and simultaneous attack on French military and

583

Foran J., Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 99.

230

civilian authorities in the so-called Toussaint Rouge, on 1st of November 1954. This was a reaction
to the news that French have abandoned Indochina. However, unlike Indochina French reaction
was different, as it was not willing to permit cessions of its own territory. Algeria was legally not
a colony but an integral part (department) of France. First years of the war were characterized by
conflicts between FLN and Algerian communists, each of them seeing its own future for Algeria.
FLN massacred Pied-Noir civilians including children and French authorities responded with
similar actions. French won Battle of Algeria and employed brutal torture tactics to break insurgent
network. FLN as well used terror tactics and wide-spread assassinations of civilians. Unlike
Indochina, Algeria was a brutal war in which French resorted to barbarism the same as FLN.
French recruited local Harkis tribesmen to fight against the FLN with guerrilla tactics, bringing
the conflict into symmetry. FLN responded by using deception strategy and infiltration, their
fighters volunteered to serve in French forces, and then escaped with information and equipment.
French also used mass forced relocations of suspected population to deny guerrillas support. This
was deeply resented by local Muslims and further turned their opinion against the French. Starting
from 1958 French achieved many military victories by successfully employing search and destroy
missions, led by Special Forces units such as Commandos de Chasse. 584
However deep divisions in French society caused military coup dtat against left-wing
government. Army believed that government would abandon Algeria and sacrifice French honor,
like it did in Indochina. Famous general Charles de Gaulle took power and even though it was
obvious France has won militarily, public opposition forced France to sign a referendum and
according to its results Algeria gained its independence.585 Ceasefire during the referendums and
peace talks, was attempted to be broken by terrorist attacks of French national radicals OAS.
Around 1.4 million Pied-Noirs were evacuated from Algeria to metropolitan France which had
severe social and economic consequences. Most Harkis and other non-French nationals who
supported France during the war were deliberately left to the Muslim. Many of them and other
French left behind, were killed by Arab lynch mobs, at the end of the war in 1962. According to

584

See in Windrow M., The Algerian War 1954-62, Osprey Publishing, 2013.
Proclamation des resultats du referendum dautodetermination du 1er juillet 1962, Journal Officiel de lEtat
Algerien, 6 July 1962. Link: http://archives.ecpad.fr/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Independance_algerie.pdf
585

231

the peace deal with FLN, France maintained military presence in the port of Mers El Kebir until
1967, and conducted nuclear tests in the Algerian desert.586
Features of French conduct:
Response with barbarism to enemys barbarism methods. Extensively relying on its technological
and air domination. Recruiting troops from metropolitan France as well. Between 1956 and 1962
French forces numbered 470 000, supported with 90 000 Harkis. 587 They had significant numerical
advantage over insurgents. Using those strategies and tactics which conserved French troops.
Significantly lower casualties than those of FLN, which was virtually destroyed. Mass force
relocations of suspected population. High civilian casualties. International context worked against
the rebels, as they were isolated from any foreign help. Despite military victory of the French, they
were forced to retreat due to serious political instability at home, lack of national support for the
war, and political victory of FLN in Algeria. France did not employ hearts and minds campaign,
but relied on repression. French international prestige was seriously damaged after losing another
war.
Table 16: Main features of French way of war in Algeria
Group I.
Cold War era (1945-1990)
Case study 5.

Military victory/Political defeat

Algerian War (1954-1962)

Proper training of troops
Giving troops the proper equipment
Employment of special forces
Relying on soldiers which were not French
Abandoning local allies to be massacred by the enemy
Sensitive of casualties and public opinion
Relying on air power
Relying on superior technology
Regnault J. M., Frances Search for Nuclear Test Sites, 1957-1963, The Journal of Military History Vol. 67:
No 4, October 2003.
587
Windrow, The Algerian War, p. 17.
586

232

Retreat if gain less than loss

Relocation of suspected population
Systematic employment of barbarism
French casualties significantly lower
Indirect strategy of repression
Employment of those kind of strategies and tactics which
ensured minimal French casualties
Source: prepared by author

Vietnam War (1955-1975)588

Following the retreat of the French, North Vietnam continued low intensity military operations
against South Vietnam. Viet Cong was a North backed communist insurgency in the South. In
1959 North invaded Laos, establishing the so-called Ho Chi Minh trail which was a logistic supply
route from North through Laos and Cambodia, to the South. Via this road North Vietnam was able
to supply Viet Cong with troops and equipment. Starting from 1961 US involvement increased.
President Kennedy was determined to continue Eisenhowers strategy, and not give ground to
further communist expansion. To counter this insurgency in South Vietnam, US devised a
Strategic Hamlet program. This had the purpose to relocate suspected civilian population into
camps, based on examples from successful British counterinsurgency campaigns. However due to
poor execution and wide spread corruption of South Vietnam officials, the program backfired and
further alienated local population from US politics. Furthermore, South Vietnamese leader of the
program, Pham Ngoc Thao, was in fact a communist agent.589 In 1962 USA, China, Soviet Union,

588

The exact start date of American war in Vietnam can be debated. As historian J. Carland suggested there was a
period of 15 years between 1950 and 1965 during which it became obvious that USA is substantially involved in the
war. He points out few possible candidate dates being 1945, 1950, 1955, 1961, 1964. Certainly it was after 1964 that
US was undisputedly determined to win this war. However if we observe that in 1954 US were financing 80% of
French involvement and after the French retreat they sponsored South Vietnamese government since 1955 I
conclude this to be the start date. Also the US Department of Defense officially lists US casualties in Vietnam War
starting from 1st of November 1955. See Carland J., When Did the Vietnam War Start for the United States?,
Historical Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, 17 June 2012, pp. 1-5; Leland A.,
Oboroceanu M. J., American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics, Congressional Research
Service, CRS Report for Congress, 26 February 2010, p. 4.
589
Frankum R. B., Historical Dictionary of the War in Vietnam, Scarecrow Press, 2011, p. 358.

233

North Vietnam and other countries signed agreement to respect neutrality of Laos. 590 However this
was broken by North Vietnamese who used it for Ho Chi Minh trail and cooperated with Pathet
Lao, Laotian communist fighters trying to overthrow their neutral government. US at first started
to fight insurgents with special units like Green Berets, but with limited success. Starting from
1965 USA got involved with more and more troops, reaching its peak of 549,500 in 1968.591
Overall US commander General William Westmorland resorted to more aggressive tactics of
search and destroy in an attempt to use US superior training, air domination and technology to
crush Viet Cong in South Vietnam. However this proved impossible as Viet Cong was tactically
flexible enough to avoid direct clashed and employed psychological warfare to exhaust US
soldiers. US relied on helicopters to quickly bring and evacuate troops in and out enemy controlled
territory. CIA conducted Phoenix assassination program with the purpose to kill as many as
possible Viet Cong supporters. Throughout the war USAAF dropped more bombs than in the entire
WWII in Europe, causing huge casualties but with little effect on enemys willingness to fight.592
North Vietnam and Viet Cong proved to be a nut impossible to crack. US soldiers were suffering
from physical and psychological exhaustion as they were fighting in difficult terrain against a
seemingly invisible enemy. Furthermore, the Air Force was not able to break Ho Chi Minh trail
and stop the North Vietnamese supplies to the South. Tet offensive in 1968 in terms of casualties,
proved almost fatal for communist forces but all that the US public opinion could see were the
US casualties. Americans attempted to attack Laos and cut Ho Chi Minh trail, but domestic mass
demonstrations forced it to abandon the campaign. Increasing public unrest caused US government
to pull out its troops completely by 1972. Further South Vietnamese offensives were proven
disastrous, as South Vietnamese were not the same combat effective as US troops. South
Vietnamese were equipped by the US, but they were not well-trained nor especially motivated.
Their soldiers proved to be technologically inferior as they could not effectively bond with the
equipment the US provided them with. Furthermore, as USA backed Israel during Yom Kippur
War (1973), Arab countries responded by oil embargo, and South Vietnam could not afford to
supply its forces with fuel. 593 Following the US withdrawal North Vietnam increased its

590

Treaties UN, Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos signed at Geneva 23 July 1962, United Nations document.
Link: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20456/volume-456-I-6564-English.pdf
591
Krepinevich A. F., The Army and Vietnam, JHU Press, 2009, p. 248.
592
See in Sanders V., Turning Points in the Vietnam War, History Review, 2008.
593
Campagna A. S., The Economic Consequences of the Vietnam War, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1991, p. 119.

234

offensive activities, which resulted in the conquest of South Vietnam in 1975. Civilian and military
structures which cooperated with USA were left to the mercy of North Vietnamese. American
public cared more of their own casualties, and was strongly opposed to any further US engagement
in the war.594
Features of US response:
Heavy relying on technological and air domination to fight the enemy, in order to reduce number
of US casualties. Strategies, tactics and medical evacuation were designed to minimize number of
killed US soldiers. Relying on South Vietnamese to resist political and military offensive of the
North Vietnam. Once it became obvious that South Vietnamese are not able or motivated to do so,
US troops quickly lost morale as well.US public initially gave support for the war but it turned
into unprecedented mass anti-war movement.595Despite military success, US were forced to retreat
because of the lack of public support. Significant influence of the media, which only portrayed the
war without strategic perspective of things. People thought that they are losing when in fact they
were winning. International context enabled US to be supported by Australia, New Zealand and
troops of some other countries, but key US allies Canada, UK and France refused to take part.
Because of the threat of world war, USA was not able to use its nuclear arsenal. Enemy was
extremely determined and terrain was in his favor. Casualties of USA and its allies were
significantly smaller than those of North Vietnam and its allies. However number of casualties was
still unacceptable for the US public. Prestige of USA after retreat from Vietnam was significantly
damaged and caused deep revisions within US political and military structures.
Table 17: Main features of American way of war in Vietnam
Group I.
Cold War era (1945-1990)
Case study 6.

Military victory/Political defeat

Vietnam War (1955-1975)

594

See in Lawrence M. A., The Vietnam War: A Concise International History, Oxford University Press, 2010.
Influenced and supported by Soviet Unions secret services. According to famous Soviet defector Stanislav
Lunev GRU and KGB financed the Vietnam anti-war movement and helped to fund just about every antiwar
movement and organization in America and abroad. See in Lunev S., Winkler I., Through the Eyes of the Enemy,
Regnery Publishing, 1998, p. 78; United States Congress House, Committee on National Security, Subcommittee on
Military Research and Development, US G.P.O., 1998, p. 14. Link: http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/003524131
(29/3/13).
595

235

Proper training of troops

Giving troops the proper equipment
Employment of special forces
Relying on soldiers which were not American
Abandoning local allies to be massacred by the enemy
Sensitive of casualties and public opinion
Relying on air power
Relying on superior technology
Retreat if gain less than loss
Relocation of suspected population
Systematic employment of barbarism
American casualties significantly lower
Indirect strategies of logistical bombing and infiltration
missions
Employment of those kind of strategies and tactics which
ensured minimal American casualties
Source: prepared by author

Suez Crisis (1956)

In 1956 Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized Suez Canal. Also Egypt strengthened
its connections with Soviet Union against Britain and USA. At the time Egypt was seen as leading
country in the Muslim world and main supporter of its nationalistic movements. France, for
example was rightfully suspicious of Egypts support to FLN in the Algerian war. Nassers closing
of the Suez Canal seriously damaged British and French access to oil from Arab countries. For this
reason Britain and France considered military solution to remove Nasser from power.
France and Israel in the years before have developed military and political alliance. Britain
reluctantly accepted to form an alliance with Israel as it would damage its relations with Arab
countries, however these three countries agreed to conduct joint military operations.
Geographically speaking Israel does not belong to the western world, but its military style is

236

characterized by western warfare culture in addition to distinctive Israeli way of doing things
due to its specific strategic position.
USA was strongly opposed to military intervention as at the same time Soviets intervened against
Hungarian revolution. It could not support aggressive action of its allies and at the same time
sanction similar actions by Soviet Union. Furthermore USA wanted to expand its influence in
Muslim world and keep good relations with Egypt. Israel attacked via Sinai with additional air
support from Britain and France. Egyptian army was decisively defeated in armored warfare and
Israeli conquered all of the Sinai reaching Suez within days. British and French combined fleets
successfully launched air strikes and airborne assaults along Suez Canal, effectively seizing
Egyptian stronghold of Port Said. British/French/Israeli coalition achieved military victory within
7 days from starting of the operations.
Nasser by sinking 40 ships in Suez Canal, used asymmetry to effectively block it for the next year.
Political situation for Britain and France was highly unfavorable. USA imposed economic
sanctions on both countries. This was followed by Arab oil sanctions as well. 596 Britain considered
military solution to capture Kuwait and Qatar if USA continue with sanctions. 597 Soviet Union
threatened with use of nuclear missiles to attack Britain and France. This had the result that it was
not the USA who gained political credits in the Arab world but the Soviet Union. French-US
relations further deteriorated, and France was determined to develop its own nuclear program
rather than to be independent on US protection. Germany sided with France in this decision and
this marked the birth of modern Franco-German alliance which is the basis of European Union.
Furthermore France shared its nuclear technology with Israel. 598 Under immense international
political pressure, Britain and France were forced to retreat from Suez marking the end of the war.
This also signaled the end of United Kingdom as the world superpower.599
Features of the war:

596

See in Varble D., The Suez Crisis, The Rosen Publishing Group, 2009.
Williams C., Harold Macmillan, Hachette, 2012, p. 259.
598
Styan D., France and Iraq: Oil, Arms and French Policy-Making in the Middle East, I. B. Tauris, 2006, p. 42.
599
British then-Prime Minister Harold MacMillan offered a way according to which Britain should reinvent its
global politics: We are the Greeks of the Hellenistic Age. The power has passed from us to Romes equivalent, the
United States of America, and we can at most aspire to civilize and occasionally to influence them. Chew E., How
Big Powers Fight Small Wars: Contending Traditions of Asymmetry in the British and American Ways of War,
Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 40: No. 1, SAGE publishing, 2014, p. 18.
597

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No action of such scale can be done without at least US political protection, Britain lost status of
a superpower.600French/British/Israeli employed strategies which offered rapid military victory
relying on superior tactical skill of its troops. Egypt was militarily supplied by Soviet Union and
possessed advanced weapons systems but its troops were not skilled enough to operate it
effectively. French/British/Israeli troops were well trained, equipped and motivated. They
employed such tactics and strategies which minimized their casualties. As a result Egyptian
casualties were significantly higher than those of the French/British/Israeli alliance. Economic and
political loss could not match the gain from military victory. Leftist organized protests in Britain
against governments intervention. Political tensions within alliance limited its effectiveness.
Prestige of both France and Britain suffered seriously. Troops of the alliance resorted to barbarism.
Israeli killed civilians near Jordanian border and the French executed Egyptian POWs. These
French units were withdrawn from Algerian War, and had a strong anti-Muslim sentiment.
Strategic bombing proved ineffective. The alliance considered air domination as a necessity before
ground operations take place.
Table 18: Main features of British/French/Israeli way of war in Egypt
Group I.
Cold War era (1945-1990)
Case study 7.

Military victory/Political defeat

Suez Crisis (1956)

Proper training of troops
Giving troops the proper equipment
Employment of special forces
Sensitive of casualties and public opinion
Relying on air power
Relying on superior technology
Retreat if gain less than loss
600

An extremely powerful nation, especially one capable of influencing international events and the acts and
policies of less powerful nations. A superpower is a state with a dominant position in international relations and is
characterized by its unparalleled ability to exert influence or project power on a global scale. This is done through
the means of both military and economic strength, as well as diplomatic and soft power influence. See
superpower, Dictionary.com, Random House Inc. Link: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/superpower
(21/12/14).

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Employment of barbarism due to fighting a culturally

different enemy
Alliances casualties significantly lower
Indirect strategy of assault from the sea
Employment of those kind of strategies and tactics which
ensured minimal Alliances casualties
Source: prepared by author

Bizerte crisis (1961)

After Tunisia gained independence from France in 1956, the French still remained in possession
of Bizerte naval base. It played an important part in the Algerian War. Tunisian military in 1961
surrounded French base demanding their departure. French sent a helicopter provoking the
conflict. France sent division size paratrooper reinforcements, and these, after heavy streetfighting, took the city. France remained in the control of Bizerte until the end of Algerian War in
1963, when they retreated.601
Features of French response:
Acting to protect its strategic interests and prestige in Mediterranean. Employment of a strategy
which ensured quick resolve of the conflict. Employment of those strategies and tactics which
ensured minimal French casualties. As a result Tunisian casualties are significantly higher than
those of France. International context favored French response, as there was no serious political
sanctions. Relying on its technological and air superiority.
Table 19: Main features of French way of war in Tunisia
Group I.
Cold War era (1945-1990)
Case study 8.

Military victory/Political defeat

Suez Crisis (1956)

Employment of highly trained troops

601

Jaques T., Dictionary of Battles and Sieges: A-E, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007, p. 143.

239

Relying on air power

Relying on superior technology
Retreat if gain less than loss
French casualties significantly lower
Direct strategy which demanded quick military victory
Employment of those kind of strategies and tactics which
ensured minimal French casualties
Source: prepared by author

Portuguese Colonial War (1961-1974)

The regime of Estado Novo, under Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, maintained Portugals neutrality
during WWII as its eventual engagement on the side of the British, its long standing ally, would
surely cause Spanish involvement on the side of Axis. So keeping strong connections with Britain,
after the war Portugal became one of the founding members of NATO. In 1961, under US support
emerged three insurgency movements in Portuguese colonies of Angola, Guinea and Mozambique.
Portugal was the first country to establish a colonies in Africa and will be the last one to leave.
Since Portugals economy was not strong enough to support the war effort, regime of Estado Novo
relied on economies of colonies to bear the brunt of military costs. USA was trying to depose the
regime and it used its political influence to impose UN sanctions against Portugal. Furthermore
Soviet Union was helping insurgents in all three colonies with weapons and materiel. Other NATO
members gave limited political support.
However in 13 years of war in these three places Portugal achieved military success, which was
also followed by limited political success. Portuguese, being under sanctions, developed their own
weaponry and tactics, to successfully use it against the rebels. However nations sentiment
opposing the war was growing, and a leftist military coup deposed Estado Novo in 1974 which
resulted in Portuguese withdrawal. For many of the local Portuguese it was impossible to accept
this reality, because they had a long lasting connection with the colonies and viewed it as their

240

homeland. However, fearing atrocities by the new Communist governments, over a million
Portuguese loyalists escaped to metropolitan Portugal, South Africa and elsewhere. 602
Features of Portuguese response:
Under economic and political sanction from both USA and Soviet Union, Portugal had little hope
to maintain its colonial empire. For this reason it developed independent weapon systems and
tactics. Using such strategies and tactics which conserved its troops. This resulted in number of
Portuguese casualties being significantly lower than insurgents, in all three conflict zones. Relying
on air power and technology. Resorting to barbarism as a response to insurgents barbarism, and
it also employed hearts and mind campaign within the local population. Using specialized units to
search and destroy rebel strongholds. Recruiting indigenous population to fight alongside regular
forces from the mainland. Later these forces were disarmed and left behind to be executed by the
rebels. For Portugal it was not so important to maintain international prestige, as its world
domination was centuries long gone. Economic prospects of keeping the colonies was the primary
motive, as well as the prestige of the regime among its own population. The simple fact that
Portugal has colonies in Africa would made it an important actor in world politics.
Table 20: Main features of Portuguese way of war in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea
Group I.
Cold War era (1945-1990)

Military victory in Angola and Mozambique/Stalemate

Case study 9.

in Guinea/Overall political defeat

Portuguese Colonial War (1961-1974)

Proper training of troops
Giving troops the proper equipment
Restructuring the entire armed forces, from top to
bottom, for counterinsurgency operations
Employment of special forces
Relying on soldiers which were not Portuguese
Abandoning local allies to be massacred by the enemy
Sensitive of casualties and public opinion
602

See in Cann J., Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War 1961-74, HELION & Company, 2012.

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Relying on air power

Relying on superior technology
Retreat if gain less than loss
Relocation of suspected population
Systematic employment of barbarism
Portuguese casualties significantly lower
Indirect strategy of repression
Employment of those kind of strategies and tactics
which ensured minimal Portuguese casualties
Source: prepared by author

Multinational Force in Lebanon (1982-1984)

Following Israeli invasion of Lebanon and its confrontation with Palestinian PLO, and other
Muslim militant organizations Lebanese government asked for a peacekeeping force to be sent
to Beirut. PLO retreated to Tunisia, and Israelis agreed to a ceasefire and leave Beirut. However
Muslim militant organizations backed by elements of Syrian military attacked Multinational forces
consisted of US, British, French and Italian troops. Suicide bombings and Soviet supplied antiaircraft weapons, caused hundreds of casualties to the Multinational forces and the loss of two US
aircraft. As the fighting between Shiite and Druze militiamen intensified, Multinational forces
abandoned Lebanon.
Features of the conflict:
Casualties of USA and France were higher than those of Muslim militants who employed
asymmetric strategy of terrorism. US/French response of conventional artillery and air assault was
ineffective and it further resulted in two lost aircraft. US public was shocked to see its troops killed
and politics retreated the troops. Political gain was much less than losses. Operation was done
primarily to consolidate US international prestige.
Table 21: Main features of MNF way of war in Lebanon
Group I.
Cold War era (1945-1990)
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Case study 10.

Military defeat/Political defeat

Multinational Force in Lebanon (1982-1984)

Employment of highly trained troops
Relying on air power
Relying on superior technology
Retreat if gain less than loss
MNF casualties significantly higher
Failed indirect strategy of peace-enforcing
against enemys asymmetry
Failed employment of those kind of strategies and
tactics which ensured minimal MNF casualties
Highly sensitive to casualties and public opinion
Source: prepared by author

United States invasion of Panama (1989-1990)

Panamas leader, General Manuel Noriega had long and close connections with CIA and US
politics. It was widely known that he was involved in money laundering and drug trafficking
operations but this was ignored as he was US ally against Soviet influence in Central America.
According to treaties between US and Panama, US was supposed to give control of strategically
important Panama Canal to the Panamas government by the year 2000, retaining only limited
military and political presence. However diplomatic relations between Noriega and the Bush Sr.
administration began to deteriorate, and as a consequence the US had interest to depose Noriega
and replace him with a more cooperative government. To do so, Bush administration provoked
tensions to rise between US military personnel in Panama and Noriegas forces. At the same time
the US influenced public opinion to demand military action. The cherry on the cake for Bush
Sr. was Noriegas proclamation of state of war to exist between Panama and USA. Under pretense
of defending human rights and democracy, fighting drug trafficking, and protecting Panama
treaties, the US invaded. Operation Just Cause was devised to quickly offer a military solution, as
previous attempts to stage a coup against Noriega failed. US forces invaded Panama from their
bases within Panama itself, and from the sea. After two weeks of fighting Noriega surrendered to

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US troops and soon after his imprisoned in USA, a new Panama government was installed which
consolidated USAs strategic interests in the region.603
Features of US invasion:
Public opinion in USA was in favor of military action. Invasion had to be quick and conducted in
such a way which ensures minimal casualties. Panamanian casualties are several times higher than
US ones. Use of Special Forces and relying on advanced military technology. Psychological
warfare and propaganda. Extensive use of helicopters but limited aircraft attacks to minimize
civilian damage. International prestige of USA increased after the operation.
Table 22: Main features of American way of war in Panama
Group I.
Cold War era (1945-1990)
Case study 11.

Military victory/Political victory

United States invasion of Panama (1989-1990)

Employment of highly trained troops
Relying on air power
Relying on superior technology
Relying on information warfare
American casualties significantly lower
Direct strategy which demanded quick military
victory
Employment of those kind of strategies and
tactics which ensured minimal American
casualties
Retaining moral high ground by minimizing
civilian casualties
Source: prepared by author

603

See in Rottman G., Panama 1989-90, Osprey Publishing, 2012.

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CONCLUSIONS
Since the defeat of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan in WWII, Western powers
were faced with a new threat of Communism and its perpetuator the Soviet Union. Technology of
warfare has changed as the World has entered Nuclear age. No military conflict between two
blocks was possible without destruction of human life on a colossal scale. Also nothing could
justify such destruction and whoever would be the first to launch nuclear weapons would also have
to bear the guilt of nothing less than mass genocide. 604 In the environment of this political and
military standoff the two blocks confronted each other in a series of smaller scale proxy wars.
Some of them have been described by historians as colonial wars while others have more clearly
suggested the intention to suppress Communist influence. 605 Emerging as the victors of WWII
both Britain and France have fought wars to maintain their colonial possessions. However it was
clear after their intervention in the Suez (1956) that their political influence has been seriously
diminished. Both British and French have in the end abandoned their colonial possessions. In those
campaigns they have extensively relied on ground troops originating from their colonies. This was
for the purpose to minimize risk of casualties to the soldiers from metropolitan areas. Portugal too
has followed the same logic by organizing units from their colonies to fight in the colonies. In noncolonial wars such as Korean War, US intervention in Vietnam and Lebanon USA tended to
form their forces from coalition of countries to gain International political protection. In all of the
wars paramount has been to ensure domestic support. Also all of the Western actors have
extensively relied on technology and air power rather than manpower on the ground. This too was
to reduce the risk of casualties. In anti-insurgency campaigns Western actors would resort to
barbarism to try to physically break the insurgents usually as a response to enemys barbaric

604

Doctrine of nuclear deterrence has effectively since locked the World in a military standoff in which neither actor
dares to attack the other with direct military force. Essentially this doctrine guarantees nuclear destruction to the
attacker in case of an aggression.
605
Wars of decolonization have had the primary intention for the oppressed nations to liberate themselves of
European colonial rule. However by fighting against the Western colonial powers, independence movements came
into domain of strategic interests of Communist forces. So apart from the obvious interest to control it, West also
had to fight in the colonies in order to retain it from Communist influence. From a strategic point of view
decolonization wars have resulted in three distinctive scenarios. First, is the situation in which a Western actor
would lose military control of the colony, but still keep political and economic connections. Second, when Western
actor would lose military and political control, and the ex-colony would fall under Soviet influence. Third, when
Western actor would lose its military and political control, but Communism would also not be able to penetrate to
dominate this area. Instead, like in the examples of some Muslim countries, they would group as Radical Muslim
fighters against the West. But regardless, those being hostile towards the West would also be a useful situation for
Soviets even if these newly independent countries would not be under Soviet control.

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actions. Important aspect of barbarism was that it was employed against culturally different enemy.
When forced to retreat Western actors would consciously abandon their local allies to the enemy.
When devising strategy Western actors would choose the kind of direct or indirect strategy that
would ensure their own minimum casualty risks. All of the wars were fought in a cost effective
way, meaning that gains outweighed the losses. Either political, economic or other strategic. When
the losses would become bigger than the gains, a Western actor would always choose to retreat,
preferably in a way which would not damage its prestige. Due to employment of casualty
minimizing strategies, advanced technology and specialized troops the losses of Western actors
were always smaller than the ones of the enemy. Even if the enemy would fight a guerrilla
campaign. Only in Lebanon (1982) were the Western losses higher and this was due to enemys
employment of asymmetric barbarism.
Key points of Chapter 4: First group of case studies
All wars were fought in the context of Cold War between East and West
All of the Western actors employed those strategies and tactics which ensured
minimizing of their casualties
Western actors relied on local allied troops, usually non-westerners to fight alongside
them, this too was to reduce their own casualties
All of the Western actors relied on their superior technology and air power
In a prolonged conflict Western actors primarily relied on an indirect strategy and
employed direct strategy when a rapid military victory was sought
Western actors employed barbarism as a response or in a systematic fashion against a
culturally different enemy who fights wars with barbaric methods
When the potential loss outweighed the potential gain Western actor would choose to
retreat rather than wasting its resources to a fight a war which is not cost-effective
In all cases when Western actor was militarily or politically defeated it would retreat and
abandon its local allies to the cruelty of the enemy

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Chapter 5: Second group of case studies

To know your Enemy, you must become your Enemy.
Sun Tzu (544 BC-496 BC)
In this chapter I am analyzing the second group of case studies. These case studies are conventional
wars fought after the breakdown of Soviet Union and its expansionistic strategy. Its successor
Russia since then maintains a defensive strategic policy. 606 Western powers in the last two decades
are on the global strategic offensive to maintain its established worldwide domination. This group
of case studies were chosen to be as similar as possible to the matter of my study and this is NATO
alliance and its strategic conduct. Second group includes: First Gulf War (1990-1991), War in
Somalia (1992-1993), NATO operations in Bosnian War (1993-1995), NATO operations in
Kosovo War (1999), NATO War in Afghanistan (2001-2014), Coalition of the willing invasion of
Iraq (2003) and Iraq War (2003-2011-ongoing), NATO operations in Libyan Civil War (2011) and
French intervention in Northern Mali conflict (2013-2014). I have selected these case studies for
the following reasons:

First Gulf War is the first truly modern war. Use of advanced technology, forming of
International Coalition and lack of effective Russian interference characterized this war. It
was a war of profit, both in the sense of maintaining stability in the oil market and
establishing US prestige and diplomatic relations in the Persian Gulf. For the next two
decades actions of the International community became dominated by US diplomatic
efforts.

US involvement in War in Somalia was a failed UN peace establishing operation which

demonstrated the sensitivity of US public to casualties. Loss of elite troops and savage
nature of the conflict led to a change in perception of US public towards its engagement in
future peace operations.

NATO operations in Bosnian War are in fact the first NATO military intervention in its
history. Both European powers and United Nations have not been able to force Serbian
leadership to a negotiating table and peaceful resolvement of the conflict. NATO bombing

606

Russian aggressive moves in Ukraine could be seen as a part of global strategic defensive. The same as the West
was doing during the Cold War with its proxy wars in Korea or Vietnam. However this view can be a matter of
debate and is of less relevance for this dissertation.

247

operations and Croatian Armys military offensives brought Milosevic to Dayton peace
conference to end the War in Bosnia. Russia took once again a more active role threatening
direct intervention in the War. This conflict pointed out UNs lack of military decisiveness
and identified NATO as the muscle which can actually enforce UN resolutions.

NATO bombing of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) forced the Serbs to abandon their
operations in Kosovo. NATO once again confirmed to be in a way the armed branch of
UN. Serbs would not give up their national dream of Great Serbia without being militarily
forced into it. US technological prestige demonstrated its superiority by waging a war from
air and with no combat casualties. However it also pointed out a weakness and dependence
on this technology, as the Serbs managed to knock down advanced pieces of equipment
allowing Russian and Chinese to get a hold of its technology.

NATO involvement in Afghanistan was the first time in its history that Article V. was
invoked by USA for being attacked on its own soil by Al-Qaeda terrorists. This marked
terrorism as being one of the principal enemies of NATO. Such an enemy required a change
in strategy and deployment of ground troops to directly confront it.

Coalitions invasion in Iraq and US involvement in Iraq War was an unprecedented war
being an operation in which without solid and internationally accepted moral high ground,
the US-led Coalition conquered the country of Iraq and deposed Saddams regime. It
confirmed the superpower status of USA who managed to impose its strategy even with
the opposition from other major powers. However this war also signaled US dependency
on oil and paramount to secure its influence in the oil-rich Gulf countries. Following the
invasion various Iraqi insurgent groups fought against US-led occupation and new
democratic government. As of early 2015 new radical Islam group called ISIL (Islamic
State of Iraq and Levant) went on the offensive establishing its control over big parts of
Iraq and Syria.

NATO operations in Libyan Civil War similarly as in Yugoslavia, a decade earlier,

confirmed NATO alliance as the armed branch of United Nations carrying out its resolution
against Gaddafis regime by force. NATO once again used only its air power to minimize
the risk of casualties and counted in its technologic superiority to conduct operations.
However, unlike Yugoslavia, Libya is an oil rich country and we can observe the operations
in this context too.
248

French operations in Mali was a part of a wider French effort (Operation Barkhane) to
establish diplomatic and military influence over the Sahel region in Africa. Threatened by
the growth of radical Islam, France has sent ground troops to support democratic African
countries, parts of its former colonial empire, in their struggle to maintain stability in subSaharan African regions. France has identified its primary objective being counter
terrorism.

The subject of this dissertation is NATO and even if this alliance existed throughout the Cold War
its only military actions took place after its end. Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan saw the
coordinated efforts of the NATO alliance to confirm its military and political might with which it
carries out UN resolutions. However no NATO action can take place without the consensus of its
strongest Western members. For this reason there is no reason to study case studies of NATOs
military interventions with any distinctive approach than those of USA, Britain and France. Each
of these actors profoundly influences NATOs strategic culture and to study any of them is equally
correct as to study all of them. Each of these societies has its own distinctive culture and political
approach but their style of war-making is remarkably similar.
Now I will discuss every case study in more detail.

First Gulf War (1990-1991)

For almost a decade, Iraq and Iran have been engaged in a bloody war (1980-1988), in which
neither side came out victorious. Since Iraq was a Soviet ally, USA supported Iran with war
materiel. 607 After Iranian offensive which was likely to force Iraqi surrender, USA switched
politics and supported Iraq. It could be seen as a classic bloodletting strategy. War resulted in
hundreds of thousands of lives and hundreds of billions US dollars, being lost by both sides. 608
Following this war, Iraq was in debt to primarily Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and it demanded from
these countries to write off this debt which they refused. Kuwait was an easier target to make

607

After the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979), political relations between Iran and USA have been hostile, but USA
provided support to Iran to prevent its defeat from Iraq and subsequent falling into the Soviet influence zone. See in
Parsi T., Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States, Yale University Press,
2007.
608
See in Hiro D., The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict, Routledge, 2012.

249

pressure on, as Iraq had claims on its territory and Kuwait broke OPEC cartel oil production quotas.
This had the consequence that Iraq was losing lot of money. Saddam threatened Kuwait with an
invasion if it does not comply with its demands. When Kuwait did not, Iraq fulfilled its threats and
invaded this oil rich country in 1990. Iraqi military operations achieved their objectives within two
days. Not surprisingly if we know, that Iraq at the time had the ambition to become the leading
country of the Arab world, and had developed strong armed forces. USA, fearing that invasion of
Kuwait would further increase oil prices and destabilize world economy, began with the
preparations for a military solution. It used its political influence in the UN to pass resolutions first
for economic sanctions, followed quickly by the second for naval blockade of Iraq. At the same
time Saddam Hussein tried to find political solution for the crisis, offering to retreat from Kuwait
and disarmament of his WMD if Israel does the same. However the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, as
Crocker in Into the Desert: Reflections on the Gulf War called it was a defining moment for the
US having to decide will it stand back in the face of this invasion or roll it back. George Bush Sr.
made it clear that this will not stand.609 Since Saddam Husseins aggressive policy invaded the
country of Kuwait, US had the support of the oil rich Gulf countries which were concerned with
his offensive intentions. Saudi Arabia invited the US to station their military at Saudi territory and
agreed to pay for a big portion of the war effort. The Bush administration in the most sustained
and successful diplomatic effort in modern times, managed to put together an International military
coalition that included divisions from Egypt and Syria, as well as units from the Gulf. Arab states
were prepared to confront another Arab state under Western command. 610 In 1990 the US begun a
military build-up in Saudi Arabia against the possible Iraqi invasion on that country. All in all a
total of 34 countries formed a Coalition against Iraq.611 Some countries like Japan and Germany
did not commit combat troops but instead put billions of dollars military aid. US diplomacy went
around the world ensuring support for military action. Apart from Moscows non-interference it

609

Crocker R. in Engel J. (ed.), Into the Desert: Reflections on the Gulf War, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 9.
Ibid, p. 10.
If it had not been for the US military support in confronting Saddams invasion in Iraq, the Gulf countries would not
give their support for the NATO to conduct operations in Afghanistan in 2001.
611
US diplomatic and economic pressure motivating many of those who were initially reluctant to join.
610

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was important to ensure support from Arab countries. 612 All in all, US-led Coalition troops
numbered a total of 956,600.613
Parallel with its political and economic efforts, USA launched a world-wide media campaign to
turn public opinion against Iraq. This was further assisted by Iraqis themselves as they resorted to
barbarism against civilians in occupied Kuwait. Starting in early 1991, USA launched an air
campaign against Iraq. Objective was to establish air domination and weaken Iraqi defensive
potential from the air. Iraqi anti-air defenses were strong but with limited effect against advanced
US air weapon systems. In response Saddam repeatedly attacked Saudi Arabia and Israel with
missiles. Purpose to attack Israel, was to provoke it into the war as some other Arab countries
would then likely retreat from Coalition and switch to Iraqi side, rather than fight alongside Israel.
However Israel kept its cool and did not intervene under US political persuasion. 614
USA had the moral high ground for the military operation which is signaled in the message from
gen. Norman Schwarzkopf to his troops:
Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines of the United States Central Command, this morning at
0300, we launched Operation Desert Storm, an offensive campaign that will enforce the United
Nations resolutions that Iraq must cease its rape and pillage of its weaker neighbor and withdraw
its forces from Kuwait. My confidence in you is total. Our cause is just! Now you must be the
thunder and lightning of Desert Storm. May God be with you, your loved ones at home, and our
country.615
Following a successful air and Special Forces infiltration campaign, UN attack could begin. Bulk
of International forces was made up of US, British and French troops, while others had supportive
roles. In desert terrain which favors armored warfare, Coalition had two key advantages. First was
technological as they had superior armored units and then revolutionary satellite navigation
technology. Second was air domination which provided with air support and reconnaissance.
These enabled Coalition to move its troops across the desert without landmarks and engage the
enemy on his weak points, as they knew where Iraqi troops are located. Kuwait was declared
612

See in Freedman L., Karsh E., The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order,
Princeton University Press, 1993.
613
Hersh S., Chain of Command, Penguin Books, 2005, p. 181.
614
Cheney D., In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir, Simon and Schuster, 2011, p. 215.
615
Lowry R., The Gulf War Chronicles: A Military History of the First War with Iraq, iUniverse, 2008, p. 9.

251

liberated after four days of intense fighting. In their retreat Saddams troops set Kuwaits oil wells
ablaze. Simultaneously US and French armored units rushed across undefended desert, as a part
of overall strategy of flank attack. As the Iraqi army retreated from Kuwait to escape encirclement
it was relentlessly bombed on the open road without protection, which caused large number of
their casualties. In just 100 hours Coalition decisively defeated Iraqi troops and established a
ceasefire. US public opinion needed this victory after seeing their helicopters feeling Saigon
(1975), Iran (1980) and Beirut (1983). Panama was too small a victory to boost their national spirit.
To oust Saddam out of Kuwait in just 100 hours was a moment in which the US established its
world-wide prestige as the most powerful military force. 616
It was expected from Coalition forces to continue their advance towards Bagdad, but this was not
US strategy. Such action would likely result in further casualties and break the Coalition apart. 617
Furthermore there was no UN resolution to continue the advance to Iraq itself. US-initiated
Kurdish uprising took place in the northern Iraq. But without direct US support, it was brutally
crushed by Saddams generals. All other uprisings in other parts of Iraq were also brutally crushed
and according to Peter W. Galbraith, resulted in nearly three million of refugees. 618 Husseins
regime took revenge against civilians supporting the uprising. 619 Saddam consolidated its power
and an angry dictator caused lot of concerns to Saudi Arabian king Fahd. Through diplomatic
channels the king demanded from Bush to make other actions which would depose the Iraqi
regime.620 However UN did not approve a resolution which would call for an invasion of Iraq but
placed Iraq under strict sanctions. Based on UNs resolution USA and UK imposed a no-fly zone
over Iraq, which will be effective until the invasion in 2003. 621
In this case study I notice general features common with the first group of case studies:

616

Engel, p. 2.
Pope C., Cheney changed his view on Iraq, Seattle Post-Intelligencer Washington Correspondent, 28
September 2004.
618
Galbraith P. W., Refugees from War in Iraq: What Happened in 1991 and What May Happen in 2003, Migration
Policy Institute Policy Brief, February No 2, 2003.
619
Yetiv S. A., The Persian Gulf Crisis, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1997, p. 108.
620
Engel, p. 138.
621
United Nations Security Council, UN Resolution 687, 3 April 1991; and UN Resolution 688, 5 April, 1991.
Original documents retrieved at links: http://www.casi.org.uk/info/undocs/scres/1991/688e.pdf; and
http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/687.pdf (14/02/15).
USA and UK bombed Iraq in 1996, 1998 and invaded in 2003 because Iraq did not fully cooperate with the text of
the resolution 687.
617

252

US formed an International Coalition against Iraq, to ensure political protection and the moral high
ground for its operations. Their overall strategy was consisted of series of indirect strategies. When
launched a direct strategy to attack Iraqi armed forces, it was done in such a way which minimized
Coalitions casualties. Victory had to be achieved rapidly by relying on advanced technology, air
domination, special units and highly trained armed forces. With skilled strategy USA ensured
numerical superiority, as Iraq had to deploy considerable portion of its troops in other front sectors.
Iraqi casualties were much higher than those of the Coalition. Cost of the war was mostly paid by
other countries.622 Economic and political gains of the war by far outweighed the losses. USA
established world-wide prestige as the sole military superpower.
Iraqi frequently resorted to barbarism against civilians and military. When encountered a situation
which had potential to cause them high casualties, US resorted to barbarism as well. 623 US
encouraged uprisings in Iraq but eventually failed to support the uprising with concrete operations
against Saddam.624 USA did not pursue broken enemy to conquer entire country. Primary motive
seems to be fear of additional casualties and possible continuation of war with Iran. US public
opinion supported military action as long as it is quick and results in minimal casualties. This is
the dominant variable which I observed in all of the first group case studies, and is confirming the
hypothesis.
Table 23: Main features of American way of war in Iraq
Group II.
Modern era (1991-present)
Case study 1.

Military victory/Political victory

United Nations operation to liberate Kuwait

(1990-1991)625
Employment of highly trained troops
Relying on air power
Relying on superior technology

622

See in Peters J. E., Deshong H., Out of Area, or Out of Reach?, RAND, 1995.
Schmitt E., U.S. Army Buried Iraqi Soldiers Alive in Gulf War, New York Times, 15 September 1991.
624
Embry J., Uprising in Iraq may be slow because of U.S. inaction in 1991, Cox News Service, 4 April 2003.
625
Main ground operations took place between 24th and 28th of February 1991.
623

253

Introducing geospatial revolution by satellite

navigation and precision strikes
Relying on information warfare
UN casualties were significantly lower than
those of Iraq Army
Direct strategy which demanded quick military
victory
Employment of those kind of strategies and
tactics which ensured minimal Coalition
casualties
Retaining moral high ground by minimizing
civilian casualties, forming an big International
Coalition including troops from Arab countries
US, British and French units used as cracking
troops, other remained in supportive duties
Initiating an uprising against Saddam but
abandoning local allies in the face of other
strategic interests
US resorted to barbarism on an occasion against
a culturally different enemy.
Introducing the concept of CNN effect and
spectator sport wars
Source: prepared by author

US operations in Somalian War (1992-1993)

By late 1992, situation in Somalia escalated to a humanitarian disaster. After the fall of president
Barre in January 1991, the country was torn apart by civil war between various factions. It has
been identified 14 different factions. 626 Since November 1992, intense fighting broke throughout

626

1. SAMO Mohamed R. Arbow, 2. SDA Mohamed F. Abdullahi, 3. SDM Addi Musse Mavow, 4. SDM (SNA)
Mohamed Nur Alio, 5. SNDU Ali Ismail Abdi, 6. SNF Gen. Omar Haji Mohamed, 7. SNU Mohamed Rajis

254

the country between two factions, one supporting transition president Ali Mahdi Mohamed and
the other supporting leader of the United Somali Congress gen. Mohamed Farah Aidid. Some of
the factions joined with each other and other operated alone. These hostilities caused hundreds of
thousands of refugees and humanitarian disaster. Near 4.5 million Somalis were affected with
famine and diseases. Estimations were that 300,000 people died as the result of the war and at least
1.5 were jeopardized. Adding to that was a million refugees in neighboring countries. 627 For these
reasons United Nations decided to act.628 However, after the first UN missions (UNOSOM I)
Pakistani soldiers were killed in June 1993 under the attack by United Somali Congress, the UNs
response was a resolution to use all necessary means to establish a situation in which humanitarian
aid can be distributed.629 For this purpose UN sent task force (UNITAF) later that year of which
the bulk was formed by US troops. Later this task force was transformed into UNOSOM II whose
efforts culminated in October 1993 with Battle of Mogadishu in which US Joint Task Force
suffered heavy losses. 630
Primary US interest was to establish control of the country and prevent it to fall under Islamite
militant groups. Somalia is strategically positioned on the entrance of Persian Gulf, and there
present-day pirate activities frequently cause damage and instability to world economy.
Dominating force within Somalia was Mohamed Farrah Aidid-led United Somali Congress, which
was an alliance of various militant groups. These were strongly suspected to be supported by Al-

Mohamed, 8. SPM Gen. Aden Abdulluhi Nur, 9. SPM (SNA) Ahmed Hashi Mahmmud, 10. SSDF Gen.
Mohdammed Abshir Mussa, 11. SSNM Abdi Warsame lsaq, 12. USC (SWA) Gen. Mohammed Farah H Aidid, 13.
USC Mohammed Qanyare Afrah, 14. USF Abdurahman Dualch Al, 15. USP Mohamed Abdi Hashi Chairman.
See in United States Institute of Peace, Addis Ababa Agreement concluded at the first session of the Conference on
National Reconciliation in Somalia: 27 March 1993, Peace Agreements Digital Collection, USIP Library, 20
March 2002. Link:
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/somalia_03271993.pdf;
Baxter P., Somalia: US Intervention, 1992-1994, Helion and Company, 2013, p. 19; Fitzgerald N. J., Somalia:
Issues, History, and Bibliography, Nova Publishers, 2002, p. 29.
627
Somalia: UNOSOM I, United Nations publication. Link:
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1backgr2.html (14/02/15).
628
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 733, 23 January 1992. Link:
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/peace/docs/scres733.html (14/02/15).
629
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 837, 6 June 1993. Link: http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/332/32/IMG/N9333232.pdf?OpenElement (14/02/15).
630
UN official figures state that 28,000 military and police personnel plus some 2,800 international and locally
recruited staff which participated in operation. Report also state that Supporting UNOSOM II in the field, but not
part of it, were approximately 17,700 troops of the United States Joint Task Force in Somalia. A Quick Reaction
Force was part of the United States presence. These troops remained under United States command. Department of
Public Information, Somalia - UNOSOM II, United Nations publication, 21 March 1997. Link:
http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosom2b.htm (14/02/15).

255

Qaeda, as its leader Osama Bin Laden was at the time residing in neighboring Sudan. 631 US forces
launched operation to capture Aidid. Following first successful mission, US forces launched
another to capture other Aidids key figures in Somalian capital of Mogadishu. Both missions were
conducted by highly trained regular units and Special Forces with helicopter support. During the
second one, Somali fighters retaliated by shooting down two US helicopters. To rescue survived
soldiers on the ground, US local command and later UN send additional forces. A savage battle
followed as thousands of Somali militia and civilians were rushing to kill US soldiers at the crash
site. Severely outnumbered US soldiers used their superior weapons and fighting skills to fight off
the enemy, and some of them managed to escape the city. In the Battle of Mogadishu, USA suffered
in total 18 killed and 73 wounded.632 In terms of numbers, Somalian casualties were much higher
than those of the US, but to lose so many troops among Special Forces is considered to be heavy
casualties. 633 In the aftermath of the battle, US military presence in Somalia increased
significantly, although just temporarily. This was to serve the purpose of protecting the evacuation
of US army already there, rather than use these reinforcements to punish gen. Aidid. The new US
commanding officer gen. Montgomery had a clear guidance: protect the force, protect the UN, and
bring the force out with minimum of casualties. Clinton ordered to stop all actions by US forces
against Aidid except those required in self-defense.634 US military presence was limited mainly
near the safety of the shoreline. Primary strategic interest of USA seemed to be to protect entrance
to the Persian Gulf, not military solve Somalian Civil War. UN secretary Boutros-Ghali proclaimed
Somalia a failed mission and last UN units retreated in 1995. 635
In this case study I notice general features common with the first group of case studies:
USA used specialist and highly trained units for the mission. Helicopter cover, relying on superior
tactics and technology. USA did not use heavy armor as it was considered that show of force would
be bad for the peace efforts. This political decision proved to be fatal for the outcome of the
operation. Enemy achieved victory by using asymmetry. In 1993 television images of Somali mob
jumping and singing on a knocked Black Hawk helicopter and dragging the bodies of soldiers

631

Murdico S. J., Osama Bin Laden, The Rosen Publishing Group, 2007, p. 33.
Meek J. G., Black Hawk Down Anniversary: Al Qaedas Hidden Hand, ABC News, 4 October 2013.
633
Various estimates placed Somali casualties between 500 and 1,500. See Brown J. S., The United States Army in
Somalia 1992-1994, United States Army Center of Military History, 24 February 2006, p. 23.
634
Ibid, p. 24.
635
Ibid, p. 26.
632

256

through the streets of Mogadishu cut the public support for what was supposed to be a humanitarian
mission.636 For the US public to see these images was too much. Public opinion was crucial.
Somalis as a culturally different enemy fought a war according to their style of war-making, which
includes barbarism and mutilation. US responded by significantly reducing humanitarian aid to the
entire country, which can also be seen as a form of barbarism. US prestige suffered, and possibly
because of high casualties suffered in Somalia, US was reluctant to get militarily involved in
Bosnian and Croatian wars. Losses outweighed the gain and US chose to retreat. This is the
dominant variable which I observed in all of the first group case studies, and is confirming the
hypothesis.
Table 24: Main features of American way of war in Somalia
Group II.
Modern era (1991-present)
Case study 2.

Military defeat/Political defeat

Battle of Mogadishu (1993)

Employment of highly trained troops
Relying on air power
Relying on superior technology
Relying on satellite navigation and precision
strikes
Relying on information warfare
US casualties significantly lower
Direct strategy which demanded quick military
victory capture of Adids lieutenants
Failed employment of those kind of strategies
and tactics which ensured minimal US
casualties
Retaining moral high ground by operating in a
UN peace mission with humanitarian efforts

U.S. expects more attacks in Iraq: Residents hang slain Americans bodies from bridge, CNN News, 6 May
2004.
636

257

As a result of enemys asymmetry US casualties

were lower in terms of numbers, but high if we
consider strategic value of Special Forces
Abandoning humanitarian efforts
Clinton administration chose an honorable
retreat instead risking further casualties
CNN effect of dead US soldiers infuriated
domestic public opinion
Source: prepared by author

NATO operations in Bosnian War (1993-1995)

UNs incapability to effectively check Serbian aggression in Bosnia and Croatia, was finally more
seriously approached by NATO. It was the alliances first joint military operation in history. Main
reason for Western military non-intervention, to stop these two brutal European wars was
inconsistency among major powers over objectives. Russia, Britain and France all supported
Serbia. Russia because Serbia was the only Russian European ally. France and Britain, because
they each had their interests in keeping Yugoslavia in any form. Britain much more than France.
USA at first did not interfere and left the matter to be resolved by its European allies. 637 However,
after Serbian military failure became evident, USA started to take a more active role. It allied itself
with Croatia and ArBiH and politically pressured these two to cease hostilities, and re-form their

637

As C. Hodge in her groundbreaking study Britain and the Balkans pointed out the thoughts of J. Sharp, a senior
researcher at Defense Studies, Kings College London: It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the main reason
Britain did not halt Serbian aggression is that policy makers in Whitehall wanted Serbia and its proxies to prevail.
British envoys to Belgrade all advised London that without strong Serbia there is no stability in the Balkans. This
region could easily fall under German influence sphere. All the EC members accepted the Dutch initiative to send
30,000 troops in Croatia but Britain categorically declined and blocked the motion. France and Germany declared a
common European defense initiative and proposed sending troops to Croatia. But with British opposition no such
force could be mounted. Milosevic readily used the opportunity to launch five pronged offensive into Croatian in
September 1991. During this time British diplomacy used its influence to sway French president F. Mitterrand on its
side, and Franco-British alliance war born with a common attitude towards Serbia which will be in effect for the
next four years. This was a British successful British effort to counter German support for Croatia. Only with
Jacques Chirac did this attitude broke and result in a new French attitude in 1995. Britains role during the both
Croatian and Bosnian War to support Serbia was crucial. Even in 1999 when Tony Blair actively participated in
bombing of Serbia, it was to depose Milosevic, British policy towards the Balkans and its support of Serbian
aspirations remained the same. See in Hodge C., Britain and the Balkans: 1991 Until the Present, Routledge, 2006.

258

alliance from the beginning of the war. Main reason for them two to go to war, were series of
staged provocations in which British secret service MI6 had a significant role. 638
Primary US objective was to gain political prestige by establishing peace in Europe, and checking
Russian strategic interests. Because of fear of possible Russian military involvement, NATO could
not intervene with ground troops. Also, due to Serbian extensive employment of barbarism, NATO
had the moral high ground to interfere. Croatia was determined to resolve the conflict in Croatia
by itself, so NATOs activities were directed against Republika Srpskas forces in Bosnia. Starting
from mid-1993, combined forces of NATO members enforced a no-flight zone over Bosnia thus
preventing any side from using aircraft in military operations. Since Republika Srpska had almost
the entire arsenal of Yugoslavian Air Force at its disposal, these measure were concerning it the
most. Air battle over Banja Luka was the first NATOs military engagement in its history. It
resulted in five Serbian aircraft being shot down, with no losses to the NATO.639 As a response to
NATO and UN activities, Serbian forces repeatedly attacked UN soldiers with the purpose to
take them hostage. Under threat to kill Dutch UN forces in Srebrenica, NATO called off the
airstrike against advancing Serbian units. Following departure of the UN from Srebrenica,
Serbians committed genocide over Bosniak Muslim population within what was supposed to be
a UN protected zone. To save some Western reputation, NATO allowed and supported successful
Croatian offensive Operation Storm (August 1995) which overnight completly changed the
military situation against the Serbs. Later that same month Serbs committed another massacre in
Markale, Sarajevo to which NATO responded by starting an extensive air campaign Deliberate
Force. In one month of bombing, NATOs air operation and Croatian Operation Mistral (October
1995), forced the Serbs on a negotiating table to sign the Dayton agreements. 640 Only after the
military engagements ceased NATO deploy ground forces 60 000 strong to maintain the peace
settlement in Bosnia. 641
In this case study I notice general features common with first group case studies:

638

Barisic M., British Agents Instigated the Bosnian-Croatian Conflicts, Executive Intelligence Review, Vol. 20:
No. 33, 27 August 1993, pp. 32-35.
639
Dakic M. S., Hronika Republike Srpske Krajine 1989-1995, p. 25. Link: krajinaforce.com, (7/1/14).
640
See in Owen R., Deliberate Force: a case study in effective air campaigning, DIANE Publishing, 2000.
641
Assenova M., The Debate on NATOs Evolution: A Guide, CSIS, 2003, p. 9.

259

Operations were conducted because of prestige and NATOs strategic interest to check Serbian
expansion and Russian influence. Because of fear of Russian direct involvement, NATO could not
employ its full military arsenal. Western public opinion forced NATO take action but the same
public opinion influenced NATOs strategy to only use air power, as it minimizes risk of casualties.
When enemy used barbarism and asymmetry, NATO chose to withdrew rather than face more
casualties. They abandoned their smaller local ally to genocide which, because of the
development of mass-media, negatively impacted NATOs political prestige. NATO, instead of
deploying its own ground troops for attack operations relied on local allied forces of Croatia and
ArBiH to conduct them. During the operation NATO only suffered one pilot killed and several
lost aircraft.642 Serbian losses were considerably higher. NATOs economic losses from the
conflict were outweighed by political gain of resolving the crisis. Strategy devised by NATO relied
on superior fighting skill of its troops, and superior technology to minimize casualties. This is the
dominant variable which I observed in all of the first group case studies, and is confirming the
hypothesis.
Table 25: Main features of NATOs way of war in Bosnia
Group II.
Modern era (1991-present)
Case study 3.

Military victory/Political victory

NATO operations in Bosnia (1993-1995)

Employment of highly trained troops
Relying on air power
Relying on superior technology
Relying on satellite navigation and precision
strikes
Relying on information warfare
NATO loses one warplane but suffers no
casualties
Indirect strategy to support ground operations
made by Croatian and ArBiH forces
642

U.S. Jet Crashes in Adriatic, Pilot Dies, Associated Press, 29 April 1994.

260

Relying solely on Air operations, ground troops

of Western countries were incorporated into UN
peacekeeping forces and came into occasional
conflict with the Serbs.
Retaining moral high ground by operating in a
UN peace mission with a response to Serbian
barbarism such as Srebrenica and Markale
Leaving ground operations to be conducted by
a local ally
Finally to take decisive action against Serbian
atrocities saved face of the Western powers
CNN effect of a genocide infuriated domestic
public opinion
Source: prepared by author

NATO operations in Kosovo War (1999)

Following Serbian military defeats in Croatia and Bosnia tensions begin to escalate between
Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo.643 As a result of Serbian repression, Kosovo Albanians formed an
insurgency in 1996 primarily led by Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). This insurgency group
responded to Serbian barbarism strategy with barbarism as well. Peace negotiations mediated by
Western diplomacy failed, and NATO started to consider a military solution. Because of Serbian
massacre of Kosovo Albanian civilians, systematic rape, pillage and mass deportations NATO
put political pressure on Slobodan Milosevic, to accept UN peacekeeping force and Kosovo as an
autonomous province within Yugoslavia. At the time Yugoslavia was made up of Federal republics
Serbia and Montenegro. During the Croatian and Bosnian War, everybody knew that Serbs were
the enemy but it was very difficult to exactly put a single name on these various Serbian groups.
643

Serbs enjoyed hegemony in both First and Second Yugoslavia. Their efforts to militarily impose their policy of
ethnic cleansing in Croatia and Bosnia failed. Croatia conducted successful military offensives with which it
regained full control over its territory. Bosnian War was resolved in the Dayton conference which gave the Serbs
autonomy in one part of Bosnia but effectively signaled the defeat of Greater Serbia aspirations. Frustrated over
the loss of what Serbian nationalists perceived as their national territory, Serbian leadership brutally responded to
Albanian requests in Kosovo.

261

Legally speaking aggression on Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was made by Yugoslavian
Peoples Army, Republika Srpskas armed forces, SAO Krajinas Armed forces, Montenegro
volunteers and various Serbian paramilitary groups. Formally, as Milosevic cleverly stated in
1991, there could be no peace negotiations with him as nobody from Serbia is attacking anybody.
Informally and in reality, all orders were coming from his office in Belgrade. Serbian strategy to
create Greater Serbia was very cleverly conceived, but its lacked military means to employ it. All
these various Serbian armed forces, regardless of their potential were not up to the task, and
proved to be no match for then well-organized western style Croatian Army (HV). 644 Their
frustration because of repeated failures to achieve military victory, led to extensive employment
of barbarism against both Croatian and Bosnian Muslim non-combatants.645 This barbarism rouse
international anger and not only gave moral high ground but compelled Western world to take
action. Extent of genocide in Srebrenica (1995) was smaller when compared genocide in Ruanda
(1994), but it had much more impact on public opinion. After all the military failures, Kosovo was
the last chance to save what was left of Serbian pride as their most important national myths are
connected with this area.646
When Milosevic refused to succumb to NATOs political pressure demanding him to retreat his
army from Kosovo - NATO in order to compel him, responded by employing an extensive air
campaign. There were two main reasons why NATO limited its activities to high altitude bombing
operations. First, fear of casualties and second, fear of Russian military intervention. It has been
long known that Milosevic enjoyed strong support from Moscow, as Serbs are Russias most
important European ally. Significant number of Russian volunteers fought alongside Serbian units
in Kosovo.647 Apart from Russia, China was also expressing strong objections to NATOs military
intervention and gave support to Milosevic regime. Relations between USA and these two major
actors reached the lowest point within the decade. 648
Serbian armed forces after a decade of economic sanctions, political isolation and one military
defeat after another suffered extensively. Troops were motivated but their once advanced

644

See in Magas B., Zanic I., The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1991-1995, Frank Cass, 2001.
Arreguin-Toft, p. 122.
646
Rezun M., Europes Nightmare: The Struggle for Kosovo, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001, p. 35.
647
Rowland J., Fighting for a foreign land: Yugoslav troops have support from Russian volunteers, BBC News,
20 May 1999.
648
Miles J., Bombing fuels Chinese hostility, BBC News, 8 May 1999.
645

262

weapons systems in 1999 could not be properly maintained, and there were shortages of pretty
much everything. NATO air strikes destroyed all strategically important targets within days, but
Serbs were still fighting back. Clinton administration was reluctantly considering invasion with
ground troops. France was strongly opposing to it, as its public had divided opinions on action
against Serbia. According to French assessments it would take at least half a million troops to get
the job done. 649
Instead, NATO infiltrated Norwegian and British Special Forces units within Serb-occupied
Kosovo, to work with KLA insurgents.650 Also CIA conducted covert operations with the purpose
of deposing Milosevic, including cyberwarfare against Serbian defensive systems. 651 Only
officially admitted CIAs aerial bombing operation was bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade,
which resulted in many wounded and several deaths. USA sent official apology to China claiming
it was an accident.652 In the era of geospatial reliance in warfare, one doesnt hit Chinese embassy
by accident. Especially if we observe it in the context of Serbian shooting down US B-117
bomber, which took place a month before and consequent Chinese intelligence rushing to
examine remnants of this technology. 653
NATO had troops deployed in Macedonia, but these were not to move into Kosovo before Serbian
military is destroyed by bombing operations. Some, like US president Clinton argued that it was
the NATOs air campaign which has demoralized Serbian military and civilian structures and
pressured Milosevic to order retreat.654 It is true that public opinion was against Milosevic, but not
because of the bombing so much, as for the fact he proved incompetent to realize political promises
he has made. His regime was repressive but it was not a dictatorship, and he too heavily relied on
public opinion. The primary reason Milosevic eventually decided to retreat from Kosovo, was
Russians backing out political support. As soon as Russian president Yeltsin announced that he
will support western peace plan, Milosevic surrendered on the same day. 655 Russia at the time was
649

Cox S., Gray P., Air Power History: Turning Points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo, Routledge, 2013, p. 325.
Saxi H. L., Norwegian and Danish Defence Policy: A Comparative Study of the Post-Cold era, IFS, 2010, p. 38.
651
CIA reportedly authorized to develop ways to destabilize Yugoslavian government, CNN News, 24 May 1999.
652
Trojanovic I., NATOs 1999 War on Yugoslavia: The Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. Was it
Deliberate?, Global Research, 4 March 2013.
653
Shimatsu Y., How Chinas Stealth Aircraft Rose From Ashes of Balkan War, New America Media, 25 January
2011.
654
Bill Clinton himself declared that the outcome of Allied Force proved that a sustained air campaign, under the
right conditions, can stop an army on the ground. See in Lambeth, NATOs Air War for Kosovo, p. 221.
655
Ibid, p. 67.
650

263

dependent on US economic aid, and Second Chechnya War was starting to escalate. So it was
USAs indirect strategy that effectively succeeded to force Serbian surrender.
After the retreat of Serbian armed forces from Kosovo, International peacekeeping force (KFOR)
of 50 000 troops moved in from Macedonia. 656 In 2008 Kosovo declared itself an independent
state. It has control over most of its territory and has a partial international support as Serbia,
Russia, China, India and other strong countries did not recognize it. Kosovo remains strong US
ally in the region, and if Serbia breaks ties with its nationalism it will find it easier to join both
NATO and EU. However one must keep in mind that, despite the fact that many in Serbia see
Russian backing off during the bombing as treachery Serbia will always remain a Russian
Trojan Horse within Europe, as neither Russia nor Serbia were decisively military defeated with
their culture and interest ties, continue to be strong.
In this case study I notice general features common with first group case studies:
In order to maintain its prestige level NATO was compelled to take action. Out of fear of casualties
and Russian direct involvement, NATO was reluctant to undertake major ground offensive
operation. NATO relied on its superior fighting skill and advanced technology to coerce
Milosevics withdrawal by employing high altitude aerial bombing operations. NATO allied itself
with smaller local force KLA, and assisted its ground operations with Special Forces and Aerial
campaign. Public opinion within NATO countries expressed limited support on war with Serbia.
NATO suffered only a few lost aircraft and few casualties. However a serious blow to US
technologic advance was Serbian asymmetry which resulted in confirmed downing of B-117, and
rumored downing of then super-secret B-2 Spirit stealth bomber. 657 Serbia was much more capable
enemy than Iraq or Somalia, but after a decade of indirect strategies it became a third rate actor.
Serbians, out of frustration for repeated military failures, and according to their cultural beliefs
committed barbarism to which NATO did not answer. First NATO was from being militarily
cornered by Yugoslavia. Second it was important to maintain moral high ground and public
support. For this reason NATO tried to keep civilian casualties low. Rapid victory was not the
priority as Serbia was politically isolated. Serbian casualties were significantly higher than
656

Initially there were 50 000 troops from 39 countries, by June 2008 this number decreased to 14 759 from 34
countries. Trifunovska S., North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Kluwer Law International, 2010, pp. 211-212.
657
B-2 Shot Down over Yugoslavia in 1999 war, Interview with Djordje Anicic: ex-deputy commander 250 Rocket
Brigade of Yugoslav Army, TV Kosava, 4 February 2010.

264

NATOs. During operations NATO employed only those strategies and tactics which minimize
the risk of casualties among its forces. This is the dominant variable which I observed in all of the
first group case studies, and is confirming the hypothesis.
Table 26: Main features of NATOs way of war in Kosovo
Group II.
Modern era (1991-present)
Case study 4.

Military victory/Political victory

NATO operations in Kosovo (1999)

Employment of highly trained troops
Relying on air power
Relying on superior technology
Relying on satellite navigation and precision
strikes
Relying on information warfare
NATO suffers no combat casualties but loses an
advanced piece of aircraft
Indirect strategy to support ground operations
made by Kosovo Liberation Army
Relying solely on Air operations, ground troops
moved in once peace has been established
Retaining moral high ground by operating in a
UN peace mission with a response to Serbian
barbarism of ethnic cleansing
Leaving ground operations to be conducted by
a local ally
To take action to remove Milosevic confirmed
Western prestige
Sport spectator war which could be safely
watched on distance with no NATO combat
casualties
265

Source: prepared by author

NATO War in Afghanistan (2001-2014)

US withdrawal from Somalia because of fear of further casualties, showed Osama bin Laden
American weakness as he called it.658 He identified that fear of losses is the dominant factor
which influences US strategic action. So Bin Laden allegedly organized a major terrorist attack on
USA in 2001.659 Allegedly or not is less important. What is tangible is that Taliban terrorist attack
served a long-term interest of USA. Because it is, at least since mid-1980s, US strategic interest
to establish domination of oil rich Iraq and Iran. Afghanistan is the perfect location to control the
region militarily, as it is strategically exceptionally well-positioned and is outside Russian and
Chinese influence zone. 660 So all USA needed was a moral high ground to attack it, and this is
precisely what it got with 9/11. Strategy behind this attack is to this day not clear, but its
consequences were not. Thousands of civilian casualties, barbarically destroyed national economic
and political symbols deeply enraged US public. Damage done to USA was small compared to
its resources, but damage to its prestige was enormous. It was a moment in history in which a
berserk giant sent a clear message to the whole world, that it is on a path of revenge. Who was a
friend had to support and who was not was better not to be found in the way.
With such unprecedented moral high ground, few voices raised objection when in October 2001
George W. Bush identified Al-Qaeda terrorist organization as the perpetuator, and demanded from
Afghanistan to extradite bin Laden. 661 Taliban government denounced any linking with the attacks
and showed some signs of cooperation but not convincing enough. George W. Bush categorically
declined negotiation with terrorism and launched military operation against Afghanistan. 662
USA for the first time invoked Article V of NATO to which other members responded. 663

658

Thornton R., Asymmetric Warfare: Threat and Response in the 21st Century, Polity, 2007, p. 10.
Whitehouse B., Unveiling Terrorism, Fundamentalism, and Spiritual Abuse, Bilquees Press, 2009, p. 94.
660
Borger J., Bush team agreed plan to attack the Taliban the day before September 11, The Guardian, 24 March
2004.
661
Geltzer J. A., US Counter-terrorism Strategy and Al-Qaeda: Signaling and the Terrorist World-View, Routledge,
2009, p. 40.
662
This Day in History, Oct 7, 2001: US-led attack on Afghanistan begins, History Channel, link:
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/us-led-attack-on-afghanistan-begins (8/1/14).
663
NATO topics, NATO and the Scourge of Terrorism: What is Article 5?
Link: http://www.nato.int/terrorism/five.htm (8/1/14).
659

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Invasion begun with extensive aerial bombing of strategic targets by US and British air forces.
Since 1996 there has been an on-going insurgency in north of the country, led by so-called
Northern Alliance, who fought to depose Taliban regime. US Special Forces allied themselves
with these insurgents and started offensive towards the south. Soon all major cities fell and NATO
forces established bases in the country. From the political structures of Northern Alliance, a new
Afghan government was formed which according to US propaganda better served Afghan
national interest. Taliban were known for their extensive employment of barbarism when battling
Northern insurgency, but Northern Alliance responded with barbarism as well. However to give
USA much needed moral high ground, evidences of massacres committed by Northern troops were
concealed.664 Taliban went hiding in mountains and formed an insurgence (resurgence) of their
own. Resorting to barbarism and low intensity warfare are both distinctive features of Afghan warmaking culture, present in that area since days of Alexander the Great.665
UN-approved, NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for 13 years was
fighting against Taliban and other Islamists. Apart from search and destroy anti-insurgency
missions, NATO was conducting an extensive hearts and minds campaign supported by nationwide education and investment program. To win Afghan population on their side and ensure their
loyalty to new Afghan government, USA and allies are building schools, roads, and hospitals, and
in general trying to increase the standard of the Afghan population. 666 However Al-Qaeda fighters

US blocked probes into Afghan prisoner killings, AFP, 10 July 2009.

See in Tanner, Afghanistan.
666
Pulitzer winning professor of journalism at Sanford, J. Brinkley pointed out serious mismanagement of US
financial aid. More than 100 billion dollars have been spent by USAID program for Afghanistan and the contractors
to which US government gave the job of rebuilding the country have failed to effectively use the money. CIA data
say that After all the money spent, still today, the CIA says, Afghanistan has the worlds highest infant mortality
rate; one hundred and twenty-two of every thousand children die before they reach age one. Brinkley J., Money Pit:
The Monstrous Failure of US Aid to Afghanistan, World Affairs, January/February 2013. Human development
Index Report 2015 places Afghanistan on the 169th place as one of the poorest countries in the World. United
Nations Development Reports, International Human Development Indicators 2015. Link:
http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries (15/02/15). Between 2001 and 2010 Afghanistan has received total amount of 286.4
billion dollars of international aid. Poole L., Afghanistan: Tracking Major Resource Flows, Global Humanitarian
Assistance Report Paper, 2010. However around 40% of this aid goes back to donor countries in corporate profits
and consultant salaries. An additional problem is ineffectiveness of contractors which are tasked with implementing
the aid program. And finally the widespread corruption of Afghanistan officials in this insecure country. Waldman
M., Falling Short: Aid effectiveness in Afghanistan, ACBAR Advocacy Series, March 2008, p. 5. No exact data
can be established on how many schools exactly have been attacked and destroyed by the Taliban but figures are
high as schools are the primary target of the insurgents. In North-West Pakistan province of Swat, the Taliban
insurgency has destroyed 400 of the total 1 576 schools there with 70% of them being girl schools. Teacher and
children have been frequently attacked. Khan R. S., Pakistan rebuilds its education network after Taliban are driven
out of Swat, The Guardian, 26 June 2012.
664
665

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could find refuge in neighboring Pakistan because of which this country is under strong US
influence to cooperate. Hundreds of attacks by pilotless drones, had been made by CIA to destroy
the insurgency. But collateral damage with extensive number of civilian casualties, have led to
worldwide critics of this US strategy. 667 Also more and more US allies are abandoning Afghan
campaign under pressure from their publics, arguing that war is too costly and they do not see
strategic interest to stay there. Country remains burdened by corruption, drug trade and poverty.
Furthermore, allegiance of many of the Afghan tribe warlords remain dubious. It is yet to be seen
how this conflict will end. In December 2014 NATO ISAF mission has terminated its campaign
and left the security of the country in the hands of 352 000 Afghan soldiers and police which it
helped train. As of January 2015 NATO is involved in Afghanistan with a non-combat mission
Resolute Support to provide further training, advice and assistance to the Afghanistan Armed
Forces (ANDSF).668
In this case study I notice general features common with first group case studies:
USA the same as in Vietnam War, took advantage (or possibly even staged) of an incident to
militarily intervene in a country which represents its long term strategic interest. Al-Qaeda used
asymmetry to attack US mainland and as a result American casualties were much higher than
theirs. Identical thing we noticed in Lebanon. Unlike Vietnam where US responded to barbarism
with barbarism, in the form of Phoenix assassination program NATO makes all the efforts to
win a hearts and mind campaign. Evidences of NATO or Northern Alliances barbarism is either
being marginalized or covered up. Such actions make clear that US strategy is to maintain moral
high ground against the Al-Qaeda. This is similar as British did in Malaya. But unlike Malaya, US
are not conducting mass relocations of Afghan population. Negative experiences from Vietnam
proved that employment of relocation strategy is double-edged sword. Similarly like Vietcong
used Laos, Taliban insurgents use neighboring Pakistan as a hideout. The same as with Laos, USA
maintains strong relations with Pakistan to battle insurgents. But CIAs drones bombings in this
country are barbarism, as many civilians were killed as well. In addition to this, CIA is also known

667

In Pakistan 2004-2015 CIA has executed 413 drone strikes in which estimated killed are between 2 438 to 3 942
people out of which 416 to 959 are classified as civilians and 168 to 204 as children. Data from City University of
London, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, The Bureaus complete data sets on drone strikes in Pakistan,
most recent strike 28 January 2015. Link: http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/dronesgraphs/ (15/02/15).
668
NATO A-Z, NATO and Afghanistan.

268

to use kidnaping, torture and execution of Al-Qaeda key figures similar as the French in Algeria.
NATO allied itself with a local force, Northern Alliance which did the brunt of ground operations.
Special Forces infiltration, aerial bombing and international pressure were the key features of
NATOs invasion strategy. Once the Taliban insurgent phase begun, USA deployed highly trained
and motivated units with superior training, logistic, intelligence, leadership and technology.
International units of both NATO and other allies are there to ensure US political support and
moral high ground for the war. In Afghanistan, a portion of US troops is under NATO command,
and others are under direct US command. This says something about integration of this alliance.
What is a novelty, is the extensive employment of private contractors. By employing contractors
instead of conventional troops, USA reduces the likelihood of its own casualties. However, as we
mentioned before, contractors (mercenaries) are also a double-edged sword as their loyalty is
limited and they draw negative publicity.
Furthermore, US-sponsored Afghan government, similar like South Vietnamese, is known for its
corruption and drug trafficking relations. Also USA and NATO is culturally different than
Afghans, and it is difficult to for them to make a cooperation both in war-making culture and
human relation. The same as in Vietnam, where Americans thought that they came to help South
Vietnamese only to become demoralized, once they realized that South Vietnamese are not as
combat effective nor willing as they are. US-NATO soldiers in Afghanistan often encounter these
cultural problems, and this reduces their motivation. But what I notice as the crucial variable in
NATO strategy in Afghanistan is that it was devised in such a way to make an absolute priority
for their casualties to be low. Under pressure for prolonged duration of the conflict and suffered
casualties, western public demanded for their forces to be pulled back. This is the dominant
variable which I observed in all of the first group case studies, and is confirming the hypothesis.
Table 27: Main features of NATOs way of war in Afghanistan
Group II.
Modern era (1991-present)
Case study 5.

Military victory/Political victory

NATO operations in Afghanistan (20012015)

Employment of highly trained troops
269

Relying on air power

Relying on superior technology
Relying on satellite navigation and precision
drone strikes
Relying on information warfare
NATO suffers much less combat casualties
than the Taliban
Cooperating efforts with local Afghan forces
opposing the Taliban
Hearts and minds campaign in
counterinsurgency struggle
Retaining moral high ground by operating
against terrorists
USA sent a decisive message to the terrorists
by attacking them on their own ground
For the first time in modern history war has
been brought into the homes of US citizens as
they were attacked on their own soil
Western public demanded troops to be pulled
out due to casualties
Source: prepared by author

Coalition of the willing invasion of Iraq (2003) and Iraq War (2003-2011-ongoing)
Since the end of the First Gulf War in 1991, Iraq was under political and economic isolation. Its
military potential was seriously hampered under strong international sanctions. In everyday life of
Iraqi there were shortages of everything, including the necessities such as medicine and food. To
avoid humanitarian catastrophe Iraq was permitted to sell limited amounts of oil, enough to pay
for food and war retributions. USA enforced no-fly zones over Iraq and US military closely

270

monitored all traffic in and out of the country. 669 In 1998, with the purpose to further destabilize
Saddams government, USA conducted bombing campaign on Iraqi military installations.
Operation had to be abandoned after few days, as it met strong criticism from both US Arab allies
and domestic public opinion. 670 However more than a decade of sanctions took a heavy toll on
both Iraqi civil and military. Yet still Saddam held on to power. Following Al-Qaedas alleged
involvement in 9/11 attack and successful invasion of Afghanistan Bush administration insisted
on Saddams involvement and WMD production. There was no evidence for any link between AlQaeda and Iraq or weapons production. Iraqi nuclear program was preventively destroyed in 1981,
and even this was designed by its French constructors in such a way not to be able to produce
nuclear weapons.671
US key allies declined to join in for the campaign, so a NATO action like in Afghanistan was out
of the question. Therefore USA found allies among UK, Australia and Poland. It was a classical
war of interest but to ensure moral high ground, US propaganda insisted on Iraqi connections with
Al-Qaeda and its threat to the world peace. Under immense US and British political pressure and
despite the biggest anti-war protests in history world stood still in disbelief, as the Coalition of
the Willing moved in for the kill of what was left of the Saddams once formidable military. In
1991 it took an international Coalition of 34 countries, worldwide public support and almost a
million soldiers to liberate Kuwait. In 2003, a Coalition of a few countries with unprecedented
public opposition and little more than quarter of a million soldiers conquered the whole of Iraq. 672
Such is the power of strategy.
Since at least 2002 CIA and Special Forces teams were infiltrated in Northern Iraq, mostly
inhabited by Kurds which were ready to fight against Saddam. USA abandoned them in 1991, but
they were managed to be persuaded for another campaign. Parallel to this US also used deception
669

Resolution 661 (1990), United Nations, 6 August 1990. Link: http://daccessods.un.org/TMP/2146947.68190384.html

670
Dec 16, 1998: Clinton orders air attack on Iraq, History Channel, This day in History Link:
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/clinton-orders-air-attack-on-iraq (9/1/14).
671
Shue H., Rodin D., Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification, Oxford University press, 2009, p. 215.
672
Robinson L., Whitelaw K., Deploying the Free Iraqi Forces: What role for the arriving anti-Saddam Iraqi
fighters?, US News, 7 April 2003.
Initial list which President G. W. Bush called Coalition of the willing included 50 countries. However besides US
only four other countries contributed with troops for the actual invasion UK, Australia, Poland, Denmark and
Spain. Operation Iraqi Freedom counted 297 000 Coalition troops facing off Iraqi Armys 375 000 plus an
unknown number of poorly trained citizens militia. Tucker S. (ed.), U.S. Leadership in Wartime: Clashes,
Controversy, and Compromise, ABC-CLIO, 2009, p. 873.

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as their secret agent code named April Fool provided Iraqi Intelligence with fake invasion plans
according to which the main invasion was to come from the Turkish border, not from the South.
In reality, Turkey was not willing to participate in invasion and denied use of its territory. 673 Kurds
are its enemies and Turkey even invaded their territory in Northern Iraq (briefly in 2008).
Unlike the First Gulf War the opening of the campaign was not preceded by a long
bombardment.674 USA did not have the resource of time. Instead Coalitions strategy was devised
to offer rapid victory. World for the first time saw employment of a new Shock and awe strategy,
which I previously discussed. Campaign begun with an attempted, but failed, decapitation air
strikes on Iraqi key leaders and command and control centers. This was followed by blitzkrieg of
armored columns across the desert, amphibious landings and other special operation to secure main
strategic objectives oil wells. US Special Forces and Kurdish irregulars successfully attacked
Iraqi troops in the North.
After series of intense battles with a determined Iraqi Army, Coalition forces, following a bloody
battle, captured Bagdad 20 days after the campaign had begun. 675 During the operations, Iraqi top
military commanders were bribed to abandon their posts and leave the country. Almost
immediately begun the hunt for Saddam Hussein and his key officials. Various groups within Iraqi
society begun to fight among themselves and US military intervened to secure civic order.
Widespread loot across the city begun and among targets was the Iraqi National Museum, from
which thousands of worlds most important artefacts were stolen. During the campaign Iraqi troops
repeatedly employed barbarism such as execution of POW, rape, human shield and pretense to
surrender. Their soldiers who were wishing to surrender were being executed by the officers. USA
did not respond to barbarism with the same, as it was vital for it to keep moral high ground, and
the enemy was being repeatedly defeated anyway. Soon after Saddam was captured. Later tried
and executed on the 30th December 2006 by the new Iraqi government. 676

673

See in Geraghty T., Black Ops: The Rise of Special Forces in the CIA, the SAS, and Mossad, Pegasus Books,
2012.
674
Saddam was anticipating and fearing a long aerial campaign and for this purpose dispersed and trained his army
to conceal its position. Mahnken T. G., Keaney T. A., War in Iraq: Planning and Execution, Routledge, 2007, p. 79.
675
During the invasion period 20th March to 1st May 2003, US suffered 139 and UK 33 killed soldiers. Ibidem.
676
American officials gave Saddam Hussein to Iraqi officials saying that they have no issue in handing him over as
long as it is in accordance to the law. Iraqi president Talabani agreed to the verdict of execution. Religious leader
ayatollah in Najaf confirmed and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki signed the death by hanging sentence as
opposed to Saddams request to be shot by firing squad. Sentence was carried out in a small room next to Saddams

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Soon after military defeat of Iraqi Army, insurgency begun for which Saddam has prepared
grounds before the invasion, with stockpiled and concealed weapons. 677 Since then we observe the
second phase of Iraq War. Guerrilla gradually rose and gathered support from those elements
enraged by enemys occupation despite the fact that USA and allies did not employ barbarism
and repression.678 A potential US mistake could have been to disband Iraqi Army after the invasion
effectively releasing around 400 000 trained soldiers into the general population. 679 Strategy of
guerrilla relies on sabotage, ambush, open assaults and terror like suicide bombings, kidnappings,
improvised explosive devices, car bombs etc. World was shocked in 2004, to see bodies of killed
US contractors mutilated, dragged on streets, burned and hung on a bridge by an angry mob.680
But apart from its brutality, during the whole war, US Intelligence was surprised of Insurgents
effectiveness and their robust command and control system. 681
US counterinsurgency strategy is based on heavy force, clear and hold, mercenaries and barbarism,
but only directed against insurgents not civilians, as USA is conducting a hearts and minds
campaign. Since the invasion, insurgency defeated US forces on several occasions, most notably
in Battle of Fallujah to which USA quickly responded by Second Battle of Fallujah, and it
remains one of the fiercest urban battles in US military history. Violence between various Iraqi
factions escalated into civil war so USA increased efforts on political level supported by
economic recovery, to gain cooperation from most of the society. One of the key elements of US
former prison housing his intelligence services. Newton M. A., Scharf M. P., Enemy of the State: The Trial and
Execution of Saddam Hussein, Macmillan, 2008, pp. 203-204.
677
Cordesman A. H., Davies E. R., Iraqs Insurgency and the Road to Civil Conflict, Greenwood Publishing Group,
2008, p. 51.
678
There are several identified Iraqi guerrilla groups, of which the most prominent ones are Sunni Nationalist and
Sunni Islamist extremists. Sunni Nationalist represent the former regime elements and strive to reestablish Baathist
rule. Sunni Islamists include both foreign cadre and Iraqis forming neo-Salafi elements of the insurgency which see
it as a wider war of Sunni puritanism. They readily attacked Coalition troops, Iraqi troops and civilians. Al-Qaeda in
Mesopotamia is behind them and this group rose to prominence ever since now forming the ISIL war in Northern
Iraq and Syria. Next group is Shiite militias which has ties with Iran and is fighting both Sunnis, Coalition and Iraqi
Army. They are consisted of two militias called Mahdi Army and Badr Organization. Final group is Kurdish militias
united under the name Peshmerga which is fighting for the independence of Kurdistan and has cooperated with both
Iraqi Army and Coalition forces. Cordesman, pp. 25-26.
679
Tucker, p. 873.
680
The four American civilians killed were employees of Blackwater Security Consulting, a U.S. government
contractor. U.S. expects more attacks in Iraq: Residents hang slain Americans bodies from bridge, CNN News, 6
May 2004.
The fact that four bodies were barbarically mutilated and left burned to hang from a bridge sent a message of the
brutal reality of counterinsurgency war. However it did not have the reaction to pull out the troops like it did in
Somalia a decade earlier. Scahill J., Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army, Profile
Books, 2011, p. 171.
681
Ware M., Papers give peek inside al Qaeda in Iraq, CNN News, 11 June 2008.

273

strategy was to train Iraqi government troops, to replace US soldiers in counter-insurgent

operations.
There has been several incidents involving US soldiers and contractors in massacres against Iraqi
civilians. Things such as these happen in war, and especially in low intensity war against culturally
different enemy which extensively employs barbarism. It is difficult for any army to keep its troops
disciplined. However, since USA legally prosecuted these perpetuators, we can observe that
systematic barbarism is not a part of US strategy. These incidents and casualties among its troops,
brought immense public pressure to US for withdrawal of its troops. In 2012 last US soldier left
Iraq and this caused again for the insurgency to increase its activities. New Iraq government now
has taken the brunt of fight, with US air support and CIA clandestine operations. 682 In the
beginning of 2014, ISIL managed to take control of considerable portion of western Iraq. This is
an on-going conflict and we are yet to see its outcome. 683
In this case study I notice general features common with first group case studies.
To conquer Iraq, USA employed a series of indirect and direct strategies since at least mid-1980s.
All the strategies were designed in such a way to minimize US casualties. Because of the lack of
international support and very dubious moral high ground, speed and low casualties were essential
factors in 2003 invasion. There was simply no time for a long bombing campaign to proceed
ground forces. Instead, US could rely on its previously employed strategy of more than a decade
of economic and military blockade as it significantly reduced Iraqi military potential. USA made
its first priority to establish an air domination over Iraqi skies. Several intertwining strategies were
employed with devastating consequences for what was left of Saddams military. First, immense
US political and diplomatic activity ensured worlds non-reaction as political or public support
were not feasible. Second, deception of Iraqi leadership about invasion plans. Third, infiltration of
Special Forces and Intelligence agents to ally USA with smaller local actor, Kurdish irregulars.
Fourth, decapitation strikes on Iraqi command and control infrastructure. And final, rapid thrust
with elite armored units in Blitzkrieg fashion.

682

Harvey F. P., Explaining the Iraq War: Counterfactual Theory, Logic and Evidence, Cambridge University Press,
2012.
683
U strahu od sukoba, civili bjeze izAnbara (In fear of conflict civilians are running away from Anbar), AlJazeeraBalkans, 9 January 2014.

274

USA relied on its superior technology and better quality of troops to employ only those tactics
and strategies which will defeat the enemy rapidly, while at the same time, US casualties will be
minimal. Civilian casualties were also attempted to be kept low as USA had very limited moral
high ground for invasion. Iraqi will to resist, was despite all strategies still considerable but will
itself was not sufficient to counter Coalitions air domination and superior troops. Out of frustration
for military failure and due to cultural differences, Iraqi employed barbarism. However this was
not responded by deliberate barbarism, as US moral high ground was walking on a string. Later
during the insurgency phase, CIA secretly employed barbarism as a way to bring asymmetric
conflict with insurgency and terrorism into a symmetric one. Those US soldiers who broke under
pressure and committed atrocities were tried, in order to show to the world that barbarism is not
US official strategy. To win hearts and minds campaign, Coalition, from 2003 onwards, tried
employ only those strategies which will ensure public cooperation. They did not, like in Malaya
or Vietnam, tried to relocate population to separate it from insurgents. What is also different from
these two probability case studies, is US extensive employment of mercenaries. Purpose of this
was to lower the cost of the war and reduce casualties among their regular troops.
To fight insurgents, USA relied on heavy force, clear and hold and technological superiority. This
enabled USA to bring an asymmetric insurgency into a symmetric realm, and almost defeat it. And
this almost is the biggest unknown, as US troops pulled back since the surge in 2007 and finally
in December 2011 under pressure from domestic public opinion. Their military achievements were
high and casualties were low, significantly lower than those of Saddams Iraqi Army or insurgents
but still too much for US public. This is why USA, the same as in Vietnam, organized new Iraqi
Army and left it by itself, to battle civic unrest and on-going insurgency. So far US invasion of
Iraq has not paid off in terms of political prestige, but it considerably paid off economically and
strategically. Because Iraq is now a US friend from which any action against Iran can be made.
Second, its rich oil resources are at US disposal. All in all, the gain was higher than losses. But
what we have seen so far, since the start of the conflict, is that USAs absolute priority was always
to employ only those strategies and tactics which minimize the risk of their casualties. This is the
dominant variable which I observed in all of the first group case studies, and is confirming the
hypothesis.

275

Table 28: Main features of American way of war in Iraq

Group II.
Modern era (1991-present)
Case study 6.

USA pulled out its troops/War in Iraq ongoing

Coalition operations in Iraq (2003-2011)

Employment of highly trained troops
Relying on air power
Relying on superior technology
Relying on satellite navigation and precision
drone strikes
Relying on information warfare
Coalition suffers much less combat casualties
than the Iraqi during both invasion and
counterinsurgency phase
Cooperating efforts with local Iraqi forces
opposing the Radical Islamists
Ineffective hearts and minds campaign in
counterinsurgency struggle
Losing the moral high ground for fighting a
war of profit
USA showed to be the most powerful military
organization but also lost face as champion of
democracy
Western public demanded troops to be pulled
out due to casualties
Source: prepared by author

NATO operations in Libyan Civil War (2011)

Libya, an oil rich country in North Africa has caught international attention since the late 1960s.
Primarily because of its leader col. Muammar Gaddafi who came to power in 1969 with a bloodless
276

coup dtat undertaken by Libyan military. The new Libyan republic, led by the principles of
Gaddafis Green Book, was to serve Libyan people and create a prosperous country free of
corruption. Since then, income from oil exploitation made Libya a player in World politics where
it supported primarily anti-American movements around the globe. Gaddafi was always a proSoviet and an anti-West figure known to be supporting terrorism, and his presence in Libya in
many ways bothered France, UK and USA. But despite his extravagance, Gaddafi was a skilled
politician and USA never managed to completely internationally isolate his regime. Perhaps
because he was also in many ways useful to the West as he kept refugees from North Africa outside
Europe.684 Since his rise to power, Libya developed considerably and standard of life was in most
aspects good. Political guidelines of the Green Book present a way how to create an almost perfect
state. However, Gaddafi failed to fulfill one promise made in this book. Him and his power became
the biggest problem of Libya. Officially he had only ceremonial function, unofficially, and in
reality, the government was just an instrument as he, his family and his tribal clan held all the
power. Corruption was widespread and Gaddafi aroused both domestic and international anger
because of his and his familys dissolute lifestyle. Naturally Libyan people were unhappy with
these things, but realistically it would never be enough to depose him, as the situation in the country
was bearable for most people. So what Libyans needed was a little push. In a classic outside
staged crisis, secret services of western powers managed to fuel civic unrest which escalated into
civil war.685 Following events of the Arab spring in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt, Libyan people
in mass protests demanded more effective government. Gaddafi sided with the people,
encouraging the government to be replaced by one less corrupted and more efficient. However, as
it is to be expected, government showed little efforts. Social networks, media, underground music
and infiltrated provocateurs ignited the mass all quickly gave shape to protesters own political
program, in whose center was the objective of removing Gaddafi and his clan from power. Among
protesters there were also present Al-Qaeda and radical Islamists, however these were not
bothering US enough for it to point them out to the public, as radicalization of protests was serving
The EU was paying Libya to deal with refugees seeking a new life in Europe. Vandvik B., The EUs dubious
refugee deal, The Guardian, 20 October 2010.
685
CIA and Mossad are known to use social networks to manipulate public perceptions. Roberts P. C., How America
Was Lost: From 9/11 to the Police/Welfare State, Atwell Publishing, 2014, p. 139. However no solid evidence can
be provided to support this claim. Therefore it will remain under doubt. What are the facts is that internet is a
marvelous tool of empowerment and social networks added tremendously to the Arab Spring starting from 2010.
See The Phenomenon of Social media in Jarmon J. A., The New Era in U.S. National Security: An Introduction to
Emerging Threats and Challenges, Rowman & Littlefield, 2014, p. 41.
684

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its strategic interests.686Masses of people have a mind of its own, and soon enough a revolution
escalated.
In Libya there has always been imposed limited repression, and old tensions between privileged
and unprivileged parts of the society became to emerge. Gaddafi, himself taking power by a coup,
was always afraid to be deposed in the same way. For this reason his strategy was to keep Libyan
army weak and never to identify potential successor around which then, his opponents could
gather. Elite brigades and oil resources were kept under his control by installing loyal segments,
mostly from his own tribal clan.687 When masses begun protesting violently, police responded with
more violence. To this masses responded even more violently. As Gaddafi was not willing to step
down, soon society broke into anti-Gaddafi and Gaddafi loyal forces. Anti-Gaddafi were armed,
possibly with foreign support and large number of underprivileged army members defected to their
side. Western powers begun political isolation and extensive propaganda campaign against
Gaddafi and his forces. As I stated before, war and masses have a nature of its own and once
violence commences, it is difficult, almost impossible to stop it. One side hurts the other, then the
other responds, to which again the first responds even more and soon enough full scale war and
barbarism are present. This is exactly what happened in Libya. There was undoubtedly a long
dissatisfaction with Gaddafis regime, but this regime was never so repressive and this dissent
never so strong, to escalate to civil war. However, with skilled strategies USA, France and UK
managed to ignite it.
Soon after the fighting broke out, UN passed a resolution 1973 approving NATOs 14 members
to impose no-fly zone over Libya.688 After establishing effective air domination, NATO allied

Why Theres a War In Mali: Because We Bumped Off Libyas Gaddafi, WashingtonsBlog, 15 January 2013.
Italian analyst Alessandro Politi estimated that Gadhafi, fearing a coup, has deliberately kept his army weak in
recent years, but he has bolstered elite forces that are personally loyal to him. Poggioli S., Gadhafis Military Muscle
Concentrated In Elite Units, NPR, 10 March 2011. Another analyst Dave Hartwell said that Gaddafis
paramilitary unit, the Revolutionary Guard Corps, was seen as his most loyal forces. A second crack battalion, the
32nd Brigade was commanded by Gaddafis youngest son Khami. AFP, Gaddafis elite forces key to Libya conflict:
experts, Al Arabiya News, 10 March 2011. There are no reliable data on the exact numbers comprising loyalists
forces of Gaddafi. Estimates are about 50 000 including regular army, draftees and mercenaries. Khamis Brigade
was proven to be the most deadly. Lobban R. A., Dalton C. H., Libya: History and Revolution, ABC-CLIO, 2014, p.
189.
688
UN Security Council approved a no-fly zone over Libya with all necessary measures to protect civilian protesters
from being attacked by Gaddafis regime. Speaking after the vote, representatives who had supported the text
agreed that the strong action was made necessary because the Gaddafi regime had not heeded the first actions of the
Council and was on the verge of even greater violence against civilians as it closed in on areas previously dominated
by opposition in the east of the country. They stressed that the objective was solely to protect civilians from further
686
687

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itself with rebel National Transitional Council (NTC) and begun an air-bombing campaign against
Gaddafis forces. During the conflict NATOs troops did not engage in ground operation but only
supported NTCs from air. This way they minimized the risk of their own casualties and the more
Libyans die, the more NATO propaganda gains moral high ground. Both sides during the war
employed barbarism. And it is not surprising as it was a civil war, and in this type of war has a
strong personal hatred factor. Gaddafi extensively used foreign mercenaries, which unlike his own
forces, had even less restraint when it came to committing atrocities against Libyan civilians. 689
These, once captured, were executed by anti-Gaddafi forces. After eight months, following the
defeat at Sirte, Gaddafi was killed. There are several versions of his death including the one in
which Syrian president Bashar al-Assad gave Gaddafis phone number to French secret service,
so that it can locate him. According to it, Gaddafi was executed by French agent who infiltrated
the rebel crowd.690 Images which went around the world, were those of Gaddafis body paraded
and mutilated by an armed mob. Sporadic fighting continued as his surviving sons and last
supporters tried to escape, but there was not safety for them anywhere. With their capture and
executions, war in Libya was over.691
In this case study I notice general features common with first group case studies.
Libya was politically isolated by skilled political pressure of USA, France and UK. Since all of
these three powers could agree on objectives their other smaller allies joined in as well and this
war was carried out by NATO. Economic gains from Libyan rich oil fields outweighed the cost of
the war. NATO allied itself with small local ally NTC to conduct ground operations, while it
provided naval, air and political support. Russia and China were at first supporting Gaddafi, but
as it was a civil strife and NATO did not step out of boundaries which were given to it by UN,
harm. Lebanons speaker stressed that the text would not result in the occupation of one inch of Libyan territory by
foreign forces. The representative of the United Kingdom pledged that partners in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the Arab League were now ready to act to support the text. The representative of the
United States said that today, the Council had responded to the Libyan peoples cry for help. The Councils purpose
was clear: to protect Libyan civilians. The Security Council had authorized the use of force, including enforcement
of a no-fly zone, to protect civilians and civilian areas targeted by Colonel Muammar Al-Gaddafi, his allied forces
and mercenaries. United Nations Security Council, Security Council Approves No-Fly Zone over Libya,
Authorizing All Necessary Measures to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions, 10 March
2011. Link: http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm (15/02/15).
689
Milosevic S., Srpski psi rata cuvaju Gadafija (Serbian Dogs of War guarding Gaddafi), Alo, 23 February
2011.
690
Blomfield A., Bashar al-Assad betrayed Col. Gaddafi to save his Syrian regime, The Telegraph, 30 September
2012.
691
See in Vandewalle D., A History of Modern Libya, Cambridge University Press, 2012.

279

there was not much they could do but stand and watch. When it became obvious that Gaddafi was
defeated, they too recognized NTC as legitimate representative of Libya, but it was too late for
their share of the spoils. These were already divided among Western countries. However sine 2011
the country has fallen into low intensity violence and starting from May 2014 a civil war between
Radical Islamist and Democratic government forces. We are yet to see the outcome and possible
further Western involvement.
This war again showed that no armed conflict can be led without some sort of US involvement,
regardless of the fact that Libya is within European powers influence zone. US political protection
ensured Russian and Chinese non-involvement. Gaddafis political connections around the world
proved to be for nothing, as all of his sympathizers abandoned him. These including Italian primeminister Silvio Berlusconi, with whom he had close ties. Gaddafis forces barbarism was
extensively used by NATOs propaganda to ensure their moral high ground. During the whole
operation, from the Arab Spring to the death of Gaddafi we can observe that NATO only
employed those tactics and strategies, which ensured that it suffers low casualties. As a result
NATO suffered no human casualties, no significant loss of equipment and increased its political
prestige. This is the dominant variable which I observed in all of the first group case studies, and
is confirming the hypothesis.
Table 29: Main features of NATOs way of war in Libya
Group II.
Modern era (1991-present)
Case study 7.

Overthrow of Gaddafi/Ongoing conflict

NATO operations in Libya (2011)

Employment of highly trained troops
Relying on air power
Relying on superior technology
Relying on satellite navigation and precision
strikes
Relying on information warfare
NATO suffers no combat casualties

280

Indirect strategy to support ground operations

made by Libyan National Transitional Council
Relying solely on Air operations and maritime
blockade
Retaining moral high ground by operating in a
UN approved mission as a response to
Gaddafis barbarism of attacking civilian
protesters
Leaving ground operations to be conducted by
a local ally
To take action to remove Gaddafi confirmed
Western

prestige

and

opened

potential

prospects for oil exploitation

Sport spectator war which could be safely
watched on distance with no NATO combat
casualties
Source: prepared by author

French intervention in Northern Mali conflict (2013-2014)

Mali, this African landlocked country has a long history of civic unrest and occasional conflict
between central government with Tuareg and other Arab nomad tribes which demand
independence of Northern Mali. Series of Tuareg rebellions, 1962-1964, 1990-1995 and 20072009, have all ended in peace settlements between rebels and Mali government. The objective of
reaching autonomy was not achieved. So in 2012 another rebellion broke out, in which various
elements of Tuareg and Arab tribes including radical Islamite groups, renewed the fight. 692

692

Niger is rich in uranium which is needed for French nuclear power plants. France cannot allow for the conflict to
spread from Mali into it as 30% of Uranium needed for French industry is coming from Niger. See in Notin J., La
Guerre de la France au Mali, Tallandier, 2014.

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In strategy every action has its consequences. Arab Spring and NATOs action in Libya, among
other things, caused renewal of this rebellion. 693 Heavy weapons used in Libya found their way
across the desert borders into the hands of Mali rebels. 694 National Movement for the Liberation
of Azawad (MNLA) and Islamists groups successfully fought against the Mali government troops,
and seized control of the Northern part. MNLA proclaimed independence of Azawad, which was
opposed by both African Union and European Union. Mali military, discontent with its leadership
blamed it for military failure and staged a bloodless coup, in which the government was replaced
by military officers. However, as Mali is landlocked, without valuable natural resources and
heavily dependent on economic help from African Union its neighbors quickly imposed
economic sanctions against the putsch. Under this pressure military junta backed off and new
president was inaugurated, promising decisive military action. In fact he used the phrase we will
not hesitate to wage a total and relentless war against the rebels, but we express some doubt that
he fully understood the meaning of it. 695 In fact this coup weakened Malis military response to
the rebels, as it added to confusion among Mali troops.
African Union sent troops to battle the rebels, and USA, UK, Germany, Italy and France provided
logistic and political assistance. Tensions between MNLA and radical Islamite begun to emerge
and soon open fighting broke out between them as well. The two groups objectives differed from
the start, as Islamite wanted to impose Islamic law, Sharia in Northern Mali. This was rejected by
MNLA, and seeing that independence is not a feasible option they allied themselves with Mali
government, identifying radical Islamite as a primary threat. Radicals, despite their extensive
employment of barbarism, followed by strong opposition from a sizable parts of population still
achieved military successes, which threatened French military position within Mali. French
military presence in Mali, and other parts of its former colonial empire, is not motivated so much
economically, as much by prestige to control Africa as a part of their grand strategy, to maintain

693

Fall of Gaddafi and looting of his weapons storage directly influenced renewal of Tuareg rebellion in Northern
Mali. See in Gowan R., Is Mali Africas War Now?: Malis Conflict, the Sahels Crisis, World Politics Review, 21
January 2013.
694
Nossiter A., Qaddafis Weapons, Taken by Old Allies, Reinvigorate an Insurgent Army in Mali, New York
Times, 5 February 2012.
695
Malis new leader threatens total war against Tuareg rebels, The Telegraph, 13 April 2012.

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the ability to project military power around the globe. 696 So to protect this interests, France
launched operation Serval in beginning of 2013 to militarily intervene against Radical Islamists. 697
Based on UN resolutions, French ground forces and air units seized strategically important cities
and organized Mali and African Unions soldiers for more effective response to the rebels. French
diplomacy was involved into the conflict from the start and government decided to intervene to
protect its strategic interests. Again with some opposition from its public opinion, as it fails to see
the change in warfare which demands that French strategic position is no longer defended at its
borders. Since the French intervention, Coalition of Mali, African Union and the French Army has
taken control of all major cities. This conflict is officially ended as a French victory and France
has expanded its military operations in the form of Operation Barkhane to secure the Maghreb and
Sahel regions (specifically Mali, Chad and Niger) from growth of Radical Islam. 698
In this case study I notice general features common with first group case studies:
France, to protect its strategic interests, intervened in the Northern Mali conflict. Brunt of the
ground troops are made of local forces from Mali, and African countries under French influence.
Political prestige and securing the region with intervention in Mali, outweighs economic gain for
France. To keep the cost of intervention low, France used its political influence to get logistic
support from its allies, USA and other NATO members. Only when it proved that local forces
themselves are not able to deal with rebellion themselves, did the French intervene. French
intervention troops are consisted of elite naval, air and ground units. With employment of Special
Forces, and relying on allied units to do most of the fighting France is minimizing the risk of its
own casualties. French domestic opinion will not tolerate high casualties. So far French losses are
significantly lower than the estimated number of enemy soldiers killed. French strategy did not
answer to enemys barbarism with barbarism, as they did in their counter-insurgency campaign in
Algeria. First, France is far from being military cornered; second, Mali is far less valuable than
Algeria was; and third, to keep moral high ground and international support for intervention. Since
696

Similar situation is currently taking place in Central African Republic. In order to protect its military presence
and strategic interests, French government has intervened with 1200 soldiers. The primary purpose of this action is
to stop a possible genocide between CERs Muslim and Christian population. Such a thing to happen, in their former
colony, would have serious impact for the French political prestige. See more in French army buildup in CAR
unlikely to quell bloodshed, UPI, 2 December 2013.
697
France confirms Mali military intervention, BBC News, 11 January 2013.
698
See in Francis D. J., The regional impact of the armed conflict and French intervention in Mali, NOREF
Report, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre publication, April 2013.

283

the beginning of conflict, French intervention is devised in such a way to use only those strategies
and tactics which will minimize its casualties, as they are costly both economically and politically.
This is the dominant variable which I observed in all of the first group case studies, and is
confirming the hypothesis.
Table 30: Main features of French way of war in Mali
Group II.
Modern era (1991-present)
Case study 8.

Military victory/Political victory

French operations in Mali (2013-2014)

Employment of highly trained troops
Relying on air power
Relying on superior technology
Relying on satellite navigation and precision
strikes
Relying on information warfare
France suffers significantly less casualties than
Islamists
Counterinsurgency strategy to support ground
operations made by Mali and African Unions
regular forces
Retaining moral high ground by operating
against terrorism and protecting civilians
Counting on a local ally to fight alongside its
units
To take action to fight Islamists confirmed
French prestige in the region and secured
uranium exploitation
War against Islamists seemed far to the French
public until Jihadist responded with a terrorist

284

attack on Charlie Hebdo satirical magazine in

Paris killing 12 journalists
Source: prepared by author

CONCLUSIONS
In all of the examined case studies, both Cold War and Modern, we notice two key features. Cases
in which Western strategy proved not to be cost effective were the ones in which a western actor
resorted to systematic barbarism or the ones in which the enemy successfully employed asymmetry
thus traumatizing western public opinion. In all of the cases public support was crucial for Western
actor to conduct military operations. Starting from the end of the Cold War geospatial revolution
profoundly changed the way wars are being fought. Satellite navigation and real time tracking of
enemy movements rapidly decreased the time in which decisions are being made. Also satellite
navigation made air attacks much more precise and effective. War on terror introduced drones
which being operated from afar remove the risk of casualties. However employment of drones
raised moral questions. Despite their advanced technology drones caused civilian casualties and
changed perception of the war itself. To fight with drones made war became more similar to a
video game than to actual combat. Psychologically it is easier to kill a distant enemy. Internet and
cyberwarfare became deeply intertwined with actual military operations. Developments in
information technology made public opinion to be manipulated with greater effect. In the Arab
World public access to information had a two tier effect. In one way oppressed societies demanded
democratization and on the other internet strengthened the influence of Radical Islamism. Creation
of ISIL and its savage methods never seemed closer to Western societies. Apart from developments
in communication and navigation technology, other key features of the Western strategy since the
end of the Cold War remained exactly the same. Western actors if possible count on a local ally to
conduct ground operations while they provide air support. Also local allies are easily left behind
to the barbarism of the enemy. When in Iraq immediately after the First Gulf War, US encouraged
an uprising against Saddam US eventually abandoned them to be crushed by Saddams loyalists.
In every one of its actions, except Afghanistan, NATO responded with its air force supporting the
ground operations of local allies. Afghanistan was an exception for the high commitment by
NATO as Article V. was invoked. And even there its troops were acting as the support of the
285

Northern Alliance which were already fighting the Taliban. Modern war became a matter of
international coalitions rather than a single actor despite the superpower status of the US. When a
rapid victory was demanded a direct strategy would be developed. On the other hand prolonged
counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq demanded revisiting the strategies from the
past like the French in Algeria or the British in Malaya. But in every single strategy, the repeated
factor was always the question of cost effectiveness and casualties. Public opinion became a factor
more important than ever before. For this reason an important element remerged from history
privatization of security.

286

Key points of Chapter 5: Second group of case studies

All the wars are/were fought in the context of USA being the sole World superpower
Western actors confirming and protecting its status established after the dissolution of
the Soviet Union
Russia remains a threat for the West for its natural resources and nuclear arsenal
China emerged as a major threat for its economy and nuclear arsenal
European Union started to make signs that its policy is different than that of the US-UK,
and slowly emerges as the Worlds strongest political and economic entity
Geospatial revolution, tremendous development of technology, expansion of strategy
into cyberspace and limited time for response
All of the Western actors employed those strategies and tactics which ensured
minimizing of their casualties
All of the Western actors relied on their superior technology and air power
In a prolonged conflict Western actors primarily relied on an indirect strategy and
employed direct strategy when a rapid military victory was sought
Western actors employed barbarism as a response or in a systematic but in a
clandestine fashion against a culturally different enemy who fights wars with barbaric
methods
Avoid to intervene militarily if conflict can be won by other non-military strategies
Let the ground fighting be done by local forces which can easily be abandoned in case
the conflict stops being cost-effective
Emerging of private contractors to take over some traditionally military duties
High sensitivity to casualties and public support, CNN effect
Every conflict is fought in a manner to confirm western prestige

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CONCLUSION
There are causes worth dying for, but none worth killing for.
Albert Camus (1913-1960)
My main hypothesis in this dissertation was that the NATO alliance will in the future employ only
those strategies which will be cost effective. This premise I have developed by observing the
repeating features in pattern of behavior, which have characterized Western style of warfare since
the end of WWII. In this period USA emerged as an actor so strong, that all military powers became
asymmetric. No war could be led without of the interference of USA in some way. Since WWII
the World has entered the nuclear age. With the presence of atomic weapons and developments in
missile technology to deliver them, warfare has profoundly changed. And under the constant threat
of the nuclear Armageddon which a war between the West and East would cause, strategy has
emerged to be more important than ever before. In this environment in which the US effectively
took the role of the world police, its wars demand as a necessity to have the support of domestic
public opinion and favorable international context. But even tough USA is asymmetrically stronger
than all other military powers, its influence is far from being a hegemony. And because West has
the supremacy wars are being led far away, and western public is not aware of the direct danger.
Their tolerance of casualties is low and their support for action demands concrete evidence that
the benefits will outweigh the risk and losses. Every western strategy in every conflict was cost
effective, and if it would prove not to be the Western actor would retreat. My hypothesis was
confirmed.
Because strategy became the dominant force in this new environment I have started my dissertation
with a chapter on strategy and war. In this, chapter one, after reviewing different arguments on
strategy from different publications I have offered my own definition of strategy to be: the
universal intellectual force which operates in the realm of intangible as an art of planning and
marshalling resources in order to achieve pre-set objectives of vital importance. Problem in
studying strategy and defining it is that strategy operates in the realm of secrecy and paradox.
Strategy is a force present with intelligent beings who use strategy in order to direct, project and
manage their power in an environment. War too, like strategy is difficult to study and to define.
This is because war is inseparably connected with strategy in the way that war is strategys violent

288

product. Therefore, after disusing different definitions on war, I have defined war as a state of
violently manifested conflict between strategies. What has been observed with both strategy and
war is their changing character but also their unchanging nature. Only the manifestation of strategy
and war, the way there are being displayed is what changes with time. Throughout history warfare
has been constantly changing, but since historys beginnings the essential nature of strategy and
war has remained exactly the same. For this reason it is possible for us to study both with accuracy.
Modern warfare is characterized by two factors asymmetry and the mere presence of a
superpower, namely the United States of America with its dominant military arsenal. Also modern
strategy has expanded into cyberspace but not yet really into space. In this chapter the most
important outcome was that a way to which a society is making war is a reflection of its strategic
culture. I believe this to be the crucial factor when it comes to creating strategy.
That brings us to the issues of direct and indirect strategy described in second chapter of the
dissertation. After discussing with works of L. Hart and A. Beaufre, I introduced my view on the
matter. I defined direct strategy to be the one which is designed to attack the armed forces of the
enemy and which is seeking rapid victory. On the other hand, indirect strategy in my view is the
one which attacks other segments of enemys structure and resources. Such as people,
infrastructure, politics, economy, supplies and so on. I observed that both direct and indirect
strategies are consistent of the same general strategic components which include: goals
(objectives), tactics (ways) and strategic culture (style). All of these can be applied either on
operational, theater or grand strategic level. Some of the examples which I classified as direct
strategies are Blitzkrieg, Preemptive strike, Cyberwar and Total war. And strategies like Attrition,
Guerrilla, Raiding and Decapitation I believe to be indirect strategies.
The different concepts explaining the creation, evolution and causes of forming the alliances were
presented in chapter three, followed by the explanation of the decision making process within the
NATO alliance. In this chapter I wrote about different theories of alliances and decision making
process within the NATO alliance. At the end of the chapter I concluded that the main factor in
forming alliances is the existence of a threat. This threat can be imminent or potential. Alliances
are formed on the promise that actors will come to aid each other in times of need. And the basis
on which alliances can be formed are either political friendship, signed pact or temporary coalition.
However in every case interest plays the key role, and nations decide to form these security
289

alliances on the conditions of balancing, bandwagoning, ideology, foreign aid, penetration or

dtente. NATO alliance is formed on four of these conditions, which makes it an alliance with a
strong basis. Principal idea behind the NATO alliance is that if any of the members of NATO are
attacked by a force outside of the alliance, other NATO members of the alliance will come to aid.
NATO is ideologically a western culture alliance considering its pledge to promote liberty, rule of
law and democracy. NATO makes decisions by consensus. Strategy is formed by the North
Atlantic Council, main political body of NATO. Sovereignty in this process is paramount as every
member has the veto right. However to make decisions by consensus theoretically risks: delayed
action, lowest common denominator decision making, and even inaction resulting from stalemate.
NATO is structured in such a way to have a permanently established chain of command without
many standing troops. These are provided by member-states once the decision for military action
has taken place. I observed that factors which repeatedly influence NATOs strategy-making are:
culture, economy, technology, quality of its armed forces, motivation of its troops, public opinion
and domestic support, political limitation to not be able to openly point out the real situation and
the real enemy, information and finally prestige. In my opinion the most important factor is culture
because it influences strategy making to be formed with the priority to avoid potential losses to the
western actors.
And this strategic culture I have tested in chapter four where I analyzed the first group of case
studies. These covered the time span since the end of the Second World War (1945) to the end of
Cold War (1991). In the end of this chapter I concluded that in each of the case studies the western
actors involved would always devise their strategies in such a way to minimize the risk of their
casualties. All the examined wars were fought in the context of a global Cold War between East
and West. If in the conflict area there would be a local friendly force, then the Western actor would
prefer to fight from the air counting on the technology, and leave a big portion of the hard ground
operations to the local ally. But in all cases when a Western actor would be defeated it would pull
out its troops and abandon the local allies to the cruelty of the victorious enemy. In a prolonged
conflict Western actors would chose an indirect strategy and employed direct strategy only when
a rapid military victory was necessary. Western actors employed barbarism as a response or in a
systematic fashion against a culturally different enemy who fights wars with barbaric methods.
When the potential loss outweighed the potential gain Western actor would choose to retreat rather
than wasting its resources to a fight a war which is not cost-effective. I concluded that the dominant
290

parameter in the strategic conduct of westerners is a specific strategic culture which sees war as a
bloody business, and wants to fight wars in a cost effective way.
The same process I repeated in chapter five where I analyzed the second group of case studies.
These included conflicts which took place since the end of the Cold War (1991) to the present day
(March 2015). For example French operations in Sahel, Iraq War and Global War on Terror in
general are on-going conflicts. In this period all wars were fought in the context of USA being the
sole World superpower. Western actors fight wars to confirm and protect their dominant status
established after the defeat of the Soviet Union. However Russia remains a constant threat for the
West for its natural resources and powerful nuclear arsenal. Also China emerged as a major World
player for with its rapid economic and military development. European Union started to make
signs that its policy is different than that of the United States and United Kingdom, and started to
slowly emerge as the possible strongest political and economic entity in the World. All the wars
fought were characterized by geospatial revolution, tremendous development of technology,
expansion of strategy into cyberspace and limited time for response. As in the first group of case
studies, in war all of the Western actors counted on their superior technology and air power. In a
prolonged conflict Western actors primarily relied on an indirect strategy and employed direct
strategy only when a rapid military victory was necessary. Western actors employ barbarism as a
response to barbarism in a systematic, but clandestine fashion against a culturally different enemy
who fights wars with barbaric methods. Also Western actors are avoiding to intervene militarily if
conflict can be won by other non-military strategies. West lets the ground fighting to be done by
local forces which can easily be abandoned in case the conflict stops being cost-effective. Because
of the high sensitivity of western public to their casualties and the CNN effect, we can observe
the (re)emerging of private contractors to take over some traditional military duties.
All of the case studies I summarized in the form of table 31. It gives visualization of the aspects
of western warfare since the entry into the nuclear age. This table answers in a concise way the
key questions about each conflict. Was it a conflict in which the western actor fought an
asymmetrical war? Did the engagement into the war had a favorable domestic and international
context? And finally, was the strategy cost effective in achieving its strategic objectives?
Therefore in conflicts in which the Western actor fought an insurgency the conflict was
asymmetric. Strategy proved not to be cost-effective in the cases of First Indochina War, Algerian
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War, Vietnam War, Multinational Force in Lebanon and War in Somalia. In Indochina, Algeria
and Vietnam the Westerns lost their public support for the conflict. Their campaigns were not able
to support military efforts with political victories. In the mentioned wars, the enemy was barbaric
and led the war with barbaric methods. To these the West also responded with barbarism and
finally retreat, once the losses would amass to the point in which there was nothing to gain from
the war. Cases in which the enemy fought asymmetrically and the Western strategy proved to be
cost effective were the ones in which the Western actor would conduct a hearts and minds
campaign. In Malaya and to some extent Afghanistan and Iraq, Western forces gained the support
from local population and invested efforts to separate them from the insurgency. This was most
evident in Malaya, where the British gained the support from the locals. Unlike in Kenya, where
the British broke the insurgency with forced relocation and barbarism. In symmetrical conflicts of
Korean War, Suez Crisis, Bizerte crisis, United States invasion of Panama, NATO operations in
Bosnian War, NATO operations in Kosovo War, Coalition of the willing invasion of Iraq and
NATO operations in Libyan Civil War Westerners would seek to impose a quick and decisive
victory. It is as if they were racing to finish the conflict as long as the public supports it. If the war
would prove to be not profitable, Westerners would choose to retreat rather than to continue the
war. In Korea for example the Westerners accepted a ceasefire rather than to continue until the
complete military defeat of North Korea. Also if there would a local force available to fight on the
ground Western actor would prefer to fight from air counting on its air domination. Bosnia, Kosovo
and Libya proved this to be a fact. In all of the conflicts, regardless if the Western actor would be
victorious or defeated, it would fight in a cost effective way. And this proved my hypothesis that
in every scenario the paramount was minimizing the risk or casualties and doing everything
possible to maintain the public support.

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Table 31: Aspects of modern western warfare

Armed conflict

Asymmetric

Domestic

International Strategy

context

context

effective

First Indochina War

Malayan Emergency

Korean War

Mau Mau Uprising

Vietnam War

Algerian War

Suez Crisis

Bizerte crisis

Portuguese Colonial War

Multinational Force in Lebanon

United States invasion of Panama -

First Gulf War

War in Somalia

NATO operations in Bosnian -

NATO operations in Kosovo War -

NATO War in Afghanistan

cost

War

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Coalition of the willing invasion -

NATO operations in Libyan Civil -

of Iraq
Iraq War

War
French intervention in Northern +
Mali conflict
Source: Prepared by author

To conclude this study I would like to point out that not only the cultural factor cannot be ignored
as relevant in strategy making it turned out to be the most dominating one. Every strategy which
was ever devised, has been done so under the influence and according to the war-making culture.
And culture is something which cannot be easily changed. By analyzing modern western warfare
I have noticed a repeated factor. Western actors, according to their strategic culture only employ
those kind of strategies which are cost effective. This hypothesis from the beginning of my study
I have tested on two groups of case studies and confirmed it to be accurate. Therefore I can
conclude that it is likely for NATO in the future to continue to devise and employ only those
strategies which will ensure cost effectiveness in achieving strategic objectives. Paramount in
western strategic decisioning is minimizing the risk of its own casualties. If there is no strategic
gain from the conflict, either in political or remunerative terms it is also likely that a western
actor will not continue to participate in this conflict. If there is a local ally which can take the brunt
of the ground operations, western actors will prefer it to employment of their own soldiers. NATO
will rely on its superior airpower to be the main part of its military involvement. When choosing
a direct or indirect strategy I have noticed that since WWII and the entry into nuclear age there
was a constant stream of NATOs indirect strategies directed against first Soviet Union, then
Russia and now China too. Direct strategies the West used only against weaker actors which served
as proxy wars as a part of Wests higher indirect strategy against its real enemies in the East. When
I say cost effective, this mean a profit in strategic terms. A political or economic, but primary for
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the purposes of higher strategic interests. West fights wars in a way that it has to pay off, and if it
doesnt then the Western actor will retreat.
At the end of this dissertation, I would like to share my thoughts on modern strategic development.
It is my deep belief that in reality there is no reason, for people to fight over resources and
domination within this planet. Technology can enable all and many more to live in this planet in
peace, and live well. Our present technologic achievements are great but still quite primitive if you
think about it for example we still burn fuel to produce electricity, thus polluting our living space.
With further technologic development enough food and water can be produced and enough quality
living space provided. Our civilization has still not effectively expanded into the desert, jungle,
sea or into space. One just has to move from the cities to understand just how small humans really
are. There is really plenty of space for each and every one of us. People might find the necessary
strength for political unity in the very real threat of our present unsustainable development to
consume this blue planet of ours. Therefore some hard times are ahead of humanity in general but
with wise strategic decisioning I believe we can all come out as winners from this. Because humans
itself are the real wealth of this world. They have the power both to destroy but also to create
wonderful things. Every action begins on the border of unknown. For the first step it takes a lot of
wisdom, courage, and craziness even. The outcome is always uncertain. Strategic realm is infinite
and it can always find a way. I believe that war is not a solution.
War is hell.
William Tecumseh Sherman (1879)

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Documents and Statements
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, US Navy, October 2007. Link:
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328

LIST OF TABLES, DIAGRAMS AND MAPS

Tables:
Table 1: Different views on strategy..... 33
Table 2: Definitions on strategic culture... 50
Table 3: Levels of strategy 53
Table 4: Example of levels of strategy of Japan in WWII 66
Table 5: Types of operations to resolve conflicts according to RAF.... 76
Table 6: Different views on war.... 83
Table 7: Operating areas of strategies.. 180
Table 8: Formation of modern alliances.. 186
Table 9: Older classification of alliances according to Correlates of War project.. 187
Table 10: Classification of alliances according to P. T. Warren. 191
Table 11. Wars including NATOs military interventions.. 213
Table 12: Main features of French way of war in Indochina.. 223
Table 13: Main features of British way of war in Malaya... 226
Table 14: Main features of UN (US-UK) way of war in Korea.. 228
Table 15: Main features of British way of war in Kenya.... 230
Table 16: Main features of French way of war in Algeria.. 232
Table 17: Main features of American way of war in Vietnam... 235
Table 18: Main features of British/French/Israeli way of war in Egypt. 238
Table 19: Main features of French way of war in Tunisia.. 239
Table 20: Main features of Portuguese way of war in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese
Guinea. 241
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Table 21: Main features of MNF way of war in Lebanon.. 242

Table 22: Main features of American way of war in Panama 244
Table 23: Main features of American way of war in Iraq... 253
Table 24: Main features of American way of war in Somalia. 257
Table 25: Main features of NATOs way of war in Bosnia 260
Table 26: Main features of NATOs way of war in Kosovo... 265
Table 27: Main features of NATOs way of war in Afghanistan.... 269
Table 28: Main features of American way of war in Iraq... 276
Table 29: Main features of NATOs way of war in Libya.. 280
Table 30: Main features of French way of war in Mali... 284
Table 31: Aspects of modern western warfare.... 293
Diagrams:
Diagram 1: Relationship between security studies and strategy.. 38
Diagram 2: Relationship within the strategic realm. 55
Diagram 3: Formula on the morality of war. 89
Diagram 4: Relationship within strategy according to Lucien Poirier.. 115
Diagram 5: Direct and Indirect strategy.. 117
Diagram 6: Types of Modern Alliances according to P. T. Warren... 194
Maps:
Map 1: The Western world 49
Map 2: Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity sphere... 68
Map 3: Far East and Pacific 1941, major Japanese war objectives and planned opening attacks 69

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SUMMARY
Dissertation analyzes modern western warfare since the end of Second World War. Strategic
culture of western warfare has influenced NATOs strategic decisioning in such a way that every
strategy has been devised with the priority to minimize the risk of western casualties. Western
strategy is always cost effective in relation to its strategic objectives, either in economic or in
political sense. Presentation of research is divided in two parts. First part consists of chapters one
to three and discusses theoretical aspects of strategy and war. Second part consists of chapter four
and five and analyzing modern western warfare.
Introduction discusses importance of the problem, state of the art, and hypothesis with description
of research steps and framework of analysis.
Chapter One analyzes strategy and war from theoretical aspect. Both segments of the chapter
discuss strategy and war from the point of view of various publications. Also author offers his own
definitions of both strategy and war.
Chapter Two analyzes different parts of strategy direct and indirect strategy and strategy of
barbarism. These concepts are discussed with relevant literature but in theoretical terms their
understanding is new.
Chapter Three briefly analyzes theory of alliances, decision making process within the NATO and
its organizational structure.
Chapter Four analyzes western warfare in selected case studies. These include wars which took
place since the end of WWII to dissolution of Soviet Union.
Chapter Five analyzes selected case studies which include wars since the dissolution of the Soviet
Union to early 2015.
Finally conclusions confirm the hypothesis of NATOs way of strategic thinking to be crucially
influenced with western culture of cost-effectiveness. Author discusses western style of warfare
and in relation to the present strategic situation offers some predictions for future strategic
developments.

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STRESZCZENIE
Niniejsza rozprawa bada zachodnie strategie wojenne od momentu zakoczenia II Wojny
wiatowej. Zachodnia kultura strategii wpyna znaczco na decyzje NATO w ten sposb, i
kada strategia planowana jest tak, by zminimalizowa straty na zachodzie. Taktyki zachodu
musz by zawsze opacalne pod wzgldem wyznaczanych celw, zarwno w kwestiach
ekonomicznych, jak i politycznych. Wyniki bada przedstawione zostay w dwch czciach.
Pierwsza cz skada si z dwch rozdziaw, ktrych tematem s teoretyczne aspekty strategii
wojennych i samego konfliktu. Druga cz obejmuje rozdzia czwarty i pity powicony analizie
wspczesnych zachodnich strategii. We wprowadzeniu omwiona zostaa waga problemu,
aktualny stan bada oraz postawione do tej pory hipotezy, jak rwnie opis kolejnych etapw
prowadzonych bada i kontekstu analiz. Rozdzia pierwszy traktuje o analizie teorii strategii i
konfliktu. W dwch podrozdziaach strategie i konflikt zostaj przedstawione z punktu widzenia
rnych publikacji naukowych. Autor rozprawy proponuje take swoj wasn definicj obydwu
terminw. Rozdzia drugi obrazuje rnic midzy trzema typami strategii - bezporedni,
poredni oraz barbarzysk. Pojcia te, zdefiniowane ju w literaturze naukowej, nabieraj
nowego znaczenia w rozumieniu teoretycznym. Rozdzia trzeci powicony jest krtkiej analizie
teorii sojuszy, jak rwnie metod podejmowania decyzji na onie NATO i struktury samej
organizacji. Rozdzia czwarty omawia wybrane konflikty wojenne, w tym wojny, ktre rozegray
si po zakoczeniu II Wojny wiatowej a do rozpadu Zwizku Radzieckiego. W rozdziale pitym
analizie poddane zostay przypadki wojen od rozpadu Zwizku Radzieckiego do pocztkw roku
2015. W czci zawierajcej wnioski, dowiedziona zostaje prawdziwo hipotezy, wedug ktrej
zachodnia kultura, koncentrujca si na opacalnoci, wpyna znaczco na strategie NATO.
Autor omawia zachodnie taktyki prowadzenia dziaa wojennych w ich relacji z obecn sytuacj,
jak rwnie przedstawia swoje sugestie dotyczce rozwoju owych strategii w przyszoci.

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