Digested Case in Natres

CASES
IN
NATURAL RESOURCES
SUBMITTED TO:
Atty. Ismael Manaligod
SUBMITTED BY:
Sophia E. Matote
Jonna Maye S. Canindo
Maureen Margareth D. Eslava
Sony Berth Daluping
Eric Gonayon
CSU Ll.B- II
G.R. No. 79538. October 18, 1990

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT
AND REALTY CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS:
On October 12, 1965, petitioner entered into a timber license agreement with the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose
Feliciano, wherein it was issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber
except prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of
54,920 hectares located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya from
October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990.
However, on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development
(Bureau), Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging
operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging
concession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential
instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro
Pena.
Subsequently, petitioners timber license agreement was cancelled. He sent a letter
addressed to then President Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the
Bureau's directive, citing in support thereof its contributions to forest conservation and
alleging that it was not given the opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its
logging operations, but no favorable action was taken on his letter;
Barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half of the area formerly covered by
petitioners TLA was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation
under a new TLA which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was
allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or
license. The latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed
President Ferdinand Marcos.
Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter dated
March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and another letter dated April 2, 1986 to
Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the
reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was cancelled in August 1983 during
the Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin
Peaks Development and Realty Corporation without public bidding and in violation of
forestry laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner
to take possession of all logs found in the concession area. However, petitioner's request
was denied. Petitioner moved for reconsideration reiterating, among others, its request
that the timber license agreement issued to private respondent be declared null and void.
The MNR however denied this motion. Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders
of the MNR to the Office of the President. The Office of the President, acting through
then Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for lack of
merit. Petitioner filed with the Court a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance
of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction,
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has the right to seek the nullification of the Bureau
orders cancelling his timber license agreement and the granting of TLA to private
respondent, which were issued way back in 1983 and 1984, respectively.
HELD:
NO. The failure of petitioner to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable period
of time renders the petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal consequences of laches.
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier,
or to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled thereto has either abandoned it of declined to assert it. The rule is that
unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged right may,
depending upon the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Verily, the laws did
these who are vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights. In the case at bar, petitioner
waited for at least three years before it finally filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984. Considering that
petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity to
seek relief from the courts which were normally operating at the time, its delay
constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the
writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie. There is a more
significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner and
against public respondents herein. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the
courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special
technical knowledge and training of such agencies. More so where, as in the present case,
the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on
the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. For this Court recognizes the
wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in determining the appropriate
actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural resources, and the proper parties who
should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources. Timber licenses, permits and
license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted.
And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State
to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the
particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so
require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of
law clause.
BENGUET CORPORATION,
163101
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
- versus DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES-MINES

ADJUDICATION BOARD and J.G. REALTY AND MINING CORPORATION,
Respondents.
FACTS:
Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a Royalty Agreement with Option to Purchase
(RAWOP) , wherein J.G. Realty was acknowledged as the owner of four mining claims
with a total area of 288.8656 hectares. The parties also executed a Supplemental
Agreement. The mining claims were covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
(MPSA) Application No. APSA-V-0009 jointly filed by J.G. Realty as claim-owner and
Benguet as operator.
After some time, the Executive Vice-President of Benguet, Antonio N. Tachuling, issued
a letter informing J.G. Realty of its intention to develop the mining claims. However, J.G.
Realty, through its President, Johnny L. Tan, then sent a letter to the President of Benguet
informing the latter that it was terminating the RAWOP. The latter alleged that petitioner
violated some of the provisions of the RAWOP, specifically on non-payment of royalties
and non-fulfillment of obligations stipulated therein.
J.G. Realty filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity/Cancellation of the RAWOP. POA
issued a Decision, cancelling the RAWOP and its Supplemental Agreement. BENGUET
was subsequently excluded from the joint MPSA Application over the mineral claims.
Subsequent MR was denied. Said decision was upheld by DENR-MAB.
Hence this instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner the filing of the petition with the Supreme Court is
proper.
HELD:
NO. the instant petition can be denied outright as Benguet resorted to an improper
Remedy.
The last paragraph of Section 79 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7942 or the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995 states, A petition for review by certiorari and question
of law may be filed by the aggrieved party with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days
from receipt of the order or decision of the [MAB].
The Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform rule
on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies. Under the rule, appeals from their judgments and
final orders are now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review. A
quasi-judicial agency or body has been defined as an organ of government, other than a
court or legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication
or rule-making. MAB falls under this definition; hence, it is no different from the other
quasi-judicial bodies enumerated under Rule 43. Besides, the introductory words in
Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91among these agencies areindicate that the
enumeration is not exclusive or conclusive and acknowledge the existence of other quasijudicial agencies which, though not expressly listed, should be deemed included therein.
The judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that direct resort from
administrative agencies to this Court will not be entertained, unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained from the appropriate lower tribunals, or unless exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy falling within and calling for the
exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
Thus Benguet should have filed the appeal with the CA.
Petitioner having failed to properly appeal to the CA under Rule 43, the decision of the
MAB has become final and executory. On this ground alone, the instant petition must be
denied.
G.R. No. 148267. August 8, 2002
ARMANDO C. CARPIO, petitioner, vs. SULU RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, respondent.
FACTS:
This case originated from a petition filed by respondent [Sulu Resources Development
Corporation] for Mines Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) No. MPSA-IV-131,
covering certain areas in Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioner [Armando C. Carpio] filed an
opposition/adverse claim thereto, alleging, inter alia, that his landholdings in Cupang and
Antipolo, Rizal will be covered by respondents claim, thus he enjoys a preferential right
to explore and extract the quarry resources on his properties.
After due proceedings were held, the Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines and Geo-Sciences
Bureau of the DENR rendered a Resolution upholding petitioners opposition/adverse
claim. Respondent appealed the foregoing Resolution to the Mines Adjudication Board.
Meanwhile, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss appeal on the ground of respondents
failure to comply with the requirements of the New Mining Acts Implementing Rules
and Regulations. The Mines Adjudication Board rendered the assailed Order dismissing
petitioners opposition/adverse claim. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
said Order which was denied by the Board. An appeal was filed with the CA but same
was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appeals from the Decision or Final Orders of the Mines Adjudication
Board should be made directly to the Supreme Court as contended by the respondent and
the Court of Appeals, or such appeals be first made to the Court of Appeals as contended
by herein petitioner.
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
Factual controversies are usually involved in administrative actions; and the CA is

prepared to handle such issues because, unlike this Court, it is mandated to rule on
questions of fact. In Metro Construction, we observed that not only did the CA have
appellate jurisdiction over CIAC decisions and orders, but the review of such decisions
included questions of fact and law. At the very least when factual findings of the MAB
are challenged or alleged to have been made in grave abuse of discretion as in the present
case, the CA may review them, consistent with the constitutional duty of the judiciary.
To summarize, there are sufficient legal footings authorizing a review of the MAB
Decision under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. First, Section 30 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, mandates that [n]o law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent. On
the other hand, Section 79 of RA No. 7942 provides that decisions of the MAB may be
reviewed by this Court on a petition for review by certiorari. This provision is
obviously an expansion of the Courts appellate jurisdiction, an expansion to which this
Court has not consented. Indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court would unnecessarily burden it.
Second, when the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, transfers
to the CA pending cases involving a review of a quasi-judicial bodys decisions, such
transfer relates only to procedure; hence, it does not impair the substantive and vested
rights of the parties. The aggrieved partys right to appeal is preserved; what is changed is
only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided. The parties still have a
remedy and a competent tribunal to grant this remedy.
Third, the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform
rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies. Under the rule, appeals from their
judgments and final orders are now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition
for review. A quasi-judicial agency or body has been defined as an organ of government,
other than a court or legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule-making. MAB falls under this definition; hence, it is no different
from the other quasi-judicial bodies enumerated under Rule 43. Besides, the introductory
words in Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91 -- among these agencies are -- indicate that the
enumeration is not exclusive or conclusive and acknowledge the existence of other quasijudicial agencies which, though not expressly listed, should be deemed included therein.
Fourth, the Court realizes that under Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 as amended by
RA No. 7902, factual controversies are usually involved in decisions of quasi-judicial

bodies; and the CA, which is likewise tasked to resolve questions of fact, has more elbow
room to resolve them. By including questions of fact among the issues that may be raised
in an appeal from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA, Section 3 of Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95 and Section 3 of Rule 43 explicitly expanded the list of such issues.
According to Section 3 of Rule 43, [a]n appeal under this Rule may be taken to the
Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided whether the appeal
involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. Hence, appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies even only on questions of law may be brought to the CA.
Fifth, the judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that direct
resort from administrative agencies to this Court will not be entertained, unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained from the appropriate lower tribunals, or unless
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy falling within
and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
Consistent with these rulings and legal bases, we therefore hold that Section 79 of
RA 7942 is likewise to be understood as having been modified by Circular No. 1-91, BP
Blg. 129 as amended by RA 7902, Revised Administrative Circular 1-95, and Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court. In brief, appeals from decisions of the MAB shall be taken to the CA
through petitions for review in accordance with the provisions of Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Court.
DESAMA vs ELISEA GOZUN
G.R. No. 157882, March 30, 2006
FACTS:
Executive Order No. 279, promulgated by then President Corazon Aquino,
authorized the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from
foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts of agreements
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate
recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign
proponent.
After some time, President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law Rep. Act No.
7942 entitled, An Act Instituting A New System of Mineral Resources
Exploration, Development, Utilization and Conservation, otherwise known as the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued
DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 23, Series of 1995, containing the
implementing guidelines of Rep. Act No. 7942. This was soon superseded by
DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996, which took effect on 23 January 1997 after due
publication.
Previously, however, or specifically on 20 June 1994, President Ramos
executed an FTAA with Arimco Mining Corporation (AMC) over a total land area
of 37,000 hectares covering the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino.
Included in this area is Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya. Counsels for
petitioners filed a demand letter addressed to then DENR Secretary Heherson
Alvarez, for the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA for the primary reason that Rep.
Act No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations DAO 96-40 are
unconstitutional.
Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a
single company that now goes under the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining
Corporation (CAMC), the controlling 99% of stockholders of which are Australian
nationals.
MGB rejected the demand of counsels for petitioners for the cancellation of the
CAMC FTAA.
Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus,
with a prayer for a temporary restraining order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mining act and its implementing rules and regulations
are void and unconstitutional specifically Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and
Section 107 of DAO 96-40 FOR IT allows the unlawful and unjust taking of
private property for private purpose in contradiction with Section 9, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:
NO. Section 76 of Republic Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40;
Republic Act No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations contained in
DAO 96-40 insofar as they relate to financial and technical assistance
agreements referred to in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the
Constitution are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
While this Court declares that the assailed provision is a taking provision,
this does not mean that it is unconstitutional on the ground that it allows taking of
private property without the determination of public use and the payment of just
compensation.
The taking to be valid must be for public use. Public use as a requirement
for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is now synonymous with
public interest, public benefit, public welfare and public convenience. It includes
the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage.
Public use as
traditionally understood as actual use by the public has already been
abandoned.
Mining industry plays a pivotal role in the economic development of the
country and is a vital tool in the governments thrust of accelerated recovery.
Irrefragably, mining is an industry which is of public benefit. That public use is
negated by the fact that the state would be taking private properties for the
benefit of private mining firms or mining contractors is not at all true.
There is also no basis for the claim that the Mining Law and its
implementing rules and regulations do not provide for just compensation in
expropriating private properties. Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section
107 of DAO 96-40 provide for the payment of just compensation
LA BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, Inc. vs RAMOS

G.R. No. 127882
January 27, 2004
FACTS:
On March 3, 1995, President Ramos signed into law R.A. No. 7942. Section 15
thereof declares that the Act shall govern the exploration, development, utilization, and
processing of all mineral resources. Such declaration notwithstanding, R.A. No. 7942
does not actually cover all the modes through which the State may undertake the
exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources.
The State, being the owner of the natural resources, is accorded the primary power
and responsibility in the exploration, development and utilization thereof. As such, it
may undertake these activities through four modes:
The State may directly undertake such activities.
(2)The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations.
(3)Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by
Filipino citizens.
(4)For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements with foreignowned corporations involving technical or financial assistance.
R.A. No. 7942 primarily concerns itself with the second and fourth modes.
Petitioners submit that, in accordance with the text of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, FTAAs should be limited to technical or financial assistance only. They
observe, however, that, contrary to the language of the Constitution, the WMCP FTAA
allows WMCP, a fully foreign-owned mining corporation, to extend more than mere
financial or technical assistance to the State, for it permits WMCP to manage and operate
every aspect of the mining activity
On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary
demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No.
96-40, giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however,
has yet to respond or act on petitioners letter.
Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with
a prayer for a temporary restraining order. They allege that at the time of the
filing of the petition, 100 FTAA applications had already been filed, covering an
area of 8.4 million hectares, 64 of which applications are by fully foreign-owned
corporations covering a total of 5.8 million hectares, and at least one by a fully
foreign-owned mining company over offshore areas.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT Republic Act No. 7942 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
HELD:
The Court hereby declares unconstitutional and void the following:
(1) provisions of Republic Act No. 7942:
(a)The proviso in Section 3 (aq),
(b)Section 23,
(c)Section 33 to 41,
(d)Section 56,
(e)The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, and
(f) Section 90.
(2) All provisions of Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Administrative Order 96-40, s. 1996 which are not in conformity with this Decision,
and
(3) The Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement between the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines and WMC Philippines, Inc.
It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40 contain provisions that are
more favorable to WMCP, hence, these laws, to the extent that they are favorable to
WMCP, govern the FTAA.
In addition, R.A. No. 7942 explicitly makes certain provisions apply to pre-existing
agreements.
R.A. No. 7942 is invalid insofar as said Act authorizes service contracts. Although
the statute employs the phrase financial and technical agreements in accordance with
the 1987 Constitution, it actually treats these agreements as service contracts that grant
beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
APEX MINING CO., INC.,

Petitioner,
- versus SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP. ET AL,
Respondents.
x-------------------------x
BALITE COMMUNAL PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE,

Petitioner,
- versus SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP., APEX MINING CO., INC., ET
AL,
Respondents.
x------------------------x
THE MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD AND ITS MEMBERS, THE HON.
VICTOR O. RAMOS (Chairman), UNDERSECRETARY VIRGILIO MARCELO
(Member) and DIRECTOR HORACIO RAMOS (Member),
Petitioners,
- versus -
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION,

Respondent.
FACTS:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration dated 12 July 2006, filed by
Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), of this Courts Decision
dated 23 June 2006 (Assailed Decision). The Assailed Decision held that the
assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in favor of SEM violated one of the
conditions stipulated in the permit, i.e., that the same shall be for the exclusive
use and benefit of Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) or its duly authorized
agents. Since SEM did not claim or submit evidence that it was a designated
agent of MMC, the latter cannot be considered as an agent of the former that can
use EP 133 and benefit from it. It also ruled that the transfer of EP 133 violated
Presidential Decree No. 463, which requires that the assignment of a mining right
be made with the prior approval of the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Moreover, the Assailed Decision
pointed out that EP 133 expired by non-renewal since it was not renewed before
or after its expiration.
The Assailed Decision likewise upheld the validity of Proclamation No. 297
absent any question against its validity. In view of this, and considering that
under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known as the Mining Act of
1995, mining operations in mineral reservations may be undertaken directly by
the State or through a contractor, the Court deemed the issue of ownership of
priority right over the contested Diwalwal Gold Rush Area as having been
overtaken by the said proclamation. Thus, it was held in the Assailed Decision
that it is now within the prerogative of the Executive Department to undertake
directly the mining operations of the disputed area or to award the operations to
private entities including petitioners Apex and Balite, subject to applicable laws,
rules and regulations, and provided that these private entities are qualified.
SEM also filed a Motion for Referral of Case to the Court En Banc and for
Oral Arguments dated 22 August 2006.
Apex, for its part, filed a Motion for Clarification of the Assailed Decision,
praying that the Court elucidate on the Decisions pronouncement that mining
operations, are now, therefore within the full control of the State through the
executive branch. Moreover, Apex asks this Court to order the Mines and
Geosciences Board (MGB) to accept its application for an exploration permit.
In its Manifestation and Motion dated 28 July 2006, Balite echoes the
same concern as that of Apex on the actual takeover by the State of the mining
industry in the disputed area to the exclusion of the private sector. In addition,
Balite prays for this Court to direct MGB to accept its application for an
exploration permit.
Camilo Banad, et al., likewise filed a motion for reconsideration and

prayed that the disputed area be awarded to them.
ISSUE/S:
Whether Southeast Mindanao Mining Corp. (SEM) acquired a vested
right over the disputed area, which constitutes a property right
protected by the Constitution.
HELD:
NO. SEM does not aver or prove that its mining rights had been perfected
and completed when the Philippine Bill of 1902 was still the operative law.
Surely, it is impossible for SEM to successfully assert that it acquired mining
rights over the disputed area in accordance with the same bill, since it was only
in 1984 that MMC, SEMs predecessor-in-interest, filed its declaration of locations
and its prospecting permit application in compliance with Presidential Decree No.
463. It was on 1 July 1985 and 10 March 1986 that a Prospecting Permit and EP
133, respectively, were issued to MMC. Considering these facts, there is no
possibility that MMC or SEM could have acquired a perfected mining claim under
the auspices of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Whatever mining rights MMC had that
it invalidly transferred to SEM cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be

considered mining rights as contemplated under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
immortalized in McDaniel and Gold Creek Mining.
SEM likens EP 133 with a building permit. SEM likewise equates its
supposed rights attached to the exploration permit with the rights that a private
property land owner has to said landholding. This analogy has no basis in law.
As earlier discussed, under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, national
wealth, such as mineral resources, are owned by the State and not by their
discoverer. The discoverer or locator can only develop and utilize said minerals
for his own benefit if he has complied with all the requirements set forth by
applicable laws and if the State has conferred on him such right through permits,
concessions or agreements. In other words, without the imprimatur of the State,
any mining aspirant does not have any definitive right over the mineral land
because, unlike a private landholding, mineral land is owned by the State, and
the same cannot be alienated to any private person as explicitly stated in Section
2, Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution:
All lands of public domain, waters, minerals x x x and all

other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall
not be alienated. (Emphases supplied.)
Further, a closer scrutiny of the deed of assignment in favor of SEM

reveals that MMC assigned to the former the rights and interests it had in EP
133, thus:
1.
That for ONE PESO (P1.00) and other valuable
consideration received by the ASSIGNOR from the ASSIGNEE, the
ASSIGNOR hereby ASSIGNS, TRANSFERS and CONVEYS unto
the ASSIGNEE whatever rights or interest the ASSIGNOR may

have in the area situated in Monkayo, Davao del Norte and
Cateel, Davao Oriental, identified as Exploration Permit No.
133 and Application for a Permit to Prospect in Bunawan, Agusan
del Sur respectively. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is evident that what MMC had over the disputed area during the
assignment was an exploration permit.
Clearly, the right that SEM
acquired was limited to exploration, only because MMC was a mere holder
of an exploration permit. As previously explained, SEM did not acquire the
rights inherent in the permit, as the assignment by MMC to SEM was done
in violation of the condition stipulated in the permit, and the assignment
was effected without the approval of the proper authority in contravention
of the provision of the mining law governing at that time. In addition, the
permit expired on 6 July 1994. It is, therefore, quite clear that SEM has no
right over the area.
CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING

G.R. No. 169080
EXPLORATION CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
- versus MACROASIA CORPORATION(formerly INFANTA MINERAL AND INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION),
B L U E R I D G E M I N E R A L C O R P O R AT I O N , a n d L E B A C H M I N I N G
CORPORATION,
Respondents.
FACTS:
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Infanta Mineral
and Industrial Corporation (Infanta) entered into a Mining Lease Contract V-1050.
Infantas corporate name was then changed to Cobertson Holdings
Corporation and subsequently to its present name, Macroasia Corporation.
After sometime, Celestial filed a Petition to Cancel the subject mining
lease contracts and other mining claims of Macroasia including those covered by
Mining Lease Contract No. V-1050, before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the
Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) of the DENR.
Blue Ridge, in an earlier letter-petition, also wrote the Director of Mines to
seek cancellation of mining lease contracts and other mining rights of Macroasia
and another entity, Lebach Mining Corporation (Lebach), in mining areas in
Brookes Point.
Celestial is the assignee of 144 mining claims covering such areas
contiguous to Infantas (now Macroasia) mining lode claims. Celestial also holds
an MPSA with the government which covers 2,835 hectares located at Ipilan/
Maasin, Brookes Point, Palawan and two pending applications covering another
4,040 hectares in Barangay Mainit also in Brookes Point.
Celestial sought the cancellation of Macroasias lease contracts.
Macroasia refuted the grounds for cancellation invoked by Celestial.
Based on the records of the Bureau of Mines and findings of the field
investigations, the POA granted the petition of Celestial to cancel the Mining
Lease Contracts of Macroasia; and found the claims of the others indubitably
meritorious. It gave Celestial the preferential right to Macroasias mining areas.
It upheld Blue Ridges petition, but only as against the Mining Lease Contract
areas of Lebach, and the said leased areas were declared automatically
abandoned. It gave Blue Ridge priority right to the aforesaid Lebachs areas/
mining claims. Blue Ridge and Macroasia appealed before the MAB.
Lebach did not file any notice of appeal with the required memorandum of
appeal; thus, with respect to Lebach, the above resolution became final and
executory.
The MAB made a decision upholding the Decision of the POA to cancel
the Mining Lode/Lease Contracts of Macroasia.
However, the MAB, subsequently issued a resolution vacating its previous
decision, holding that neither the POA nor the MAB had the power to revoke a
mineral agreement duly entered into by the DENR Secretary. The MAB further
held that the power to cancel or revoke a mineral agreement was exclusively
lodged with the DENR Secretary.
Celestial and Blue Ridge made an appeal.
The CA Special12th Division affirmed the MAB Resolution which upheld
the exclusive authority of the DENR Secretary to approve, cancel, and revoke
mineral agreements. The CA also denied Celestials Motion for Reconsideration.
While the CA Special 10th Division granted Blue Ridges petition; reversed
and set aside the Resolutions of the MAB; and treated the cancellation of a
mining lease agreement as a mining dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the POA under Sec. 77 of RA 7942, explaining that the power to resolve mining
disputes, which is the greater power, necessarily includes the lesser power to
cancel mining agreements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is only the Secretary of the DENR who has the
jurisdiction to cancel mining contracts and privileges?
HELD:
YES. It is only the Secretary of the DENR who has jurisdiction to cancel
mining contracts and privileges.
After a scrutiny of the provisions of PD 463, EO 211, EO 279, RA 7942 and its
implementing rules and regulations, executive issuances, and case law, we rule
that the DENR Secretary, not the POA, has the jurisdiction to cancel existing
mineral lease contracts or mineral agreements based on the following reasons:

The power of the DENR Secretary to cancel mineral agreements
emanates from his administrative authority, supervision, management, and
control over mineral resources under Chapter I, Title XIV of Book IV of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987.
It is the DENR, through the Secretary, that manages, supervises, and
regulates the use and development of all mineral resources of the country. It has
exclusive jurisdiction over the management of all lands of public domain, which
covers mineral resources and deposits from said lands. It has the power to
oversee, supervise, and police our natural resources which include mineral
resources. Derived from the broad and explicit powers of the DENR and its
Secretary under the Administrative Code of 1987 is the power to approve mineral
agreements and necessarily to cancel or cause to cancel said agreements.
Under RA 7942, the power of control and supervision of the DENR
Secretary over the MGB to cancel or recommend cancellation of mineral rights
clearly demonstrates the authority of the DENR Secretary to cancel or approve
the cancellation of mineral agreements.
The DENR Secretarys power to cancel mining rights or agreements
through the MGB can be inferred from Sec. 230, Chapter XXIV of DENR AO
96-40 on cancellation, revocation, and termination of a permit/mineral
agreement/FTAA.
[G.R. No. 86889. December 4, 1990]

LUZ FARMS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
FACTS: On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved
R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine in its coverage. On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing
Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of
R.A. No. 6657. On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of
R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms).
Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in
the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the
same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the
enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d)
and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and
Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No.
6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on
January 9, 1989.
Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and
rules be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a
writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining
public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as they are made
to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers. This
Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1989 resolved to deny, among

others, Luz Farms prayer the issuance of a preliminary injunction in its
Manifestation dated May 26 and 31, 1989.
Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24,
1989 resolved to grant said Motion for Reconsideration regarding the
injunctive relief, after the filing and approval by this Court of an
injunction bond in the amount of P100,000.00. This Court also gave
due course to the petition and required the parties to file their
respective memoranda.
ISSUE: WON Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and
17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and
Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No.
6657 is unconstitutional.
HELD: YES. It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II
of R.A. 6657 which includes private agricultural lands devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising in the definition of
"commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agroindustrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform
program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock
and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.
Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms argument that the requirement in
Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing corporate farms which
include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement
production-sharing plans (pending final redistribution of their
landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from three
percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net
profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for
being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process.
[G.R. No. 61293. February 15, 1990]

DOMINGO B. MADDUMBA and ANITA C. MADDUMBA, petitioners, vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Represented by its
Chairman, Board of Trustees, HONORABLE LEONILO OCAMPO,
respondent.
FACTS: On December 10, 1980, respondent GSIS conducted a public
bidding of several foreclosed properties. Included in the properties
offered to the public was a house and lot situated at 3377 New
Panaderos Street, Sta. Ana, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 4749 of the Register of Deeds of Manila.
Petitioner Domingo B. Maddumba participated in the public bidding and
submitted his sealed bid in the amount of P98,000.00 in Philippine
currency. The bid was subject to the condition that there should be a
down payment of 35% of the amount thereof, the 10% constituting
the proposal bond with the remaining 25% to be paid after the receipt
of the notice of award or acceptance of the bid. Accordingly, petitioner
enclosed with his sealed bid a manager's check in the amount of
P9,500.00 and cash in the amount of P300.00 to complete the
P9,800.00 proposal bond.
Upon the receipt of the notice of award, petitioner offered to pay the
additional 25% in Land Bank bonds at their face value. These bonds
were issued to petitioner as payment for his riceland consisting of
twenty-six hectares located in Cordon, Isabela acquired by the
Government from him under Presidential Decree No. 27. However, the
GSIS rejected the offer, hence it was withdrawn by petitioner.
Petitioner then offered to pay in cash the remaining 25% down

payment "and all future installments." HYPERLINK "http://
elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/
Decisions/1990.zip%3E12e,df%7C1990/FEB1990/61293.htm" \l
"_ftn1" \o "" Thereafter, on November 16, 1981, petitioner paid in
cash the balance of the required down payment.
A "Deed of Conditional Sale" was executed by the parties on November
19, 1981, where the petitioner as vendee agreed to pay the vendor
GSIS "the balance of the purchase price of SIXTY THREE THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED FIVE & 50/100 (P63,705.50) PESOS. Philippine
currency, in SIXTY (60) monthly installments of ONE THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED SIXTEEN & 69/100 (P1,416.69) PESOS. Philippine currency,
at twelve (12%) percent interest per annum, compounded monthly,
beginning December 1, 1981." HYPERLINK "http://
"_ftn2" \o ""
The first installment in the amount of P1,416.00 was paid by petitioner
on December 3, 1981. When the second monthly installment became
due, petitioner sent a letter dated January 5, 1982, to the GSIS Board
of Trustees requesting that he be allowed to pay the monthly
amortizations with his Land Bank bonds commencing in January, 1982
until the exhaustion of the said bonds. HYPERLINK "http://
"_ftn3" \o "" Petitioner invoked the provisions of Section 85 of
Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 251.
The GSIS Board of Trustees, in its Resolution No. 91 adopted on

January 22, 1982, denied petitioner's offer. The board resolved to
reiterate the policy that Land Bank bonds shall be accepted as
payment only at a discounted rate to yield the System 18% at
maturity. HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documentsdtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1990.zip%3E12e,df%7C1990/
FEB1990/61293.htm" \l "_ftn4" \o ""
In a letter dated February 12, 1982, petitioner asked the Board of
Trustees to reconsider Resolution No. 91. HYPERLINK "http://
"_ftn5" \o "" Petitioner reiterated his reliance on Section 85 of
Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, and further supported his position
with the contention that the policy of the GSIS contravenes the ruling
in the case of Gonzales, et al. vs. The Government Insurance System,
etc., et al.. HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documentsdtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1990.zip%3E12e,df%7C1990/
FEB1990/61293.htm" \l "_ftn6" \o "" Likewise, petitioner submitted an
opinion of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, dated February 12, 1982,
wherein it was stated, inter alia, that if the GSIS accepts the Land
Bank bonds as payment thereof, it must accept the same at par or
face value. To accept said bonds at a discounted rate would lessen the
credibility of the bonds as instruments of indebtedness. HYPERLINK
"http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/
SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1990.zip%3E12e,df%7C1990/
FEB1990/61293.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o ""
In a letter dated May 31, 1982, petitioner was advised by the Manager,
Acquired Assets Department, GSIS that Resolution No. 415 was

adopted on May 18, 1982 by the GSIS Board of Trustees denying the
request of petitioner. Hence, on August 5, 1982, the instant original
action for mandamus was filed by petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not under the provisions of Section 85 of Republic
Act No. 3844, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 251 effective
July 21, 1973, the GSIS may be compelled to accept Land Bank bonds
at their face value in payment for a residential house and lot
purchased by the bondholder from the GSIS.
HELD: Yes. It is not disputed that under the above quoted provisions,
a government-owned or controlled corporation, like the GSIS, is
compelled to accept Land Bank bonds as payment for the purchase of
its assets. As a matter of fact, the bidder who offers to pay in bonds
of the Land Bank is entitled to preference. What respondent GSIS is
resisting, however, is its being compelled to accept said bonds at their
face value. Respondent, in support of its stance that it can discount
the bonds, avers that "(a) PD 251 has amended Section 85 of RA 3844
by deleting and eliminating the original provision that Land Bank bonds
shall be accepted in the amount of their face value; and (b) to accept
the said bonds at their face value will impair the actuarial solvency of
the GSIS and thoroughly prejudice its capacity to pay death,
retirement, insurance, dividends and other benefits and claims to its
more than a million members, the majority of whom are low salaried
government employees and workers." HYPERLINK "http://
"_ftn8" \o ""
[G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000]

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA

8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands
of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural HYPERLINK
"javascript:void(0);"resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law
basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over
ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al
contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include
private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said
law violate the rights of private landowners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is HYPERLINK
"javascript:void(0);"unconstitutional.
HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they

voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same
result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was
dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence,
ancestral domains may include public domain somehow against the

regalian doctrine.
[G.R. No. 134958. January 31, 2001]

PATRICIO CUTARAN, DAVID DANGWAS and PACIO DOSIL, petitioners,
vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES, herein
represented by SEC. VICTOR O. RAMOS, OSCAR M. HAMADA and
GUILLERMO S. FIANZA, in his capacity as Chairman of Community
Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands (CSTFAL), Baguio City,
respondents.
FACTS: Cutaran et.al. assails the validity of DENR Special Order31,
Special Order 25, and Department Administrative Order 2 for being
issued without prior legislative authority.- Special Order (SO) 31
(1990): Creation of a Special Task force on acceptance, identification,
evaluation and delineation of ancestral land claims in the Cordillera
Administrative Region- Special Order (SO) 25: Creation of Special
Task Forces provincial and community environment and natural
resources offices for the identification, delineation and recognition of
ancestral land claims nationwide- DAO 2: Implementing Rules and
Guidelines of Special Order no. 25 The same year SO 31 was issued,
relatives of petitioners filed separate applications for Certificate of
Ancestral Land Claim (CALC) for the land they occupy inside the Camp
John Hay Reservation. -These petitions were denied. Also pursuant to
the SOs, the heirs of A peg Carantes filed application for CALC for
some portions of land in the Camp John Hay Reservation, overlapping
some of the land occupied by the petitioners. The petitioners contend
that if not for the respondents timely resistance to the Orders, the
petitioners would be totally evicted from their land.- Petitioners filed in
the CA petition to enjoin respondents from implementing Orders on
ground that they are void for lack of legal basis. CA ruled that SO31
has no force and effect for preempting legislative prerogative for it was
issued prior to the effectivity of RA7586 (National Integrated Protected
Systems), but it sustained SO25and DAO 2 on the ground that they
were issued pursuant to powers delegated to DENR under RA7586.-
Petitioners now contend that CA erred in upholding the validity of

SO25 and DAO 2 and seek to enjoin the DENR from processing the
application of CALC of Heirs of Carantes.
ISSUE: WON SO 25 and DAO 2 are valid
HELD: Not a justiciable controversy. The petition was prematurely
filed. There is yet no justiciable controversy for the court to resolve.
The adverse legal interests involved are the competing claims of the
petitioners and heirs of Carantes to possess a common piece of land.
Since the CALC application of the Heirs of Carantes has not yet been
granted or issued, and which the DENR may or may not grant, there is
yet no actual or imminent violation of petitioners asserted right to
possess the disputed land.- Definition of justiciable controversy: a
definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests which may be resolved by a court of law
through the application of a law.- Subject to certain well-defined
exceptions, the courts will not touch an issue involving the validity of a
law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or
performed that has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the
person contesting its validity. This Court cannot rule on the basis of
petitioners speculation that the DENR will approve the application of
the heirs of Carantes. There must be an actual governmental act which
directly causes or will imminently cause injury to the alleged legal right
of the petitioner to possess the land before the jurisdiction of this
Court may be invoked. There is no showing that the petitioners were
being evicted from the land by the heirs of Carantes under orders from
the DENR.
[G.R. No. 59603. April 29, 1987]

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. HON.
CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of
First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is
where the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is
to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development
Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are
registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the
government without them reaching the agreement as to the
compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the
appointment of the commissioners to determine the just
compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the
government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was
objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of
just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value
declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by
the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the
reception of the commissioners report. EPZA then filed this petition for
certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further
hearing the case.
Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of

determining just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just
compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes

impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render
the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is
reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree
may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in
determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the courts
own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to
arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a
judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may
make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of
the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be
taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail
over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from
looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.
[G.R. No. 127296. January 22, 1998]

EDUBIGIS GORDULA, CELSO V. FERNANDEZ, JR., CELSO A.
FERNANDEZ, NORA ELLEN ESTRELLADO, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, J.F. FESTEJO AND CO., INC. AND REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF LAGUNA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by the National Power
Corporation), respondents.
FACTS: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No.

573[3] withdrawing from sale and settlement and setting aside as
permanent forest reserves, subject to private rights, certain parcels of
the public domain which included Parcel No. 9 - Caliraya-Lumot River
Forest Reserve. They were primarily for use as watershed area. The
parcel of land subject of the case at bar is, by petitioners' explicit
admission,[4]within Parcel No. 9, the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest
Reserve. Petitioner Edubigis Gordula filed with the Bureau of Lands, an
Application[5]for a Free Patent over the land. Manuel Fernandez and
several others also filed free patent applications covering other parcels
of land in the area. Mr. Antonio Aquino, Jr., the Civil Security Officer of
the Cavinti reservoir complex, sent a Memorandum to the President of
the Napocor informing him of the fences and roads being constructed
in the saddle area, more particularly, in the lots sold by petitioner
Fernandez to petitioner Estrellado. Respondent Republic, through the
Napocor, filed against petitioners a Complaint for Annulment of Free
Patent and Cancellation of Titles and Reversion with Writ of Preliminary
Injunction in the RTC of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. The trial court rendered
judgment in favor of petitioners. Respondent Republic, through the
Napocor, elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals. On
June 20, 1996, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled against
petitioners. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject parcels of land are non-disposable
and inalienable public land?

HELD: The two (2) parcels of land were public disposable and alienable
lands before the issuance, by the former President, of Proclamation
No.573, on June 26, 196. The property was, however, later reserved,
under Proclamation No. 573, as a permanent forest, on June26,
196[9]. Since then, the property became non-disposable and
inalienable public land. By their very nature or by executive or
statutory fiat, they are outside the commerce of man, unsusceptible of
private appropriation in any form and inconvertible into any character
less than of inalienable public domain, regardless of their actual state,
for as long as the reservation subsists and is not revoked by a
subsequent valid declassification. Petitioners do not contest the nature
of the land in the case at bar. It is admitted that it lies in the heart of
the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, which Proclamation No. 573
classified as inalienable and in disposable. No public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from
the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of a title
from the state. The facts show that petitioner Gordula, did not acquire
title to the subject land prior to its reservation under Proclamation No.
573. He filed his application for free patent only in January, 1973,
more than three (3) years after the issuance of Proclamation No. 573
in June, 1969. At that time, the land, as part of the Caliraya-Lumot
River Forest Reserve, was no longer open to private ownership as it
has been classified as public forest reserve for the public good.
J.M. TUASON & CO., INC. v. LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION

FACTS: R.A. 2616 authorized expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in
Quezon City owned by petitioner and 2 others. Lands were to be
divided to lots to be sold. They prayed that it be declared
unconstitutional because violative of equal protection clause since
statute applies only to Tatalon estate.
ISSUE: WON
HELD: No person shall be denied equal protection. A judicial being is

included within its terms. Those adversely affected may under such
circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show
that the governmental act assailed was prompted by the spirit of
hostility, or at the very least discrimination that finds no support in
reason. Petitioner failed to prove denial of equal protection. Occupants
believe in gf that veterans subdivision is the real owner. Only when the
place vastly improved with building of roads, infrastructure did
petitioner claimed for the first time that they are the owners.
[G.R. No. 84647. May 23, 1991]

MARIA ALICIA LEUTERIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
HEIRS OF BENITO LEUTERIO, respondents.
FACTS: Pablo Leuterio died in San Luis, Pampanga on June 15, 1950,
leaving a large estate consisting of several parcels of land in
Pampanga.HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/
SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1991.zip%3E2bc,df%7C1991/MAY1991/84647.htm" \l
"_ftn2" His widow, Ana Maglanque -- who had been one of his domestic
servants and later his mistress, and whom he had married a few
months before his death, more precisely, on February 25, 1950 -- took
possession of his estate and administered it.HYPERLINK "http://
elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1991.zip
%3E2bc,df%7C1991/MAY1991/84647.htm" \l "_ftn3"
On July 23, 1957, Patrocinio Apostol, a niece of Pablo Leuterio, filed a
petition in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for her
appointment as guardian of Maria Alicia Leuterio, then 16 years of age,
alleged to be the legitimated daughter of said Pablo
Leuterio.HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/
"_ftn4"
On November 20, 1957, Benito Leuterio, a brother of Pablo Leuterio of
the full blood, instituted proceedings for the settlement of the
decedent's intestate estate in the same Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, praying for his appointment as administrator.HYPERLINK
"http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/
1991.zip%3E2bc,df%7C1991/MAY1991/84647.htm" \l "_ftn5" Benito Leuterio's
petition pertinently alleged that Pablo Leuterio had died without
leaving a will; that he was survived, not only by said Benito Leuterio,
but also by a) the children of Elena Leuterio, deceased, sister of the
full blood of the decedent; b) Vicente D. Leuterio, the son of Gregoria
Leuterio, also deceased, and also a sister of the full blood of Pablo
Leuterio. That Pablo Leuterio died a widower; and that the claim of
Patrocinio Apostol, a niece of the decedent, that the latter had left a
legitimate daughter was "without foundation in fact and in law."
The petition was opposed by Ana Maglanque and Maria Alicia Leuterio
(the latter being represented by the above named Patrocinio Apostol).
After hearing, the Probate Court appointed Ana Maglanque
administratrix of Pablo Leuterio's estate.
The event leading directly to the appellate proceedings at bar was the
filing in the settlement proceeding by Maria Alicia Leuterio on October
19, 1962 of a pleading entitled "Assertion of Rights," in which she
averred that she was the only forced heir of Pablo Leuterio and
therefore entitled to succeed to the latter's entire estate, subject only
to the rights accorded by law to her mother, Ana
Maglanque.HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/
"_ftn6"
In respect of this claim, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts
and issues, as regards the celebration and the validity of the marriage
of Pablo Leuterio and Ana Maglanque; the identity of the decedent's
relatives by consanguinity, supra; the character of the decedent's

estate as being "his own separate, exclusive properties and, therefore,
his capital.
ISSUE: WON the Probate Court had erred 1) in rejecting (as spurious) Exhibit D, "which is the certificate of the
record of birth of Maria Alicia Leuterio in the Civil Registry of San Luis,
Pampanga;"
2) "in not giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of Gervacio
Bagtas and Paula Punzalan who are disinterested witnesses and who
are school teachers at the San Luis Elementary School where appellant
Maria Alicia Leuterio was studying;"
3) "in holding that the testimony of Don Sotero Baluyut given in the
form of a deposition appears to be in the form of an accommodation;"
4) in not declaring (on the basis of the evidence) that Maria Alicia
Leuterio has been in the possession of the status of a natural child
before and after the marriage of her parents * * ."
HELD: "In this case, the Court is not inclined to conclude that there
was an express desire on the part of Pablo to recognize Maria Alicia as
his natural child. As previously adverted to, the birth certificate,
baptismal certificate and the photographs do not bear the signatures
of Pablo expressing his acknowledgment of Maria Alicia as his natural
daughter with Ana Maglanque. Indeed, Maria Alicia is said to have
been born, reared and raised in the house of Pablo. Appellees explain
this by stating that Ana was a househelp in the house of Pablo. Pablo
has no child with his previous wife, and it is not unusual if he looked
upon Maria Alicia as if she were his own daughter in or outside his
residence. Upon these considerations, the court a quo was correct in
rejecting the testimonies of Dar Juan, Paula Punzalan and Gervacio
Bagtas, and the deposition of Sotero Baluyut. With respect to Dar
Juan, Punzalan and Bagtas, the lower court saw and observed their
demeanor in the witness stand and objected to their vital claims. With
respect to the testimony of Sotero Baluyut, petitioners admit that he
and Pablo were very close friends.
"What clinches the case in favor of appellees, to Our mind, is the
absolute lack of a document or writing, such as receipts of payment of
school fees in the name of Pablo, signatures in school cards, or a letter
to relatives or friends naming Maria Alicia as his daughter, despite the

lapse of 9 years from the birth of Maria Alicia in 1941 up to his death
in 1950.
In her appeal to this Court, petitioner Maria Alicia Leuterio submits
that the Decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed because it
was "clear and patent error" on its part 1) to surmise "that the action of the petitioner for legitimation is
based on voluntary recognition," and
2) to hold that the "facts and the laws involved place this case
squarely on all fours with the case of Colorado et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-39948, February 28, 1985, although the action of
herein petitioner is one for compulsory recognition and for
legitimation."
The petition is without merit, and cannot be granted.
It seems to this Court that both the Court of Appeals and the Probate
Court were aware of the precise nature of the petitioner's recourse: a
judicial declaration of her compulsory or involuntary recognition as
Pablo Leuterio's natural child. The record discloses that the Probate
Court went to some lengths to stress the distinction between voluntary
and compulsory recognition, and to make petitioner's counsel identify
the exact character of the remedy that she was seeking -- whether it
be voluntary, or compulsory, recognition -- quoting in this connection,
the exchange between the Judge and petitioner's attorney, which
culminated in the latter's description of the desired relief as "not
voluntary acknowledgment in the sense that the decedent did not
execute a public document expressly acknowledging the petitioner
Maria Alicia Leuterio as his natural child. Because we believe that a
public document is one of the evidence of compulsory
acknowledgment." HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/
documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1991.zip%3E2bc,df
%7C1991/MAY1991/84647.htm" \l "_ftn13" \o "" It said:
"There should not be confusion in terms: one thing is the
acknowledgment of a child by the father, made voluntarily; another is
the action that should be instituted by the child against the father to
compel the latter to acknowledge him as a natural child. The
continuous possession of the status of a natural child, tolerated by his
father and justified by direct acts of the latter, does not, of itself,
constitute evidence of acknowledgment that he is so in effect. It is, at
most, an evidence to compel the father to acknowledge him. However,
the action for this purpose should be brought within the periods of
time prescribed in Article 137 of the old Civil Code (now Article 285 of
the new Civil Code). (Gitt vs. Gitt, 68 Phil. 385)."
The Probate Court's statements correctly reflect the state of the law at
the time. HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documentsdtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1991.zip%3E2bc,df%7C1991/
MAY1991/84647.htm" \l "_ftn14" \o "" In fact, it is consistent with the
statement of the law attempted by petitioner's own distinguished
counsel, citing Concepcion vs. Untaran, 38 Phil., 737, 738, viz.:
"The father of a natural child may recognize it in two different ways:
(a) by a voluntary recognition (Art, 131, civ. code); (2) by an
involuntary recognition enforced by either a civil or criminal action
(Art. 135, Civ. Code; Art. 499, Pen. Code).
"A voluntary recognition of a natural child may be made: (a) in the
record of births; (b) by will; and (c) by any other public instrument.
(Art. 131, Civil Code).
"An involuntary recognition of a natural child is made: (a) by an
incontrovertible paper written by the parent expressly recognizing his
paternity; (b) by giving such child the status of a natural child of the
father, justified by direct act of the child of the father or his family (art.
135, Civ. Code); and (c) by a criminal action for rape, seduction or
abduction. (par. 2, art. 449, Pen. Code)."
It was in this sense, too, that the Court of Appeals appeared to have
understood and applied the law to the case. As much is apparent from
its declaration that "(r)ecognition under the Civil Code of 1889 must
be precise, express and solemn (Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 65 SCRA
161), whether voluntary or compulsory (Baron vs. Baron, 63 OG No. 2,
Jan. 9, 1967)." Like the Probate Court, whose judgment it affirmed,
the Court of Appeals ruled that the evidence failed to prove either the
existence of "an incontrovertible paper written by the parent expressly
recognizing his paternity," or the "giving (to) such child (of) the status
of a natural child of the father" conformably with Article 135 of the
Civil Code of 1889. Hence, there was no factual basis on which to rest
a declaration of involuntary recognition by Pablo Leuterio of Maria
Alicia as his natural daughter.
Now, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, by familiar
doctrine, conclusive on this Court and are not thus subject of review,
specially where those findings are the same as those made by the Trial
Court. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, but none obtains
in the case at bar.

The petitioner also contests the Appellate Court's holding that Article
283 of the present (1950) Civil Code has no retroactive effect. That
conclusion was no doubt based on the fact that Article 2260 of the
same Code expressly accords such effect only to voluntary recognition
thus by inference excluding compulsory recognition for the causes or
under the circumstances enumerated in Article 283, with its "catch-all"
provision that recognition may be compelled if the child has in his
favor "any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father."
HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/
SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1991.zip%3E2bc,df%7C1991/
MAY1991/84647.htm" \l "_ftn15" \o "" While a contrary view, i.e., in
favor of retroactivity, may find support in the excepting clause of
Article 2253, also of the Civil Code, which gives effect to rights
declared for the first time therein, though arising from acts done or
events occurred under prior law provided no vested or acquired rights
of the same origin are prejudiced thereby, there is little point in
pursuing that question insofar as the resolution of this appeal is
concerned.
Whether Article 283 has retroactive effect or it operates only
prospectively, the fact is that both the Probate Court and the Court of
Appeals rejected in its entirety -- as variously, insufficient,
unpersuasive and spurious -- petitioner's evidence both oral and
documentary bearing on her alleged status as a natural child of Pablo
Leuterio. That rejection forecloses the claim of petitioner to either
voluntary or compulsory recognition, be it made under the Civil Code
of 1889 which was in force at the time of her asserted birth or, in the
case of compulsory recognition, under the more liberal Article 283 of
the present Code. It can hardly be disputed that in opening the door
to "any evidence" of paternity in an action to compel acknowledgment,
Article 283 by no means did away with the usual tests of competence,
sufficiency and credibility to which such evidence is subject when
offered in a court of law, or strip the courts of their function and
prerogative of passing upon its acceptability after applying such tests.
Such evidence here having been found wanting after due assessment
as already stated, petitioner's claim was properly denied.
[G.R. No. 109490. February 14, 1994]

PATROCINIO E. MARGOLLES, VIRGINIA E. VILLONGCO, EDUARDO C.
ESPINOSA, LUCIA E. LAPERAL, NORMA C. ESPINOSA, TERESITA E.
CASAL, ALICE E. SOTTO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
FIRESTONE CERAMICS, INC., BOOMTOWN DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, SPOUSES CYNTHIA D. CHING and CHING TIONG
KENG, SPOUSES CARMEN SOCO and LORENZO ONG ENG CHONG,
SPOUSES SOLEDAD B. YU and YU SY CHIA, and LETICIA NOCON
CHAN, respondents.
On 11 July 1985, Firestone, Boomtown, spouses Cynthia D. Ching and
Ching Tiong Keng, spouses Carmen Soco and Lorenzo Ong Eng Chong,
spouses Soledad Yu and Yu Sy Chia, and Leticia Nocon Chan filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Makati, Metro Manila, a complaint
for annulment of titles, recovery of possession, and quieting of titles
against Patrocinio E. Margolles, Virginia E. Villongco, Edgardo C.
Espinosa, Lucia E. Laperal, Norma E. Espinosa, Teresita E. Casal, Alice
E. Sotto, Veronica Gana, and Equitable Banking Corporation. Also
included among the defendants were the Land Registration
Commissioner and the Register of Deeds of Pasay City.
The complaint averred that the parcels of land in question were
registered in the names of Benito Gonzales and Emeterio Espiritu was
issued pursuant to a decision in Land Registration Case No. N-6625,
dated 22 July 1969. On 04 February 1976, the property was
subdivided by Gonzales and Espiritu into five lots, resulting in the
issuance of five TCT.
Months after plaintiffs took possession of the premises, the defendants
demanded that the plaintiffs vacate the premises. Claiming
ownership, the defendants, on their part, traced their titles from
Original Certificate of Title No. 4216 issued to the spouses Lorenzo
Gana and Ma. Juliana Carlos on 26 March 1929 pursuant to Decree No.
35183 in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 672 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, G.L.R.O. Record No. 30406.
On 04 April 1956, OCT No. 4216 was cancelled and, in its place, TCT
No. 43555 was issued to Lorenzo Gana and Veronica Gana married to
Ramon Rodriguez. TCT No. 43555 was itself likewise cancelled (on the
same day) and TCT No. 43556 was issued, this time in the name of
Veronica Gana alone. On 13 August 1956, Veronica Gana sold the land
to Patrocinio Margolles, resulting in the issuance of TCT No. 46302.

Margolles subdivided the property into seven (7) lots, each lot being
covered, respectively, by TCTs No. 379913, No. 379914, No. 379915,
No. 379916, No. 379917, No. 379918 and No. 379919.
On 03 November 1972, Margolles sold 1/2 interest in the property to
Sto. Nio Estate Management Corporation and TCTs No. 382176, No.
382177, No. 382178, No. 382179, No. 382180, No. 382181 and No.
382182 were thereupon issued in the names of both Sto. Nio Estate
Management Corporation and Patrocinio Margolles.
On 17 May 1973, Sto. Nio Estate Management Corporation
reconveyed its interest to the property to Patrocinio Margolles and,
again, new TCTs No. 410535, No. 410536, No. 410537, No. 410538,
No. 410539, No. 410540 and No. 410541 were issued in the name of
the latter. Subsequently, TCTs No. 410536, No. 410538, No. 410539,
No. 410540 and No. 410541 were cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT
No. S-17992 was issued to Peltan Development Corporation.
Margolles subdivided the remaining parcels covered by TCTs No.
410535 and No. 410537 into fifteen (15) lots, each of which was titled
in her name, i.e., TCTs No. S-16369 up to No. S-16383, inclusive.
These titles, except TCTs No. S-16372 and No. S-16373 which were
retained in her name, were later cancelled and transferred to her
brother and sisters, her co-defendants and co-petitioners in the
present case. The transferees Virginia Villongco and Norma Espinosa
later mortgaged their own lots to Equitable Banking Corporation.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the genuineness and authenticity of Original
Certificate of Title No. A-S-47, against an overlapping Original
Certificate of Title No. 4216, was sufficiently established;
(2) Whether or not Original Certificate of Title No. 4216 was issued
while the property was still unclassified public land; and
(3) Whether or not the claim of the petitioners was correctly barred by
laches.
The first issue is basically factual. Ordinarily, only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari.HYPERLINK "http://
%3E128,df%7C1994/FEB1994/109490.htm" \l "_ftn1" This rule, however, is
subject to exceptions, such as when there are compelling reasons to
justify otherwise,HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/

SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1994.zip%3E128,df%7C1994/FEB1994/109490.htm" \l
"_ftn2" or when the appealed decision is clearly contradicted by the
evidence on record.HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documentsdtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1994.zip%3E128,df%7C1994/
FEB1994/109490.htm" \l "_ftn3" This case is so illustrative of such
exceptional instances.
To support their claim that OCT No. 4216 is genuine, the petitioners
have submitted, among other things, the following pieces of
documentary evidence:
(1) The original of OCT No. 4216, as well as the owners duplicate
certificates, on file with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal;
(2) The publications (in the English and Spanish versions) of the
Official Gazette (1927 editions), containing notices of the initial
hearing in Land Registration Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No. 30406),
instituted by the spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana Carlos,
covering a parcel of land in Tindig na Mangga, Las Pias;
(3) The order of then CFI Judge Cecilia Muoz-Palma, dated 23 March
1961, in LRC Case No. N-2126 (GLRO Record No. N-6564), denying
the registration of a parcel of land by reason of the certification, dated
26 June 1959, of the Land Registration Commissioner, Antonio N.
Noblejas, that a portion of the property covered in this post-war land
case had been decreed under Decree No. 351823, issued on 05 March
1929, in the name of the spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana A.
Carlos in LRC Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No. 30406), and while said
case covered only a part of the property in dispute, it did show,
however, that the decree was, in fact, issued to the spouses Gana and
Carlos;
(4) The Report, dated 07 June 1983, of the Land Registration
Commission's Verification Committee, sustaining the validity of Decree
No. 351823 in favor of Lorenzo J. Gana and Maria Juliana A. Carlos;
(5) Page 209 of the Book of Decrees (Old Book) of the Land
Registration Commission, showing that a decree was "okayed" in GLRO
Record No. 30406 (LRC Case No. 672), under the entry "Date O.K. for
Decree" on "1-22-29" (22 January 1929) and that a decree was issued
under the entry "Date Decree Issued" on "3-5-29" (05 March 1929);
(6) The certified true microfilm reproduction of plan Psu-49273
covering a parcel of land in Barrio Tindig na Mangga, Las Pias,
surveyed for Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana Carlos, approved by the
Bureau of Lands in 1926;
(7) The decision of this Court in Guico vs. San Pedro, 72 Phil. 415,
pointing to the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal
in LRC Case No. 672 in favor of the spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria
Juliana Carlos; and
(8) The letters of Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and Solicitor
General Francisco Chavez, stating that the information and documents
submitted to the Office of the Solicitor General by the Bureau of Lands
and the Land Registration Commission were not sufficient to support
an action for cancellation of OCT No. 4216 and the derivative titles
thereof.
HELD: The above documentary evidence is much too overwhelming to
be simply brushed aside. It is our considered view that the appellate
court has committed serious error in refusing to give any probative
value to such evidence. All that the private respondents could
basically proffer against OCT 4216 are that
(1) The title is invalid, fake and spurious,HYPERLINK "http://
%3E128,df%7C1994/FEB1994/109490.htm" \l "_ftn4" which must have been the
work of "some unscrupulous elements" who could have access to "the
Registry Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Rizal,"HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/
"_ftn5" that explains petitioners' failure to present a copy of the
decision in Land Registration Case No. 672 or Decree No. 351823; and
(2) Assuming OCT No. 4216 to have been issued, the same is invalid
having been issued on still unclassified land of the public domain.
Section 3, Rule 130, of the Revised Rules of Court, taken from Section
321 of Act No. 190, states:
"Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall
be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of

the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without
great loss of time and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office."
It has been plainly shown that the failure of the petitioners to produce
the Decree is due to the burning of the Archives of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal during the liberation of Pasig,HYPERLINK "http://
%3E128,df%7C1994/FEB1994/109490.htm" \l "_ftn6" in consequence of which
all pre-war land registration cases in Rizal have been
destroyed.HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/
"_ftn7" The respondents own witness, Eduardo Santos, Jr., has testified
that the records of pre-war registration cases are thus incomplete as
can be expected.HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/
"_ftn8" The Certification, dated 02 May 1980, of Reynaldo S. Vergara,
Acting Chief of the Docket Division of the Land Registration Authority,
states that the pre-war record of LRC Case No. 672, GLRO Record No.
030406 for the province of Rizal, is not among the records on file with
the Vault Section of the Docket Division since the same must have
been lost or destroyed as a consequence of the last world war.
SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1994.zip%3E128,df%7C1994/
FEB1994/109490.htm" \l "_ftn9" \o "" Certainly, the petitioners
cannot be held to account for those lost or destroyed records.
The private respondents argue that the petitioners should have
asked for the reconstitution of the LRC case and the decree in
accordance with Act No. 3110 HYPERLINK "http://
Decisions/1994.zip%3E128,df%7C1994/FEB1994/109490.htm" \l
"_ftn10" \o "" and Republic Act No. 26, HYPERLINK "http://
"_ftn11" \o "" or that they could have opposed, or intervened in, the
proceedings in LRC Case No. N-6625 (LRC Record No. N-36579) where
OCT No. A-S-47 has been decreed. For failing to do so, the
petitioners, it is now contended, should be held bound by the order of
default issued by the land registration court. The argument is
unacceptable. The petitioners are not covered by the general order of
default in LRC Case No. N-6625. Republic Act No. 26 only covers lost
or destroyed certificates of title. The original of OCT No. 4216 is not
extant; it has, in fact, been presented in evidence. Act No. 3110, on
the other hand, applies only to pending judicial proceedings. This
Court has heretofore held, thus "The whole theory of reconstitution is to reproduce or replace records
lost or destroyed so that said records may be complete and court
proceedings may continue from the point or stage where said
proceedings stopped due to the loss of the records. x x x.
"xxx
xxx
xxx.
"If the records up to a certain point or stage are lost and they are not
reconstituted, the parties and the court should go back to the next
preceding stage where records are available, but not beyond that;
otherwise to ignore and go beyond the stage next preceding would be
voiding and unnecessarily ignoring proceedings which are duly
recorded and documented, to the great prejudice not only of the
parties and their witnesses, but also of the court which must gain
perforce admit pleadings, rule upon them and then try the case and
decide it anew,--all of these, when the records up to said point or
stage are intact and complete, and uncontroverted.
"x x x. Act No. 3110, was not promulgated to penalize people for
failure to observe or invoke its provisions. It contains no penal
sanction. It was enacted rather to aid and benefit litigants, so that
when court records are destroyed at any stage of judicial proceedings,
instead of instituting a new case and starting all over again, they may
reconstitute the records lost and continue the case. If they fail to ask
for reconstitution, the worst that can happen to them is that they lose
the advantages provided by the reconstitution law. x x x.
"x x x. (T)o require the parties to file their action anew and incur the
expenses and suf(f)er the annoyance and vexation incident to the
filing of pleadings and the conduct of hearings, aside from the
possibility that some of the witnesses may have died or left the
jurisdiction, and also to require the court to again rule on the
pleadings and hear the witnesses and then decide the case, when all
along and all the time the record of the former pleadings of the trial
and evidence and decision are there and are not disputed, all this
would appear to be not exactly logical or reasonable, or fair and just to
the parties, including the trial court which has not committed any
negligence or fault at all. HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/
documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1994.zip%3E128,df
%7C1994/FEB1994/109490.htm" \l "_ftn12" \o ""
Furthermore, Section 45 of Act No. 3110, provides that "(n)othing
contained in (the) Act shall be construed to repeal or modify the
provisions of Section Three Hundred and Twenty One of Act Numbered
One Hundred and Ninety." Section 321 of Act No. 190 is now Section 3
(aforequoted), Rule 130, of the Revised Rules of Court, otherwise
known as the best evidence rule." Hence, even if the petitioners have
failed to have the records of the LRC case reconstituted, they are not
precluded from establishing by other evidence the requisite proof of
validity of OCT No. 4216.
Quite recently, in Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. (WIDORA) vs.
Court of Appeals,HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/
"_ftn13" this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Florentino Feliciano,
said:
"x x x. The copy of OCT No. 351 offered by Ortigas was a certified
true copy of the original thereof found in the Registration Book of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal. The admissibility of such a copy in court
proceedings is an exception to the ordinary rule on secondary
evidence; such admissibility is in fact mandated by Section 47 of Act
No. 496 (The Land Registration Act). Under the Land Registration Act
which was in force at the time OCT No. 351 issued, the original thereof
found in the Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Rizal was an
official transcript of Decree No. 1425, with respect to the land covered
by such decree situated in the Province of Rizal.
"Thus, OCT No. 351 constitutes direct proof of the existence of Decree
No. 1425 upon which the Ortigas TCTs (Nos. 77652 and 77653) are
based. x x x." (Footnotes omitted; underscoring supplied.)
The private respondents maintain, nonetheless, that OCT No. 4216,
issued in favor of the spouses Gana and Carlos, is invalid, so covering,
as it supposedly did, unclassified public lands. Here, the private
respondents base their claim on Forestry Administration Order (FAO)
No. 4-1141 (1968), implementing LC Map No. 2623, Project No. 13-A.
According to them, Las Pias comprises 2,556 hectares, out of which

1,200 hectares have been declared alienable and disposable public
lands in 1928, under LC Map No. 766, Project 13, and that "Tindig na
Mangga" has not been covered thereby until the reclassification in
1968. As such, they submit, the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
sitting as Land Registration Court in 1929, did not acquire jurisdiction
to adjudicate the property in question to the petitioners predecessorsin-interest.HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/
"_ftn14"
No cogent proof, however, has been given to support the above
contention. To the contrary, in fact, is the letter, dated 27 April 1988,
of then Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, which in part, reads:
"Thirdly, it is also alleged that the title is null and void because it
allegedly covers land within the forest zone. There is no clear-cut
proof to that effect. The certification of Mr. Rogelio dela Rosa of the
Timber Management Division, Bureau of Forest Development, dated
July 31, 1979, simply states that the tract of land situated in Barrio
Tindig na Mangga, Las Pias, Metro Manila containing an area of
197,525 square meters as shown and described on this plan
Psu-04-006417 x x x was found to be within the Alienable or
Disposable Block of LC Project No. 13-A of Las Pias, Rizal certified as
such on January 3, 1968 per BFD Map LC-2623. The certification
refers to land with an area of only 19.7525 hectares. It does not state
the relationship of said land with the land covered by OCT No. 4216
which has an area of 99.6157 hectares.
"xxx
xxx
xxx.
"Fifthly, the recommendation of the Director of Lands for the

cancellation of OCT No. 4216 is premised mainly on the allegation that
the land is within the forest zone, having been allegedly released as A
& D land only in 1968. But the recommendation is based on the same
certification of Mr. de la Rosa of the Bureau of Forest Development
which, as earlier observed, does not make any clear reference to the
land covered by OCT No. 4216 and is, therefore, vague and
inconclusive."
Unfortunately, for all concerned, no authentic copy of LC Map No. 766,
Project 13, could be presented, albeit understandably, considering that
even the records of the National Mapping and Resource Authority
(NAMREA) have apparently been lost or destroyed during the second
World War.
In Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation vs. Court
of AppealsHYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/
"_ftn15" (a case to annul a 1912 decision of the land registration court),
the Republic sought to prove that, at the time an original certificate of
title was issued, the land covered thereby was still within the forest
zone. It offered as evidence a land classification map prepared by the
Director of Forestry in 1961. The Court ruled:
x x x. When the proceedings were originally filed by the Republic
before the Court of Appeals, the petitioner contended that when the
decree in favor of De Perio was issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912 the
parcels of land were still part of the inalienable public forests.
However, petitioner's case rested solely on land classification maps
drawn several years after the issuance of the decree in 1912. These
maps failed to conclusively establish the actual classification of the
land in 1912 and the years prior to that. Before this Court, petitioner
reiterates said contention and refers, for the first time, to a 1908
proclamation reserving the land in Zambales as a naval reservation
and alleging that the subject parcels of land are parts thereof. These x
x x are insufficient to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the
decree's regularity x x x."
Furthermore, FAO No. 4-1141, signed by then Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources Arturo R. Tanco, Jr., on 03 January 1968,
provides:
"1. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1827 of the Revised
Administrative Code, I hereby declare as alienable or
disposable and place the same under the control of the
Bureau of Lands for administration and disposition in
accordance with the Public Land Act, subject to private
rights, if any there be and to the conditions herein specified,
the portions of the public domain situated in the
Municipalities of x x x Las Pias, x x x Province of Rizal x x x
which are designated and described as alienable or
disposable on Bureau of Forestry Map LC-2623, approved on
January 3, 1968." (Underscoring supplied.)
The issuance of OCT No. 4216 in 1929, conferring a private right, is
then amply protected by FAO No. 4-1141; otherwise, certificates of
title issued prior to 1968 could possibly be all nullified.
Finally, the private respondents raise estoppel by laches on the part of

the petitioners. Laches is "the failure or neglect for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence could or should have been done earlier, or the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or has declined to assert it. HYPERLINK "http://
"_ftn16" \o ""
Contrary to private respondents claim that no action was taken by the
petitioners until a petition for quieting of title was filed in 1985 by the
private respondents themselves, the records would indicate that upon
the subdivision of the lots in question by Espiritu and Gonzales, and
the subsequent transfers of the same to the private respondents in
1976, a demand was seasonably made by the petitioners for the
private respondents to vacate the premises. From the time OCT No.
A-S-47 was issued to the private respondents in 1969 until the
demand was made in 1976, only seven (7) years had elapsed.
Lastly, it is a settled rule that "when two certificates of title are issued
to different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the
earlier in date must prevail, and, in case of successive registrations
where more than one certificate is issued over the land, the person
holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person
who relies on a subsequent certificate. HYPERLINK "http://
"_ftn17" \o "" The titles of the petitioners, having emanated from an
older title, should thus be upheld.
.
HYPERLINK "http://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2008/06/sunbeam-convenience-foodsinc-vs-ca.html"Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. vs. CA

G.R. No. 50464, Jan. 29, 1990
FACTS:
Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. is the recipient of a Sales Patent
issued by the Bureau of Lands over two parcels of land in Bataan. An
OCT was thereby issued. The Solicitor-General filed an action for
reversion on the ground that the lots were forest lands and therefore
inalienable.
CA ruled, upholding the Solicitor-General's contention.
ISSUE:
Whether or not land is alienable
HELD:
The SC affirmed.
Our adherence to the Regalian Doctrine subjects all agricultural,
timber, and mineral lands to the dominion of the State. Thus, before
any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural purposes, there must be
a positive act from the Government. Even rules on the confirmation of
imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as
forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that
it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain.
The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not
confer any validity on such title if the property covered by the title or
patent is part of the public forest.
Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest: Director of Lands v. IAC (1986)
Labels: 1986, Case Digest, Juris Doctor, Land Titles and Deeds, Land
Titles and Deeds Case Digest
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and
Deeds)
FACTS:
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo
Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the
Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land
possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines
was discovered by Magellan
land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872
granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes
on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the
alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M
worth of improvements
ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly
recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of
Maconacon, Isabela
donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela
IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of
ISSUES:
W/N the land is already a private land - YES

W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private
corporations or associations applies- NO
HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc
YES
already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a
grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of
title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by
the courts, an application therefore is sufficient
it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become
private property, at least by presumption
The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which
does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced
by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of
said patent.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by
earlier law
2. NO
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to
which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on
October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must
also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such
acquisition
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not
acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024
hectares
Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of

carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A
which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces
but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, HYPERLINK
"javascript:void(0);" Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from
Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot
averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be
heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided
by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being
heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling
that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to HYPERLINK
"javascript:void(0);"promote general welfare so as to curb down the
indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due
process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of
the HYPERLINK "javascript:void(0);"executive. The movement of carabaos
from one area to the other does not HYPERLINK
"javascript:void(0);"mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would
ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the
carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC
found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police
power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property

confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on
the HYPERLINK "javascript:void(0);"administrative authorities of the power
to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment
on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative
powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
HYPERLINK "http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/joya-vs-pcgg-225-scra-568gr-no-96541.html"JOYA VS. PCGG [225 SCRA 568; G.R. No. 96541;
24 Aug 1993]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: HYPERLINK "http://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case
%20Digests"Case Digests, HYPERLINK "http://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/
Political%20Law"Political Law
Facts: On 9 August 1990, Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of

PCGG, wrote then President Corazon C. Aquino, requesting her for
authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement between the
Republic of the Philippines through PCGG and
Christie, Manson andWoods International, Inc concerning the
scheduled sale on 11 January 1991 of eighty-two) Old Masters
Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacaang and the
Metropolitan Museum of Manilaalleged to be part of the ill-gotten
wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies. On 14
August 1990, then President Aquino, through former Executive
Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., authorized Chairman Caparas to sign
the Consignment Agreement allowing Christie's of New York to auction
off the subject art pieces for and in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. On 15 August 1990, PCGG, through Chairman Caparas,
representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed
the Consignment Agreement with Christie's of New York. According to
the agreement, PCGG shall consign to CHRISTIE'S for sale at public
auction the eighty-two Old Masters Paintings then found at the
Metropolitan Museum of Manila as well as the silverware contained in
seventy-one cartons in the custody of the Central Bank of the
Philippines, and such other property as may subsequently be identified
by PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be subject to the provisions
of the agreement.
On 26 October 1990, the Commission on Audit through then Chairman

Eufemio C. Domingo submitted to President Aquino the audit findings
and observations of COA on the Consignment Agreement of 15 August
1990 to the effect that: the authority of former PCGG Chairman
Caparas to enter into the Consignment Agreement was of doubtful
legality; the contract was highly disadvantageous to the government;
PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the U.S.;
and, the assets subject of auction were historical relics and had
cultural significance, hence, their disposal was prohibited by law.
After the oral arguments of the parties on 9 January 1991, we issued
immediately our resolution denying the application for preliminary
injunction to restrain the scheduled sale of the artworks on the ground
that petitioners had not presented a clear legal right to a restraining
order and that proper parties had not been impleaded.
On 11 January 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled
and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau
of Treasury.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
(2) Whether or not the Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware
are embraced in the phrase "cultural treasure of the nation".
(3) Whether or not the paintings and silverware are properties of
public dominion on which can be disposed of through the joint
concurrence of the President and Congress.
(4) Whether or not PCGG has complied with the due process clause
and other statutory requirements for the exportation and sale of the
subject items.
(5) Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic, and if
so, whether the above Issue warrant resolution from this Court.
Held: This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which

provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest
in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall
be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial
review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the
legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal
standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is
material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree,
as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be
personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate
the constitutional right of some third and related party.
There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed
exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a
case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the
fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution, and when a
taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the
disbursement of public funds.
Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and
in law. The ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the
foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public
has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings
when they were placed on exhibit.
The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration
however should not be understood to mean that the ownership of
these paintings has automatically passed on the government without
complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due

process and just compensation. If these properties were already
acquired by the government, any constitutional or statutory defect in
their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only
by the proper parties the true owners thereof whose authority to
recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by
statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the
legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become
publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right
whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition.
Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Obviously,
petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds
but the disposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is
worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique
silverware were acquired from private sources and not with public
money.
Anent the second requisite of actual controversy, petitioners argue that
this case should be resolved by this Court as an exception to the rule
on moot and academic cases; that although the sale of the paintings
and silver has long been consummated and the possibility of retrieving
the treasure trove is nil, yet the novelty and importance of the Issue
raised by the petition deserve this Court's attention. They submit that
the resolution by the Court of the Issue in this case will establish
future guiding principles and doctrines on the preservation of the
nation's priceless artistic and cultural possessions for the benefit of the
public as a whole.
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an
actual case of controversy one which involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extralegal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of
justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has
become stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this
petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from
holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date 11

January 1991 which is long past, the Issue raised in the petition
have become moot and academic.
The cultural properties of the nation which shall be under the
protection of the state are classified as the "important cultural
properties" and the "national cultural treasures." On the other hand, a
"national cultural treasures" is a unique object found locally,
possessing outstanding historical, cultural, artistic and/or scientific
value which is highly significant and important to this country and
nation. This Court takes note of the certification issued by the Director
of the Museum that the Italian paintings and silverware subject of this
petition do not constitute protected cultural properties and are not
among those listed in the Cultural Properties Register of the National
Museum.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and
mandamus is DISMISSED.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS Case Digest
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS [267 SCRA 408; G.R. No.
122156; 3 Feb 1997]
Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of
thePhilippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8
December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila
Hotel Corporation. In a closebidding held on 18 September 1995 only
two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of
the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator,
which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/

strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts,
matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong
Berhad.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has
disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of
the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with
Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and
mandamus.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified
with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and

culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who
believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power
and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all
intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.
6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC
carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is
owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled
corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the
tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy.
Issue: Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is
violative of the Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy and is
therefore null and void.
Held: The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just
any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of
privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a
significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century
Philippine history and culture. This is the plain and simple meaning of
the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this
Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the
duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to
respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus
ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner MANILA
PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and
thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other
acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease
and desist from selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian
firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid of the
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.
According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10,

second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory
provision, a positive command which is complete in itself and needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En
Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over
foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question.
The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the
51% of the equity of said hotel to fall within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and controlling stock.
The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the
nations cultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in

question should be interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the same time,
not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from
granting rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence
of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped
from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former
knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too.
Manosca Vs CA Case Digest

Manosca Vs. Court Of Appeals
252 SCRA 412
G.R. No. 106440
January 29, 1996
Facts: The National Historical Institute declared the parcel of land

owned by Petitioners as a national historical landmark, because it was
the site of the birth of Felix Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo.
The Republic of the Philippines filed an action to appropriate the land.
Petitioners argued that the expropriation was not for a public purpose.
Issue: Whether or Not the taking or exercise of eminent domain may

be granted.
Held: Public use should not be restricted to the traditional uses. The
taking is for a public use because of the contribution of Felix Manalo to
the culture and history of the Philippines.
HYPERLINK "http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/mmda-vs-bel-air-village-328scra-836-gr.html"MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village [328 SCRA 836; G.R. No.
135962; 27 Mar 2000]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: HYPERLINK "http://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case
%20Digests"Case Digests, HYPERLINK "http://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/
Political%20Law"Political Law
Facts: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner

herein, is a Government Agency tasked with the delivery of basic
services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA),
respondent herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner to
open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The
said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient
movement of persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City.
This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924. On the
same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter
wall separatingthe subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be
demolished.
The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition
of the wall, filed a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining
order. Respondent claimed that the MMDA had no authority to do so
and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner
appealed the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the
authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an
agent of the State that can practice police power in the delivery of
basic services in Metro Manila.
Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune
Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers.
Held: The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity
toexercise police power. Police power is primarily lodged in the
National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to
government units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not
a political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA
cannot exercise police power because it cannot be delegated to them.
It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924
does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants
of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police
power.
It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and
coordinating with various national government agencies, peoples
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector
for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast
metropolitan area.
Technology vs CA (193 scra 147)
Facts: Technology Developers Inc. is engaged in manufacturing and

exporting charcoal briquette. On February 16, 1989, they received a
letter from respondent Acting Mayor Pablo Cruz, ordering the full
cessation of the operation of the petitioners plant in Sta. Maria,
Bulacan. The letter also requested the company to show to the office
of the mayor some documents, including the Building permit, mayors
permit, and Region III-Pollution of Environmental and Natural
Resources Anti-Pollution Permit. Since the company failed to comply in
bringing the required documents, respondent Acting Mayor, without
notice, caused the padlock of companys plant premises, effectively
causing stoppage of its operation. Technology Developers then
instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with
preliminary injuction against respondents, alleging that the closure
order was issued in grave abuse of discretion. The lower court ruled
against the company. The CA affirmed the lower courts ruling.
Issue: 1. Whether or not the mayor has authority to order the closure
of the plant. YES.
2. Whether or not the closure order was done with grave abuse
of discretion. NO.
Ruling:
1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the
matter of determining whether there is a pollution of the environment
that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is
essentially addressed to the then National Pollution Control
Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements, now the
Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town

has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution,
and by virture of his police power, he may deny the application for a
permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless
appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the
health of the residents of the community from the emissions in the
operation of the business.
2. The Acting Mayor, in the letter, called the attention of petitioner to
the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor
"not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the
residents in the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its
operation until further orders and it was required to bring the
following: a. Building permit; b. Mayor's permit; and c. Region IIIDepartment of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution
permit.
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of
the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the
Provincial Governor through channels.
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an
investigation was made. It found that the fumes emitted by the plant
of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no
proper air pollution device has been installed.
5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality
of Sta. Maria, but instead presented a building permit issued by an
official of Makati.
6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate

by the then National Pollution Control Commission on December 15,
1987, the permit was good only up to May25, 1988.
Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit
much less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent any
hazard to the health of the residents of the community. Petitioner
takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in
this dollar-earning industry. It must be stressed however, that
concomitant with the need to promote investment and contribute to
the growth of the economy is the equally essential imperative of
protecting the health, nay the very lives of the people, from the
deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.
G.R. No. 108619 July 31, 1997

EPIFANIO LALICAN,petitioner,vs. HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, Presiding
Judge, RTC Branch 52,
Puerto Princesa City and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.
Issue:
Whether the term lumber is included in the concept of timber in order to
constitute an offense as stated in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry
Reform Code of the Philippines).
Facts:
The petitioners were apprehended on the Sitio Cadiz, Barangay Bacungan Puerto
Princesa for violating Section 68 of PD No. 705 or known as The Forestry Reform Code
of the Philippines. There were 1, 800 board feet of lumber loaded in two (2) passenger
jeeps in different sizes and dimension that were confiscated. On August 9, 1991, all the
accused were pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Petioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information filed against them
contenting that, Section 68 of PD 705 does not include lumber because the wording of the
law categorically specify timber to be collected as to constitute the violation on the said
law. He further contends that, the law is vague because it does specify the authority or
legal documents required by existing forest law and regulation.
The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that it is not the
courts to determine the wisdom of the law or to set the policy as rest by the legislature.
He further asserts that the word timber should include lumber which is a product or
derivative of a timber. The position of the prosecution could result to the circumvention
of the law, for one could stealthily cut a timber and process it to become a lumber. On
September 24, 1991, the lower court construed the interpretation of the law against the
State thus the motion was granted.
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration on the order underscoring the
fact that the accused presented Private Land Timber Permit No. 030140 dated February
10, 1991 which had expired; that while the certificate of origin indicated Brgy. Sta. Cruz,
the product actually came from Sitio Cadiz, and that the two jeeps bearing the product
were not equipped with certificates of transport agreement. Added to this was the fact
that, if the product were indeed lumber, then the accused could have presented a
certificate of lumber origin, lumber sale invoices in case of sale, tally sheets and delivery
receipts for transportation from one point to another. The motion was approved thus this
case.
Ruling:
NO, The Court ruled that, the word lumber includes timber. The primary reason
why the law was enacted is to secure and maximize the use of the natural resources; the
non inclusion of lumber on the law may give rise for the circumvention of law. Section
68 of the said law punishes these acts namely (a) the cutting, gathering, collection, or
removal of timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any
authority; or (b) possession of timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations. Be that as it may, the
legislative intent to include possession of lumber in Sec. 68 is clearly gleaned from the
expressed reasons for enacting the law which, under Executive Order No. 277. To
exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly
emasculate the law itself. A law should not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act
which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat
compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the
law. After all, the phrase "forest products" is broad enough to encompass lumbers which,
to reiterate, is manufactured timber. Hence, to mention lumber in Sec. 68 would merely
result in tautology.
G.R. No. 158182 June 12, 2008
SESINANDO MERIDA,
PHILIPPINES,respondent.
petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
Issue:
1. Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even
though it was
based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer
2. Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705.
Facts:
Petitioner was charged in the RTC of Romblon with violation of Section 68 of
PD 705 for "cutting, gathering, collecting and removing a lone narra tree inside a private land over
which private complainant Oscar Tansiongco claims ownership. When confronted during
the meeting about the fell narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with
the permission of one Vicar Calix who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from
Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. It was later found out that he converted the narra
trunk into lumber.
He was found guilty by the Trial Court but he appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his
defense of denial. Petitioner also contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case because it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer as
provided under Section 80 of PD 705. CA affirmed the lower courts ruling, but ordered
the seized lumber confiscated in the government's favor. Also, it sustained the trial court's
finding that petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial admissions of cutting the narra tree in
the Mayod Property without any DENR permit.
Ruling:
Yes, The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure list the cases which must be
initiated by a complaint filed by specified individuals, non-compliance of which ousts the

trial court of jurisdiction from trying such cases. However, these cases concern
only defamation and other crimes against chastity and not to cases concerning Section
68 of PD 705. Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit an interested
person from filing a complaint before any qualified officer for violation of Section 68 of
PD 705, as amended.
Moreover, here, it was not forest officers of employees of the Bureau of Forest
Development who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but
Tansiongco, a private citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus,
Hernandez cannot be faulted for not conducting an investigation to determine "if
there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report." At any rate,
Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705 or the Revised Rules, from
filing a complaint ]before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD
705.
2. Yes, Petitioner is guilty of the second paragraph of section 80, which is the cutting, gathering,
collecting, or removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land
without any authority. The court also said that the lumber or processed log is covered by
the forest products term in PD 705, as the law does not distinguish between a raw and processed
timber.
A.M. No. MTJ-93-874 March 14, 1995
AUGUSTUS L. MOMONGAN petitioner, vs. JUDGE RAFAEL B. OMIPON,
respondent.
Issue:
Whether the respondent Judge erred in releasing the truck used to transport an
illegal lumber despite of prima facie evidence for violation of PD 705 as amended by EO
277.
Facts:
Augustus Momongan is the Regional Director of DENR in Tacloban City, while
the respondent Judge Omipon is the incumbent Judge of MCTC of Hinunangan Silago,
Southern Leyte. At around 10:00 of November 14, 1992 the police officer of Hinunangan
Silago, Southern Leyte apprehended a truck loaded with illegally cut lumber. The truck
was owned by Basilio Cabig drived by Dionisio Golpe. After the apprehension and
confiscation, a preliminary investigation was done to determine whether there is a
probable cause to engender the owner of the truck and the driver guilty on the violation of
PD 705. Despite of the presence of prima facie evidence the respondent Judge ordered
the release of the truck apprehended. Mr.Cabig was charged against PD 705 but Mr.
Golpe the driver was not included in the complaint.

The Regional Director Momongan filed an instant complaint against the judge
alleging that the release order was a violation of PD 705 Sections 68 and 68-A
respectively, and Administrative Order No. 59.Complainant claims that respondent Judge
has no authority to order the release of the truck despite the non-inclusion of Mr. Golpe in
the complaint. The truck should have been turned over to the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office of San Juan, Southern Leyte for appropriate disposition as
the same falls under the administrative jurisdiction of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources Office.
Respondent Judge explained that after conducting the preliminary investigation,
he found that Golpe, the owner of the truck, is principally engaged in the hauling of sand
and gravel and the delivery of hollow blocks, and the loading of the timber in the car is
due to the request of his friend Cabig. Respondent Judge observed that Golpe has a lesser
participation in the crime of illegal logging. More importantly, the fact that the complaint
charged only Cabig, respondent Judge, in the exercise of his sound discretion, ordered the
release of the truck owned by Golpe.
Ruling:
No, The court found that the respondent order to release the truck owned and
driven by Mr. Dionisio Golpe legally justifiable. According to the RPC, Every penalty
imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of
the crime and the instrument or tools with which it was committed." However, this cannot
be done if such proceeds and instruments or tools "be the property of a third person not
liable for offense." In this case, the truck, though used to transport the illegally cut
lumber, cannot be confiscated and forfeited in the event accused therein be convicted
because the truck owner/driver, Mr. Dionisio Golpe was not indicted. Hence, there was
no justification for respondent Judge not to release the truck.
Complainant is correct in pointing out that the DENR Secretary or his duly
authorized representative has the power to confiscate any illegally obtained or gathered
forest products and all conveyances used in the commission of the offense and to dispose
of the same in accordance with pertinent laws. The release of the truck did not render
nugatory the administrative authority of the DENR Secretary. Despite the order of
release, the truck can be seized again either by filing a motion for reinvestigation and
motion to include the truck owner/driver, as co-accused, which complainant has done as
manifested before the lower court or by enforcing Adm. Order No. 59. Section 12.
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA,
minors, and represented by their parents petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE
HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati,
Branch 66,respondents.
Issue
Whether children have the legal standing to file the case?

Facts
This case is unique in that it is a class suit brought by 44 children, through
their parents, claiming that they bring the case in the name of their generation as well as
those generations yet unborn. Aiming to stop deforestation, it was filed against the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources HYPERLINK
" h t t p : / / e n . w i k i p i l i p i n a s . o r g / i n d e x . p h p ?
title=Department_of_Environment_and_Natural_Resources" \t "_blank" , seeking to have
him cancel all the timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and
desist from accepting and approving more timber license agreements.
The children invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by
the State in its capacity as parens patriae.
The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and
to stop issuing them was "contrary to the highest law of humankind-- the natural law
and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation." The case was
dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts, so it was
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the
legal standing to file the case based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility.
Their right to a healthy environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that
environment for the succeeding generations. In this, the Court recognized legal standing
to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-impairment of
contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power of the state in the interest of
public welfare.
G.R. No. 131270 March 17, 2000

P E R F E C T O PA L L A D A , p e t i t i o n e r,
PHILIPPINES,respondent.
vs.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
Issue:
Whether a separate certificates of origin is used for lumber and timber.
Facts:
Sometime in the latter part of 1992, DENR received a reports that illegally cut
lumber were delivered in the warehouse of Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation in
Valencia Bukidnon. DENR officers in collaboration of PNP raided the companys
warehouse and found a large stockpile of lumber in varying sizes cut by a chainsaw. As
proof that the company had acquired the lumber by purchase, petitioner produced two
receipts issued by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard of Maramag, Bukidnon, dated March 6 and
17, 1992. The DENR officers did not, however, give credit to the receipt considering that
R. L. Rivero Lumberyard's permit to operate had long been suspended. What is more, the
pieces of lumber were cut by chain saw and thus could not have come from a licensed
sawmill operator.
On February 23, 1993, petitioner, as general manager, together with Noel Sy, as
assistant operations manager, and Francisco Tankiko, as president of the Valencia Golden
Harvest Corporation, and Isaias Valdehueza, were charged with violation of section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended. During the trial, the accused presented documents that the
lumber are legally obtained. This may include the certificate of origin. However, the
court found out that Pallada was guilty of the violation of PD 705 and the rest of the
accused were acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence. The case was appealed to the CA
and rendered a decision affirming the decision of the lower court, thus this case was
elevated.
Ruling:
Yes, there should be a separate Certificate of origin. The trial court acted correctly
in not giving credence to the Certificates of Timber Origin presented by petitioner since
the lumber held by the company should be covered by Certificates of Lumber Origin.For
indeed, as BFD Circular No. 10-83states in pertinent parts:
In order to provide an effective mechanism to pinpoint accountability and
responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in documenting
the origin thereof, the attached Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . which
form[s] part of this circular [is] hereby adopted as accountable forms for official
use by authorized BFD officers . . . .
5. Lumber . . . transported/shipped without the necessary Certificate of Lumber
Origin (CLO) . . . as herein required shall be considered as proceeding from
illegal sources and as such, shall be subject to confiscation and disposition in
accordance with LOI 1020 and BFD implementing guidelines.

The irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which they are found
not only questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the trial court in giving no
credence to the same. The presence of such glaring irregularities negates the
presumption that the CTOs were regularly executed by the DENR officials
concerned.
G.R. No. L-46772 February 13, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF QUEZON , respondent.
Issue:
Whether the information correctly and properly charged an offense and whether the
trial court had jurisdiction over the case.
Facts:
The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs,
defined and punished under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as
the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. The information provided that Godofredo
Arrozal and Luis Flores, together with 20 other John Does whose identities are still
unknown, the first-named accused being the administrator of the Infanta Logging
Corporation, conspired and entered the privately-owned land of one Felicitacion Pujalte, titled
in the name of her deceased father, Macario Prudente, and proceeded to illegally cut, gather,
and take, there from, without the consent of the said owner and without any authority
under a license agreement, 60 logs of different species.
On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the
information on 2grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
and, (2) that the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form. Trial
court thus dismissed the information based on the respondents grounds.
Ruling:
The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut,
gathered, collected or removed timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber or other
forest products cut ,gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or to any
private individual; and 3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without
authority under a license agreement, leas, license, or permit granted by the state. The failure
of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is not fatal. It
should be noted that the logs subject of the complaint were taken not from a public forest
but from private woodland registered in the name of complainant's deceased father,
Macario Prudente. The fact that only the state can grant a license agreement, license or
lease does not make the state the owner of all the logs and timber products produced in
the Philippines including those produced in private woodlands. Thus, ownership is not an
essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705. As to
the second issue raised, the regular courts still has jurisdiction. Sec. 80 of PD 705covers 2
specific instances when a forest officer may commence a prosecution for the violation of the
Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines.
The first authorizes a forest officer or employee of the Bureau of Forestry to arrest
without a warrant, any person who has committed or is committing, in his presence, any of
the offenses described in the decree. The second covers a situation when an offense
described in the decree is not committed in the presence of the forest officer or employee
and the commission is brought to his attention by a report or a complaint. In both cases,
however, the forest officer or employee shall investigate the offender and file a complaint
with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation and file
the necessary informations in court. Unfortunately, the instant case does not fall under any of
the situations covered by Section 80 of P.D. 705. The alleged offense was committed not in the
presence of a forest officer and neither was the alleged commission reported to any forest
officer. The offense was committed in a private land and the complaint was brought by
a private offended party to the fiscal. As such, the OSG was correct in insisting that
P.D. 705 did not repeal Section 1687 of the Administrative Code giving authority to
the fiscal to conduct investigation into the crime of demeanour and have the necessary
information or complaint prepared or made against person charged with the commission of the
crime. In short, Section 80 does not grant exclusive authority to the forest officers, but only
special authority to reinforce the exercise of such by those upon whom vested by the general
law.
G.R. No. 136142 October 24, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFONSO DATOR et.al ,
Accused- Appelant
Issue:
Whether the penalty imposed to Telan the accused is correct in violation of PD
705
Facts:
Pator Teala and his co accused Alfonso Dator and Benito Genol were charged
with the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise
known as the Revised Forestry Code. The accused while transporting pieces of lumber
bound to Maasin Souther Leyte, they were apprehended by the police officer and seized
pieces of lumber. As a result SPO1 Bacala issued a seizure receipt covering the fifty-one
(51) pieces of confiscated Dita and Antipolo lumber and one (1) unit of Isuzu cargo truck
with Plate No. HAF 628. The confiscated pieces of lumber and the cargo truck were
turned over to SPO3 Daniel Lasala, PNP Property Custodian of Maasin, Southern Leyte
who, in turn, officially transferred custody of the same to the CENRO, Maasin, Southern
Leyte. The accused Telan alleged that the pieces of lumber were cut from the track of
land belonging to his mother in San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte which he intended to
use in the renovation of his house in Barangay Abgao of the same municipality. He
further contends that he secured verbal permission to Boy Leonor an officer-in -charge of
the DENR.
The lower courts found out that the accused is guilty in violation of PD 705
sentencing the accused to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA,
with the accessory penalties provided by law, which is two (2) degrees higher than
PRISION MAYOR maximum, the authorized penalty similar to Qualified Theft, and to
pay the costs. Thus, this case was elevated to the court.
Ruling:
No, In the case at bench, the confiscated fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Dita and
Antipolo lumber were classified by the CENRO officials as soft, and therefore not
premium quality lumber. It may be noted that the said pieces of lumber were cut by the
appellant, a mere janitor in a public hospital, from the land owned by his mother, not for
commercial purposes but to be utilized in the renovation of his house. It does not appear
that appellant Telen had been convicted nor was he an accused in any other pending
criminal case involving violation of any of the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code
(P.D. No. 705, as amended). In view of the attendant circumstances of this case, and in
the interest of justice, the basis for the penalty to be imposed on the appellant should be
the minimum amount under Article 309 paragraph (6) of the Revised Penal Code which
carries the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods for simple theft.
Considering that the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.
705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal
Code, pursuant to the said decree, the imposable penalty on the appellant shall be
increased by two degrees, that is, from arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods
to prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law,the penalty to be imposed on the appellant should be six (6) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.
G.R. No. 120365 December 17, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILSON B. QUE,accusedappellant

Issue:
Whether the appellants activities consist an offense
Facts:
Provincial Task Force got wind that a that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate
number PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos
Norte. Acting on said information, members of the PTF went on patrol
several times within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City. On
March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1 Elmer
Patoc went on patrol around the area. At about1:00 in the morning, they posted
themselves at the corner of General Segundo Avenue and Rizal Street. Thirty minutes
later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck with plate number PAD-548 pass by. They followed
the truck and apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge.On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant
was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag with violation of Section 68 of
P.D. 705as amended by E.O. 277. The Information alleged that, on or about the 8th day of
March, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner of an I(s)uzu Ten
Wheeler Truck bearing Plate No. PAD-548, with intent of gain, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in possession, control and custody 258 pieces
of various sizes of Forest Products Chain saw lumber (Species of Tanguile) with a total
volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or equivalent to 8.79 cubic meters valued in the total amount of
P93,232.50 atP25.00/bd. ft., necessary permit, license or authority to do so from the
proper authorities Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he
acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a legal source. During the trial, he
presented the private land timber permits (PLTP) issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosa and Elpidio Sabal The
PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from the forest area covered
by the permit. He alleged that the tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by
the PLTPs of Cayosa and Sabal and that they were given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as
payment for his hauling services
Ruling:
Yes, Possession of the lumber without the necessary permit is a violation of the
RFC. When the police apprehended Que, he failed to present documentary evidence to
prove that he has the permit to possess and transport the lumber. All he had was the
permit for the coconut slabs. He even concealed the lumber so as to avoid it from being
seen upon first inspection of the load. Under the circumstances, there is no doubt that the
accused was aware that he needed documents to possess and transport the lumber, but
could not secure one and therefore, concealed such by placing it in such a manner that it
could not be seen by merely looking at the cargo. There are 2 ways of violating Sec. 68 of
the Revised Forestry Code:
a. by cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without
licence and
b. by possessing timber or other forest products without required legal documents.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of said acts. However,
in the second offense, mere possession without proper documentation consummates the
crime.
G.R. No. 161798 October 20, 2004
PICOP RESOURCES, INC.,petitioner, vs. HON. AUGUSTUS L. CALO, Presiding
Judge, respondent
Issue;
Whether petitioner has the right to retain the seized confiscated products by the
virtue of MOA regarding the Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Verification of
Private Tree Plantation.
Facts:
Petitioner PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) owns and operates a multi-billion
peso pulp and paper manufacturing facility in Bislig City, Agusan del Norte. It holds
government-issued Pulpwood and Timber License Agreement (PTLA) No. 47 and
Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) No. 35 which gave petitioner the
exclusive right to co-manage and develop with the State almost 130,000 hectares of forest
land within the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), through its
officers, rendered three Memoranda, dated August 22, 1997, February 16, 2001and April
6, 2001 designating the petitioner as DENR depository and custodian for apprehended
forest products and conveyances within its concession. On May 25, 2001, the Office of
the CENRO-Bislig and petitioner entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
containing "Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Verification of Private Tree
Plantation." The MOA provided, among others, that field validation/verification of
applications for Certificates of Private Tree Ownership (CTPOs) shall be conducted
jointly by the DENR, the local government unit concerned, and petitioner. Pursuant to
these Memoranda, petitioners security personnel were deputized as DENR officers to
apprehend and seize the tools, equipment and conveyance used in the commission of
illegal logging and the forest products removed and possessed by the offenders.
In the course of the enforcement of the aforesaid Memoranda, petitioner PICOP,
through its security personnel, had on numerous occasions apprehended within its
concession and tree plantation area. These illegally cut forest products and conveyances
were kept in PICOPs impounding area.
A class suit was initiated among the members of UFAB asking for preliminary
mandatory Injunction. They further asked for the declaration of the memoranda null and
void and sought to restrain the DENR and those who are participants from enforcing the
said memoranda. The RTC ordered Elias R. Seraspio, Jr. to recall, withdraw and abrogate
the enforcement of the assailed Memorandum dated February 16, 2001 and to refrain and
desist from implementation. Petitioner was also ordered to release the
confiscatedfalcatalogs and vehicles to the owners thereof, or to the CENRO-Bislig or
the Office of the Government Prosecution-Surigao del Sur, where the administrative and
criminal proceedings were ongoing.
Ruling:
Petitioner had no right or interest to protect in the confiscated forest products and
conveyances. Petitioners compound was used only as a depository for the confiscated
logs and conveyances by virtue of the Memorandum. While it claimed that some of the
confiscated forest products may have come from its concession area, petitioner admitted
that the ownership of the confiscated products was still to be determined in the cases
pending either at the CENRO-Bislig or at the Office of the Government ProsecutionSurigao del Sur. Hence, petitioners interest in the confiscated forest products was merely
contingent and cannot be material as contemplated under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner contends that private respondents intrusion was in
violation of petitioners PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. These license agreements gave
petitioner the exclusive right to co-manage and develop forest lands, and recognized
petitioner as owner of the trees and other products in the concession area.In filing this
petition, petitioner is merely defending its subsisting proprietary interest pursuant to these
license agreements.
It is clear that petitioner has no material interest to protect in the confiscated forest
products and conveyances. It has no subsisting proprietary interest, as borne out by its
licensing agreements, which need to be protected by annulling the writ of injunction
issued by the trial court. Petitioner also cannot claim the right to retain custody of the
apprehended logs and conveyances by virtue of its being designated a depository of the
DENR pursuant to the assailed Memoranda. As such depository, petitioner merely holds
the confiscated products and conveyances in custody for the DENR while the
administrative or criminal proceedings regarding said products are pending.
GR NO. 152989. September 4, 2002

Roldan, Jr. petitioner v. Hon, Madrona et.al. respondents
Issue:
a. Whether a person who cuts trees for his own use within his property without the
necessary permit from the DENR and without transporting the same outside said
property, be criminally charged for violating PD 705?
b. Whether the owner of a private property is administratively liable under Section
14 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-21 despite the fact that he did not transport
the logs out of his property and used them for his own agricultural purposes.
Facts:
On August 9, 2001, petitioner applied for a Private Land Timber Permit (PLTP)
from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for him to cut some trees for
a proposed road and poultry farm in his property. He also paid all the fees required by the
various government agencies. While waiting for the permit to be issued, petitioner was
allegedly informed by some employees from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) that he could proceed with the cutting of trees even though his
application was still awaiting approval. Consequently, petitioner proceeded with the
cutting of trees and bulldozing of the roadway. He used the cut logs as materials to build
his chicken cages. About three weeks later, representatives of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources and personnel from the Intelligence Service, Armed Forces of the
Philippines (ISAFP) of Tacloban City raided petitioners place, allegedly without a search
warrant. An inventory of the cut trees was conducted there were 872 pieces of sawn
lumber/flitches (8,506 board feet) and three felled timber logs with a total market value
of P235,454.68 at P27.00 per board foot.
Ruling:
a. Yes, Under Section 68, PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, it is clear that the
violators of the said law are not declared as being guilty of qualified theft. As to the
assertion that his penalty for cutting trees in his own land should not be equated with that
for qualified theft, suffice it to say that the judiciary is never concerned with the wisdom
of the law. Whether or not the legislature was correct in imposing on violators of PD 705
a penalty equal to that imposable on those guilty of qualified theft is a question beyond
the power of the Court to resolve. It is a settled rule that the fundamental duty of the
Court is to apply the law regardless of who may be affected, even if the law is harsh dura lex sed lex
Section 14 of Administrative Order No. 2000-21, the Revised Guidelines in the
Issuance of Private Land Timber Permit/Special Private Land Timber Permit, provides:
SEC. 14. Penal Provisions. - Any log/timber or finished-wood
products covered by these regulations which are transported without the
prescribed documents shall be considered illegal and, therefore, subject to
confiscation in favor of the government and shall be disposed in
accordance with laws, rules and regulations governing the matter.
b. No, The rule is clear. The aforementioned administrative order considers the
mere act of transporting any wood product or timber without the prescribed documents as
an offense which is subject to the penalties provided for by law.
G.R. No. 184098 November 25, 2008

AMADO TAOPA,petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondent.
Issue:
Whether the penalty imposed against the petitioner is correct in violation of PD
705
Facts:
On April 2, 1996, the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office of Virac, Catanduanes seized a truck loaded with illegally-cut lumber and arrested
its driver, Placido Cuison. The lumber was covered with bundles of abaca fiber to prevent
detection. On investigation, Cuison pointed to petitioner Amado Taopa and a certain
Rufino Ogalesco as the owners of the seized lumber Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison pleaded
not guilty on arraignment. After trial on the merits, the RTC found them guilty as charged
beyond reasonable doubt. Only Taopa and Cuison appealed the RTC decision to the Court
of Appeals (CA). Cuison was acquitted but Taopa's conviction was affirmed.The
dispositive portion of the CA decision read:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from isREVERSEDwith respect
to accused-appellant
Cuison, who is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on
reasonable doubt, andMODIFIEDwith
respect to accused-appellants Amado Taopa
and Rufino Ogalesco by reducing the penalty
imposed on them to four (4) years,
nine (9) months and eleven (11) days ofprision
correccional, as minimum, to ten
(10) years ofprision mayor, as maximum
Ruling:
NO, Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) for the penalties to be imposed on violators. Violation of
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft. The law treats cutting,
gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest products without license as an
offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.
The actual market value of the 113 pieces of seized lumber was P67,630.
Following Article 310 in relation to Article 309, the imposable penalty should
bereclusion temporalin its medium and maximum periods or a period ranging from 14
years, eight months and one day to 20 years plus an additional period of four years for the
excess ofP47,630.
The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence imposable on Taopa shall be the
penalty next lower to that prescribed in the RPC. In this case, the minimum term shall be
anywhere between 10 years and one day to 14 years and eight months orprision mayorin
its maximum period toreclusion temporalin its minimum period.
The maximum term shall be the sum of the additional four years and the medium
period of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or 16 years, five
months and 11 days to 18 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion temporal. The
maximum term therefore may be anywhere between 16 years, five months and 11 days
ofreclusion temporalto 22 years, two months and 21 days ofreclusion perpetua.
G.R. No. 175289 August 31, 2011
CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN
PHILIPPINES,Respondent.
et.al
, Petitioners,
PEOPLE
OF THE
Isuue:
Whether mere possession of timber without the legal documents required under
forest laws and regulations makes one automatically liable even criminal intent in
violation of Section 68, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, as amended.
Facts:
In a Criminal Complaint filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4,
Cagayan de Oro City by Marcelino B. Pioquinto (Pioquinto), Chief of the Forest
Protection and Law Enforcement Unit under the TL Strike Force Team of Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioner Aniano Latayada (Latayada) and
three others namely, Barangay Captain Camilo Sudaria (Sudaria) of Tagpangi, Cagayan
de Oro City, Marlon Baillo (Baillo) and Cipriano Boyatac (Boyatac), were charged with
violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. The
respondents were guilty of gathering and possessing sixty-three (63) pieces flitches of
varying sizes belonging to the Apitong specie with a total volume of Four Thousand
Three Hundred Twenty Six (4,326) board feet valued at P108,150.00, without any
authority and supporting documents as required under existing forest laws and regulation
to the damage and prejudice of the government.
Ruling:
Yes, As a special law, the nature of the offense is malum prohibitum and as
such, criminal intent is not an essential element. There is no dispute that petitioners were
in constructive possession of the timber without the requisite legal documents. Villarin
and Latayada were personally involved in its procurement, delivery and storage without
any license or permit issued by any competent authority. Given these and considering that
the offense is malum prohibitum, petitioners contention that the possession of the
illegally cut timber was not for personal gain but for the repair of said bridge is, therefore,
inconsequential.
CA-G.R. SP. No. 80927. February 4, 2005

LT. RODELLO B. LARAYA, PN, et.al., petitioners, vs. HON. PERFECTO E. PE,
RTC of Palawan,respondent.
Issue:
Whether the Respondent Judge acted in excess of his Jurisdiction or with Grave
Abuse Of Discretion when he allowed the Re-Opening Of Pre-Trial For Purposes Of
Plea-Bargaining without The consent of the Complainants and Contrary to Section 2,
Rule 116 Of The Revised Rules On Criminal Procedure, As Amended.
Facts:
It was on 12 September 2002, thirty eight (38) Chinese nationals on board their
fishing vessels were caught within the Malampaya Natural Gas Platform Project
Exclusive Zone, in El Nido, Palawan in the act of illegal fishing. Hundreds of kilos of
Groupers (locally known, as Lapu-Lapu), Wrasse (locally known, as Mameng) and
Snappers (locally known, as Maya-Maya) were found in the said fishing vessels found
within the vessels, among others, were powders and pillets, suspected to be noxious
substances or component ingredients of explosives. A bottle of home-made dynamite was
also retrieved. A criminal complaint was filed against the accused-private respondents
for the violation of Republic Act No. 8550, otherwise known as the Philippine Fisheries
Code of 1998, specifically, Section 87 (Poaching) and Section 88 (Fishing through
Explosives, Noxious or Poisonous Substances) of the said Act.
Subsequently, criminal informations for violation of Republic Act No. 8550 were
filed against all 38 Chinese nationals with the Regional Trial Court of Palawan. All of the
accused-private respondents thereafter pleaded not guilty to the charges on 07 May 2003.
During the pre-trial of the criminal cases, counsel for the accused-private
respondents manifested their intention to enter into plea bargaining by entering a plea of
guilty to a lesser offense under paragraph 2 of Section 88 of Republic Act 8550.

However, the then prosecuting officer of the cases, Provincial Prosecutor Alen Ross B.
Rodriguez did not accede
After prosecution presented its first witness and initial cross-examination was
conducted by the counsel for the defense, or after only two hearing dates, however,
Provincial Prosecutor Alen Ross B. Rodriguez manifested his intention to inhibit from
further prosecuting the criminal cases. Continuation of the trial was, hence, rescheduled
the following day.
On 16 July 2003, with the appearance of a new prosecutor, counsel for the
defense asked the court to re-open the pre-trial stage of the criminal cases and reiterated
the accused-private respondents earlier intention of availing plea bargaining. This time,
the Provincial Prosecutors Office, represented by Prosecutor Olegario Cayetano, Jr., did
not object. On the contrary, Prosecutor Cayetano manifested that the government was
amenable to re-open pre-trial for the purpose of plea-bargaining. Consequently, the trial
court ordered the re-opening of the pre-trial.
During the re-opened pre-trial stage, all the accused-private respondents through their
counsel plead guilty to violation of Paragraph 2, Section 88 of Republic Act 8550. The
public prosecutor interposed no objection with the change of plea and informed the court
that the prosecutors conformity with the plea bargaining was in consonance with the
directive of the Chief State Prosecutor
Ruling:
NO, Section 1, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for Certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial and quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
a n d j u s t i c e m a y re q u i re . X X X
XXX
XXX
Hence, for the herein petitioners to lodge the instant action, they must first be a
person aggrieved, otherwise, they would be without legal standing to pursue this legal
recourse. That having been said, this Court rules that the herein petitioners are not
persons aggrieved by the assailed decision of the trial court in the subject criminal cases.
It is elementary in criminal law that a crime is an offense against the State, and is hence
prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines. For this reason, Section 5 of Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that all criminal actions
commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the prosecutor. Furthermore, Section 1 of P.D. 1275, provides the exclusive
domain of the prosecutory arm of the government as how best to deal with the
prosecution of criminal cases. Hence, any grievance in course thereof affecting the
interest of the State must proceed only from such an arm of the government.
A.M. No. MTJ- 03- 1487. December 1, 2003

SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF GUINDULMAN, BOHOL, petitioner, vs. JUDGE
MANUEL A. DE CASTRO,
Acting Presiding
Judge, MCTC, Guindulman-Duero, Bohol, respondent.
Issue:
Whether the respondent Judge committed gross ignorance of the law for not
imposing the proper penalty provided for in Sec. 90, R.A. No. 8550, otherwise known as
The Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998.
Facts:
It was on May 17, 2002 when lawmen apprehended a boat captain and eight
crew members of the fishing boat B/B Junida-J who were fishing within the vicinity of
the municipal waters and fish sanctuary of Basdio, Guindulman, Bohol with a ring net
(known locally as licom). Charges for violation of Sections 86, 90 and 96 of Republic
Act No. 8550 were immediately filed with the MCTC, Guindulman-Duero, Bohol,
presided over in an acting capacity by Judge Manuel A. de Castro. In the morning of the
very next day, a Saturday, two of the accused, namely: Narciso J. Jusay, Jr. (boat owner)
and Rolando T. Amistoso (boat captain) were released from detention upon order of
respondent. It appears that respondent held a court session on May 18, 2002, despite the
fact that it was a Saturday, and proceeded to arraign both accused who pleaded guilty.
The respondent judge exaggerated the speedy disposition of the case commanding the
accused to pay five thousand pesos and further commanded to return the alleged
impounded boats to the accused. Surprised by such turn of events, the Sangguniang
Bayan passed a resolution for the further investigation on the action of respondent judge
about the crime charged against the accused and a copy thereof was received by the
Office of the Chief Justice, Supreme Court on June 25, 2002.
Ruling:
Yes, the respondent Judge committed a grave ignorance of the law and violation
of circulars issued by the court when he tried a case in Saturday. The respondent judge
impudently misused his authority to impose the penalty under the law which it cannot be
countenanced. If judges wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by law, there will
not only be confusion in the administration of justice but even also oppressive disregard
of the basic requirements of due process. The observance of the law, which he is bound to
know is required of every judge. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to
his office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be constitutive of gross
ignorance of the law. A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence. It is a pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the law and
the changes therein for ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses
no one, not even judges. Indeed, it has been said that -- when the inefficiency springs
from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the
discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position
and the title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately
done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. HYPERLINK "http://
%3E152,df%7C2003/DEC2003/am_mtj_03_1487.htm" \l "_ftn20" \o ""
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1430. September 8, 2003
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR ROMEO B. SENSON, complainant, vs. JUDGE
HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN,
MTCC, PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, respondent.
Issue:
Whether the decision of the respondent judge is correct in approving the Urgent
motion for custody of Fishing Net.
Facts:
On 14 March 2000, several persons were apprehended for violation of Section 86
of Republic Act No. 8550, also known as The Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998
H Y P E R L I N K " h t t p : / / s c . j u d i c i a r y. g o v. p h / j u r i s p r u d e n c e / 2 0 0 3 / s e p 2 0 0 3 /
am_mtj_02_1430.htm" \l "_ftn1" \o "" by members of the Philippine National Police.
The items seized from those arrested included (a) 1 unit fish net, (b) 36 units lights (300
watts), (c) 1 unit light (500 watts), (d) 1 unit buoy, (e) 7 containers, (f) 7 plastic container
boxes, (g) 4 styropore boxes, and (h) 10 boxes of fish. On the same day, Criminal Case
No.15019 against them was filed. Three days later, Danilo Alayon and Norma Villarosa,
asserting to be the co-owners of the M/B King Fisher that was used in the illegal fishing
activity, filed an Urgent Motion for Custody of Fishing Net, alleging that the fish net
which costs no less than P600,000.00 was left unattended at the beach exposed to the
elements and movements of the sea which could cause its early deterioration and ultimate
loss. Respondent Judge, despite the vigorous objection of the public prosecutor, granted
the motion in part, to the following effect To obviate their possible loss, destruction and/or deterioration, pending resolution of
the above-captioned case, the apprehending officers or whoever has the custody, are
ordered to cause the immediate turnover of the following items to movants who undertake
to produce the same whenever needed in court, as they can only be properly confiscated
in favor of the government upon conviction of the accused.
The respondent contended that Republic Act No. 8550, the law under which the
accused were charged with having transgressed, did not provide for the seizure of the
fishing paraphernalia pending trial and that the prosecution still could prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt even without the evidence being presented since it
had sufficient witnesses for the purpose.
Ruling:
No, the seizure of the fishing paraphernalia has been made as being an incident to
a lawful arrest. Rule 127, Section 12, of the Rules of Court HYPERLINK "http://
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/sep2003/am_mtj_02_1430.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o ""
provides:
SEC. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest.- A person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant.
G.R. No. 132451 December 17, 1999
CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA,petitioner, vs. HON. RENATO C.
CORONA, in his capacity as the
Executive
Secretary, HON. FRANCISCO VIRAY, in his capacity as
the Secretary of Energy, CALTEX PHILIPPINES INC., PILIPINAS
SHELL PETROLEUM CORP. and PETRON
CORP.,respondents.
Issue:
Whether the exclusion of Section 19 (setting the time of full deregulation of oil
law) on RA 8479 made by the congress makes the law unconstitutional.
Facts:
November 5, 1997, this Court in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of
EnergyandLagman,et al.,v.Hon.Ruben Torres,et al.,declared Republic Act No. 8180,
entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes",
unconstitutional, and its implementing Executive Order No. 392 void. R.A. 8180 was
struck down as invalid because three key provisions intended to promote free competition
were shown to achieve the opposite result. More specifically, this Court ruled that its
provisions on tariff differential, stocking of inventories, and predatory pricing inhibit fair
competition, encourage monopolistic power, and interfere with the free interaction of the
market forces.
As a result of the Tatad decision, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8479, a new
deregulation law without the offending provisions of the earlier law. Petitioner Enrique T.
Garcia, a member of Congress, has brought the petition seeking to declare Section 19
thereof, which sets the time of full deregulation, unconstitutional. After failing in his
attempts to have Congress incorporate in the law the economic theory he espouses,
petitioner asks the court, in the name of upholding the Constitution, to undo a violation
which he claims Congress has committed.
Ruling:
No, It bears stressing that R.A. 8180 was declared invalid not because
deregulation is unconstitutional. The law was struck down because, as crafted, three key
provisions plainly encouraged the continued existence if not the proliferation of the
constitutionally proscribed evils of monopoly and restraint of trade. It is not the function
of the Court to safeguard the members of the congress on what law they will enact
because this is the exact tenet on the encroachment of power as stipulated on the principle
of separation of power. The court as a whole, respects the laws legislate by the congress.
The validity of such laws, may only be impugned if it violates the Constitution. In the
case at bar, the Constitution perse was not violated nor ridiculed.
G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,petitioner,vs. COURT OF
APPEALS; HON. JUDGE
HERCULANO TECH, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 70, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF BINANGONAN RIZAL; FLEET
DEVELOPMENT,
INC. and CARLITO
ARROYO; THE MUNICIPALITY OF
BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS,respondents.
Issue:
Whether the Local Government Code Code of 1991 repealed the Charter of
Laguna Lake Developmental Authority (RA NO. 4850) in the issuance of fish pen
permits and other related activity involving Laguna de Bay.
Facts:
This is a petition made by Laguna Lake Development Authority to declare an
exclusive power on the regulation of issuing a fish open permits over the businessmen
engage in the Laguna de bay. The power to issue a permit was then transferred to the
office of the mayor on the different municipalities of Laguna thus making the Laguna de
bay crowded and unhealthy for living of natural resources and danger to the livelihood
among the folks of Laguna.
Ruling:
No, the court holds that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not
necessarily repeal the laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and
granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. The
Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which
categorically expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there
was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amendments.
It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority
constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is
a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation
which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a wellsettled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular case or
class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and
application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the
general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law."
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute
should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute.
The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special
circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. A special law cannot be repealed, amended
or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.Thus, it has to be concluded
that the charter of the Authority should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991.
G.R. No. L-68474 February 11, 1986

NUCLEAR FREE PHILIPPINE COALITION, ET AL.,petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
POWER CORPORATION, ET AL.,respondents.
G.R. No. 70632 February 11, 1986
LORENZO M. TAADA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE ATOMIC
ENERGY COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents.
Issue:
Whether the judgement of PAEC on the nuclear power plant safe.
Facts:
a. G.R. No. 70632, petitioners question the competence of respondent PAEC
Commissioners to pass judgment on the safety of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant-1
PNPP-1 in PAEC Licensing Proceedings No. 1-77 without however seeking their ouster
from office, although "proven competence" is one of the qualifications prescribed by law
for PAEC Commissioners. Petitioners also assail the validity of the motion
(application) filed by the National Power Corporation (NPC) for the conversion of its
construction permit into an operating license for PNPP-1 on the principal ground that it
contained no information regarding the financial qualifications of NPC, its source of
nuclear fuel, and insurance coverage for nuclear damage.
b.. In G.R. No. 68474, acting on the motion filed therein dated June 8, 1985 to
order PAEC to reconsider its orders of May 31 and June 5, 1985, the urgent motion for
mandatory injunction and/or restraining order dated August 3, 1985, the second urgent
motion for mandatory injunction dated August 12, 1985, and the various pleadings and
other documents submitted by the parties relative thereto, and considering the paramount
need of a reasonable assurance that the operation of PNPP-1 will not pose an undue risk
to the health and safety of the people, which dictates that the conduct of the inquiry into
the safety aspects of PNPP-1 be characterized by sufficient latitude, the better to achieve
the end in view, unfettered by technical rules of evidence (Republic Act 5207, section
34), and in keeping with the requirements of due process in administrative proceedings.
Ruling:
a. The Court therefore resolved to RESTRAIN respondent PAEC Commissioners
from further acting in PAEC Licensing Proceedings No. 1-77.the said decision is due to
the pamphlets that PAEC had circulated. Having thus prejudged the safety of the PNPP-1
respondent PAEC Commissioners would be acting with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction were they to sit in judgment upon the safety of the plant,
absent the requisite objectivity that must characterize such an important inquiry.
b. The respondent PAEC (once reconstituted) to re-open the hearing on PNPP-1
so as to give petitioners sufficient time to complete their cross-examination of the expert
witnesses on quality assurance, to cross-examine the witnesses that petitioners have failed
to cross-examine on and after August 9, 1985, and to complete the presentation of their
evidence, for which purpose, respondent PAEC shall issue the necessary subpoena and
subpoena duces tecum to compel the attendance of relevant witnesses and/or the
production of relevant documents. For the said purposes, the PAEC may prescribe a time
schedule which shall reasonably assure the parties sufficient latitude to adequately
present their case consistently with the requirements of dispatch. lt is understood that the
PAEC may give NPC the opportunity to correct or supply deficiencies in this application
or evidence in support thereof.
Azucena Salalima vs. Employees Compensation Comm. and Soc. Sec. System
G.R. No.-146360
Facts:
Petitioners husband Juancho Saldima was employed for twenty nine years as a route
helper and salesman for the Meycauayan Plant of Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines Inc.
during the annual company medical examination, Juancho was diagnosed with
pulmonary tuberculosis. Later found him to have cancer of the lungs and died after few
months. Azucena, the wife of Juancho is now claiming for the benefits of her husband
from the company and the SSS. RTC dismissed the case. CA affirmed and this petition
was therefore filed.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to benefits provided by P.D. 626
Held:
SC answered in the affirmative. Because the facts of the case showed that the cause of
Juanchos death was his mere work and that his medical history states that his stay at
Coca cola is a contributory to his sickness. SSS was ordered to pay the claimant and the
RTCs and CAs decisions were reversed and set aside.
Social Justice Society, et. al. vs. Honorable Jose Atienza, Jr.
G.R. No. 156052
Facts:
Chevron is engaged in the business of importing, distributing and marketing of petroleum
products in the Philippines while Shell and Petron are engaged in the business of
manufacturing, refining and likewise importing and marketing of petroleum products.
Petitioners sought to compel Mayor Tienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 which was
enacted by Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila and became effective upon approval by
Mayor Atienza. This ordinance reclassifies the area described from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners to cease and desist from operating their business
within 6 months. Among the business is the Pandacan Terminal of the Oil companies. Oil
companies intervened in the issue attacking the validity of the ordinance.
Issue:
Whether the ordinance approved by respondent is valid or not
Held:
Valid. Because the tremendous event happened near the area which many were put into
danger, the Manila Municipal Office shall do its ministerial duty to protect all property
and health of those people who lived in the vicinity and nearby cities. The court ordered
the transfer of Pandacan Terminal within a non extendible period of 90 days. The life of
the people shall be the utmost priority of the government in terms of its security, though
the business will lose billions of money, the municipality cannot sacrifice its people.
Filinvest Credit Corporation vs. IAC and Nestor Sunga, Jr.
G.R. No. 65935
Facts:
A case filed by Nestor Sunga Jr., businessman and owner of the NBS Machineries and the
NAP-NAP Transit. He purchased a minibus Mazda from Motorcester with an agreement
to pay the balance in monthly basis. Later, Nestor failed to pay his obligations to the
company which cause the confiscation of the minibus by the officers of Filinvest Corp.
The minibus was mortgaged to Filinvest Corp. Sunga cleared his obligations to Filinvest
which the court rendered decisions granting Sunga moral, actual damages, litigation
expenses and Attorney's fees. Filinvest filed motion to review the decision of the court.
Issue:
Whether the award of damages to Sunga is valid
Held:
Yes. It is valid but it is unconscionable, therefore the SC reduced the amount granted to
Sunga since the facts show that the latter had not suffered much and that it is his
obligation to pay the minibus as it was stipulated between him and Filinvest Corp. Moral
and actual damages were granted but litigation expenses was eliminated for it has no
price for litigation.
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.
G.R. Nos. 120865-71
Facts:
A case filed by authority against all those who were given permit by Municipal mayors
Pacis, Papa and Jala-Jala to include them as releasers of permits and other respondents
for violating the provisions who has the jurisdiction to give permits. But the issue not
only lies on the granting of permits but the error on deciding that authority is not a quasijudicial agency that R.A. 4850 was amended by P.D. 813 and E.O. 927 s. of 1983 and the
LGU has the power to issue permits.
Issue:
Whether LLDA has the power as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body
Held:
Yes. LLDA has express powers as regulatory and quasi-judicial body to cease and desist
orders and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fish pens, fish cages and other
aqua-culture structures in Laguna De Bay. It is not co-equal to RTC but only to its extent
of power provided by law. All permits issued were declared null and void and all
structures on the said area shall be demolished because of the void permits granted to
owners and operators.
Agapito Magbanwa, et. al. vs. IAC, et. al.
G.R. no. 66870-72
Facts:
A case where all plaintiffs who were tenants of the defendants complained the diversion
of the free flow of water from their farm lots which caused portions of their landholdings
to dry up to their great damage and prejudice and they were asked to vacate the areas for
they could not plant any longer for lack of water.
Issue:
Whether plaintiffs are entitled to damages
Held:
Yes. Because the closing of water flow to the petitioners farm lots caused damage and
prejudicial to them in their harvest. It has no showing in the facts that petitioners were
negligent but instead the respondents bad faith which caused prejudice to the former.
Under the law, the landowner has the obligation to keep tenant in the peaceful and
continuous cultivation of his landholding. A disturbance of possession such as the act
complained of is violative of the law. Therefore, the court granted moral and exemplary
damages and Attorneys fees to plaintiffs.
Ernesto Rodriguez, et. al. vs. IAC and Daytona Construction and Development
Corporation
G.R. no. 74816
Facts:
Plaintiffs filed an action for abatement of a public nuisance with damages against
defendant. After four extensions of time to file an answer by defendant, Daytona moved
to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and cause of action. Motions denied, defendant
was declared in default and authorized plaintiffs to present evidence ex parte. The facts of
the case at bar shows that there is other nearby residents who were prejudiced by the
Daytona Corp. for the running of its business. It affected their health and property. But in
this case, the delay of the respondents to answer id questionable and contrary to law.
Issues:
1. Whether petitioners have cause of action to file the case

2. Whether respondents are liable for damages
Held:
1. Yes. Because the business had greatly prejudiced their health and property. The permit
given to Daytona is valid but the conditions provided were not met.
2. Yes. Respondents are liable for damages except nominal damages based on the
discretion of the court instead moral and actual damages were awarded because sufficient
evidence had supported as such.
DENR vs. Gregorio Daraman, et. al.
G.R. No. 125797
Facts:
This is a case filed by the DENR represented by RED Israel Gaddi against Gregorio
Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio who were caught by one Pablo opinion to transport
illegal pieces of lumber using the vehicle of one Baby Lucenecio, the Holy Cross Funeral
Services. Here, the respondents alleged that one Asan, owner of furniture shop ask the
two to bring also some pieces of wood to his house located near the funerals location.
Opinion, DENR employee, saw the vehicle and inspected it, there he saw some lumber
and issued an order of forfeiture. The court granted bond and released the funeral car and
lumber because it was found out that Daraman and Lucenecio were not owners of the
vehicle and lumber. Hence, this complaint was filed.
Issue:
Whether the respondents violated P.D. 705 section 68-A
Held:
Yes. The court cannot deny the fact that Section 68-A P.D. 705 is also applicable to those
who transport lumber without proper documents. Here, Daraman and Lucenecio had no
permit to transport lumber although they were only asked to bring the lumber to the
house of one Asan. The RTC has overstepped its jurisdiction of the case since DENR was
given the power to confiscate the property in favor of the state/government. The release
of this property defeated the purpose of section 68-A of P.D. 705. Therefore, SC granted
the petition of DENR, RTCs decision was reversed and set aside.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Honorable Roman Cansino, Jr. et. al.
G.R. No. L-17923
Facts:
On October 3, 1960, Magdayo Ramirez, owner of 85 tubs of fish filed a complaint for
replevin against Commander Abraham Campo and manager of Royal Cold Storage. Upon
the filing by Ramirez of a P2, 000 bond, Judge Roman Cansino ordered the court sheriff
to take possession of the 85 tubs of fish for five days and release it to Ramirez.
Commander Ocampo filed a petition to return the fish for the same fish were caught in
TONY LEX I boat. Here, the fish were caught through the use of dynamite, which is a
violation and crime under R.A. 428. Action for prohibition and injunction were filed by
Ocampo against the Judge and the sheriff.
Issues:
Whether respondent Judge erred in posting a bond in dissolving the warrant of seizure
Whether Ramirez violated R.A. 428
Held:
Yes. RTC Judge Cansino erred in dissolving the warrant of seizure because the petitioner
is the R.P and the same is exempt from the obligation to post such a bond.
Yes. Ramirez violated R.A. 428 because under this law, it is violative to use dynamite in
fishing which the Bureau of Fisheries strictly observes the implementation of the said
law.
Sea Lion Fishing Corporation vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. no. 172678
Facts:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of CA in denying the
Motion for Reconsideration and petition for Certiorari and Mandamus. Here, 17 Chinese
fishermen were caught poaching off Mangsee Island in Palawan. The Barangay officials
and team of Philippine Marines found F/V Sea Lion with five boats with fishing nets
spread over the water. The court filed various cases against the Chinese fishermen to wit:
Violation of section 977 of R.A. 85508[8]; Violation of section 909[9] of R.A. 8550 and
violation of Section 27(a) and (f) 10 [10] of R.A. 9141711(110 and section 8712(12) of
R.A. 8550, F/V sea Lion filed an Urgent Motion for Release of evidence alleging that it
owns the vessel. The court released the vessel but later the court found out that the
evidence of ownership of Sea Lion was not supported by documents. Therefore,
government forfeited the vessel.
Issue:
Whether the forfeiture of F/V Sea Lion in favor of the government was proper
Held:
Yes. The government was correct when it forfeited F/V Sea Lion since its motion was
only filed after the judgment has been rendered and it failed to seek all remedies given
the sufficient time to do so. The lower court had jurisdiction over the case and the
petitioner was not denied of due process and gets it failed to comply with the other
requirements provided in the law.
Legaspi VS. Civil Service Commission
G.R. no. 72119
Facts:
Civil Service Commission denied Valentin Legaspis (petitioner) request for information
on the civil service eligibilities of 2 people employed as sanitarians, Julian Sibonghanoy
and Mariano Agas, in the Health Department in Cebu. Petitioner claims that his right to
information is guaranteed by the Constitution prays for the issuance of the extraordinary
writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said information.
The Solicitor General challenges the petitioners standing to sue upon the ground that the
latter does not possess any legal right to be informed of the civil services eligibilities of
the government employees concerned. SolGen further argues that there is no ministerial
duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he
seeks.
Issue:
WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil service
eligibilities of the Health Department employees.
Held:
Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligible for the position of
sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas, for said position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by
the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.
Aldovino vs Alunan
G.R no. 102232
Facts:
The petitioners herein were affected by reorganizing of Ministry of Tourism as provided
in Section 29 of Executive Order No. 120 which took effect on January 30, 1987. These
EO provides that incumbents whose positions are not included in the new position
structure and staffing pattern or who are not reappointed are deemed separated from the
service. Pursuant to this, the Department of Tourism issued various office orders and
memoranda declaring all positions thereat vacant. To that effect, it leads to the separation
of many of its employees including the petitioners. The court had previously decided
similar cases of Mandani, Abrogar and Arnaldo. The petitioners and intervenors claimed
that they should not be deprived of their life granted to their former co-employees plead
for reinstatement without the loss of seniority rights. Furthermore, they claimed for back
salaries will be computed under the new staffing pattern from dates of their invalid
termination at rates not lower than their former salaries. The court aims to determine
whether the separation of herein petitioners and intervenors from service was pursuant to
office orders and memoranda declared void in Mandani case, thus reinstating and paying
them with their back wages.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners and intervenors must be reinstated and paid of their back
wages.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that herein petitioners are reinstated immediately to their
former positions without loss of seniority rights and with back salaries computed under
new staffing pattern from the dates of their invalid dismissal at rates not lower than their
former salaries but not to exceed a period of 5 years with several provisions. Having
found out that the Executive Order is unconstitutional, thus dismissal of the employees is
also unconstitutional. The courts declared its total nullity. An unconstitutional act is not a
law, it confers no rights, imposes no duties and affords no protection. In legal
contemplation, it is inoperative as if it had not been passed.
G.R. No. L-20875 April 30, 1923

VICENTE ABAOAG, ET AL vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, ET AL.
Facts:
In the year 1884 a number of "Bagos" or Igorots or non-Christians, numbering at that
time about thirty, were invited by the gobernadorcillo and principalia of the then town of
Alava, now the municipality of Sison, of the Province of Pangasinan.
The "Bagos" entered upon said land, took possession of it and have continued to live
upon the same and have cultivated it since that date. On February 28, 1919, the Bagos
filed an action, claiming the land was registered to them under the Torrens system but
was later dismissed on the grounds of lack of evidence that they are entitled to the land.
Issue:
W/N the court is correct in dismissing the case on the grounds of lack of evidence.
Held:
No, the court is not correct in dismissing the case on the grounds of lack of evidence.
If we were to look into the Royal Decrees of Spain, as the attorney for the appellants has
done, we will find that Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the
Philippines into trespassers of the land which they occupy, or even into tenants at will. In
the Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754, we find the following: "Where such possessors
shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient
possession as a valid title by prescription." We may add that every presumption of
ownership under the public land laws of the Philippine Islands is in favor of one actually
occupying the land for many years, and against the Government which seeks to deprive
him of it, for failure to comply with provisions of subsequently enacted registration land
act.
In addition to the facts above stated, the record shows that at the time of the delivery of
said parcel of land to the petitioners, it was unoccupied and unimproved public land; that
since their entry upon the possession of the land in the year 1884, they and their ancestors
have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the same, believing in good faith that they were the owners.
Wherefore, the court reversed its decision, thus the petitioners where permitted to present
whatever evidence they may have.
G.R. No. L-4231
April 1, 1908
CASTLE BROTHERS, WOLFE AND SONS vs. GUTIERREZ HERMANOS

Facts:
There was a verbal contract between Knight and Don Leopoldo Criado by which the
defendants agreed to sell the plaintiffs 500 bales of good current Manila hemp at P24 a
picul. That, while some mention of marks was made, Knight said he could not accept
those marks unless they turned out to be up to the quality of "good current Manila."
However, Don Leopoldo Criado testified that the phrase "good current" was never
mentioned in the conversation and that he stated to Mr. Knight that the defendants had
554 bales of the four marks mentioned, and that of those he sold 500 bales.
Knights testimony was supported by the testimony of Higginbotham who was his
assistant in the office and who heard the conversation, and who states that there was a
positive agreement on the part of Don Leopoldo Criado to furnish 500 bales of "good
current Manila."
On the 500 bales, delivered, the plaintiffs accepted and paid for 210 bales and no question
as to these bales on made in the case. They refused to accept 299 bales on the ground that
it was not good current Manila hemp, called upon the defendants to furnish 299 bales of
that quality and notified them that, on failure to do so, they would buy the same in the
market and charge the increased cost of the defendants. The defendants refused to
substitute other bales and the plaintiffs bought 299 bales of good current Manila hemp at
P28.50 a picul, P4.50 more per picul than the price at which the defendants had agreed to
furnish them that quality of hemp. The loss to the plaintiffs was therefore P2,691 and to
recover that sum this action was brought.
Thus the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.
Issue:
W/N the ruling of the court is correct basing from the evidence presented.
Held:
Yes, the ruling of the court is correct.
Aside from Knight and Higginbothams testimonies, the other evidence in which the
court based its ruling is the letter received by the plaintiff on September 13, 1906 from
Portland Cordage Company, of Oregon which states that they are asking the plaintiff to
offer them 500 bales of good current Leyte hemp, but the plaintiffs cannot furnish 500
good current Leyte hemp, instead they offered 500 bales of good current Manila hemp.
On the same day, before sending the letter, Knight saw Don Leopoldo Criado who told
him that they could furnish 500 bales of good current Manila Bales, thus their verbal
contract. Don Leopoldo Criado denies that he had the conversation with Knight on that
day, but the fact that the telegrams where sent and received was undeniable.
G.R. No. L-24796
June 28, 1968
Director of Forestry vs. Muoz

Facts:
Piadeco claims to be the owner of Some 72,000 hectares of land 3 located in the
municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in
Antipolo and Montalban, province of Rizal. Piadeco's evidence of ownership consists
of Titulo de Propiedad and a deed of absolute sale.
The controversy began when the Acting Director of Forestry Apolonio F. Rivera required
Piadeco to surrender the original certificate to him. Ground for this cancellation was that
Piadeco had violated forestry rules and regulations for cutting trees within the Angat and
Marikina Watershed Reservations, expressly excluded from the said certificate.
Piadeco filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against
the Director of Forestry, Forest Station Warden Marquez and Nawasa, essentially upon
the averment that their acts heretofore narrated were "all precipitate, arbitrary, whimsical
and capricious." The preliminary injunction was granted and then he moved to declare the
forestry officials in default for failure to answer its petition on time. The forestry officials
asked the court to dismiss the petition upon the averments that said court had no
jurisdiction over their persons or the subject matter of the petition, and that administrative
remedies have not yet been exhausted by Piadeco. On the same date, too, but in a
separate motion, said forestry official asked for a reconsideration of the lower court's
order granting preliminary injunction, bottomed upon their charge that the illegal cutting
of trees by Piadeco inside the Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservations which are
the main source of water supply of the City of Manila and its surrounding towns and
cities poses a grave danger of causing them to dry up to the prejudice and irreparable
injury of the inhabitants thereof. The forestry officials were declared in default.
Piadeco entered into an amicable settlement with Nawasa whereby Piadeco's case against
Nawasa was withdrawn, the right of way granted by Nawasa to Piadeco remaining
revoked and cancelled; and Nawasa's counterclaim against Piadeco was also withdrawn
in consideration of P1,651.59 paid by Piadeco to Nawasa, representing the former's
liabilities to the latter. The court approved of the amicable settlement.
Piadeco applied for the renewal of its Certificate of Private Woodland Registration but
was denied by Assistant Director of Forestry J. L. Utleg but Piadeco continued logging
operations. It was about this time that illegal logging was denounced by some members
of Congress thereby attracting national attention. The Secretary of National Defense
directed the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to implement the request. And, the Chief
of Staff dispatched a task force of the army into the Angat area, which impounded and
seized all logs cut by Piadeco and other loggers which were purportedly conducting
illegal operations and they made a private quarters on a portion of Piadecos land and
prevented continuation of logging operations, from cutting and gathering of timber and
other forest products and enjoyment of said property. Hence, Piadeco filed a complaint
but was denied.

Issue:
W/N Piadeco's title is registrable with the Bureau of Forestry
Held:
No. Piadecos title is not registarable with the Breau of Forestry.
The pertinent statutory provision is Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative
Code, viz:
SEC. 1829. Registration of title to private forest land. Every private owner of land
containing timber, firewood and other minor forest products shall register his title to the
same with the Director of Forestry. A list of such owners, with a statement of the
boundaries of their property, shall be furnished by said Director to the Collector of
Internal Revenue, and the same shall be supplemented from time to time as occasion may
require.
Upon application of the Director of Forestry the fiscal of the province in which any such
land lies shall render assistance in the examination of the title thereof with a view to its
registration in the Bureau of Forestry.
Ampliatory thereof is Section 7, Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 of July 1, 1941, as
amended by Forestry Administrative Order 12-2, which took effect on January 1, 1963. It
reads:
7. Titles that may be registered. Only the following titles covering lands containing
timber, firewood and other minor forest products may be registered under and pursuant to
Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code;
(a) Administrative titles granted by the present Government, such as homestead patent,
free patent, and sales patent; and
(b) Judicial titles, such as Torrens Title obtained under the Land Registration Act (Act
496, as amended) or under the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259, as amended).
The amendment of Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 by Forestry Administrative Order
12-2 consisted in theomission of one paragraph, paragraph (c), which particularized as
one of the titles registrable pursuant to Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code,
"[t]itles granted by the Spanish sovereignty in the islands and duly recognized as valid
titles under the existing laws."
In the case at bar however, Piadecos title was issued during the Spanish regime. And it is
state in Section 1829, does not describe with particularity titles that may be registered
with the Bureau of Forestry. Spanish titles are quite dissimilar to administrative and
judicial titles under the present system. Although evidences of ownership, these Spanish
titles may be lost thru prescription. They are, therefore, neither indefeasible nor
imprescriptible. It should not have been allowed registration in the first place. Obviously,
registration thereof can never be renewed.
G.R. No. L-21814 July 15, 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. MELECIO ABANZADO, ET AL
Facts:
The Director of Forestry filed a petition to review a judgment in a land registration
proceeding, no decree having been issued as yet, arose from its failure to accord him the
opportunity to present his evidence to show that the land in controversy is part of a
communal forestand is thus non-disposable.
More specifically, what was sought by appellant public official in his amended petition
for review was the reconsideration of a previous decision, reached without his being
heard, adjudicating in favor of private respondents what was alleged to be a portion of the
Bais Communal Forest, a non-disposable public land. There was an opposition to such
petition by private respondents, who argued that no extrinsic fraud was alleged and that
the Director of Forestry was barred by estoppel or laches. The appealed order was based
on the absence of actual or extrinsic fraud, thus resulting in the denial of the petition for
review.
Issue:
W / N the court the Director of Forestry / Lands be allowed to present his evidences in
the case at bar.
Held:
Yes, the Director of Forestry / Lands should be allowed to present his evidences in the
case at bar.
A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, the appeal was taken directly to this
Court on a question of law raising the constitutional issues of absence of a hearing in
accordance with due process as well as the deviation from the fundamental principle that
forest resources as part of the national patrimony should be inalienable.
It should be quite apparent why no other decision except that of reversal of the appealed
order is warranted. For in addition to the lack of respect for the requirements of
procedural due process, there was on the part of the lower court a disregard of a basic
state policy. The Constitution then in force, as is similarly the case with the present
Charter, was quite explicit on the point of forest resources being inalienable. That is a
paramount state objective.
In the matter Ozaeta Romulo (July 30 1979)

Facts:
Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner
when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no
imposition or deception is practiced through this use. They also contend that no local
custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partners name in a professional firms
name; there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila
Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily identifies the individual
members of the firm.
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court:
1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and
2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976,
praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of
partners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both
Petitions were ordered consolidated.
Issue:
W/N the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of the partners
who already passed away in the name of the firm
Held:
No. The surviving partners are not allowed to retain the name of the deceased partner in
the name of the firm.
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations
between attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of
professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could
give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop
the names of the deceased partners from their firm name.
G.R. No. L-3793
February 19, 1908
CIRILO MAPA vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT

Facts:
The petitioner sought to have registered a tract of land of about 16 hectares in extent,
situated in the barrio of San Antonio, in the district of Mandurriao, in the municipality of
Iloilo. The petitioner presented evidence which appears that the land in question is
lowland, and has been uninterruptedly, for more than twenty years, in the possession of
the petitioner and his ancestors as owners and the same has been used during the said
period, and up to the present, as fish ponds, nipa lands, and salt deposits. The witnesses
declare that the land is far from the sea, the town of Molo being between the sea and the
said land. Judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioner and the Government has
appealed.
Issue:
W/ N the said property is an agricultural land.
Held:
The question as to whether the lands there involved were or were not agricultural lands
within the meaning of the sections was neither discussed nor decided.
The decision of that court was based upon Act No. 926 section 54, paragraph 6 which
follows:
All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public
lands, as defined by said act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a
bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years
next preceding the taking effect of this act, except when prevented by war, or force
majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to
a Government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.
The main phrase agricultural lands as defined by said act of Congress of July 1, is
found not only in section 54 above quoted but in other parts of Act No. 926, and it seems
that the same construction must be given to the phrase wherever it occurs in any part of
that law. Moreover, if it should be said that there is no definition in the act of Congress of
the phrase "agricultural land," we do not see how any effect could be given to the
provisions of Act No. 916, to which we have referred. If the phrase is not defined in the
act of Congress, then the lands upon which homesteads can be granted cannot be
determined.
G.R. No. L-3714
January 26, 1909
ISABELO MONTANO Y MARCIAL vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, ET AL.

Facts:
Isabelo Montano presents a petition to the Court of Land Registration for the inscription
of a piece of land in the barrio of Libis, municipality of Caloocan, used as a fishery. This
petition was opposed by the Solicitor-General in behalf of the Director of Lands on the
ground that the land in question belonged to the Government of the United States, and the
latter, that it was the absolute owner of all the dry land along the eastern boundary of the
said fishery. The Court of Land Registration in its decision of December 1, 1906,
dismissed the said oppositions without costs in favor of Isabelo Montano y Marcial.
Issue:
W/N the property in question is an agricultural land.
Held:
The property is an agricultural land
The section quoted is section 54, paragraph 6, Act No. 926, in which the phrase used is
"agricultural public lands."
Throughout the opinion the phrase "public lands" is repeatedly and exclusively used. The
entire discussion was directed to the question as to whether the property there in question
being "public land," it could be considered as agricultural public land and the conclusion
reached is stated at page 182, as follows:
In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land," as used in Act No. 926, means those
public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.
In that case the land in question was a long distance from the sea. In fact, the entire town
of Molo was between it and the water. It could in no sense be called tidal land. Therefore,
the opinion was devoted to a consideration of not what were "public lands" but whether
this particular tract was or was not agricultural public land. The question what the phrase
"public lands" meant neither considered nor decided in that opinion, for its resolution was
not necessary. In the concurring opinion, however, that question was discussed and it was
stated that the phrase "public lands" used in Act No. 926 must be interpreted according to
the American understanding of the words employed and the meaning of the terms as
definitely fixed by the decrees of the United States Supreme Court.
G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988

YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN vs.
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 leaving behind properties here in
the Philippines.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the HYPERLINK
"javascript:void(0);"grant of letters of administration alleging that they are the children of
the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. The petition was opposed by Yao Kee et al alleging
that Yao Kee is the lawful HYPERLINK "javascript:void(0);"wife of the deceased whom
he HYPERLINK "javascript:void(0);"married in China. The trial court rendered decision
in favor of the opposition. On HYPERLINK "javascript:void(0);"appeal, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision, modifying the decision declaring the marriage of Sy Kiat to
Yao Kee as not has been proven valid in accordance with the laws of China. Hence, both
parties moved for reconsideration to which the Supreme Court granted.
ISSUE:
W/N the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in accordance with Philippine laws.
HELD:
Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine HYPERLINK
"javascript:void(0);"courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be
alleged and proven as any other fact. To establish the validity of marriage, the existence
of foreign law as a question of fact and the alleged marriage must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence.
For failure to prove the foreign law or custom and consequently of the marriage, the
marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat in China cannot be recognized in the jurisdiction
of Philippine courts.
G.R. No. 2869
March 25, 1907
MATEO CARIO vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT

Facts:
Carino is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies filed for writ of error
because the CFI and SC dismissed his petition for application. For more than 50 years
before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, he and his ancestors had held the land as
recognized owners by the Igorots. Cario inherited the land in accordance with Igorot
custom. He tried to have the land adjusted under the Spanish land laws, but no document
issued from the Spanish Crown. In 1901, Cario obtained a possessory title to the land
under the Spanish Mortgage Law. The North American colonial government, however,
ignored his possessory title and built a public road on the land prompting him to seek a
Torrens title to his property in the land registration court.

Issue:
W/N the petitioner is granted ownership of the land.
Held:
Yes. The petitioner is entitled to ownership of said land.
The petitioner's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings
against him or his father ever was made. And also under the Spanish Law: "Where such
possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show
that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription." For cultivated land, 20 years,
uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, 30.
G.R. Nos. L-31666, L-31667 and L-31668 April 30, 1979

LEPANTO vs. DUMYUNG
Facts:
The director of lands filed a criminal case against the defendants on the ground of
misrepresentation and false data and information. The defendants in the three cases filed
an amended joint answer with counterclaim to the complaint in intervention. The
defendants filed a motion to dismiss the same on the ground that the accused had
complied with all the legal requirements in the acquisition of their patents which were
duly issued by the Director of Lands and that they are not guilty of the alleged
falsification of public documents.
Issue:
W/N the defendants are entitled to ownership of the land.
Held:
Yes. The Defendants are entitled to ownership of the land in question.
Section 44 of the Land Act in its second paragraph states:
A member of the national cultural, minorities who has continuously occupied and
cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in- interest, a tract or tracts of
land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in
the preceding paragraph of this section: PROVIDED, that at the time he files his free
patent application, he is not the owner of any real property secured or disposable under
this provision of the Public Land Law.
It is for this reason that is, to give these national cultural minorities who were driven
from their ancestral abodes, a fair chance to acquire lands of the public domain.
G.R. No. L-37682 March 29, 1974

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. PEDRO SAMSON ANIMAS
Facts:
There was a land in General Santos City which was claimed by Isagani Du Timbol. The
land covered by the free patent and title in question was originally applied for by Precila
Soria, who transferred her rights to the land and its improvements to defendant Isagani
Du Timbol who filed his application as a transferee from Precila Soria.
Bureau of Forestry, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Branch I,
General Santos City to declare the free patent in the name of defendant Isagani Du
Timbol null and void ab initio and to order the reversion of the land in question to the
mass of public domain. The action is based on the ground that the land covered thereby is
a forest or timber land which is not disposable under the Public Land Act. And claimed
that the said patent and title were obtained fraudulently as private respondent Isagani Du
Timbol never occupied and cultivated the land applied for. The case was dismissed.
Issue:
W/N Hon. Animas decision is correct.
Held:
No. The First decision was incorrect.
The complaint alleges that applicant Isagani Du Timbols actions constitutes as fraud.
A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. A title will be considered void
if it is procured through fraud, as when a person applies for registration of the land under
his name although the property belongs to another. In the case of disposable public
lands, failure on the part of the grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by law is a
ground for holding such title void.
GR No.71169, December 22, 1988

Sangalang ET. Al v. IAC,
Facts:
Sangalang filed an action to enforce by specific performance restrictive easement upon
property, specifically the Bel- Air Village subdivision in Makati, Metro Manila, pursuant
to stipulations embodied in the deeds of sale covering the subdivision, and for damages.
Bel - Air itself had brought its own complaints, four in number, likewise for specific
performance and damages to enforce the same 'deed restrictions.' The court ruled in favor
of the plantiffs. The IAC reversed the decision of the court.
Issue:
W/N the IAC erred in the decision of the case at bar.
Held:
No. The IAC did not commit any error in the ruling of the case at bar.
The petitioners have not shown why we should hold otherwise other than for the
supposed "non-impairment" guaranty of the Constitution, which, as we have declared, is
secondary to the more compelling interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not
been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the
judgments so appealed. In that connection, we find no reversible error to have been
committed by the Court of Appeals.
G.R. No. L-43203 July 29, 1977

JOSE C. CRISTOBAL vs. ALEJANDRO MELCHOR and FEDERICO ARCALA
Facts:
The plaintiff was formerly employed as a private secretary in the President's Private
Office, Malacaang, Manila.
Five of the employees who were separated not including the herein plaintiff filed a civil
and were reinstatement and the payment of their salaries. The plaintiff sent a letter to the
Office of the President requesting reinstatement to his former position and the payment of
salary but the request was denied repeatedly until he received a letter which declared the
matter definitely closed. The plaintiff then filed a complaint against the Executive
Secretary, Alejandro Melchor and Federico Arcala, cash disbursing officer, Office of the
President of the Philippines. The defendants argued that the plaintiff had no cause of
action as he is deemed to have abandoned his office for failure to institute the proper
proceedings to assert his right within one year from the date of separation pursuant to
Sec. 16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, he having come to court only after the lapse of
more than nine years, thereby in effect acquiescing to his separation, and therefore he is
not entitled to any salary from termination of his employment. The complaint was
dismissed.
Issue:
W/N the court erred in dismissing the case.
Held:
Yes. The court made an error in dismissing the case.
There was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part of Jose Cristobal amounting to
abandonment of his right to reinstatement in office. Although Cristobal failed to file his
complaint within one year from the date of separation but, it is claimed, he allowed
almost nine years passing before coming to court by reason of which he is deemed to
have acquiesced to his removal. The Court stated that in a general sense, laches is failure
or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. And it is the
doctrine of laches which is invoked to defeat Jose Cristobal's suit, there are exceptional
circumstances attending which take this case out of the rule enunciated above and lead us
to grant relief to appellant. These are:
-There was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part of Jose Cristobal amounting to
abandonment of his right to reinstatement in office.
-It was an act of the government through its responsible officials more particularly then
Executive Secretary Amelito Mutuc and his successors which contributed to the alleged
delay in the filing of Cristobal's present complaint for reinstatement.

-The dismissal of appellant Cristobal was contrary to law on the strength of this Court's
Decision.
Wherefore, the court ordered the reinstatement and payment of back wages of the
plaintiff.
G.R. No. L-36142 March 31, 1973

JAVELLANA VS. TAN
Facts:
In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate HYPERLINK
"javascript:void(0);"implementation of the new 1973 Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino
and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from
implementing the said constitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution is void
because the same was initiated by the president. He argued that the President is w/o
power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution.
Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is not a free election there being
intimidation and fraud.
ISSUE:
W/N the SC must give due HYPERLINK "javascript:void(0);"course to the petition.
HELD:
The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices
expressed the view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president
of the Philippines, in the exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, there being no
competent evidence to show such fraud and intimidation during the election, it is to be
assumed that the people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The
question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was left to
the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown
such acquiescence.
G.R. No. 81311 June 30, 1988

KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAGLILINGKOD SA PAMAHALAAN VS. TAN
Facts:
EO 273 was issued by the President of the Philippines which amended the Revenue
Code, adopting the value-added tax (VAT) effective 1 January 1988. Four petitions
assailed the validity of the VAT Law for being beyond the President to enact; for being
oppressive, discriminatory, regressive, and violative of the due process and equal
protection clauses, among others, of the Constitution. The Integrated Customs Brokers
Association particularly contend that it unduly discriminate against customs brokers
(Section 103 [r]) as the amended provision of the Tax Code provides that service
performed in the exercise of profession or calling (except custom brokers) subject to
occupational tax under the Local Tax Code, and professional services performed by
registered general professional partnerships are exempt from VAT.
Issue:
Whether the E-VAT law discriminates against customs brokers.
Held:
The phrase except custom brokers is not meant to discriminate against custom brokers
but to avert a potential conflict between Sections 102 and 103 of the Tax Code, as
amended. The distinction of the customs brokers from the other professionals who are
subject to occupation tax under the Local Tax Code is based upon material differences, in
that the activities of customs brokers partake more of a business, rather than a profession
and were thus subjected to the percentage tax under Section 174 of the Tax Code prior to
its amendment by EO 273. EO 273 abolished the percentage tax and replaced it with the
VAT. If the Association did not protest the classification of customs brokers then, there is
no reason why it should protest now.
G.R. No. L-23136 August 26, 1974
MATHAY et al vs. THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST COMPANY et al

Facts:
The plaintiff filed a class suit against the defendant bank on the ground of breach of
contract between the plaintiff and defendant bank and "falsely certified to the calling of a
special stockholders' meeting allegedly pursuant to due notice and call of Defendant
Bank" without notifying the plaintiffs and other stockholders. The defendants moved for
the dismissal of the action on the ground of the plaintiffs-appellants had no legal standing
or capacity to institute the alleged class suit; that the complaint did not state a sufficient
and valid cause of action; and that plaintiffs-appellants' complaint against the increase of
the number of directors did not likewise state a cause of action. Thus the court dismissed
the case. The plaintiffs appealed.
Issue:
W/N the plaintiffs have sufficient cause of action.
Held:
No, there was no sufficient cause of action.
It having been shown that the complaint failed to state ultimate facts to constitute a cause
of action, it becomes unnecessary to discuss the other assignments of errors.
G.R. No. L-45987
May 5, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CAYAT

Facts:
In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-HYPERLINK
"javascript:void(0);"Christians from drinking gin or any other HYPERLINK
"javascript:void(0);"liquor HYPERLINK "javascript:void(0);"outside of their customary
alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in
violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be
imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the
constitutionality of the HYPERLINK "javascript:void(0);"said Act. He averred, among
others, that it violated his right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said
this attempt to treat them with discrimination or mark them as inferior or less capable
race and less entitled will meet with their instant challenge. The law sought to
distinguish and classify native non-Christians from Christians.
ISSUE: W/N the said Act violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable
classification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have
the characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an
indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;
(1) Must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) Must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) Must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) Must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial,
not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or
parentage. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as an inferior
or less capable race. On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of
the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality
in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there
can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the
government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and
civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in
view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.
G.R. No. L-14078
March 7, 1919
RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes) vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO

Facts:
The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian
inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative
Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a
site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only
solicit homesteads on thisreservation providing that said homestead applications are
previously recommended by the provincial governor.
In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the
Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River
including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to
take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who
shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in
sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.
Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures
for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests
in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.
It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling
within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.
It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on
the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said
to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having
run away from the reservation.
Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives a person of his
liberty of abode. Thus, WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.
Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a
person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws,
and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute
slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of
the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Assigned as reasons for the action:
(1) Attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and
(2) The only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to
live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following;
(3) The protection of the Manguianes;
(4) The protection of the public forests in which they roam;
(5) The necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the
degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own
good and the general good of the Philippines.
Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the
individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general wellbeing. No man can do exactly as he pleases.
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law.
Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas
corpus can, therefore, not issue.
G.R. No. L-51773 May 16, 1980

LT. COL. RODRIGO S. DE GUZMAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT JUDGE MARCELINO M. ESCALONA, FLORENTINO
RODRIGO, and MARIANO DAYDAY.
Facts:
The defendants Florentino Rodrigo and Mariano Dayday were charged with "Illegal
Possession of Explosive locally known as 'dinamita'. While in the seawaters of the Cebu,
confederating and mutually helping with one another, without authority of the law and
without proper permit from authorities, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously possess, keep an explosive, locally known as 'DINAMITA' in their banca
purposely for use of illegal fishing and three (3) bottles of explosives, two (2) paddles,
two (2) fishnets locally known as "SIBOT" and one (1) banca were recovered from their
possession and control, which acts of the above-named accused is a gross violation of PD
No. 1058. Both were found guilty of said accusation.
However, the judge only submitted possession of explosives in connection with
subversion is covered by Presidential Decree No. 9, thus, the old law on illegal
possession of explosives, Act 3023, has not been completely repealed; that having found
that the possession by the two accused of two bottles of home-made explosives was
solely for fishing purposes and had no connection with subversion, the illegal act should
fall not under Presidential Decree No. 9 but under Act 3023.
Petitioner Lt. Col. Rodrigo S. De Guzman, PC Provincial Commander Integrated
National Police Superintendent at Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City, instituted these
certiorari proceedings alleging mainly that the offense charged was one for possession of
explosives intended for illegal fishing under Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1058, and not for violation of Act 3023 which had long been
repealed by several laws and decrees; that the penalty provided for by current legislation
is one which falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance;
and that respondent Judge's Decision has no legal basis.
Issue:
W/N the responded judge erred in rendering judgment even though the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Held:
Yes. Considering that the Municipal Circuit Court lacked competent jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the criminal complaint against the accused respondents.
Presidential Decree No. 1058 is an amendatory decree, which increased the penalties for
certain forms of illegal fishing and for other acts made punishable under Presidential
Decree No. 704 or the "Fisheries Decree of 1975". The pertinent portion of Section 33 of
Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1058 reads:
Sec. 33. Illegal fishing; illegal possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing;
dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. - It shall be unlawful for any
person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken gathered fish or fisheries/
aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous
substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d),
respectively, of Section 3 hereof: Provided, that possession of such explosives with intent
to use the same for illegal fishing as herein defined shall be punishable as hereinafter
provided. ... (Emphasis supplied).
Section 38, subsection a (1) of Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1058, correspondingly provides:
(1) By the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years to twenty-five (25)
years in the case of mere possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing. ...
(Emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General in the Comment he filed for petitioner
People of the Philippines, respondent Judge's reference to Presidential Decree No. 9 is
misplaced for, indeed, there is no mention at all of, nor any reference to, Presidential
Decree No. 9 in the Complaint.
G.R. No. L-25434 July 25, 1975

HONORABLE ARSENIO N. ROLDAN, JR., in his capacity as Acting Commissioner,
Philippine Fisheries Commission, and THE PHILIPPINE NAVY
vs.
HONORABLE FRANCISCO ARCA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Branch 1) and MORABE, DE GUZMAN & COMPANY
Facts:
On August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats, Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also
respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, were actually seized for illegal fishing
with dynamite. Fish caught with dynamite and sticks of dynamite were then found aboard
the two vessels.
It was alleged that at the time of the seizure of the fishing boats in issue, the same were
engaged in legitimate fishing operations off the coast of Palawan; that by virtue of the
offer of compromise dated September 13, 1965 by respondent company to the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the numerous violations of the Fishery Laws, if
any, by the crew members of the vessels were settled. However, the ships were
apprehended without warrant for alleged violations of some provisions of the Fisheries
Act and the rules and regulations promulgated there under.
Respondent filed with the Court against petitioner Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N.
Roldan, Jr., for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI (one of two fishing boats in
question) which had been seized and impounded by petitioner Fisheries Commissioner
through the Philippine Navy. The court dismissed the complaint for failure of the
petitioner to prosecute and failure of the defendant to appear.
It was held that Hon. Roldan acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion.
Issue:
W/N is it lawful to apprehend fishing boats without warrant.
Held:
Yes. In the case at bar, it is lawful to apprehend the fishing boats without warrant.
The word boat in its ordinary sense, means any water craft, the fishing boats Tony Lex III
and Tony Lex VI are likewise vessels within the meaning of the term vessel. the accepted
definition of vessel includes "every description of water craft, large or small, used or
capable of being used as a means of transportation on water"
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of the
customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a
search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the search warrant must be sought before such warrant could be secured; hence
it is not practicable to require a search warrant before such search or seizure can be
constitutionally effected.
Since the crew of certain fishing vessels were caught, in flagrante, illegally fishing with
dynamite and without the requisite license, their apprehension without a warrant of arrest
and the seizure of the vessel, as well as its equipment and the dynamites found therein, as
an incident to a lawful arrest was held to be lawful.
G.R. No. L-9699
August 26, 1915
THE UNITED STATES vs. JUAN HERNANDEZ, ET AL.

Facts:
In 1947, Liberato Jimenez was appointed as a temporary legal investigator in the
Philippine Veterans Board (PVB). In 1949, he was promoted as HYPERLINK
"javascript:void(0);"the Chief of the Investigation Section but still in a temporary
capacity because he is not civil service eligible. In 1950, he took a promotional civil
service exam. In July 1951, Jimenez received a letter from PVB Chairman Gen.
Guillermo Francisco advising him that he is being replaced by a civil service eligible. In
September 1951, Jimenez received the results of the civil service exam he took in 1950;
he passed. He then appealed his separation from service.
ISSUE:
W/N Jimenez should be reinstated.
HELD:
No. In fact, he should have been separated from HYPERLINK "javascript:void(0);"the
service even before 1951. Under the law, he was supposed to only hold such temporary
appointment for three months while the appointing power is still looking for a civil
service eligible. His extended stay in the service is only upon the grace of the appointing
power. Further, there is no law which provides that a temporary appointment may ripen to
a permanent one. When he met the civil service eligibility, Jimenez did not become
entitled to a permanent position in the PVD. The power to appoint is in essence
discretionary on the part of the proper authority, in this case the head of the department.
The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to
his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified for any competitive position in
the Civil Service. Mere certification as a civil service eligible does not amount to an
appointment. The Civil Service Commission does not insure any appointment; it only
certifies an eligible to be possessed of the qualification as required for a position
classified under its rules.
G.R. No. 152644
February 10, 2006
JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and B. HERNANDEZ, Petitioners,

- versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the
President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager
for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation
(Marcopper), a corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit that discharged
millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
The DOJ separately charged petitioners in the MTC of Boac, Marinduque with
violation of Article 91(B), sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No.
1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067), Section 8 of PD No. 984
or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984), Section 108 of
Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942), and
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property.
Petitioners moved to quash the Information on the following grounds:
the Information were duplicitous as the Department of Justice charged more
than one offense for a single act;
petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of
Marcopper when the incident subject of the Information took place; and
the Informations contain allegations which constitute legal excuse or justification.
MTC issued a Consolidated Order), granting partial reconsideration to its Joint

Order and quashing the Information for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The
MTC maintained the Information for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the
RPC. Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC of Boac,
Marinduque, assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the
Informations for violation of RA 7942. The RTC granted public respondents
appeal but denied petitioners petition. Branch 94 set aside the Consolidated
Order in so far as it quashed the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD
984 and ordered those charges reinstated. RTC affirmed the Consolidated Order
in all other respects. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. Petitioners contended that since the acts complained of in the charges
for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 are the very same acts
complained of in the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC, the latter
absorbs the former. Hence, petitioners should only be prosecuted for violation of
Article 365 of the RPC. The Court of Appeals affirmed RTCs ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed
for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property should stand.
HELD:
NO. The information filed by the petitioner should not be quashed.
There is no duplicity of charges in the present case.
There is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges
more than one offense. Under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to
quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid
confusing the accused in preparing his defense. Here, however, the prosecution
charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each Information charging
only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a
ground to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the petition deserves
outright denial.
G.R. No. 139548. December 22, 2000

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO G. BUMOLO et al., , respondents.
FACTS:
MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION registered its mining claims in Pao,
Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya with the DENR from February 02,1982 to October 12,
1982. Private respondents Alberto G. Bumolo and others registered their mining
claims in the same area from 28 July 1981 to 22 September 1988, which claims
were subsequently converted into Mineral Production Sharing Agreements
(MPSA).
On March 12, 1982 petitioner entered into Option Agreements over the mining.
Under the Agreements, petitioner was granted the exclusive and irrevocable right
to explore the mining claims for three (3) years with provision for extension.
On December 23, 1982 and March 26, 1987 petitioner filed Prospecting Permit
Applications (PPA) with the Bureau of Forest Development, DENR, on the
alleged ground that a portion of the area covered by the mining claims was within
the Magat River Forest Reservation under Proc. 573 of June 26, 1969 and with
DAR on account of alleged coverage of the other portion within the Nueva
Vizcaya-Quirino Civil Reservation under Proc. 1498 of 11 September 1975.
On 15 July 1991 Executive Director Leonardo A. Paat rejected petitioners
Prospecting Permit Application (PPA) on the ground that the Memorandum of
July 08, 1991 endorsed by the Regional Technical Director for Mines revealed
that the area covered was outside government reservation; that the prospect
claim was in conflict with existing claims; and, that the area had been extensively
explored in the early 1980's.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration.
Regional Executive Director Samuel
Paragas recommended to the DENR Secretary that petitioner's request for
reconsideration be denied; that the existing rights of mining claim holders be
respected; and, that the prior legal rights of MPSA/Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement applicants over subject area be recognized.
As regards petitioner's PPA filed with the DAR, it appeared that it was issued a
clearance to prospect for six (6) months from December 11, 1995.
On August 15, 1997 petitioner appealed to public respondent Mines Adjudication
Board (MAB). Petitioner maintained that subject area was within the Magat River
Forest Reservation. On June 11, 1998 the rejection of the PPA was affirmed
whereas the mining claims of respondents Alberto G. Bumolo et al. that had been
converted into a MPSA, subject to compliance with R.A. 7942 and DAO No.
96-40, were given due course.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration.
motion .
Respondent MAB denied petitioners
ISSUE:
Whether respondent MAB erred in finding that the area subject of the PPA was
outside the Magat River Forest Reservation.
HELD:
Respondent MAB correctly upheld the ratiocination of Regional Executive
Director Paragas in denying petitioner's PPA.
The disapproval of Marcoppers PPA moreover, did not emanate from a single
recommendation of the RTD for Mines. Records would show that as early as
May 31, 1989 x x x the Bumolo group of PD 463 claims which Marcopper has
eventually surrounded by filing its own PAO 1-30 group of claims x x x x was
confirmed by the Forest Engineering Section of the region to be outside
proclaimed watershed areas, wilderness, national parks and existing government
reforestation projects x x x x
In other words, the circumstance that the area covered by petitioner's PPA is
outside the Magat River Forest Reservation has been adequately established by
the following evidence: (a) confirmation as early as 31 May 1989 by the Forest
Engineering Section of Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (b) the 8 July 1991 Memorandum

Report of Regional Technical Director Punsal Jr.; and, (c) plotting provided by the
National Mapping and Resources Information Authority per its 2 June 1995
indorsement of the maps to the office of the Regional Executive Director.
Petitioner contests the exclusion of the area subject of its PPA within the Magat
River Forest Reservation based merely on the alleged "typographical error
committed by somebody in the Engineering Section of the DENR." Aside from the
fact that the allegation does not have anything to support it, the aforementioned
documents which the Regional Executive Directors relied upon in denying the
PPA had already settled the issue.
Furthermore, respondent MAB even fortified the bases for the rejection of
petitioner's PPA. As plotted by the Lands Management Sector of DENR Region
2 contained in the sketch plan of 11 November 1996 and as shown in the Land
Use map of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Dupax,
Nueva Vizcaya, the area covered under the PPA is indeed outside any
government reservation.
G.R. No. 98332
January 16, 1995
MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources, and JOEL D. MUYCO, Director of Mines and Geosciences Bureau,
respondents.
FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279, authorizing the DENR
Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production, or productionsharing agreements for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral
resources, and prescribing the guidelines for such agreements and those
agreements involving technical or financial assistance by foreign-owned
corporations for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
the DENR Secretary issued DENR Administrative Order No. 57, series of 1989,
entitled "Guidelines on Mineral Production Sharing Agreement under Executive
Order No. 279." HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/
SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1995.zip%3E14d,df%7C1995/
JAN1995/98332.htm" \l "_ftn6" \o "" Under the transitory provision of said DENR
Administrative Order No. 57, embodied in its Article 9, all existing mining leases
or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution
pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, except small scale mining leases and those
pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry resources covering an area of twenty
(20) hectares or less, shall be converted into production-sharing agreements

within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines.
The Secretary of the DENR then further issued DENR Administrative Order No.
82, series of 1990, laying down the "Procedural Guidelines on the Award of
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) through Negotiation."
H Y P E R L I N K " h t t p : / / e l i b r a r y. j u d i c i a r y. g o v. p h / d o c u m e n t s - d t s e a r c h /
SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1995.zip%3E14d,df%7C1995/
JAN1995/98332.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o ""
The issuance and the impending implementation by the DENR of Administrative
Order Nos. 57 and 82 after their respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners
Association of the Philippines, Inc. HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/
documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1995.zip%3E14d,df
%7C1995/JAN1995/98332.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o "" to file the instant petition assailing
their validity and constitutionality before this Court.
Petitioner Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., mainly contends that the
administrative orders do not conform with Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279,
petitioner contends that both orders violate the non-impairment of contract
provision under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution on the ground that
Administrative Order No. 57 unduly pre-terminates existing mining leases and
other mining agreements and automatically converts them into productionsharing agreements within one (1) year from its effectivity date. On the other
hand, Administrative Order No. 82 declares that failure to submit Letters of Intent
and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreements within two (2) years from the date of
effectivity of said guideline or on July 17, 1991 shall cause the abandonment of
their mining, quarry and sand gravel permits.
Petitioner argued that Executive Order No. 279 does not contemplate automatic
conversion of mining lease agreements into mining production-sharing
agreement as provided under Article 9, Administrative Order No. 57 and/or the
consequent abandonment of mining claims for failure to submit LOIs and MPSAs
under Section 3, Administrative Order No. 82 because Section 1 of said
Executive Order No. 279 empowers the DENR Secretary to negotiate and enter
into voluntary agreements which must set forth the minimum terms and
conditions provided under Section 2 thereof. Moreover, petitioner contends that
the power to regulate and enter into mining agreements does not include the
power to preterminate existing mining lease agreements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 issued by the DENR
Secretary are unconstitutional.
HELD:
NO. DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 are not unconstitutional.
The questioned administrative orders are reasonably directed to the

accomplishment of the purposes of the law under which they were issued and
were intended to secure the paramount interest of the public, their economic
growth and welfare. The validity and constitutionality of Administrative Order
Nos. 57 and 82 must be sustained, and their force and effect upheld.
Administrative Order No. 57 applies only to all existing mining leases or
agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution
pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. It bears mention that under the text of
Executive Order No. 211, there is a reservation clause which provides that the
privileges as well as the terms and conditions of all existing mining leases or
agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211, shall be subject to any and all modifications or
alterations which Congress may adopt pursuant to Article XII, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution. Hence, the strictures of the non-impairment of contract clause
under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution HYPERLINK "http://
elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/
1995.zip%3E14d,df%7C1995/JAN1995/98332.htm" \l "_ftn20" \o "" do not apply
to the aforesaid mining leases or agreements granted after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. They can be amended,
modified or altered by a statute passed by Congress to achieve the purposes of
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
Moreover, nowhere in Administrative Order No. 57 is there any provision which
would lead us to conclude that the questioned order authorizes the automatic
conversion of mining leases and agreements granted after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, to production-sharing
agreements. The provision in Article 9 of Administrative Order No. 57 that "all
such leases or agreements shall be converted into production sharing
agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines" could not
possibly contemplate a unilateral declaration on the part of the Government that
all existing mining leases and agreements are automatically converted into
production-sharing agreements. On the contrary, the use of the term
"production-sharing agreement" in the same provision implies negotiation
between the Government and the applicants, if they are so minded. Negotiation
negates compulsion or automatic conversion as suggested by petitioner in the
instant petition. A mineral production-sharing agreement (MPSA) requires a
meeting of the minds of the parties after negotiations arrived at in good faith and
in accordance with the procedure laid down in the subsequent Administrative
Order No. 82.
OLYMPIC MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., Petitioner,

- versus PLATINUM GROUP METALS CORPORATION, Respondent.
CITINICKEL MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,Petitioner,
- versus HON. JUDGE BIENVENIDO C. BLANCAFLOR, in his capacity as the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Branch 95, Puerto
P r i n c e s a C i t y, P a l a w a n , a n d P L AT I N U M G R O U P M E TA L
CORPORATION,
Respondents
PLATINUM GROUP METALS CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
- versus CITINICKEL MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, acting for its

own interest and on behalf of OLYMPIC MINES AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
Respondent.
PLATINUM GROUP METALS CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
- versus COURT OF APPEALS and POLLY C. DY,
Respondents
FACTS:
In 1971 and 1980, Olympic was granted Mining Lease Contracts by the
Secretary of the DENR covering mining areas located in the municipalities of
Narra and Espanola, Palawan.
On July 18, 2003, Olympic entered into an Operating Agreement with Platinum,
by virtue of which Platinum was given the exclusive right to control, possess,
manage/operate, and conduct mining operations, and to market or dispose
mining products on the Toronto Nickel Mine in the Municipality of Narra. In
return, Platinum would pay Olympic a royalty fee of 2% of the gross revenues.
Olympic and Platinum applied for, and were subsequently granted the necessary
government permits and environmental compliance certificates.
On April 24, 2006, Olympic sent a letter to Platinum, informing the latter of the
immediate termination of the Operating Agreement on account of Platinums
gross violations of its terms, and directing Platinum to immediately surrender
possession of the subject mining areas under the Operating Agreement.
Olympic instituted an action for the issuance of an injunctive writ before the RTC
of Puerto Princesa against Platinum. In its prayer, Olympic sought to enjoin
Platinum from conducting mining operations on the subject mining areas, and
also to recover possession thereof. The RTC dismissed Olympics complaint.
Olympic then filed two cases with the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board
(PMRB) for the revocation of the SSMPs of Platinum, on the ground of Olympics
termination of the Operating Agreement because of the alleged gross violations
thereof by Platinum. This was dismissed and POA for the cancellation of the
Operating Agreement and the revocation of the SSMPs of Platinum. This case
was subsequently withdrawn by .
While these two administrative cases were pending, Olympic transferred its
applications for mineral agreements, including its rights under the Operating
Agreement, to Citinickel via a Deed of , without the knowledge or consent of
Platinum. This assignment was thereafter approved by the Regional Director of
the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB).
After the assignment, Citinickel filed Civil Case No. 06-0185 before the RTC of
Paraaque, on June 21, 2006, seeking to invalidate the Operating Agreement
based on Platinums alleged violation of its terms.
This action was also
dismissed by the trial court, citing forum shopping and improper venue as among
the grounds for dismissal. Citinickel did not bother to appeal this dismissal,
opting instead to find other remedies.
Citinickel thereafter filed three administrative cases: PMRB Case No. 002-06,
DENR Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) Case No. 8253, and POA
Case No. 2006-02-B.
Civil Case No. 4199 involved a complaint for quieting of title, damages, breach of
contract, and specific performance filed by Platinum against Olympic before the
RTC of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, Branch 95 on June 14, 2006.
Olympic sought the dismissal of Platinums Civil Case No. 4199 through a motion
to dismiss where Olympic alleged that the trial court was without jurisdiction to
rule on the issues raised in the case. Olympic contended that the case involved
a mining dispute requiring the technical expertise of the POA; accordingly,

jurisdiction should be with the PO
ISSUE:
Which body has the authority to hear and decide the dispute between Olympic/
Citinickel and Platinum, as parties to the operating agreement.
HELD:
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations of the complaint. It is thus obvious that the
complaint falls within the ambit of the RTCs original jurisdiction, to the exclusion
of all other judicial or quasi-judicial bodies.
Although Section 77 (d) of the Mining Act has transferred to the POA jurisdiction
over disputes pending before the Bureau of Mines and the DENR, Section 77 (b)
did not adopt the wording of Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (c) of PD No. 1281 so
as to include all other forms of contracts public or private involving mining
rights; Section 77 (b) in relation to Section 3 (ab) of the Mining Act did not include
a general catch-all phrase to cover other agreements involving mining rights
similar to those in Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (c) of PD No. 1281. Instead, the
Mining Act, through the above-quoted Sections 3 (ab) and 26, has limited the
jurisdiction of the POA, as successor of the adjudicatory functions of the Bureau
of Mines, to mineral agreements between the government and the private
contractor. Otherwise stated, while disputes between parties to any mining
contract (including operating agreements) may previously fall within the Bureau
of Mines jurisdiction under Section 7 (a) or (c) of PD No. 1281, it can no longer
be so placed now within the authority of the POA to settle under Section 77 (b) of
the Mining Law because its jurisdiction has been limited to the resolution of
disputes involving public mineral agreements.
The controlling factor in determining venue for cases is the primary objective for
which said cases are filed. Platinums primary objective in filing the complaint is
to protect its interest in the subject mining areas, although it joined its claims of
breach of contract, damages, and specific performance in the case. In any
event, the Rules of Court allow joinder of causes of action in the RTC, provided
one of the causes of action (in this case, the cause of action for quieting of title or
interest in real property located in Palawan) falls within the jurisdiction of said
court and venue lies therein. In fine, there is absolutely no reason to disturb
the CAs findings that venue was properly laid in the Palawan court.
G.R. No. 163509
PICOP RESOURCES, INC.,petitioner,
- versus -
BASE METALS MINERAL RESOURCES CORPORATION and THE MINES

ADJUDICATION BOARD, respondents.
FACTS:
Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation (CMMCI for brevity)

entered into a Mines Operating Agreement (Agreement for brevity) with Banahaw
Mining and Development Corporation (Banahaw Mining for brevity) whereby the
latter agreed to act as Mine Operator for the exploration, development, and
eventual commercial operation of CMMCIs eighteen (18) mining claims located
in Agusan del Sur.
Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications for
Mining Lease Contracts over the mining claims with the Bureau of Mines. So that
Banahaw Mining was issued a Mines Temporary Permit authorizing it to extract
and dispose of precious minerals found within its mining claims. Upon its
expiration, the temporary permit was subsequently renewed thrice by the Bureau
of Mines, the last being on June 28, 1991.
Since a portion of Banahaw Minings mining claims was located in petitioner
PICOPs logging concession in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner
PICOP entered into a Memorandum of Agreement, whereby, in mutual
recognition of each others right to the area concerned, petitioner PICOP allowed
Banahaw Mining an access/right of way to its mining claims. Banahaw Mining
converted its mining claims to applications for Mineral Production Sharing
Agreements (MPSA for brevity).
While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996,
decided to sell/assign its rights and interests over thirty-seven (37) mining claims
in favor of private respondent Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation (Base
Metals for brevity). The transfer included mining claims held by Banahaw Mining
in its own right as claim owner, as well as those covered by its mining operating
agreement with CMMCI.
Upon being informed of the development, CMMCI, as claim owner, immediately
approved the assignment made by Banahaw Mining in favor of private
respondent Base Metals, thereby recognizing private respondent Base Metals as
the new operator of its claims.
On March 10, 1997, private respondent Base Metals amended Banahaw

Minings pending MPSA applications with the Bureau of Mines to substitute itself
as applicant and to submit additional documents in support of the application.
Area clearances from the DENR Regional Director and Superintendent of the
Agusan Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary were submitted, as required.
On October 7, 1997, private respondent Base Metals amended MPSA
applications were published in accordance with the requirements of the Mining
Act of 1995.
On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-Sciences
Bureau (MGB), Caraga Regional Office No. XIII an Adverse Claim and/or
Opposition to private respondent Base Metals application. After the submission
of their respective position paper, the Panel Arbitrator issued an Order
disapproving private respondent Base Metals MPSA on the reasons that adverse
claim was filed on time, that the granting of the MPSA application on area subject
of an IFMA or PTLA which is covered by a Presidential Warranty, the panel
believes it cannot, unless the grantee consents thereto, without the grantees
consent, the area is considered closed to mining location (sec. 19) (b) (No. 2),
DAO No. 96-40) and that the mining location in forest or timberland is allowed
only if such forest or timberland is not leased by the government to a qualified
person or entity and if it is leased the consent of the lessor is necessary, in
addition to the area clearance to be issued by the agency concerned before it is
subjected to mining operation.
Plantation is considered closed to mining locations because it is off tangent to
mining. Both are extremes. They can not exist at the same time. The other must
necessarily stop before the other operate.
Private respondent Base Metals filed a Notice of Appeal with public respondent
MAB, the latter
rendered the assailed decision setting aside the Panel
Arbitrators order. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the MAB.
Hence this petition.
PICOP presents the following issues: (1) the 2,756 hectares subject of Base
Metals MPSA are closed to mining operations except upon PICOPs written
consent pursuant to existing laws, rules and regulations and by virtue of the
Presidential Warranty; (2) its Presidential Warranty is protected by the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution; and (3) it does not raise new issues in its
petition.
PICOP asserts that its concession areas are closed to mining operations as
these are within the Agusan-Surigao-Davao forest reserve established under
Proclamation No. 369 of then Gov. Gen. Dwight Davis. The area is allegedly also
part of permanent forest established under Republic Act No. 3092 (RA 3092),
and overlaps the wilderness area where mining applications are expressly
prohibited under RA 7586. Hence, the area is closed to mining operations under
Sec. 19(f) of RA 7942.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the area covered by Base Metals MPSA is, by law, closed to
mining activities
Whether or not the Presidential Warranty is a contract protected by the nonimpairment clause of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
Anent the first issue, the Court ruled that the area covered by Base Metals
MPSA is, by law, not closed to mining activities.
There is no evidence in this case that the area covered by Base Metals MPSA
has been proclaimed as watershed forest reserves.
Even granting that the area covered by the MPSA is part of the Agusan-DavaoSurigao Forest Reserve, such does not necessarily signify that the area is
absolutely closed to mining activities. Contrary to PICOPs obvious misreading of
our decision in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, supra, to the effect that mineral
agreements are not allowed in the forest reserve established under Proclamation
369, the Court in that case actually ruled that pursuant to PD 463 as amended by
PD 1385, one can acquire mining rights within forest reserves, such as the
Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve, by initially applying for a permit to
prospect with the Bureau of Forest and Development and subsequently for a
permit to explore with the Bureau of Mines and Geosciences.
Moreover, Sec. 18 RA 7942 allows mining even in timberland or forestty subject
to existing rights and reservations. Similarly, Sec. 47 of PD 705 permits mining
operations in forest lands which include the public forest, the permanent forest or
forest reserves, and forest reservations
With regard to the second issue, the Court do not subscribe to PICOPs
argument that the Presidential Warranty dated September 25, 1968 is a contract
protected by the non-impairment clause of the 1987 Constitution.
An
examination of the Presidential Warranty at once reveals that it simply reassures
PICOP of the governments commitment to uphold the terms and conditions of its
timber license and guarantees PICOPs peaceful and adequate possession and
enjoyment of the areas which are the basic sources of raw materials for its wood
processing complex. The warranty covers only the right to cut, collect, and
remove timber in its concession area, and does not extend to the utilization of
other resources, such as mineral resources, occurring within the concession.
The Presidential Warranty cannot be considered a contract distinct from
PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. It is merely a collateral undertaking which cannot
amplify PICOPs rights under its timber license. Since timber licenses are not
contracts, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.
PYRO COPPER MINING CORPORATION, petitioner,
versus
MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD-DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, ET AL, respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws
engaged in the business of mining. On 31 March 2000, petitioners Application
for Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA), for the exploration,
development and commercial utilization of certain pyrite ore and other mineral
deposits in a 4,360.71-hectare land in Dasol, Pangasinan, was approved and
MPSA No. 153-2000-1 was issued in its favor.
Private respondent is also a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines and engaged in the business of mining. Private respondent filed
an Application for Exploration Permit with MGB covering the same properties
covered by and during the subsistence of APSA-SF-000089 and MPSA No.
153-2000-1 of petitioner. In turn, petitioner filed a Verified Protest/Opposition to
the Application for Exploration Permit of the private respondent. It was allegedly
filed with the Panel of Arbitrators on 30 August 2005 and was received by the
latter on 5 September 2005.
Prior, however, to petitioners filing of its Verified Protest/Opposition to the private
respondents Application for Exploration Permit, petitioners MPSA No.
153-2000-1 was cancelled, a Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
The MGB issued EP No. 05-001 to private respondent.
Panel of Arbitrators dismissed motu proprio the Verified Protest/Opposition of
petitioner. Petitioner elevated by appeal to the MAB which was also dismissed.
The case was elevated to the Court of appeals but judgment was rendered
against the petitioner.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Panel of Arbitrators has jurisdiction to cancel, deny and/or revoke
EP No. 05-001 issued by MGB to private respondent.
HELD:
NO. The Panel of Arbitrators has no jurisdiction to cancel, deny and/or revoke
EP No. 05-001 issued by MGB to private respondent
Section 77 of Republic Act No. 7942 establishes the jurisdiction of the Panel of
Arbitrators, thus:
Sec. 77. Panel of Arbitrators. x x x. Within thirty (30) working days, after the
submission of the case by the parties for decision, the panel shall have
exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide on the following:
Disputes involving rights to mining areas;
Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits;
Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and claimholders/concessionaires;
and
Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department at the date of the
effectivity of this Act.
The Panel of Arbitrators only has jurisdiction over adverse claims,
conflicts, and oppositions relating to applications for the grant of mineral
rights, but not over cancellation of mineral rights already granted and
existing.
As to who has jurisdiction to cancel an existing exploration permit, Section 28 of
DAO NO. 96-40 explicitly provides:
Section 28. Cancellation of an Exploration Permit. The
Director/concerned Regional Director may cancel the Exploration
Permit
for failure of the Permittee to comply with any of the
requirements and for
violation(s) of the terms and conditions
under which the Permit is issued.
For renewed Exploration
Permits, the Secretary upon the recommendation
of
the
Director shall cause the cancellation of the same.
According to Section 5 of DAO No. 96-40, Director means the Director of the
MGB Central Office, while Regional Director means the Regional Director of
any MGB Regional Office. As the authority to issue an Exploration Permit is
vested in the MGB, then the same necessarily includes the corollary power to
revoke, withdraw or cancel the same. Indisputably, the authority to deny, revoke,
or cancel EP No. 05-001 of private respondent is already lodged with the MGB,
and not with the Panel of Arbitrators.
G.R. No. L-49109. December 1, 1987

SANTA ROSA MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. MINISTER OF
NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE J. LEIDO, JR. AND DIRECTOR OF MINES
JUANITO C. FERNANDEZ, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner , Santa Rosa Mining Company, Inc., is a mining corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. It alleges that it is the
holder of fifty (50) valid mining claims situated in Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte, acquired under the provisions of the Act of the U.S. Congress dated 1 July
1902 (Philippine Bill of 1902, for short).
On 14 October 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1214 was issued, requiring holders
of subsisting and valid patentable mining claims located under the provisions of
the Philippine Bill of 1902 to file a mining lease application within one (1) year
from the approval of the Decree. Petitioner accordingly filed a mining lease
application, but "under protest", on 13 October 1978, with a reservation
annotated on the back of its application that it is not waiving its rights over its
mining claims until the validity of Presidential Decree No. 1214 shall have been
passed upon by this Court HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/
documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1987.zip%3E338,df
%7C1987_proofreaded/DEC1987/l_49109.htm" \l "_ftn1" \o "" .
On 10 October 1978, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition, alleging that it has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law to protect its rights (except by said petition). Petitioner
assails Presidential Decree No. 1214 as unconstitutional in that it amounts to a
deprivation of property without due process of law.
Petitioner avers that its fifty (50) mining claims had already been declared as its
own private and exclusive property in final judgments. The respondents, on the
other hand, allege that petitioner has no standing to file the instant petition as it
failed to fully exhaust administrative remedies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1214 is constitutional.
HELD:
Presidential Decree No. 1214 is not unconstitutional.

It is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of the State, as owner, over lands of
the public domain, of which petitioner's mining claims still form a part, and over
the patrimony of the nation, of which mineral deposits are a valuable asset. It
may be underscored, in this connection, that the Decree does not cover all
mining claims located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only those claims over
which their locators had failed to obtain a patent. And even then, such locators
may still avail of the renewable twenty-five year (25) lease prescribed by Pres.
Dec. No. 463, the Mineral Development Resources Decree of 1974.
Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 8, Art. XIV of the 1973
Constitution.
Petition is dismissed.
G.R. No. 135190. April 3, 2002

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
BALITE PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE and others similarly situated; and
THE HONORABLE ANTONIO CERILLES, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), PROVINCIAL
MINING REGULATORY BOARD OF DAVAO (PMRB-Davao), respondents.
FACTS:
The instant case involves a rich tract of mineral land situated in the AgusanDavao-Surigao Forest Reserve known as the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area.
Located at Mt. Diwata in the municipalities of Monkayo and Cateel in Davao Del
Norte, the land has been embroiled in controversy since the mid-80s due to the
scramble over gold deposits found within its bowels.
On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper) was granted
Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which
included the hotly-contested Diwalwal area.
Not long thereafter, Congress enacted on June 27, 1991 Republic Act No. 7076,
or the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act. The law established a Peoples SmallScale Mining Program to be implemented by the Secretary of the DENR
SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/2002.zip%3E1c,df%7C2002/
APR2002/135190.htm" \l "_edn3" \o ""
and created the Provincial Mining
Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the DENR Secretarys direct supervision and
control. HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/
APR2002/135190.htm" \l "_edn4" \o "" The statute also authorized the PMRB to
declare and set aside small-scale mining areas subject to review by the DENR
Secretary HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/
APR2002/135190.htm" \l "_edn5" \o "" and award mining contracts to smallscale miners under certain conditions.
APR2002/135190.htm" \l "_edn6" \o ""
On December 21, 1991, DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran issued
Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 66, declaring 729 hectares of the
Diwalwal area as non-forest land open to small-scale mining. HYPERLINK "http://
2002.zip%3E1c,df%7C2002/APR2002/135190.htm" \l "_edn7" \o ""
The
issuance was made pursuant to the powers vested in the DENR Secretary by
Proclamation No. 369, which established the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest
Reserve.
On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03
APR2002/135190.htm" \l "_edn10" \o "" which directs the DENR to study
thoroughly and exhaustively the option of direct state utilization of the mineral
resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area. Such study shall include, but shall not
be limited to, studying and weighing the feasibility of entering into management
agreements or operating agreements, or both, with the appropriate government
instrumentalities or private entities, or both, in carrying out the declared policy of
rationalizing the mining operations in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area; such
agreements shall include provisions for profit-sharing between the state and the
said parties, including profit-sharing arrangements with small-scale miners, as
well as the payment of royalties to indigenous cultural communities, among
others. The Undersecretary for Field Operations, as well as the Undersecretary
for Legal and Legislative Affairs and Attached Agencies, and the Director of the
Mines and Geo-sciences Bureau are hereby ordered to undertake such studies.
x x x HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/
APR2002/135190.htm" \l "_edn11" \o ""
Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
before the Court of Appeals against PMRB-Davao, the DENR Secretary and
Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative (BCPMC), which represented all the
OTP grantees. It prayed for the nullification of the above-quoted Memorandum
Order No. 97-03 on the ground that the direct state utilization espoused therein
would effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It ruled that the DENR Secretary
did not abuse his discretion in issuing Memorandum Order No. 97-03 since the
same was merely a directive to conduct studies on the various options available
to the government for solving the Diwalwal conflict.
APR2002/135190.htm" \l "_edn9" \o ""
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that the assailed
memorandum order did not adopt the direct state utilization scheme in resolving
the Diwalwal dispute.
Held:
We agree with the Court of Appeals ruling that the challenged MO 97-03 did not
conclusively adopt direct state utilization as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal
dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed
thereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing else. Contrary to
petitioners contention, it did not grant any management/operating or profitsharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for that matter, but
simply instructed the DENR officials concerned to undertake studies to determine
its feasibility.
G.R. No. 69997. September 30, 1987

UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, DIRECTOR OF LANDS, GREGORIA BOLANOS, AUREA
ARAOJO, GERVACIO ARAOJO, MARIA BERNAL, FELIX DETECIO, JESUS
ASUNCION, MELANIO ASUNCION and BIENVENIDO ASUNCION,
respondents.
FACTS:
On July 20, 1962, the President of the Philippines granted mining patents on
mineral claims located at Ungay Malobago, Rapu-Rapu, Albay to herein
petitioners and other private individuals.
Way back on October 30, 1959, John Canson, Jr. and Carlos Stilianopulos
assigned their rights to their mining claims in favor of the petitioner. The
assignment of rights was recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay
on December 2, 1959.
The aforestated mining patents, after their issuance on July 20, 1962, were all
recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay on August 28, 1962 and
transcribed on September 4, 1962 in the Registration Book of the Registry of
Deeds of Albay. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Albay issued the

respective original certificates of titles pursuant to Section 122 of Act No. 496 in
the names of John Canson, Jr., Carlos Stilianopulos, and the petitioner.
Subsequently, or from 1968 to 1974, tree patents were granted by the
respondent Director of Lands and the corresponding original certificates of titles
were issued by the Register of Deeds to private respondents.
All of the above patents covered portions of the lots covered by the patents
belonging to the petitioner.
The petitioner filed a complaint for annulment and cancellation of patents against
the private respondents and prayed that all the free patent titles issued in their
favor for properties over which original certificates of title had already been
issued in its favor be declared null and void.
The trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint
The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lands in question belong to the public domain;
Whether or not the appellate court erred in dismissing the complaint on the
ground that the petitioner had no personality to institute the same
HELD:
No.
Article XIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution provides:
"All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be alienated and no license, concession, or
lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant." (Emphasis
supplied)
Therefore, applying the aforequoted provision to the case at bar, we conclude
that the issuance of the lode patents on mineral claims by the President of the
Philippines in 1962 in favor of the petitioner granted to it only the right to extract
or utilize the minerals which may be found on or under the surface of the land.
On the other hand, the issuance of the free patents by the respondent Director of
Lands in 1979 in favor of the private respondents granted to them the ownership
and the right to use the land for agricultural purposes but excluding the
ownership of, and the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found
on or under the surface.
There is no basis in the records for the petitioner's stand that it acquired the right
to the mineral lands prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, thus, making
such acquisition outside its purview and scope.
Anent the second issue, the petitioner has no personality to institute the action
below for annulment and cancellation of patents. The mineral lands over which it
has a right to extract minerals remained part of the inalienable lands of the public
domain and thus, only the Solicitor General or the person acting in his stead can
bring an action for reversion.
LOCAL GOVERNANCE CASES:

G.R. No. 110249. August 21, 1997
ALFREDO TANO, ET AL, petitioners,
vs.
GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES ET AL respondents.
Facts:
On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City
enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: AN
ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER
OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY
1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES THEREOF.
To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero
issued Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993 dated January 22, 1993 which reads
as follows:
In the interest of public service and for purposes of City Ordinance No.
PD426-14-74, otherwise known as AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY

PERSON ENGAGED OR INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN ANY BUSINESS,
TRADE, OCCUPATION, CALLING OR PROFESSION OR HAVING IN HIS
POSSESSION ANY OF THE ARTICLES FOR WHICH A PERMIT IS REQUIRED
TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A MAYORS PERMIT and City Ordinance No.
15-92, AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND
LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO
JANUARY 1, 1998, you are hereby authorized and directed to check or conduct
necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped
out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any port within
the jurisdiction of the City to any point of destinations [sic] either via aircraft or
seacraft.
On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of
Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33 entitled: A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING
THE CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND
SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS, TO
WIT: FAMILY: SCARIDAE (MAMENG), EPINE PHELUS FASCIATUS (SUNO).
CROMILEPTES ALTIVELIS (PANTHER OR SENORITA), LOBSTER BELOW
200 GRAMS AND SPAWNING, TRADACNA GIGAS (TAKLOBO), PINCTADA
MARGARITEFERA (MOTHER PEARL, OYSTERS, GIANT CLAMS AND OTHER
SPECIES), PENAEUS MONODON (TIGER PRAWN-BREEDER SIZE OR
MOTHER), EPINEPHELUS SUILLUS (LOBA OR GREEN GROUPER) AND
FAMILY: BALISTIDAE (TROPICAL AQUARIUM FISHES) FOR A PERIOD FIVE
(5) YEARS IN AND COMING FROM PALAWAN WATERS,
and,
ORDINANCE NO. 2, Series of 1993
Entitled, Ordinance Prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying,
selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms, to wit: 1.
Family: Scaridae (Mameng), 2. Epinephelus Fasciatus (Suno), 3. Cromileptes
altivelis (Panther or Senorita), lobster below 200 grams and spawning), 4.
Tridacna Gigas (Taklobo), 5. Pinctada Margaretefera (Mother Pearl, Oysters,
Giant Clams and other species), 6. Penaeus Monodon (Tiger Prawn-breeder size
or mother), 7. Epinephelus Suillus (Loba or Green Grouper) and 8. Family:
Balistidae (Topical Aquarium Fishes) for a period of five (5) years in and coming
from Palawan Waters.
Respondents implemented the said ordinances, thereby depriving all the
fishermen of the whole province of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa of
their only means of livelihood and the petitioners Airline Shippers Association of
Palawan and other marine merchants from performing their lawful occupation
and trade.
Petitioners filed this petition directly with the COURT alleging that the Ordinances
deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them
from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2
and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution; that the Office Order No. 23
contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayors permit could be
granted or denied; in other words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to
determine whether or not to issue permit and; that Ordinance No. 2 of the
Province of Palawan altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession,
buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any
distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing method, the
Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in
lawful ways; and insofar as petitioners-members of Airline Shippers Association
are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and
entering into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out
their business endeavors to a successful conclusion.
And finally, to declare Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as null
and void,
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ASSAILED ORDINANCES ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
HELD:
It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local
government units) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. HYPERLINK "http://
1997.zip%3E57,df%7C1997/AUG1997/110249.htm" \l "_edn15" \o ""
To
overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short, the
conflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt.
AUG1997/110249.htm" \l "_edn16" \o ""
Where doubt exists, even if well
founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.
AUG1997/110249.htm" \l "_edn17" \o ""
After a scrunity of the challenged Ordinances and the provisions of the
Constitution petitioners claim to have been violated, we find petitioners
contentions baseless and so hold that the former do not suffer from any infirmity,
both under the Constitution and applicable laws.
Under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have the
power, inter alia, to enact ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology. It likewise specifically vests municipalities with the power to
grant fishery privileges in municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or charges
therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious
or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of
fishing; and to prosecute other methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation
of the provisions of applicable fishing laws. HYPERLINK "http://
1997.zip%3E57,df%7C1997/AUG1997/110249.htm" \l "_edn46" \o "" Finally, it
imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the
sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to [p]rotect the
environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the
environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing
and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication
of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance.
G.R. No. L-40243. March 11, 1992

CELESTINO TATEL, petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC, SALVADOR A.
SURTIDA, in his capacity as Mayor of Virac, Catanduanes; GAVINO V.
GUERRERO, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Virac, Catanduanes; JOSE T.
BUEBOS, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; ANGELES
TABLIZO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; ELPIDIO T. ZAFE,
in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; MARIANO ALBERTO, in his
capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; JULIA A. GARCIA, in her capacity
as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; and PEDRO A. GUERRERO, in his capacity
as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes, respondents.
FACTS:
Celestino Tatel, a businessman, is engaged in the import and export of abaca

and other products. He has a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena.
Residents of barrio Sta. Elena filed a complaint against petitioner. They alleged
that the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside
the warehouse of petitioner affected the peace and tranquility of the
neighborhood due to the smoke, obnoxious odor and dust emitted by the
machine. A committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to
investigate the matter. The committee noted the crowded nature of the
neighborhood with narrow roads and the surrounding residential houses, so
much so that an accidental fire within the warehouse of petitioner occasioned by
a continuance of the activity inside the warehouse and the storing of inflammable
materials created a danger to the lives and properties of the people within the
neighborhood.
Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on
April 22, 1966 declaring the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a
public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Municipal Council of
Virac.
Petitioner instituted the present petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction.
ISSUES:
WHETHER OR NOT petitioner's warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning of
Article 694 of the Civil Code and whether Ordinance No. 13, S. 1952 of the
Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void.
HELD:
Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac
in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal
corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of
local self-government and as such are endowed with police powers in order to
effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation.
SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1992.zip%3E290,df%7C1992/MAR1992/
l_40243.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o "" Its authority emanates from the general welfare
clause under the Administrative Code.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of
the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and
basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that a

municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2)
must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must
not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public
policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. HYPERLINK "http://
1992.zip%3E290,df%7C1992/MAR1992/l_40243.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" Ordinance
No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria.
LAND TENURE CASES:

G.R. No. 86889. December 4, 1990
LUZ FARMS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
FACTS:
On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657,
which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.
On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the
Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as
embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657.

On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and
Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms).
Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and
poultry business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands
to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section
13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures
Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on
January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof
as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657, the Guidelines and
Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657
and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 are unconstitutional.
HELD:
Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the
raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing
Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are null and void for
being unconstitutional.
Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes private agricultural lands devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising in the definition of "commercial
farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are
made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply
no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian
reform. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of
1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry
industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform
program of the Government.
The requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing corporate farms
which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement productionsharing plans (pending final redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they
are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten
percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation is
unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process.
SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1992.zip%3E290,df%7C1992/MAR1992/
l_40243.htm" \l "_ftn2" \o ""
G.R. No. 78742. July 14, 1989

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR.,
BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO,
FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C.
BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J.
PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. APRESTO, CONSUELO
M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON
S. FERRER, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, respondent.
G.R. No. 79310. July 14, 1989
ARSENIO AL. ACUA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS
JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and
PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros
Occidental, petitioners, vs. JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and
PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, respondents.
G.R. No. 79744. July 14, 1989
INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner, vs. HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF

THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. JOKER ARROYO,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs.
SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCEA, and
ROBERTO TAAY, respondents.
G.R. No. 79777. July 14, 1989
NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners, vs. HON.
PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
G.R. No. 79777
Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos.
228 and 229, and R.A. No. 6657.
The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and
owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland
worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Agustin Hermano, Jr. The
tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified
farmers under P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on
grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the
constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation.
They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she
promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is invalid also for violation of
Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limits
for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4)
and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.
The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27
to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial
prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve
the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands
and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
G.R. No. 79310
The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill
District, Victorias, Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is
an organization composed of 1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks to

prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the
President. Although they agree that the President could exercise legislative
power until the Congress was convened, she could do so only to enact
emergency measures during the transition period. At that, even assuming that
the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No.
131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the
constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and equal
protection.
They contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just
compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no
such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform,
"in violation of due process and the requirement for just compensation, placed his
landholding under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer Certificates of Land
Transfer were subsequently issued to the private respondents, who then refused
payment of lease rentals to him.
On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his
small landholding under Operation Land Transfer and asked for the recall and
cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private
respondents. He claims that on December 24, 1986, his petition was denied
without hearing. On February 17, 1987, he filed a motion for reconsideration,
which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued.
These orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they directly
effected the transfer of his land to the private respondents.
The petitioner now argues that:
(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the
Philippines.
(2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no
private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.
(3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under
the 1987 Constitution.
G.R. No. 78742
The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to
owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are
cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed
the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such
lands.
According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No.
27:
No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be
ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights
of the tenant-farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in
accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy
their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not
issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. They
therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue
the said rules.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228
and 229 are constitutional.
HELD:
R.A. No. 6657, Section 18 of the CARP Law, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and
E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are constitutional.
The Court declared that the content and manner of the just compensation
provided for in Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution.
E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21,
1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27.
(Emphasis supplied.)
it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree,
after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full
payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order
to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by
the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership
after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance

payment for the land."
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership
of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds
with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner.
SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1989.zip%3E1f3,df%7C1989_proofreaded/
JUL1989/78742.htm" \l "_ftn57" \o ""
No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either.
Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by
arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.
The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229
should be invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required
by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657
does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its
most controversial provisions. This section declares:
Retention Limits. - Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own
or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of
which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such
as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by
the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no
case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3)
hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following
qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is
actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners
whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed
to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original
homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original
homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as
long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill
shall have only one subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only short
attention. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of
its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text.
Ibid., p. 20; Fabian v. Desierto, supra, p. 487.

Id.
See 1, Art. VIII, Constitution.
Fabian v. Desierto, supra, p. 489.
Ibid., p. 492; Metro Construction v. Chatham Properties, supra, pp. 22-23.
Its precursors are Circular No. 1-91, which prescribed the rules governing
appeals to the CA from the final orders or decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
and quasi-judicial agencies; and Administrative Circular No. 1-95, which revised
the earlier circular.
Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Metro Construction v. Chatham Properties, supra, p. 20.
Ibid.
Prior to BP Blg. 129, the jurisdiction of the CA, under the Judiciary Act of 1948, was as
follows:
SEC. 29. Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. - The Court of Appeals shall have
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases, actions, and proceedings, not
enumerated in section seventeen of this Act, properly brought to it, except final
judgments or decisions of Court of First Instance rendered after trial on the merits
in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, which affirm in full the judgment or
decision of a municipal or city court, in which cases the aggrieved party may
elevate the matter to the Court of Appeals only on petition for review, to which the
Court of Appeals shall give due course only when the petition shows prima facie
that the court has committed errors of fact or of fact and law that would warrant
reversal or modification of the judgment or decisions sought to be reviewed. The
decision of the Court of Appeals shall be final: Provided, however, That the
Supreme Court in its discretion may, in any case involving a question of law,
upon petition of the party aggrieved by the decision and under rules and
conditions that it may prescribe, require by certiorari that the said case be
certified to it for review and determination, as if the case had been brought before
it on appeal. (RA No. 5433)
SEC. 30. Original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. - The Court of Appeals
shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, injunction,
certiorari, habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs and process in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the CA was expanded by BP Blg. 129 and RA No. 7902 to read:
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or
not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of
Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with
the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No.
442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings,
receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual
issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction,
including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials
or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be completed
within three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.
Metro Construction v. Chatham Properties, supra, p. 22.

St. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission, 295 SCRA
494, 510, September 16, 1998.

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CASES

Atty. Ismael Manaligod

G.R. No. 79538. October 18, 1990

- versus DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES-MINES

G.R. No. 148267. August 8, 2002

ARMANDO C. CARPIO, petitioner, vs. SULU RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT

The petition is meritorious.

Factual controversies are usually involved in administrative actions; and the CA is

RA No. 7902, factual controversies are usually involved in decisions of quasi-judicial

DESAMA vs ELISEA GOZUN

G.R. No. 157882, March 30, 2006

the 1987 Constitution.

LA BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, Inc. vs RAMOS

January 27, 2004

APEX MINING CO., INC.,

BALITE COMMUNAL PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE,

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION,

Camilo Banad, et al., likewise filed a motion for reconsideration and

it invalidly transferred to SEM cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be

All lands of public domain, waters, minerals x x x and all

Further, a closer scrutiny of the deed of assignment in favor of SEM

the ASSIGNEE whatever rights or interest the ASSIGNOR may

CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING

mineral lease contracts or mineral agreements based on the following reasons:

[G.R. No. 86889. December 4, 1990]

Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1989 resolved to deny, among

[G.R. No. 61293. February 15, 1990]

Petitioner then offered to pay in cash the remaining 25% down

The GSIS Board of Trustees, in its Resolution No. 91 adopted on

Acquired Assets Department, GSIS that Resolution No. 415 was

[G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000]

FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA

HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they

ancestral domains may include public domain somehow against the

[G.R. No. 134958. January 31, 2001]

Petitioners now contend that CA erred in upholding the validity of

[G.R. No. 59603. April 29, 1987]

Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of

compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes

[G.R. No. 127296. January 22, 1998]

FACTS: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No.

and inalienable public land?

J.M. TUASON & CO., INC. v. LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION

HELD: No person shall be denied equal protection. A judicial being is

[G.R. No. 84647. May 23, 1991]

relatives by consanguinity, supra; the character of the decedent's

to relatives or friends naming Maria Alicia as his daughter, despite the

in the case at bar.

[G.R. No. 109490. February 14, 1994]

to Patrocinio Margolles, resulting in the issuance of TCT No. 46302.

justify otherwise,HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of

According to them, Las Pias comprises 2,556 hectares, out of which

"Fifthly, the recommendation of the Director of Lands for the

Finally, the private respondents raise estoppel by laches on the part of

HYPERLINK "http://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2008/06/sunbeam-convenience-foodsinc-vs-ca.html"Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. vs. CA

W/N the land is already a private land - YES

Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of

oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property

Facts: On 9 August 1990, Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of

On 26 October 1990, the Commission on Audit through then Chairman