Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16797
without interest, payable within ninety (90) days from this date,
provided that in case of default it shall bear interest at the rate
of 12% per annum,
clearly fixes a date of maturity, the stipulated twelve per cent in
case of default being nothing more than a penalty, designed to
induce the debtor to pay on or before the expiration of the
ninety (90) days. Hence, there was no call upon the court to
set another due date.
Finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is
affirmed, with costs against appellants.
ESCOLIN, J.:+.wph!1
This petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks to annul and
set aside the Order of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, dated September 25, 1981, upholding its
jurisdiction in SEC Case No. 2035, entitled "Carolina Hofilea,
B.
That the dacion en pago is void because there was
gross undervaluation of the assets included in the so-called
dacion en pago by more than 100% to the prejudice of Pioneer
Glass and to the undue advantage of DBP and Union Glass;
C.
That the DBP unduly favored Union Glass over
another buyer, San Miguel Corporation, notwithstanding the
clearly advantageous terms offered by the latter to the
prejudice of Pioneer Glass, its other creditors and so-called
'Minority stockholders.'
2.
Holding that the assets of the Pioneer Glass taken
over by DBP and part of which was delivered to Union Glass
particularly the glass plant to be returned accordingly.
3.
That the DBP be ordered to accept and recognize the
appraisal conducted by the Asian Appraisal Inc. in 1975 and
again in t978 of the asset of Pioneer Glass. 1
In her common prayer, Hofilea asked that DBP be sentenced
to pay Pioneer Glass actual, consequential, moral and
exemplary damages, for its alleged illegal acts and gross bad
faith; and for DBP and Union Glass to pay her a reasonable
amount as attorney's fees. 2
On April 21, 1981, Pioneer Glass filed its answer. On May 8,
1981, petitioners moved for dismissal of the case on the
ground that the SEC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter
or nature of the suit. Respondent Hofilea filed her opposition
to said motion, to which herein petitioners filed a rejoinder.
On July 23, 1981, SEC Hearing Officer Eugenio E. Reyes, to
whom the case was assigned, granted the motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction. However, on September 25, 1981, upon
motion for reconsideration filed by respondent Hofilea,
Hearing Officer Reyes reversed his original order by upholding
the SEC's jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
persons of petitioners. Unable to secure a reconsideration of
the Order as well as to have the same reviewed by the
Commission En Banc, petitioners filed the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition to set aside the order of September
25, 1981, and to prevent respondent SEC from taking
cognizance of SEC Case No. 2035.
The issue raised in the petition may be propounded thus: Is it
the regular court or the SEC that has jurisdiction over the
case?
In upholding the SEC's jurisdiction over the case Hearing
Officer Reyes rationalized his conclusion thus:t.hqw
As correctly pointed out by the complainant, the present action
is in the form of a derivative suit instituted by a stockholder for
the benefit of the corporation, respondent Pioneer Glass and
Manufacturing Corporation, principally against another
stockholder, respondent Development Bank of the Philippines,
for alleged illegal acts and gross bad faith which resulted in the
dacion en pago arrangement now being questioned by
complainant. These alleged illegal acts and gross bad faith
came about precisely by virtue of respondent Development
Bank of the Philippine's status as a stockholder of corespondent Pioneer Glass Manufacturing Corporation although
its status as such stockholder, was gained as a result of its
being a creditor of the latter. The derivative nature of this
instant action can also be gleaned from the common prayer of
the complainant which seeks for an order directing respondent
Development Bank of the Philippines to pay co-respondent
Pioneer Glass Manufacturing Corporation damages for the
alleged illegal acts and gross bad faith as above-mentioned.
Separate Opinions
Separate Opinions
In this case, the SEC seems to have adopted the orders of the
two hearing officers as its own orders as shown by the stand
taken by the Solicitor General in defending the SEC. If that
were so, that is, if the orders of the hearing officers should be
treated as the orders of the SEC itself en banc, this Court
would have no jurisdiction over this case. It should be the
Appellate Court that should exercise the power of review.
Carolina Hofilea has been a stockholder since 1958 of the
Pioneer Glass Manufacturing Corporation. Her personal assets
valued at P6,804,810 were apparently or supposedly
mortgaged to the DBP to secure the obligations of Pioneer
Glass (p. 32, Rollo).
Pioneer Glass became indebted to the Development Bank of
the Philippines in the total sum of P59,000,000. Part of the loan
was used by Pioneer Glass to establish its glass plant in
Rosario, Cavite. The unpaid interest on the loan amounting to
around seven million pesos became the DBP's equity in
Pioneer Glass. The DBP became a substantial stockholder of
Pioneer Glass. Three members of the Pioneer Glass' board of
directors were from the DBP.
The glass plant commenced operations in 1977. At that time,
Pioneer Glass was heavily indebted to the DBP. Instead of
foreclosing its mortgage, DBP maneuvered to have the
mortgaged assets of Pioneer Glass, including the glass plant,
transferred to the DBP by way of dacion en pago. This
transaction was alleged to be an "auto contract" or a case of
the DBP contracting with itself since the DBP had a dominant
position in Pioneer Glass.
Hofilea alleged that although the debt to the DBP of Pioneer
Glass amounted to P59,000,000, the glass plant in 1977 had a
"sound value" of P77,329,000 and a "reproduction cost" of
P90,403,000. She further alleged that San Miguel Corporation
was willing to buy the glass plant for P40,000,000 cash,
whereas it was actually sold to Union Glass & Container
Corporation for the same amount under a 25-year term of
payment (pp. 32-34, Rollo).
On March 31, 1981; Carmen Hofilea filed with the SEC a
complaint against the DBP, Union Glass, Pioneer Glass and
Rafael Sison as chairman of the DBP and Pioneer Glass
boards of directors. Union Glass filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the Court
of First Instance. Hofilea opposed the motion. Hearing Officer
Reyes in his order of July 23, 1981 dismissed the complaint on
the ground that the case is beyond the jurisdiction of the SEC.
Hofilea filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed
by Union Glass. Hearing Officer Reyes in his order of
September 25, 1981 reconsidered his dismissal order and
ruled that Union Glass is an indispensable party because it is
the transferee of the controverted assets given by way of
dacion en pago to the DBP. He ruled that the SEC has
jurisdiction over the case.
Union Glass filed a motion for reconsideration. Hearing Officer
Antonio R. Manabat denied the motion on the ground "that the
present action is an intra-corporate dispute involving
stockholders of the same corporation (p. 26, Rollo).
Union Glass filed a second motion for reconsideration with the
prayer that the SEC should decide the motion en banc. The
hearing officer ruled that the remedy of Union Glass was to file
a timely appeal. Hence, its second motion for reconsideration
was denied by the hearing officer. (This ruling is a technicality
which hinders substantial justice.)
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur in the Court's judgment penned by Mr. Justice Escolin
setting aside the questioned orders of respondent SEC and
ordering that petitioner Union Glass be dropped from SEC
Case No. 2035 for lack of SEC jurisdiction over it as a third
party purchaser of the glass plant acquired by the DBP by
dacion en pago from Pioneer Glass, without prejudice to
Hofilea filing a separate suit in the regular courts of justice
against Union Glass for recovery and cancellation of the said
sale of the glass plant in favor of Union Glass.
I concur also with the statement in the Court's opinion that the
final outcome of SEC Case No. 2035 with regard to the validity
of the dacion en pago is a prejudicial case. If Hofilea's
complaint against said dacion en pago fails in the SEC, then it
clearly has no cause of action against Union Glass for
cancellation of DBP's sale of the plant to Union Glass.
The purpose of this brief concurrence is with reference to the
statement in the Court's opinion that "Thus, Hofileas
complaint against the latter can only prosper if final judgment is
rendered in SEC Case No. 2035, annulling the dacion en pago
executed in favor of the DBP," to erase any impression that a
favorable judgment secured by Hofilea in SEC Case No. 2035
against the DBP and Pioneer Glass would necessarily mean
that its action against Union Glass in the regular courts of
justice for recovery and cancellation of the DBP sale of the
glass plant to Union Glass would necessarily prosper. It must
be borne in mind that as already indicated, the SEC has no
jurisdiction over Union Glass as an outsider. The suit in the
regular courts of justice that Hofilea might bring against Union
Glass is of course subject to all defenses as to the validity of
the sale of the glass plant in its favor as a buyer in good faith
ANTONIO, J.:
The issue posed in this appeal is whether or not plaintiff
corporation (non- stock may institute an action in behalf of its
individual members for the recovery of certain parcels of land
allegedly owned by said members; for the nullification of the
transfer certificates of title issued in favor of defendants
appellees covering the aforesaid parcels of land; for a
declaration of "plaintiff's members as absolute owners of the
property" and the issuance of the corresponding certificate of
title; and for damages.
On April 26, 1966, plaintiff-appellant Sulo ng Bayan, Inc. filed
an accion de revindicacion with the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Valenzuela, Bulacan, against
defendants-appellees to recover the ownership and
possession of a large tract of land in San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan, containing an area of 27,982,250 square meters,
more or less, registered under the Torrens System in the name
of defendants-appellees' predecessors-in-interest. 1 The
complaint, as amended on June 13, 1966, specifically alleged
that plaintiff is a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines, with its principal office and place of
business at San Jose del Monte, Bulacan; that its membership
is composed of natural persons residing at San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan; that the members of the plaintiff corporation,
through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, had
pioneered in the clearing of the fore-mentioned tract of land,
cultivated the same since the Spanish regime and continuously
possessed the said property openly and public under concept
of ownership adverse against the whole world; that defendantappellee Gregorio Araneta, Inc., sometime in the year 1958,
through force and intimidation, ejected the members of the
plaintiff corporation fro their possession of the aforementioned
vast tract of land; that upon investigation conducted by the
members and officers of plaintiff corporation, they found out for
the first time in the year 1961 that the land in question "had
been either fraudelently or erroneously included, by direct or
constructive fraud, in Original Certificate of Title No. 466 of the
Land of Records of the province of Bulacan", issued on May
11, 1916, which title is fictitious, non-existent and devoid of
legal efficacy due to the fact that "no original survey nor plan
whatsoever" appears to have been submitted as a basis
thereof and that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan which
issued the decree of registration did not acquire jurisdiction
over the land registration case because no notice of such
proceeding was given to the members of the plaintiff
corporation who were then in actual possession of said
properties; that as a consequence of the nullity of the original
title, all subsequent titles derived therefrom, such as Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 4903 issued in favor of Gregorio Araneta
and Carmen Zaragoza, which was subsequently cancelled by
I
Appellant contends, as a first assignment of error, that the trial
court acted without authority and jurisdiction in dismissing the
amended complaint when the Secretary of Justice had already
approved the transfer of the case to any one of the two
branches of the Court of First Instance of Malolos, Bulacan.
Appellant confuses the jurisdiction of a court and the venue of
cases with the assignment of cases in the different branches of
the same Court of First Instance. Jurisdiction implies the power
of the court to decide a case, while venue the place of action.
There is no question that respondent court has jurisdiction over
the case. The venue of actions in the Court of First Instance is
prescribed in Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The laying of venue is not left to the caprice of plaintiff, but
must be in accordance with the aforesaid provision of the rules.
2 The mere fact that a request for the transfer of a case to
another branch of the same court has been approved by the
Secretary of Justice does not divest the court originally taking
cognizance thereof of its jurisdiction, much less does it change
the venue of the action. As correctly observed by the trial court,
the indorsement of the Undersecretary of Justice did not order
the transfer of the case to the Malolos Branch of the Bulacan
Court of First Instance, but only "authorized" it for the reason
given by plaintiff's counsel that the transfer would be
convenient for the parties. The trial court is not without power
to either grant or deny the motion, especially in the light of a
strong opposition thereto filed by the defendant. We hold that
the court a quo acted within its authority in denying the motion
for the transfer the case to Malolos notwithstanding the
authorization" of the same by the Secretary of Justice.
II
Let us now consider the substantive aspect of the Order of
dismissal.
III
Footnotes
1
Civil Case No. 233-V, entitled Sulo ng Bayan, Inc.,
Plaintiff, versus Gregorio Araneta, Inc., Paradise Farms, Inc.,
National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority (NWSA) Hacienda
Caretas, Inc., and Register of Deeds of Bulacan, Defendants.
4
I Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, 1974 Ed., sec.
25, pp. 99-100; Borja v. Vasquez, 74 Phil. 560, 566-567' VillaRey Transit, Inc. v. Ferrer, 25 SCRA 845, 857.
5
Stockholder of F. Guanzon and Sons, Inc. v. Register
of Deeds of Manila, 6 SCRA 373. A share of stock only typifies
an aliquot part of the corporation's property, or the right to
share in its proceeds to that extent when distributed according
to law and equity (Hall & Faley v. Alabama Terminal, 173 Ala.,
398, 56 So., 235), but its holder is not the owner of any definite
portion of its property or assets (Gottfried v. Miller, 104 U.S.,
521; Jones v. Davis 35 Ohio St. 474). The stockholder is not a
co-owner or tenant in common of the corporate property
(Harton v. Hohnston, 166 Ala., 317, 51 So., 992). (Ibid., pp.
375-376.)
19 SCRA 962. The doctrine of alter ego is based upon the
misuse of a corporation by an individual for wrongful or
inequitable purposes, and in such case the court merely
disregards the corporate entity and holds the individual
responsible for acts knowingly and intentionally done in the
name of the corporation." (Ivy v. Plyler, 246 Cal. App. 2d. 678,
54 Cal. Reptr. 894.) The doctrine of alter ego imposes upon the
individual who uses a corporation merely as an instrumentality
to conduct his own business liability as a consequence of fraud
or injustice perpetuated not on the corporation, but on third
persons dealing with the corporation.
[G.R. No. L-7020. June 30, 1954.]
ALICIA GO, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ALBERTO GO, ET
AL., Defendants-Appellants.
Enrique V. Filamor and Nicolas Belmonte for Appellants.
Emmanuel T. Jacinto for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; JOINDER OF PARTIES,
APPLICABLE TO BOTH COMPLAINT AND COUNTERCLAIM.
The rule permitting the joinder of parties applies with equal
force to a counterclaim in view of the similarity of rules
applicable to both complaint and counterclaim.
(b)
Original jurisdiction in civil actions arising in their
respective municipalities and cities, and not exclusively
cognizable by the Courts of First Instance; and
x
SYLLABUS
1. JUDGMENTS; DISMISSAL FOR NON-JOINDER OF PARTY
CONSIDERED ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS. The
dismissal of a civil case for non-joinder of a party constitutes
an adjudication on the merits, unless otherwise ordered by the
court.
DECISION
SYLLABUS
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
On May 16, 1962 Angelita F. Rivera instituted Civil Case No.
50408 against Loreto Luciano in the Court of First Instance of
Manila for the collection of the sum of P5,862.60. However, on
June 9, 1962, upon motion of defendant, the case was
dismissed on the ground that her husband was not joined as
defendant. Plaintiff did not appeal from the order of dismissal.
On August 14, 1962 Angelita F. Rivera filed another action
against the same defendant, Loreto Luciano, in the Court of
First Instance of Manila for the recovery of the sum of
P5,897.60. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 51262. It
involved the same subject matter, the same cause of action
and the same parties as in Civil Case No. 50408. Again, Loreto
Lucianos husband was not joined as defendant, but the
complaint alleged as reason for this that defendant was
engaged in business. Before filing an answer defendant moved
for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the same was
barred by the dismissal of the previous Civil Case No. 50408.
The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case.
It would seem clear that from this testimony the church had
been in possession of the land in question through its priests,
its representatives in the municipality, for a period as long back
as any of the witnesses could remember, covering a period
certainly from forty to fifty years. There was no proof to show
that any other person or entity had been in possession of the
land before that time, excepting the plaintiff.
CONCEPCION, J.:
II.
This is an original action for prohibition with preliminary
injunction.
3.
Aside from prescribing a fine not exceeding
P10,000.00 and imprisonment of not more than five (5) years
for those who shall violate any provision of Republic Act No.
3452 or any rule and regulation promulgated pursuant thereto,
Section 15 of said Act provides that "if the offender is a public
official and/or employees", he shall be subject to the additional
penalty specified therein. A public official is an officer of the
Government itself, as distinguished from officers or employees
of instrumentalities of the Government. Hence, the duly
authorized acts of the former are those of the Government,
unlike those of a government instrumentality which may have a
personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the
Government, as such. The provisions of Republic Act No. 2207
are, in this respect, even more explicit. Section 3 thereof
provides a similar additional penalty for any "officer or
employee of the Government" who "violates, abets or tolerates
the violation of any provision" of said Act. Hence, the intent to
apply the same to transactions made by the very government
is patent.
Indeed, the restrictions imposed in said Republic Acts are
merely additional to those prescribed in Commonwealth Act
No. 138, entitled "An Act to give native products and domestic
entities the preference in the purchase of articles for the
Government." Pursuant to Section 1 thereof:
The Purchase and Equipment Division of the Government of
the Philippines and other officers and employees of the
municipal and provincial governments and the Government of
the Philippines and of chartered cities, boards, commissions,
bureaus, departments, offices, agencies, branches, and bodies
of any description, including government-owned companies,
authorized to requisition, purchase, or contract or make
disbursements for articles, materials, and supplies for public
use, public buildings, or public works shall give preference to
materials ... produced ... in the Philippines or in the United
States, and to domestic entities, subject to the conditions
hereinbelow specified. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under this provision, in all purchases by the Government,
including those made by and/or for the armed forces,
preference shall be given to materials produced in the
Philippines. The importation involved in the case at bar violates
this general policy of our Government, aside from the
provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.
The attempt to justify the proposed importation by invoking
reasons of national security predicated upon the "worsening
situation in Laos and Vietnam", and "the recent tension created
by the Malaysia problem" - and the alleged powers of the
President as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces in the
Philippines, under Section 2 of the National Defense Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 1), overlooks the fact that the
protection of local planters of rice and corn in a manner that
would foster and accelerate self-sufficiency in the local
production of said commodities constitutes a factor that is vital
to our ability to meet possible national emergency. Even if the
intent in importing goods in anticipation of such emergency
were to bolster up that ability, the latter would, instead, be
impaired if the importation were so made as to discourage our
farmers from engaging in the production of rice.
Besides, the stockpiling of rice and corn for purpose of national
security and/or national emergency is within the purview of
Republic Act No. 3452. Section 3 thereof expressly authorizes
the Rice and Corn Administration "to accumulate stocks as a
national reserve in such quantities as it may deem proper and
necessary to meet any contingencies". Moreover, it ordains
rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and another with the
Government of Burma; that these contracts constitute valid
executive agreements under international law; that such
agreements became binding effective upon the signing thereof
by representatives the parties thereto; that in case of conflict
between Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 on the one hand,
and aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter should
prevail, because, if a treaty and a statute are inconsistent with
each other, the conflict must be resolved under the
American jurisprudence in favor of the one which is latest in
point of time; that petitioner herein assails the validity of acts of
the Executive relative to foreign relations in the conduct of
which the Supreme Court cannot interfere; and the
aforementioned contracts have already been consummated,
the Government of the Philippines having already paid the
price of the rice involved therein through irrevocable letters of
credit in favor of the sell of the said commodity. We find no
merit in this pretense.
The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as
alleged executive agreements has been sufficiently
established. The parties to said contracts do not pear to have
regarded the same as executive agreements. But, even
assuming that said contracts may properly considered as
executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null
and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements
being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos.
2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the
American constitutional system enter into executive
agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not,
by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is
prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the
Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce
laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the
performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in
the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative
enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly
repealing the same through an executive agreement providing
for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
The American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict
between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point
of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, for
respondents not only admit, but, also insist that the contracts
adverted to are not treaties. Said theory may be justified upon
the ground that treaties to which the United States is signatory
require the advice and consent of its Senate, and, hence, of a
branch of the legislative department. No such justification can
be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by
previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle
of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up
and that of the United States.
As regards the question whether an international agreement
may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the
Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the
affirmative, by providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that
the Supreme Court may not be deprived "of its jurisdiction to
review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari,
or writ of error as the law or the rules of court may provide,
final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in (1) All
cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question". In
other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a
treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but,
also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
(b)
The employment of the nation's citizens and
resources for national defense shall be effected by a national
mobilization.
Separate Opinions
(c)
The national mobilization shall include the execution
of all measures necessary to pass from a peace to a war
footing.
(d)
The civil authority shall always be supreme. The
President of the Philippines as the Commander-in-Chief of all
military forces, shall be responsible that mobilization measures
are prepared at all times.(Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, I find in that declaration of policy that the security of
the Philippines and its freedom constitutes the core of the
preservation of our State which is the basic duty of every
citizen and that to secure which it is enjoined that the President
employ all the resources at his command. But over and above
all that power and duty, fundamental as they may seem, there
is the injunction that the civil authority shall always be
supreme. This injunction can only mean that while all
precautions should be taken to insure the security and
preservation of the State and to this effect the employment of
all resources may be resorted to, the action must always be
taken within the framework of the civil authority. Military
authority should be harmonized and coordinated with civil
authority, the only exception being when the law clearly ordains
otherwise. Neither Republic Act 2207, nor Republic Act 3452,
contains any exception in favor of military action concerning
xxx
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From the above, it not only appears but is evident that the
respondents were not concerned with the present rice situation
confronting the consuming public, but were solely and
exclusively after the stockpiling of rice for the future use of the
army. The issue, therefore, in which the Government was
interested is not whether rice is imported to give the people a
bigger or greater supply to maintain the price at P.80 per ganta
for, to quote again their contention: "the rice is not supposed
to be poured into the open market to affect the price to be paid
by the public, as it is not for the consuming public, regardless
of whether there is or there is no emergency", but whether
rice can legally be imported by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines avowedly for its future use, notwithstanding the
prohibitory provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.
The majority opinion ably sets forth the reasons why this Court
can not accept the contention of the respondents that this
importation is beyond and outside the operation of these
statutes. I can only emphasize that I see in the theory
advanced by the Solicitor General a dangerous trend that
because the policies enunciated in the cited laws are for the
protection of the producers and the consumers, the army is
removed from their application. To adopt this theory is to
proclaim the existence in the Philippines of three economic
groups or classes: the producers, the consumers, and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. What is more portentous is
the effect to equate the army with the Government itself.
TEEHANKEE, J.:1wph1.t
The Court grants the petition for review by way of appeal from
the Resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals dated
November 24, 1975 and January 15, 1976 dismissing the
appeal of the late Florentino Nuguid Vda. de Haberer in CA-G.
R. No. 5368090-R and ordering all pleadings filed in said
cases after the death of said appellant stricken off the records,
for having been issued with grave error of law if not with grave
abuse of discretion and remands the case for proper
proceedings and determination of the appeal on the merits.
This case originated from the Court of First Instance of Rizal
where the late Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer as the duly
registered owner filed in 1964 and 1965 (11) complaints for
recovery of possession of the parcel of land evidenced by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the Register of Deeds
of Rizal issued in her name, situated at Mandaluyong, Rizal,
alleging that private respondents had surreptitiously entered
the land and built their houses thereon.
The lower court, after trial on the merits, rendered a
consolidated decision, dated May 26, 197 l, dismissing all the
complaints. On motion of the late Florentina Nuguid Vda. de
Haberer the cases were reopened and retried on grounds of
newly discovered evidence. On September 15, 1972, the lower
court issued an order reviving its decision of May 26, 1971.
The decision was thus appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In the Court of Appeals, the cases were erroneously dismissed
once before, on the ground that the appeal was allegedly filed
out of time. The issue was brought to this Court in Cases Nos.
L-39366 and L-39620-29, entitled "Florentina Nuguid Vda. de
Haberer vs. Federico Martinez, et al., 1 On January 29, 1975,
this Court rendered its judgment setting aside the appellate
court's dismissal of the appeal and ordering the reinstatement
of the same for proper disposition on the merits, having found
"that contrary to respondent court's erroneous premises and
computation, petitioner duly and timely perfected her appeal
within the reglementary period and in compliance with the