Case Digest

Laurel vs. Misa

Topic:
Treason Laurel vs. Misa 77 Phil. 856 FACTS:
The accused was charged with treason. During
the Japanese occupation, the accused adhered
to the enemy by giving the latter aid and
comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried for
treason since his allegiance to the Philippines
was suspended at that time. Also, he claims
that he cannot be tried under a change of
sovereignty over the country since his acts were
against the Commonwealth which was replaced
already by the Republic.
HELD/RATIO:
The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes
absolute and permanent allegiance to his
government or sovereign. No transfer of
sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed
that the
Philippine government still had the power.
Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is
either
subsisting
or
eliminated
and
replaced.
Sovereignty per se wasnt suspended; rather, it
was the
exercise of sovereignty that was suspended.
Thus, there is no suspended allegiance.
Regarding the
change of government, there is no such change
since the sovereign the Filipino people is still
the
same. What happened was a mere change of
name of government, from Commonwealth to
the
Republic of the Philippines.
DISSENT:
During the long period of Japanese occupation,
all the political laws of the Philippines
were suspended. Thus, treason under the
Revised Penal Code cannot be punishable where
the laws
of the land are momentarily halted. Regarding
the change of sovereignty, it is true that the
Philippines wasnt sovereign at the time of the
Commonwealth since it was under the United
States. Hence, the acts of treason done cannot
carry over to the new Republic where the
Philippines is now indeed sovereign.

SANDERS VS VERIDIANO II
FACTS:
Petitioner Sanders is a special services director
of the US Naval Station. Petitioner Moreau was
the commanding officer of the Subic Naval
Base, which includes the said station. Private
respondent Rossi and Wyer are both American
citizens with permanent residence in the
Philippines. They were employed as gameroom
attendants. Respondents were advised that their
employment
had
been
converted
from
permanent full-time to permanent part-time.
They protested the conversion and the hearing
officer recommended the reinstatement of
respondents to full-time. Sanders disagreed
with the recommendation. In a letter he stated
respondents tend to alienate co-workers and
they were difficult employees to supervise; and
even though the grievance was confidential they
placed the records in public places Before the
start of the grievance, a letter purportedly
coming from Moreau (which did not carry his
signature) but was signed by W.B. Moore by
direction from Moreau, explaining the change
of employment status was sent to the Chief of
Naval Personnel and to concur therewith.
Respondents filed a case for damages against
petitioners alleging that the letter contained
libelous imputations that had exposed them to
ridicule,
mental
anguish
etc.
Private
respondents made it clear that the petitioners
were being sued in their private or personal
capacity. Petitioner moved to dismiss stating
that the acts performed by them I the discharge
of their official duties and therefore court has
no jurisdiction under the doctrine of state
immunity. Their motion was denied. ISSUE:
Whether petitioners were performing their
official
duties when they did the acts for which they
have been sued
for damages.
HELD: The court held in the affirmative. Mere
allegation that a government functionary is
being sued in his personal capacity will not
automatically remove him from the protection of
the law of public officers and doctrine of state
immunity. The acts for which the petitioners are
being called to account were performed by them
in the discharge of their official duties. The
doctrine of State immunity is applicable not
only to our government but also to foreign states
sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of our
courts. There are two exceptions in the rule: 1.
He may be sued when the purpose is to compel
him to do an act required by law. 2. Also when
the government itself has violated its own laws,
the government may be impleaded. The case

does not fall within the exceptions. Mistakes

concededly committed by such public officers
are not actionable as long as they were not
motivated by malice or gross negligence
amounting to bad faith.

MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee vs. FRANCISCO

PILAPIL, defendant-appellant (58 SCRA 4, July 25, 1974)
Facts:
FlorentinoPilapil, deceased, left an insurance having his child,
MillianPilapil, as the beneficiary and authorized his brother,
Francisco Pilapil, to act as trustee during his daughters
minority. The lower court decided to give the mother of the
child, Melchora Cabanas, the right to act as trustee citing the
appropriate provisions in the Civil Code and the consideration
of the childs welfare. The defendant appealed for the case.
He claims the retention of the amount in question by invoking
the terms of the insurance policy. He is the rightful trustee of
the insurance policy.

the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit

that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that
even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still
deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the
lower court to decide as it did. The trust, insofar as it is in
conflict with the above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto
null and void. In order, however, to protect the rights of the
minor, MillianPilapil, the plaintiff should file an additional
bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R
of this Court to raise her bond therein to the total amount of
P5,000.0

Issue:
Whether the mother should be entitled to act as a trustee of a
minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance policy from
the deceased.
Ruling:
With the provisions Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code as
basis, the decision is affirmed with costs against the
defendant-appellant, Francisco Pilapil. Article 320 states that
the father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under
parental authority. If the property is worth more than two
thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond
subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance." And
Article 321 states that "The property which the child has
acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any
lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in
usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under
parental authority and whose company he lives. With the
added condition that the child stays with the mother, not the
uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the
decision arrived at stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. The
appealed decision is supported by another rational
consideration. It is reinforced by its adherence to the concept
that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as
parenspatriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of
litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his
best interest This prerogative of parenspatriae is inherent in
the supreme power of every State, whether that power is
lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no
affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes
exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of
the people and the destruction of their liberties." There is a
constitutional provision vitalizing this concept that "The State
shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution."If, as

Amigable vs. Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360 (1972)

Ponente: J. Makalintal; en banc; unanimous
Facts: yAppeal from CFI of Cebu, dismissing plaintiffs comp
laint yVictoriaAmigable, the appellant herein, is the registered
owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City yNo
annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest
in theproperty appears at the back of the transfer certificate
of title of said lot yWithoutprior expropriation or negotiated
sale, the government used ap ortion of said lot, with an area
of 6,167 square meters, for the construction of the Mango and
GorordoA venues yAmigable's counsel wrote the President of
the Philippines, requestingp ayment of thep ortion of her lot
which had been appropriated by the government;A uditor
General disallowed it yAmigable filed for recovery of ownership
to said CFI, but denied on groundsprimarily that government
is immune from suit without its consent
Issue:
yWhether or not the appellant mayproperly sue the
government under the facts of the case
Held:
It is not immune from suit yWhere the government takes
awayp rop erty from ap rivate landowner forp ublic use
without going through the legalprocess of expropriation or
negotiated sale, the aggrievedp arty mayp roperly maintain a
suit against the government without thereby violating the
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its
consent (Ministerio vs. CFI of Cebu) ySince no annotation in
favor of the government app ears at the back of her certificate
of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance
of anyp ortion of her lot to the government, the app ellant
remains the owner of the whole lot. yThe only relief available
(sinceA venues have been constructed) is for the government

to make due compensation.T o determine due compensation

for the land, the basis should be thep rice or value thereof at
the time of the taking. ythep laintiff is entitled to damages in
the form of legal interest on theprice of the land from the time
it was taken up to the time thatp ayment is made by the
government. yGovernment shouldp ay attorneys fees
Notes: yThe doctrine of governmental immunity from suit
cannot serve as an instrument forp erp etrating an injustice
on a citizen

commercial and proprietory acts. the result is that state

immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental
acts.
The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only
when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of
the foreign sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic
affairs. A state may be descended to the level of an individual
and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be
sued. Only when it enters into business contracts. It does not
apply where the conracts relates the exercise of its sovereign
function. In this case, the project are integral part of the
naval base which is devoted to the defense of both US and
phils., indisputably, a function of the government of highest
order, they are not utilized for , nor dedicated to commercial
or business purposes.

US Vs. Ruiz 136 SCRA 487

Facts:
The usa had a naval base in subic, zambales. The base was
one of those provided in the military bases agreement
between phils. and the US. Respondent alleges that it won in
the bidding conducted by the US for the constrcution of
wharves in said base that was merely awarded to another
group. For this reason, a suit for specific preformance was
filed by him against the US.
Issue: Whether the US naval base in bidding for said
contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke
state immunity.
Held:
The traditional role of the state immunity excempts a state
from being sued in the courts of another state without its
consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the
principle of indepemndence and equality of states. Howecer,
the rules of international law are not petrified; they are
continually and evolving and because the activities of states
have multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish them
between sovereign and governmental acts and private,

SANTIAGO vs. REPUBLIC Petition for Certiorari from

order of dismissal of CFI Zamboanga, 1978
FACTS:

 Jan. 1971 - Ildefonso Santiago & his wife donated a land to

the Bureau of Plant Industry on the condition that lighting &
water facilities will be installed and an office building &
parking lot will be built on said land which should be ready
for occupancy on or before Dec. 7, 1974. Bureau failed to
meet the conditions thus, Santiago filed this case against the
RP thru the Director of the Bureau of Plant Industry for the
revocation of the deed of donation. CFI granted RPs
motion to dismiss on the ground that the state cant be sued
w/o its consent.

service is to file a claim w/ the Commission on Audit as

contemplated in Act No. 3803 & Commonwealth Act No. 327

ISSUE: WON Santiago can sue the Bureau of Plant Industry.

Fontanilla v. Maliaman [February 27, 1991]

HELD: Yes. Petition granted. CFI ordered to proceed with

case.

Facts: Motion for reconsideration of the Courts Second

Division decision in GR no. 61045. The Solicitor General
maintains that NIA on the strength of PD no. 552 and the
case of Angat River Irrigation System vs. Angat River Workers
Union that NIA does not perform solely and primarily
propriety functions but is an agency of the government tasked
with governmental functions and is therefore not liable for
tortuous act of its driver Hugo Garcia, who was not its special
agent. Son of the petitioners were killed by the driver of
NIA.They filed a case for damages against NIA

RATIO: 1.Admittedly, state cannot be sued w/o its consent.

Government departments, bureaus, agencies, offices or
instrumentalities cannot be sued either if the suit would
result in adverse consequences to the public treasury,
whether in disbursements of funds/loss of property. (Del Mar
vs. Philippine Veterans Administration) This principle has
been implicit in the 1935 Constitution (Republic vs. Purisima)
thus, issue of its retroactivity as raised by the petitioner is
immaterial. 2.However, it would be unfair to cloak the State
with immunity when it has violated an agreement wherein it
has received gratuitously a certain property w/o fulfilling the
terms of the agreement. This is offensive to ones sense of
justice. The government should set the example. Since the
State can waive its immunity from suit impliedly, the case at
bar should prosper. The doctrine of immunity from suit
cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice
on a citizen (Ministerio vs. CFI Cebu). Thus when the State
commits an injustice against a citizen, it implies waiver of its
immunity. Bureau of Plant Industrys failure to abide by the
conditions under w/c the donation was given presumes that
it gave its consent to be sued. There being no money claim, it
will not affect the States treasury. A donor, w/ RP as donee,
is entitled to go to court when there is a breach of the
conditions of such donation. The State benefited from the
contract and when it ignores its obligations, the people might
lose its confidence on the State. *additional notes: 1.The
doctrine of the non-suability of the State is a corollary of the
positivist concept of law w/c according to Holmes, negates the
assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself the
source of the law on w/c such a right may be predicated. It is
in consideration of the vastly expanded role of the government
enabling it to engage in business pursuits to promote general
welfare. (Mobile Phil. Exploration vs. Customs Arrastre
Service). 2.A government-owned & controlled corporation has
a personality of its own distinct & separate from that of the
government. It may sue & be sued & may be subjected to
court processes just like any other corporation. (National
Shipyard & Steel Corporation vs. CIR). 3.An action against the
government officials is essentially one against the
government. (Araneta vs. Gatmaitan) 4.Basic & fundamental
principle of the law that the govt cant be sued before courts
of justice w/o its consent covers with the mantle of its
protection an entity such as the Angat River Irrigation
System. (Angat River Irrigation System vs. Angat River
Workers Union) 5.Bureau of Cusotms acting as part of the
machinery of the national government in the operation of the
arrastre service is immune from suit under the doctrine of
non-suability of the State. The claimants remedy to recover
the loss or damage to the goods under the custody of such

Issue: WON the NIA

proprietary function

is

corporate

body

performing

Held: Yes NIA is a government agency with juridical

personality separate and distinct from the government.It can
be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of
its driver who was not its special agent.
Ratio: The irrigation districts in the US are identical with
the irrigation system in the Philippines.As such, it is
appropriate to consider certain doctrines from the American
jurisprudence. o Irrigation district is a public quasi
corporation organized however to conduct a business for the
private benefit of the owners of land within its limits.They are
members of the corporation, control its affairs, and alone are
benefited by its operations.It is, in the administration of its
business, the owner of its system in a
proprietary rather than a public capacity, and must assume
and bear the burdens of proprietary ownership. o Quasipublic corporation possessed some governmental powers and
exercised some governmental functions, but held that the
construction and operation of its irrigation canals and ditches
was a proprietary rather than a governmental function, and
hence the district was responsible in damages for negligent
construction or operation of its canal system. Constituent
exercise
of
sovereignty
and
considered
as
compulsory.Ministrant merely the exercise of propriety
function and compulsory Other corporations that brings
public benefit and public welfare are basically proprietary in
nature (telecommunications, electricity) NAWASA vs. NWSA
Consolidated unions it was held that NAWASA is not an
agency performing governmental functions rather it performs
proprietary functions.The function of providing water supply
and sewerage service are regarded as mere optional functions
of the government even though the service rendered caters to
the community as a whole and the goal is for the general
interest of society. NIA was not created for the purpose of
local government.It is essentially a service agency of the
government aimed at promoting public interest andpublic
welfare, such fact does not make NIA essentially and purely a
government-function corporation.NIA was created for the

purpose ofconstructing, improving, rehabilitating, and

administering all national irrigation systems in the
Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation
project. NIA is a government agency invested with a
corporate personality separate and distinct from the
government.Also in PD 552 it was provided that NIA can sue
and be sues in court.NIA has its own assets and liabilities
and it also has corporate powers to be exercised by the BOD.
Separate Opinion: Padilla NIA is an agency of the
government with an original charter.RA 3061 created NIA.
The charter of NIA confers upon it a separate juridical
personality to exercise all the powers of a corporation under
the Corporation Law.NIAs primary purpose is to undertake
integrated irrigation projects, by the construction ofmultiplepurpose water resource projects to increase agricultural
production for the financial uplifting of the people. NIA is
maintained and operated by the government in the
performance of its governmental function of providing the
Filipino people, particularly, the farmers nationwide, improved
irrigation systems to increase the countrys agricultural
production.Only the government has the capacity and
facilities to successfully undertake a project or venture of
such magnitude.Fees collected are for cost of operation,
maintenance, insurance and rehabilitation of the irrigation
systems. The fact that the charter treats NIA as
incorporated under the Corporation law and confers upon it a
separate judicial personality is not the test in determining
whether it is performing a governmental or proprietary
function.It was held that were the nature of the duties
imposed on an agency and performed by it does not reveal
that it was intended to bring any special corporate benefit or
pecuniary profit to the government, said agency is deemed to
be exercising a governmental function. The charter of NIA
provides that it may sue and be sue, thus, the consent of NIA
to be sued has been given.The rule of immunity no longer
applies.Is the State liable for damages?No.The State would be
liable for damages when it acts through a special agent.The
Hugo Garcia was not a special agent rather he was NIAs
regular driver.For the State to be liable Congress should enact
an appropriate legislation to compensate the petitioners and
to appropriate the necessary fund for it.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. REYES Petition for

Certiorari to Annul & Set Aside RTC Cavite Branch 22
Resolution, 1993
FACTS: Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen,
worked as an ID checker at the US Navy Exchange (NEX) at
the US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in
Quezon City. Shes married to Edgardo Montoya, a FilipinoAmerican serviceman employed by the US Navy & stationed in
San Francisco. Petitioner Maxine Bradford is an American
Citizen employed at the JUSMAG headquarters as the activity
exchange manager. Jan. 22, 1987 Montoya bought some
items from the retail store Bradford managed, where she had
purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she was already
at the parking lot, Mrs. Yong Kennedy, a fellow ID checker
approached her & told her that she needed to search her bags
upon Bradfords instruction. Montoya approached Bradford to
protest the search but she was told that it was to be made on
all JUSMAG employees on that day. Mrs. Kennedy then
performed the search on her person, bags & car in front of
Bradford & other curious onlookers. Nothing irregular was
found thus she was allowed to leave afterwards. Montoya
learned that she was the only person subjected to such
search that day & she was informed by NEX Security Manager
Roynon that NEX JUSMAG employees are not searched
outside the store unless there is a strong evidence of a wrongdoing. Montoya cant recall any circumstance that would

trigger suspicion of a wrong-doing on her part. She is aware

of Bradfords propensity to suspect Filipinos for theft and/or
shoplifting. Montoya filed a formal protest w/Mr. Roynon but
no action was taken. Montoya filed a suit against Bradford
for damages due to the oppressive & discriminatory acts
committed by petitioner in excess of her authority as store
manager. She claims that she has been exposed to contempt
& ridicule causing her undue embarrassment & indignity.
She further claims that the act was not motivated by any
other reason aside from racial discrimination in our own land
w/c is a blow to our national pride & dignity. She seeks for
moral damages of P500k and exemplary damages of P100k.
May 13, 1987 Summons & complaint were served on
Bradford but instead of filing an answer, she along with USA
government filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that: (1) this
is a suit against US w/c is a foreign sovereign immune from
suit w/o its consent and (2) Bradford is immune from suit for
acts done in the performance of her official functions under
Phil-US Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 & Military
Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that US has rights,
power & authority w/in the bases, necessary for the
establishment, use & operation & defense thereof. It will also
use facilities & areas w/in bases & will have effective
command over the facilities, US personnel, employees,
equipment & material. They further claim that checking of
purchases at NEX is a routine procedure observed at base
retail outlets to protect & safeguard merchandise, cash &
equipment pursuant to par. 2 & 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT
SUBIC INST. 5500.1. July 6, 1987 Montoya filed a motion
for preliminary attachment claiming that Bradford was about
to leave the country & was removing & disposing her
properties w/intent to defraud her creditors. Motion granted
by RTC. July 14, 1987 Montoya opposed Bradfords motion
to dismiss. She claims that: (1) search was outside NEX
JUSMAG store thus its improper, unlawful & highlydiscriminatory and beyond Bradfords authority; (2) due to
excess in authority and since her liability is personal,
Bradford cant rely on sovereign immunity; (3) Bradfords act
was committed outside the military base thus under the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts; (4) the Court can inquire into
the factual circumstances of case to determine WON Bradford
acted w/in or outside her authority. RTC granted Montoyas
motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
and later on issued writ of attachment opposed by Bradford.
Montoya allowed to present evidence & Bradford declared in
default for failure to file an answer. RTC ruled in favor of
Montoya claiming that search was unreasonable, reckless,
oppressive & against Montoyas liberty guaranteed by Consti.
She was awarded P300k for moral damages, P100k for
exemplary damages & P50k for actual expenses. Bradford
filed a Petition for Restraining Order. SC granted TRO
enjoining RTC from enforcing decision. Montoya claims that
Bradford was acting as a civilian employee thus not
performing governmental functions. Even if she were
performing governmental acts, she would still not be covered
by the immunity since she was acting outside the scope of her
authority. She claims that criminal acts of a public
officer/employee are his private acts & he alone is liable for
such acts. She believes that this case is under RP courts
jurisdiction because act was done outside the territorial
control of the US Military Bases, it does not fall under
offenses where US has been given right to exercise its
jurisdiction and Bradford does not possess diplomatic
immunity. She further claims that RP courts can inquire into

the factual circumstances & determine WON Bradford is

immune.
ISSUES/RATIO:
1.WON the case is under the RTCs jurisdiction - YES
Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the Court.
US did not obtain leave of court (something like asking for
Courts permission) to intervene in the present case.
Technically, it should not be allowed to intervene but since
RTC entertained its motion to dismiss, it is deemed to have
allowed US to intervene. By voluntarily appearing, US must
be deemed to have subjected itself to RTCs jurisdiction. 2.
WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying
Bradfords motion to dismiss. - NO Petitioners failed to specify
any grounds for a motion to dismiss enumerated in Sec. 1,
Rule 16, Rules of Court. Thus, it actually lacks cause of
action. A cause of action is necessary so that Court would be
able to render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer
in the complaint. A motion to dismiss w/c fails to state a
cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the
allegations in the complaint. RTC should have deferred the
resolution instead of denying it for lack of merit. But this is
immaterial at this time since petitioners have already brought
this petition to the SC. 3.WON case at bar is a suit against the
State. - NO Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art.
XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution. This immunity also
applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in discharge of their duties since
it will require the state to perform an affirmative act such as
appropriation of amount to pay damages. This will be
regarded as a case against the state even if it has not be
formally impleaded. But this is not all encompassing. Its a
different matter where the public official is made to account
in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law & injurious to
rights of plaintiff. State authorizes only legal acts by its
officers. Action against officials by one whose rights have been
violated by such acts is not a suit against the State w/in the
rule of immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of state
immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating
an injustice. It will not apply & may not be invoked where the
public official is being sued in his private & personal capacity
as an ordinary citizen. This usually arises where the public
official acts w/o authority or in excess of the powers vested in
him. A public official is liable if he acted w/malice & in bad
faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
(Shauf vs. CA) Also, USA vs. Guinto declared that USA is not
conferred with blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its
agents in the Philippines merely because they have acted as
agents of the US in the discharge of their official functions. In
this case, Bradford was sued in her private/personal capacity
for acts done beyond the scope & place of her official function,
thus, it falls w/in the exception to the doctrine of state
immunity. 4.WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity. - NO
First of all, she is not among those granted diplomatic
immunity under Art. 16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance
Agreement creating the JUSMAG. Second, even diplomatic
agents who enjoy immunity are liable if they perform acts
outside their official functions (Art. 31, Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations).
HELD: Petition denied. TRO lifted

G.R. No. L-9657. November 29, 1956

LEOPOLDO T. BACANI and MATEO A. MATOTO vs.
NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION, ET AL., NATIONAL
COCONUT CORPORATION and BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS
FACTS:
Plaintiffs herein are court stenographers assigned in Branch
VI of the Court of First Instance of Manila. During the
pendency of Civil Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled
Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation, Assistant
Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for Defendant,
requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript of
the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing.
Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel
Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and
thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their
fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of
P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for
said transcript at the rate of P1 per page. However, the
Auditor General disallowed the payment of these fees and
ordered that it shall be reimbursed for the reason that
NACOCO, being a public corporation, is exempted from the
fees. For reimbursement to take place, it was further ordered
that the amount of P25 per payday be deducted from the
salary of Bacani and P10 from the salary of Matoto. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE: WON NACOCO is exempt from legal fees being an
alleged government corporation.
HELD:
NO.
There are functions which our government is required to
exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our
Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of
sovereignty (constitute), and those which it may exercise to
promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the
people (ministrant). To this latter class belongs the
organization of those corporations owned or controlled by the
government to promote certain aspects of the economic life of
our people such as the National Coconut Corporation. These
are what we call government-owned or controlled corporations
which may take on the form of a private enterprise or one
organized with powers and formal characteristics of a private
corporations under the Corporation Law. They do not acquire
the status of a government entity for the simple reason that
they do not come under the classification of municipal or
public corporation. NACOCO is a GOCC. Thus, not part of the
government.

NATIVIDAD ANDAMO & EMMANUEL ANDAMO,

vs. IAC, & MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LASALETTE
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990 CJ Fernan
certiorari , prohibition andmandamus
ISSUE:
W/N a CORP., which has built through its agents,
waterpaths, water conductors & contrivancesw/in its land,
thereby causing inundation & damage to an adjacent land,
can be held civilly liable for damages under Art. 2176 & 2177
on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can
proceedindependently of the criminal case.
FACTS:
Sps. Andamo, owners of a parcel of land situated in Cavite
which is adjacent to that of Missionaries of Our Lady of La
Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
W/in the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and
contrivances, including an artificial lake,were constructed,
which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land,
caused a young man todrown, damaged petitioners' crops and
plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of
petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy
seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to
destruction.
Andamo instituted a criminal action against Efren Musngi,
Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin,officers and directors of
herein respondent corporation, for destruction by means of
inundation under Art. 324, RPC
Subsequently, petitioners filed another action (civil case)
against respondent corporation, for damages with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
TC dismissed Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, as the
criminal case which was instituted ahead of thecivil case was
still unresolved. It was anchored on the provision of Section 3
(a), Rule III of the Rulesof Court which provides that "criminal
and civil actions arising from the same offense may

beinstituted separately, but after the criminal action has been

commenced the civil action cannot beinstituted until final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." IAC
affirming the decisionof TC.
RULING:
Decision of IAC is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. TC is ordered
to reinstate Civil Case and toproceed with the hearing of the
case with dispatch. This decision is immediately executory.
the civil action is one under Arts 2176 & 2177, on
quasi-delicts. All the elements are present:
(a)damages suffered by the plaintiff, (
b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and
(c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by
theplaintiff.
In Azucena vs. Potenciano, the Court declared that in quasidelicts, "(t)he civil action is entirelyindependent of the
criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177, CC. There
can be no logicalconclusion than this, for to subordinate the
civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of
the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or
acquittal would render meaningless theindependent
character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Art.
31, that his action mayproceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."

that it is discretionary on its part to grant or discontinue the

pension sought by del Mar. The action of del Mar was
premature because of his failure to exhaust administrative
remedies before invoking judicial intervention, and that the
court a quo was without jurisdiction to try the case as del
Mar demand partakes of a money claim against the PVA. After
due trial, the court a quo rendered judgment upholding del
Mar claims.
This appeal raises several questions which will be discussed
in seriatim.
1.The PVA argues that the court a quo was without
jurisdiction to try civil case because it involves a money claim
against the said PVA a mere agency of the Government
performing governmental functions with no juridical
personality of its own and, in reality, partakes of an action
against the Philippine Government which is immune from suit
without its consent.Is the PVA exempt from the filing of an
appeal bond? To resolve this issue, we must initially
determine whether the PVA is an agency or instrumentality of
the Republic of the Philippines, and, in the affirmative,
whether it exercises governmental functions. a.this Court
referred to the claim of the private respondent therein as "a
claim for a sum of money against the Government, which
claim, if adjudged finally to be meritorious, would render the
Republic of the Philippines liable therefor," since the funds
from which the claim was to be satisfied were funds
appropriated by Congress for the PVA; As a general
proposition, the rule well-settled in this jurisdiction on
the immunity of the Government from suit without its
consent holds true in all actions resulting in "adverse
consequences on the public treasury, whether in the
disbursements of funds or loss of property."
2.del Mar alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies
before resorting to court action. a.in the present controversy
involves a question solely of a legal nature, there arises no
need for the litigant to resort to all administrative remedies
available to him before seeking judicial relief.

QUIRICO DEL MAR vs. THE PHILIPPINE VETERANS

ADMINISTRATION
Facts
Del Mar averred that he served during World War II as chief
judge advocate of the Cebu Area Command; he subsequently
obtained an honorable discharge from the service on October
20, 1946 on a certificate of permanent total physical
disability; he subsequently obtained an honorable discharge
from the service on October 20, 1946 on a certificate of
permanent total physical disability; in March 1950, the said
Board discontinued payment of his monthly life pension on
the ground that his receipt of a similar pension from the
United States Government, through the United States
Veterans Administration, by reason of military service
rendered in the United States Army in the Far East during
World War II, precluded him from receiving any further
monthly life pension from the Philippine Government. PVA
reiterated its contention that del Mar's receipt of a similar
pension from the United States Government effectively barred
him from claiming and receiving from the Philippine
Government the monthly life pension and PVA also asserted

3.The validity of section 6 of Regulation No. 2 of the "Rules

and Regulations on Veterans' Benefits" adopted by the PVA
constitutes the core of the present controversy. a.Pursuant to
the foregoing, the PVA cancelled and discontinued the
monthly life pension of del Mar reasoning that the latter's
receipt of a similar pension from the United States
Government precluded his enjoying any like benefit from the
Philippine Government. The principle recognizing the
necessity of vesting administrative authorities with the power
to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
statute and to effectual its policies, constitutes well
established doctrine in this jurisdiction. The PVA's pretense
that del Mar case falls under the clause of section 9 of
Republic Act 65, as amended, which excepts those who "are
actually receiving a similar pension from other Government
funds" from the coverage of said section 9 predicated upon
its interpretation that the phrase other Government funds"
includes funds of the United States Government fails to
persuade this Court as a valid argument to justify its
cancellation of del Mar monthly life pens.
4.The rest of the assigned errors relate to the allege undue
interference by the court a quo with the purely discretionary

functions of the PVA in the matter of granting discontinuing

the pension benefits.

obligation arising from expropriation of land they are already

enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain should be
exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice.

a. The law concedes to administrative bodies the authority to

act on and decide claims and applications in accordance with
their judgment, in the exercise of their adjudicatory capacity.
This Court directs the appellant Philippine Veterans
Administration to compute and then to pay to the appellee del
Mar his past and accumulated monthly life pension at the
aforementioned statutory rates.
REPUBLIC vs PALACIO
FACTS:

Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of
land owned by private respondents, Admiral Finance
Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of
Makati determined the cost of the said land which the
petitioner must pay to the private respondents amounting to
P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00.
It issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied
with a writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which
was deposited in PNB. However, such order was opposed by
petitioner through a motion for reconsideration, contending
that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor
levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the
disbursement of public funds without the proper
appropriation required under the law, citing the case of
Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio.The RTC dismissed such
motion, which was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the
latter affirmed said dismissal and petitioner now filed this
petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are
exempt from garnishment and levy upon execution.
Held:
It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of
respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of
P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by respondent
sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which are public fund and
thereby are exempted from execution without the proper
appropriation required under the law. There is merit in this
contention. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that
public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless
otherwise provided for by statute. Municipal revenues derived
from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended
primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the
governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are
exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the municipal
council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating the
said amount from its public funds deposited in their PNB
account, no levy under execution may be validly effected.
However, this court orders petitioner to pay for the said land
which has been in their use already. This Court will not
condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal

Ortiz instituted action against Handong Irrigation Association

to recover possession of land which
HIA allegedly entered and occupied at the inducement of
Irrigation Service Unit, an agency under the
Dept. of Public Works and Communications.
A writ of execution and order of garnishment was served
against the deposits and trust funds of ISU to pay for the
damages to Ortiz .CA upheld on the basis that ISU is engaged
in the private business of purchase and sale of irrigation
pumps.
ISSUE:
WON State or its fund can be made liable for damages
HELD :
NO
RATIO:
The ISU liability in inducing HIA to invade and occupy land of
Ortiz arose from torts and not from
contract.It is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that
embodied in Art 2180 of CC that the State is only liable for
torts caused by its special agents especially commissioned to
carry out the acts complained of outside of such agents
regular duties. There being no proof that the making of the
tortuous inducement was authorized, neither the state nor its
funds can be made liable. Other issues:
Even if the liability of the state had been judicially
ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself
whether to pay the judgment or not. Thus execution cannot
issue on a judgment against the state.

REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973
Facts:
On July 7, 1969, a decision was rendered in Special
Proceedings No. 2156-R infavor of respondents P.J. Kiener
Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and InternationalConstruction
Corporation and against petitioner confirming the arbitration
award in theamount of P1,712,396.40.The award is for the
satisfactionof
a
judgment
against
thePhlippine
Government.On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable
Guillermo Villasor issued an Orderdeclaring thedecision final
and executory.Villasor directed the Sheriffs of RizalProvince,

Quezon City as well as Manilato execute said decision.The

Provincial Sheriffof Rizal served Notices of Garnishment with
several Banks,specially on PhilippineVeterans Bank and
PNB.The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on
deposit with PhilippineVeterans Bank andPNB are public
funds duly appropriated and allocated for thepayment of
pensions of retirees, pay andallowances of military and
civilian personneland for maintenance and operations of the
AFP.Petitioner, on certiorari, filed prohibition proceedings
against respondent JudgeVillasor for acting in excess of
jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack
of jurisdiction in grantingthe issuance of a Writ of Execution
against the propertiesof the AFP, hence the notices and
garnishment arenull and void.
Issue:
Is the Writ of Execution issued by Judge Villasor valid?
Held:
What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with
the dictates of theConstitution.It isa fundamental postulate of
constitutionalism flowing from the juristicconcept of
sovereignty that the stateas well as its government is immune
from suitunless it gives its consent.A sovereign is exempt from
suit,not because of any formalconception or obsolete theory,
but on the logical and practical ground that therecan beno
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends.The State may not be sued without
its consent. A corollary, both dictated by logicand soundsense
from a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object
of agarnishment proceeding even if theconsent to be sued had
been previously granted andthe state liability adjudged.The
universal rule that wherethe State gives its consent tobe sued
by private parties either by general or special law, it may
limitclaimants actiononly up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution and thatthepower of the
Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since the
government fundsand properties maynot be seized under
writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy suchjudgments,
is
based
on
obviousconsiderations
of
public
policy.Disbursements of publicfunds must be covered by the
correspondingappropriation as required by law.Thefunctions
and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowedto
be paralyzedor disrupted by the diversion of public funds
from their legitimate and specific objects,asappropriated by
law.

G.R. No. L-33112 June 15, 1978

PHIL. NATIONAL BANK vs. JAVIER PABALAN

Issue;
The petitioner is requesting for certiorari against the writ of
execution authorized by the Hon Judge Pabalan regarding the
transfer of funds amounting to P12,724.66 belonging to
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration.

Facts;
Philippine National Bank invoked the doctrine of nonsuability in behalf of PVTA. It is to be admitted that under the
present Constitution, what was formerly implicit as a
fundamental doctrine in constitutional law has been set forth
in express terms: "The State may not be sued without its
consent." In addition, the amount held by said bank is
subject to garnishment.

Held;
The certiorari was dismissed without cost by the Supreme
Court saying that the funds held by PNB is subject for
garnishment, thus, the writ of execution be imposed
immediately. The non-suability clause raised by PVTA being a
government owned corporation was also denied citing
previous decisions held by the Supreme Court specifically
citing that of Manila Hotel Employees Association vs Manila
Hotel Company and to quote 'it is well-settled that when the
government enters into commercial business, it abandons its
sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other
corporation.

Case Digest - Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance, G.R.

No. L-31635, August 31, 1971
Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance, G.R. No. L-31635,
August 31, 1971
FACTS:
Petitioners as plaintiffs in a complaint filed with the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, dated April 13, 1966, sought the
payment of just compensation for a registered lot, containing
an area of 1045 square meters, alleging that in 1927 the
National Government through its authorized representatives
took physical and material possession of it and used it for the
widening of the Gorordo Avenue, a national road, Cebu City,
without paying just compensation and without any
agreement, either written or verbal. There was an allegation of
repeated demands for the payment of its price or return of its
possession, but defendants Public Highway Commissioner
and the Auditor General refused to restore its possession. It
was further alleged that on August 25, 1965, the appraisal
committee of the City of Cebu approved Resolution No. 90,

appraising the reasonable and just price of Lot No. 647-B at

P50.00 per square meter or a total price of P52,250.00.
Thereafter, the complaint was amended on June 30, 1966 in
the sense that the remedy prayed for was in the alternative,
either the restoration of possession or the payment of the just
compensation.
In the answer filed by defendants, now respondents, through
the then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice, Antonio P.
Barredo, the principal defense relied upon was that the suit
in reality was one against the government and therefore
should be dismissed, no consent having been shown. Then on
July 11, 1969, the parties submitted a stipulation of facts to
this effect: "That the plaintiffs are the registered owners of Lot
647-B of the Banilad estate described in the Survey plan RS600 GLRO Record No. 5988 and more particularly described
in Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-5963 containing an area
of 1,045 square meters; That the National Government in
1927 took possession of Lot 647-B Banilad estate, and used
the same for the widening of Gorordo Avenue; That the
Appraisal Committee of Cebu City approved Resolution No.
90, Series of 1965 fixing the price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00
per square meter; That Lot No. 647-B is still in the possession
of the National Government the same being utilized as part of
the Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City, and that the National
Government has not as yet paid the value of the land which is
being utilized for public use."
The lower court dismissed the complaint on January 30,
1969 stating that the case is undoubtedly against the
National Government and there is now showing that the
Government has not consented to be sued in this case. The
petitioners appealed by certiorari to review the decision and
contended that they are entitled for just compensation under
the Art III, Sec. 1 (2) of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the decision of the CFI of Cebu to dismiss
the complaint by reason Government immunity from suit
correct?
HELD:
NO. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot
be an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. If
there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners
would not be in sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable
then that precisely there was a failure on what the law
requires and the petitioners has the right to demand from the
Government what is due to them. The Supreme Court decided
that the lower courts decision of dismissing the complaint is
reversed and the case remanded to the lower court for
proceedings in accordance with law.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO,LA UNION

vs.HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, ET.AL.
FACTS:

At about 7am of December 16, 1965, acollision occurred

involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot
(owned bythe Estate of Macario Nieveras), a gravel andsand
truck driven by Jose Manandeg (ownedby Tanquilino
Velasquez), and a dump truck of the Municipality of San
Fernando, La Union anddriven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the
impact,several passengers of the jeepney includingLaureano
Bania Sr. died as a result of theinjuries they sustained and
four others sufferedvarying degrees of physical injuries.The
private respondents instituted acomplaint for damages
against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot,
ownerand driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney.
However, the aforesaid defendantsfiled a Third Party
Complaint against thepetitioner and the driver of a dump
truck of petitioner.Petitioner raised as one of its defensesthe
non-suability of the State.
ISSUE:
WON the Municipality of San Fernandois immune from suit.
HELD:
YES.Anent the issue of whether or not themunicipality is
liable for the torts committed byits employee, the test of
liability of themunicipality depends on whether or not
thedriver, acting in behalf of the municipality, isperforming
governmental or proprietaryfunctions.In the case at bar, the
driver of thedump truck of the municipality insists that
"hewas on his way to the Naguilian river to get aload of sand
and gravel for the repair of SanFernando's municipal streets."
We alreadystressed in the case of
Palafox,et .al vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, the District
Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102Phil 1186) that
"the construction ormaintenance of roads in which the truck
andthe driver worked at the time of the accidentare
admittedly governmental activities."We arrive at the
conclusionthat themunicipality cannot be held liable for the
tortscommitted by its regular employee, who wasthen engaged
in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death
of the passenger tragic and deplorable thoughit may be
imposed on the municipality noduty to pay monetary
compensation

HELD:

US VS GUINTO
February 26, 1990
FACTS:
These cases are consolidated because they all involve the
doctrine of state immunity.
1) US VS GUINTO (GR No. 76607) The private respondents
are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base
in connection with the bidding conducted by them for
contracts for barber services in the said base which was won
by a certain Dizon.The respondents wanted to cancel the
award to the bid winner because they claimed that Dizon had
included in his bid an area not included in the invitation to
bid, and subsequently, to conduct a rebidding.
2} US VS RODRIGO (GR No 79470) Genove, employed as a
cook in the Main Club at John Hay Station, was dismissed
after it had been ascertained in an investigation that he
poured urine in the soup stock.Genove filed a complaint for
damages against the club manager who was also an officer of
USAF.
2) US VS CEBALLOS (GR No 80018) Luis Bautista, a barracks
boy in Camp ODonnel, was arrested following a buy-bust
operation conducted by petitioners who were USAF officers
and special agents of the Air Force Office. A trial ensued
where petitioners testified against respondent Bautista.As a
result of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his
employment. He then filed for damages against petitioners
claiming that because of the latters acts, he was removed
from his job.
3) US VS ALARCON VERGARA (GR No 80258) Complaint for
damages was filed by private respondents against individual
petitioners for injuries allegedly sustained by handcuffing and
unleashing dogs on them by the latter.The individual
petitioners, US military officers, deny this stressing that the
private respondents were arrested for theft but resisted arrest,
thus incurring the injuries. In all these cases, the individual
petitioners claimed they were just exercising their official
functions.The USA was not impleaded in the complaints but
has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect
suits against it to which it has not consented.
ISSUE:
Is the doctrine of state immunity applicable in the cases at
bar?

A state may not be sued without its consent.This doctrine is

not absolute and does not say the state may not be sued
under any circumstance.The rule says that the state may not
be sued without its consent, which clearly imports that it may
be sued if it consents. The consent of the state to be sued may
be manifested expressly or impliedly.Express consent may be
embodied in a general law or a special law.Consent is implied
when the sate enters into a contract or it itself commences
litigation.When the government enters into a contract, it is
deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting
party and divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit
with its implied consent.Waiver is also implied when the
government files a complaint, thus opening itself to a
counterclaim. The USA, like any other state, will be deemed to
have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a
contract in its proprietary or private capacity.
1) US VS GUINTO (GR No 76607) The court finds the
barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US
government to be commercial enterprises operated by private
persons.The petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the
complaint, the contract in question being decidedly
commercial.Thus, the petition is DISMISSED and the lower
court directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of the
case.
2) US VS RODRIGO (GR No 79470) The restaurant services
offered at the John Hay Station operated for profit as a
commercial and not a government activity.The petitioners
cannot invoke the doctrine of self immunity to justify the
dismissal of the damage suit filed by Genove.Not even the US
government can claim such immunity because by entering
into the employment contract with Geneove in the discharge
of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its
sovereign immunity from suit. Still, the court holds that the
complaint against petitioners in the lower court be dismissed.
There was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in the
dismissal of Genove, the petitioner acted quite properly in
terminating the private respondents employment for his
unbelievably nauseating act of polluting the soup stock with
urine.
3) US VS CEBALLOS (GR No 80018) It was clear that the
individually-named petitioners were acting in the exercise of
their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust
operation and thereafter testified against the complainant.For
discharging their duties as agents of the United States, thay
cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their
principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.The
conclusion of the trial court that the answer filed by the
special counsel of Clark Air Base was a submission of the US
government to its jurisdiction is rejected.Express waiver
cannot be made by a mere counsel of the government but
must be effected through a duly-enacted statute.Neither does
it come under the implied form of consent.Thus, the petition
is granted and the civil case filed in the lower court
dismissed.
4) US VS ALARCON VERGARA (GR No 80258) The
contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer
study of what actually happened. The record were too meager
to indicate that the defendants were really discharging their
official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when

the incident occurred.Only after the lower court shall have

determined in what capacity the petitioners were acting will
the court determine, if still necessary, if the doctrine of state
immunity is applicable.

WON the respondents decision is valid.

Rat io na le:
The position of the Republic has been fortified with the
explicit affirmation found in this provision of the
presentConstitution: "The State may not be sued without its
consent.
Ruling:
The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction
even prior to the effectivity of the [1935]Constitution is
alogical corollary of the positivist concept of law which, to
para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of anylegal right
asagainst the state, in itself the source of the law on which
such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all,even if such a
principle does give rise to problems, considering the vastly
expanded role of government enabling it toengage in business
pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to
the analytical school of thought alone thatcalls for
itscontinued applicability. Nor is injustice thereby cause
private parties. They could still proceed to seek collection of
their money claims by pursuing the statutory remedy of
having the Auditor General pass upon them subject toappeal
to judicial tribunals for final adjudication. We could thus
correctly
conclude
as
we
did
in
the
cited
ProvidenceWashington

Republic vs Purisima

Facts:
A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by
defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil
suit inthe sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a
money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the
plaintiffbeing private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines,
Inc. At that time, theleading case of Mobil Philippines
Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, where Justice
Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to passon
the meritsof a claim against any office or entity acting as part
of the machinery of the national government unlessconsent
beshown, had been applied in 53 other decisions. Respondent
Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of FirstInstance of
Manila denied the motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972.
Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue:

Insurance decision: "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the

government without its consent, as it hasoperated in practice,
hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful
parent of injustice, considering the vastand ever-widening
scope of state activities at present being undertaken.
Whatever difficulties for private claimantsmay still exist,is,
from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the
balancing of interests, so unavoidable in thedetermination of
what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the
public weal, the verdict must be, as it has beenthese so
manyyears, for its continuing recognition as a fundamental
postulate of constitutional law." [
Switzerland General Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Republic of the
Philippines]
***The consent, to be effective, must come from the State
acting through a duly enacted statute as pointedout byJustice
Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice
and Corn Administration agreed tohad no bindingforce on the
government.

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Edilberto

G. Sandoval, RTC of Manila, Branch 9, Caylao et.al G. R.
No. 84607, March 19, 2003

FACTS:
The doctrines of immunity of the government from suit is
expressly provided in the Constitution under Article XVI,
Section 3. It is provided that the State may not be sued
without its consent. Some instances when a suit against the
State is proper are: (1) When the Republic is sued by name;
(2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government
agency; (3) When the suit is, on its face, against a government
officer but the case is such that ultimate liablity will belong
not to the officer but to the government. With respect to the
incident that happened in Mendiola on January 22, 1987 that
befell twelve rallyists, the the case filed against the military
officers was dismissed by the lower court. The defendants
were held liable but it would not result in financial
responsibility to the government. The petitioner (Caylao
Group) fileda suit against the State that for them the State
has waived its immunity when the Mendiola Commission
recommended the government to indemnify the victims of the
Mendiola incident and the acts and utterances of President
Aquino which is sympathetic to the cause is indicative of
State's waiver of immunity and therefore, the government
should also be liable andshould be compensated by the
government . The case has been dismissed that State has not
waived its immunity. On the other hand, the Military Officer
filed a petition for certiorari to review the orders of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 9.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit
and therefore should the State be liable for the incident?
HELD:
No. The recommendation made by the Mendiola Commission
regarding the indemnification of the heirs of the deceased and
the victims of the incident does not in any way mean liability
authomatically attaches to the State. The purpose of which is
to investigate of the disorders that took place and the
recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State.
The acts and utterances of President Aquino does not mean
admission of the State of its liability. Moreover, the case does
not qualify as suit against the State. While the Republic in
this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not
pertain to the government. The military officials are held
liable for the damages for their official functions ceased the
moment they have exceeded to their authority. They were
deployed to ensure that the rally would be peaceful and
orderly and should guarantee the safety of the people. The
court has made it quite clear that even a high position in the
government does not confera license to persecute or recklessly
injure another. The court rules that there is no reversible
error and no grave abuse of dicretion commited by the
respondent Judge in issuing the questioned orders.