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A general theory of generic


modelling and paradigm shifts:
part 1 the fundamentals
Maurice Yolles

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modelling and
paradigm
shifts: part 1
283

Business School, Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, UK, and

Gerhard Fink
IACCM, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna, Austria
Abstract
Purpose Anticipating behaviour and responding to the needs of complexity and the problematic issues
that they can generate requires modelling to facilitate analysis and diagnosis. Using arguments of
anticipation as an imperative for inquiry, the purpose of this paper is to introduce generic modelling
for living systems theory, and assigns the number of generic constructs to orders of simplex modelling.
An nth simplex order rests in an nth order simplex cybernetic space. A general modelling theory of higher
orders of simplexity is given, where each higher order responds to every generic construct involved,
the properties of which determining the rules of the complex system being that is represented.
Higher orders of simplexity also explain greater degrees of complexity relatively simply, and give rise to
the development of new paradigms that are better able to explain perceived complex phenomena.
Design/methodology/approach This is part 1 of three linked papers. Using principles that arise
from Schwarzs living systems set within a framework provided by cultural agency theory, and with
a rationale provided by Rosens and Dubois concepts of anticipation, the papers develops a general
modelling theory of simplex orders. It shows that with the development of new higher orders,
paradigm shifts can occur that become responsible for new ways of seeing and resolving stubborn
problematic issues. The paper is composed of two parts. Part 1 establishes the fundamentals for
a theory of modelling associated with cybernetic orders. Using this, part 2 establishes the principles of
cybernetic orders using simplex modelling. This will include a general theory of generic modelling.
Part 3 extends this, developing a fourth order simplex model, and exploring the potential for higher
orders using recursive techniques through cultural agency theory.
Findings Cultural agency theory can be used to generate higher simplex through principles of
recursion, and hence to create a potential for the generation of families of new paradigms. The idea
of conceptual emergence is also tied to the rise of new paradigms.
Research limitations/implications The use of higher order simplex models to represent complex
situations provides the ability to condense explanation concerning the development of particular
system behaviours, and hence simplify the way in which the authors analyse, diagnose and anticipate
behaviour in complex situations. Illustration is also given showing how the theory can explain the
emergence of new paradigms.
Practical implications Cultural agency can be used to structure problem issues that may
otherwise be problematic, within both a top-down and bottom up approach. It may also be used to
assist in establishing behavioural anticipation given an appropriate modelling approach. It may also be
used to improve and compress explanation of complex situations.
Originality/value A new theory of simplex orders arises from the new concept of generic
modelling, illustrating cybernetic order. This permits the possibility of improved analysis and
diagnosis of problematic situations belonging to complex situations through the use of higher order
simplex models, and facilitates improvement in behavioural anticipation.
Keywords Behaviour, Adaptation, Emergence, Complexity, Systems theory, Cybernetics
Paper type Research paper

The authors thank Jose Manuel Perez Rios for his constructive comments on an early version of
this paper.

Kybernetes
Vol. 44 No. 2, 2015
pp. 283-298
Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0368-492X
DOI 10.1108/K-11-2014-0255

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Introduction
Ever since Beer (1980) and Luhmann (1995), it has been useful to see societies as complex
living systems. However, it is now almost a common adage that society (and hence the
social situations encountered there-in) is becoming more complex. An explanation comes
from Ionescu (1975) who tells us that societies have become centrifugal, creating more
complexity and intensity, as they have become politically centripetal thereby facilitating
unrepresentative corporate decision making as they accumulate of political power.
Complexity and modelling
So what is a complex system? A dictionary definition is: the state or quality of being
intricate or complicated, but this does not really illuminate anything. A clearer definition
comes from the systems community where complexity represents something that has
many parts that interact with each other in multiple ways. Yolles (1999) has elaborated on
this by defining five dimensions of complexity: computational complexity, having a large
number of interactive parts or variables; technical (or cybernetic) complexity, having
a tangle of control processes that are difficult to discern because they are numerous and
highly interactive, and thus when there is limited future predictability; organisational
complexity, having a tangle of rules that guide interactions between a set of identifiable
parts of a situation, or specification of the attributes that it has; personal complexity, having
different and conflicting subjective views of a situation; and emotional complexity
having a tangle of emotional vectors are projected into a situation by its participants
seen as emotional involvement.
The complexity of a social situation is dependent upon the paradigm from which it
is seen. Paradigms have three attributes (Morgan, 1980) that allow this to happen:
(1) Constructs, which give a complete view of reality or way of seeing.
(2) Social organisation, which creates new schools of thought; these are accompanied
by the development of particular language, providing a guide to paradigm
distinction.
(3) Concrete tools and texts are used for processes of scientific puzzle solving.
The constructs of (1) are usually symbolically woven into a figurative pattern that is
a meaningful (semantic) theory. Without (2) there is no paradigm, and new paradigms
arise when at least (1) and (2), or (2) and (3), are satisfied. Complexity in the cybernetics
paradigm highlights the concept, for instance, of relativity, where different individuals
and groups play different games, have different goals, and live in different conceptual
worlds (Geyer and van der Zouwen, 1991). This relativity construct has the collective
support of the cybernetics community (the social organisation). It has developed tools
and texts to enable individuals or groups to be related in their ways of thinking, and
compared in their key beliefs, assumptions or values (Umpleby, 1997).
To better understand complex social situations, they need to be modelled. We take
a (formal) model to be a representation of a semantic theory with a formal system.
This is different from a schema, which has no underlying theory and no formal system,
but is simply a set of ideas that may eventually develop into a theory. Formality occurs
through language that enables a set of explicit statements (propositions and their
corollaries) to be made that enable everything that might be expressed about the beliefs
and other attributes within a given paradigm to be expressed in a self-consistent way.
A formal system uses language that includes terms able to create meaningful
explanations, and formulates a set of propositions as a relationship between a set of

predefined symbolic elements. As a result of these meanings, semantic theory


emerges. The propositions define a logic that establishes a framework of thought
and conceptualisation, and propositions that do not require proof are called axioms.
The relationships may be implicit or explicit, and defined by logical operators that
through the terms and symbols, creates theory. When theory is manifested as
form/structure with imputed rules, a model arises. The theory may be used to resolve
real or hypothetical posed problematic issues called situations, by using analysis and
diagnosis. Analysis uses the relationships in the model to distinguish between a set of
interactive parts of the situation, thus enabling easier study. Diagnosis examines
the analysed situations using the theory, in order to identify situational explanations.
In systems science, this is done while keeping the whole situation as the frame of
reference. Analysis and diagnosis are typically more difficult when situations are complex.
For Zeigler (1984) there is a relationship between model complexity and complex
reality. This relationship may be proportional for good models that can represent
increasing complexity, and the closer the model is to a perceived complex reality, the
more complex is the model. Ashby (1968) recognises that a good model is one that
generates a satisfactory way of viewing a situation, by being able to respond to the
variety that might occur in it through the generation of its own (requisite) variety.
Weinberg (1975, p. 140) tells us that a good model should have three pragmatic goals:
(1) Completeness broad enough to encompass all phenomena of interest in order
to reduce surprise.
(2) Independence decomposing a set of inquiries into non-interacting qualities in
order to reduce metal effort.
(3) Minimalness to integrate the states of situations that are unnecessarily
discriminated in order to make inquiry easier.
Another attribute of a good model is validity, i.e. does the model have a basis that makes
it well grounded in logic or truth? Thus, if a statement is valid and all of its premises are
true, then its conclusion is also true. This is a pragmatic definition, but there are
technical attributes of validity that contradict the conclusion. Gdels (1931) exploration
of validity resulted in his Incompleteness Theorem. This says that in a semantic theory
one cannot be sure that valid statements preserve truth an outcome that is apparently
sensitive to certain conditions (Murzi and Shapiro, 2014). Murzi and Shapiro note that
any attempt to prove a positive relationship between validity and truth leads to
paradox, unless reference to the system is made externally.
In an attempt to resolve the paradox practically for organisational situations, Beer
(1979, p. 311) adopted Whitehead and Russells (1910) concept of the metasystem.
He recognised that every social system (with its own particular paradigm and
language) has associated with it a metasystem (with its own particular paradigm
and language) that observes, controls and communicates with the system. It should
here be realised that paradigms create language through the terms that they adopt and
that are used in the development of theory and its models. Any arguments relating
to issues in paradigmatic language are therefore reflected in the models that a paradigm
produces to represent itself.
Now systems operate through paradigms, and like paradigms the views of those
who populate them are bounded. They see themselves and their models from a within
perspective due to their membership of the system, and have no access to a broader
frame of reference. This is reflected in their use of language. The language of the

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system is a bounded construct because of its paradigmatic nature. Here then, propositions
about the language itself cannot be expressed in the language itself. Consequently,
another language that offers another frame of reference is required that is over and
beyond the language being used at the time. The demand then, is that a new frame
of reference is required that can encompasses the systemic frame of reference. This new
frame of reference belongs to the systems metasystem. Due to the close connection
between language and modelling, system models need to be viewed from higher order
frames of reference for validation. Practically, Beer adopted a modelling approach in
which the system and metasystem is considered pairwise in a dyadic interaction, this
throughout the whole system hierarchy. Interestingly, if one were to extend the modelling
approach beyond the pairwise interactive dyad to include higher order metasystems, then
to preserve Beers resolution to the paradox, the metasystem-system relationship should
itself be seen as a coupled formal system with a meta-metasystem. An iterative argument
for this leads to the accumulation of higher order metasystems. This is an imperative for
the general theory of cybernetic orders that we shall pursue in this paper.
Returning to complexity, Ashby (1956) argued that in complex situations systems
are more usefully explored through their overall patterns of behaviour. Such patterns
may change indeterminably. A modelling approach that can both deal with increasing
complexity and enable patterns of behaviour to be anticipated would help resolve
connected problems. This is one of the interests of this paper.
In dealing with increasing social system complexity there is a need to model situations
as simply and effectively as possible. According to Cohen and Stewart (1995, p. 232),
complex situations become simpler with emergence that can collapse chaos and bring
order to a system that seems to be in random fluctuation. This is a fundamental
proposition of systems theory, and a property of the whole (rather than its contained
parts). Cohen and Stewart (1995, pp. 411-419) also refer to simplex situations that have
been exposed to some form of emergence. Modelling complexity provides improved
modelling through simplexity, which Cohen and Stewart note may be recognised to have
occurred when a set of rules can be identified that can explain a situation through large
scale simplicities that have developed. Effectively, simplexity refers to the dialectics
between simplicity and complexity.
We distinguish simplex models from others by introducing the ideas of modelling
substructure and superstructure. Simplex models have a fundamental substructure onto
which superstructure is erected. It is the superstructure that is responsible for generating
model complexity and epistemic content. We now proposed that there are orders of simplex
model. Like squeezing a lemon to get its juice, higher simplex orders conceptually
compress complex situations more densely while extracting more meaning from them.
This occurs through the use of higher order conceptual constructs that improve the
comprehension, diagnosis and resolution of stubborn problematic issues. For Maturana
and Varela (1979), higher order explanations are justified through meaningful theory
extensions which contribute to the understanding of complex situations by expanding
contexts, thereby reducing the assumption of all things being equal. It can also improve
context dependent anticipation. An example of a simplex variable is autopoiesis (Maturana,
1970a, b; Mingers, 1995), providing a new way of seeing social systems (Beer, 1980).
Living systems and anticipation
In developing the theoretical discourse of this paper, we use Schwarzs (1994) theory of
living systems (also see: Yolles, 2006). This sits on the foundational work of Miller
(1978) which reduces the complexity of the structure and organisation of living

systems. Miller offered seven ontologically distinct levels of living systems that
range in complexity from the lower levels of cell, organ, and organism, to higher levels
of group, organisations, societies, and supranational systems. In exploring this he
provides a common framework for analysing the nature, condition, structure and process
of systems at various levels of complexity. This ability to compress complexity through
the development of new terminology was important to living systems theory, and
provided a theoretical basis that has since been used in social cybernetic paradigms.
Social living social systems have pathologies that affect their viability and their
capacity to anticipate their future behaviour. Anticipation is important to living
systems since it enables them to adapt to future conditions (Collier, 2006). Thus for
instance pathologies have been responsible for the development of the 2007/2008
western economic crisis which shook western socio-economic viability, where analysis
has revealed conflicts of interest in regulatory bodies, inadequate control processes
(e.g. the failure of regulators, the credit rating agencies, and the market itself), no control of
financial excesses, and ultimately the use of the wrong models to guide control
processes (Levin and Coburn, 2011). This especially includes a lack of understanding
of the complex dynamics of microscopic processes from which macroscopic processes
arise [] (Yolles and Fink, 2013, p. 4). So, anticipating the future is pathology
dependent, but it also requires a good model of a situation that is structure
determined (Schwarz, 2001; Yolles and Dubois, 2001). Embedding anticipation into
a good model has consequences for Weinbergs view of completeness, allowing one to
require a strong structure that allows useful anticipation under complexity. So how is
such a structure created?
Rosen (1985) adopted the term anticipatory (living) system to indicate that an
anticipatory model enables what we shall call dynamic projections for potential
behaviour. For Dubois (2000) this constitutes model-based weak anticipation, rather
than system-based strong anticipation. Weak anticipation occurs through some
cognitive/mental model which may influence the systems structure. Strong
anticipation occurs through the structure itself which ultimately influences its
patterns of behaviour and its viability. In Table I we indicate distinctions between
weak and strong anticipation (Yolles, 2006).
As will be shown in due course, it is possible to represent both weak and strong
anticipation together using a simplex model. This is part of a general systems model
which consists of a set of components (like subsystems and processes) to represent
a complex whole, working together for some purpose(s). Some of these components
will be generic: conceptual constructs that provide perspective, and represent an
entire systemic function (i.e. actions as sets of behavioural processes, or activities,
Anticipation
type
Weak

Strong

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Explanation
Based on a model of the system and produces theoretical prediction based on
structural properties. As illustration, strategic management involves weak
anticipation because it is model-based and involves an interpretation of the
environment that occurs from an examination of behavioural perturbations
Connected to operative management, and influenced by strategic management
Operative management involves strong anticipation that conditions
(facilitates and constrains) the way that the organisation responds to
environmental perturbations of its behaviour

Table I.
Distinction between
weak and strong
anticipation in
self-organising
social systems

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or purposes). The systems model will ultimately have a generic structure composed of
generic constructs and non-generic positioned residues. A simplex model forms its
generic substructure, while other components form its superstructure. One of the
purposes of this paper is to present a family of simplex models which reflect different
orders of complexity, characterising properties of the cybernetic space to which they
belong. The superstructure added to any simplex model is determined by particular
contextual modelling interests, and adds epistemic content.
Simplex modelling and orders of cybernetics
An order of simplex model sits in a cybernetic space of the same order. The cybernetic
space maintains generic rules that facilitate model building, and in the case of simplex
modelling, through the use of generic constructs. These have a capacity in a given
model to compress complexity by more effectively explaining attributes of complex
situations. There is a relationship between cybernetic order and generic construct
order, which this paper will explore in terms of simplex modelling.
Low orders of simplex modelling will be seen to be related to Piagets (1950/1972)
concepts of learning set within a living system context. One aspect of this for
Von Glasersfeld (1983) is instrumental learning, which may be explained as follows.
A system is instrumental when it strategically manifests its goals or aims operatively.
It learns instrumentally when strategic models that facilitate behaviour are modified
by experience, where antecedents and consequences are related. This is distinct from
cognitive learning where knowledge is developed through experience and accumulated
or adjusted.
Learning requires anticipation (Von Glasersfeld, 2003, p. 7). This is elaborated on by
Dubois (1998), who links anticipation with control in modelling and simulation.
He identifies incursive control which results in system stabilisation. He also identifies
hyperincursive control, which is concerned with managing multiple possible scenario
outcomes. Boxer and Cohen (2000) explain that Dubois work in anticipative systems can
be formalised as second-order metatheories (formal descriptions of systemic generic
structures). This lies, they say citing Dubois (1995), at the basis of a third order cybernetics.
Structure of the paper
This paper has three parts. In it we take a generic modelling perspective to describe
simplex orders of modelling substructure that characterise the cybernetic space
in which it sits. Overall we shall explain that: first order cybernetics is concerned with
inter/action and self-organisation. Second order cybernetics is concerned with instrumental
generic inter/action in a social living system, permitting self-production, adaptation, and
self-organisation. Third order cybernetics is concerned with cognitive generic inter/action
in a social living system, additionally permitting self-creation and novel adaptation.
These and higher order cybernetic spaces will in due course be explored.
Using a modelling process that originates with Yolles (2006) and sits on the dynamic
complex systems platform of Schwarz (1994), we shall:
(1) consider the nature of generic structuring;
(2) recognise that generic construct properties are responsible for what Cohen and
Stewart refers to as the rules of simplexity; and
(3) define orders of simplexity where higher orders are reflective of higher
degrees of complexity.

We shall also propose a general theory of potential paradigmatic evolution through


increasing orders of simplexity. This adopts principles of cultural agency theory
(Yolles, 2006; Yolles and Fink, 2011), where agency has the properties of purpose, teleology
(autonomy, coherence, and identity), self-organisation, self-reference, self-reflection,
self-regulation, self-organisation, cultural self-reference, and adaptation.
This structure is represented across the three parts of this paper. In this part 1 we
consider the need to anticipate behaviour for purposes of social system viability.
We then develop a simplex order modelling approach, where each higher order has
greater conceptual compression capacity to increasingly simplify complex situations,
improve the capacity for anticipation, and improve capacity to analyse and diagnose.
In part 2 of this paper we shall provide examples of first to third order simplex
modelling. We shall also propose a general theory of orders of simplex modelling.
We use the principles of both recursion and incursion, where recursion is associated
with formal modelling and incursion with informal modelling and qualitative inference.
It is through recursion that orders of simplex modelling is defined, and through
incursion that qualitative (informal) inferences occur that can contribute to modelling
conditions and determine modelling parameters.
In part 3 of the paper we shall create a fourth order simplex model. We shall then
argue, with illustration, that the implicit emergence of meaningful higher orders of
simplex modelling have been responsible for paradigm shifts, each radically altering
the way in which complexity is viewed. We can offer an illustration of this. It is possible
to refer to the influence of communicative action (borrowing the term from Habermas,
1987) where purposeful action is predicated on social communication and agreement.
Thus, social influence may be modelled as a first order cybernetic process involving
communicative action, when it is therefore seen as an environmental attribute.
However, modelling social influence as a higher order attribute in a fourth order
cybernetic process gives it fundamental importance to the nature of self, as an element
of an autonomous system. The consequential dynamics of the whole assembly thereby
changes. Changing the way in which complexity is viewed, using high order invariant
constructs to process information, can thus result in radical resolution of previously
stubborn problematic issues. We shall finally examine cultural agency theory in terms
of simplex order generation.
Generic modelling
Generic modelling can be represented through orders of simplexity, each order sitting
in its own cybernetic space of generic rules. While references to first and second
cybernetic orders are relatively common (e.g. Glanville, 2004), and sometimes to third
cybernetics (Taschdjian, 1978; Boxer and Kenny, 1990; Boxer and Cohen, 2000;
Pockock, 1999; Yolles and Dubois, 2001), there is no general theory of higher cybernetic
orders. Here, our interest will be to create a general theory of simplex order that is
reflective of cybernetic orders.
A simplex model is a modelling substructure that sits together with a superstructure
of systemic constructs that involves epistemic content. The substructure is composed
of generic constructs, of which there are two classes:
(1) Invariant generic constructs are ontic and represent a dynamic networks of
(real) processes that manifest orders of agency attributes across related state
systems that occupy some part of a defined supersystem. The networks are
invariant in their epistemic (processing) nature, but the order that they take

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refers to rank in a hierarchy the meaning which can change with context.
Operating in the supersystem, the construct may be explained as a semantic
manifold that acts as a channel between at least two ontologically coupled
independent domains with systemic states. While the invariant generic construct
manifests epistemic content dynamically between the domains, its nature is not
subject to epistemic variation. Examples are autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela,
1979; Mingers, 1995) and autogenesis (Csnyi and Kampis, 1985), which are
constructs that can each, respectively, be seen as a network of first and second
order processes that manifest meaning across the independent domains.
While contextual frames of reference may change for invariant generic constructs,
the nature of their relative manifesting functions do not.
(2) Variant generic constructs are an interconnected ontological assembly of state
systems in which meaning can vary as its epistemic properties change with
context, thus making them semantically susceptible to recursive processes.
In other words, variant generic constructs have the capacity to change because
they are state systems with context sensitive epistemic content.
We can now offer a proposition: a simplex order is a system substructure defined by the
given number of invariant generic constructs, with variant generic construct that act as
the invariant construct complement. One could not exist meaningfully without the other.
There are always the same numbers of invariant generic constructs (if one includes
feedback as a collective entity) as there are variant generic constructs.
We have referred to recursion above. This constitutes a modelling procedure that
can be repeated indefinitely. Glanville (2002, p. 25) defines it as a backward movement
or return: e.g. a process by which the response to a statement raises that statement
again. It relates to all things that are applied to themselves, including the cybernetics
of cybernetics. It has also been defined by Yolles (1999) as the application of a whole
concept or set of actions that occur at one systemic level of consideration to a lower
logical systemic level of systemic consideration. It may also be argued in the following
way. If action as a functional operator is applied to some object/subject at one focus in
a system hierarchy, then applying the same action to an object/subject at a lower
focus constitutes recursion. However, any epistemic content that is part of those actions
likely changes with context during the transformation from one focus to the other.
So, recursion is facilitated through the capacity of variant context-sensitive generic
constructs to change.
Beer (1959) adopts a proposition of viability important to recursion in viable systems:
that every viable system contains and is contained in a viable system. Thus, consider an
autonomous organisation with departments and divisions. This would enable Beer to
say that each department is autonomous and interactive in its division, as is each division
in the organisation. It should be noted that the use of the word autonomy here may be
replaced by more or less autonomous since the nature of autonomy is a subjectively
assessed relative concept (Beer, 1979, p. 119; Schwarz, 2001). To illustrate recursion
under this proposition, Beer (1979) models an organisation using his Viable System Model.
Thus, to investigate a change in the department of an organisation such that its
viability is preserved, he might define two levels of recursion within the organisations
system hierarchy. This enables the autonomous organisation to be evaluated for
viability through its autonomous division, this through its autonomous department
of interest. The division is thus seen as an autonomous subset of an autonomous
organisation, as is the department of the division.

Philosophical positioning in cybernetics


There are a number of philosophical positions that may be relevant to discussions
about cybernetic orders. These include positivism, post-positivism, radical
constructivism and constructivism. In positivism the real world can be objectively
known, activities in it can be explained and predicted, and regularities are investigated
in terms of causal relationships between constituent elements. In post-positivism
(Fischer, 1998), cause and effect are explored from the perspective of inquirers who may
see an objective reality differently due to their distinct cultural experiences and
different worldviews. Myers (1999) contends that most post-positivists are
constructivists who believe that we each construct our view of the world through
our perceptions of it. Perception and observation are deemed to be fallible, and so our
constructions of it are imperfect. Objectivity is also a social rather than individual
characteristic involving critique across a subject area.
Constructivism originates with Piaget (1950/1972) who sought a general pattern of
cognitive development in children. As a result he created a Genetic Epistemology
involving knowledge acquisition (Lesh and Doerr, 2003). Taber (2006, p. 131) notes
Piaget and Inhelders (1973) demonstration that children who have not undertaken
formal instruction might still construct their own ideas about their world experiences,
and create their own meanings for words while developing language. Constructivism
therefore establishes a capacity for the self-construction/self-creation of knowledge
(Boot and Hodgson, 1987) not embraced by post-positivism. While constructivism is
popular today, Taber (2006) notes that the literature is not coherent about its nature,
with its conceptualisations becoming rarefied away from its original context and
meaning. In the same vein, Osborne (1996) notes that constructivism suffers from
a flawed instrumental epistemology, and has confused the manner in which new
knowledge is made with the manner in which old knowledge is learned. Notions of truth,
he declares, have also been replaced by the concept of viability, leading to a failure to
distinguish how one idea might be more viable than another denying objectivity and
rationality. Constructivism, he tells us, also fails to recognise its own limitations.
Close to both post-positivism and constructivism, Von Glasersfeld used what he called
radical constructivism to explain some principles of cybernetics. Unlike in post-positivism,
knowers are agnostic about their being an objective world, and relativism and the role of
knowledge in adaptability are central tenets. Von Glasersfelds (1995, p. 51) view of radical
constructivism may be explained through two propositions:
P1. Dynamic Knowledge Adaptation: knowledge is not passively received, but is
a process of dynamic adaptation towards viable interpretations of experience.
P2. Relativism: the function of cognition is adaptive, and serves the subjects organisation
of the experiential world, not the discovery of an objective ontological reality.
In P1 the knower: is agnostic towards an objective reality (since we have no way of
knowing what that reality might be), and unlike constructivism, does not necessarily
construct knowledge of a real world (Dougiamas, 1998; Tural, 2006; Tuncer, 2009).
However, the phrase not necessarily is not explained, leaving a semantic gap. To gain
clarity here, we note Von Glasersfeld (1995, p. 121) statement:
[] this first person is assumed to be a constructor of knowledge. Thus the question arises
whether the active agent, the subject that is supposed to reside in this first person, can
spontaneously construct knowledge of him- or herself. It has often been said that it cannot,
and that self-knowledge arises only from interaction with other persons.

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This interaction constitutes a social process. Seeing cognitive learning this way arises
from the work of Vygotsky (1962), who stresses the role of social interaction in the
development of cognition and the construction of meaning. Von Glasersfeld (1995, p. 141)
used the social aspects of Vygotskys theories on learning with selections of Piagets.
One can accommodate the distinctions between Vygotskys and Piagets paradigms by
recognising the apparent conflict of whether knowledge creation is an individual or
social construct. This conflict can be subdued by recognising that knowledge creation
arises instrumentally in the first instance, from a strategic thought processes that has
been exposed to an operative environment. It occurs with conceptual emergence that
results from a cognitive dissonance arising from a conflict between information about
what known and what is perceived. This emergent virtual knowledge, as we shall call it,
is coded information that can instrumentally contribute to behaviour. Virtual knowledge
is idiosyncratic and precurrent to cultural sediments of knowledge. In Piagets model,
processes of knowledge self-creation occur as sediments of idiosyncratic knowledge,
but there is no direct developmental normative process for this. An indirect process
occurs through operative interactions that can make knowledge sediments normative
through experience. In Vygotskys model, social validation of virtual knowledge
defines knowledge, filters idiosyncrasy and generates normativity. The distinction
between Piagets and Vygotskys approaches therefore seems to lie in whether
knowledge creation is deemed to be the result of an idiosyncratic or a normative
processes of sedimentation. In Piagets model, knowledge self-creation is possible, but
in Vygotskys it is not an immediate facility since knowledge is social rather than
individual. Idiosyncratic virtual knowledge may contribute to adaptation, but it will not
necessarily improve viability. Social filtering of virtual knowledge creates normative
knowledge, which can then contribute to both social adaptation and viability. In such
situations, adaptation may be seen socially as novel, implying that the recognition of
novelty is ultimately a social phenomenon.
Thus, it is not only knowledge, but also virtual knowledge that influences behaviour.
When new socially filtered knowledge is embraced, the knower has identified with it, and
this requires self-reference. This circuital explanation to knowledge creation couples
Vygotsky and Piaget by explaining the creation of knowledge in a more indirect way.
In radical constructivism knowledge self-creation should therefore be seen as a social
filtering process that is dependent on instrumental virtual knowledge. Without other
explanations, social filtering may be inferred to be a first order cybernetic processes of
systemic interaction through processes of communication (for instance as discussed by
Von Glasersfeld, 1995, 2003). However, as we shall see in due course, there is potentially
more to this as one moves to fourth order cybernetic modelling that ensures that one
recognises the social role in creating self-identity.
The distinction between Von Glasersfelds and Piagets conceptual interests is that
the former was more concerned with adaptation, and the latter learning. In radical
constructivism, knowledge self-creation is not strictly speaking a requirement, though
virtual knowledge creation would appear to be. This is because the self-creation
process is not a requirement for adaptation, even though knowledge self-creation is in
principle admitted if socially filtered. This is in contrast to constructivism, where
knowledge construction/creation is an important component of learning and the
creation of novelty. It requires knowing about the contingencies that constrain and
channel knowledge interconnections as this occurs.
In P2, relativism is an epistemic position that clarifies the scope and limitations
of knowledge, and this can be explored in terms of observers and the observed.

For Glanville (2002) there is a need to include the observer in the creation of an
understanding of the dynamics of a set of interactive objects, and the circular
relationship between the observed and observer. The observer also has a perspective
that biases what is observed. Objectivity is therefore ameliorated. Glanville (2004,
p. 1384) assigns this to second order cybernetics, and tells us that the distinction
between the first- and second-order cybernetics depends [] on a change in attitude
to the observer who, in second-order cybernetics, is understood to be both within the
system being described and affected by it. Second order cybernetics is thus seen as
dealing with observing systems and their subjectivity. System subjectivity, for Bruiger
(1998), represents in the system itself statements about itself. These subjectivities may
result in different representation of the objective real world, or a recognition that the real
world is constructed by observers.
Glanville (2004, p. 1380) asserts that the radical constructivism of Von Glasersfeld
(1987) questions what there is to observe, and if it has not been observed by a given
observer situation undecidability results. Undecidability is discussed by Boxer and
Cohen (2000, p. 21) in terms of adaptability, where an agent is capable of successfully
adapting to its environment by tracing out trajectories through a space of agent
theories via successive elaborations of its articulations. A theory of an agent may
therefore be formulated (by an observer of it) as a formal representation of its
articulations that constitute a formal theory. A formal theory would have to include
formal models of the (observed) models of the world of the agent and of their
trajectories, and should be able to account for three kinds of error in these models.
In reference to Boxer and Cohen (2000), these errors include:

Correspondence, in which the agents models fail to anticipate its experience.

Coherence, where an anticipated elaboration of the agents articulations renders


the theory itself internally inconsistent, resulting in the need by the observed
agent of a change in its theory.

Undecidability, where an agent faces multiple possible elaboration of its


articulations, each of which induces mutually inconsistent closures within which
to anticipate. The nature of closure, according to Van de Vijver (1999), is that
it provides stability, giving protecting from colonising stimuli, leaving openness
to new potentially meaningful stimuli, and providing a context from which to
interpret surroundings.

We have noted that the distinction between radical constructivism and constructivism
is that the former does not explicitly require self-reference, while the latter does. This is
because constructivism relates to the maintenance of identity (Boudourides, 2003), and
hence external reference is also an attribute (Luhmann and Fuchs, 1994). If self-reference is
not an explicit part of the radical constructivist modelling process, then self-reference and
external reference cannot be formally distinguished. However, a model may have inferred
self-reference attributes when it may become associated with informal model qualities.
This distinction between the formal and informal only becomes interesting when radical
constructivism is deemed to involve (socially filtered) knowledge creation.
Glanville is interested in self-reference as part of a whole assembly, but it has not
been said whether this might just be an implied attribute. Where it is not a formal
attribute of a model taking an explicit part of the modelling process, models are not
constructivist. Where radical constructivism is deemed to only embrace instrumental
learning, the radical constructivist label may be seen as a misnomer, making it now

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perhaps even closer to post-positivism. In the same way that Spering (2001) sees
that communication events are an implied part of a cultural framework, we argue that
self-reference can be an informally inferred attribute associated with a living system
that conditions modelling. The distinction between formal and informal inclusion
is important since it determines whether knowledge self-creation is an explicit part of
the modelling process, or just implied. We shall accept here that radical constructivism
informally embraces knowledge creation, arising as a consequence of first order
cybernetic social communication that occurs internally to a plural social system.
Von Glaserfsfeld provides no explanation of how the process of social filtering
creates normative knowledge in radical constructivism. To understand this, we need to
return to the principles of learning as represented by Piaget (1950/1972), in many
respects similar to the simpler approach by Agryris (1976) who proposed the idea of
single and double loop learning. Agryris identification of two loop learning levels
places a cybernetic stress towards learning, different from Von Glasersfelds interest in
adaptation. Learning may be seen as a system control process that conditions the
system for improved adaptation and viability. This leads us to consider three questions
which this research may be able to respond to:

While Agtryris has talked of two levels of learning loop, how many levels of
learning loops actually exist, and if so what do higher order loops mean for
cybernetic modelling?

What is the role of the learning loop, in particular as a control and discovery
process for cybernetic modelling, and how does it enhance our understanding of
reality?

How can one select starting points for multiple learning loops?

Conclusion
This paper begins by discussing social complexity and the need to model it simply.
It argues that complexity is dependent on the paradigm that views it, leading to an
identification of the characteristics of complexity. The nature of the paradigm was also
considered, and that it can be associated with the idea of conceptual emergence, when
new paradigms may rise. This should, it was argued, enables us to formulate a general
theory of generic modelling, set within the framework of orders of simplex modelling,
which has its seat in the work of Dubois (1998) on incursive and hypericursive
anticipatory systems.
How models respond to complexity was discussed, arguing that a good model
is more capable of representing a complex situation. The nature of a good model is
discussed, and one of its attributes, validity is shown to be a problematic concept
because of Gdels Incompleteness Theory. This results in paradox when exploring
validity unless the situation identified in a system is associated with a metasystem that
observes, controls and communicates with it.
So, modelling complex systems ideally requires a distinction between the system
and the controlling metasystem. But this is not enough to model social complexity.
Rather, there is a need to simplify complexity. To do this leads to a discussion of
simplexity, the nature of which is to represent a dialectic between simplicity and
complexity. This idea, taken from Cohen and Stewart and linked with cybernetic
orders, leads to the concept of orders of simplexity that emerge from complexity.
The requirement, then, was to determine what the structure of orders of a simplex

model might formulation of simplex orders might be. This is resolved by looking at the
needs of anticipation as discussed by Rosen, and then by Dubois, and recognising that
anticipating behaviour in living systems is structure dependent. The way in which
this recognition contributes to the development of the theory in this paper is to take
it that orders of cybernetics provide a propositional environment for the creation of
anticipatory models that is, models of a system the structures of which broadly
determine their patterns of behaviour. Until now the discussion of cybernetic orders in
the literature has been an arbitrary process.
Linking simplex modelling to cybernetic order results in the idea of simplex order.
A simplex order constitutes the substructure of a model that resides in an order of
cybernetics space with cybernetic rules that are determined by that space. The simplex
substructure is determined from the paradigm within which it is composed, typically
using axiomatic propositions that do need to be shown to be true. Any additional
modelling attributes constitute its superstructure that creates epistemic content for the
simplex substructure, though these typically might require some form of validation.
Building on from this, simplex models were described as generic models, and the nature
of generic variables was explained.
Finally, the philosophical underpinnings associated with cybernetic/simplex orders
was considered, distinguishing between positivism, post-positivism, radical
constructivism and constructivism. It was explained that first order cybernetics is
positivism, second order cybernetics is radical constructivist, but with the caveat that
learning is instrumental. Third order cybernetics is seen as constructivist.
In the next part 2 of this paper we will set up three cybernetic orders of simplex
model, and then formulate a general theory of simplex orders. Following this in part 3
of the paper we shall illustrate a fourth order cybernetics, and discuss how recursive
modelling can generate higher orders.
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Corresponding author
Dr Maurice Yolles can be contacted at: prof.m.yolles@gmail.com

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