Due Process Clause Digest v.1

10 NOV 1978]
Facts: On 22 February 1968, Ordinance 6537 (An ordinance

making it unlawful for any person not a citizen of the
Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to
be engaged in any kind of trade, business or occupation
within the City of Manila without first securing an employment
permit from the mayor of Manila; and for other purposes) was
passed by the Municipal Board of Manila and signed by Manila
Mayor Antonio J. Villegas on 27 March 1968.
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1.VILLEGAS V. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO [GR L-29646,
Due Process Clause [Compiled Case Digest]

him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage
in a means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the
due process and equal protection clause is given to all
persons, both aliens and citizens. The ordinance does not lay
down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the
exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor
arbitrary and unrestricted powers. The ordinances purpose is
clearly to raise money under the guise of regulation by
exacting
P50
from
aliens
who
have been
cleared
for
employment. The amount is unreasonable and excessive

because it fails to consider differences in situation among
The Ordinance prohibits aliens from employment and trade in
aliens required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, full-
the City of Manila without the requisite mayors permit; but
time, part-time, rank-an-file or executive.
excepting persons employed in the diplomatic or consular

missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance
programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign
government,
and
those
working
households,
and
members
of
in
their
religious
respective
orders
or
congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid

monetarily or in kind. The permit fee is P50, and the penalty is
imprisonment of 3 to 6 months or fine of P100-200, or both.
Villegas V Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho G.R. No. L-29646 |

1978-11-10
Subject:
Equal Protection, Uniformity of Taxation, Undue
Delegation of Legislative Power
Facts:
Manila,
Ordinance No. 6537, passed by the City of

prohibits
aliens
from
being
employed,
whether
On 4 May 1968, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in
permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an
Manila, filed a petition, with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the
Manila (Civil Case 72797), praying for (1) the issuance of the
permit fee of P50.00, unless exempted under the Ordinance.
writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the

implementation of the ordinance, and (2) judgment to declare
Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila, filed a
the ordinance null and void. On 24 May 1968, Judge Francisco
petition to restrain the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6637
Arca (CFI Manila, Branch I) issued the writ of preliminary
and to declare the same null and void. The CFI Judge granted
injunction and on 17 September 1968, the Judge rendered a
the petition.
decision declaring the ordinance null and void, and the

preliminary injunction is made permanent.
Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No.6537
Mayor Villegas filed a petition for certiorari to review the

decision of the CFI.
cannot be declared null and void on the ground that it violated

the rule on uniformity of taxation because the rule on
uniformity of taxation applies only to purely tax or revenue
Issue: Whether the Ordinance, requiring aliens - however
measures and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue
economically situated - to secure working permits from the
measure but is an exercise of the police power of the state, it
City of Manila at a uniform fee of P50, is reasonable.
being principally a regulatory measure in nature.
Held:
The
ordinance
is
arbitrary,
oppressive
and
unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus,

deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and
therefore, violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution. Requiring a person, before he can
be employed, to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila,
who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying
Held:
Uniformity of Taxation
1. The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax

or
revenue
measure
because
its
principal
purpose
is
regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that the first
permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and

judgment in the processing and approval of applications for
employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character,
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part which requires that the alien shall secure an employment

to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may
withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the
basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a
means of livelihood.
the second part which requires the payment of P50.00 as

employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure.
6. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged
There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens
to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted,
who have been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the
he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This
purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of
guarantee includes the means of livelihood.
regulation.
7. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal
Equal Protection
protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and

citizens.
2. The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is

excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial
2.Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)
differences in situation among individual aliens who are

required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the
Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that
J. Fernando
Facts:
the classification should be based on real and substantial

differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association,
particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being
and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned
collected from every employed alien, whether he is casual or
for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963
permanent,part time or full time or whether he is a lowly
to be applicable in the city of Manila.
employee or a highly paid executive.
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
3. Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not lay down

any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of
his discretion.
4. Where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any

policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's
action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a
permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the

powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the
fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers.
They also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged
ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative of due process insofar
because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per
annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second
class motels; there was also the requirement that the
guests would fill up a form specifying their personal
information.
entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor
There was also a provision that the premises and
arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance
facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses
of permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and
would be open for inspection from city authorites. They
unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity
claimed this to be violative of due process for being
per se lawful.
vague.
Due Process
5. The ordinance violates the due process rule of the

Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed
The law also classified motels into two classes and

required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities
in first class motels such as a telephone in each room,
a
dining
room
or,
restaurant
and
laundry.
The
for being arbitrary.

It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours.
same time, to increase "the income of the city

government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in

the hotel.
and general welfare of the people. In view of the

requirements of due process, equal protection and
other applicable constitutional guaranties, however,
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic

cancellation of the license of the hotels that violated
the ordinance.
The
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petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this
the power must not be unreasonable or violative of due

process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due
lower
court
declared
the
ordinance
unconstitutional.
process. It has a standard to which the governmental

action should conform in order that deprivation of life,
liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid.
What then is the standard of due process which must
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.
exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite

Issue:Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of
to free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It
Manila is violative of the due process clause?
is
responsiveness
to
the
supremacy
of
reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
Held: No. Judgment reversed.
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.
Ratio:
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law.
with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
However, the Judiciary should not lightly set aside
circumstances," decisions based on such a clause
legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of
requiring
personal or property rights under the guise of police
fundamental principles of our society." Questions of
regulation.
due process are not to be treated narrowly or
"close
and
perceptive
inquiry
into
pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.

O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case
was in the scope of police power. As underlying
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the
questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of
ordinances nullity for an alleged failure to meet the
legislation
due process requirement.
of
this
character,
the
resumption
of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some

factual foundation of record for overthrowing the
statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the
present case, the lower court deciding the matter on
the
pleadings
and
the
stipulation
of
facts,
the
presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment

against the ordinance set aside.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations

are also incidental to the police power and the right to
exact a fee may be implied from the power to license
and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees
the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider
discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and
aside from applying the well-known legal principle that
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance
municipal
was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices
oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general
hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and
rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. Eg. Sale
prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees
of liquors.
was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind

from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the
ordinances
must
not
be
unreasonable,
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement

the states police power.
In one case- much discretion is given to municipal
corporations in determining the amount," here the
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license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if

it were viewed purely as a police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting
duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not
violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in
democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by
law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good
of the individual and for the greater good of the peace
and order of society and the general well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance
of liberty and authority in his mind through education
and
personal
discipline,
so
that
there
may
be
established the resultant equilibrium, which means

peace and order and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality
as a living principle, unlike in the sole case of People v
Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent
given way to the assumption by the government of the
right of intervention even in contractual relations
affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty
involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the
standard for the validity of governmental acts is much
more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal
information, the maintenance of establishments, and
the full rate of payment- Holmes- We agree to all
the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with
what they omit but there is no canon against using
common sense in construing laws as saying what they
obviously mean."
3. Rubi, et. al. vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [GR
14078, 7 March 1919]
On 1 February 1917, the Provincial Board of

Mindoro adopted Resolution 25 creating a reservation /
permanent settlement for Mangyans (Mangyanes) in an
800-hectare public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan
Lake, and resolving that Mangyans may only solicit
Facts:
homesteads on the reservation provided that said

homestead applications be previously recommended
by the provincial governor.
On 21 February 1917, the Secretary of Interior
approved Resolution 25. On 4 December 1917, the
provincial governor of Mindoro issued Executive Order
2 which directed all Mangyans in the vicinities of the
townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east
of the Baco River including those in the districts of
Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their
habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later
than 31 December 1917, and penalizing any Mangyan
who refused to comply with the order with
imprisonment of not exceeding 60 days, in accordance
with section 2759 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed
their dwellings within the reservation of Tigbao and are
prosecuted in accordance with section 2759 of Act No.
2711. On the other hand, Doroteo Dabalos, was
detained by the sheriff of Mindoro by virtue of the
provisions of Articles 2145 and 2759 of Act 2711, for
having run away from the reservation. Rubi and other
Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro applied for writs
of habeas corpus, alleging that the Manguianes are
being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province.
Issue: Whether due process was followed in the
restraint of the Manguianes liberty, either on their

confinement in reservations and/or imprisonment due
to violation of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code
Held:
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away

except by due process of law. The meaning of "due
process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life,
liberty, property, and immunities under the protection
of the general rules which govern society."
To constitute "due process of law," a judicial
proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances,
even a hearing and notice are not requisite, a rule
which is especially true where much must be left to the
discretion of the administrative officers in applying a
law to particular cases. Neither is due process a
stationary and blind sentinel of liberty.
Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority,
whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly
devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in
furtherance of the public good, which regards and
preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must
be held to be due process of law. Due process of law"
means simply that "first, that there shall be a law
prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the
What is due process of law depends on circumstances.

It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the
situation. The pledge that no person shall be denied
the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a
statute which is applicable to all of a class. The
classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot
be purely arbitrary in nature. Herein, one cannot hold
that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with
when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is
considered. They are restrained for their own good and
the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say
that due process of law has not been followed. To go
back to our definition of due process of law and equal
protection of the laws. There exists a law; the law
seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the
regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies
alike to all of a class.
Action pursuant to Section 2145 of the Administrative
Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without
due process of law and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in
reservations in accordance with said section does not
constitute slavery and involuntary servitude.
We are further of the opinion that Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the
police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy
of the United States.
Rubi and the other Manguianes are not unlawfully
imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus
can, therefore, not issue.
4. G.R. NO. 86899-903 MAY 15, 1989173 SCRA 409 DELOSO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
This petition seeks to annul and set aside the
resolution of the Sandiganbayan which preventivelysuspended
petitioner Amor D. Deloso (accused in the criminal cases)
from his position as provincial governor of Zambales and from
any office that he may be holding.
Page
legislative department of the Government; second,

that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third,
that it shall be enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it
shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state
or to all of a class."

by the Municipality of Botolan thru a loan financed by the
Land Bank of the Philippines for lease to local farmers at
reasonable cost, without any agreement as to the payment of
rentals for the use of tractor by the latter, thereby, causing
undue injury to the Municipality of Botolan.
Deloso was, then, elected governor of the Province
of Zambales in the January 18, 1988 local elections.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner be suspended
indefinitely.
HELD
It would be most unfair to the people of Zambales
who elected the petitioner to the highest provincial office in

their command if they are deprived of his services for an
indefinite period with the termination of his case possibly
extending beyond his entire term.
The Court rules that a preventive suspension of an
elective public officer under Section 13 of Republic Act 3019
should be limited to the ninety (90) days under Section 42 of
Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service Decree, which
period also appears reasonable and appropriate under the
circumstances of this case.
The petitioner may still be suspended but for
specifically expressed reasons and not from an automatic
application of Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
preventive suspension limited to only ninety (90) days after
which Deloso will assume once again the functions of
governor of Zambales.
5.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.

1. TANADA V. TUVERA (RESOLUTION)
G.R. No. L-63915 | 1986-12-29
Subject:
Due Process, Publication requirement
Facts:
Petitioners demand the disclosure of a number
of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been
published as required by law. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when
it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately
upon their approval.
Deloso was the duly elected mayor of Botolan,

Zambales in the local elections of November 1971. While he
occupied the position of mayor, a certain Juan Villanueva filed
In an earlier decision, the Court affirmed the necessity for the

publication of presidential issuances which are of general
application.
a complaint withthe Tanodbayan accusing him of having

committed acts in violation of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act
3019) for issuing to certain Daniel Ferrer a tractor purchased
Petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction

between laws of general applicability and those which are not;
Held:
Publication requirement
1. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides:
Page
that publication means complete publication; and that the

publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette.

5.1. Interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, that is,regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public.
5.2. Letters of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties.
"ART.2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days

following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided xxx."
5.3. Instructions issued by the Minister of Social

Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions
for adoption
2. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the

date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication
itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
5.4. Rules laid down by the head of a government

agency on the assignments or workload of his
personnel or the wearing of office uniforms
3.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteenday period shall be shortened or extended.
6. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since

its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.
4. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to
those of general application.
4.1. All statutes, including those of local application
and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature.
4.2. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution.
4.3. Administrative rules and regulations must also
be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
4.4. The charter of a city must be published
notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of
the national territory and directly affects only the
inhabitants of that place.
4.5. All presidential decrees must be published,
including even,say, those naming a public place after
a favored individual or exempting him from certain
prohibitions or requirements.
6.1. The mere mention of the number of the

presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the
supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere
supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the
publication requirement. This is not even substantial
compliance
7. Under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws
must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere (i.e.
newspaper of general circulation), as a requirement for their
effectivity.
Due Process
8. Omission of the publication requirement would offend due
process insofar as it would deny the public of knowledge of
the laws that are supposed to govern it. The conclusive
presumption that every person knows the law presupposes
that the law has been published if the presumption is to have
any legal justification at all.
2. WEBB VS DE LEON (1995)
G.R. No. 121234 | 1995-08-23
Subject:
Probable Cause, Warrant of Arrest, Due Process, Discovery
Procedure is available during Preliminary Investigation stage,
4.6. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must

be published if they are meant not merely to
interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank
Act which that body is supposed to enforce
Discharge of State Witness, Right to Fair Trial (Prejudicial

Publicity)
Facts:
4.7. Municipal ordinances must also be published

although they are not covered by this rule but by the
Local Government Code.
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)

filed with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint
charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian,
5. Examples of issuances that need NOT be published
Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons, with the crime of
Rape with Homicide. Forthwith, the Department of Justice
Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuo to conduct the preliminary

investigation of those charged with the rape and killing on
Page
formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State

judges should have conducted "searching examination of
witnesses" before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
June 30, 1991 of Carmela N. Vizconde; her mother Estrellita
6. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that upon filing of
Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their
information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for
home at BF Homes, Paraaque, Metro Manila.
the accused.
Held:
Probable Cause
1. The court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it found probable cause against the
petitioners. A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable
cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing
certainty of guilt.
2. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution deals with the

requirements of probable cause both with respect to issuance
of warrants of arrest and search warrants. It is generally
assumed that the same quantum of evidence is required
whether one is concerned with probable cause to arrest or
probable cause to search. But each requires a showing of
probabilities as to somewhat different facts and
7. The court also rejects petitioners' contention that a judge

must first issue an order of arrest before issuing a warrant of
arrest. There is no law or rule requiring the issuance of an
Order of Arrest prior to a warrant of arrest.
8. In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a

crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested
committed it. The recital and analysis of the parties' evidence
made in the DOJ Panel Report satisfied both judges that there
is probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against
petitioners.
9. Before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely

determine personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt
of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de
novo hearing to determine the existence of probable
cause. They just personally review the initial
determination of the prosecutor finding a probable
cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.
The sufficiency of the review process cannot be measured by
merely counting minutes and hours.
circumstances, and thus one can exist without the other.
Due Process
3. In search cases, two conclusions must be supported by
10. The records show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the
substantial evidence: (a) that the items sought are in fact
preliminary investigation with indecent haste. Petitioners were
seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity,
given fair opportunity to prove lack of probable cause against
and (b) that the items will be found in the place to be
them.
searched.
11. Petitioners cannot also assail as premature the filing of the
4. In arrest cases there must be probable cause (a) that a
Information in court against them for rape with homicide on
crime has been committed and (b) that the person to be
the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse
arrested committed it, which of course can exist without any
resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. The
showing that evidence of the crime will be found at premises
filing of said Information is in accord with Department of
under that persons control.
Justice Order No. 223, series of 1993, dated June 25,
Warrant of Arrest
1993 which allows the filing of an Information in court after

the consummation of the preliminary investigation even if the
5. The Constitution, the Rules of Court, and our case
accused can still exercise the right to seek a review of the
law repudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent
prosecutor's recommendation with the Secretary of Justice.
Discovery Procedure is available during Preliminary

Investigation stage
12. Failure to provide discovery procedure during preliminary

investigation does not, however, negate its use by a person
under investigation when indispensable to protect his
Page

determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be
admitted into the Program whenever the following
circumstances are present:
(a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a

grave felony as defined under the R.P.C. or its
equivalent under special laws;
constitutional right to life, liberty and property.

(b) there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
(c) there is no other direct evidence available for the

13. Preliminary investigation is not too early a stage to guard
proper prosecution of the offense committed;
against any significant erosion of the constitutional right to

due process of a potential accused.
(d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on

its material points;
14. The object of a preliminary investigation is to determine

the probability that the suspect committed a crime. We hold
(e) he does not appear to be most guilty; and
that the finding of a probable cause by itself subjects the

suspect's life, liberty and property to real risk of loss or
diminution. In the case at bar, petitioners are charged with
(f) he has not at anytime been convicted of any crime

involving moral turpitude
the crime of rape with homicide, a non-bailable offense when

the evidence of guilt is strong.
Discharge of State Witness
15. The power of the court to discharge a state witness under

Section 9, Rule 119 is a part of the exercise of jurisdiction but
Right to Fair Trial; Prejudicial Publicity
19. The pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain

circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right
to fair trial.
is not a recognition of an inherent judicial function. Under this

provision, the court is given the power to discharge a state
witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over
the crime and the accused.
20. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be

an allegation and proof that the judges have beenunduly
influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of
publicity.
16. Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for not including Jessica
Alfaro in the Information considering her alleged conspiratorial
21. In the case at bar, nothing in the records that will prove
participation in the crime of rape with homicide. The non-
that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the
inclusion of Alfaro is anchored on Republic Act No. 6981
investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and
(Witness Protection Program) enacted on April 24, 1991.
impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on

the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of
17. Alfaro qualified under Section 10 of said law which

provides:
the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond
knowing.
3.PEOPLE VS. MAYOR SANCHEZ (1999)
Sec. 10. State Witness. Any person who has

participated in the commission of a crime and desires
to a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as
G.R. No. 121039-45
Declarations on the Witness Stand can best be Evaluated by
Page
Subject:

Evaluated by the Trial Judge
1. The matter of assigning values to declarations on the
the Trial Judge; The Credibility of Centeno and Malabanan as
witness stand is best and most competently performed by the
Witnesses was Established during Trial; The Defense of Alibi
trial judge, who had the unmatched opportunity to observe
offered by all the Appellants is Demolished by Positive
the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various
Identification; Discrepancies between Sworn Statements do
indicia available but not reflected in the record. (People vs.
not Necessarily Discredit Witnesses; Discrepancies in
Tacipit)
Testimonies refer to Trivial Details and do not affect the Case;

The Absence of Extensive Abrasions on the Vaginal Wall does
The Credibility of Centeno and Malabanan as Witnesses
not rule out Rape; The Publicity Given to the Case did not
was Established during Trial
Impair Appelants Right to a Fair Trial; To Warrant a Finding of

Prejudicial Publicity, there must be Actual Prejudice
2. Judge Demetriou who presided over the entire trial until its
very conclusion expressed her satisfaction with the way
Facts:
witnesses' Centeno and Malabanan survived the "hot seat"

with flying colors, so to speak.
In 1993, the country was shocked with the happening of the

Allan Gomez Eileen Sarmenta rape-slay incident. The case
3. The judges impressions of the star witnesses for the State
drew strong condemnation from an outraged populace. The
bind the Supreme Court, for the Court accords great respect if
accused charged were Calauan Mayor Antonio Sanchez,
not finality, to the findings of the trial court on the credibility
George Medialdea, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon, Zoilo Ama,
of witnesses.
Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit. Then Pasig Regional Trial

Court Judge Harriet Demetriou found all the accused guilty
4. Once the prosecution witnesses are afforded full faith and
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide
credit, the defense's version necessarily stands
on seven counts.
discredited. (People vs. Calegan)
The prosecution's version of the events on that horrible night
The Defense of Alibi offered by all the Appellants is
was based mainly on the recollections of its star witnesses
Demolished by Positive Identification
Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan, members of

appellant Sanchez' security team. They were co-conspirators
5. All the appellants relied on the defense of denial/alibi. They
turned state witnesses. Both admitted having taken part in
argued that they were at their respective homes on the night
the abduction of Eileen and Allan, but denied any personal
of the rape-slay. But Centeno and Malabanan confirmed the
involvement in the rape of Eileen and the twin killings that
presence of all the appellants and their respective
followed.
participation.
The accused went before the Supreme Court to appeal. The
6. Positive identification by credible witnesses of the accused
pith of the assigned errors and the focus of the appellants'
as the perpetrators of the crime, as we have consistently held,
arguments was the issue of witnesses Centeno and
demolishes the alibi. (People vs. Tabaco)
Malabanan's credibility, whose open-court narrations served

as principal basis for the trial court's rendition of a guilty
7. Except for the Mayor Sanchez and Medialdea, the other
verdict.
appellants failed to present corroborating testimonial

evidence to buttress their respective alibis.
Held:
8. The defense of alibi is inherently weak especially when
Declarations on the Witness Stand can best be
wanting in material corroboration. Categorical declarations of
more credible than the uncorroborated alibi interposed by the

accused.
Page
witnesses for the prosecution of the details of the crime are
10

The Absence of Extensive Abrasions on the Vaginal
Wall does not rule out Rape
9. Alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is invoked
17. Prosecution witness Dr. Villaseor, medico-legal officer,
and sought to be crafted mainly by the accused himself and
ruled out the possibility of any consented sexual intercourse
his immediate relatives. (People vs. Danao)
on the part of Eileen. Appellants belittle the conclusion and

advances the view of their expert witness, Dr. Ernesto Brion
Discrepancies between Sworn Statements do not
who testified to the effect that there can be no multiple rape if
Necessarily Discredit Witnesses
there is only one laceration on Eileen's hymen as testified to

by Dr. Villaseor.
10. In an attempt to discredit Centeno, appellants principally

harp on the contradictions in four (4) Sworn Statements
18. The Court dismissed the argument and ruled that the
executed by Centeno.
absence of extensive abrasions or contusions on the vaginal

wall does not rule out rape because the slightest penetrations
11. Discrepancies between sworn statements and testimonies
enough.
made at the witness stand do not necessarily discredit the

witnesses.
The Publicity Given to the Case did not Impair

Appelants Right to a Fair Trial
12. Sworn statements/affidavits are generally subordinated in

importance to open court declarations because the former
19. The Supreme Court cannot sustain appellants claim that
are often executed when an affiant's mental faculties are not
they were denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial
in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of
publicity.
narrating in full the incident which has transpired.

20. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case
13. Testimonies given during trials are much more exact and
at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high
elaborate. Thus, testimonial evidence carries more weight
stake criminal trials.The right of an accused to a fair trial is
than sworn statements/affidavits.
not incompatible to a free press.
Discrepancies in Testimonies refer to Trivial Details and
21. Responsible press has always been regarded as the
do not affect the Case
handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in

the criminal field. The press does not simply publish
14. It may be conceded that there are inconsistencies in
information about trials but guards against the
Centeno's testimony, but they refer to trivial details which do
miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors,
not, in actuality, touch upon the "whys" and "wherefores" of
and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and
the crime committed.
criticism.
15. Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses when
To Warrant a Finding of Prejudicial Publicity, there
referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not
must be Actual Prejudice
affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity,

or the weight testimony.
22. The test of actual prejudice must be used to know the

presence of prejudicial publicity. There must be allegation and
16. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the
proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply
sincerity of a witness and prove that his testimony is not
that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. (Martelino vs.
rehearsed.
Alejandro)
4. FELICIDAD ANZALDO VS JACOBO CLAVE
Due Process Administrative Due Process
Page
11

Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the
Philippines.
5.PEOPLE V. MEDENILLA [GR 131638-39, 26 MARCH

2001]
Facts: On 16 April 1996, Loreto Medenilla y Doria was caught
Dr Anzaldo, 55, had been working in the National Institute of

Science and Technology for 28 years. She was holding the
position Scientist Research Associate IV when she was
for illegal possession and unlawfully selling 5.08g of shabu

(Criminal Case 3618-D), was in unlawful possession of 4
transparent plastic bags of shabu weighing 200.45g (Criminal
Case 3619-D) in Mandaluyong City.
appointed as Science Research Supervisor II. Her appointment
Versions of facts leading to the arrest are conflicting; the
was approved by the CSC in 1978. The position was previously
prosecution alleging buy-bust operations, while defense claim
held by Dr Kintanar who recommended Dr Venzon to his
illegal arrest, search and seizure. Arraigned on 25 June 1996,
position. Dr Venzon contested the position. Dr Afable, the one

who appointed Anzaldo, averred that Anzaldos appointment
Medenilla pleaded not guilty. The judge therein, for the

purpose of clarification, propounded a question upon a
witness during the trial.
was approved by the NIST evaluation Committee which gave
On 26 November 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
88 points to Anzalado and 66 points to Venzon. The issue was
(Branch 262) found Medenilla, in Criminal Cases 3618-D and
elevated to the Office of the president by Venzon. Clave was
3619-D, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections
then the Presidential Executive Assistant. Pursuant to PD 807

or the Civil Service Decree, Clave referred the issue to the
CSC. Clave was also holding the chairmanship of the CSC.
Clave issued Res 1178 appointing Venzon to the contested
15 and 16 of RA 6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act of

1972).
Issue: Whether judges are allowed to asked clarificatory
questions.
position. After the denial of her motion for the reconsideration

of that resolution, or on January 5, 1980, Anzaldo appealed to
the Office of the President of the Philippines. Since Clave was
holding the office of PEA he just affirmed his decision as the
CSC chairman.
Held: A single noted instance of questioning cannot justify a

claim that the trial judge was biased. The Court have
exhaustively examined the transcript of stenographic notes
and determined that the trial judge was more than equitable
in presiding over the hearings of this case. Moreover, a judge
is not prohibited from propounding clarificatory questions on a
ISSUE: Whether or not there is due process in the case at bar.
witness if the purpose of which is to arrive at a proper and just

determination of the case. The trial judge must be accorded
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Anzaldo. When PEA Clave said

in his decision that he was inclined to concur in the
recommendation of the Civil Service Commission, what he
meant was that he was concurring with Chairman Claves
recommendation: he was concurring with himself. It is evident
that Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential
a reasonable leeway in putting such questions to witnesses as

may be essential to elicit relevant facts to make the record
speak the truth. It cannot be taken against him if the
clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain
truths which tend to destroy the theory of one party.
=====================================
========================
Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation

of (himself) Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission.
6. IMELDA R. MARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO.
Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair
126995, OCTOBER 6, 1998
to Anzaldo that PEA Clave should decide whether his own

recommendation as Chairman of the CSC, as to who between
Anzaldo and Venzon should be appointed Science Research
Purisima, J.
Facts:
On June 8, 1984, IMELDA MARCOS and JOSE DANS,
as Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Light Railway Transit

Authority (LRTA) entered into a Lease Contract with the
Philippine General Hospital Foundation (PGHFI) involving an
Page
1.
12

PGHFI and the subsequent sub-lease contract between PGHFI
and Transnational Construction Corporation; and
b.
the
First
Division
convicted
her
after
Justice
Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division of 5 after a lunch
LRTA property in Pasay City for P102,760.00 per month for 25
in a Quezon City restaurant where they agreed to convict her
years;
in one case and acquit her in her other cases. The said
2.
On June 27,1984, the PGHFI subleased the said
meeting was attended by another
justice who is not a
property for P734,000.00 per month to the Transnational
member of the First Division or the Special Division in violation
Construction
of the Rules of the Sandiganbayan which requires that
Corporation
represented
by
one
Ignacio
Jumenez;
3.
sessions of the court shall be done only in its principal office in

After
petitioners
husband
was
deposed
as
Manila and that only justices belonging to the division should
President of the Philippines, she and Dans were charged of
join the deliberations.
alleged violation of Section 3 [g] of RA 3019, otherwise known
Held:
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the
The petitioner is hereby acquitted.
Sandiganbayan;
1. The great disparity between the rental price of the lease
4.
agreement signed by the petitioner (P102,760.00 per month)
After trial , the First Division of the Sandiganbayan
failed to comply with the legal requirement that all the 3
and the sub-lease rental (P734,000.00 per month) does not
justices must be unanimous in its Decision because Justice
necessarily render the monthly rate of P102,760.00 manifestly
Garchitorena
the
and grossly disadvantageous to the government in the
conviction of both accused while Justice Narciso Atienza voted
absence of any evidence using rentals of adjacent properties
to acquit them;
showing that the rentals in the property subject of the lease
5.
Thereafter, Justice Garchitorena as Presiding Justice
agreement is indeed very low. NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER
issued Administrative Order No. 288-93 constituting a Special
WAS PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION REGARDING THE
Division of five and designating Justices Augusto Amores and
RENTAL RATE OF ADJACENT PROPERTIES.. As such,
Cipriano del Rosario;
prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the petitioner
6.
reasonable doubt.
Justice
and
Justice
Jose
Balajadia
voted
for
On September 21, 1993, Justice Amores wrote

Garchitorena
Manifestation.
On
that
the
he
same
be
given
date,
15
days
however,
his
Justice
the
2. The court notes likewise the bias and prejudice of Presiding

Justice Garchitorena against the petitioner as shown by his
Garchitorena dissolved the division of 5 allegedly because he
leading, misleading and baseless hypothetical questions of
and Justice Balajadia had agreed to the opinion of Justice del
said justice to RAMON F. CUERVO, witness for the petitioner.
Rosario;
Said justice asked 179 questions to the witness as against the
7.
On September 24, 1993, a Decision was rendered
prosecutor who cross-examined the witness which was 73.
convicting the petitioner and Dans of violation of Sec. 3 [g] of
Said number of questions could no longer be described as
RA 3019;
clarificatory questions. Another ground therefore for the
8.
On June 29, 1998, the Third Division of the Supreme
acquittal of the petitioner is that she was denied IMPARTIAL
Court by a vote of 3-2 affirmed the conviction of the petitioner
TRIAL before the Sandiganbayan. This is one reason why the
but acquitted DANS;
case could no longer be remanded to the Sandiganbayan
9.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration
especially so that the other Sandiganbayan Justices in the
and at the same time prayed that her Motion be heard by the
Special Division of 5 have retired. There is therefore no
Supreme Court en banc claiming that her right to due process
compelling reason why the case should still be remanded to
of law, both substantive and procedural, was violated:
the lower court when all the evidence are already with the
a.
Supreme Court.
as a result of the fact that she was convicted as a
result of the alleged disparity of the rentals agreed upon with
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, and Panganiban voted for

conviction while Justice Vitug was the only Justice who voted
for the return of the case to the Sandiganbayan to allow the
corrections of the perceived irregularities in the proceedings
below.)
Page
(NOTE: The vote was 9-5 for Acquittal. CJ Narvasa, Justices
13

lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices in the First Division.
At that stage, petitioner had a vested right to be heard by the
five (5) justices, especially the new justices in the persons of
Justices Amores and del Rosario who may have a different
view of the cases against her. At that point, Presiding Justice
Garchitorena and Justice Balajadia may change their mind and
c.
DBP VS. CA, January 29, 1999
d.
MATUGUINA VS. CA, 263 SCRA 490
e.
PEOPLE VS. CA, 262 SCRA 452
f.
JAVIER VS. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194
agree with the original opinion of Justice Atienza but the

turnaround cannot deprive petitioner of her vested right to the
opinion of Justices Amores and del Rosario. It may be true
that Justice del Rosario had already expressed his opinion
during an informal, unscheduled meeting in the unnamed
Due Process
restaurant but as aforestated, that opinion is not the opinion
Imelda was charged together with Jose Dans for Graft &
contemplated by law. But what is more, petitioner was denied
Corruption for a dubious transaction done in 1984 while they
the opinion of Justice Amores for before it could be given,
were officers transacting business with the Light Railway
Presiding Justice Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division.
st
Transit. The case was raffled to the 1 Division of the

Sandiganbayan.
The
division
was
headed
by
Justice
Garchitorena with J Balajadia and J Atienza as associate

justices. No decision was reached by the division by reason of
Atienzas dissent in favor of Imeldas innocence. Garchitorena
then summoned a special division of the SB to include JJ
Amores and Cipriano as additional members. Amores then
asked Garchitorena to be given 15 days to send in his
manifestation. On the date of Amores request, Garchitorena
received manifestation from J Balajadia stating that he agrees
with J Rosario who further agrees with J Atienza. Garchitorena
then issued a special order to immediately dissolve the
special division and have the issue be raised to the SB en
banc for it would already be pointless to wait for Amores
manifestation granted that a majority has already decided on
Imeldas favor. The SB en banc ruled against Imelda.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process has been observed.
HELD: The SC ruled that the ruling of the SB is bereft of merit
as there was no strong showing of Imeldas guilt. The SC
further emphasized that Imelda was deprived of due process
by
reason
of
manifestation.
Garchitorena
Such
not
procedural
waiting
flaws
for
Amores
committed
by
respondent Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of its

decision convicting petitioner. Garchitorena had already
created the Special Division of five (5) justices in view of the
7. EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION VS. CALDERON

GR.No.156168
December 14, 2004
FACTS
Jose T. Calderon is a businessman engaged in several business
activities here and abroad, either in his capacity as President or
Chairman of the Board thereon. He is also a stockholder of PLDT and
a member of the Manila Polo Club, among others. He is a seasoned
traveler, who travels at least seven times a year in the U.S., Europe
and Asia. On the other hand, Equitable Banking Corporation is one of
the leading commercial banking institutions in the Philippines, engaged
in commercial banking, such as acceptance of deposits, extension of
loans and credit card facilities, among others.Sometime in September
1984, Calderon applied and was issued an Equitable International Visa
card. The said Visa card can be used for both peso and dollar
transactions within and outside the Philippines.
The credit limit for the peso transaction is twenty thousand pesos;
while in the dollar transactions, Calderon is required to maintain a
dollar account with a minimum deposit of $3,000.00, the balance of
dollar account shall serve as the credit limit.In April 1986, Calderon
together with some reputable business friends and associates went to
Hongkong for business and pleasure trips. Specifically on 30 April
1986, Calderon accompanied by his friend, Ed De Leon went to Gucci
Department Store located at the basement of the Peninsula Hotel
Hongkong. There and then, Calderon purchased several Gucci items
(t-shirts, jackets, a pair of shoes, etc.). The cost of his total purchase
amounted to HK$4,030.00 or equivalent to US$523.00. Instead of
paying the said items in cash, he used his Visa card to effect payment
thereof on credit. He then presented and gave his credit card to the
saleslady who promptly referred it to the store cashier for verification.
Shortly thereafter, the saleslady, in the presence of his friend, Ed De
Leon and other shoppers of different nationalities, informed him that
his Visa card was blacklisted. Calderon sought the reconfirmation of
ISSUE
Whether or not Calderon can be indemnify with damages.
RULING
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or
harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense
or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was
not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law
affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not
amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called
damnum absque injuria.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the
injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries
resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the
plaintiff- a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility
by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort
damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation
of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the
imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded;
and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the
injury.
8.SERAPIO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
CONSOLIDATED CASES JANUARY 28, 2003
G.R. NO. 148468, G.R. NO. 148769, G.R. NO. 149116
WON petitioner should instead be released through a writ of

habeas corpus.
14
Page
the status of his Visa card from the saleslady, but the latter simply did
not honor it and even threatened to cut it into pieces with the use of a
pair of scissors.Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, and in order to
avoid further indignities, Calderon paid cash for the Gucci goods and
items that he bought.
HELD:
A. Although he was already arraigned, no plea has yet been entered
thereby rendering the case moot. Nonetheless, the court takes
cognizance and held that arraignment is not a prerequisite to
conduct hearing on petition for bail.
B. The court finds no inconsistency between an application of an
accused for bail and his filing of motion to quash. Bail, is a security
given to release a person in custody of the law. A motion to quash
on the other hand is a mode by which an accused assails the
validity of a criminal complaint filed against him for insufficiency
of its facts in posits law. This tow has objectives not necessarily
antithetical to each other.
C. In exceptional cases, habeas corpus may be granted by the court
even when the person is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his
voluntary surrender. However, in the case at bar, there is no showing of
any basis for the issuance of the writ. The general rule is that the
writ does not apply when the person alleged to be restraint of his
liberty is in custody of an officer under process issued by
competent court; more so, petitioner is under detention pursuant to a
valid arrest order.
The petition was partly GRANTED on motion to quash. The petition for
habeas corpus and bail was DISMISSED.
9.SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. HON. LANTION AND MARK

JIMENEZ G.R. NO. 139465, OCTOBER 17, 2000
overturning 322 SCRA 160 (Jan. 18, 2000)
FACTS:
Edward Serapio was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal
Counsel of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. This foundation was
established to help provide educational opportunities for the poor and
underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and students. Donations
came pouring in from various institutions, organizations and that of
Chavit Singson. However, on the latter part of 2000, Chavit accused
then President Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in the illegal
number game jueteng as protector, beneficiary and recipient. The
Ombudsman took the necessary steps and find probable cause, thus
the case of plunder before the Sandiganbayan.
The accused, herein petitioner took all legal remedy to bail but
consequently due to numerous petitions and motion to quash, the
same was suspended and counter petitioned. Petitioner also prayed
forissuance of habeas corpus.
By virtue of an extradition treaty between the US and the Philippines,

the US requested for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for violations of
US tax and election laws. Pending evaluation of the extradition
documents by the Philippine government, Jimenez requested for
copies of the US extradition request. The Secetary of Justice denied
that request.
ISSUE:
During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is
private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of

notice and hearing?
ISSUE:
WON petitioner should be arraigned first before hearing his
petition for bail;
WON petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended
information during pendency of his petition to bail; and
HELD:
Private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. Extradition is a

proceeding sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call
into operation all the rights of an accused guaranteed by the Bill of
of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be

adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.
Dissent (original decision): Under the extradition treaty, the prospective
extraditee may be provisionally arrested pending the submission of the
request.
Page
Rights. The process of extradition does not involve the determination
15

are still undergoing evaluation. As held by the US Supreme Court
in United States v. Galanis:
An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the
constitutional safeguards that accompany a criminal trial in this country
do not shield an accused from extradition pursuant to a valid treaty.
Because of this possible consequence, the evaluation
process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative
As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the
proceeding, and partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation.
evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a
Thus, the basic due process rights of notice and hearing are
preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do
indispensable.
not necessarily apply to the former.
Assuming that the extradition treaty does not allow for such rights, the
The procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances
Constitutional right to procedural due process must override treaty
must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the
obligations.
government function involved as well as the private interest that has
When there is a conflict between international law
obligations and the Constitution, the Constitution must prevail.
been affected by governmental action. The concept of due process is

flexible for not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for
the same kind of procedure.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. HON. LANTION
In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, the Court
stresses that it is not ruling that the private respondent has no right to
Facts: On January 18, 2000, petitioner was ordered to furnish private
due process at all throughout the length and breadth of the
respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers
extrajudicial
and to grant the latter reasonable period within which to file his
determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the degree of
comment with supporting evidence.
what is due. Stated otherwise, a prior determination should be made
proceedings. Procedural
due
process
requires
as to whether procedural protections are at all due and when they are
Private respondent states that he must be afforded the right to notice
due, which in turn depends on the extent to which an individual will be
and hearing as required by our Constitution. He likens an extradition
condemned to suffer grievous loss.
proceeding to a criminal proceeding and the evaluation stage to a

preliminary investigation.
As aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition

Treaty affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence
Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration assailing the
against him once the petition is filed in court. The time for the
mentioned decision.
extraditee to know the basis of the request for his extradition is merely
moved to the filing in court of the formal petition for extradition. The
Issue: Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due
extraditees right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation
process right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
stage of the extradition process to accommodate the more compelling
extradition process
interest of the State to prevent escape of potential extraditees which

can be precipitated by premature information of the basis of the
Held: No. Private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing
request for his extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
extradition proceedings is the need to be more deferential to the

judgment of a co-equal branch of the government, the Executive,
An
extradition
proceeding
is sui
generis. It
is not
criminal
which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater power over
proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as
matters involving our foreign relations. Needless to state, this balance
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The process of extradition does not
of interests is not a static but a moving balance which can be adjusted
involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His
as the extradition process moves from the administrative stage to the
guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he
judicial stage and to the execution stage depending on factors that will
will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only
come into play. In sum, we rule that the temporary hold on private
relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be
respondents privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his
invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers
right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental
United States. There is no denial of due process as long as

fundamental fairness is assured a party.
10.GOVERNMENT OF THE USA V. HON. PURGANAN
GR. NO. 148571 SEPT. 24 2002
Page
fairness should he decide to resist the request for his extradition to the
16

excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a
potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of
PD No. 1069
ii.
Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

Lessons: Extradition Process, Bail on Extradition, Right of Due
excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail
Process and Fundamental Fairness in Extradition

Laws: Bill of Rights, PD 1069, US-Phil Extradition Treaty
iii.
FACTS:
HELD:
Petition is a sequel to the case Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion.

The Secretary was ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of the
Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED. Regional

Trial Court of
Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it.
extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a
reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting
evidence. But, on motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it
reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the
right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process.
Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process
i.
YES.
By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that

accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage. From the knowledge and the
On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA, represented by the
material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good
Philippine Department of Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for
first impression or a prima facie finding sufficient to make a speedy
Extradition praying for the issuance of an order for his immediate
initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the
arrest pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent the flight of
accused. The prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the
Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed
petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident
before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion praying for his
from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after
application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. After the hearing,
having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did
as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum.
exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the
Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in case a warrant should
matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. The silence of the Law
issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is
no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire
The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing
proceedings. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition
bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After he had surrendered
proceedings are summary in nature. Sending to persons sought to be
his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted
extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for
provisional liberty.
hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to

prepare and execute an escape which neither the Treaty nor the Law
Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
could have intended.
of the Rules of Court to set aside the order for the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by
cash which the court deems best to take cognizance as there is still no
Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of
local jurisprudence to guide lower court.
a warrant of arrest. To determine probable cause for the issuance of

arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination
under oath or affirmation of complainants and the witnesses they may
produce.
ISSUES:
i.
Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
The Proper Procedure to Best Serve The Ends Of Justice In

Extradition Cases
a prima facie finding whether

a)
they are sufficient in form and substance
b)
they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law
c)
the person sought is extraditable
Page
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting

documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible,
17

1)
that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a
danger to the community; and

2)
that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the

highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in
extradition cases therein
At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and
documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses
since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and
of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima
fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-
facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion
tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.
of the judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case
is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and
for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to
won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public knowledge
answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings.
that the United States was requesting his extradition. Therefore, his
Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify
constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences
the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be
of the extradition case. Thus, the court ruled against his claim that his
given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings.
election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him

bail.
ii.
Yes.
Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance
The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the
for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to
Constitution, as well
grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a
unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more.
person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
Extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because
to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and,
extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of
contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to

the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to
unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In extradition, the
mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our
presumption of innocence is not at issue. The provision in the
government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the
Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired even
Petition for Extradition.
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended finds

application only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
iii.
NO.
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are
fundamental fairness. The doctrine of right to due process and
bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the
fundamental fairness does not always call for a prior opportunity to be
present case. Extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from
heard. A subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. He will be
the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for
given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition
bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before
court hears the Petition for Extradition. Indeed, available during the
the extradition court.
hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard
and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
nature of extradition.
Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is subject to

judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case. Bail
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the
may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and
extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in
convincing showing
that country. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state;
Other Doctrines:
Five Postulates of Extradition
1)
Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime
In this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an
Page
yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
18

We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our
obligations
under the Treaty. Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a
position to deliver the
accused, should it be found proper
5)
There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an
Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused
isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to
were
improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.
willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein

respondent:
2)
The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
a)
leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his
indictment proceedings there; and

By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have
b)
remaining in the requested state despite learning that the
reposed its trust
requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged
in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its
with are bailable
treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter
to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case
Extradition is Essentially Executive
therein.
Extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility

arising out of the presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to
3)
The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of government

has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.
An extradition proceeding is sui generis:

a)
It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the
rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. It does not
11. CENTRAL BANK VS. CA
involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His

guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he
220 SCRA 536
will be extradited.
b)
An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal
proceedings involve a full-blown trial.

c)
In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal
FACTS: Central Bank discovered that certain questionable loans
case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a
extended by Producers Bank of the Philippines (PBP), totaling
fugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of a
approximately P300 million (the paid-in capital of PBP amounting only
prima facie case
to P 140.544 million, were fictitious as they were extended, without
d)
Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory
collateral, to certain interests related to PBP owners themselves.
upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may
Subsequently and during the same year, several blind items about a
adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final
family-owned bank in Binondo which granted fictitious loans to its
discretion to extradite him.
stockholders appeared in major newspapers which triggered a bankrun in PBP and resulted in continuous over-drawings on the banks
Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance
demand deposit account with the Central Bank; reaching to P 143.955
through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is
million. Hence, on the basis of the report submitted by the Supervision
restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. The
and Examination Sector, the Monetary Board (MB), placed PBP under
ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to
conservatorship.
determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition

Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.
PBP submitted a rehabilitation plan to the CB which

proposed the transfer to PBP of 3 buildings owned by Producers
4)
Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
Properties, Inc. (PPI), its principal stockholder and the subsequent
overdraft obligation but which was not approved due to disagreements

between the parties. Since no other rehabilitation program was
submitted by PBP for almost 3 years its overdrafts with the CB
continued to accumulate and swelled to a staggering P1.023
Page
mortgage of said properties to the CB as collateral for the banks
19

tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other
cases as may be referred to them." In General Order 21 dated 30
September 1972, the military tribunals, "exclusive of the civil courts,"
were vested with jurisdiction among others, over violations of the law
on firearms, and other crimes which were directly related to the
billion. Consequently, the CB Monetary Board decided to approve in
quelling of rebellion and the preservation of the safety and security of
principle what it considered a viable rehabilitation program for PBP.
the Republic.
There being no response from both PBP and PPI on the proposed
rehabilitation plan, the MB issued a resolution instructing Central Bank
In General Order 12-b dated 7 November 1972, "crimes against
management to advise the bank that the conservatorship may be lifted
persons as defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code" were
if PBP complies with certain conditions.
added
to
the
jurisdiction
of
military
tribunals/commissions.
Subsequently, General Order 49, dated 11 October 1974, redefined the

Without responding to the communications of the CB, PBP
jurisdiction of the Military Tribunals. The enumeration of offenses
filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati against the
cognizable by such tribunals excluded crimes against persons as
CB, the MB and CB Governor alleging that the resolutions issued were
defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code.
arbitraty and made in bad faith. Respondent Judge issued a temporary

restraining order and subsequently a writ of preliminary injunction. CB
filed a motion to dismiss but was denied and ruled that the MB
resolutions were arbitrarily issued. CB filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders of the trial
court but CA affirmed the said orders. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in not dismissing the

case for lack of cause of action and declaring the MB
resolutions as arbitrary.
HELD: The following requisites must be present before the order of

conservatorship may be set aside by a court:
(1) The appropriate pleading must be filed by the stockholders of
record representing the majority of the capital stock of the bank in the
proper court;
(2) Said pleading must be filed within ten (10) days from receipt of
notice by said majority stockholders of the order placing the bank
under conservatorship; and
(3) There must be convincing proof, after hearing, that the action is
plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith.
In the instant case, the original complaint was filed more than 3 years
after PBP was placed under conservator, long after the expiration of
However, although civil courts should have exclusive jurisdiction over

such offenses not mentioned in Section 1 of GO 49, Section 2 of the
same general order provided that "the President may, in the public
interest, refer to a Military Tribunal a case falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the civil courts" and vice versa. On 17 April 1975, William
Tan (@ Go Bon Ho), Joaquin Tan Leh (@ Go Bon Huat, @ Taowie)
and Vicente Tan (@ Go Bon Beng, @ Donge), with 12 others (Luis Tan
[@ Tata, @ Go Bon Hoc], Ang Tiat Chuan [@ Chuana], Mariano Velez,
Jr., Antonio Occaciones, Leopoldo Nicolas, Enrique Labita, Oscar
Yaun, Eusebio Tan [@ Go Bon Ping], Alfonso Tan [@ Go Bon Tiak], Go
E Kuan [@ Kunga], Marciano Benemerito [@ Marcing, @ Dodong],
Manuel Beleta, and John Doe), were arrested and charged in Criminal
Case MC-1-67 before the Military Commission 1, for the crimes of: (1)
murder through the use of an unlicensed or illegally-possessed firearm,
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Section 1, par. 6 of General Order 49, for the killing on 25 August 1973
of Florentino Lim of the wealthy Lim Ket Kai family of Cagayan de Oro
City; and (2) unlawful possession, control, and custody of a pistol,
caliber .45 SN-1283521 with ammunition, in violation of General
Orders 6 and 7 in relation to Presidential Decree 9. Because the case
was a "cause celebre" in Cagayan de Oro City, President Marcos,
pursuant to the recommendation of Defense Secretary Juan Ponce
Enrile, withdrew his earlier order to transfer the case to the civil courts.
the 10-day period deferred to above. It is also beyond question that the
Hence, the case was retained in the military court. All the
complaint and the amended complaint were not initiated by the
accused were detained without bail in the PC Stockade in Camp
stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock.
Crame. Upon arraignment on 6 May 1975, all the accused pleaded

"not guilty." Manuel Beleta was discharged to be used as a state
12. TAN VS. BARRIOS [GRS 85481-82, 18
witness. He was released from detention on 5 May 1975. Almost daily
OCTOBER 1990]
trials were held for more than 13 months. The testimonies of 45
Facts: On the basis of Proclamation 1081 dated 21 September 1972,

then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, thru General Order 8 dated 27
September 1972, authorized the AFP Chief of Staff to create military
prosecution witnesses and 35 defense witnesses filled up 21 volumes

of transcripts consisting of over 10,000 pages. On 10 June 1976, a
decision entitled "Findings and Sentence," was promulgated by the
Military Commission finding 5 of the accused namely: Luis Tan, Ang
Nicolas guilty of murder, where each of them was sentenced to suffer

an indeterminate prison term of from 17 years, 4 months, and 21 days,
to 20 years.
Page
Tiat Chuan, Mariano Velez, Jr., Antonio Occaciones, and Leopoldo
20

Demecillo issued an order on 26 October 1988, requiring State
Prosecutor Barrios to submit certified copies of "the supporting
affidavits of the previous cases wherever they are now," and of the
Supreme Court order "which is the basis of filing the cases, within 5
days from receipt" of his said order. The State Prosecutor has not
A sixth accused, Marciano Benemerito, was found guilty of
complied with that order. On 7 November 1988, William Tan, Joaquin
both murder and illegal possession of firearm, and was sentenced to
Tan Leh and Vicente Tan filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition
suffer the penalty of death by electrocution. 8 of the accused, namely:
praying that the informations in Criminal Cases 88-824 and 88-825,
Oscar Yaun, Enrique Labita, Eusebio Tan, Alfonso Tan, Go E Kuan,
and the order of Judge dated 26 October 1988 be annulled, among
William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh, and Vicente Tan were acquitted of the
others.
charges, and released on 11 June 1976. On 17 January 1981,

Proclamation 2045 ended martial rule and abolished the military
Issue: Whether the reprosecution of Tan, et. al. would
tribunals and commissions. On 22 May 1987, the Supreme Court
violate their right to protection against double jeopardy.
promulgated a decision in Olaguer vs. Military Commission 34, et al.

(150 SCRA 144), vacating the sentence rendered on 4 December 1984
Held: The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before
by Military Commission 34 against Olaguer, et al. and declaring that
military tribunals and commissions during the ten-year period of martial
military commissions and tribunals have no jurisdiction, even during
rule (1971-1981) which were created under general orders issued by
the period of martial law, over civilians charged with criminal offenses
President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers, is an
properly cognizable by civil courts, as long as those courts are open
operative fact that may not be justly ignored. The belated declaration in
and functioning as they did during the period of martial law.
1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did

not erase the reality of their consequences which occurred long before
In October 1986, 6 habeas corpus petitions were filed in the
the Court's decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which now
Supreme Court by some 217 prisoners in the national penitentiary, who
prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. The doctrine of
had been tried for common crimes and convicted by the military
"operative facts" applies to the proceedings against Tan, et. al. and
commissions during the 9-year span of official martial rule (G.R. Nos.
their co-accused before the Military Commission. The principle of
75983, 79077,79599-79600, 79862 and 80565 consolidated and
absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians
entitled Manuel R. Cruz, et al. vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, et al.,
should not be allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the
160 SCRA 700). Conformably with the ruling in Olaguer, the Supreme
particular case of Tan, et. al., the proceedings were fair, that there were
Court in Cruz vs. Enrile (160 SCRA 700), nullified the proceedings
no serious violations of their constitutional right to due process, and
leading to the conviction of non-political detainees who should have
that the jurisdiction of the military commission that heard and decided
been brought before the courts of justice as their offenses were totally
the charges against them during the period of martial law, had been
unrelated to the insurgency sought to be controlled by martial rule. On
affirmed by the Supreme Court (Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2,
15 September 1988, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoez issued
63 SCRA 546) years before the Olaguer case arose and came before
Department Order 226 designating State Prosecutor Hernani Barrios
the Supreme Court. Because of these established operative facts, the
"to collaborate with the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in the
refiling of the information against Tan, et. al. would place them in
investigation/reinvestigation of Criminal Case MC-1-67 and, if the
double jeopardy, in hard fact if not in constitutional logic.
evidence warrants, to prosecute the case in the court of competent

The doctrine of double jeopardy protects the accused from harassment
jurisdiction."
by the strong arm of the State: "The constitutional mandate is (thus) a

On 15 November 1988, State Prosecutor Hernani T. Barrios
rule of finality. A single prosecution for any offense is all the law allows.
was designated Acting City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in lieu of the
It protects an accused from harassment, enables him to treat what had
regular
an
transpired as a closed chapter in his life, either to exult in his freedom
investigation/reinvestigation, Fiscal Barrios filed on 9 December 1988,
or to be resigned to whatever penalty is imposed, and is a bar to
in the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City two (2) informations
unnecessary litigation, in itself time-consuming and expense-producing
for (1) Illegal Possession of Firearm [Criminal Case 88-824]; and (2)
for the state as well. It has been referred to as 'res judicata in prison
Murder [Criminal Case 88-825] against all the 15 original defendants in
grey.' The ordeal of a criminal prosecution is inflicted only once, not
Criminal Case MC- 1-67 including those who had already died.
whenever it pleases the state to do so."
fiscal
who
inhibited
himself.
Without
conducting
Criminal Cases 88-824 and 88-825 of the RTC, Cagayan de Oro City,
were assigned by raffle to the sala of RTC Judge Leonardo N.
13. MEJIA VS. PAMARAN [GRS L-56741-
Demecillo. Before issuing warrants for the arrest of the accused, Judge
42, 15 APRIL 1988]
Manila by Eusebio Lu against Feliciano F. Endangan, Josefina

Meimban, Teodorico Bontia, Rolando Antillon, Jose Mabalot and
Vicente Villamor. All cases were decided by the City Court of Manila
against Endangan, et. al., all of whom appealed in due time to the
Page
Facts: 6 ejectment cases were filed separately in the City Court of
21

Thereafter, she told Pilar Bautista, daughter of Jose Mabalot, and
Gloria Antonio, daughter of Vicente Villamor, about the help offered by
Atty. Mejia. The two said they would think it over as they had already
signed something. When she went to the court to deposit her rentals
Atty. Mejia asked her if her companions were agreeable to the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila, where the cases were raffled to
suggestion and she replied she had already told them and that they
Branch XXVI, presided over by the Honorable Jose P. Alejandro (Civil
would consider the matter. On 20 November 1979, Sylvia Dizon y
Case 122794 to 122799).
Resurreccion who loaned Meimban P500 accompanied the latter to the

court. She was seated at the corridor near the door of Atty. Mejia's
On 12 August 1979, Endangan, Bontia, Antillon, Mabalot, and Villamor
office which was partially open, and she saw Meimban handed an
entered into a compromise agreement with Lu whereby the Endangan,
envelope to Atty. Mejia who put it inside her desk drawer. On 7
et. al. individually received from Lu the sum of P5,000 in consideration
December 1979, the date set for the hearing of the motion to withdraw
of which Endangan, et. al. agreed to vacate the premises in question
the compromise and to file memoranda filed by Pilar Bautista and
and remove their houses therefrom within 60 days from the date of the
Gloria Antonio in behalf of their fathers, Atty. Mejia approached
execution of the agreement, failing which the appellee shall have the
Meimban and said no oppositor might arrive, and asked her if Bautista
authority to demolish Endangan, et. al.'s houses with costs thereof
had brought 1/2 of the P1,000.00. Bautista placed P600 in an envelope
chargeable against them.
and the two of them, Bautista and Meimban, went to Atty. Mejia's
The compromise agreement was submitted to the court. Josefina

Meimban did not join her co-defendants in entering into the
compromise agreement. Up to that stage of the cases, the counsel of
record of the defendants was Atty. S. G. Doron. On 22 August 1979,
Atty. Modesto R. Espano of the Citizens Legal Assistant Office (CLAO),
wrote Atty. Doron to inform him that Mrs. Meimban has sought the
assistance of the CLAO regarding her case, and asked that the
records of the case be sent to him. As a consequence, Atty. Doron filed
on 30 August 1979 his motion to withdraw appearance as counsel for
Meimban in Civil Case 122795. While Endangan, Bontia, Antillon,
Mabalot and Villamor, have decided to settle with Lu through
compromise agreement that they signed, Meimban resolved to
prosecute her appeal in her own case, Civil Case 122795. When
Meimban followed up her case in Branch XXVI of the CFI of Manila
and had occasion to talk to Danilo Buenaventura of that Branch who
told her that her case was already submitted for decision. She sought
assistance from the CLAO where she was instructed by Atty. Espano
to find out the real status of the case. She returned to the court
sometime in July 1979 and that was when she first came to know Atty.
Aurora Mejia who told her that the case has not yet been decided
because there was still one party who has not signed the compromise
agreement prepared by Atty. Doron. Atty. Mejia also remarked that she
was surprised why rich people were helping in that case, like a certain
Atty. Lu, a brother of Eusebio Lu, who has been approaching the
office. Bautista handed the envelope containing the money to Atty.

Mejia who received it. On 3 September 1980, Atty. Mejia attempted to
bribe the Tanodbayan Investigator (Christina Corall-Paterno), through
intricate gold chain with a pendant hearing an inscription of letter "C,"
(which the investigator returned through an employee, Dante Ramos).
CorallPaterno investigated the complaints of Josefina Meimban and
Pilar Bautista against Atty. Aurora Mejia y Rodriguez for violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On 23 April 1981, the
Sandiganbayan, in Criminal Case 1988, found Aurora Mejia y
Rodriguez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph
(b), Section 3 of RA 3019 and sentenced her to an indeterminate
imprisonment ranging from 4 years and 1 day as minimum to 7 years
as maximum, to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office and
to indemnify the victim Josefina Meimban the sum of P1,000.00
representing the money given to her. The Sandiganbayan also found
Mejia, in Criminal Case 1989, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of paragraph (b), Section 3 of RA 3019 and likewise
sentenced her to an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from 4 years
and 1 day as minimum to 7 years as maximum, to suffer perpetual
disqualification from public office and to indemnify the victim Pilar
Bautista the amount of P500 representing the money given to her.
Mejia was also ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings. Mejia filed
a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Presidential Decree is an ex-post facto law.
presiding judge; and then told her she would help them provided they
give P1,000 each for a gift to the Judge, to which she replied she
Held: The contention that Presidential Decree 1606 is contrary to the
would broach the matter to her companions. From the court, she went
ex post facto provision of the Constitution is similarly premised on the
to Atty. Modesto Espano and told the lawyer the case was not yet
allegation that "petitioner's right of appeal is being diluted or eroded
submitted. Atty. Espano instructed her to get her papers from Atty.
efficacy wise." Mejia alleged that the procedure provided for by the
Doron, which she did.
Sandiganbayan are ex post facto and hence all proceedings taken

against her are void ab initio being in violation of the Constitution. It is
further argued that only one stage of appeal is available to Mejia under
the Court of Appeals and that in said appeal to the Supreme Court only
issues of law may be raised and worse still the appeal has become a
matter of discretion rather than a matter of right. A more searching
scrutiny of its rationale would demonstrate the lack of persuasiveness
of such an argument. The Kay Villegas Kami decision, promulgated in
1970, supplies the most recent and binding pronouncement on the
matter. To quote from the ponencia of Justice Makasiar: "An ex post
facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the
passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes
such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was,
when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4)
alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less
or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights and
remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful, and (6) deprives a person
accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty." Even the most careful scrutiny of the said
definition fails to sustain Mejia's claim. The "lawful protection" to which
an accused "has become entitled" is qualified, not given a broad
scope. It hardly can be argued that the mode of procedure provided for
in the statutory right to appeal is therein embraced.
14. PEOPLE V. ESTRADA [GR 130487, 19 JUNE 2000]
Facts: On 27 December 27, 1994, Roberto

Estrada y Lopez sat at the bishops chair while
the sacrament of confirmation was being
performed at the St. Johns Cathedral, Dagupan
City. Rogelio Mararac, the security guard at the
cathedral, was summoned by some churchgoers.
Mararac went near Estrada and told him to
vacate the Bishop's chair. Mararac twice tapped
Estradas hand with his nightstick. When Mararac
was about to strike again, Estrada drew a knife
from his back, lunged at Mararac and stabbed
him, hitting him below his left throat. Mararac fell.
Wounded and bleeding, Mararac slowly dragged
himself down the altar. SP01 Conrado Francisco
received a report of the commotion inside the
cathedral, went inside the cathedral, approached
Estrada who was sitting on the chair, and advised
the latter to drop his knife. Estrada obeyed.
However, when Chief Inspector Wendy Rosario,
Deputy Police Chief, who was also at the
confirmation rites, went near Estrada, Estrada
embraced Rosario and two wrestled with each
Page
PD 1606 which effectively deprives her of the intermediate recourse to
22

other. Rosario was able to subdue Estrada.
Estrada was brought to the police station and
placed in jail. Maranac expired a few minutes
after arrival at the hospital. On 29 December
1994, Estrada was charged with the crime of
murder for the killing of Mararac. On 6 January
1995, at the arraignment, the Public Attorney's
Office, filed an "Urgent Motion to Suspend
Arraignment and to Commit Accused to
Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital." It
was alleged that Estrada could not properly and
intelligently enter a plea because he was
suffering from a mental defect; that before the
commission of the crime, he was confined at the
psychiatric ward of the Baguio General Hospital in
Baguio City. The motion was opposed by the City
Prosecutor. The trial court, motu proprio,
propounded several questions on Estrada. Finding
that the questions were understood and
answered by him "intelligently," the court denied
the motion that same day. The arraignment
proceeded and a plea of not guilty was entered
by the court on Estrada's behalf. On 23 June
1997, the trial court (RTC Dagupan City, Branch
44, Criminal Case 94-00860-D) rendered a
decision upholding the prosecution evidence and
found Estrada guilty of the crime charged and
thereby sentenced him to death, and ordered him
to pay P50,000 for indemnity, P18,870 for actual
expenses, and P100,000 as moral damages.
Estradas counsel appealed.
Issue: Whether a mental examination of the
accused should be made before the accused may
be subjected to trial.
Held: The rule barring trial or sentence of an
insane person is for the protection of the
accused, rather than of the public. It has been
held that it is inhuman to require an accused
disabled by act of God to make a just defense for
his life or liberty. To put a legally incompetent
person on trial or to convict and sentence him is
a violation of the constitutional rights to a fair
trial and due process of law. Section 12, Rule 116
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure speaks
of a "mental examination." An intelligent
determination of an accused's capacity for
rational understanding ought to rest on a deeper
and more comprehensive diagnosis of his mental
condition than laymen can make through
Page
observation of his overt behavior. Once a medical

or psychiatric diagnosis is made, then can the
legal question of incompetency be determined by
the trial court. By depriving appellant of a mental
examination, the trial court effectively deprived
appellant of a fair trial. The trial court's
negligence was a violation of the basic
requirements of due process; and for this reason,
the proceedings before the said court must be
nullified.
23

The nature of the CIR is that of an administrative court
with judicial and quasi-judicial functions for the
purpose of settling disputes and relations between
employers and employees. It can appeal to voluntary
arbitration for dispute. It can also examine the
industries in a locality by order of the president.
There is a mingling of executive and judicial
functions, which constitutes a departure from the
separation of powers.
The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly
15. ANG TIBAY V CIR (1940) 69 PHIL 635
constrained by technical rules of procedure, and is not

bound by technical rules of legal procedure. It may also
include any matter necessary for solving the dispute.
Facts:
The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial

Toribio claimed to have laid off workers due to
Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of
the shortage of leather soles in the Ang Tibay factory.
certain procedural requirements does not mean that it
The Court of industrial relations forwarded a motion for
can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or
recon with the supreme court.
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements
In pursuit of a retrial in the Court of Industrial

Relations, the national labor union, the respondent,
averred:
of due process in trials and investigations of an

administrative character.
Some examples that it must follow are:
1. The shortage of soles has no factual basis
1. right to a hearing
2. The scheme was to prevent the forfeiture of his bond
2. consideration of evidence by the court
to cover the breach of obligation with the Army
3. duty to deliberate implies a necessity which cannot
3. The letter he sent to the army was part of this
be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
scheme
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached
4. The company union was an employer dominated
4. substance of evidence and the non-binding aspect of
one.
judicial decisions in an admin court so as to free them
5. laborers rights to CBA is indispensable.
from technical rules
6. Civil code shouldnt be used to interpret a legislation
5. the decision must be rendered at the evidence
of American industrial origins.
presented at the hearing. The court may also delegate
7. Toribio was guilty of unfair labor practice for favoring
some powers to other judicial bodies.
his union.
6. The court must act on its own decision at reaching a
8. Exhibits are inaccessible to respondents.
controversy. It mustnt merely accept the views of a
9. The exhibits can reverse the judgment.
subordinate.
7. The court must clearly state the issues and the
Issue: Is the Court of Industrial Relations the proper
rationale for the decision.
venue for the trial?
The record is barren and doesnt satisfy a factual basis

as to predicate a conclusion of law.
Held: Yes. Case remanded to the CIR
Evidence was still inaccessible.

The motion for a new trial should be granted and sent
Ratio:
to the CIR.
There was no substantial evidence that the
exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their

union affiliation or activity.
69 Phil. 635 Political Law Constitutional Law Due

Process in Administrative Bodies
Grounds
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather
company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged
Page
Remedial Law Civil Procedure Motion For New Trial;
24

the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.
(3)
While the duty to deliberate does not impose the
obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
his employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU)
support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to
questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
employees laid off were members of NLU while no members

of the rival labor union (National Workers Brotherhood) were
laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union
and Toribio was merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where
Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme
Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU.
The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is
entitled to a new trial.
HELD: Yes. The records show that the newly discovered
evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they attached
to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to
them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due
diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them
and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-
(4)
Not only must there be some evidence to support a
finding or conclusion but the evidence must be substantial.

Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
(5)
The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record

and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6)
The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore,
must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law

and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views
of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7)
The administrative body should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties

to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and
the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of
this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
reaching importance and effect that their admission would

necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books
of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not
previously accessible but already existing).
Subject: Court of Industrial Relations, Due Process in Administrative

Proceedings, Substantial Evidence
Facts:
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR,
A motion for new trial was filed before the Supreme Court by the
although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must also
respondent labor union seeking to vacate its previous decision, and to
make sure that they comply to the requirements of due
remand the case to the Court of Industrial Relations. On the other
process. For administrative bodies, due process can be
hand, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the Solicitor General
complied with by observing the following:
seeking to have the Court reconsider its decision. This case arose out
(1)
The right to a hearing which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit

evidence in support thereof.
(2)
Not only must the party be given an opportunity to
present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish
of a labor dispute wherein the employees of a leather company,

members of the respondent union, were laid off, on the basis of an
alleged leather shortage. Thus, a case for unfair labor practice was
filed against the leather company, herein petitioner, before the Court of
Industrial Relations. The union now asks for new trial on the basis of
Court of Industrial Relations despite the exercise of due diligence.
Held:
Page
newly discovered evidence which they could not have filed before the
25

mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process
in trials and investigations of an administrative character.
Due Process in Administrative Proceedings

Court of Industrial Relations
8. There are primary rights which must be respected even in
1.The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions
proceedings of this character:
are specifically stated in the law of its creation.

a. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which
2.It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial
includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own
system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of
case and submit evidence in support thereof.
the Government.
b. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present
3.Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only
his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which
when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are
he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of

Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is
more active, affirmative and dynamic.
c. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the

obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity,
4. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the
a place when directly attached.
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its

functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and
d. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding

or conclusion but the evidence must be "substantial."
expensive.
e. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented
5. In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of
at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that
parties affected.
purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation

and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies
f. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges,
between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality
therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the
here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a
law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental
subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work
powers.
is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies

coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with
6. The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by
the enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other
technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to
subordinates to render final decision, with the right to appeal to board
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory authority.
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any

technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical
g. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all
rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it
controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
may deem just and equitable."
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and
the reasons for the decision rendered.
7. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said
to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not
Substantial Evidence
adequate to support a conclusion.
Page
9. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as
26
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

1. ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN [GR
148560, 19 NOVEMBER 2001]
Lessons Applicable: Consti Overbreadth doctrine,
void-for-vagueness doctrine; Crim Law 1- mala in se;
Crim pro proof beyond reasonable doubt
Laws Applicable: Art. 3 RPC
FACTS:
An information is filed against former President

Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. 'Asiong Salonga'
and 'Jose Velarde,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy'
Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe
a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or
Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas and John
Does & Jane Does of the crime of Plunder under
RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder)
June, 1998 to January 2001: Estrada

himself and/or in connivance/conspiracy with
his co-accused, who are members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates and/or other persons,
by taking undue advantage of his official
position, authority, relationship, connection, or
influence, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate
and acquire by himself, directly or indirectly, illgotten wealth of P4,097,804,173.17 thereby
unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines,
through any or a combination or a series of
overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or
means
Received P545,000,000.00 in the form

of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form
of pecuniary benefit, by himself and/or in
connection with co-accused Charlie 'Atong'
Ang, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, and John Does and
Jane Does, in consideration of toleration or
protection of illegal gambling
Diverting, receiving, misappropriating,

converting or misusing directly or indirectly, for
his or their personal gain and benefit, public
funds of P130,000,000.00, more or less,
representing a portion of P200,000,000.00)

tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171,
by himself and/or in connivance with coaccused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, John
Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane
Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and other John Does &
Jane Does
For His Personal Gain And Benefit, The

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
To Purchase 351,878,000 Shares Of Stocks,
More Or Less, And The Social Security System
(SSS), 329,855,000 Shares Of Stock, More Or
Less, Of The Belle Corporation worth
P1,102,965,607.50 and P744,612,450.00
respectively and by collecting or receiving,
directly or indirectly, by himself and/or in
connivance with John Does and Jane Does,
commissions or percentages by reason of said
purchases which became part of the deposit in
the equitable-pci bank under the account
name Jose Velarde
by unjustly enriching himself from

commissions, gifts, shares, percentages,
kickbacks, or any form of pecuniary benefits, in
connivance with John Does and Jane Does,
P3,233,104,173.17 and depositing the same
under his account name Jose Velarde at the
Equitable-Pci Bank
Estrada questions the constitutionality of the

Plunder Law since for him:
1 it suffers from the vice of vagueness
2. it dispenses with the "reasonable
doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions
3. it abolishes the element of mens
rea in crimes already punishable under The
Revised Penal Code
April 4, 2001: Office of the Ombudsman filed before
the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations, docketed
as:
1. Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as
amended by RA 7659
2. Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for
violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and
3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act), respectively
3. Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par.
(d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees)
4. Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The
Revised Penal Code)
5. Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias
(CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085)
April 11, 2001: Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on
the grounds of lack of preliminary investigation,
Page
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and

opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. - Denied
April 25, 2001: Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in
Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that a probable cause for
the offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of
warrants for the arrest of the accused
June 14, 2001: Estrada moved to quash the
Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that
the facts alleged therein did NOT constitute an
indictable offense since the law on which it was based
was unconstitutional for vagueness and that the
Amended Information for Plunder charged more than 1
offense Denied
Estrada filed a petition for certiorari are:
1. The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for
being vague
2. The Plunder Law requires less evidence for
proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore
violates the rights of the accused to due process
3. Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a
malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the
power of Congress to so classify it
27
ISSUES:
1. W/N the Plunder Law is constitutional
(consti1)
2. W/N the Plunder Law dispenses with the
"reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions (crim pro)
3. W/N the Plunder Law is a malum
prohibitum (crim law 1)
Overbreadth Doctrine - a governmental

purpose may NOT be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms
overbreadth claims, if entertained at
all, have been curtailed when invoked
against ordinary criminal laws that are
sought to be applied to protected
conduct
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague
statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech.
HELD: Petition is dismissed. Plunder Law is

constitutional.
1. YES
Miserably failed in the instant case to

discharge his burden and overcome the
presumption of constitutionality of the
Plunder Law
Plunder Law contains ascertainable

standards and well-defined parameters
which would enable the accused to
determine the nature of his violation.
Combination- at least two (2) acts

falling under different categories of
enumeration
series - must be two (2) or more

overt or criminal acts falling under the
same category of enumeration
pattern - at least a combination or

series of overt or criminal acts enumerated
in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d)
Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine - a
statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily

guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of
due process of law
- The test in determining whether a criminal statute is
void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed
conduct when measured by common understanding
and practice
- can only be invoked against that specie of
legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that
which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or
by construction
- a statute or act may be said to be vague when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ in its application.
- the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in 2
respects:
a. it violates due process for failure to
accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct
to avoid
b. it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle
- As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a
litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is
vague in all its possible applications
Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect

resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State
may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law,
the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have

special application only to free speech cases.
2.
NO.
Subject:
Constitutionalchallenge-Void
for
Vagueness,
Overbreadth doctrine, Facial challenge
Facts:
Former President Joseph Estrada was prosecutedunder RA 7080
(Plunder Law), as amended by RA 7659. He challenges the law as
unconstitutional for (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it
violates the right of due process of the accused as it dispenses with
the"reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) by
Page
The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is

indispensable to command the respect and confidence
of the community in the application of criminal law.
o has acquired such exalted stature in the
realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the
Due Process Clause which protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond

reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to
form a combination or series which would constitute a
pattern and involving an amount of at least
P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and
every other act alleged in the Information to have been
committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate
or acquire ill-gotten wealth
o Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof
of the predicate acts. This conclusion is
consistent with reason and common
sense. There would be no other explanation
for a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill gotten wealth."
3. NO
plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal
intent (mens rea)
o Any person who participated with the said public officer
in the commission of an offense contributing to the
crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such
offense.
o In the imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised
Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.
indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of
plunder since the degree of responsibility of the
offender is determined by his criminal intent
o The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder
is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For
when the acts punished are inherently immoral or
inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not
matter that such acts are punished in a special law,
especially since in the case of plunder the predicate
crimes are mainly mala in se
28

defining Plunder as ?malum prohibitum?, it abolishes the element of
mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code.
Estrada also points to the failure of the law to providefor the statutory
definition of the terms "combination" and"series" in the key phrase "a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d),
and Sec. 2, and the word"pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions
supposedly render the PlunderLaw unconstitutional for being
impermissibly vague and overbroad.
Held:
Void for Vagueness Doctrine
1. Thevoid-for-vagueness doctrine statesthat "a statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act interms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at itsmeaning and differ as to its application, violates
the first essential of dueprocess of law." It can only be
invoked against that specie of legislationthat is utterly vague
on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarifiedeither by a
saving clause or by construction.
2. Astatute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standardsthat men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning anddiffer in its
application. In such instance, the statute isrepugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects ?
i. it violates due process for failure to
accordpersons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct
toavoid; and,
ii. it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion
incarrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Governmentmuscle.
3. Butthe doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are
merely couched inimprecise language but which nonetheless
specify a standard though defectivelyphrased; or to those
that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable tocertain
types of activities. The first may be "saved" by
properconstruction, while no challenge may be mounted as
against the second wheneverdirected against such activities.
4. Aslong as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule
that would informthose who are subject to it what conduct
would render them liable to its penalties,its validity will be
sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in
itsapplication; the counsel, in defending one charged with its
violation; and moreimportantly, the accused, in identifying
the realm of the proscribed conduct.
5. The Plunder Law does not suffer from theconstitutional defect
of vagueness
a. It contains ascertainable standards andwell-defined
parameters which would enable the accused to
determine the natureof his violation-- what the
Plunder Law punishes is the act of a public
officerin amassing or accumulating ill-gotten
wealth of at least P50,000,000.00through a series
or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par.
(d), of thePlunder Law
6. Astatute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because
general terms areused therein, or because of the
employment of terms without defining them.
7. Wordsof a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and
ordinaryacceptation and signification, unless it is evident that
29
malum in se. For when the acts punished are

inherentlyimmoral or inherently wrong, they are
mala in se and it does not matter thatsuch acts are
punished in a special law, especially since in the
case ofplunder the predicate crimes are mainly
mala in se.
Page
the legislatureintended a technical or special legal meaning

to those words.
8. Whenthe Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is
referringto at least 2 acts falling under different categories of
enumerationprovided in Sec. 1(d)
9. Toconstitute a ?series" there must be 2 or more overt or
criminal actsfalling under the same category of enumeration
found in Sec. 1(d)
Overbreadth Doctrine
10. Theoverbreadth doctrine decrees that"a governmental
purpose may not be achieved by means which
sweepunnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.?
Facialchallenge
11. Afacial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute
and to one which isoverbroad because of possible "chilling
effect" upon protectedspeech.
12. Thedoctrines
of strict
scrutiny,
overbreadth,
and
vagueness are analyticaltools developed for testing "on their
faces" statutes infreespeech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases.They cannot be
invoked when what is involved is a penal or criminal statute.
Procedural dueprocess
13. Thethesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every
component of thecrime suffers from a dismal misconception
of the import of that provision. Whatthe prosecution needs to
prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of
actssufficient to form a combination or series which would
constitute a pattern andinvolving an amount of at least
P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove eachand every
other act alleged in the Information to have been committed
by theaccused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme
or conspiracy to amass,accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth. To illustrate, supposing that theaccused is charged in
an Information for plunder with having committed fifty(50)
raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove
all thesefifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern
at least two (2) ofthe raids beyond reasonable doubt
provided only that they amounted to at least
P50,000,000.00.
14. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or
establish anysubstantive right in favor of the accused but
only operates in furtherance of aremedy. Even without
invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had.Thus,
even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed
and vitiated,it may simply be severed from the rest of the
provisions without necessarilyresulting in the demise of the
law; after all, the existing rules on evidencecan supplant
Sec. 4 more than enough.
Plunderis malum in se
15. Plunderis a malum in se which requires proof of criminal
intent.
a. Theapplication of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances in the RPC toprosecutions under
the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that
mens reais an element of plunder since the
degree of responsibility of the offender
isdetermined by his criminal intent.
b. Thelegislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that
plunder is a heinous offenseimplies that it is a
2.
I.
RANDOLF S. DAVID V. GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO, G.R. NO. 171396, MAY 3, 2006 (AND
OTHER CONSOLIDATED CASES)
THE FACTS
On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the

20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued
PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national
emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President
of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon
me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states
that: The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call
out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in
my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout
the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to
all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by
me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17,
Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the
executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers,
leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army, and some members of the
political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President
Arroyo.They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President
and take-over the reins of government as a clear and present danger.
Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants
on February 24, 2006 on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of
the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo,
was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25,
2006. Seized from the premises in the absence of any official of the
Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building were several
materials for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP
and AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the
warrantless search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017
issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of
her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines
to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
II. THE ISSUE
1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made
pursuant to PP 1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily
Tribunes officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid?
[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]

1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et
al., made pursuant to PP 1017, were NOT valid.
[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable
unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of
arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides [for the following circumstances of valid
warrantless arrests]:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.
Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit
warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner Davids warrantless arrest.
During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of
BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their
observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the
invective Oust Gloria Nowand their erroneous assumption that
petitioner David was the leader of the rally.Consequently, the Inquest
Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not
wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is
insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.
2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily
Tribunes officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.
[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is
illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays
down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4
requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates
that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the
presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or
in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section
9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime,
unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be
searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at
any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG
operatives.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is
constitutional.
RULING:
Page
III. THE RULING
30

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be
divided into three important provisions,
thus:
First provision: by virtue of the power
vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do
hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout
the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or
rebellion
Second provision:
and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction;
Third provision: as provided in Section
17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar
as provided by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the
calling-out power is that whenever it becomes
necessary, the President may call the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. (Integrated
Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyos declaration of a state
of rebellion was merely an act declaring a status
or condition of public moment or interest, a
declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II
of the Revised Administration Code. Such
declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless,
without legal significance, and deemed not
written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than
that. In declaring a state of national emergency,
President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling
on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on
Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the States
extraordinary power to take over privately-owned
public utility and business affected with public
interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of
Page
an
awesome
power.
Obviously,
such
Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of
Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of
President Arroyos calling-out power for the
armed forces to assist her in preventing or
suppressing lawless violence.
Second Provision: The "Take Care"
Power.
The second provision pertains to the
power of the President to ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17,
Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control
of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP
1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
President
Arroyo
the
authority
to
promulgate decrees. Legislative power is
peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.
Section 1, Article VI categorically states that
[t]he legislative power shall be vested in
the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial
Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise
of legislative power by issuing decrees.
Third Provision: The Power to Take
Over
Distinction must be drawn between the
Presidents authority to declarea state of
national emergency and to exercise emergency
powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants
the President such power, hence, no legitimate
constitutional objection can be raised. But to the
second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of
emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of
Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate
such powers to the President. Certainly, a body
cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it.
However,
knowing
that
during
grave
emergencies, it may not be possible or
31

practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its
powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed
it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency
powers to the President, subject to certain
conditions, thus:
(1)
There must be a war or other
emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited
period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to
such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be
exercised to carry out a national policy declared
by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be
understood as an aspect of the emergency
powers clause. The taking over of private
business affected with public interest is just
another facet of the emergency powers generally
reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17
states that the the State may, during the
emergency
and
under
reasonable
terms
prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct
the operation of any privately owned public utility
or business affected with public interest, it
refers to Congress, not the President. Now,
whether or not the President may exercise such
power is dependent on whether Congress may
delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing
the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17,
Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing
PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation
does not authorize her during the emergency to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest without authority
from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the
President alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however, without legislation, he has
no power to take over privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest.
Nor can he determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without
legislation, the President has no power to point
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since

it provides a standard by which the AFP and the
PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is
necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of
lawless violence. Considering that acts of
terrorism have not yet been defined and made
punishable by the Legislature, such portion of
G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.
Page
out the types of businesses affected with public

interest that should be taken over. In short, the
President has no absolute authority to exercise all
the powers of the State under Section 17, Article
VII in the absence of an emergency powers act
passed by Congress.
32

Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no
factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such
power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the
emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural
calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP
1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and
unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become
moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the
declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within
the presidents calling out power, take care power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and
partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of
the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there
489 SCRA 160 Political Law The Executive Branch Presidential
are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP.
Proclamation 1017 Take Care Clause Take Over Power Calling
Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that
Out Power
PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions

of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Bill of Rights Freedom of Speech Overbreadth

Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and
the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president,
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in
then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential
issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals
Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General
Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration
Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness
of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting
and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the
Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and
defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the
at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public
reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the
organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally
Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine
permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to
Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military.
rally which led to his arrest.
Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any

contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor,
justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the
was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA
seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her
articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news
arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was
agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such
Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a
power or duty must not stifle liberty.
warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against
Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of
developed for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases. The
national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition
7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom of speech
directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call

upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence.
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the
validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining
comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected
Page
cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily
33

House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state
of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of
legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only take
care of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are

considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus,
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private
claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes
corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again,
authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency
that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the
protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP
president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise
1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is
of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such
manifestly subject to state regulation.
exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress

must be based on the following:
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP
1017. The SC considered the Presidents calling-out power as a
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this

does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the
within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
Congress may prescribe.
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA

has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President,
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national
as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the
policy declared by Congress.
most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law
declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-
Declaration
out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may

call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not
or rebellion. And such criterion has been met.
tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the

president by the president.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine

Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He
David vs. Arroyo
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president

declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated
G.R. No. 171396 | 2006-05-03
Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the

President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause
to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The
SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted
former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081).
The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is
peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6
categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
Subject:
Moot and Academic, Locus Standi, Political Question(Callingout Power), Emergency Powers of the President, Facial
Challenge
(Overbreadth
Doctrine),
Facial
Challenge
(Vagueness), Section 17, Article VII (Take Care Power or
Control Power of the President), Section 17, Article XII (Take
Over Power of the President), 'As Applied' Challenge,Acts of
Terrorism, Right to Peacably Assemble,

(iv)
34
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th

Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo
issued Presidential
Proclamation
No.
1017 (PP
1017)
'declaring a state of national emergency'. On the same day,
the President also issued General Order No. 5 implementing
PP 1017 and directing the AFP and PNP to take appropriate
actions 'to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless
violence'
Page
Facts:
3.
the case is capable of repetition yet evading

review.
President Arroyo's issuance of PP 1021 did not render

the present petitions moot and academic. During the
eight days that PP 1017 was operative, the police
officers committed illegal acts in implementing it.
Moreover, all the above exceptions are present to
justify the Court's assumption of jurisdiction over the
petitions.
Locus Standi
Thereafter, during the dispersal of the rallyists along
EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) Randolf S. David, a
UP professor and newspaper columnist, and Ronald Llamas,
president of party-list Akbayan.
Also, in the early morning of February 25, 2006,operatives of
the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the
PNP,on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily
Tribune offices in Manila.
4.
In public suits, our courts adopt the 'direct injury'

test which states that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have 'a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.
5.
However,being a mere procedural technicality, the

requirement of locus standi maybe waived. Thus,
even where the petitioners have failed to show direct
injury,they have been allowed to sue under the
principle of 'transcendental importance.'
6.
Petitioners David, Llamas and the Tribune suffered

'direct injury' resulting from the 'illegal arrest' and
'unlawful search' committed by police operatives
pursuant to PP 1017.
7.
KMU's assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated

its right to peaceful assembly may be deemed
sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may
be granted standing to assert the rights of their
members. The courts took judicial notice of the
announcement by the Office of the President banning
all rallies and canceling all permits for public
assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5.
8.
The national officers of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines (IBP) have no legal standing,having no
direct or potential injury which the IBP as an
institution or its members may suffer as a
consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and
G.O. No.5. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty
to preserve the rule of law istoo general an interest.
However, in view of the transcendental importance
ofthe issue, the Court vested them with locus
standi.
One week after the issuance of PP 1017 and GO No.

5, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1021 declaring
that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.
Petitions were filed challenging the constitutionality of and
G.O. No. 5 and PP 1017.
The factual basis cited by the Arroyo camp for the executive
issuances was the alleged existence of plot attempts from the
political opposition and NPA to unseat or assassinate
President Arroyo. The plot attempts were a clear and present
danger that justified the orders.
Held;
Moot and Academic
1.
2.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to

present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value.
As a general rule, courts decline jurisdiction over
cases rendered moot. However, courts will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, in the following
situations:
(i)
there is a
Constitution;
(ii)
the exceptional character of the situation

and the paramount public interest is
involved;
(iii)
grave
violation
of
the
when constitutional issue raised requires

formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public;
Political Question, Calling-Out Power

9.
While the President's 'calling-out' power is a

discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, 'this
does not prevent an examination of whether such
power was exercised within permissible constitutional
limits or whether it was exercised in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion.'
11. To show arbitrariness, it must be shown that the

President's decision is totally bereft of factual basis'.
If this is not proven, the Court cannot thereafter
undertake an independent investigation beyond the
pleadings.' (citing IBP v Zamora)
Page
10. As to how the Court may inquire into the President's

exercise of power, the standard is not correctness,
but arbitrariness. The test is that 'judicial inquiry
can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that
the President's decision is correct,' but that 'the
President did not act arbitrarily.'(citing Lansang v.
Garcia)
35

15. Related to the 'overbreadth' doctrine is the 'void for
vagueness doctrine' which holds that 'a law is facially
invalid if men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.' It is subject to the same principles
governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an
analytical tool for testing 'on their faces' statutes in
free speech cases. And like overbreadth,it is said
that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face
only if it isvague in all its possible applications.
Calling Out Power (First Provision of PP 1017)
12. Petitioners failed to show thatPresident Arroyo's

exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017,
istotally bereft of factual basis. The government
presented reports of events leadingto the issuance
PP 1017 (i.e. escape and threats of Magdalo group,
defectionsin
military,
etc.)
which
was
not
contradicted by petitioners. Hence, thePresident was
justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.
Facial Challenge (Overbreadth Doctrine)
13. The overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool

developed for testing 'on their faces' statutes in free
speech cases. PP 1017 is not primarily directed to
speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually
a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms
of lawless violence.
14. Claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases

involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only 'spoken words' and 'overbreadth claims
have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary
criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct.'
Facial Challenge (Vagueness)
16. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution grants the

President, as Commander-in-Chief, a 'sequence' of
graduated powers. From the most to the least
benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
and the power to declare Martial Law. Citing IBP v.
Zamora, the Court ruled that the only criterion for
the
exercise
of
the
calling-out
power
is
that 'whenever it becomes necessary,' the
President may call the armed forces 'to prevent or
suppress
lawless
violence,
invasion
or
rebellion.'
17. Considering the circumstances then prevailing,
President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017.
Owing to her Office's vast intelligence network, she
is in the best position to determine the actual
condition of the country.
18. There is a distinction between the President's
authority to declare a 'state of rebellion' and the
authority to proclaim a ?state of national
emergency?. In declaring a state of national
emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a
provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also
relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the
State's extraordinary power to take over privatelyowned public utility and business affected with public
interest.
19. PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It
is merely an exercise of President Arroyo's callingout power . As such, it cannot be used to justify acts
that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can
be done. specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without
judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c)
take-over of news media and agencies and press
censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees,
are powers which can be exercised by the President
as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid
declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus.
20. The second provision pertains to the power of the

President to ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII of
the Constitution.
21. PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
President Arroyo the authority to promulgate
'decrees.' Legislative power is peculiarly within the
province of the Legislature. Neither Martial Law nor a
state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can
justify President Arroyo's exercise of legislative
power by issuing decrees. Presidential Decrees are
laws which are of the same category and binding
force as statutes because they were issued by then
President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative
power during the period of Martial Law under the
1973 Constitution.
22. President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees.
It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore,
cannot be enforced. With respect to 'laws,' she
cannot call the military to enforce or implement
certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing
family and property relations, laws on obligations
and contracts and the like. She can only order the
military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to
its duty to suppress lawless violence.
Take Over Power (Third Provision of PP 1017)
23. PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants the
President, during a ?state of emergency?, authority
to temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any
privately-owned
public
utility
or
business
affected with public interest, without authority or

delegation from Congress.
24. A distinction must be drawn between the President's
Page
'Take Care' Power (Second Provision of PP 1017)
36

(1) There must
emergency.
be
war
or
other
(2) The delegation must be for a limited

period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such
restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be
exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress.
'As Applied' Challenge
26. Courts do not declare statutes invalid merely
because they may afford an opportunity for abuse in
the manner of application. The validity of a statute
or ordinance is to be determined from its general
purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end
desired, not from its effects in a particular case.
'Acts of Terrorism'
27. G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to
immediately
carry
out
the
'necessary
and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.'
28. The Court declares that the 'acts of terrorism'
portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional. Since there
is no law defining 'acts of terrorism,' it is President
Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the
discretion to determine what acts constitute
terrorism. Consequently,there can be indiscriminate
arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and
residences, taking over the media enterprises. These
acts go far beyond the calling-out power of the
President. Yet these can be effected in the name of
G.O. No. 5 under the guise of suppressing acts of
terrorism.
authority to declare 'a state of national emergency'

and
to
exercise
emergency
powers.
While
the
President alone can declare a state of national

emergency, however, theexercise of emergency
powers, such as the taking over of privately owned
public
utility
or
business
affected
with
public
interest, requires a delegation from Congress.

The President has no absolute authority to exercise
Right to Peacably Assemble

29. David's warrantless arrest was unjustified. David, et
al. were arrested while they were exercising their
right to peaceful assembly. They were not
committing any crime, neither was there a showing
of a clear and present danger that warranted the
limitation of that right. As can be gleaned from
circumstances, the charges of inciting to sedition and
violation of BP 880 were mere afterthought.
allthe powers of the State under Section 17, Article

VII in the absence of an emergency powers act
passed by Congress.
25. Congressmay
grant
emergency
powers
President, subject to certain conditions,thus:
to
the
30. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a

blatant disregard of the principle that 'freedom of
assembly is not to be limited, much less denied,
except on a showing of a clear and present danger of
a substantive evil that the State has a right to
prevent.'
3. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFFAPPELLEE VS. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, ACCUSEDAPPELLANT
G.R. NO. 121777 (350 SCRA 163) JANUARY 24,
2001
FACTS:
On the afternoon of January 30, 1994, Maria
Lourdes Modesto andNancy Araneta together with her
friends Jennelyn Baez, and Sandra Aquinowent to the
house of Jasmine Alejandro, after having learned that a
woman isthere to recruit job applicants for Singapore.
Carol dela Piedra was alreadybriefing some people
when they arrived. Jasmine, on the other hand,
welcomedand asked them to sit down.
They listened to the recruiter who was then
talking about thebreakdown of the fees involved:
P30,000 for the visa and the round trip ticket,and
P5,000 as placement fee and for the processing of the
papers. The initialpayment was P2,000, while P30,000
will be by salary deduction. The recruitersaid that she
was recruiting nurses for Singapore.
Araneta, her friends and Lourdes then filled up
bio-data forms and wererequired to submit pictures
and a transcript of records. After the interview,Lourdes
gave the initial payment of P2,000 to Jasmine, who
assured her thatshe was authorized to receive the
money.
Meanwhile, in the morning of the said date,
Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of thePhilippine Overseas
Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call
froman unidentified woman inquiring about the
legitimacy of the recruitmentconducted by a certain
Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos, whose duties include
thesurveillance of suspected illegal recruiters,
immediately contacted a friend, acertain Mayeth
Bellotindos, so they could both go the place where
therecruitment was reportedly being undertaken.
Upon arriving at the reportedarea at around
4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the house and
pretended to be anapplicant. Ramos remained outside
and stood on the pavement, from where hewas able to
see around six (6) persons in the sala. Ramos even
heard awoman, identified as Carol Figueroa, talk about
the possible employment shehas to provide in
Singapore and the documents that the applicants have
tocomply with. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos
came out with a bio-dataform in hand.
Page
31. Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate

assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local
government units. They have the power to issue
permits and to revoke such permits after due notice
and hearing on the determination of the presence of
clear and present danger. Here, petitioners were not
even notified and heard on the revocation of their
permits.
37

Thereafter, Ramos conferred with a certain
Capt. Mendoza of the CriminalInvestigation Service
(CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal
recruiter.A surveillance team was then organized to
confirm the report. After which, araid was executed.
Consequently, Carol was charged and
convicted by the trial court of illegal recruitment.
Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction
for illegal recruitment inlarge scale and assails, as well,
the constitutionality of the law defining andpenalizing
said crime.
First, accused submits that Article 13 (b) of the
LaborCode defining recruitment and placement is
void for vagueness and, thus,violates the due process
clause. The provision in question reads:
ART. 13. Definitions.
(a) x x x.
(b) Recruitment and placement refers to any act of
canvassing,enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and
includesreferrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad,whether
for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity
which, in anymanner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shallbe deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement.
ISSUES: (1)Whether or not sec. 13 (b) of P.D. 442, as
amended, otherwiseknown as the illegal recruitment
law is unconstitutional as it violates the dueprocess
clause.
(2)Whether or not accused was denied equal
protection andtherefore should be exculpated
HELD:
(1)For the First issue, dela Piedra submits that
Article 13 (b) of theLabor Code defining
recruitment and placement is void
forvagueness and, thus, violates the due process
clause.
Due process requires that the terms of a penal
statute must besufficiently explicit to inform those who
are subject to it what conduct ontheir part will render
them liable to its penalties.
In support of her submission, dela Piedra
invokes People vs. Panis,where the Supreme Court
criticized the definition of recruitment
andplacement.
The Court ruled, however, that her reliance on
the said case wasmisplaced.
The issue in Panis was whether, under the
proviso of Article 13 (b), thecrime of illegal recruitment
could be committed only whenever two ormore
persons are in any manner promised or offered any
employment fora fee. In this case, the Court merely
bemoaned the lack of records thatwould help shed
Dela Piedra further argues that the acts that

constituterecruitment and placement suffer from
overbreadth since bymerely referring a person for
employment, a person may beconvicted of illegal
recruitment.
That Section 13 (b) encompasses what
appellant apparently considersas customary and
harmless acts such as labor or employment
referral(referring an applicant, according to
appellant, for employment to aprospective employer)
does not render the law overbroad. Evidently,Dela
Piedra misapprehends concept of overbreadth.
A statute may be said to be overbroad where it
operates to inhibit theexercise of individual freedoms
affirmatively guaranteed by theConstitution, such as
the freedom of speech or religion. A generallyworded
statute, when construed to punish conduct which
cannot beconstitutionally punished is unconstitutionally
vague to the extent that itfails to give adequate
warning of the boundary between theconstitutionally
permissible and the constitutionally
impermissibleapplications of the statute.
(2)Anent the second issue, Dela Piedra invokes
the equalprotection clause in her defense.
She points out that although theevidence purportedly
shows that Jasmine Alejandro handed out
applicationforms and even received Lourdes Modestos
payment, appellant was the onlyone criminally
Page
light on the meaning of the proviso. The absence of

such records notwithstanding, the Court was able to
arrive at areasonable interpretation of the proviso by
applying principles in criminallaw and drawing from the
language and intent of the law itself. Section 13(b),
therefore, is not a perfectly vague act whose
obscurity is evidenton its face. If at all, the proviso
therein is merely couched in imprecise language that
was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for
vagueness.
38

charged. Alejandro, on the other hand, remained scotfree.From this, she concludes that the prosecution
discriminated against her ongrounds of regional
origins. Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro is
aZamboanguea, and the alleged crime took place in
Zamboanga City.
The Supreme Court held that the
argument has no merit.
The prosecution of one guilty person
while others equally guiltyare not prosecuted,
is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection
of the laws. The unlawful administration by
officers of a statute fair on itsface, resulting in
its unequal application to those who are
entitled to betreated alike, is not a denial of
equal protection unless there is shown tobe
present in it an element of intentional or
purposeful discrimination.But a discriminatory
purpose is not presumed, there must be a
showingof clear and intentional
discrimination.
In the case at bar, Dela Piedra has
failed to show that, in chargingher, there was a
clear and intentional discrimination on the
part of theprosecuting officials.
Furthermore, the presumption is that
the prosecuting officersregularly performed
their duties, and this presumption can be
overcomeonly by proof to the contrary, not by
mere speculation. As said earlier,accused has
not presented any evidence to overcome this
presumption. The mere allegation that dela
Piedra, a Cebuana, was charged with
thecommission of a crime, while a
Zamboanguea, the guilty party inappellants
eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a
conclusion that theprosecution officers denied
appellant equal protection of the laws.

Due Process Clause Digest v.1

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Due Process Clause Digest v.1

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10 NOV 1978]

Facts: On 22 February 1968, Ordinance 6537 (An ordinance

1.VILLEGAS V. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO [GR L-29646,

Due Process Clause [Compiled Case Digest]

employment. The amount is unreasonable and excessive

The Ordinance prohibits aliens from employment and trade in

aliens required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, full-

the City of Manila without the requisite mayors permit; but

time, part-time, rank-an-file or executive.

excepting persons employed in the diplomatic or consular

congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid

Villegas V Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho G.R. No. L-29646 |

Equal Protection, Uniformity of Taxation, Undue

Delegation of Legislative Power

Ordinance No. 6537, passed by the City of

permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an

Manila, filed a petition, with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of

employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the

permit fee of P50.00, unless exempted under the Ordinance.

writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the

the ordinance null and void. On 24 May 1968, Judge Francisco

petition to restrain the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6637

Arca (CFI Manila, Branch I) issued the writ of preliminary

injunction and on 17 September 1968, the Judge rendered a

decision declaring the ordinance null and void, and the

Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No.6537

Mayor Villegas filed a petition for certiorari to review the

cannot be declared null and void on the ground that it violated

Issue: Whether the Ordinance, requiring aliens - however

measures and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue

economically situated - to secure working permits from the

measure but is an exercise of the police power of the state, it

City of Manila at a uniform fee of P50, is reasonable.

being principally a regulatory measure in nature.

unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus,

1. The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax

regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that the first

permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and

part which requires that the alien shall secure an employment

Due Process Clause [Compiled Case Digest]

the second part which requires the payment of P50.00 as

6. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged

There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens

to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted,

who have been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the

he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This

purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of

guarantee includes the means of livelihood.

protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and

2. The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is

2.Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)

differences in situation among individual aliens who are

the classification should be based on real and substantial

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association,

particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being

and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned

collected from every employed alien, whether he is casual or

for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963

permanent,part time or full time or whether he is a lowly

to be applicable in the city of Manila.

employee or a highly paid executive.

Undue Delegation of Legislative Power

3. Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not lay down

4. Where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any