Evaluation of Whether Psychology Is A Science or Not

Alan Cummins 1165236

Trends and Issues in Psychology – PSY287 – Margaret Walsh

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An Introduction

In evaluating whether Psychology is a science or not the issue is broken down into several

distinct areas. In order to determine the validity of such a statement it is necessary to

operationally define science and psychology and how they are intertwined and related. The

limitations of the science in the realm of psychology are then discussed and future paradigm

shifts outlined.

A Definition of Science

Science is defined as a branch of knowledge or study of dealing with facts or truths

systematically arranged and showing the operation of general laws. This knowledge is gained

through observation and experimentation and systematic study. The discipline of science can be

broken down into constituent parts, namely: observation, identification, description,

experimental investigation and theoretical explanation of the phenomena under study. The

Positivist view of science focuses on causal explanation with evidence of a theory based on

measurement, carried out in a thorough, meticulous and objective manner. Such scientific

experimentation is precise and tightly controlled, quantifiable, repeatable and not open to

influence from culture or history, allowing for limited opportunities for bias. This definition of

scientific experimentation is further expanded by Kuhn (1962) who suggests that science and

scientific knowledge is a product of scientific experimentation in tandem with professional

training, accreditation, global paradigms, professional self-regulating public societies and peer-

reviewed journals.

A Definition of Psychology

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Psychology can be described as the understanding and prediction of others and of oneself.

Zimbardo (1992) formally defines psychology as the scientific study of the behaviours of

individuals and their mental processes. Cattell (1981) describes this scientific study of

personality as seeking to understand personality

‘as one would the mechanisms of a watch, the chemistry of the life processes in mammals

or the spectrum of a remote star’

He emphasises objectivity and the quest to predict and control what will happen next in the realm

of personality or more loosely human psychological nature. In doing so, scientific laws of a

general nature can be inferred. Harré (1985) in his work notes that common sense is the basis of

psychology, upon which scientific study of the area is built. As a human activity Wellman (1990)

gives relevance to desires, beliefs, thinking and intentions that help shape mentalistic

psychology. Heider (1958) espouses common sense psychology as one mixing the personal

dispositional and internal world with that of the environment, situational factors and the external

surroundings. There is a duality of science in terms of the internal and the external. Blackman

(1980) and Van Langenhove (1995) align these two seemingly at odds concepts into an

underlying belief in the importance of empirical methods and by adapting and borrowing

scientific methods and vocabulary from traditional natural sciences psychological phenomena

can be explained, attributed, predicted and controlled.

Science and Psychology as One

Psychology was originally the domain of philosophy where rational argument rather than data

collection and analysis was used to describe and explain psychological events within a person.

Wundt (1874) has been attributed with making this movement from philosophical debate to the

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study of observable phenomena. The duality of physical matter and internal concepts in the mind

as described by Descartes was to be replaced by mechanism and reductionism. Empiricists such

as Locke, Hume and Berkeley gave pertinence to only those things that were measurable and

repeatable. Introspection held no place in this new scientific realm of psychology. Graham

(1986) identifies that the emergence of psychology as a separate discipline distinct from

philosophy was merely a reflection of the zeitgeist of the day. Philosophy as Richards (2002)

describes had made significant contributions to the body of psychological concepts was filtered

out. Heather (1976) suggests that to gain acceptance as a science the human face or philosophical

beginnings of psychology were suppressed. The importance of description and explanation was

over-run by measurement, prediction and control in the laboratory setting. In classifying

psychology as a science it brought to the fore psychology as an aid in practical solutions to

common public problems versus psychology as a science of collection and interpretation.

Limitations of Traditional Science

Defining Psychology as a science suggests that personality and behaviour can be described by

universal laws. It is, however impossible to prove anything universally true by observation alone.

There is no scientific knowledge without experiential influence. Desse (1972) suggests that

objectivity is always a matter of degree as the experimenter uses their own intuitions in

determining what to control or observe. In psychology there is a deluge of factors to consider and

mot cannot be controlled or designed out of an experiment. Gould (1987) questions if science

can truly be objective. Similarly, Danziger (1990) speaks to the historical and cultural world in

which both experimenter and subject / participant lives. The hard definition of science cannot be

applied to any experiment and certainly not in relation to psychology. Popper (1972) states that

observations are always pre-structured and directed. In Rosenthal (1966), it is found that

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experimenter expectations (Valentine, 1992), demand characteristics (Orne 1962) and self-

fulfilling prophecy have a huge and profound effect on results obtained. Science as specifically

applied to psychology is wrought with biases, prejudices and assumptions of the individual

scientist and the professional bodes which they work under. Psychology in dealing with human

nature is distinct from the physical and natural sciences and should not be considered a science in

the traditional sense. In trying to imitate the natural sciences Graham (1986) notes that the soul

of the participant and the experimenter are left to one side which is exactly what psychology is

trying to measure and predict. By falling into a rational based analysis and method of

experimentation Rogler (1999), Lee (1994), Reid (1994) suggests that psychology has become

reductionist in nature making use of experimental paradigms that are incapable of explaining the

phenomena under investigation. As such psychology is curtailed and confined by being defined

as a science. By being restricted to the rigours of science and the responsibilities that such a label

brings about psychology is valuing truth over usefulness. There is a balance required between the

formal and informal definition and classification of psychology. Gahagan (1991) indicates that

there is a difference between Psychologists as scientist concerned with truth versus psychologist

as lay person concerned with using psychology in a practical manner. Psychological concepts are

difficult to measure. Berger and Luckmann (1966) speak to similar considerations, that of lay

theories versus the interests of science of measurement and quantification. If psychology is to be

considered a science then variables must be controllable and predictable. By trying to shoe-horn

psychology into laboratory conditions external validity of results are brought into doubt.

Psychology, by its very nature deals with elastic concepts, behaviours have multiple causes and

relationships far too complex for accurate scientific measurement in the laboratory. Linsay

(1995) states that psychology does not operate in a value free vacuum. If we accept this

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statement then the objectivity of psychology and its classification as a science is brought into

question. Traditional science as lead to cultural insensitivity, Rogler (1999) notes that

standardised scientific experimentation ignores cultural considerations. Studies are prone to

ethnocentrism and are culture bound, Sinha (1997). Psychology cannot be expanded and applied

out from a precise situation to a general all encompassing theory. Issues such as representative

ness, in terms of use of students in a large amount of experimentation (Krupat and Garonzik,

1994) leads us to question if psychology should be considered a science. Science lays greatest

credence with quantative rather than qualitative, but as Bassett (2002) notes there is a large

amount of important work in psychology based purely on qualitative measurement and

observation. Psychology is extremely diverse and versatile and bounding study to scientific

laboratory would be extremely limiting. Non-experimental studies such as those carried out by

Pilavin (1969), experimentation outside the lab, Hazan and Shaver (1987), a correlation study

and Freud (1909) would be left on the scientific scrapheap without sufficient quantative data to

statistically justify their worth.

A New Concept of Science for Psychology

Science and its emphasis on empirical data is too limiting in nature for the subject of psychology.

Banniter and Fransella (1980) suggest that research continues to formally define and measure

experimental variables but that the results obtained would be less important than how the

experiment helped to progress the understanding of human behaviour. In doing so this would

refocus psychology on to its definition as originally outlined, the study of human behaviour.

Danziger (1997) discusses the assumption under which modern psychology places huge weight

on psychology as a science. There is an implicit belief in scientific measurement as the way

forward. It ignores the issues of culturally and socially bound experimentation. A combination of

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paradigms needs to be brought into play. Reason and Rowan (1981) describe objective subjective

experimentation which incorporates the strictly mechanistic, reductionist approach of science

with those of humanistic approaches. May (1967) suggests that incorporating humanistic

endeavours does not invalidate the scientific approach, as Graham (1986) notes, eastern

psychology, rooted in humanistic theories along with western scientific theories of psychology

can work in tandem in a dualistic nature. Graham goes further to suggest that natural science

provide partial explanation and that a dualistic approach, that incorporates but is not bound by

empirical science can lead to a deeper understanding.

Conclusion

In summation considering psychology as a science is limiting. Psychology is extremely diverse

incorporating behaviourism, psycho-dynamic, cognitive, social and evolutionary psychological

approaches. As Strickland (2000) and Miller (1969) discuss, psychology must build upon and

step beyond its classification as a science. Considering psychology as a science has brought

many benefits and will continue to do so but if we are to continue to deepen our understanding of

psychology and integrate this knowledge into beneficial social change we must look beyond

psychology as science in its most formal terms.

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