Negotiating For The Market

Negotiating for the Market
Joshua Gans
University of Melbourne
March, 2010
Thursday, 11 March 2010

Introduction Markets for Ideas
Competition Research Question
Cooperation Literature
Conclusion Outline
Markets for Ideas
•Traditional models of innovation: competition

- Start-ups innovate for entry into product markets and displace
incumbents (Gilbert & Newbery, 1981; Reinganum, 1983)
•New Models of innovation: competition

- Start-Ups have options to engage in cooperative commercialisation (e.g.,
licensing, acquisitions) rather than compete in product markets (Salant,
1982; Gans and Stern, 2000)
- Advantages in saving on duplicative complementary assets (Teece, 1986)
or softening of product market competition
Negotiating for the Market 2 /38

Conclusion Outline
Sources of Entrepreneurial Rents
Cooperation with
established firms
Competition with
established firms
Source: Thomson Venture/NVCA

Conclusion Outline
Sources of Entrepreneurial Rents
Source: Disk Drives, Christensen (1997, p.23)

Conclusion Outline
New Model: Cooperation (Biotech)

Conclusion Outline
Creation without Destruction?

•Competition: Technological entrepreneurship can displace
product market incumbents
- Entrepeneurship implies creative destruction
•Cooperation: Technological entrepreneurship may reinforce

existing market power
- Entrepreneurship leads to creation but no destruction
Key insight: Competition vs cooperation is not a given but a

choice ... the result of negotiations between start-ups and
incumbents.

Conclusion Outline
Research Agenda
•Builds on research program with Scott Stern (MIT) and David

Hsu (Wharton) ...
•To use insights from bargaining theory to understand the

commercialisation choices entrepreneurial start-ups.
•Questions:
- What are the gains from trade between start-ups and established firms?
- What impediments exist that might prevent these gains from being
realised?
- What are the welfare consequences of these choices?

Conclusion Outline
This Paper
•Consider a dynamic environment.

•Understand whether licensing and acquisitions are likely to
occur in a Schumpeterian environment -- that is, competition for
the market is more important than competition in the market.
•Characterise the welfare impact of cooperation -- specifically

on the rate of innovation in the industry.

Conclusion Outline
(Bilateral) Gains from Trade

•A start-up firm and an incumbent will trade in ideas markets if
their joint surplus exceeds their outside options
- Outside options: If the start-up can enter the product market (or deal
with another incumbent), then these are their profits under competition
plus sunk entry costs (Teece, 1986)
- Joint surplus: Continuation of incumbent position (plus additional value
of innovation)
- Implies gains from trade: avoiding duplicative investments and
softening product market competition (Gilbert & Newbery)
•Long-run: incumbent need not invest as much in R&D capabilities

- Caveat: ability to generate substitute innovations to dampen start-up
bargaining power (Gans & Stern, 2000)

Conclusion Outline
Impediments to Ideas Trading

•Bargaining inefficiency
- Information asymmetries cause inefficient break-downs or delay -- however,
we will see attempted trading.
•No gains from trade

- There are incomplete contracts implying that continued start-up ownership
and control is important. For example, to facilitate the transfer of tacit
knowledge (Arora, 1995).
•Strategic bypass
- Negotiations may require disclosures that harm the start-up’s competitive
position (i.e., allowing incumbent imitation); so much so that they avoid the
negotiation option -- Arrow’s disclosure problem (Anton & Yao, 1994).
Negotiating for the Market 10/38

Conclusion Outline
Dynamics and Ideas Markets

•Static rationale for cooperative commercialisation is strong
•Informal strategic concern (esp in teaching cases)
- EMI & the CT Scanner: “licensing would be ... ‘selling our birthright.’ ”
- Nucleon: licensing was viewed as ‘mortgaging away’ the company’s future.
- Ecton: “Cannon was also concerned about the impact that an acquisition might have on Ecton’s product
development process…. The Ecton founders were worried that if their company were absorbed into a larger
organization after acquisition, their development efforts for next-generation products would get mired …
Perhaps, they reasoned, their efforts would be more successful in the long run if they remained independent
until they had a refined product development process that might survive acquisition and integration.”
•Informal economic reaction:

- No problem. Then start-up should build future losses into the ‘price.’
•Formal evaluation
- Requires a dynamic model of successive innovation

Conclusion Outline
Outline
•Set-up dynamic model based on Segal-Whinston (2008)

•Equilibrium under competition
•Equilibrium under licensing
•Equilibrium under acquisition

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Technological Dynamics
•Most models of innovation and ideas markets are static

- Roles of firms in an industry is fixed
- Single innovation race
•Dynamics -- on-going innovation races

- Entrants come in and may become incumbents
- Incumbents protect against entrants
- Licensing may preserve roles in equilibrium but not off the equilibrium
path

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Segal-Whinston (AER, 2008)
•Model of dynamic technological competition

- SW apply to antitrust practices
- SW consider entrants as competing and displacing incumbents -- on-
going change
•Here, modifications
- Remove static competition effects to focus on dynamics in
Schumpeterian, ‘winner-take-all’ or ‘for the market’ competition.
- Incorporate ideas markets
- Model dynamic capabilities (firms may not be long-lived)

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Firms & Innovations

• Discrete time, infinite horizon with common discount factor, δ
• Innovations are sequential
- Innovation yields new product of higher quality than previous generation
• Incumbent (I)
- There is a single producer of the new product who can earn per period monopoly
rents, Π, until displaced.
• Innovation leader
- For each product generation only one firm conducts R&D
- Innovation leader drawn from pool of firms including the current incumbent
(O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse, 1998)
- I can be the innovation leader and prolong incumbency
- Otherwise, label leader as ‘entrant’ or E.

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Innovation Rate

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Innovation Rate
Innovation
Leader
chosen

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Innovation Rate
E
Innovation
Leader
chosen

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Innovation Rate
Choose
E φ E ∈[φ ,1]
Innovation
Leader
chosen

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Innovation Rate
Choose
E φ E ∈[φ ,1]
Innovation
Leader
chosen

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Innovation Rate
Choose
E φ E ∈[φ ,1]
Innovation
Leader
chosen
I Choose
φ I ∈[φ ,1]

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Innovation Rate
Choose
E φ E ∈[φ ,1]
Innovation
Leader
chosen
I Choose
φ I ∈[φ ,1]
No cost to R&D
Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Innovation Rate
Choose
E φ E ∈[φ ,1] φ̂ E = 1
Innovation
Leader
chosen
I Choose
φ I ∈[φ ,1]
No cost to R&D
Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Innovation Rate
Choose
E φ E ∈[φ ,1] φ̂ E = 1
Innovation
Leader
chosen
I Choose
φ I ∈[φ ,1] φ̂ I = φ
No cost to R&D
Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Commercialisation Choices

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Entrant
Innovates

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Competition
Entrant
Innovates

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
I loses
Competition
monopoly
profits
Entrant
Innovates

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
I loses E
Competition
monopoly becomes I
profits (earns Π)
Entrant
Innovates

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
I loses E
Competition
monopoly becomes I
profits (earns Π)
Entrant
Innovates
Cooperation

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
I loses E
Competition
monopoly becomes I
profits (earns Π)
Entrant
Innovates
I retains
Cooperation monopoly
profits

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
I loses E
Competition
monopoly becomes I
profits (earns Π)
Entrant
Innovates
I retains E remains
Cooperation monopoly E
profits (earns τ)

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Dynamic Capabilities

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Prior Activity

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Prior Activity
Production
Only

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Prior Activity
Production
Only
Innovation
Only

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Prior Activity
Production
Only
Innovation
Only
Production &
Innovation
Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Prior Activity Example
Production
Only
Innovation
Only
Production &
Innovation
Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Production I not an
Only innovation leader
Innovation
Only
Production &
Innovation
Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Production I not an
Innovation E as innovation
Only leader
Production &
Innovation
Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Production I not an
Only leader
Production & Merger or I as

Innovation innovation leader

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Probability of
becoming Leader
Production I not an
Only leader


Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Probability of
becoming Leader
Production I not an
σ p ∈[0,1]
Only leader


Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Probability of
becoming Leader
Production I not an
σ p ∈[0,1]
Only leader
σ i ∈[0,1]


Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Probability of
becoming Leader
Production I not an
σ p ∈[0,1]
Only leader
σ i ∈[0,1]
Production & Merger or I as σ ip ≥ max{σ p , σ i }


Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Competition

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Competition
Innovation
Leader

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Competition
Innovation
Leader

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Competition
Innovation Capabilities
Leader Stage
I acquires innovation
I and production
capabilities

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Competition
Innovation Capabilities Research
Leader Stage Stage
I acquires innovation I earns Π and chooses

I and production ϕI in each period until
capabilities innovates

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Competition
Leader Stage Stage


Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Competition
Leader Stage Stage

or

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Competition
Leader Stage Stage

or
E acquires innovation
E capability and I
acquires production
capability

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Competition
Leader Stage Stage

or
I earns Π and E
E capability and I
chooses ϕE in each
acquires production
period until innovates
capability

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Competition
Innovation Capabilities Research Competition
Leader Stage Stage Stage

or
I earns Π and E
E capability and I
chooses ϕE in each E replaces I
acquires production
capability

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Competition
Innovation Capabilities Research Competition

or
I earns Π and E
E capability and I
chooses ϕE in each E replaces I
acquires production
capability

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Continuation Payoffs
VE = (1 − φ E )δVE + φ E (Π + σ iδV + (1 − σ i )δVI ) I

i
VI = (1 − φ E )(Π + δVI ) + φ Eσ pδVE
V = (1 − φ I )(Π + δV ) + φ I (Π + σ ipδV + (1 − σ ip )δVI )

I
i
I
i
I
i

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Incentives to Innovate

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
E Π + σ iδV + (1 − σ i )δVI − δVE

I
i

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion

I
i

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion

I
i
I (1 − σ ip )δ (V − VI )
I
i

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion

I
i
φ̂ E = 1
I (1 − σ ip )δ (V − VI )
I
i

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion

I
i
φ̂ E = 1
I (1 − σ ip )δ (V − VI )
I
i
φ̂ I = φ

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Markov perfect equilibrium
VE = 1
Δc (
Π 1 − δ (1 − φ ) + δ (σ i − φσ ip ) )
VI = 1
Δc (
δΠ 1 − δ (1 − φ ) + δ (σ i − φσ ip ) σ p )
V =
I
i 1
Δc ( 2
(
Π 1 − δ 1 − φ (1 − σ ip ) − σ )σ )
i p
Δ c = 1 − δ (1 − φ ) − δ (φσ ip + δ ((1 − δ (1 − σ i ) + δφ (1 − σ ip ))σ p )

Introduction
Model Set-Up
Competition
Equilibrium
Cooperation
Restructuring
Conclusion
Restructuring & Spin-Outs

Would an incumbent innovation leader spin-out its innovating arm?
•Not worthwhile if ...
V ≥ VI + VE ⇒ 1 − φ (1 − σ ip ) ≥ σ i + σ p
I
i
... but spin-outs are always socially desirable as

entrants innovate more than incumbents

Introduction
Competition Licensing
Restructuring
Cooperation
Acquisition
Conclusion
Licensing
Leader Stage Stage

or
I earns Π and E
E capability and I
chooses ϕE in each
acquires production
capability

Introduction
Restructuring
Cooperation
Acquisition
Conclusion
Licensing
Innovation Capabilities Research Negotiation

or
I earns Π and E
E capability and I
chooses ϕE in each E negotiates with I
acquires production
capability

Introduction
Restructuring
Cooperation
Acquisition
Conclusion
Negotiations
Π − τ + σ pδV + (1 − σ p )δVI + τ + σ iδVE

I
i

Joint Payoff from Cooperation
≥ σ pδVE + Π + σ iδV + (1 − σ i )δVI

I
i
  
Joint Payoff from Competition
(
⇒ (σ p − σ i )δ V − VE − VI ≥ 0
I
i
)
Introduction
Restructuring
Cooperation
Acquisition
Conclusion
VE = (1 − φ E )δVE + φ E (τ + σ iδVE )
VI = Π + (1 − φ E )δVI + φ E (−τ + σ pδV ) I

i

I
i
I
i
I
i

Introduction
Restructuring
Cooperation
Acquisition
Conclusion
Markov Perfect Equilibrium

( ) (τ + σ δV )
1− γ γ
max τ Π − τ + σ pδV + (1 − σ p )δVI − σ pδVE
I
i
i E
− (Π + σ iδV + (1 − σ i )δVI )
I
i
φ̂ E = 1 φ̂ I = φ
Licensing is the unique equilibrium outcome if ...
(
(σ p − σ i )δ 1 − φ (1 − σ ip ) − σ i − σ p ≥ 0 )

Introduction
Restructuring
Cooperation
Acquisition
Conclusion
Licensing Equilibrium Outcomes

σ ip
Competition
VIi < VI + VE
σp Licensing
Licensing
Competition
VIi ≥ VI + VE
σi σ ip
Introduction
Restructuring
Cooperation
Acquisition
Conclusion
Licensing Equilibrium Outcomes

σ ip
Competition
VIi < VI + VE
σp Licensing
Licensing
Does high σi
drive Competition
VIi ≥ VI + VE
competition?
σi σ ip
Introduction
Restructuring
Cooperation
Acquisition
Conclusion
Intuition
If VIi ≥ VI + VE want an incumbent innovator

σ p > σ i achieve that by keeping I as incumbent (Licensing)
σ p < σ i achieve that by making E the incumbent (Competition)
If I < VI + VE want an entrant innovator

V i
σ p > σ i achieve that by making E the incumbent (Competition)

σ p < σi achieve that by keeping I as incumbent (Licensing)
But welfare maximised by always maximising chance

for entrant innovator
Introduction
Licensing
Competition
Restructuring
Cooperation
Acquisition
Conclusion
Restructuring
σ ip
Restructuring
no gains VIi < VI + VE
from trade
σp
Licensing
Competition
VIi ≥ VI + VE
σi σ ip
Introduction
Licensing
Competition
Restructuring
Cooperation
Acquisition
Conclusion
Negotiations
Π − τ + σ ipδV + (1 − σ ip )δVI + τ
I
i
  
≥ σ pδVE + Π + σ iδV + (1 − σ i )δVI

I
i
  

Introduction
Licensing
Competition
Restructuring
Cooperation
Acquisition
Conclusion
Negotiations
I
i
  
≥ σ pδVE + Π + σ iδV + (1 − σ i )δVII

i
  
⇒ (σ ip − σ i )δ (V − VI ) ≥ σ pδVE
I
i

Introduction
Licensing
Competition
Restructuring
Cooperation
Acquisition
Conclusion
Negotiations
I
i
  

i
  
I
i
1 − σ ip > 1 − σ i − σ p

Introduction
Licensing
Competition
Restructuring
Cooperation
Acquisition
Conclusion
Negotiations
I
i
  

i
  
I
i
1 − σ ip > 1 − σ i − σ p implies positive externality on

potential entrants

Introduction
Licensing
Competition
Restructuring
Cooperation
Acquisition
Conclusion
VE = (1 − φ E )δVE + φ Eτ
VI = Π + (1 − φ E )δVI + φ E (−τ + σ ipδV ) I

i

I
i
I
i
I
i

Introduction
Licensing
Competition
Restructuring
Cooperation
Acquisition
Conclusion

Introduction
Licensing
Competition
Restructuring
Cooperation
Acquisition
Conclusion
φ̂ E = 1 φ̂ I = φ

Introduction
Licensing
Competition
Restructuring
Cooperation
Acquisition
Conclusion
φ̂ E = 1 φ̂ I = φ
Acquisition is the unique equilibrium outcome if and only if ...
(
σ ip − σ i − σ p 1 − δ (1 − φ )(1 − σ ip ) ≥ 0 )

Introduction
Licensing
Competition
Restructuring
Cooperation
Acquisition
Conclusion
φ̂ E = 1 φ̂ I = φ
(
σ ip − σ i − σ p 1 − δ (1 − φ )(1 − σ ip ) ≥ 0 )
Sufficient condition:

Introduction
Licensing
Competition
Restructuring
Cooperation
Acquisition
Conclusion
φ̂ E = 1 φ̂ I = φ
(
σ ip − σ i − σ p 1 − δ (1 − φ )(1 − σ ip ) ≥ 0 )
Sufficient condition: σ ip ≥ σ i + σ p

Introduction
Licensing
Competition
Restructuring
Cooperation
Acquisition
Conclusion
Acquisition Equilibrium Outcomes

σ ip
VIi < VI + VE
Competition
σp
Acquisition
Does high σi
drive VIi ≥ VI + VE
competition?
σi σ ip
Introduction
Licensing
Competition
Restructuring
Cooperation
Acquisition
Conclusion
Welfare
•Acquisition never socially desirable

•Significant: commentators suggest that Schumpeterian
competition implies loose merger policy
•Here: merger consolidates capabilities to become next lead

innovator in incumbent’s hands (removes entrant capabilities) --
with reduced innovation incentives.
•Merger delays forces of creative destruction

Introduction
Licensing
Competition
Restructuring
Cooperation
Acquisition
Conclusion
Licensing & Acquisition

σ ip
Lic’g Competition
VIi < VI + VE
σp Licensing
Acquisition Compn
VIi ≥ VI + VE
σi σ ip
Introduction
Competition Extensions
Cooperation Future Directions
Conclusion
Extensions
•R&D Costs
- Would change little but if rates of innovation the same, the incentive to
use negotiations to increase likelihood of incumbent innovator is
removed.
•Product market competition

- Increases (static) drivers for licensing
- Licensing involves additional welfare costs
•Multiple innovators
- Incumbent still has lower incentives to innovate so conclusion unchanged

Introduction
Conclusion
Future Directions

Introduction
Conclusion
Future Directions
•Endogenise capability acquisition

Introduction
Conclusion
Future Directions

•Impact of other anti-trust practices under licensing

Introduction
Conclusion
Future Directions

•Impact of other anti-trust practices under licensing
•Richer space of strategic variables


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Negotiating for the Market

Thursday, 11 March 2010

Markets for Ideas

•Traditional models of innovation: competition

•New Models of innovation: competition

Negotiating for the Market 2 /38

Sources of Entrepreneurial Rents

Source: Thomson Venture/NVCA

Negotiating for the Market 3 /38

Sources of Entrepreneurial Rents

Source: Disk Drives, Christensen (1997, p.23)

Negotiating for the Market 4 /38

New Model: Cooperation (Biotech)

Negotiating for the Market 5 /38

Creation without Destruction?

•Cooperation: Technological entrepreneurship may reinforce

Key insight: Competition vs cooperation is not a given but a

Negotiating for the Market 6 /38

•Builds on research program with Scott Stern (MIT) and David

•To use insights from bargaining theory to understand the

Negotiating for the Market 7 /38

•Consider a dynamic environment.

•Characterise the welfare impact of cooperation -- specifically

Negotiating for the Market 8 /38

(Bilateral) Gains from Trade

•Long-run: incumbent need not invest as much in R&D capabilities

Negotiating for the Market 9 /38

Impediments to Ideas Trading

•No gains from trade

Negotiating for the Market 10/38

Dynamics and Ideas Markets

•Informal economic reaction:

Negotiating for the Market 11/38

•Set-up dynamic model based on Segal-Whinston (2008)

Negotiating for the Market 12/38

•Most models of innovation and ideas markets are static

•Dynamics -- on-going innovation races

Negotiating for the Market 13/38

Segal-Whinston (AER, 2008)

•Model of dynamic technological competition

Negotiating for the Market 14/38

Firms & Innovations

Negotiating for the Market 15/38

Negotiating for the Market 16/38

Negotiating for the Market 16/38

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Negotiating for the Market 17/38

Negotiating for the Market 17/38

Negotiating for the Market 17/38

Negotiating for the Market 18/38

Negotiating for the Market 18/38

Negotiating for the Market 18/38

Negotiating for the Market 18/38

Prior Activity Example