Professional Documents
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UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT NEC NOS DISTINGUERE DEBEMUS When the
law does not distinguish, neither should we distinguish.
Dabalos v RTC Br. 59, Angeles City, Pampangga, G.R. No. 190960, January
7, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Karlo Angelo Dabalos was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of R.A.
9262 Violence Against Women and Children before the RTC Branch 59, Angeles
Pampangga, for the act of violence on the complainant by pulling the latters hair,
punching the complainants back, shoulder and left eye, thereby demeaning and
degrading the complainants worth and dignity as a human being. The RTC ordered
for the arrest of the said petitioner.
Dabalos filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the order of the RTC
and insists that his act is not covered by R.A. 9262 due to the reason that he was
no longer in a dating relationship with the private respondent, thus the proximate
reason for the petitioners act is not their relationship. Instead, petitioner claims
that the act constituted was only Slight Physical Injuries under the Revised Penal
Code which falls under the Jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the act constituted by the accused is covered by R.A. 9262.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the petition filed herein has no merit.
Sec. 3(a) of R.A. 9262 reads:
Section 3. Definition of Terms.
(a) Violence against women and their children refers to any act or series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person has or had sexual or dating relationship,
or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or likely to result
in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty.
The law is broad but it specifies two limiting qualifications for act or series of acts to
be considered a violation of R.A. 9262:
(a) It is committed against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had sexual or dating relationship, or with
From the Decisions and Orders of the SAC-RTC, petitioners then filed the instant
Petitions for Review directly before this Court. On 24 July 2006, we resolved to
consolidate the cases at bar, considering that the factual milieu and legal issues
involved in both cases are similar in nature.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners erred in applying Rule 45 of Rules of Court on
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court and not Rule 60 of Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law.
Held: The Supreme Court denied the consolidated petition for review on the
grounds that the petitioners resorted to a wrongful mode of appeal by applying Rule
45 of Rules of Court, filing the petition directly with the Supreme Court. The
Petitioners should have filed the petition to the Court of Appeals as provided in Rule
60 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law:
Section 60. Appeals. - An appeal may be taken from the Special Agrarian
Courts
(SAC-RTC) by filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals within
fifteen days (15) days from receipt of notice of the decision; otherwise, the
decision shall become final.
The special jurisdiction of the SAC-RTC is conferred and regulated by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, and appeals there from are governed by
Section 60 thereof.
Furthermore, even if the Court were to allow the appeals to prosper, The Court finds
that the Petitions before the SAC-RTC were filed out of time.
In this case, petitioners received a copy of the PARAD Decision on September 27
2002.They filed their Motion for Reconsideration thereof on 11 October 2002, or 14
days from their receipt of a copy of the Decision. On 21 December 2002, they
received the Order denying their motion. Hence, petitioners only had one more day
within which to file their Petitions with the SAC-RTC for the determination of just
compensation for their respective properties. Since December 22, 2002 fell on a
Sunday, they had until December 23, 2002 to file their Petition However, they only
filed their Petitions on January 6 2003, or 16 days after they received the order
denying their Motion for Reconsideration. Clearly, the Petitions before the SAC-RTC
were filed out of time.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the consolidated Petitions for Review are
hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decisions and Orders of the Special Agrarian
Court-Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Naga City in Civil Case Nos. 2003-007 and
2003-004 are hereby affirmed.
FACTS:
On 3 August 2010, a Second Complaint was filed by Reyes, et al. against the
same respondent also based on betrayal of public trust and culpable violation
of the Constitution.
On 11 August 2010, the two complaints were referred by the House Plenary
to the Committee on Justice at the same time.
On 1 September 2010, the Committee on Justice found the First and Second
Complaints sufficient in form. On 7 September 2010, the Committee on
Justice, found the First and Second Complaints were sufficient in form.
ISSUE #1: Does the Supreme Court have the power to determine whether public
respondent committed a violation of the Constitution in the exercise of its discretion
relating to impeachment proceeding?
HELD: Yes, under the doctrine of expanded judicial review. The Constitution did not
intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress.
Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v.
Carr, judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise
of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial
review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and
balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is
not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated
system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this
instance, but simply upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the repository
of the sovereign will.
ISSUE #2: Is the petition premature and not yet ripe for adjudication?
HELD: No. In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on the validity of
the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a
mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the
House (Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for
immediate interpretation.
The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment
complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot
thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the
constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated
against an impeachable officer within a period of one year.
HELD: Yes. Contrary to petitioner contention, the Impeachment Rules are clear in
echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a "verified
complaint or resolution," and that the substance requirement is met if there is "a
recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction
of the committee.
ISSUE #5: May the Supreme Court look into the narration of facts constitutive of
the offenses vis--vis petitioners submissions disclaiming the allegations in the
complaints?
HELD: No. This issue would "require the Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political
question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature
(Francisco vs. House of Representatives.)
ISSUE #6: Was petitioner denied of due process, because of the delay in the
publication of the Impeachment Rules?
HELD: No. The Supreme Court discussed the difference between publication and
promulgation.
To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3,
2010, public respondent provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of the 14th
Congress and thereafter published on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules,
admittedly substantially identical with that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers
of general circulation.
Citing Taada v. Tuvera, petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process
since the Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after
public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise
tacks her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that
"Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section."
To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms "promulgate" and
"publish," the case of the Judiciary is in point. In promulgating rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, the Supreme Court has invariably required the publication of
these rules for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is concerned,
however, PROMULGATION means "the delivery of the decision to the clerk of
court for filing and publication.
Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the
proceedings taken prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which faithfully
comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in
cases where impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the
mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution would already run
or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-day period of publication prior
to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would already
violate the Constitution for its inaction on the impeachment complaints
pending the completion of the publication requirement. (Just like what
happened in this case, where the complaint was filed even before the 15 th Congress
open its first session)
Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on
impeachment is aimed at "effectively carry[ing] out the purpose" of impeachment
proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion when the House deemed
it proper to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to
meet the exigency in such situation of early filing and in keeping with the "effective"
implementation of the "purpose" of the impeachment provisions. In other words, the
provisional adoption of the previous Congress Impeachment Rules is within the
power of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out
the avowed purpose.
It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where the
rights of witnesses are involved, impeachment is primarily for the protection of the
people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the offender.
HELD: Francisco doctrine states that the term "initiate" means to file the
complaint and referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may
not be filed against the same official within a one year period. Therefore, the oneyear period ban is reckoned not from the filing of the first complaint, but on the date
it is referred to the House Committee on Justice.
Petitioner submits that referral could not be the reckoning point of initiation because
"something prior to that had already been done. This is wrong. Following
petitioners line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint or the endorsement
by a member of the House steps done prior to the filing would already initiate
the impeachment proceedings.
ISSUE #7: Does an impeachment complaint need to allege only one impeachable
offense?
Petitioner argues that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it
disregarded its own Impeachment Rules, which provides that "the Rules
of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable, apply to
impeachment proceedings before the House." Petitioner invokes the application of
Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on one offense per
complaint rule. To petitioner, the two impeachment complaints are insufficient in
form and substance since each charges her with both culpable violation of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust.
HELD: The Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses,
with each charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set
known as the "Articles of Impeachment." It, therefore, follows that an impeachment
complaint need not allege only one impeachable offense.
FACTS:
Victoria Amante, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province
of Cebu, was charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of P.D. 1455, otherwise
known as The Auditing Code of the Philippines. Accused filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation due to lack of Jurisdiction stating that Section 4 of R.A. 8249
provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have original jurisdiction only in cases where
the accused holds a position otherwise classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher,
based on the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A. 7658). The
Sandiganbayan considered the said motion by Amante and dimissed the case.
Petitioner disputed the contention of Amante and the appreciation of the
Sandiganbayan of its decision in Inding v Sandiganbayan, which in this particular
case, Inding did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of
the enumeration provided for in Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. 1606, as amended,
exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either violation of R.A. 3019, R.A.
1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the RPC. Petitioner adds that the
enumeration in the said statutes were equally applicable to offenses committed in
relation to public office.
Amante commented that the general rule for the Sandiganbayan to acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter as laid down in the Section 4 of P.D. 1806 which
states that the offender must be of SG 27 and the exceptions were laid down in the
following sub paragraphs and if the indictment involves offenses other than that of
the three offenses mentioned, such general rule shall be applicable. Respondent
stated therefore that the Ruling of the Sandiganbayan is correct in its decision.
OSP, in its reply, reiterated that the enumeration of Public officials in Section 4(a)(1)
to (g) or P.D. 1606 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
should include their commission of other offenses in relation to the office under
Section 4(b) of the same P.D. 1606. It cited the case of Esteban v Sandiganbayan
wherein the ruling of the Court is that an offense is said to have been intimately
connected with the office of the offender or perpetrated in the performance of his
or her official functions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26
who was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the offense therein charged is intimately
connected with the accuseds office and was and was perpetrated while they were
in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed,
the accused had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have
committed it had they not held their offices.
It is beyond the clarity that the same provision of Section 4(b) does not mention any
qualification as to the public officals involved. It simply stated, public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same code. Therefore, it refers to
those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically
enumerated.
It is a well settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of statute will be
interpreted in their natural , plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless
and trades 2. That students were not in the custody of the school since the
semester has already ended 3. There was no clear identification of the fatal gun,
and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through
enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining discipline. Petitioners on othe
other hand claimed their son was under school custody because he went to school
to submit his physics report, a requirement for graduation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Collegio San Jose-Recoletos, which is not an arts and trade
establishment, is liable under Article 2180
HELD: Pertinent portion in Article 2180 provides:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain
in their custody.
The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply to
all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather
than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the
student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part
of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and
trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception
to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of
their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the
head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula
singulis "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads of
establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices."
The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the
school notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident happened. It
was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement.
What was important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. On the other
hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable
because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. Each
was exercising only a general authority over the students and not direct control and
influence exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes.
In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable
considering that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and
later returned to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to
the higher authorities. Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof was
shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.
Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision
because only the teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made
responsible for the damage caused by the student. Hence, under the facts
disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with
Alfredo resulting to his death.
Section 131. Definition of Terms. - When used in this Title, the term: x x x (c)
"Amusement Places" include theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and
other places of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself
by seeing or viewing the show or performance
Considering these, it is clear that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs
and tourist spots cannot be considered venues primarily where one seeks
admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances.
While it is true that they may be venues where people are visually engaged, they
are not primarily venues for their proprietors or operators to actively display, stage
or present shows and/or performances. Thus, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses,
hot springs and tourist spots do not belong to the same category or class as
theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia. It follows that they
cannot be considered as among the other places of amusement contemplated by
Section 140 of the LGC and which may properly be subject to amusement taxes.
2. Whether or not the three-year prescriptive period provided under Article 291
of the Labor Code, as amended, is applicable to respondents claim of service
incentive leave pay.
HELD: Yes, Bautista is entitled to Service Incentive Leave. The Supreme Court
emphasized that it does not mean that just because an employee is paid on
commission basis he is already barred to receive service incentive leave pay. The
question actually boils down to whether or not Bautista is a field employee.
According to Article 82 of the Labor Code, field personnel shall refer to nonagricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal
place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work
in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.
As a general rule, field personnel are those whose performance of their job/service
is not supervised by the employer or his representative, the workplace being away
from the principal office and whose hours and days of work cannot be determined
with reasonable certainty; hence, they are paid specific amount for rendering
specific service or performing specific work. If required to be at specific places at
specific times, employees including drivers cannot be said to be field personnel
despite the fact that they are performing work away from the principal office of the
employee.
Certainly, Bautista is not a field employee. He has a specific route to traverse as a
bus driver and that is a specific place that he needs to be at work. There are
inspectors hired by Auto Bus to constantly check him. There are inspectors in bus
stops who inspects the passengers, the punched tickets, and the driver. Therefore,
he is definitely supervised though he is away from the Auto Bus main office.
On the other hand, the three-year prescriptive period ran but Bautista was able to
file his suit in time before the prescriptive period expired. It was only upon his filing
of a complaint for illegal dismissal, one month from the time of his dismissal that
Bautista demanded from his former employer commutation of his accumulated
leave credits. His cause of action to claim the payment of his accumulated service
incentive leave thus accrued from the time when his employer dismissed him and
failed to pay his accumulated leave credits.
Therefore, the prescriptive period with respect to his claim for service incentive
leave pay only commenced from the time the employer failed to compensate his
accumulated service incentive leave pay at the time of his dismissal. Since Bautista
had filed his money claim after only one month from the time of his dismissal,
necessarily, his money claim was filed within the prescriptive period provided for by
Article 291 of the Labor Code.
NOTA BENE:
Definition of Service Incentive Leave
Service incentive leave is a right which accrues to every employee who has served
within 12 months, whether continuous or broken reckoned from the date the
employee started working, including authorized absences and paid regular holidays
unless the working days in the establishment as a matter of practice or policy, or
that provided in the employment contracts, is less than 12 months, in which case
said period shall be considered as one year. It is also commutable to its money
equivalent if not used or exhausted at the end of the year. In other words, an
employee who has served for one year is entitled to it. He may use it as leave days
or he may collect its monetary value.
ALBON v FERNANDO
G.R. No. 148357 (June 30, 2006)
FACTS: In May 1999, the City of Marikina undertook a public works project to widen,
clear, and repair the existing sidewalks to Marikina Greenheights Subdivision. It was
undertaken by the city government pursuant to Ordinance No. 59. Subsequently,
petitioner Albon filed a taxpayer suit for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with
damages against respondents City Engineer Alfonso Espirito, Assistant City
Engineer Anaki Maderal, and City Treasurer Natividad Cabalquinto.
According to the petitioner it was unconstitutional and unlawful for respondents to
use government equipment and property, and to disburse public funds of the City of
Marikina for the grading, widening, clearing, and maintenance of the existing
sidewalks of the said subdivision. He alleged that the sidewalks were private
property because Marikina Greenheights Subdivision was owned by V.V. Soliven, Inc.
Hence, the city government could not use public resources on them. In undertaking
the project, therefore, respondents allegedly violated the constitutional prescription
against the use of public funds for private purposes as well as Section 335 and 336
of Republic Act 7160 and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents. Ordinance No. 59 is a valid
enactment. The court recognized the inherent police power of the municipality and
with this, it is allowed to carry out the contested works. The Court of Appeals
sustained the decision of the trial court stating that sidewalks of Marikina
Greenheights Subdivision were public in nature and ownership thereof belonged to
the City of Marikina or the Republic of the Philippines following the 1991 White
Plains Association decision. Thus, the improvement and widening of the sidewalks
pursuant to Ordinance No. 59 of 1993 was well within the LGU powers.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the validity of Ordinance
No. 59
HELD: No, like all LGUs, the City of Marikina is empowered to enact ordinances for
the purposes set forth in the Local Government Code (RA 7160). It is expressly
vested with the police powers delegated to LGUs under the General Welfare Clause
of RA 7160. With this power, LGUs may prescribe reasonable regulations to protect
the lives, health, and property of their constituents, and maintain peace and order
within their respective territorial jurisdictions. Also, in the exercise of their inherent
police power, the cities and municipalities have the power to exercise such powers
and discharge such functions and responsibilities as may be necessary, appropriate
and incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic service and facilities,
including infrastructure to efficient intended primary to service and facilities,
including infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of their
residents and which are financed by their own funds. These infrastructure facilities
include municipal or city roads and bridges and similar facilities. Regarding the
nature of ownership of the sidewalks in question, there is also no hindrance in
declaring that the sidewalks are of public dominion. PD 957, as amended by
PD1216, mandates subdivision owners to set aside open spaces which shall be
devoted exclusively for the use of the general public.