G.R. No.

102007 September 2, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually
convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on
February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric
malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it
required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a
result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the
appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused
while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel
invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes
root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative. This same issue posed therein was phrased
thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when
the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is
extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of the term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as
contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted from
Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:

La responsabilidad penal se extingue.

1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su fallecimiento no
hubiere recaido sentencia firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the old statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes litigantes recurso
alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos legales concedidos al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite. Because, it is only when judgment is such that, as Medina y
Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed "en condena determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes
"una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused die, according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni
responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before judgment becomes
executory, "there cannot be any determination by final judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists,"
for the simple reason that "there is no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the
same view. Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body
mention the term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court which states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the
sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one positive conclusion: The term final judgment
employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not become executory, it cannot
be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where, as in this case, the right to institute a separate civil action
is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the criminal and the civil aspects of the case." People vs.
Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958
ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is based solely on the felony committed and of which
the offender might be found guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated,
supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced by reason of
that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the
anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil liability in a case where the source thereof criminal liability does
not exist. And, as was well stated in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely would remain if we are to
divorce it from the criminal proceeding."

This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the Supreme Court in the cases of People of the Philippines v.
Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of the Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing the
appeal in view of the death of the accused pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and considering that there is as yet no final judgment in view
of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89,
Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045);
consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos v. The
Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former, the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of one accused
of physical injuries who died before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore against his
estate. It was the contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused prior to final judgment extinguished all
criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However, this court
ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of
1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court below, Article
33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to be considered instituted together with the
criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article
33 may yet be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil
liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal
responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before
final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from the
crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was charged with estafa could likewise trace its
genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the property subject

matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the accused herein extinguished his criminal
liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal liability
due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of
the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for recovery of money may continue to be heard on appeal, when the
death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the
offended party shall be included in the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the deceasedaccused should be substituted as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability
depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is
also extinguished together with the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed from this long-established principle of law. In this case,
accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents.
Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent of his criminal liability. His civil
liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action already
extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal,
passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of determining if he is
civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final
judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation
through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its
reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinct from
the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the
action survives him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs.
Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).

In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is
concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money claims of the
Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus
making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform
this Court within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration
and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action
for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a
reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is
extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old
ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action impliedly instituted in the criminal action can
proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the
Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted
during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority
to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil liability ex delicto when his death supervenes during appeal. What
Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal
offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil
case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is,
preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil
action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction
of the criminal action due to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is
on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive
by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings

had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one which is dependent on the
outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not even necessitate the filing of
criminal proceedings. 12 One would be hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that
in recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the court's
pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action
due to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death
dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to
the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal
thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would
constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the
criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the
institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977,
however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex
delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial
pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was
held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which
his estate would be liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the
basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld
Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied
in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served
as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In
citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made the inference that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of
money claims, the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by holding his estate
liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the
action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, this course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be
sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that where the civil liability instituted together with the criminal
liabilities had already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals
can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the extinguishment of the component criminal liability of the deceased.
This pronouncement, which has been followed in the Court's judgments subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should
be set aside and abandoned as being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is neither authority nor justification for its application in
criminal procedure to civil actions instituted together with and as part of criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary
conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil action upon the death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as
an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims
against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3,
in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may include even
the restitution of personal or real property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed against
the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed
or implied. It is clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal
basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon
extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same
act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate
civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon
which the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law, result in an injury to person or
property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator 17 of the estate of the accused
pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of
money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal

property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in recovering damages for injury to persons thru an independent
civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased
accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses,
expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual
money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the estate
of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely
thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability
and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may
arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of
filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil
action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil
action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of
right by prescription. 22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil
liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 129282. November 29, 2001

DMPI EMPLOYEES CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC., (DMPI-ECCI), Petitioner, vs. HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, as Presiding Judge of
the RTC, Misamis Oriental, Br. 20, and ERIBERTA VILLEGAS, Respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative, Inc. (DMPI-ECCI) seeks the annulment of the
order 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, granting the motion for reconsideration of respondent Eriberta Villegas,
and thus reversing the previous dismissal of Civil Case No. CV-94-214.
The Facts
On February 18, 1994, the prosecuting attorney filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 37, an information for estafa
2 against Carmen Mandawe for alleged failure to account to respondent Eriberta Villegas the amount of P608,532.46. Respondent
Villegas entrusted this amount to Carmen Mandawe, an employee of petitioner DMPI-ECCI, for deposit with the teller of petitioner.
Subsequently, on March 29, 1994, respondent Eriberta Villegas filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, a
complaint 3 against Carmen Mandawe and petitioner DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money and damages with preliminary attachment arising
out of the same transaction. In time, petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil case on the following grounds: (1) that there is a pending
criminal case in RTC Branch 37, arising from the same facts, and (2) that the complaint failed to contain a certification against forum
shopping as required by Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91. 4crlwvirtualibrry
On December 12, 1996, the trial court issued an order 5 dismissing Civil Case No. CV-94-214. On January 21, 1997, respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration 6 of the order.
On February 21, 1997, the trial court issued an order 7 granting respondents motion for reconsideration, thereby recalling the dismissal of
the case.
Hence, this petition. 8
The Issues
The issues raised are: (1) whether the plaintiffs failure to attach a certification against forum shopping in the complaint is a ground to
dismiss the case; 9 and, (2) whether the civil case could proceed independently of the criminal case for estafa without having reserved
the filing of the civil action.
The Courts Ruling
On the first issue, Circular No. 28-91 10 of the Supreme Court requires a certificate of non-forum shopping to be attached to petitions filed
before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. This circular was revised on February 8, 1994 11 by extending the requirement to all
initiatory pleadings filed in all courts and quasi-judicial agencies other than the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Villegas failure to attach a certificate of non-forum shopping in her complaint did not violate Circular No. 28-91, because at
the time of filing, the requirement applied only to petitions filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. 12 Likewise,

Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is inapplicable for the reason that the complaint was filed on March 29, 1994, three days before April 1,
1994, the date of effectivity of the circular. 13crlwvirtualibrry
On the second issue, as a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the social injury produced by the
criminal act which is sought to be repaired thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal injury caused
to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated through indemnity which is civil in nature. 14crlwvirtualibrry
Thus, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." 15 This is the law governing the recovery of civil liability arising from
the commission of an offense. Civil liability includes restitution, reparation for damage caused, and indemnification of consequential
damages. 16crlwvirtualibrry
The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the commission of the offense in the criminal case since the
civil action is either deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted.
Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective on December 1, 2000, provides that:
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action. [Emphasis supplied]
Rule 111, Section 2 further provides that
After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has
been entered in the criminal action. [Emphasis supplied]
However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the
same act or omission, the rule has been changed.
Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
17crlwvirtualibrry
There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising
from the offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even without a reservation. 18crlwvirtualibrry
Rule 111, Section 3 reads:
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action.
The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions which became effective on December 1,
2000 are applicable to this case.

Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested
rights in the rules of procedure. 19crlwvirtualibrry
Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-214, an independent civil action for damages on account of the fraud commited against respondent Villegas
under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed independently even if there was no reservation as to its filing.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the order dated February 21, 1997. 20crlwvirtualibrry
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984

ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision which reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction and
acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion on the ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal ordered them to pay
jointly and severally the amount of P9,000.00 to the complainants as actual damages.
The petitioners were charged under the following information:
The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, PEPITO BEDENIA, YOLLY RICO, DAVID BERMUNDO,
VILLANOAC, ROBERTO ROSALES, VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA, JR., RICARDO CELESTINO, REALINGO alias
"KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias TATO, and FOURTEEN (14) RICARDO DOES of the crime of GRAVE COERCION, committed as follows:
That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in the municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of Camarines
Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones,
Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac, Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo Celestino,
Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by confederating and mutually helping one another, and acting
without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats, force and violence prevent
Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and
by subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures
therein by axes and other massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of
the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the amount of P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages, and
further the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor,
and the rest of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and
that it was committed with evident premeditation.
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states that:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley
Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment of
FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P10,000.00;
moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly and severally, and all the
accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the proportionate costs of this proceedings.

The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermundo, Christopher Villanoac, Godofredo Villania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto
Rosales, Ricardo Celestino and Jose Ortega, are hereby ordered acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for their criminal participation
in the crime charged.
The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. They contended that the trial court's finding of grave
coercion was not supported by the evidence. According to the petitioners, the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of market
premises and the removal of the complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the
market stall was a nuisance per se. The petitioners stated that the lower court erred in finding that the demolition of the complainants'
stall was a violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the market
premises. The petitioners questioned the imposition of prison terms of five months and one day and of accessory penalties provided by
law. They also challenged the order to pay fines of P500.00 each, P10,000.00 actual and compensatory damages, P30,000.00 moral
damages, P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the sense that the appellants are acquitted on ground of reasonable
doubt. but they are ordered to pay jointly and severally to complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as actual damages.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results
in the extinction of their civil liability. The Court of Appeals denied the motion holding that:
xxx xxx xxx
... appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether the crime of coercion was committed, not on facts that no unlawful act
was committed; as their taking the law into their hands, destructing (sic) complainants' properties is unlawful, and, as evidence on record
established that complainants suffered actual damages, the imposition of actual damages is correct.
Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON
PETITIONERS PAYMENT OF DAMAGES TO COMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUITTING PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME CHARGED
FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY AROSE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 26, 1974 THAT SINCE APPELLANTS'
ACQUITTAL WAS BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT, NOT ON FACTS THAT NO UNLAWFUL ACT WAS COMMITTED, THE
IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS CORRECT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT PLAIN JUDICIAL ERROR, IN HOLDING IN ITS
APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT PETITIONERS COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT, THAT IS TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR HANDS,
DESTRUCTING (sic) 'COMPLAINANTS' PROPERTIES', AFTER HOLDING IN ITS MAIN DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6,1974 THAT THE

ACTS FOR WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED DID NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION AND THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF ANY
OTHER CRIME.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS HEREIN, APPELLANTS IN CA-G.R. NO. 13456CR, JOINTLY
AND SEVERALLY, TO PAY COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED ACTUAL DAMAGES.
The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners
to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.
Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that arising from and as a consequence
of the criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the criminal case), no civil liability
arising from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him. They cite precedents to the effect that the liability of the defendant for the
return of the amount received by him may not be enforced in the criminal case but must be raised in a separate civil action for the
recovery of the said amount (People v. Pantig, 97 Phil. 748; following the doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad Co. v. Honorable Rodolfo
Baltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69 Phil. 623; People v. Maniago 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda, 5 SCRA 1067; Aldaba v.
Elepafio 116 Phil. 457). In the case before us, the petitioners were acquitted not because they did not commit the acts stated in the
charge against them. There is no dispute over the forcible opening of the market stall, its demolition with axes and other instruments, and
the carting away of the merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly
constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief.
The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:
For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the violence must be employed against the person, not against property as
what happened in the case at bar. ...
xxx xxx xxx
The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense other than coercion?
From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted either for threats or malicious mischief. But the law does not allow us to render
judgment of conviction for either of these offenses for the reason that they were not indicted for, these offenses. The information under
which they were prosecuted does not allege the elements of either threats or malicious mischief. Although the information mentions that
the act was by means of threats', it does not allege the particular threat made. An accused person is entitled to be informed of the nature
of the acts imputed to him before he can be made to enter into trial upon a valid information.
We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in accordance with law.
While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are liable for the actual damages suffered by the complainants by reason of
the demolition of the stall and loss of some of their properties. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it that of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (Rule 111,
Sec. 3 (c), Rev. Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51 OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811). In the instant case, the fact from which
the civil might arise, namely, the demolition of the stall and loss of the properties contained therein; exists, and this is not denied by the

accused. And since there is no showing that the complainants have reserved or waived their right to institute a separate civil action, the
civil aspect therein is deemed instituted with the criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of Court).
xxx xxx xxx
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. There is no implied institution when the offended
party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. (Morte Sr. v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the civil liability which is
also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.
As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v. Garcia, et at. 73 Phil. 607 laid down the rule
that the same punishable act or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and, where provided by law, his
employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime and the liability arising from the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one
of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused, However, the offended party cannot recover damages under both
types of liability. For instance, in cases of criminal negligence or crimes due to reckless imprudence, Article 2177 of the Civil Code
provides:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be
observed:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in
the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or
indemnity for the damage suffered.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from
which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that
the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for
instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See
Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused
was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623).
Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that:

When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a
civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon
motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to
be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any
declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would not constitute an obstacle to the filing of a civil case
based on the same acts which led to the criminal prosecution:
... The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for and in the interest of the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School and for
his personal benefit is not a declaration that the fact upon which Civil Case No. V-3339 is based does not exist. The civil action barred by
such a declaration is the civil liability arising from the offense charged, which is the one impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
(Section 1, Rule III, Rules of Court.) Such a declaration would not bar a civil action filed against an accused who had been acquitted in
the criminal case if the criminal action is predicated on factual or legal considerations other than the commission of the offense charged.
A person may be acquitted of malversation where, as in the case at bar, he could show that he did not misappropriate the public funds in
his possession, but he could be rendered liable to restore said funds or at least to make a proper accounting thereof if he shall spend the
same for purposes which are not authorized nor intended, and in a manner not permitted by applicable rules and regulations. (Republic v.
Bello, 120 SCRA 203)
There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil
case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the
accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. The constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts
on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and
a more studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil
action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of
litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence adduced by both the prosecution and the defense:
xxx xxx xxx
(9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones, complying with the instructions contained in said Memorandum No. 32 of
the Mayor, and upon seeing that Antonio Vergara had not vacated the premises in question, with the aid of his policemen, forced upon
the store or stall and ordered the removal of the goods inside the store of Vergara, at the same time taking inventory of the goods taken
out, piled them outside in front of the store and had it cordoned with a rope, and after all the goods were taken out from the store, ordered
the demolition of said stall of Antonio Vergara. Since then up to the trial of this case, the whereabouts of the goods taken out from the
store nor the materials of the demolished stall have not been made known.
The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:

On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had not up to that time complied with the order to vacate, the co-accused
Chief of Police Galdones and some members of his police force, went to the market and, using ax, crowbars and hammers, demolished
the stall of the Vergaras who were not present or around, and after having first inventoried the goods and merchandise found therein,
they had them brought to the municipal building for safekeeping. Inspite of notice served upon the Vergaras to take possession of the
goods and merchandise thus taken away, the latter refused to do so.
The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were:
Cost of stall construction P1,300.00
Value of furniture and equipment
judgment destroyed 300.00
Value of goods and equipment taken 8,000.00
P9,600.00
It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the complainants Vergaras and carted away its contents. The defense
that they did so in order to abate what they considered a nuisance per se is untenable, This finds no support in law and in fact. The
couple has been paying rentals for the premises to the government which allowed them to lease the stall. It is, therefore, farfetched to
say that the stall was a nuisance per se which could be summarily abated.
The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the destruction of the complainant's market stall and had its contents
carted away. They state:
On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the Mayor to vacate the passageways of Market Building No. 3, the
Vergaras were still in the premises, so the petitioners Chief of Police and members of the Police Force of Jose Panganiban, pursuant to
the Mayor' 6 directives, demolished the store of the Vergaras, made an inventory of the goods found in said store, and brought these
goods to the municipal building under the custody of the Municipal Treasurer, ...
The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when the accused in a criminal prosecution
is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted." According to some scholars, this provision of substantive law calls for a separate civil action and cannot be
modified by a rule of remedial law even in the interests of economy and simplicity and following the dictates of logic and common sense.
As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:
... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action but inadequate to justify a conviction in the criminal action, may it
render judgment acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt, but hold him civilly liable nonetheless? An affirmative answer to this
question would be consistent with the doctrine that the two are distinct and separate actions, and win (a) dispense with the reinstituting of
the same civil action, or one based on quasi-delict or other independent civil action, and of presenting the same evidence: (b) save the
injured party unnecessary expenses in the prosecution of the civil action or enable him to take advantage of the free services of the
fiscal; and (c) otherwise resolve the unsettling implications of permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil action whether based on delict,
or quasi-delict, or other independent civil actions.

... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here suggested, Art. 29 of the Civil Code should be amended because it clearly
and expressly provides that the civil action based on the same act or omission may only be instituted in a separate action, and therefore,
may not inferentially be resolved in the same criminal action. To dismiss the civil action upon acquittal of the accused and disallow the
reinstitution of any other civil action, would likewise render, unjustifiably, the acquittal on reasonable doubt without any significance, and
would violate the doctrine that the two actions are distinct and separate.
In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that there is much sophistry and no pragmatism in the doctrine that it is
inconsistent to award in the same proceedings damages against the accused after acquitting him on reasonable doubt. Such doctrine
must recognize the distinct and separate character of the two actions, the nature of an acquittal on reasonable doubt, the vexatious and
oppressive effects of a reservation or institution of a separate civil action, and that the injured party is entitled to damages not because
the act or omission is punishable but because he was damaged or injured thereby (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, pp.
288-289).
We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant damages despite a judgment of acquittal based on
reasonable doubt. What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in
a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action
for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the
remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate
filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the
same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not,
however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirement, a provision which imposes an uncalled for burden before
one who has already been the victim of a condemnable, yet non-criminal, act may be accorded the justice which he seeks.
We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the intent of the legislator that they could not possibly have
intended to make it more difficult for the aggrieved party to recover just compensation by making a separate civil action mandatory and
exclusive:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the
Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived
from the the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a
clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two
liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or
correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party... it is just and proper that, for the
purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of

indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of
every private right to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the
wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? (Code Commission, pp. 45-46).
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more evidence must be adduced or where the
criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely
remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended party
may, of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in
the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to
be filed.
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in awarding damages despite a judgment of
acquittal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

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[G.R. No. 147703. April 14, 2004]

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat
the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability.
Both the primary civil liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in one single decision
that has become final and executory.
The Case
[if
!supportFootnotes][1][endif]
Before this Court is a Petition for Review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 29, 2000[if !
supportFootnotes][2][endif] and the March 27, 2001[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59390.
Petitioners appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was
dismissed in the first Resolution as follows:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the appeal is ordered DISMISSED.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
The second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:
On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years,
nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay damages as follows:
a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, plus the sum of P25,383.00, for funeral
expenses, his unearned income for one year at P2,500.00 a month, P50,000.00 as indemnity for the support of Renato Torres, and the
further sum of P300,000.00 as moral damages;
b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum of P237,323.75 for funeral expenses,
her unearned income for three years at P45,000.00 per annum, and the further sum of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages and
P200,000.00 as attorneys fees[;]
c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum of P22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the
sum of P20,544.94 as medical expenses and her loss of income for 30 years at P1,000.00 per month, and the further sum of
P100,000.00 for moral damages;
d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as hospital expenses, doctors fees of P170,000.00 for the orthopedic surgeon,
P22,500.00 for the [n]eurologist, an additional indemnity [of] at least P150,000.00 to cover future correction of deformity of her limbs, and
moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;
e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical expenses, P2,000.00 as loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages;

f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as medical expenses, P800.00 for loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral
damages;
g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as medical expenses, P4,600.00 as actual damages and her loss earnings of P1,400.00
as well as moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00;
h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as hospital expenses, P14,530.00 as doctors fees, P1,000.00 for medicines and
P50,000.00 as moral damages;
i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for medical expenses, P87.00 for medicines, P1,710.00 as actual damages and
P5,000.00 as moral damages;
j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00 for hospital bills, P500.00 for medicine, P2,100.00 as actual damages, P1,200.00 for
loss of income and P5,000.00 as moral damages;
k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Ace Van, the amount of P250,000.00 as actual damages for the
cost of the totally wrecked vehicle; to the owner of the jeepney, the amount of P22,698.38 as actual damages;
The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused.
Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing] that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court
authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by [petitioner],
filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. We affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf of accused.
Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the trial
court gave due course to [petitioners] notice of appeal. On December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office
of the Solicitor General received [a] copy of [petitioners] brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be excused from filing
[respondents] brief on the ground that the OSGs authority to represent People is confined to criminal cases on appeal. The motion was
however denied per Our resolution of May 31, 1999. On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed the instant motion to
dismiss.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once
determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employers subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the
accused-employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had already
been dismissed by the CA, then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became final and executory. Included in the civil
liability of the accused was the employers subsidiary liability.
Hence, this Petition.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]

The Issues
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:

A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction
independently of the accused.
B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 57) and Yusay v. Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply to the instant
case.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item A.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer
Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC Decision, petitioner contends that the judgment of conviction
against the accused-employee has not attained finality. The former insists that its appeal stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that
the latter had jumped bail. In effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of that of the accused-employee.
We are not persuaded.
Appeals in Criminal Cases
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thus:
Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy.
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the government may do so only if the accused would not
thereby be placed in double jeopardy.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused
should have been given a more severe penalty.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] On the other hand, the offended parties may also appeal the
judgment with respect to their right to civil liability. If the accused has the right to appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended parties
should have the same right to appeal as much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
Appeal by the Accused
Who Jumps Bail
Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its
pendency if the accused jumps bail. The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the
courts jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial relief.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail during the appeal, but also to one who does so during the trial.
Justice Florenz D. Regalado succinctly explains the principle in this wise:
x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment and during the trial, but the trial in absentia proceeded resulting
in the promulgation of a judgment against him and his counsel appealed, since he nonetheless remained at large his appeal must be

dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid provision of this Rule [Rule 124, 8 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure]. x x x[if !supportFootnotes][14]
[endif]

The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise
arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against them.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] While at large, they cannot seek relief from the
court, as they are deemed to have waived the appeal.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]
Finality of a Decision
in a Criminal Case
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
we quote:
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected.
Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the
sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for
probation.
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have
abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and executory.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
Liability of an Employer
in a Finding of Guilt
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, as follows:
In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for
crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police
regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or
for payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person
representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or
his representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery
with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeepers employees.
Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article 103 which reads:
The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of
their duties.
Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main issue raised by petitioner.
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted
in the Criminal Prosecution

At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a
criminal prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.
xxxxxxxxx
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action, that is, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action.[if !supportFootnotes]
[18][endif] Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on
the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately
from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32,[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] 33,[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]34[if !supportFootnotes][22]
[endif] and 2176[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] of the Civil Code shall remain separate, distinct and independent of any criminal prosecution based
on the same act. Here are some direct consequences of such revision and omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not
deemed included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the right to
bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act or omission.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif]
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto),
but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex
delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still
intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif]
This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which states that [e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif]
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case and is conclusively bound by the outcome thereof.
Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right to pursue the case to its logical conclusion -- including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M.
Roman, its employee.
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted
that none can be applied to it, because in all th[o]se cases, the accuseds employer did not interpose an appeal.[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif]
Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any single case in which the employer appealed, precisely because an appeal in such circumstances is not
possible.

The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal
cases instituted against their employees.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact
should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latters
lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard
Against Double Jeopardy
Petitioners appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee absolved of his criminal responsibility and the judgment reviewed as a
whole. These intentions are apparent from its Appellants Brief[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif] filed with the CA and from its Petition[if !supportFootnotes][30]
[endif] before us, both of which claim that the trial courts finding of guilt is not supported by competent evidence.[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif]
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the
whole case open to a review by the appellate court. The latter is then called upon to render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether
favorable or unfavorable to the appellant.[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif] This is the risk involved when the accused decides to appeal a sentence of
conviction.[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif] Indeed, appellate courts have the power to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court and
to increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif]
If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the accused-employee becomes open to review. It thus follows that a
penalty higher than that which has already been imposed by the trial court may be meted out to him. Petitioners appeal would thus
violate his right against double jeopardy, since the judgment against him could become subject to modification without his consent.
We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused effectively waived his right to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear,
though, that petitioner may not appeal without violating his right against double jeopardy.
Effect of Absconding
on the Appeal Process
Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure, the accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by
jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the court below final.[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif] Having been a fugitive from justice for a long
period of time, he is deemed to have waived his right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and executory. The Court in People v.
Ang Gioc[if !supportFootnotes][36][endif] ruled:
There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them.
This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by
implication. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his
right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him. x x x.[if !supportFootnotes][37][endif]
By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the court and placed himself in a position to speculate on his
chances for a reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his
option.[if !supportFootnotes][38][endif] Such conduct is intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.[if !supportFootnotes][39]
[endif]

Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who refuses to surrender to the proper authorities becomes final and
executory.[if !supportFootnotes][40][endif]
Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal case against the accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he
has waived his right to appeal; and that the judgment in the criminal case against him is now final.
Subsidiary Liability
Upon Finality of Judgment
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Petitioner argues that the rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate
Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,[if !supportFootnotes][41][endif] Alvarez v. CA[if !supportFootnotes][42][endif] and Yusay v. Adil[if !supportFootnotes][43][endif] do not apply to the
present case, because it has followed the Courts directive to the employers in these cases to take part in the criminal cases against their
employees. By participating in the defense of its employee, herein petitioner tries to shield itself from the undisputed rulings laid down in
these leading cases.
Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary liability, petitioner lost track of the most basic tenet they have laid
down -- that an employers liability in a finding of guilt against its accused-employee is subsidiary.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the
event of the latters insolvency.[if !supportFootnotes][44][endif] The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability -- Articles 102 and
103 -- are deemed written into the judgments in the cases to which they are applicable.[if !supportFootnotes][45][endif] Thus, in the dispositive
portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.
In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the
person who is subsidiarily liable.[if !supportFootnotes][46][endif] In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil
liability.[if !supportFootnotes][47][endif]
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment
rendered by a competent court.[if !supportFootnotes][48][endif] By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their
employees without the latters consent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the formers
civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.[if !supportFootnotes]
[49][endif]

Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be adequate evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the
employers of the convicted employees; (2) that the former are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the
employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) that the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency.[if !
supportFootnotes][50][endif]

The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But the determination must be based on the evidence that the
offended party and the employer may fully and freely present. Such determination may be done in the same criminal action in which the
employees liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced;[if !supportFootnotes][51][endif] and in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due
notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the judgment.

Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-employee does not mean that its liability has transformed
its nature; its liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the accusedemployees conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of the employer ipso facto attaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the finality of conviction could be the proper sanction to be imposed
upon the accused for jumping bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In effect, petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first, for
itself; and second, for its accused-employee.
The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one criminal case against the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has
both criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for this single case to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to
an entity whose liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil
liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the formers subsidiary civil liability has also become
immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of
the primary civil liability.
No Deprivation
of Due Process
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate that what is sought to be enforced is the subsidiary civil
liability incident to and dependent upon the employees criminal negligence. In other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily
liable upon the conviction of the employee and upon proof of the latters insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only his
primary civil liability, but also his employers subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence.[if !supportFootnotes][52][endif]
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process.[if !supportFootnotes][53][endif] It is merely a
procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing
such exercise.[if !supportFootnotes][54][endif] Hence, the legal requirements must be strictly complied with.[if !supportFootnotes][55][endif]
It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal as merely harmless and trivial technicalities that can be
discarded.[if !supportFootnotes][56][endif] Indeed, deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated.[if !supportFootnotes][57][endif] In these times when court
dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, such rules have to be followed by parties with greater fidelity, so as to facilitate the orderly
disposition of those cases.[if !supportFootnotes][58][endif]
After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. If the proper losing party has the right to file an
appeal within the prescribed period, then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.[if !
supportFootnotes][59][endif]

In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it participated in the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said
that the employer was deprived of due process. It might have lost its right to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court.[if !supportFootnotes]
[60][endif] In fact, it can be said that by jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.
All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the accused. It should be clear that only after proof of his
insolvency may the subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently proven that there exists an employer-employee

relationship; that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; and that the employee has been adjudged guilty of the wrongful act
and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. The proof is clear from the admissions of petitioner that [o]n 26
August 1990, while on its regular trip from Laoag to Manila, a passenger bus owned by petitioner, being then operated by petitioners
driver, Napoleon Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x x.[if !supportFootnotes][61][endif] Neither does petitioner dispute that
there was already a finding of guilt against the accused while he was in the discharge of his duties.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 150157

January 25, 2007
MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
MODESTO CALAUNAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 which affirmed in toto the decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 42, in Civil Case No. D-10086, finding petitioners Mauricio Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) solidarily liable to pay damages and attorneys fees to respondent Modesto Calaunan.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number CVD-478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and
driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep with plate number PER-290, owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan
and driven by Marcelo Mendoza.
At around 6:00 to 7:00 oclock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan, together with Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way to
Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep. The Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from Concepcion,
Tarlac. At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided.
The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and
then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of
collision.
Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for treatment to the Manila Central University
Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, the conductor of the Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred to the Veterans Memorial
Medical Center.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries, docketed as Crim. Case No. 684-M-89. Subsequently on 2
December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before the RTC of Dagupan City,
docketed as Civil Case No. D-10086. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case. Among those who testified in the criminal case
were respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos.
In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:
1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued as well as the venue and the identities of the vehicles involved;
2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed;
3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;
4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan and the existence of the medical certificate;
5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep being ahead of the bus;

6. That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and straight, although there was a ditch on the right side where the jeep fell
into.3
When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs)4 of the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as much
as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.
Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, left for abroad sometime in November, 1989 and has not returned
since then. Rogelio Ramos took the stand and said that his brother, Fernando Ramos, left for Amman, Jordan, to work. Rosalia Mendoza
testified that her husband, Marcelo Mendoza, left their residence to look for a job. She narrated that she thought her husband went to his
hometown in Panique, Tarlac, when he did not return after one month. She went to her husbands hometown to look for him but she was
informed that he did not go there.1awphil.net
The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the court where Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was
tried, to bring the TSNs of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan,5 Marcelo Mendoza6 and Fernando Ramos7 in said case, together
with other documentary evidence marked therein. Instead of the Branch Clerk of Court, it was Enrique Santos Guevara, Court Interpreter,
who appeared before the court and identified the TSNs of the three afore-named witnesses and other pertinent documents he had
brought.8 Counsel for respondent wanted to mark other TSNs and documents from the said criminal case to be adopted in the instant
case, but since the same were not brought to the trial court, counsel for petitioners compromised that said TSNs and documents could be
offered by counsel for respondent as rebuttal evidence.
For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan testified. The TSN9 of the testimony of Donato Ganiban,
investigator of the PRBLI, in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was marked and allowed to be adopted in the civil case on the ground that he
was already dead.
Respondent further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal evidence, the TSNs10 of the testimonies of Donato Ganiban, Oscar
Buan and petitioner Manliclic in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89.
The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for the collision?
Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while the latter is resolute in saying it was the former who caused the
smash up.
The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:
The parties differed only on the manner the collision between the two (2) vehicles took place. According to the plaintiff and his driver, the
jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus
overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. At the time
the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of
the jeep when the jeep was hit. Fernando Ramos corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that he was
on another jeep following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the incident took place. He said, the jeep of the plaintiff
overtook them and the said jeep of the plaintiff was followed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus which was running very fast. The bus also
overtook the jeep in which he was riding. After that, he heard a loud sound. He saw the jeep of the plaintiff swerved to the right on a

grassy portion of the road. The Philippine Rabbit Bus stopped and they overtook the Philippine Rabbit Bus so that it could not moved
(sic), meaning they stopped in front of the Philippine Rabbit Bus. He testified that the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the right because it was
bumped by the Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.
Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep in question. However, they
explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left
because it was to overtake another jeep in front of it. Such was their testimony before the RTC in Malolos in the criminal case and before
this Court in the instant case. [Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was correct, would be
determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the operation of their respective vehicles.]11
Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
its employee, specifically petitioner Manliclic.
On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan and against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. The
dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the said defendants to pay plaintiff
jointly and solidarily the amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages for the towing as well as the repair and the materials used for the
repair of the jeep in question; P100,000.00 as moral damages and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P15,000.00 as
attorneys fees, including appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the defendants are also to pay costs.12
Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals.13
In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no reversible error in the decision of the trial court, affirmed it in all
respects.14
Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. They assign as errors the
following:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN
EVIDENCE OF THE TSNs AND OTHER DOCUMENTS PRESENTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS RELIANCE ON THE VERSION
OF THE RESPONDENT ON HOW THE ACCIDENT SUPPOSEDLY OCCURRED.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS UNFAIR DISREGARD OF
HEREIN PETITIONER PRBLs DEFENSE OF EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS
EMPLOYEES.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEE.

With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the pendency of this appeal with this Court, we granted the Motion for the
Substitution of Respondent filed by his wife, Mrs. Precila Zarate Vda. De Calaunan, and children, Virgilio Calaunan, Carmelita
Honeycomb, Evelyn Calaunan, Marko Calaunan and Liwayway Calaunan.15
In their Reply to respondents Comment, petitioners informed this Court of a Decision16 of the Court of Appeals acquitting petitioner
Manliclic of the charge17 of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries attaching thereto a photocopy
thereof.
On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent Calaunan,18 Marcelo Mendoza19 and
Fernando Ramos20 should not be admitted in evidence for failure of respondent to comply with the requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.
For Section 47, Rule 13021 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his
testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those
representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes
of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse
party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.22
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the Rules for a testimony given in a former case or
proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had
no opportunity to cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed exclusively against petitioner Manliclic,
petitioner PRBLIs employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are
not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.23
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the testimonies of the three witnesses are still
admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the
objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to
the evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that
these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and
considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted.24 Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but,
when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it deserves.25
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and
Fernando Ramos in the criminal case when the same were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of
Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted by both petitioners.26 Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence the TSN containing the
testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiffs witnesses in
the criminal case should not be admitted in the instant case, why then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given in
the criminal case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it too. It cannot argue that the TSNs of the testimonies
of the witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal case should not be admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the

testimony of the witness for the accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban would be
unfair.
We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLIs argument that it will be denied due process when the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan,
Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case are to be admitted in the civil case. It is too late for petitioner PRBLI to raise
denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSNs.
For failure to object at the proper time, it waived its right to object that the TSNs did not comply with Section 47.
In Mangio v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court, through Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno,28 admitted in evidence a TSN of the testimony of
a witness in another case despite therein petitioners assertion that he would be denied due process. In admitting the TSN, the Court
ruled that the raising of denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the
admissibility of the TSN was belatedly done. In so doing, therein petitioner waived his right to object based on said ground.
Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have been admitted in the instant civil case because Section 47 of
Rule 130 refers only to "testimony or deposition." We find such contention to be untenable. Though said section speaks only of testimony
and deposition, it does not mean that documents from a former case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said documents can be admitted
they being part of the testimonies of witnesses that have been admitted. Accordingly, they shall be given the same weight as that to
which the testimony may be entitled.29
On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner Manliclic as to how the accident occurred is more credible
than respondents version. They anchor their contention on the fact that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted by the Court of Appeals of the
charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.
To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclics acquittal in the civil case.
From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising from, or based on, quasi-delict.30 Petitioner
Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless imprudence in causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure to
exercise the diligence of a good father in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. The allegations
read:
"4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was on board the above-described motor vehicle travelling at a moderate
speed along the North Luzon Expressway heading South towards Manila together with MARCELO MENDOZA, who was then driving the
same;
"5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Express Way, the above-described motor vehicle was suddenly bumped from
behind by a Philippine Rabbit Bus with Body No. 353 and with plate No. CVD 478 then being driven by one Mauricio Manliclic of San
Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac, who was then travelling recklessly at a very fast speed and had apparently lost control of his vehicle;
"6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the above-described motor vehicle was forced off the North Luzon Express Way towards
the rightside where it fell on its drivers side on a ditch, and that as a consequence, the above-described motor vehicle which maybe
valued at EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000) was rendered a total wreck as shown by pictures to be presented during the pre-trial
and trial of this case;

"7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff sustained bodily injuries which compounded plaintiffs frail physical condition and
required his hospitalization from July 12, 1988 up to and until July 22, 1988, copy of the medical certificate is hereto attached as Annex
"A" and made an integral part hereof;
"8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total wreckage of the above-described motor vehicle as well as bodily (sic) sustained by
plaintiff, was solely due to the reckless imprudence of the defendant driver Mauricio Manliclic who drove his Philippine Rabbit Bus No.
353 at a fast speed without due regard or observance of existing traffic rules and regulations;
"9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Corporation failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of (sic) family in the selection
and supervision of its drivers; x x x"31
Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent notwithstanding the declaration of the Court of Appeals that there
was an absence of negligence on his part?
In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of Appeals said:
To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that accused-appellant was negligent "when the bus he was driving bumped the jeep
from behind"; that "the proximate cause of the accident was his having driven the bus at a great speed while closely following the jeep"; x
xx
We do not agree.
The swerving of Calaunans jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in front of it was beyond the control of accused-appellant.
xxxx
Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held liable for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property with Physical Injuries as defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.32
From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on
the ground that he is not the author of the act complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure which reads:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted section applies only to a civil action
arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability referred
to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished
even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.33
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a
crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.34 It is now settled that

acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on
quasi delict.35
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime may be proved
by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission
complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal
closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil
liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict
complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground
of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasidelict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.36 An acquittal or conviction in
the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case37 based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of how the collision occurred and to disregard that of respondents. Petitioners insist
that while the PRBLI bus was in the process of overtaking respondents jeep, the latter, without warning, suddenly swerved to the left
(fast) lane in order to overtake another jeep ahead of it, thus causing the collision.
As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review. The factual findings of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court.38 Not being a trier of facts, this Court will not allow a
review thereof unless:
(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken;
(3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees;
(7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.39
After going over the evidence on record, we do not find any of the exceptions that would warrant our departure from the general rule. We
fully agree in the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that it was petitioner Manliclic who was negligent in driving
the PRBLI bus which was the cause of the collision. In giving credence to the version of the respondent, the trial court has this say:
x x x Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was correct, would be determinative of who between the
two drivers was negligent in the operation of their respective vehicle.
In this regard, it should be noted that in the statement of Mauricio Manliclic (Exh. 15) given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV
Cabading no mention was made by him about the fact that the driver of the jeep was overtaking another jeep when the collision took
place. The allegation that another jeep was being overtaken by the jeep of Calaunan was testified to by him only in Crim. Case No. 684-

M-89 before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan and before this Court. Evidently, it was a product of an afterthought on the part
of Mauricio Manliclic so that he could explain why he should not be held responsible for the incident. His attempt to veer away from the
truth was also apparent when it would be considered that in his statement given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading (Exh.
15), he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep of Calaunan while the Philippine Rabbit Bus was behind the said jeep. In
his testimony before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan as well as in this Court, he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was
already on the left side of the jeep when the collision took place. For this inconsistency between his statement and testimony, his
explanation regarding the manner of how the collision between the jeep and the bus took place should be taken with caution. It might be
true that in the statement of Oscar Buan given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading, it was mentioned by the former that the
jeep of plaintiff was in the act of overtaking another jeep when the collision between the latter jeep and the Philippine Rabbit Bus took
place. But the fact, however, that his statement was given on July 15, 1988, one day after Mauricio Manliclic gave his statement should
not escape attention. The one-day difference between the giving of the two statements would be significant enough to entertain the
possibility of Oscar Buan having received legal advise before giving his statement. Apart from that, as between his statement and the
statement of Manliclic himself, the statement of the latter should prevail. Besides, in his Affidavit of March 10, 1989, (Exh. 14), the
unreliability of the statement of Oscar Buan (Exh. 13) given to CV Cabading rear its "ugly head" when he did not mention in said affidavit
that the jeep of Calaunan was trying to overtake another jeep when the collision between the jeep in question and the Philippine Rabbit
bus took place.
xxxx
If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his conductor, Oscar Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus
was already somewhat parallel to the jeep when the collision took place, the point of collision on the jeep should have been somewhat on
the left side thereof rather than on its rear. Furthermore, the jeep should have fallen on the road itself rather than having been forced off
the road. Useless, likewise to emphasize that the Philippine Rabbit was running very fast as testified to by Ramos which was not
controverted by the defendants.40
Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclics negligence that caused the smash up, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the
employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family.41 Under Article 218042 of the
New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after
selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against
the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents
to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.43
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the required diligence in the selection and supervision of
its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. In the matter of selection, it showed the screening process that petitioner Manliclic
underwent before he became a regular driver. As to the exercise of due diligence in the supervision of its employees, it argues that
presence of ready investigators (Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient proof that it exercised the required due diligence in the supervision
of its employees.

In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service
records. In the supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and
impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was incumbent on them.44
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,45 it was explained that:
Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the
guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the
employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of
breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To
this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the
employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions.
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not
enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the
employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been
diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of
hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption.
We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "the formulation of various company policies on safety without
showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It
is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the recruitment procedures and company policies
on efficiency and safety were followed." x x x.
The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection but not in the supervision of
its employees. It expounded as follows:
From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a very good procedure of recruiting its driver as
well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no evidence though that it is as good in the supervision of its personnel. There has
been no iota of evidence introduced by it that there are rules promulgated by the bus company regarding the safe operation of its vehicle
and in the way its driver should manage and operate the vehicles assigned to them. There is no showing that somebody in the bus
company has been employed to oversee how its driver should behave while operating their vehicles without courting incidents similar to
the herein case. In regard to supervision, it is not difficult to observe that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. has been negligent as an
employer and it should be made responsible for the acts of its employees, particularly the driver involved in this case.
We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not enough to exempt petitioner PRBLI from
liability arising from the negligence of petitioner Manliclic. Same does not comply with the guidelines set forth in the cases abovementioned. The presence of the investigators after the accident is not enough supervision. Regular supervision of employees, that is,
prior to any accident, should have been shown and established. This, petitioner failed to do. The lack of supervision can further be seen
by the fact that there is only one set of manual containing the rules and regulations for all the drivers of PRBLI. 46 How then can all the

drivers of petitioner PRBLI know and be continually informed of the rules and regulations when only one manual is being lent to all the
drivers?
For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees,
petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the damages caused by petitioner Manliclics negligence.
We now go to the award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded the amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages representing the
amount paid by respondent for the towing and repair of his jeep.47 As regards the awards for moral and exemplary damages, same,
under the circumstances, must be modified. The P100,000.00 awarded by the trial court as moral damages must be reduced to
P50,000.00.48 Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good.49 The amount awarded by the trial
court must, likewise, be lowered to P50,000.00.50 The award of P15,000.00 for attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is in order and
authorized by law.51
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
55909 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the award of moral damages shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of
exemplary damages shall be lowered to P50,000.00. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. L-21438

September 28, 1966
AIR FRANCE, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner.
Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral damages;
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the
trip Bangkok-Rome, these various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus
P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted
to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs against petitioner.
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the evidence of record", are:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class"
round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of
the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G.
Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat,
the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion
ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out
that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr.
Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class"
seat in the plane.3
1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the findings" 4 of respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner charges that
respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid before it. We are asked to consider facts
favorable to petitioner, and then, to overturn the appellate court's decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based". 5 This is echoed in the statutory demand that a judgment determining the
merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based"; 6 and that "Every decision of the Court of
Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it". 7

A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack. 8 The law, however, solely insists that a decision state
the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every
bit and piece of evidence 10 presented by one party and the other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation
"to specify in the sentence the facts" which a party "considered as proved". 11 This is but a part of the mental process from which the
Court draws the essential ultimate facts. A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So
long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold
therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense". Because as this Court well observed, "There is no
law that so requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing
to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the Constitution". It is in this
setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere fact that the findings "were based entirely on the evidence for the prosecution without
taking into consideration or even mentioning the appellant's side in the controversy as shown by his own testimony", would not vitiate the
judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the decision the testimony of each witness for, or each item of evidence presented by, the
defeated party, it does not mean that the court has overlooked such testimony or such item of evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal
presumptions are that official duty has been regularly performed, and that all the matters within an issue in a case were laid before the
court and passed upon by it. 15
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as "the written statement of the ultimate facts as found
by the court ... and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered thereon". 16 They consist of the court's "conclusions" with
respect to the determinative facts in issue". 17 A question of law, upon the other hand, has been declared as "one which does not call for
an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties." 18
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals. 19 That judgment
is conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the business of this Court to alter the facts or to review the questions of fact. 20
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals support its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that
said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have
confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a
first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class
seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief before the Court of Appeals under its third
assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff had confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class
seats on the "definite" segments of his journey, particularly that from Saigon to Beirut". 21
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was no guarantee that the passenger to whom the
same had been issued, would be accommodated in the first-class compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to make

arrangements upon arrival at every station for the necessary first-class reservation. We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We
cannot understand how a reputable firm like defendant airplane company could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to
honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of
its employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or riot the tickets it
issues are to be honored or not.22
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioner's contention, thus:
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, there can be no question. Apart from his testimony, see plaintiff's
Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", and defendant's own witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony and
testified as follows:
Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what does this OK mean?
A. That the space is confirmed.
Q. Confirmed for first class?
A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)
xxx
xxx
xxx
Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that although plaintiff paid for, and was
issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of
said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C-1" belie the
testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation
whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation for a "first class"
accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot believe that after such confirmation defendant had a verbal
understanding with plaintiff that the "first class" ticket issued to him by defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong. 23
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few pesos in the amount refunded on Carrascoso's ticket,
the decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that such a
judgment of affirmance has merged the judgment of the lower court. 24 Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the Court of
Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of First Instance was free from prejudicial error and "all questions raised by the assignments of
error and all questions that might have been raised are to be regarded as finally adjudicated against the appellant". So also, the judgment
affirmed "must be regarded as free from all error". 25 We reached this policy construction because nothing in the decision of the Court of
Appeals on this point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at war with those of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by
the Court of Appeals upon a ground or grounds different from those which were made the basis of the conclusions of the trial court. 26
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in
specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a
passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and
say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a

rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the
relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts
refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts upon which the Court of Appeals predicated the
finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the
Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight. 27 We perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of petitioner's statement of its position",
as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do we subscribe to petitioner's accusation that respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a first class
seat to provoke an issue". 29 And this because, as petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his office in Bangkok "to
confirm my seat and because from Saigon I was told again to see the Manager". 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in
the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had a better right to the seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's trenchant claim is that Carrascoso's action is planted upon
breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith;31 and that the decision
of the Court of Appeals fails to make a finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this issue are:
3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for a valuable consideration, the latter acting as
general agents for and in behalf of the defendant, under which said contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed to furnish
plaintiff, First Class passage on defendant's plane during the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of Europe with Hongkong as starting point
up to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... .
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to Bangkok, defendant furnished to the plaintiff
First Class accommodation but only after protestations, arguments and/or insistence were made by the plaintiff with defendant's
employees.
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead furnished plaintiff only Tourist Class accommodations from
Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, ... the plaintiff has been compelled by defendant's employees to leave the First Class
accommodation berths at Bangkok after he was already seated.
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience and embarrassments brought by defendant's breach of
contract was forced to take a Pan American World Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to Manila.32
xxx
xxx
xxx
2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class accommodations aforesaid, plaintiff suffered inconveniences,
embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and
the like injury, resulting in moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00. 33
xxx
xxx
xxx
The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering,
amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class
transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class
accommodation berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience,

embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation,
resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith
is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. 34 The contract was averred to establish the relation between
the parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion.
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso
intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok, Carrascoso was ousted by petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a
white man; 35 and (b) evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on the part of the petitioner. It
is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral
damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even
required. 36 On the question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared:
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane belonging to the defendant Air France while at
Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist class not only without his consent but against his will, has been sufficiently established by
plaintiff in his testimony before the court, corroborated by the corresponding entry made by the purser of the plane in his notebook which
notation reads as follows:
"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene",
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-passenger. The captain of the plane who was asked by the
manager of defendant company at Bangkok to intervene even refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever
contradicted or denied this evidence for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to present its manager at Bangkok to testify at
the trial of the case, or yet to secure his disposition; but defendant did neither. 37
The Court of appeals further stated
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man. Hence, if the employees of the defendant
at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him when all the seats had already been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been picked out
as the one to suffer the consequences and to be subjected to the humiliation and indignity of being ejected from his seat in the presence
of others. Instead of explaining to the white man the improvidence committed by defendant's employees, the manager adopted the more
drastic step of ousting the plaintiff who was then safely ensconsced in his rightful seat. We are strengthened in our belief that this
probably was what happened there, by the testimony of defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to explain the meaning of
the letters "O.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said "that the space is confirmed for first class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another
witness for defendant, who was the chief of the Reservation Office of defendant, testified as follows:
"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what reservation the passenger has arranged with you?
A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation." (t.s.n., p. 247, June 19, 1959)
In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this point:
Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, "white man" have a "better right" to the seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso?
The record is silent. The defendant airline did not prove "any better", nay, any right on the part of the "white man" to the "First class" seat
that the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid and was issued a corresponding "first class" ticket.

If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's Manager in Bangkok, the defendant could have easily proven it by having
taken the testimony of the said Manager by deposition, but defendant did not do so; the presumption is that evidence willfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules of Court]; and, under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to find, as it does
find, that the Manager of the defendant airline in Bangkok not merely asked but threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the plane if he
did not give up his "first class" seat because the said Manager wanted to accommodate, using the words of the witness Ernesto G.
Cuento, the "white man".38
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first transcribed did not use the term "bad faith". But can it be
doubted that the recital of facts therein points to bad faith? The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first
class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to
the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad
faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state
of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose." 39
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad faith in the judgment of the Court of First Instance, thus:
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation with plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating circumstances
that defendant's Manager in Bangkok went to the extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many passengers to have him
thrown out of the airplane to give the "first class" seat that he was occupying to, again using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento,
a "white man" whom he (defendant's Manager) wished to accommodate, and the defendant has not proven that this "white man" had any
"better right" to occupy the "first class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for which the corresponding "first class"
ticket was issued by the defendant to him.40
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. 41 For the willful
malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code,
moral damages are recoverable. 42
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. 43 And this, because of the
relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the
comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect,
courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and
abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the
latter an action for damages against the carrier. 44

Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of contract and a tort, giving a right of action
for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of
ejection, though the language used was not insulting and she was not ejected." 46 And this, because, although the relation of passenger
and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". 47 And in another
case, "Where a passenger on a railroad train, when the conductor came to collect his fare tendered him the cash fare to a point where
the train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the train reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that point
to destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which justified the conductor in using insulting language to him, as by
calling him a lunatic," 48 and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said passenger.
1awphl.nt
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon
his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus
Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?
A When we left already that was already in the trip I could not help it. So one of the flight attendants approached me and requested
from me my ticket and I said, What for? and she said, "We will note that you transferred to the tourist class". I said, "Nothing of that kind.
That is tantamount to accepting my transfer." And I also said, "You are not going to note anything there because I am protesting to this
transfer".
Q Was she able to note it?
A No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q About that purser?
A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't have enough leg room, I stood up and I went to the pantry
that was next to me and the purser was there. He told me, "I have recorded the incident in my notebook." He read it and translated it to
me because it was recorded in French "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the
captain refused to intervene."
Mr. VALTE
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best evidence would be the notes. Your Honor.
COURT
I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his notebook reading "First class passenger
was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's
testimony above] which is incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on
the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. 49a
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh
and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the

res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". 51 The utterance of the
purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness
has been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would have been an easy matter for
petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser
could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary damages in contracts and
quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner." 53 The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in addition to
moral damages.54
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment for attorneys' fees. The
least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend to
break faith with the tradition that discretion well exercised as it was here should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral
damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily
with the trial court. 56 The Court of Appeals did not interfere with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our
imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.57
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error. We accordingly vote to affirm the
same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

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[G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003.]

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, Petitioners, v. MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR
NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY, Respondents.

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DECISION
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VITUG, J.:

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The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 April 2000 and 10
October 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 60720, entitled "Marjorie Navidad and Heirs of the Late Nicanor Navidad v. Rodolfo
Roman, et. al.," which has modified the decision of 11 August 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 266, Pasig City, exonerating
Prudent Security Agency (Prudent) from liability and finding Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and Rodolfo Roman liable for damages on
account of the death of Nicanor Navidad.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven oclock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station
after purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito
Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently
ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered
the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner
Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.

On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages
against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her
husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer,
denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards.

The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending
that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. On 11 August 1998, the trial court rendered its decision;
it adjudged:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin
ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

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"a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00;
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2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;
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3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00;
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"b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;
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"c) Attorneys fees of P20,000;
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"d) Costs of suit.
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"The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for lack of merit.
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"The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise dismissed." 1
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Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court promulgated its now assailed decision exonerating
Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable
thusly:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED, by exonerating the appellants from any liability for the death of Nicanor
Navidad, Jr. Instead, appellees Rodolfo Roman and the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) are held liable for his death and are hereby
directed to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs-appellees, the following amounts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

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a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;
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b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages;
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c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
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d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and
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e) P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees." 2

The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore
had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the
corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to
the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely
established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at
the time by Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the
application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train.

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The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000.
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In their present recourse, petitioners recite alleged errors on the part of the appellate court; viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
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"I.
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THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE TRIAL COURT
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"II.
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THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF
NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.

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"III.
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THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA." 3
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Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence and the factual findings of the trial court by holding them liable on
the basis of a sweeping conclusion that the presumption of negligence on the part of a common carrier was not overcome. Petitioners
would insist that Escartins assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a stranger that could not
have been foreseen or prevented. The LRTA would add that the appellate courts conclusion on the existence of an employer-employee

relationship between Roman and LRTA lacked basis because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of
the LRTA.

Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment
Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a
contractual relation, and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise
extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier.

Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened
with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers. 4 The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common
carrier for death of or injury to its passengers, provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.

"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."cralaw virtua1aw
library

"Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the formers
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common
carriers.

"This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employees."cralaw virtua1aw library

"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers, if the common carriers employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could
have prevented or stopped the act or omission."cralaw virtua1aw library

The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all
circumstances. 5 Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip
but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage. 6 The
statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its

employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carriers employees through
the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. 7 In case of such death or injury, a carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and 8 by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish
the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an
unforeseen event or to force majeure. 9 In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which
petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault, 10 an exception from
the general rule that negligence must be proved. 11

The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that
contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to
ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an
independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of
carriage.

Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 12 and related
provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, 13 of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employers liability is negligence or fault
on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris
tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is
primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not
been shown. Absent such a showing, one might ask further, how then must the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an
independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when
the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 14 of the Civil
Code can well apply. 15 In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. 16
Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability
had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to
apply. 17

Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor Navidad, this Court is concluded by the factual
finding of the Court of Appeals that "there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the negligence
of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven . . . ." This finding of the appellate court is not without substantial justification in our
own review of the records of the case.

There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also be
absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter
and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.

The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying
the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. 18 It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.
19

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal
damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. No costs.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

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SO ORDERED.
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[G.R. No. 108164. February 23, 1995.]

FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, LUIS A. LUNA and CLARITA S.
LUNA, Respondents.

1. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; MORAL DAMAGES; WHEN MAY BE RECOVERED IN CASE OF CULPA CONTRACTUAL; RULE; CASE AT
BAR. In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice
in the breach of the contract. Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Exceptionally, in contract of carriage,
moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed) of the common carrier.
Concededly, the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own cards cancellation. Nothing in the findings of
the trial court and the appellate court, however, can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to
private respondents. Neither could FEBTCs negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to
malice or bad faith. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral
obliguity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or ill-will. Article 21 of the Code, it should be observed, contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. Thus, even if we
are to assume that the provision could properly relate to a breach of contract, its application can be warranted only when the defendants
disregard of his contractual obligation is so deliberate as to approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or
bad faith. Most importantly, Article 21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in human relations that clearly must, in any case, give
way to the specific provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code authorizing the grant of moral damages in culpa contractual solely when the
breach is due to fraud or bad faith.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION OF THE PROVISION ON QUASI-DELICT. The Court has not in the process overlooked another
rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort
even where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant (Phil. Airlines v. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 143;
Singson v. Bank of the Phil. Islands, 23 SCRA 1117; and Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155). This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot
improve private respondents case for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort
independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly:
Where, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the
fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private respondents
damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by
itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort.

3. ID.; ID.; EXEMPLARY OR CORRECTIVE DAMAGES; WHEN AVAILABLE. Exemplary or corrective damages, in turn, are intended
to serve as an example or as correction for the public good in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages (Art.

2229, Civil Code; see Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, 148 SCRA 440; Lopez v. Pan American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431).
In criminal offenses, exemplary damages are imposed when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances (Art.
2230, Civil Code). In quasi-delicts, such damages are granted if the defendant is shown to have been so guilty of gross negligence as to
approximate malice (See Art. 2231, Civil Code; CLLC E.G. Gochangco Workers Union v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 655; Globe Mackay Cable
and Radio Corp. v. CA, 176 SCRA 778. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant is
found to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner (Art. 2232, Civil Code; PNB v. Gen. Acceptance
and Finance Corp., 161 SCRA 449).

4. ID.; ID.; NOMINAL DAMAGES; WHEN AVAILABLE; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. The banks failure, even perhaps inadvertent,
to honor its credit card issued to private respondent Luis should entitle him to recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Article
2221 of the Civil Code providing thusly: "Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered by him."

DECISION

!
!

VITUG, J.:

!
!

Some time in October 1986, private respondent Luis A. Luna applied for, and was accorded, a FAREASTCARD issued by petitioner Far
East Bank and Trust Company ("FEBTC") at its Pasig Branch. Upon his request, the bank also issued a supplemental card to private
respondent Clarita S. Luna.
In August 1988, Clarita lost her credit card. FEBTC was forthwith informed. In order to replace the lost card, Clarita submitted an affidavit
of loss. In cases of this nature, the banks internal security procedures and policy would appear to be to meanwhile so record the lost
card, along with the principal card, as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file.

On 06 October 1988, Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend, a Filipino-American, and another guest at the Bahia Rooftop
Restaurant of the Hotel Intercontinental Manila. To pay for the lunch, Luis presented his FAREASTCARD to the attending waiter who
promptly had it verified through a telephone call to the banks Credit Card Department. Since the card was not honored, Luis was forced
to pay in cash the bill amounting to P588.13. Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by this incident.

In a letter, dated 11 October 1988, private respondent Luis Luna, through counsel, demanded from FEBTC the payment of damages.
Adrian V. Festejo, a vice-president of the bank, expressed the banks apologies to Luis. In his letter, dated 03 November 1988, Festejo, in
part, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In cases when a card is reported to our office as lost, FAREASTCARD undertakes the necessary action to avert its unauthorized use
(such as tagging the card as hotlisted), as it is always our intention to protect our cardholders.

"An investigation of your case however, revealed that FAREASTCARD failed to inform you about its security policy. Furthermore, an
overzealous employee of the Banks Credit Card Department did not consider the possibility that it may have been you who was
presenting the card at that time (for which reason, the unfortunate incident occurred)." 1

Festejo also sent a letter to the Manager of the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant to assure the latter that private respondents were "very valued
clients" of FEBTC. William Anthony King, Food and Beverage Manager of the Intercontinental Hotel, wrote back to say that the credibility
of private respondent had never been "in question." A copy of this reply was sent to Luis by Festejo.

Still evidently feeling aggrieved, private respondents, on 05 December 1988, filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court
("RTC") of Pasig against FEBTC.

On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig, given the foregoing factual settings, rendered a decision ordering FEBTC to pay private
respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorneys fees.

!
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
!
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, FEBTC has come to this Court with this petition for review.
!
There is merit in this appeal.
!

In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the
breach of the contract. 2 The Civil Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith." (Emphasis supplied)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. 3 Exceptionally, in a contract of carriage, moral damages are also
allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed 4) of the common carrier. 5

Concededly, the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own cards cancellation. Nothing in the findings of
the trial court and the appellate court, however, can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to
private respondents. Neither could FEBTCs negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to
malice or bad faith.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different
from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or
ill will. 6

We are not unaware of the previous rulings of this Court, such as in American Express International, Inc., v. Intermediate Appellate Court
(167 SCRA 209) and Bank of Philippine Islands v. Intermediate Appellate Court (206 SCRA 408), sanctioning the application of Article 21,
in relation to Article 2217 and Article 2219 7 of the Civil Code to a contractual breach similar to the case at bench. Article 21
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage."cralaw virtua1aw library

Article 21 of the Code, it should be observed, contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. Thus, even if we are to assume that the
provision could properly relate to a breach of contract, its application can be warranted only when the defendants disregard of his
contractual obligation is so deliberate as to approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith. Most
importantly, Article 21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in human relations that clearly must, in any case, give way to the
specific provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code authorizing the grant of moral damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach is
due to fraud or bad faith.

Mr. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, in his ponencia in Fores v. Miranda 8 explained with great clarity the predominance that we should give to
Article 2220 in contractual relations; we quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent, the same must be discarded. We have repeatedly ruled (Cachero v.
Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. Inc., 101 Phil. 523; 54 Off. Gaz., [26], 6599; Necesito, Et. Al. v. Paras, 104 Phil., 75; 56 Off. Gaz., [23] 4023,
that moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation, in view of Articles
2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code, which provide as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

!
"ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
!
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
!
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
!
x
x
x
!
!

ART. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith.

!
"By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately becomes apparent that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
!

"(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton or deliberately injurious
conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral damages; and

"(b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the descriptive term analogous cases used in Art. 2219; not only
because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused contractual breach, but because the definition of quasi-delict in
Art. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a preexisitng contractual relations between the parties.cralawnad

"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.

"The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger, in which case
Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. 2206, that entitles the spouse, descendants and ascendants
of the deceased passenger to demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased (Necesito v. Paras,
104 Phil. 84, Resolution on motion to reconsider, September 11, 1958). But the exceptional rule of Art. 1764 makes it all the more evident
that where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice
or bad faith. We think it is clear that the mere carelessness of the carriers driver does not per se constitute or justify an inference of
malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of

moral damages by the Court of Appeals. To award moral damages for breach of contract, therefore, without proof of bad faith or malice
on the part of the defendant, as required by Art. 2220, would be to violate the clear provisions of the law, and constitute unwarranted
judicial legislation.

!
!

"The distinction between fraud, bad faith or malice in the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and negligence (as mere
carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be ignored (Arts. 1170-1172); their consequences being clearly differentiated by the
Code.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

"ART. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are
the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably
foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.

In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed
to the non-performance of the obligation."cralaw virtua1aw library

"It is to be presumed, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, that this difference was in the mind of the lawmakers when in
Art. 2220 they limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in bad faith. It is true that negligence may be occasionally so
gross as to amount to malice; but the fact must be shown in evidence, and a carriers bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere
finding that the contract was breached through negligence of the carriers employees." chanrobles law library

The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby
permit the application of applicable principles on tort 9 even where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant
(Phil. Airlines v. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 143; Singson v. Bank of Phil. Islands, 23 SCRA 1117; and Air France v. Carrascoso, 18
SCRA 155). This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents case for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission
complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to
underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or omission
can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of
quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private respondents damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without
such agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent
actionable tort.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The Court finds, therefore, the award of moral damages made by the court a quo, affirmed by the appellate court, to be inordinate and
substantially devoid of legal basis.

Exemplary or corrective damages, in turn, are intended to serve as an example or as correction for the public good in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages (Art. 2229, Civil Code; see Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, 148 SCRA 440;
Lopez v. Pan American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431). In criminal offenses, exemplary damages are imposed when the crime is
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances (Art. 2230, Civil Code). In quasi-delicts, such damages are granted if the
defendant is shown to have been so guilty of gross negligence as to approximate malice (See Art. 2231, Civil Code; CLC E.G.
Gochangco Workers Union v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 655; Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. CA, 176 SCRA 778. In contracts and
quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant is found to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner (Art. 2232, Civil Code; PNB v. Gen. Acceptance and Finance Corp., 161 SCRA
449).chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Given the above premises and the factual circumstances here obtaining, it would also be just as arduous to sustain the exemplary
damages granted by the courts below (see De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 166).

Nevertheless, the banks failure, even perhaps inadvertent, to honor its credit card issued to private respondent Luis should entitle him to
recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code providing thusly:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant,
may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him." chanrobles
lawlibrary : rednad

Reasonable attorneys fees may be recovered where the court deems such recovery to be just and equitable (Art. 2208, Civil Code). We
see no issue of sound discretion on the part of the appellate court in allowing the award thereof by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is given due course. The appealed decision is MODIFIED by deleting the award of moral and
exemplary damages to private respondents; in its stead, petitioner is ordered to pay private respondent Luis A. Luna an amount of
P5,000.00 by way of nominal damages. In all other respects, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.

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SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990

NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC.,
respondents.
Lope E. Adriano for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for private respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is whether a corporation, which has built through its agents,
waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held
civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed
independently of the criminal case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is
adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly
inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly
fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other
improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case No. TG-907-82, before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite,
Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent
corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent corporation, this time a civil case, docketed as
Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court. 1
On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the land. However, on April 26, 1984, the trial court, acting on
respondent corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action, issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case No,
TG-748 until after judgment in the related Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial court issued on August 27, 1984 the disputed order
dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still
unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and
civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." 2

Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. 3

On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division, promulgated a decision 4 affirming the questioned order of
the trial court. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated May 19, 1986. 6
Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in accordance with Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioners contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 since it is predicated on
a quasi-delict. Petitioners have raised a valid point.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of
action. 7 The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it, including the period of prescription, is to be determined not by the claim
of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. 8 The
nature of an action is not necessarily determined or controlled by its title or heading but the body of the pleading or complaint itself. To
avoid possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial laws should be liberally construed so
that the litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims. 9
Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. TG-748:
4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang, Cavite, adjacent on the right side of the aforesaid land of
plaintiffs, defendant constructed waterpaths starting from the middle-right portion thereof leading to a big hole or opening, also
constructed by defendant, thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence situated on the right side of its cemented gate
fronting the provincial highway, and connected by defendant to a man height inter-connected cement culverts which were also
constructed and lain by defendant cross-wise beneath the tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected culverts
again connected by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the lower portion of the same concrete hollowblocks fence on the left side of
the said cemented gate, which hole or opening is likewise connected by defendant to the cemented mouth of a big canal, also
constructed by defendant, which runs northward towards a big hole or opening which was also built by defendant thru the lower portion of
its concrete hollow-blocks fence which separates the land of plaintiffs from that of defendant (and which serves as the exit-point of the
floodwater coming from the land of defendant, and at the same time, the entrance-point of the same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs,
year after year, during rainy or stormy seasons.
5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land of plaintiffs, defendant also constructed an artificial lake, the
base of which is soil, which utilizes the water being channeled thereto from its water system thru inter-connected galvanized iron pipes
(No. 2) and complimented by rain water during rainy or stormy seasons, so much so that the water below it seeps into, and the excess
water above it inundates, portions of the adjoining land of plaintiffs.
6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's aforementioned water conductors, contrivances and manipulators, a
young man was drowned to death, while herein plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer, as follows:
a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and converted to deep, wide and long canals, such that the same can no longer be
planted to any crop or plant.
b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several occasions, washed away.
c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and their laborers are always in danger.

d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the land of plaintiffs are exposed to destruction. ... 10
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the
defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the
land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage
sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held that "any person who
without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby
causing loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake,
shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject of the instant case is privately
owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage
due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of
damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal
connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi
delict or culpa aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a
thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.
Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable
manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his
land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining
landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining
landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or
negligence, thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this chapter.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or
not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually

charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the
two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. 13
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising
from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary
when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a
distinct and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation
and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasidelito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ... 14
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the
Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction
exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same
negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or
culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil
case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not
exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.
In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case
according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action
contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal would render
meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently
of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the order of dismissal of
the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial
court is ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. Missionaries of Our
Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed with the hearing of the case with dispatch. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against
respondent corporation.
SO ORDERED.

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[G.R. NO. 180832 : July 23, 2008]

JEROME CASTRO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 emanated from the complaint for grave oral defamation2 filed by Albert P. Tan against petitioner
Jerome Castro.
The facts follow.
On November 11, 2002, Reedley International School (RIS) dismissed Tan's son, Justin Albert (then a Grade 12 student), for violating the
terms of his disciplinary probation.3 Upon Tan's request, RIS reconsidered its decision but imposed "non-appealable" conditions such as
excluding Justin Albert from participating in the graduation ceremonies.
Aggrieved, Tan filed a complaint in the Department of Education (Dep-Ed) for violation of the Manual of Regulation of Private Schools,
Education Act of 1982 and Article 19 of the Civil Code4 against RIS. He alleged that the dismissal of his son was undertaken with malice,
bad faith and evident premeditation. After investigation, the Dep-Ed found that RIS' code violation point system allowed the summary
imposition of unreasonable sanctions (which had no basis in fact and in law). The system therefore violated due process. Hence, the
Dep-Ed nullified it.5
Meanwhile, on November 20, 2002, the Dep-Ed ordered RIS to readmit Justin Albert without any condition.6 Thus, he was able to
graduate from RIS and participate in the commencement ceremonies held on March 30, 2003.
After the graduation ceremonies, Tan met Bernice C. Ching, a fellow parent at RIS. In the course of their conversation, Tan intimated that
he was contemplating a suit against the officers of RIS in their personal capacities, including petitioner who was the assistant
headmaster.
Ching telephoned petitioner sometime the first week of April and told him that Tan was planning to sue the officers of RIS in their personal
capacities. Before they hung up, petitioner told Ching:
Okay, you too, take care and be careful talking to [Tan], that's dangerous.
Ching then called Tan and informed him that petitioner said "talking to him was dangerous."
Insulted, Tan filed a complaint for grave oral defamation in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against petitioner on
August 21, 2003.
On November 3, 2003, petitioner was charged with grave oral defamation in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 607 under the following Information:
That on or about the 13th day of March, 2003 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named [petitioner], with deliberate intent of bringing ATTY. ALBERT P. TAN, into discredit, dishonor, disrepute and
contempt, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously speak and utter the following words to Ms. Bernice C. Ching:
"OK, YOU TOO, YOU TAKE CARE AND BE CAREFUL TALKING TO [TAN], THAT'S DANGEROUS."
and other words of similar import of a serious and insulting nature.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment.

The prosecution essentially tried to establish that petitioner depicted Tan as a "dangerous person." Ching testified that petitioner warned
her that talking to Tan was dangerous. Tan, on the other hand, testified that petitioner's statement shocked him as it portrayed him as
"someone capable of committing undesirable acts." He added that petitioner probably took offense because of the complaint he filed
against RIS in the Dep-Ed.
For his defense, petitioner denied harboring ill-feelings against Tan despite the latter's complaint against RIS in the Dep-Ed. Although he
admitted conversing with Ching (whom he considered as a close acquaintance) on the telephone a few days after RIS' 2003
commencement exercises, petitioner asserted that he never said or insinuated that Tan or talking to Tan was dangerous. On crossexamination, however, he did not categorically deny the veracity of Ching's statement.
The MeTC found that Ching's statements in her affidavit and in open court were consistent and that she did not have any motive to
fabricate a false statement. Petitioner, on the other hand, harbored personal resentment, aversion and ill-will against Tan since the DepEd compelled RIS to readmit his son. Thus, the MeTC was convinced that petitioner told Ching talking to Tan was dangerous and that he
uttered the statement with the intention to insult Tan and tarnish his social and professional reputation.
In a decision dated December 27, 2005, the MeTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of grave oral defamation:8
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused, Jerome Castro GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Grave
Oral Defamation, sentencing him therefore, in accordance to Article 358(1) of the Revised Penal Code and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor as minimum to 4 months and 1 day of arresto
mayor as maximum.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the factual findings of the MeTC. However, in view of the animosity between the
parties, it found petitioner guilty only of slight oral defamation. But because Tan filed his complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong City only on August 21, 2003 (or almost five months from discovery), the RTC ruled that prescription had already set in; it
therefore acquitted petitioner on that ground.9
On April 19, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the
decision of the RTC.10 It contended that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it downgraded petitioner's offense to slight
oral defamation. The RTC allegedly misappreciated the antecedents which provoked petitioner to utter the allegedly defamatory
statement against Tan.
The CA found that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it misapprehended the totality of the circumstances and found
petitioner guilty only of slight oral defamation. Thus, the CA reinstated the MeTC decision.11
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.12 Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner basically contends that the CA erred in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari inasmuch as the OSG raised errors of
judgment (i.e., that the RTC misappreciated the evidence presented by the parties) but failed to prove that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion. Thus, double jeopardy attached when the RTC acquitted him.
We grant the petition.

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.13 This constitutional mandate is echoed in Section 7 of Rule
117 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. ' When an accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or in
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
xxx
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xxx
Under this provision, double jeopardy occurs upon (1) a valid indictment (2) before a competent court (3) after arraignment (4) when a
valid plea has been entered and (5) when the accused was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused.14 Thus, an acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or appellate court, is final and unappealable
on the ground of double jeopardy.15
The only exception is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion or, as we held in Galman v. Sandiganbayan,16 when there
was mistrial. In such instances, the OSG can assail the said judgment in a petition for certiorari establishing that the State was deprived
of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case.17
The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion was issued without
jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy.
In this case, the OSG merely assailed the RTC's finding on the nature of petitioner's statement, that is, whether it constituted grave or
slight oral defamation. The OSG premised its allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the RTC's "erroneous" evaluation and
assessment of the evidence presented by the parties.rbl rl l lbrr
What the OSG therefore questioned were errors of judgment (or those involving misappreciation of evidence or errors of law). However, a
court, in a petition for certiorari, cannot review the public respondent's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings.18 Errors of
judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction (or those involving the
commission of grave abuse of discretion).19
Because the OSG did not raise errors of jurisdiction, the CA erred in taking cognizance of its petition and, worse, in reviewing the factual
findings of the RTC.20 We therefore reinstate the RTC decision so as not to offend the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
At most, petitioner could have been liable for damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code21 :
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The
following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention
and other relief:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
xxx
xxx
xxx

Petitioner is reminded that, as an educator, he is supposed to be a role model for the youth. As such, he should always act with justice,
give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.22
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The August 29, 2007 decision and December 5, 2007 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98649 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The November 20, 2006 decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 212 is REINSTATED. Petitioner Jerome Castro is ACQUITTED of slight oral defamation as defined and
penalized in Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

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