Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 164195

October 12, 2010

APO
FRUITS
CORPORATION
and
HIJO
INC., Petitioners,
vs.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

PLANTATION,

RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petitioners motion for reconsideration addressing our
Resolution of December 4, 2009 whose dispositive portion directs:
WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petitioners second motion for
reconsideration (with respect to the denial of the award of legal
interest and attorneys fees), and reiterates the decision dated
February 6, 2007 and the resolution dated December 19, 2007 of the
Third Division.
For a fuller and clearer presentation and appreciation of this
Resolution, we hark back to the roots of this case.
Factual Antecedents
Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation, Inc. (HPI), together
also referred to as petitioners, were registered owners of vast tracks of
land; AFC owned 640.3483 hectares, while HPI owned 805.5308
hectares. On October 12, 1995, they voluntarily offered to sell these
landholdings to the government via Voluntary Offer to Sell applications
filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
On October 16, 1996, AFC and HPI received separate notices of land
acquisition and valuation of their properties from the DARs Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO). At the assessed valuation
of P165,484.47 per hectare, AFCs land was valued at P86,900,925.88,
while HPIs property was valued at P164,478,178.14. HPI and AFC
rejected these valuations for being very low.

In its follow through action, the DAR requested the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) to deposit P26,409,549.86 in AFCs bank account
and P45,481,706.76 in HPIs bank account, which amounts the
petitioners then withdrew. The titles over AFC and HPIs properties
were thereafter cancelled, and new ones were issued on December 9,
1996 in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
On February 14, 1997, AFC and HPI filed separate petitions for
determination of just compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB). When the DARAB failed to act on these petitions for more
than three years, AFC and HPI filed separate complaints for
determination and payment of just compensation with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tagum City, acting as a Special Agrarian Court.
These complaints were subsequently consolidated.
On September 25, 2001, the RTC resolved the consolidated cases,
fixing the just compensation for the petitioners 1,338.6027 hectares of
land1 at P1,383,179,000.00, with interest on this amount at the
prevailing market interest rates, computed from the taking of the
properties on December 9, 1996 until fully paid, minus the amounts
the petitioners already received under the initial valuation. The RTC
also awarded attorneys fees.
LBP moved for the reconsideration of the decision. The RTC, in its order
of December 5, 2001, modified its ruling and fixed the interest at the
rate of 12% per annum from the time the complaint was filed until
finality of the decision. The Third Division of this Court, in its Decision
of February 6, 2007, affirmed this RTC decision.
On motion for reconsideration, the Third Division issued its Resolution
of December 19, 2007, modifying its February 6, 2007 Decision by
deleting the 12% interest due on the balance of the awarded just
compensation. The Third Division justified the deletion by the finding
that the LBP did not delay the payment of just compensation as it had
deposited the pertinent amounts due to AFC and HPI within fourteen
months after they filed their complaints for just compensation with the
RTC. The Court also considered that AFC had already collected
approximately P149.6 million, while HPI had already collected
approximately P262 million from the LBP. The Third Division also
deleted the award of attorneys fees.
All parties moved for the reconsideration of the modified ruling. The
Court uniformly denied all the motions in its April 30, 2008 Resolution.
Entry of Judgment followed on May 16, 2008.

Notwithstanding the Entry of Judgment, AFC and HPI filed the following
motions on May 28, 2008: (1) Motion for Leave to File and Admit
Second Motion for Reconsideration; (2) Second Motion for
Reconsideration, with respect to the denial of the award of legal
interest and attorneys fees; and (3) Motion to Refer the Second Motion
for Reconsideration to the Honorable Court En Banc.
The Third Division found the motion to admit the Second Motion for
Reconsideration and the motion to refer this second motion to the
Court En Banc meritorious, and accordingly referred the case to the
Court En Banc. On September 8, 2009, the Court En Banc accepted the
referral.
The Court En Banc Resolution
On December 4, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a majority vote, denied
the petitioners second motion for reconsideration based on two
considerations.
First, the grant of the second motion for reconsideration runs counter
to the immutability of final decisions. Moreover, the Court saw no
reason to recognize the case as an exception to the immutability
principle as the petitioners private claim for the payment of interest
does not qualify as either a substantial or transcendental matter or an
issue of paramount public interest.
Second, on the merits, the petitioners are not entitled to recover
interest on the just compensation and attorneys fees because they
caused the delay in the payment of the just compensation due them;
they erroneously filed their complaints with the DARAB when they
should have directly filed these with the RTC acting as an agrarian
court. Furthermore, the Court found it significant that the LBP
deposited the pertinent amounts in the petitioners favor within
fourteen months after the petitions were filed with the RTC. Under
these circumstances, the Court found no unreasonable delay on the
part of LBP to warrant the award of 12% interest.
The Chico-Nazario Dissent
Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario,2 the ponente of the original December
19, 2007 Resolution (deleting the 12% interest), dissented from the
Court En Bancs December 4, 2009 Resolution.
On the issue of immutability of judgment, Justice Chico-Nazario pointed
out that under extraordinary circumstances, this Court has recalled
entries of judgment on the ground of substantial justice. Given the

special circumstances involved in the present case, the Court En Banc

should have taken a second hard look at the petitioners positions in
their second motion for reconsideration, and acted to correct the
clearly erroneous December 19, 2007 Resolution.
Specifically, Justice Chico-Nazario emphasized the obligation of the
State, in the exercise of its inherent power of eminent domain, to pay
just compensation to the owner of the expropriated property. To be
just, the compensation must not only be the correct amount to be paid;
it must also be paid within a reasonable time from the time the land is
taken from the owner. If not, the State must pay the landowner
interest, by way of damages, from the time the property was taken
until just compensation is fully paid. This interest, deemed a part of
just compensation due, has been established by prevailing
jurisprudence to be 12% per annum.
On these premises, Justice Nazario pointed out that the government
deprived the petitioners of their property on December 9, 1996, and
paid the balance of the just compensation due them only on May 9,
2008. The delay of almost twelve years earned the petitioners interest
in the total amount of P1,331,124,223.05.
Despite this finding, Justice Chico-Nazario did not see it fit to declare
the computed interest to be totally due; she found it unconscionable to
apply the full force of the law on the LBP because of the magnitude of
the amount due. She thus reduced the awarded interest
to P400,000,000.00, or approximately 30% of the computed interest.
The Present Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion to reconsider the Court En Bancs December 4, 2009
Resolution (the present Motion for Reconsideration), the petitioners
principally argue that: (a) the principle of immutability of judgment
does not apply since the Entry of Judgment was issued even before the
lapse of fifteen days from the parties receipt of the April 30, 2008
Resolution and the petitioners timely filed their second motion for
reconsideration within fifteen days from their receipt of this resolution;
(b) the April 30, 2008 Resolution cannot be considered immutable
considering the special and compelling circumstances attendant to the
present case which fall within the exceptions to the principle of
immutability of judgments; (c) the legal interest due is at 12% per
annum, reckoned from the time of the taking of the subject properties
and this rate is not subject to reduction. The power of the courts to
equitably reduce interest rates applies solely to liquidated damages
under a contract and not to interest set by the Honorable Court itself
as due and owing in just compensation cases; and (d) the Honorable

Courts fears that the interest payments due to the petitioners will
produce more harm than good to the system of agrarian reform are
misplaced and are based merely on conjectures.
The Comment of the Land Bank of the Philippines
The LBP commented on the petitioners motion for reconsideration on
April 28, 2010. It maintained that: (a) the doctrine of immutability of
the decisions of the Supreme Court clearly applies to the present case;
(b) the LBP is not guilty of undue delay in the payment of just
compensation as the petitioners were promptly paid once the Court
had determined the final value of the properties expropriated; (c) the
Supreme Court rulings invoked by the petitioners are inapplicable to
the present case; (d) since the obligation to pay just compensation is
not a forbearance of money, interest should commence only after the
amount due becomes ascertainable or liquidated, and the 12% interest
per annum applies only to the liquidated amount, from the date of
finality of judgment; (e) the imposition of 12% interest on the balance
of P971,409,831.68 is unwarranted because there was no unjustified
refusal by LBP to pay just compensation, and no contractual breach is
involved; (f) the deletion of the attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of
the amount finally awarded as just compensation is proper; (g) this
case does not involve a violation of substantial justice to justify the
alteration of the immutable resolution dated December 19, 2007 that
deleted the award of interest and attorneys fees.
The Courts Ruling
We find the petitioners arguments meritorious and accordingly GRANT
the present motion for reconsideration.
Just compensation a Basic Limitation on the States
Power of Eminent Domain
At the heart of the present controversy is the Third Divisions
December 19, 2007 Resolution which held that the petitioners are not
entitled to 12% interest on the balance of the just compensation
belatedly paid by the LBP. In the presently assailed December 4, 2009
Resolution, we affirmed the December 19, 2007 Resolutions findings
that: (a) the LBP deposited "pertinent amounts" in favor of the
petitioners within fourteen months after they filed their complaint for
determination of just compensation; and (b) the LBP had already paid
the petitionersP411,769,168.32. We concluded then that these
circumstances refuted the petitioners assertion of unreasonable delay
on the part of the LBP.

A re-evaluation of the circumstances of this case and the parties

arguments, viewed in light of the just compensation requirement in the
exercise of the States inherent power of eminent domain, compels us
to re-examine our findings and conclusions.
Eminent domain is the power of the State to take private property for
public use.3 It is an inherent power of State as it is a power necessary
for the States existence; it is a power the State cannot do without. 4 As
an inherent power, it does not need at all to be embodied in the
Constitution; if it is mentioned at all, it is solely for purposes of limiting
what is otherwise an unlimited power. The limitation is found in the Bill
of Rights5 that part of the Constitution whose provisions all aim at the
protection of individuals against the excessive exercise of
governmental powers.
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution (which reads "No private
property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.")
provides two essential limitations to the power of eminent domain,
namely, that (1) the purpose of taking must be for public use and (2)
just compensation must be given to the owner of the private property.
It is not accidental that Section 9 specifies that compensation should
be "just" as the safeguard is there to ensure a balance property is not
to be taken for public use at the expense of private interests; the
public, through the State, must balance the injury that the taking of
property causes through compensation for what is taken, value for
value.
Nor is it accidental that the Bill of Rights is interpreted liberally in favor
of the individual and strictly against the government. The protection of
the individual is the reason for the Bill of Rights being; to keep the
exercise of the powers of government within reasonable bounds is
what it seeks.6
The concept of "just compensation" is not new to Philippine
constitutional law,7 but is not original to the Philippines; it is a
transplant from the American Constitution.8 It found fertile application
in this country particularly in the area of agrarian reform where the
taking of private property for distribution to landless farmers has been
equated to the "public use" that the Constitution requires. In Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Orilla,9 a valuation case under our agrarian
reform law, this Court had occasion to state:
Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the
market value of the property, broadly described as the price fixed by
the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal

action and competition, or the fair value of the property as between

the one who receives and the one who desires to sell, it being fixed at
the time of the actual taking by the government. Just compensation is
defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this
Court that the true measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's
loss. The word "just" is used to modify the meaning of the word
"compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for
the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and
ample.10 [Emphasis supplied.]
In the present case, while the DAR initially valued the petitioners
landholdings at a total of P251,379,104.02,11the RTC, acting as a
special agrarian court, determined the actual value of the petitioners
landholdings to beP1,383,179,000.00. This valuation, a finding of fact,
has subsequently been affirmed by this Court, and is now beyond
question. In eminent domain terms, this amount is the "real,
substantial, full and ample" compensation the government must pay to
be "just" to the landowners.
Significantly, this final judicial valuation is far removed from the initial
valuation made by the DAR; their values differ by P1,131,799,897.00
in itself a very substantial sum that is roughly four times the original
DAR valuation. We mention these valuations as they indicate to us how
undervalued the petitioners lands had been at the start, particularly at
the time the petitioners landholdings were "taken". This reason
apparently compelled the petitioners to relentlessly pursue their
valuation claims all they way up to the level of this Court.
While the LBP deposited the total amount of P71,891,256.62 into the
petitioners accounts (P26,409,549.86 for AFC and P45,481,706.76 for
HPI) at the time the landholdings were taken, these amounts were
mere
partial
payments
that
only
amounted
to
5%
of
the P1,383,179,000.00 actual value of the expropriated properties. We
point this aspect out to show that the initial payments made by the
LBP when the petitioners landholdings were taken, although promptly
withdrawn by the petitioners, could not by any means be considered a
fair exchange of values at the time of taking; in fact, the LBPs actual
deposit could not be said to be substantial even from the original LBP
valuation of P251,379,103.90.
Thus, the deposits might have been sufficient for purposes of the
immediate taking of the landholdings but cannot be claimed as
amounts that would excuse the LBP from the payment of interest on
the unpaid balance of the compensation due. As discussed at length
below, they were not enough to compensate the petitioners for the

potential income the landholdings could have earned for them if no

immediate taking had taken place. Under the circumstances, the State
acted oppressively and was far from "just" in their position to deny the
petitioners of the potential income that the immediate taking of their
properties entailed.
Just Compensation from the Prism of the Element of Taking.
Apart from the requirement that compensation for expropriated land
must be fair and reasonable, compensation, to be "just," must also be
made without delay.12 Without prompt payment, compensation cannot
be considered "just" if the property is immediately taken as the
property owner suffers the immediate deprivation of both his land and
its fruits or income.
This is the principle at the core of the present case where the
petitioners were made to wait for more than a decade after the taking
of their property before they actually received the full amount of the
principal of the just compensation due them. 13 What they have not
received to date is the income of their landholdings corresponding to
what they would have received had no uncompensated taking of these
lands been immediately made. This income, in terms of the interest on
the unpaid principal, is the subject of the current litigation.
We recognized in Republic v. Court of Appeals 14 the need for prompt
payment and the necessity of the payment of interest to compensate
for any delay in the payment of compensation for property already
taken. We ruled in this case that:
The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be
the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly
described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual
and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of
the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to
sell, i[f] fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.
Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is
deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the
final compensation must include interest[s] on its just value to
be computed from the time the property is taken to the time
when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the
court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the
actual payment, legal interest[s] accrue in order to place the
owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the
position he was in before the taking occurred.15 [Emphasis
supplied.]

Aside from this ruling, Republic notably overturned the Courts previous
ruling in National Power Corporation v. Angas 16 which held that just
compensation due for expropriated properties is not a loan or
forbearance of money but indemnity for damages for the delay in
payment; since the interest involved is in the nature of damages rather
than earnings from loans, then Art. 2209 of the Civil Code, which fixes
legal interest at 6%, shall apply.
In Republic, the Court recognized that the just compensation due to the
landowners for their expropriated property amounted to an effective
forbearance on the part of the State. Applying the Eastern Shipping
Lines ruling,17 the Court fixed the applicable interest rate at 12% per
annum, computed from the time the property was taken until the full
amount of just compensation was paid, in order to eliminate the issue
of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency
over time. In the Courts own words:
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing
interest[s] on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the
time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and "took" the
property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount
found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking
computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should
help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the
value of the currency over time.18 [Emphasis supplied.]1avvphi1
We subsequently upheld Republics 12% per annum interest
rate on the unpaid expropriation compensation in the following
cases: Reyes v. National Housing Authority, 19 Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Wycoco,20 Republic v. Court of Appeals,21 Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Imperial, 22 Philippine Ports Authority
v. Rosales-Bondoc,23and Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority.24
These were the established rulings that stood before this Court issued
the currently assailed Resolution of December 4, 2009. These would be
the rulings this Court shall reverse and de-establish if we maintain and
affirm our ruling deleting the 12% interest on the unpaid balance of
compensation due for properties already taken.
Under the circumstances of the present case, we see no
compelling reason to depart from the rule that Republic firmly
established. Let it be remembered that shorn of its eminent
domain and social justice aspects, what the agrarian land
reform program involves is the purchase by the government,
through the LBP, of agricultural lands for sale and distribution
to farmers. As a purchase, it involves an exchange of values

the landholdings in exchange for the LBPs payment. In

determining the just compensation for this exchange, however,
the measure to be borne in mind is not the taker's gain but the
owner's loss25 since what is involved is the takeover of private
property under the States coercive power. As mentioned
above, in the value-for-value exchange in an eminent domain
situation, the State must ensure that the individual whose
property is taken is not shortchanged and must hence carry
the burden of showing that the "just compensation"
requirement of the Bill of Rights is satisfied.
The owners loss, of course, is not only his property but also
its income-generating potential. Thus, when property is taken,
full compensation of its value must immediately be paid to
achieve a fair exchange for the property and the potential
income lost. The just compensation is made available to the
property owner so that he may derive income from this
compensation, in the same manner that he would have derived
income from his expropriated property. If full compensation is
not paid for property taken, then the State must make up for
the shortfall in the earning potential immediately lost due to
the taking, and the absence of replacement property from
which income can be derived; interest on the unpaid
compensation
becomes
due
as compliance with the
constitutional mandate on eminent domain and as a basic
measure of fairness.
In the context of this case, when the LBP took the petitioners
landholdings without the corresponding full payment, it became liable
to the petitioners for the income the landholdings would have earned
had they not immediately been taken from the petitioners. What is
interesting in this interplay, under the developments of this case, is
that the LBP, by taking landholdings without full payment while holding
on at the same time to the interest that it should have paid, effectively
used or retained funds that should go to the landowners and thereby
took advantage of these funds for its own account.
From this point of view, the December 19, 2007 Resolution deleting the
award of 12% interest is not only patently and legally wrong, but is also
morally unconscionable for being grossly unfair and unjust. If the
interest on the just compensation due in reality the equivalent of the
fruits or income of the landholdings would have yielded had these
lands not been taken would be denied, the result is effectively a
confiscatory action by this Court in favor of the LBP. We would be
allowing the LBP, for twelve long years, to have free use of the interest
that should have gone to the landowners. Otherwise stated, if we

continue to deny the petitioners present motion for reconsideration,

we would illogically and without much thought to the fairness that
the situation demands uphold the interests of the LBP, not only at the
expense of the landowners but also that of substantial justice as well.
Lest this Court be a party to this monumental unfairness in a social
program aimed at fostering balance in our society, we now have to ring
the bell that we have muted in the past, and formally declare that the
LBPs position is legally and morally wrong. To do less than this is to
leave the demands of the constitutional just compensation standard (in
terms of law) and of our own conscience (in terms of morality) wanting
and unsatisfied.
The Delay in Payment Issue
Separately from the demandability of interest because of the failure to
fully pay for property already taken, a recurring issue in the case is the
attribution of the delay.
That delay in payment occurred is not and cannot at all be disputed.
While
the
LBP
claimed
that
it
made
initial
payments
of P411,769,168.32
(out
of
the
principal
sum
due
of
P1,383,179,000.00), the undisputed fact is that the petitioners were
deprived of their lands on December 9, 1996 (when titles to their
landholdings were cancelled and transferred to the Republic of the
Philippines), and received full payment of the principal amount
due them only on May 9, 2008.
In the interim, they received no income from their landholdings
because these landholdings had been taken. Nor did they receive
adequate income from what should replace the income potential of
their landholdings because the LBP refused to pay interest while
withholding the full amount of the principal of the just compensation
due by claiming a grossly low valuation. This sad state continued for
more than a decade. In any language and by any measure, a lengthy
delay in payment occurred.
An important starting point in considering attribution for the delay is
that the petitioners voluntarily offered to sell their landholdings to the
governments land reform program; they themselves submitted their
Voluntary Offer to Sell applications to the DAR, and they fully
cooperated with the governments program. The present case
therefore is not one where substantial conflict arose on the issue of
whether expropriation is proper; the petitioners voluntarily submitted
to expropriation and surrendered their landholdings, although they
contested the valuation that the government made.

Presumably, had the landholdings been properly valued, the petitioners

would have accepted the payment of just compensation and there
would have been no need for them to go to the extent of filing a
valuation case. But, as borne by the records, the petitioners lands
were grossly undervalued by the DAR, leaving the petitioners with no
choice but to file actions to secure what is justly due them.
The DARs initial gross undervaluation started the cycle of court actions
that followed, where the LBP eventually claimed that it could not be
faulted for seeking judicial recourse to defend the governments and its
own interests in light of the petitioners valuation claims. This LBP
claim, of course, conveniently forgets that at the root of all these
valuation claims and counterclaims was the initial gross undervaluation
by DAR that the LBP stoutly defended. At the end, this undervaluation
was proven incorrect by no less than this Court; the petitioners were
proven correct in their claim, and the correct valuation more than
five-fold the initial DAR valuation was decreed and became final.
All these developments cannot now be disregarded and reduced to
insignificance. In blunter terms, the government and the LBP cannot
now be heard to claim that they were simply protecting their interests
when they stubbornly defended their undervalued positions before the
courts. The more apt and accurate statement is that they adopted a
grossly unreasonable position and the adverse developments that
followed, particularly the concomitant delay, should be directly
chargeable to them.
To be sure, the petitioners were not completely correct in the legal
steps they took in their valuation claims. They initially filed their
valuation claim before the DARAB instead of immediately seeking
judicial intervention. The DARAB, however, contributed its share to the
petitioners error when it failed or refused to act on the valuation
petitions for more than three (3) years. Thus, on top of the DAR
undervaluation was the DARAB inaction after the petitioners
landholdings had been taken. This Courts Decision of February 6, 2007
duly noted this and observed:
It is not controverted that this case started way back on 12 October
1995, when AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell the properties to the
DAR. In view of the failure of the parties to agree on the valuation of
the properties, the Complaint for Determination of Just Compensation
was filed before the DARAB on 14 February 1997. Despite the lapse of
more than three years from the filing of the complaint, the DARAB
failed to render a decision on the valuation of the land. Meantime, the
titles over the properties of AFC and HPI had already been cancelled
and in their place a new certificate of title was issued in the name of

the Republic of the Philippines, even as far back as 9 December 1996.

A period of almost 10 years has lapsed. For this reason, there is no
dispute that this case has truly languished for a long period of time,
the delay being mainly attributable to both official inaction and
indecision, particularly on the determination of the amount of just
compensation, to the detriment of AFC and HPI, which to date, have
yet to be fully compensated for the properties which are already in the
hands of farmer-beneficiaries, who, due to the lapse of time, may have
already converted or sold the land awarded to them.
Verily, these two cases could have been disposed with dispatch were it
not for LBPs counsel causing unnecessary delay. At the inception of
this case, DARAB, an agency of the DAR which was commissioned by
law to determine just compensation, sat on the cases for three years,
which was the reason that AFC and HPI filed the cases before the RTC.
We underscore the pronouncement of the RTC that "the delay by
DARAB in the determination of just compensation could only mean the
reluctance of the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of
the Philippines to pay the claim of just compensation by corporate
landowners."
To allow the taking of landowners properties, and to leave them
empty-handed while government withholds compensation is
undoubtedly oppressive. [Emphasis supplied.]
These statements cannot but be true today as they were when we
originally decided the case and awarded 12% interest on the balance
of the just compensation due. While the petitioners were undisputedly
mistaken in initially seeking recourse through the DAR, this agency
itself hence, the government committed a graver transgression
when it failed to act at all on the petitioners complaints for
determination of just compensation.
In sum, in a balancing of the attendant delay-related circumstances of
this case, delay should be laid at the doorsteps of the government, not
at the petitioners. We conclude, too, that the government should not
be allowed to exculpate itself from this delay and should suffer all the
consequences the delay caused.
The LBPs arguments on the applicability of cases imposing 12%
interest
The LBP claims in its Comment that our rulings in Republic v. Court of
Appeals,26 Reyes v. National Housing Authority,27 and Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Imperial,28 cannot be applied to the present case.

According to the LBP, Republic is inapplicable because, first, the

landowners in Republic remained unpaid, notwithstanding the fact that
the award for just compensation had already been fixed by final
judgment; in the present case, the Court already acknowledged that
"pertinent amounts" were deposited in favor of the landowners within
14 months from the filing of their complaint. Second, while Republic
involved an ordinary expropriation case, the present case involves
expropriation for agrarian reform. Finally, the just compensation in
Republic remained unpaid notwithstanding the finality of judgment,
while the just compensation in the present case was immediately paid
in full after LBP received a copy of the Courts resolution
We find no merit in these assertions.
As we discussed above, the "pertinent amounts" allegedly deposited
by LBP were mere partial payments that amounted to a measly 5% of
the actual value of the properties expropriated. They could be the basis
for the immediate taking of the expropriated property but by no stretch
of the imagination can these nominal amounts be considered
"pertinent" enough to satisfy the full requirement of just compensation
i.e., the full and fair equivalent of the expropriated property, taking
into account its income potential and the foregone income lost
because of the immediate taking.
We likewise find no basis to support the LBPs theory that Republic and
the present case have to be treated differently because the first
involves a "regular" expropriation case, while the present case involves
expropriation pursuant to the countrys agrarian reform program. In
both cases, the power of eminent domain was used and private
property was taken for public use. Why one should be different from
the other, so that the just compensation ruling in one should not apply
to the other, truly escapes us. If there is to be a difference, the
treatment of agrarian reform expropriations should be stricter and on a
higher plane because of the governments societal concerns and
objectives. To be sure, the government cannot attempt to remedy the
ills of one sector of society by sacrificing the interests of others within
the same society.
Finally, we note that the finality of the decision (that fixed the value of
just compensation) in Republic was not a material consideration for the
Court in awarding the landowners 12% interest. The Court, in Republic,
simply affirmed the RTC ruling imposing legal interest on the amount of
just compensation due. In the process, the Court determined that the
legal interest should be 12% after recognizing that the just
compensation due was effectively a forbearance on the part of the
government. Had the finality of the judgment been the critical factor,

then the 12% interest should have been imposed from the time the
RTC decision fixing just compensation became final. Instead, the 12%
interest was imposed from the time that the Republic commenced
condemnation proceedings and "took" the property.
The LBP additionally asserts that the petitioners erroneously relied on
the ruling in Reyes v. National Housing Authority. The LBP claims that
we cannot apply Reyes because it involved just compensation that
remained unpaid despite the finality of the expropriation decision.
LBPs point of distinction is that just compensation was immediately
paid in the present case upon the Courts determination of the actual
value of the expropriated properties. LBP claims, too, that in Reyes, the
Court established that the refusal of the NHA to pay just compensation
was unfounded and unjustified, whereas the LBP in the present case
clearly demonstrated its willingness to pay just compensation. Lastly,
in Reyes, the records showed that there was an outstanding balance
that ought to be paid, while the element of an outstanding balance is
absent in the present case.
Contrary to the LBPs opinion, the imposition of the 12% interest in
Reyes did not depend on either the finality of the decision of the
expropriation court, or on the finding that the NHAs refusal to pay just
compensation was unfounded and unjustified. Quite clearly, the Court
imposed 12% interest based on the ruling in Republic v. Court of
Appeals that "x x x if property is taken for public use before
compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the
case, the final compensation must include interest[s] on its just value
to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine,
between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal
interest[s] accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as
(but not better than) the position he was in before the taking
occurred."29 This is the same legal principle applicable to the present
case, as discussed above.
While the LBP immediately paid the remaining balance on the just
compensation due to the petitioners after this Court had fixed the
value of the expropriated properties, it overlooks one essential fact
from the time that the State took the petitioners properties until the
time that the petitioners were fully paid, almost 12 long years passed.
This is the rationale for imposing the 12% interest in order to
compensate the petitioners for the income they would have made had
they been properly compensated for their properties at the time of the
taking.

Finally, the LBP insists that the petitioners quoted our ruling in Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Imperial out of context. According to the LBP,
the Court imposed legal interest of 12% per annum only after
December 31, 2006, the date when the decision on just compensation
became final.
The LBP is again mistaken. The Imperial case involved land that was
expropriated pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, 30 and fell under
the coverage of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 13. 31 This AO
provided for the payment of a 6% annual interest if there is any delay
in payment of just compensation. However, Imperial was decided in
2007 and AO No. 13 was only effective up to December 2006. Thus,
the Court, relying on our ruling in the Republic case, applied the
prevailing 12% interest ruling to the period when the just
compensation remained unpaid after December 2006. It is for this
reason that December 31, 2006 was important, not because it was the
date of finality of the decision on just compensation.
The 12% Interest Rate and the Chico-Nazario Dissent
To fully reflect the concerns raised in this Courts deliberations on the
present case, we feel it appropriate to discuss the Justice Minita ChicoNazarios dissent from the Courts December 4, 2009 Resolution.
While Justice Chico-Nazario admitted that the petitioners were entitled
to the 12% interest, she saw it appropriate to equitably reduce the
interest charges from P1,331,124,223.05 to P400,000,000.00. In
support of this proposal, she enumerated various cases where the
Court, pursuant to Article 1229 of the Civil Code, 32 equitably reduced
interest charges.
We differ with our esteemed colleagues views on the application of
equity.
While we have equitably reduced the amount of interest awarded in
numerous cases in the past, those cases involved interest that was
essentially consensual in nature, i.e., interest stipulated in signed
agreements between the contracting parties. In contrast, the interest
involved in the present case "runs as a matter of law and follows as a
matter of course from the right of the landowner to be placed in as
good a position as money can accomplish, as of the date of taking."33
Furthermore, the allegedly considerable payments made by the LBP to
the petitioners cannot be a proper premise in denying the landowners
the interest due them under the law and established jurisprudence. If
the just compensation for the landholdings is considerable, this

compensation is not undue because the landholdings the owners gave

up in exchange are also similarly considerable AFC gave up an
aggregate landholding of 640.3483 hectares, while HPIs gave up
805.5308 hectares. When the petitioners surrendered these sizeable
landholdings to the government, the incomes they gave up were
likewise sizeable and cannot in any way be considered miniscule. The
incomes due from these properties, expressed as interest, are what the
government should return to the petitioners after the government took
over their lands without full payment of just compensation. In other
words, the value of the landholdings themselves should be equivalent
to the principal sum of the just compensation due; interest is due and
should be paid to compensate for the unpaid balance of this principal
sum after taking has been completed. This is the compensation
arrangement that should prevail if such compensation is to satisfy the
constitutional standard of being "just."
Neither can LBPs payment of the full compensation due before the
finality of the judgment of this Court justify the reduction of the
interest due them. To rule otherwise would be to forget that the
petitioners had to wait twelve years from the time they gave up their
lands before the government fully paid the principal of the just
compensation due them. These were twelve years when they had no
income from their landholdings because these landholdings have
immediately been taken; no income, or inadequate income, accrued to
them from the proceeds of compensation payment due them because
full payment has been withheld by government.
If the full payment of the principal sum of the just compensation is
legally significant at all under the circumstances of this case, the
significance is only in putting a stop to the running of the interest due
because the principal of the just compensation due has been paid. To
close our eyes to these realities is to condone what is effectively a
confiscatory action in favor of the LBP.
That the legal interest due is now almost equivalent to the principal to
be paid is not per se an inequitable or unconscionable situation,
considering the length of time the interest has remained unpaid
almost twelve long years. From the perspective of interest income,
twelve years would have been sufficient for the petitioners to double
the principal, even if invested conservatively, had they been promptly
paid the principal of the just compensation due them. Moreover, the
interest, however enormous it may be, cannot be inequitable and
unconscionable because it resulted directly from the application of law
and jurisprudence standards that have taken into account fairness
and equity in setting the interest rates due for the use or forebearance
of money.

If the LBP sees the total interest due to be immense, it only has itself
to blame, as this interest piled up because it unreasonably acted in its
valuation of the landholdings and consequently failed to promptly pay
the petitioners. To be sure, the consequences of this failure i.e., the
enormity of the total interest due and the alleged financial hemorrhage
the LBP may suffer should not be the very reason that would excuse
it from full compliance. To so rule is to use extremely flawed logic. To so
rule is to disregard the question of how the LBP, a government
financial institution that now professes difficulty in paying interest at
12% per annum, managed the funds that it failed to pay the petitioners
for twelve long years.
It would be utterly fallacious, too, to argue that this Court should tread
lightly in imposing liabilities on the LBP because this bank represents
the government and, ultimately, the public interest. Suffice it to say
that public interest refers to what will benefit the public, not
necessarily the government and its agencies whose task is to
contribute to the benefit of the public. Greater public benefit will result
if government agencies like the LBP are conscientious in undertaking
its tasks in order to avoid the situation facing it in this case. Greater
public interest would be served if it can contribute to the credibility of
the governments land reform program through the conscientious
handling of its part of this program.
As our last point, equity and equitable principles only come into full
play when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence. 34 As we have
shown above, established rulings of this Court are in place for full
application to the present case. There is thus no occasion for the
equitable consideration that Justice Chico-Nazario suggested.
The Amount Due the Petitioners as Just Compensation
As borne by the records, the 12% interest claimed is only on the
difference between the price of the expropriated lands (determined
with
finality
to
be P1,383,179,000.00)
and
the
amount
of P411,769,168.32 already paid to the petitioners. The difference
between these figures amounts to the remaining balance
of P971,409,831.68 that was only paid on May 9, 2008.
As above discussed, this amount should bear interest at the rate of
12% per annum from the time the petitioners properties were taken
on December 9, 1996 up to the time of payment. At this rate, the LBP
now owes the petitioners the total amount of One Billion Three
Hundred Thirty-One Million One Hundred Twenty-Four Thousand Two
Hundred Twenty-Three and 05/100 Pesos (P1,331,124,223.05),
computed as follows:

Just Compensation P971,409,831.68

Legal Interest from 12/09/1996
To 05/09/2008 @ 12%/annum
12/09/1996 to 12/31/1996 23 days 7,345,455.17
01/01/1997 to 12/31/2007 11 years 1,282,260,977.82
01/01/2008 to 05/09/2008 130 days 41,517,790.07
P1,331,124,223.0535
The Immutability of Judgment Issue
As a rule, a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or
modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant
to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law and regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of the land,
rendered it.36 In the past, however, we have recognized exceptions to
this rule by reversing judgments and recalling their entries in the
interest of substantial justice and where special and compelling
reasons called for such actions.
Notably, in San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission,37 Galman v.
Sandiganbayan,38Philippine
Consumers
Foundation v. National Telecommunications Commission, 39 and
Republic v. de los Angeles,40 we reversed our judgment on
the second motion for reconsideration, while in Vir-Jen Shipping and
Marine Services v. National Labor Relations Commission,41 we did so on
a third motion for reconsideration. In Cathay Pacific v. Romillo 42 and
Cosio v. de Rama,43 we modified or amended our ruling on the second
motion for reconsideration. More recently, in the cases of Munoz v.
Court of Appeals,44 Tan Tiac Chiong v. Hon. Cosico, 45Manotok IV v.
Barque,46 and Barnes v. Padilla,47 we recalled entries of judgment after
finding that doing so was in the interest of substantial justice. In
Barnes, we said:
x x x Phrased elsewise, a final and executory judgment can no longer
be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly,
even by the highest court of the land.
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial
justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the

case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of

the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f)
the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed
to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules
of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard
rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which
this Court itself had already declared to be final.48 [Emphasis supplied.]
That the issues posed by this case are of transcendental importance is
not hard to discern from these discussions. A constitutional limitation,
guaranteed under no less than the all-important Bill of Rights, is at
stake in this case: how can compensation in an eminent domain be
"just" when the payment for the compensation for property already
taken has been unreasonably delayed? To claim, as the assailed
Resolution does, that only private interest is involved in this case is to
forget that an expropriation involves the government as a necessary
actor. It forgets, too, that under eminent domain, the constitutional
limits or standards apply to government who carries the burden of
showing that these standards have been met. Thus, to simply dismiss
this case as a private interest matter is an extremely shortsighted view
that this Court should not leave uncorrected.
As duly noted in the above discussions, this issue is not one of first
impression in our jurisdiction; the consequences of delay in the
payment of just compensation have been settled by this Court in past
rulings. Our settled jurisprudence on the issue alone accords this case
primary importance as a contrary ruling would unsettle, on the
flimsiest of grounds, all the rulings we have established in the past.
More than the stability of our jurisprudence, the matter before us is of
transcendental importance to the nation because of the subject matter
involved agrarian reform, a societal objective that the government
has unceasingly sought to achieve in the past half century. This reform
program and its objectives would suffer a major setback if the
government falters or is seen to be faltering, wittingly or unwittingly,
through lack of good faith in implementing the needed reforms. Truly,
agrarian reform is so important to the national agenda that the
Solicitor General, no less, pointedly linked agricultural lands, its
ownership and abuse, to the idea of revolution. 49This linkage, to our
mind, remains valid even if the landowner, not the landless farmer, is
at the receiving end of the distortion of the agrarian reform program.

As we have ruled often enough, rules of procedure should not be

applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used
only to help secure, not override, substantial justice. 50 As we explained
in Ginete v. Court of Appeals:51
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict
and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to
suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as
to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be
final, as we are now constrained to do in the instant case.
xxxx
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party
litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination
of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again,
this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly
so as not to override substantial justice.52 [Emphasis supplied.]
Similarly, in de Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,53 we had occasion to state:
The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth
guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the
hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or
robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely
why courts in rendering justice have always been, as they ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the
other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate
language of Justice Makalintal, "should give way to the realities of the
situation.54 [Emphasis supplied.]
We made the same recognition in Barnes,55 on the underlying premise
that a courts primordial and most important duty is to render justice;
in discharging the duty to render substantial justice, it is permitted to
re-examine even a final and executory judgment.
Based on all these considerations, particularly the patently illegal and
erroneous conclusion that the petitioners are not entitled to 12%
interest, we find that we are duty-bound to re-examine and overturn
the assailed Resolution. We shall completely and inexcusably be remiss
in our duty as defenders of justice if, given the chance to make the
rectification, we shall let the opportunity pass.

Attorneys Fees
We are fully aware that the RTC has awarded the petitioners attorneys
fees when it fixed the just compensation due and decreed that interest
of 12% should be paid on the balance outstanding after the taking of
the petitioners landholdings took place. The petitioners, however,
have not raised the award of attorneys fees as an issue in the present
motion for reconsideration. For this reason, we shall not touch on this
issue at all in this Resolution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petitioners motion
for reconsideration. The Court En Bancs Resolution dated December 4,
2009, as well as the Third Divisions Resolutions dated April 30, 2008
and December 19, 2007, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The respondent Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby ORDERED to
pay petitioners Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. interest
at the rate of 12% per annum on the unpaid balance of the just
compensation, computed from the date the Government took the
properties on December 9, 1996, until the respondent Land Bank of the
Philippines paid on May 9, 2008 the balance on the principal amount.
Unless the parties agree to a shorter payment period, payment shall be
in monthly installments at the rate ofP60,000,000.00 per month until
the whole amount owing, including interest on the outstanding
balance, is fully paid.
Costs against the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
Associate Justice

D.

BRION

WE CONCUR:
RENATO
Chief Justice
(on
wellness
ANTONIO
T.
Associate Justice

C.

leave)
CARPIO*

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,

CORONA

CONCHITA
MORALES
Associate Justice
ANTONIO

CARPIO

EDUARDO

B.

JR.
Associate Justice

NACHURA
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDODE
CASTRO
Associate Justice

(on
leave)
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA**
Associate Justice

LUCAS
P.
BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO
C.
CASTILLO
Associate Justice

(on
wellness
ROBERTO
A.
Associate Justice

leave)
ABAD***

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA,
JR.
Associate Justice

PEREZ

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL
Associate Justice

MARIA
LOURDES
Associate Justice

P.

A.

DEL

SERENO

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.
RENATO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
*

On wellness leave.

**

***

On leave.
On wellness leave.

C.

CORONA

While the petitioners owned a total of 1,454.8791 hectares

based on the landholdings stated in this Courts February 6, 2007
Decision, the RTC, in its decision, fixed just compensation for
1,388.6027 hectares of land.
2

Retired from the Court on December 5, 2009.

See Masikip v. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006,
479 SCRA 391, citing Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus, 40 Phil. 550,
558-559 (1919).
4

See Manapat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 110478, 116176

and 116491-503, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 32.
5

See Heirs of Alberto Saguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, G.R. No.

135087, March 14, 2000, 328 SCRA 137.
6

Id., citing City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, 40

Phil. 349 (1919).
7

The authority to exercise the power of eminent domain was

expressly conferred to the Philippine Government through
Section 63 of the Philippine Bill of 1902, which states:
That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby
authorized, subject to the limitations and conditions
prescribed in this Act, to acquire, require, hold, maintain,
and convey title to real and personal property, and may
acquire real estate for public uses by the exercise of the
right of eminent domain. (Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.)
Section 74 of the same law, which deals with the authority
of the Philippine Government to grant franchises and
concessions, provides:
That the Government of the Philippine Islands may grant
franchises,
privileges,
and
concessions,
including
the authority to exercise the right of eminent
domain for the construction and operation of works of
public utility and service x x x: Provided, That no private
property shall be taken for any purpose under this
section without just compensation paid or tendered
therefor x x x.

More specifically, Section 3 of the Jones Act (of 1916)

provides that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation."
See Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus, supra note 3.
8

We derived the concept of "just compensation" from the last

clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which reads: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."
The Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the government
from taking its citizens' property; rather, it merely prohibits
the government from taking property without paying just
compensation. (26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain 3, citing
Diamond Bar Cattle Co. v. U.S., 168 F.3d 1209 [10th Cir.
1999].) It is designed to secure compensation, not to limit
governmental interference with property rights. (Id., citing
Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 914, 108 L. Ed. 2d
1 [1990].) It prevents the legislature (and other
government actors) from depriving private persons of
vested property rights except for a "public use" and upon
payment of "just compensation." (Id., citing Landgraf v. USI
Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S. Ct. 1522, 128 L. Ed. 2d
229 [1994].)
9

G.R. No. 157206, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 102, 116-117.

10

Id.

11

P86,900,925.88 for the land of AFC and P164,478,178.14 for

HPI.
12

Land Bank v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 148892, May 6, 2010.

13

Land Bank of the Philippines v. Orilla, supra note 9, at 117.

14

G.R. No. 146587, July 2, 2002, 383 SCRA 611.

15

Id. at 622-623.

16

G. R. Nos. 60225-26, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 542.

17

In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.

97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78), we said:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the
payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of
money, the interest due should be that which may have
been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due
shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of
interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from
default,i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and
subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or
forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the
amount of damages awarded may be imposed at
the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum.No
interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims
or damages except when or until the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where
the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the
interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when
such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the
time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run
only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at
which time the quantification of damages may be deemed
to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for
the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on
the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of
money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal
interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such
finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being
deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.
18

Supra note 12.

19

G.R. No. 147511, January 20, 2003, 395 SCRA 494.

20

G.R. No. 140160, January 13, 2004, 419 SCRA 67.

21

G.R. No. 147245, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 516.

22

G.R. No. 157753, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA 449.

23

G.R. No. 173392, August 24, 2007, 531 SCRA 198.

24

G.R. No. 154211-12, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 214.

25

Province of Tayabas v. Perez, 66 Phil. 467; J.M. Tuazon & Co.,

Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, No. L-21064, February 18,
1970, 31 SCRA 413; Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, No.
L-35861, October 18, 1979, 93 SCRA 503; Manotok v. National
Housing Authority, No. L-55166, May 21, 1987, 150 SCRA 89.
26

Supra note 14.

27

Supra note 19.

28

Supra note 22.

29

Supra note 14.

30

Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of

the Soil, Transferring to Them the Ownership of the Land They Till
and Providing the Instruments and Mechanisms Therefor.
31

Rules and Regulations Governing the Grant of Increment of Six

Percent (6%) Yearly Interest Compounded Annually on Lands
Covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No.
228 (Effective October 21, 1994). Amended by DAR AO No. 02,
series of 2004 (Issued on November 4, 2004).
32

Article 1229 states: "The judge shall equitably reduce the

penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or
irregularly complied with by the debtor."
33

Republic v. Juan, G.R. No. L-24740, July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 26;
citing 30 CJS 230.
34

See Parent-Teachers Association of St. Mathew Christian

Academy v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., G.R. No. 176518,
March 2, 2010, citing Tirazona v. Philippine EDS Techno-Service,
Inc. (PET, Inc.), G.R. No. 169712, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA
625, 626.

35

Rollo, p. 1337.

36

Equitable Banking Corp. v. Sadac, G.R. No. 164772, June 8,

2006, 490 SCRA 380, 416-417.
37

G.R. No. 82467, June 29, 1989, 174 SCRA 510.

38

G.R. No. L-72670, September 12, 1986, 144 SCRA 43.

39

G.R. No. L-63318, August 18, 1984, 131 SCRA 200.

40

G.R. No. L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422.

41

G.R. No. L-58011, November 18, 1983, 125 SCRA 577.

42

G.R No. L-64276, August 12, 1986, 143 SCRA 396.

43

G.R. No. L-18452, May 20, 1966, 17 SCRA 207.

44

G.R. No. 125451, January 20, 2000, 322 SCRA 741.

45

434 Phil. 753 (2002).

46

G.R. No. 162335, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 468.

47

482 Phil. 903 (2004).

48

Id. at 915.

49

Oral arguments at the Supreme Court, Hacienda Luisita case,

G.R. No. 171101, August 26, 2010.
50

Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43511, July 28, 1976,

72 SCRA 121; Mc Entee v. Manotoc, G.R. No. L-14968, October
27, 1961, 3 SCRA 279; Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-40098,
August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 441.
51

G.R. No. 127596, September 24, 1998, 292 SCRA 38.

52

Id. at 51-52.

53

326 Phil. 182 (1996).

54

Id. at 191.

55

Supra note 47.