Lex Discipulus

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Showing posts with label Labor Law Case Digest. Show all posts
Wednesday, October 10, 2012

Abella vs. NLRC

Posted by she lamsen

G.R. No. 71813

July 20, 1987

FACTS:
Ricardo Dionele, Sr. (private respondent) has been a regular farm
worker since 1949 in Hacienda Danao-Ramona located in
Ponteverde, Negros Occidential. Said farm land was leased to
Rosalina Abella (petitioner) for a period of ten (10) years, renewable
for another ten years.Upon the expiration of her leasehold rights,
petitioner dismissed Ricardo and another co-employee. Private
respondents filed a complaint against the petitioner at the Ministry
of Labor and Employment for overtime pay, illegal dismissal and
reinstatement with backwages. After presenting their respective
evidence, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the dismissal is warranted by
the cessation of business, but granted the private respondents
separation pay.Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the
same was denied. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents are entitled to separation pay.
HELD:
The petition is devoid of merit.Article 284 of the Labor code provides
that the employer may also terminate the employment of any
employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices,
redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or
cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless
the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this
title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of
Labor and Employment at least month before the intended date
thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving

devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled

to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one month pay or to at
least one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.
In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closure or
cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to
serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay
shall be equivalent to one month pay or at least one-half month pay
for every year of service whichever is higher. A fraction of at least
six months shall be considered one whole year."The purpose of the
said article is obvious: the protection of the workers whose
employment is terminated because of the closure of establishment
and reduction of personnel. Without said law, employees like private
respondents in the case at bar will lose the benefits to which they
are entitled for the number of years served. Although they were
absorbed by the new management of the hacienda, in the absence
of any showing that the latter has assumed the responsibilities of
the former employer, they will be considered as new employees and
the years of service behind them would amount to nothing. In any
event, it is well-settled that in the implementation and interpretation
of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing
regulations, the workingmans welfare should be the primordial and
paramount consideration.
The instant petition is hereby dismissed and the decision of the
Labor Arbiter and the Resolutionof the Ministry of Labor and
Employment are hereby affirmed.
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Friday, October 5, 2012

Mercidar Fishing Corporation vs. NLRC & Fermin Agao, Jr.

Posted by she lamsen

G.R. No. 1112574

October 8, 1998

FACTS:
This case originated from a complaint filed on September 20, 1990
by private respondent FerminAgao, Jr. against petitioner for illegal
dismissal, violation of P.D. No. 851, and non-payment of five days
service incentive leave for 1990. Private respondent had been
employed as a "bodegero" or ship's quartermaster on February 12,
1988. He complained that he had been constructively dismissed by
petitioner when the latter refused him assignments aboard its boats
after he had reported to work on May 28, 1990. Private respondent
alleged that he had been sick and thus allowed to go on leave
without pay for one month from April 28, 1990 but that when he

reported to work at the end of such period with a health clearance,

he was told to come back another time as he could not be reinstated
immediately. Thereafter, petitioner refused to give him work. For this
reason, private respondent asked for a certificate of employment
from petitioner on September 6, 1990. However, when he came
back for the certificate on September 10, petitioner refused to issue
the certificate unless he submitted his resignation. Since private
respondent refused to submit such letter unless he was given
separation pay, petitioner prevented him from entering the
premises. Petitioner, on the other hand, alleged that it was private
respondent who actually abandoned his work.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the fishing crew members are considered field
personnel as classified in Art. 82 of the Labor Code.
HELD:
Art. 82 of the Labor Code provides: The provisions of this title
[Working Conditions and Rest Periods] shall apply to employees in all
establishments and undertakings whether for profit or not, but not to
government employees, field personnel, members of the family of
the employer who are dependent on him for support, domestic
helpers, persons in the personal service of another, and workers who
are paid by results as determined by the Secretary of Labor in
appropriate regulations. "Field personnel" shall refer to nonagricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from
the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and
whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with
reasonable certainty. In contrast, in the case at bar, during the entire
course of their fishing voyage, fishermen employed by petitioner
have no choice but to remain on board its vessel. Although they
perform non-agricultural work away from petitioner's business
offices, the fact remains that throughout the duration of their work
they are under the effective control and supervision of petitioner
through the vessel's patron or master.
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Villar vs. Inciong

Posted by she lamsen

L-50283-84
April 20, 1983
FACTS:

AEU under FUR attempted to have a certification election but due to

the opposition of AEU-PAFLU, the petition was denied by the MedArbiter.
AEU-PAFLU then called a special meeting among members and it
was there decided that an investigation of certain people would be
held pursuant to the constitution and by-laws of the Federation, of
all of the petitioners and one Felipe Manlapao, for "continuously
maligning,
libelling
and
slandering
not
only
the
incumbent officers but even the union itself and the federation;"
spreading 'false propaganda' that the union officers were 'merely
appointees of the management', and for causing divisiveness in the
union.
A Trial Committee was then formed to investigate the local union's
charges against the petitioners for acts of disloyalty. AEU-PAFLU and
the Company concluded a new CBA which, besides granting
additional benefits to the workers, also reincorporated the same
provisions of the existing CBA, including the union security clause
reading, to wit:
All members of the UNION as of the signing of this Agreement shall
remain members thereof in good standing. Therefore, any members
who shall resign, be expelled, or shall in any manner cease to be a
member
of
the
UNION,
shall
be
dismissed
from
his employment upon written request of the UNION to the Company.
The petitioners were summoned to appear before the PAFLU Trial
Committee for the aforestated investigation of the charges filed
against them but they did not attend and instead requested for a
"Bill of Particulars" of the charges which had been formalized by the
AEU-PAFLU officers; they contend that their actions were merely
exercise of the right to freedom of association.
Not recognizing PAFLU's jurisdiction over their case, petitioners
again refused to participate in the investigation rescheduled and
conducted. Instead, they merely appeared to file their Answer to the
charges and moved for a dismissal.
Based on the findings and recommendations of the PAFLU trial
committee, the PAFLU President found the petitioners guilty of the
charges against them and it was requested that they be terminated
in conformity with the security clause in the CBA. Meanwhile, they
were placed under preventive suspension and denied access to the
workplace.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Minister acted with grave abuse of discretion
when he affirmed the decision of the RO4-Officer-in-Charge allowing
the preventive suspension and subsequent dismissal of petitioners
by reason of the exercise of their right to freedom of association.
HELD:
It is true that disaffiliation from a labor union is not open to legal
objection. It is implicit in the freedom of association ordained by the
Constitution. However, a closed shop is a valid form of union
security, and such provision in a CBA is not a restriction of the right
of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution.
Here, the Company and the AEU-PAFLU entered into a CBA with a
union security clause and the stipulation for closed-shop is clear and
unequivocal and it leaves no room for doubt that the employer is
bound, under the collective bargaining agreement, to dismiss the
employees, herein petitioners, for non-union membership.
Petitioners became non-union members upon their expulsion from
the general membership of the AEU-PAFLU pursuant to the Decision
of the PAFLU national president.
PAFLU had the authority to investigate petitioners on the charges
filed by their co-employees in the local union and after finding them
guilty as charged, to expel them from the roll of membership under
the constitution of the PAFLU to which the local union was affiliated.
According to the OIC: dtripped of non-essentials, the basic and
fundamental issue in this case tapers down to the determination of
WHETHER OR NOT PAFLU HAD THE AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE
OPPOSITORS AND, THEREAFTER, EXPEL THEM FROM THE ROLL
OF MEMBERSHIP OF THE AMIGOEMPLOYEES UNION-PAFLU.
Recognized and salutary is the principle that when a labor union
affiliates with a mother union, it becomes bound by the laws and
regulations of the parent organization.
When a labor union affiliates with a parent organization or mother
union, or accepts a charter from a superior body, it becomes subject
to the laws of the superior body under whose authority the local
union functions. The constitution, by-laws and rules of the parent
body, together with the charter it issues pursuant thereto to the
subordinate union, constitute an enforceable contract between the
parent body and the subordinate union, and between the members
of the subordinate union inter se.

'Due process' simply means that the parties were given the
opportunity to be heard. In the instant case, ample and
unmistakable evidence exists to show that the oppositors were
afforded the opportunity to present their evidence, but they
themselves disdained or spurned the said opportunity given to
them.
Inherent in every labor union, or any organization, is the right of selfpreservation. When members of a labor union, therefore, sow the
seeds of dissension and strife within the union; when they seek the
disintegration and destruction of the very union to which they
belong, they thereby forfeit their rights to remain as members of the
union which they seek to destroy.
We, therefore, hold and rule that petitioners, although entitled to
disaffiliate from their union and form a new organization of their
own, must, however, suffer the consequences of their separation
from the union under the security clause of the CBA.
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General Milling Corporation vs. Torres

Posted by she lamsen

196 SCRA 215 [G.R No. 9366, April 22, 1991]

FACTS:
Earl Timothy Cone is a US citizen, who was hired by General Milling
as a sports consultant and assistant coach. He possessed an alien
employment permit which was changed to pre-arranged employee
by the Board of Special Inquiry of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation. GMC requested that Cones employment permit be
changed to a full-fledged coach, which was contested by The
Basketball Coaches Association of the Philippines. Alleging that GMC
failed to show that there is no competent person in the Philippines to
do the coaching job. Secretary of Labor cancelled Cones
employment permit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Labor act with grave abuse of
discretion in revoking Cones Alien Employment Permit?
HELD:

The Secretary of Labor did not act with grave abuse of discretion in
revoking Cones Alien Employment Permit. GMCs claim that hiring of
a foreign coach is an employers prerogative has no legal basis.
Under Section 40 of the Labor Code, an employer seeking
employment of an alien must first obtain an employment permit
from the Department of labor.
GMCs right to choose whom to employ is limited by the statutory
requirement of an employment permit. The Labor Code empowers
the Labor Secretary to determine as to the availability of the
services of a person in the Philippines who is competent, able and
willing at the time of the application to perform the services for
which an alien is desired. DOLE is the agency vested with
jurisdiction to determine the question of availability of local workers.
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Escario vs. NLRC

Posted by she lamsen

G.R. No. 124055

June 8, 2000
FACTS:
Private respondents California Marketing Co., Inc. (CMC) is a
domestic corporation principally engaged in themanufacturing of
food products and distribution of such products to wholesalers and
retailers. Privaterespondent Donna Louis Advertising and Marketing
Associates, Inc. is a duly registered promotionalfirm.Petitioners
alleged that they were employed by CMC as merchandisers. They
alleged that the hiring,control and supervision of workers and the
payment of the salaries were all covered by CMC throughits agent
D.L Admark in order CMC to avoid its liability under the law.
Petitioners filed a case againstCMC before the labor arbiter for
regularization of their employment status.During the pendency of
the case, D.L Admark terminated the services of the petitioners.
Thecomplaint was amended to include alleged dismissal. CMC filed a
motion to implead as partydefendantD.L Admark, the latter filed a
motion to intervene. Both motions were granted. CMC deniedbeing
petitioners employer while D.L Admark asserted it is the employer of
the petitioners.The labor arbiter found petitioners as employees of
CMC as they were engaged in activities that arenecessary and
desirable in the usual business/trade of CMC. On appeal, the NLRC
set aside the laborarbiters decision. But ordered the reinstatement
of the petitioners in D.L Admark petitioners filed amotion for

consideration before the NLRC which was denied for lack of merit.
Hence the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not D.L Admark is a labor-only contractor or as
independent contractor.

1.
2.

1.

2.

HELD:
The Supreme Court denied the petition.
There is labor-only contracting when the contractor or subcontractor
merely recruits, supplies orplaces workers to perform a job, work or
service for a principal. In labor only contracting, the
followingelements are present:
the person supplying workers to an employer does not have
substantial capital or investment in theform of tools, equipment,
machineries, wok premise, among other tools
the workers recruited and placed by such person performing
activities which are directly related to theprincipal business of the
employer.
In contract, there is permissible job contracting when a principal
agrees to put out or farm out with acontractor or a subcontractor the
performance/completion of a specific job, work or services within
adefinite or predetermined period, regardless of whether such
job/services is to be performed orcompleted within or outside the
premises
of
the
principal.
In
this
arrangement,
the
followingconditions must concur.
The contractor carries on a distinct and independent business and
undertakes the contract work on hisaccount under the responsibility
according to his own manual and methods, free from the control
anddirection of his employer or principal in all matters connected
with the performance of his employerwork except as to the results
thereof; and
The contractor has substantial capital / investment which are
necessary in the conduct of his business.
The court reiterated that it is not enough to show substantial
capitalization on investment. In additionthe following factors need
be consideredwhether the contractor is carrying on an independent
businessthe nature and extent of the workthe skill requiredthe term
and duration of the relationshipthe right to assign the performance
of specified pieces of workthe control and supervision of the
workersthe power of the employer with respect to the hiring, firing
and payment of workers of the contractorthe control of the premises
the duty to supply premises, tools, appliances, materials and
labormode, manner and terms of payment. Based on the foregoing
criteria, the court found that D.L Admark is a legitimate
independentcontractor. Applying the four-fold test, D.L Admark was

found to be the employer of the petitioners.The Supreme Court

affirmed the NLRCs ruling.
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Sosito vs. Aguinaldo Development Corp.

Posted by she lamsen

G.R. No. L-48926

December 14, 1987
FACTS:
Petitioner Manuel Sosito was employed in 1964 by the private
respondent, a logging company, and was in charge of logging
importation, with a monthly salary of P675.00, 1 when he went on
indefinite leave with the consent of the company on January 16,
1976. On July 20, 1976, the private respondent, through its
president, announced a retrenchment program and offered
separation pay to employees in the active service as of June 30,
1976, who would tender their resignations not later than July 31,
1976. The petitioner decided to accept this offer and so submitted
his resignation on July 29, 1976, "to avail himself of the gratuity
benefits" promised. However, his resignation was not acted upon
and he was never given the separation pay he expected. The
petitioner complained to the Department of Labor,
where he was sustained by the labor arbiter. The company was
ordered to pay Sosito the sum of P 4,387.50, representing his salary
for six and a half months. On appeal to the National Labor Relations
Commission, this decision was reversed and it was held that the
petitioner was not covered by the retrenchment program.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is covered by the retrenchment
program and thus entitled to separation benefits.
HELD:
It is clear from the memorandum that the offer of separation pay
was extended only to those who were in the active service of the
company as of June 30, 1976. It is equally clear that the petitioner
was not eligible for the promised gratuity as he was not actually
working with the company as of the said date. Being on indefinite
leave, he was not in the active service of the private respondent
although, if one were to be technical, he was still in its employ. Even
so, during the period of indefinite leave, he was not entitled to
receive any salary or to enjoy any other benefits available to those
in the active service. We note that under the law then in force the

private respondent could have validly reduced its work force

because of its financial reverses without the obligation to grant
separation pay. This was permitted under the original Article 272(a),
of the Labor Code, which was in force at the time. To its credit,
however, the company voluntarily offered gratuities to those who
would agree to be phased out pursuant to the terms and conditions
of its retrenchment program, in recognition of their loyalty and to
tide them over their own financial difficulties. The Court feels that
such compassionate measure deserves commendation and support
but at the same time rules that it should be available only to those
who are qualified therefore. We hold that the petitioner is not one of
them. While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social
justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be
supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in
favor of labor. Management also has its own rights which, as such,
are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair
play. Out of its concern for those with less privileges in life, this
Court has inclined more often than not toward the worker and
upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism,
however, has not blinded us to the rule that justice is in every case
for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established
facts and the applicable law and doctrine.
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Wednesday, October 3, 2012

Tanduay Distillery Labor Union vs NLRC

Posted by she lamsen

G.R. No. 75037

April 30, 1987
FACTS:
Private respondents were all employees of Tanduay Distillery, Inc.,
(TDI) and members of the Tanduay Distillery Labor Union (TDLU), a
duly organized and registered labor organization and the exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the petitioner
company.
A Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), was executed between
TDI and TDLU. The CBA was duly ratified by a majority of the
workers in TDI including herein private respondents and contained a
union security clause which provides that all workers who are or
may during the effectivity of the CBA, become members of the

Union in accordance with its Constitution and By-Laws shall, as a

condition of their continued employment, maintain membership in
good standing in the Union for the duration of the agreement.
While the CBA was in effect and within the contract bar period the
private respondents joined another union, the Kaisahan Ng
Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMPIL) and organized its local chapter in
TDI. KAMPIL filed a petition for certification election to determine
union representation in TDI, which development compelled TDI to
file a grievance with TDLU.
TDLU created a committee to investigate its erring members in
accordance with its by-laws which are not disputed by the private
respondents. Thereafter, TDLU, through the Investigating Committee
and approved by TDLU's Board of Directors, expelled the private
respondents from TDLU for disloyalty to the Union. By letter, TDLU
notified TDI that private respondents had been expelled from TDLU
and demanded that TDI terminate the employment of private,
respondents because they had lost their membership with TDLU.
The private respondents were later on terminated. In their petition,
private respondents contend that their act of organizing a local
chapter of KAMPIL and eventual filing of a petition for certification
election was pursuant to their constitutional right to selforganization.
ISSUES:
a) whether or not TDI was justified in terminating private
respondents' employment in the company on the basis of TDLU's
demand for the enforcement of the Union Security Clause of the CBA
between TDI and TDLU; and
b) whether or not TDI is guilty of unfair labor practice in complying
with TDLU's demand for the dismissal of private respondents.
HELD:
The dismissal of an employee pursuant to a demand of the majority
union in accordance with a union security agreement following the
loss of seniority rights is valid and privileged and does not constitute
an unfair labor practice.
Article 249 (e) of the Labor Code as amended specifically recognizes
the closed shop arrangement as a form of union security. The closed
shop, the union shop, the maintenance of membership shop, the
preferential shop, the maintenance of treasury shop, and check-off
provisions are valid forms of union security and strength. They do
not constitute unfair labor practice nor are they violations of the
freedom of association clause of the Constitution. There is no
showing in these petitions of any arbitrariness or a violation of the

safeguards enunciated in the decisions of this Court interpreting

union security arrangements brought to us for review.
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Wednesday, September 26, 2012

Jose Rizal College vs. NLRC

Posted by she lamsen

FACTS:
The National Alliance of Teachers sued Jose Rizal College for alleged
nonpayment of unworked holidays from 1975 to 1977. The members
of the Alliance concerned are faculty members who are paid on the
basis of student contract hour.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the school faculty are entitled to unworked holiday
pay.
HELD:
As far as unworked regular holidays are concerned, the teachers are
not entitled to holiday pay. Regular holidays specified as such by law
are known to both school and faculty members as no class days;
certainly the latter do not expect payment for said unworked days,
and this was clearly in their minds when they entered into the
teaching contracts.
On the other hand, the teachers are entitled to be paid for unworked
special holidays. Otherwise stated, the faculty member, although
forced to take a rest, does not earn what he should earn on that day.
Be it noted that when a special public holiday is declared, the faculty
member paid by the hour is deprived of expected income, and it
does not matter that the school calendar is extended in view of the
days or hours lost, for their income that could be earned from other
sources is lost during the extended days. Similarly, when classes are
called off or shortened on account of typhoons, floods, rallies, and
the like, these faculty members must likewise be paid, whether or
not extensions are ordered.
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Jahara, et.al. vs. The Mindanao Lumber Company

Posted by she lamsen

G.R. No. L-36830

February 16, 1933

FACTS:
This is an action commenced in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga by the plaintiffs for the recovery of compensation from
the defendant company for the death of the workman, Moro
Sapturani, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3482,
otherwise as the "Workmen's Compensation Act."
The late Moro Kingan was engaged in the business of cutting timber
within the defendant's concession, employing laborers for that
purpose, among them Sapturani. Kingan paid his cutter's wages and
delivered the timber and firewood to the defendant company which
paid him the corresponding value thereof. On the morning of
February 12, 1930, between 6 and 6.30 o'clock, Sapturani, who was
about to go to the place where he was engaged in cutting timber, by
means of the defendant's train operating in the place, was run over
by the last car of the train as it was moving backwards, and died
almost instantly as a result of injuries received on different parts of
his body.
Mora Jahara, the divorced wife of the deceased, his daughters,
Albaya and Mandasiang, and their respective husbands, Ladaya and
Bachaja, are the plaintiffs and appellants in this case.
ISSUE:
1.
The court a quo erred in holding that the accident causing the
death of Moro Sapturani was due to his negligence in trying to
embark on the rear platform of the train of the defendant
corporation at the Chinkang Sawmill, Naga-Naga, which was moving
backwards at the time of the accident, and not holding that Moro
Sapturani was overrun and killed by the train of the defendant
corporation thru the negligence and carelessness of the employees
of the latter.
2.
The trial court erred in holding that the preponderance of the
weight of evidence is in favor of the defendant and against that of
the plaintiffs.
3.
The trial court erred in holding that in view of the negligence of
Moro Sapturani, the defendant cannot be made liable for the
payment of compensation to the plaintiffs under the Worksmen's
Compensation Act No. 3428 as amended by Act No. 3812, and in not
holding that even admitting the facts stated in the decision, the
paupers- appellants are still entitled to their claim under the law.
HELD:
The trial court declared that the deceased was notoriously negligent

in connection with the accident, because the evidence shows that he

tried to board the rear platform of the car as it was moving
backwards; that he succeeded in getting a foothold but failing to
obtain a hold of the car, he fell to the ground and was run over by
the train.
The Court reviewed all the evidence presented and find that the
conclusions reached by the trial court are supported by
preponderance thereof. It noted that the plaintiffs' witnesses gave a
different version of the accident. It also agree with the lower court
that Sapturani acted with notorious negligence in attempting to
board the train in the manner in which he did and, consequently, the
action cannot be maintained in accordance with subdivision 3 of
section 4 of Act No. 3428 which provides that no action for the
recovery of compensation shall prosper when the accident upon
which it is based is due to the notorious negligence of the workman.
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Ysmael Maritime Corporation vs. Avelino

Posted by she lamsen

151 SCRA 333

FACTS;
On December 22, 1971, Rolando Lim, a licensed second mate, died
when the vessel he was on board ran a ground and sank near
Sabtan, Batanes. The vessel was owned by petitioner Ysmael
Maritime Corporation. The parents of the deceased claiming that the
untimely death of their son was due to the negligence of the
petitioner sued the petitioner in the CFI for damages. By way of
affirmative defense, petitioner claimed that the private respondents
had already been compensated by the Workmans Compensation
Commission (WCC) for the same incident, for which reason they are
now precluded from seeking other remedies against the same
employer under the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the compensation remedy under the Workmens
Compensation Act (WCA), and now under the Labor Code, for workconnected death or injuries sustained by an employee ,is exclusive
of the other remedies under the Civil Code.
HELD:

In the recent case of Floresca v. Philex Mining Company, the Court

was confronted with three divergent opinions on the exclusivity
rule. One view is that the injured employee or his heirs, in case of
death, may initiate an action to recover damages (not compensation
under the Workmans Compensation Act) with the regular courts on
the basis of negligence of the employer pursuant to the Civil Code.
Another view is that the remedy of an employee for work-connected
injury or accident is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of WCA.
The third view is that the action is selective and the employee or his
heirs have a choice of availing themselves of the benefits under the
WCA or of suing in the regular courts under the Code for higher
damages from the employer by reason of his negligence. But once
the election has been exercised, the employee or his heirs are no
longer free to opt for the other remedy. The Court rejected the
doctrine of exclusivity of the rights and remedies granted by the
WCA. As thus applied to the case at bar, respondent Lim spouses
cannot be allowed to maintain their present action to recover
additional damages against petitioner under the Civil Code. In open
court, respondent admitted that they had previously filed a claim for
death benefits with the WCC and had received the compensation
payable to them under the WCA. It is therefore clear that the
respondents had not only opted to recover under the Act but they
had also been duly paid. At the very least, a sense of fair play would
demand that if a person entitled to a choice of remedies made a first
election and accepted the benefits thereof; he should no longer be
allowed to exercise the second option. Having staked his fortunes on
a particular remedy, he is precluded from pursuing the alternate
course, at least until the prior claim is rejected by the Compensation
Commission.
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Tuesday, September 25, 2012

Alano vs. Employee' Compensation Commission

Posted by she lamsen

158 SCRA 669

FACTS:
Dedicacion De Vera worked as principal of Salinap Community
School in san Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her usual tour of duty was
from 7:30 am to 5:30 pm. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00AM while
she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her
way to school, she was bumped and ran over by a speeding Toyota

mini-bus which resulted to her instantaneous death. Her brother

GenerosoAlano filed the instant claim for income benefit with the
GSIS for and in behalf of the decedents children. The claim was
denied by GSIS on the ground that the injury upon which
compensation is being claimed is not an employment accident
satisfying all the conditions prescribed by law. The ECC affirmed the
denial by GSIS. It claimed that the deceaseds accident did not meet
the conditions under the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation. First, the accident occurred at about 7:00 am or
thirty minutes before the deceaseds working hours. Second, it
happened not at her workplace but at the plaza where she usually
waits for a ride to her work. Third, she was not then performing her
official functions as school principal nor was she on a special errand
for the school.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the injury sustained by the deceased Dedicacion de
Vera resulting in her death is compensable under the law as an
employment accident.
HELD:
YES. The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally
injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while
he is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have
arisen out of and in the course of his employment. In this case, it is
not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of
work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job
necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work
on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school
principals being at the place of the accident. She was there because
her employment required her to be there.
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Iloilo Doc & Engineering Co. V. Workmens Compensation Commission

Posted by she lamsen

27 SCRA 103
FACTS:
Teodoro Pablo and Rodolfo Galopez, had just finished overtime work
at 5:00 pm and was going home. At around 5:02 pm, while Pablo
and Galopez were walking along the IDECO road, about20 meters
from the IDECO main gate, Pablo was shot by Martin Cordero. The

motive for the crime was and still unknown since Martin Cordero was
himself killed before he could be tried for Pablos death.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not Pablos death occurred in the course of
employment and arising out of the employment.
2.
Whether the PROXIMITY RULE should apply in this case.
3.
Whether the death of Pablo was an accident within the purview of
the Workmens Compensation Act.
HELD:
1.
YES. Workmens compensation is granted if the injuries result from
an accident which arises out of and in the course of employment.
Both the arising factor and the course factor must be present. If
one factor is weak and the other is strong, the injury is compensable
but not where both factors are weak. Ultimately, the question is
whether the accident is work connected. The words arising out of
refer to the origin or cause of the accident and are descriptive of its
character, while the words in the course refer to the time, place
and circumstances under which the accident takes place. The
presumption that the injury arises out of and in the course of
employment prevails where the injury occurs on the employers
premises. While the IDECO does not own the private road, it cannot
be denied that it was using the same as the principal means of
ingress and egress. The private road leads directly to its main gate.
Its right to use the road must then perforce proceed from either an
easement of right of way or a lease. Its right therefore is either a
legal one or a contractual one. In either case the IDECO should
logically and properly be charged with security control of the road.
2.

YES. The general rule in workmens compensation law known as

going and coming rule provides that in the absence of special
circumstances, an employee injured in going to, or coming from his
place of work is excluded from the benefits of workmens
compensation acts. The following are the exceptions: a. Where the
employee is proceeding to or from his work on the premises of his
employer b. Where the employee is about to enter or about to leave
the premises of his employer by way of exclusive or customary
means of ingress and egress. Where the employee is charged while
on his way to or from his place of employment or at his home or
during his employment, with some duty or special errand connected
with his employment. Where the employer, as an incident of the
employment provides the means of transportation to and from the
place of employment. The second exception is known as the
proximity rule. The place where the employee was injured being
immediately proximate to his place of work, the accident in question

must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his

employment and therefore arose out of or in the course thereof.
3.

YES. An assault although resulting from a deliberate act of the

slayer, is considered an accident within the meaning of the
Workmens Compensation Act since the word accident is intended to
indicate that the act causing the injury shall be casual or
unforeseen, an act for which the injured party is not legally
responsible.
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Mafinco Trading Corp. vs. Ople

Posted by she lamsen

GR No. L-37790
March 25, 1976
FACTS:
Cosmos Aerated Water Factory, a firm based at Malabon, Rizal,
appointed petitioner Mafinco as its sole distributor of Cosmos soft
drinks in Manila. Rodrigo Repomanta and Mafinco executed a
peddling contract whereby Repomanta agreed to buy and sell
Cosmos soft drinks. Rey Moralde entered into a similar contract.
Months later, Mafinco terminated the peddling contract with
Repomanta and Moralde. Consequently, Repomanta and Moralde,
through their union, filed a complaint with the NLRC, charging the
general manager of Mafinco for illegally dismissing them.4.Mafinco
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the NLRC
had no jurisdiction because Repomanta and Moralde were not its
employees but were independent contractors. It stressed that there
was termination of the contract not a dismissal of an employee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there exist an employer-employee relationship
between petitioner Mafinco and private respondents Repomanta and
Moralde.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that under the peddling contracts,
Repomanta and Moralde were not employees of Mafinco but were
independent contractors as found by the NLC and its fact finder and
by the committee appointed by the Secretary of Labor to look into
the status of Cosmos and Mafinco peddlers. A contract whereby one
engages to purchase and sell soft drinks on trucks supplied by the

manufacturer but providing that the other party (peddler) shall have
the right to employ his own workers, shall post a bond to protect the
manufacturer against losses, shall be responsible for damages
caused to third persons, shall obtain the necessary licenses and
permits and bear the expenses incurred in the sale of the soft drinks
is not a contract of employment.
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Pan American World Airways System vs. Pan American Employees

Association
Posted by she lamsen

1 SCRA 527
FACTS:
Petitioner herein claims that the one hour meal period should not be
considered as overtime work, because the evidence showed that
complainants could rest completely, and were not in any manner
under the control of the company during that period. The court
below found, on the contrary, that during the so-called meal period,
the mechanics were required to stand by for emergency work; that if
they happened not to be available when called, they were
reprimanded by the lead man; that as in fact it happened on many
occasions, the mechanics had been called from their meals or told to
hurry up eating to perform work during this period.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 1 hour meal period of the mechanics is
considered working time.
HELD:
Yes. The Industrial Courts order for permanent adoption of a straight
8-hour shift including the meal period was but a consequence of its
finding that the meal hour was not one of complete rest but was
actually a work hour, since for its duration, the laborers had to be on
ready call.
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Monday, September 24, 2012

Progressive Worker's Union vs. Aguas

Posted by she lamsen

G.R. No. L-59711-12

May 29, 1987

FACTS:
Petitioner Progressive Workers' Union is the local chapter of the
Federation of Free Workers [FFW] in respondent company, Solid
Mills, Inc. In the collective bargaining agreement [CBA] entered into
by and between Solid Mills, Inc. and the FFW as the certified
bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees,
respondent company agreed to grant across-the-board wage
increases to covered bargaining unit employees.
Respondent company implemented the CBA stipulation by giving the
union members a retroactive pay for the first year wage increase,
without further including wage increase into the basic wage rate of
the rank-and-file employees. Contending that the wage increase for
a particular period should be included in the basic wage rate, the
individual petitioners, presented a grievance to respondent company
demanding strict and faithful compliance with said CBA provision.
Grievance meetings thereafter held between the representatives of
the Union and the respondent company proved to be unavailing.
Hence, the Union filed with the Conciliation Division, Bureau of Labor
Relations, Ministry of Labor & Employment [MOLE], Manila, a notice
of strike for unfair labor practice, violation of CBA, violation of SS
law, job evaluation and failure to restate work week.
The union went on strike and on the same day, respondent company
filed with the NLRC, MOLE, petitions praying in the main that the
strike staged by the union be declared illegal and the participating
officers and members thereof be declared to have lost their
employment status. Respondent company likewise prayed for a
preliminary injunction/restraining order commanding the union, its
members, agents, representatives and sympathizers to lift their
picket lines and allow free and unobstructed ingress to and egress
from the company and to refrain from committing coercion, threats
and other illegal acts.
The union filed a motion to dismiss the complaints on the ground
that under B.P. 130, the labor arbiter has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaints or the nature of the actions.
ISSUES:
WON the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the petition and complaint or the nature of action or suit filed by the
petitioners.
HELD:

The Labor Arbiter have jurisdiction over the case. Declaring a strike
or lockout to be illegal requires the exercise of judicial or quasijudicial authority, which in this instance is located in the National
Labor Relations Commission. Under Article 217 of the labor Code, as
amended, Labor Arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over, among other disputes, "all other claims arising from employeremployee relations," and the Commission has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters. This statement
of jurisdiction is intended to cover all disputes between employers
and employees arising from their relationship as such, including
those involving the legality of concerted actions.
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Tuesday, September 18, 2012

Philippine Commercial International Bank vs. Anastacio D. Abad

Posted by she lamsen

G.R. No. 158045

February 28, 2005
FACTS:
Anastacio D. Abad was the senior Assistant Manager (Sales Head) of
petitioner Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank now
Equitable PCI Bank)], when he was dismissed from his work. Abad
received a Memorandum from petitioner Bank concerning the
irregular clearing of PNB-Naval Check of Sixtu Chu, the Banks
valued client. Abad submitted his Answer, categorically denying that
he instructed his subordinates to validate the out-of-town checks of
Sixtu Chu presented for deposit or encashment as local clearing
checks. During the actual investigation conducted by petitioner
Bank, several transactions violative of the Banks Policies and Rules
and Regulations were uncovered by the Fact-Finding Committee.
Consequently, the Fact-Finding Officer of petitioner Bank issued
another Memorandum to Abad asking the latter to explain the newly
discovered irregularities. Not satisfied with the explanations of Abad,
petitioner Bank served another Memorandum, terminating his
employment effective immediately upon receipt of the same. Thus,
Abad instituted a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not awarding of separation pay equivalent to one-half
(1/2) months pay for every year of service to respondent is gross,
the same being contrary to law and jurisprudence.

HELD:
The award of separation pay is required for dismissals due to causes
specified under Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, as well as
for illegal dismissals in which reinstatement is no longer feasible. On
the other hand, an employee dismissed for any of the just causes
enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code is not, as a rule,
entitled to separation pay.
As an exception, allowing the grant of separation pay or some other
financial assistance to an employee dismissed for just causes is
based on equity. The Court has granted separation pay as a measure
of social justice even when an employee has been validly dismissed,
as long as the dismissal was not due to serious misconduct or
reflective of personal integrity or morality.
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Royal Crowne International vs. NLRC

Posted by she lamsen

G.R. No. 78085

October 16, 1989

FACTS:
Petitioner, a duly licensed private employment agency, recruited
and deployed private respondent Virgilio for employment with
ZAMEL as an architectural draftsman in Saudi Arabia. Service
agreement was executed by private respondent and ZAMEL whereby
the former was to receive per month a salary of US$500.00 plus
US$100.00 as allowance for a period of one year commencing
from the date of his arrival in Saudi Arabia. However, ZAMEL
terminated the employment of private respondent on the ground
that his performance was below par. For three successive days
thereafter, he was detained at his quarters and was not allowed to
report to work until his exit papers were ready. On February 16,
1984, he was made to board a plane bound for the Philippines.
Private respondent then filed a complaint for illegal termination
against Petitioner Royal Crown Internationale and ZAMEL with the
POEA.
Petitioner contends that there is no provision in the Labor Code, or
the omnibus rules implementing the same, which either provides for
the "third-party liability" of an employment agency or recruiting
entity for violations of an employment agreement performed abroad,
or designates it as the agent of the foreign-based employer for
purposes of enforcing against the latter claims arising out of

anemployment agreement. Therefore, petitioner concludes, it

cannot be held jointly and severally liable with ZAMEL for violations,
if any, of private respondent's service agreement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner as a private employment agencymay be
held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based employer for
any claim which may arise in connection with the implementation of
the employment contracts of the employees recruited and deployed
abroad.
HELD:
Yes, Petitioner conveniently overlooks the fact that it had voluntarily
assumed solidary liability under the various contractual
undertakings it submitted to the Bureau of Employment Services. In
applying for its license to operate a private employment agency for
overseas recruitment and placement, petitioner was required to
submit, among others, a document or verified undertaking whereby
it assumed all responsibilities for the proper use of its license and
the implementation of the contracts of employment with the workers
it recruited and deployed for overseas employment. It was also
required to file with the Bureau a formal appointment or agency
contract executed by the foreign-based employer in its favor to
recruit and hire personnel for the former, which contained a
provisionempowering it to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with
the foreign principal for any of the violations of the recruitment
agreement and the contracts of employment. Petitioner was
required as well to post such cash and surety bonds as determined
by the Secretary of Labor to guarantee compliance with prescribed
recruitment procedures, rules and regulations, and terms and
conditions of employment as appropriate.
These contractual undertakings constitute the legal basis for holding
petitioner, and other private employment or recruitment agencies,
liable jointly and severally with its principal, the foreign-based
employer, for all claims filed by recruited workers which may arise in
connection with the implementation of the service agreements or
employment contracts.
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People vs. Jamilosa

Posted by she lamsen

GR No. 169076

January 23, 2007

FACTS:
Sometime in the months of January to February, 1996, representing
to have the capacity, authority or license to contract, enlist and
deploy or transport workers for overseas employment, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally recruit, contract and
promise to deploy, for a fee the herein complainants, namely,
Imelda D. Bamba, Geraldine M. Lagman and Alma E. Singh, for work
or employment in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in Nursing Home
and Care Center.
Prosecution presented three witnesses, namely Imelda Bamba,
Geraldine Lagman and Alma Singh.
According to Bamba, she met the appellant on a bus. She was on
her way to SM North Edsa where she was a company nurse.
Appellant introduced himself as a recruiter of workers for
employment abroad. Appellant told her he could help her get
employed as nurse. Appellant gave his pager number and instructed
her to contact him is shes interested. Sometime in January 1996,
appellant fetched her at her office, went to her house and gave him
the necessary documents and handed to appellant the amount of
US$300.00 and the latter showed her a photocopy of her supposed
US visa. However, the appellant did not issue a receipt for the said
money. Thereafter, appellant told her to resign from her work
because she was booked with Northwest Airlines and to leave for
USA on Feb, 1996. On the scheduled departure, appellant failed to
show up. Instead, called and informed her that he failed to give the
passport and US visa because she had to go to province because his
wife died. Trying to contact him to the supposed residence and hotel
where he temporarily resided, but to no avail.
Winess Lagman testified that she is a registered nurse. In January
1996, she went to SM North Edsa to visit her cousin Bamba. At that
time Bamba informed her that she was going to meet to appellant.
Bamba invited Lagman to go with her. The appellant convinced them
of his ability to send them abroad. On their next meeting, Lagman
handed to the latter the necessary documents and an amount of
US$300.00 and 2 bottles of black label without any receipt issued by
the appellant. Four days after their meeting, a telephone company
called her because her number was appearing in appellants cell
phone documents. The caller is trying to locate him as he was a
swindler. She became suspicious and told Bamba about the matter.
One week before her scheduled flight, appellant told her he could
not meet them because his mother passed away.

Lastly, Alma Singh, who is also a registered nurse, declared that she
first met the appellant at SM North Edsa when Imelda Bamba
introduced the latter to her. Appellant told her that he is an
undercover agent of FBI and he could fix her US visa. On their next
meeting, she gave all the pertinent documents. Thereafter, she gave
P10,000 to the appellant covering half price of her plane ticket. They
paged the appellant through his beeper to set up another
appointment but the appellant avoided them as he had many things
to do.
The accused Jamilosa testified on direct examination that he never
told Bamba that he could get her a job in USA, the truth being that
she wanted to leave SM as company nurse because she was having
a problem thereat. Bamba called him several times, seeking advices
from him. He started courting Bamba and went out dating until
latter became his girlfriend. He met Lagman and Singh thru Bamba.
As complainants seeking advice on how to apply for jobs abroad, lest
he be charged as a recruiter, he made Bamba, Lagman and Singh
sign separate certifications, all to effect that he never recruited
them and no money was involved. Bamba filed an illegal recruitment
case against him because they quarreled and separated.
RTC rendered judgment finding accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale.
ISSUE:
W/N the trial court erred in convicting accused appellant of the
crime of illegal recruitment in large scale
HELD: Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether
for profit or not. Provided, That any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
Illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and
includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a
non-licensee or non-holder of authority. Provided, That any such nonlicensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a
fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so
engaged.

To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the prosecution is

burdened to prove three (3) essential elements, to wit: (1) the
person charged undertook a recruitment activity under Article 13(b)
or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2)
accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage
in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) accused
committed the same against three or more persons individually or
as a group. As gleaned from the collective testimonies of the
complaining witnesses which the trial court and the appellate court
found to be credible and deserving of full probative weight, the
prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove
the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged.
Indeed, the findings of the trial court, affirmed on appeal by the CA,
are conclusive on this Court absent evidence that the tribunals
ignored, misunderstood, or misapplied substantial fact or other
circumstance.
The failure of the prosecution to adduce in evidence any receipt or
document signed by appellant where he acknowledged to have
received money and liquor does not free him from criminal liability.
Even in the absence of money or other valuables given as
consideration for the "services" of appellant, the latter is considered
as being engaged in recruitment activities. It can be gleaned from
the language of Article 13(b) of the Labor Code that the act of
recruitment may be for profit or not. It is sufficient that the accused
promises or offers for a fee employment to warrant conviction for
illegal recruitment.
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