Professional Documents
Culture Documents
law.
One is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for his
own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is
liable for the acts of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which
gives rise to the responsibility.
Crimes under penal code
1. affect public interest
2. Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act
3. not as broad as quasi-delicts because crimes are punished only if there is a
penal law clearly covering them
4. proof beyond reasonable doubt is required
effective method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just
been released, and besides, he was probably without property which might
be seized in enforcing any judgment against him for damages.
Section 1902 of that chapter reads: "A person who by an act or omission
causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged
to repair the damage so done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable,
not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for
whom they should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the
damages caused by the minors who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx "Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are
equally liable for the damages caused by their employees in the service of
the branches in which the latter may be employed or in the performance of
their duties. xxx xxx xxx
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to avoid the damage."
the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter either of a
criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime
or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this
jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized,
even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could
have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for
which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil
liability arising from his crime.
Reginald Hill, a minor, married but living with his father, Atty. Marvin
Hill with whom he was living and getting subsistence killed Agapito Elcano
CFI Civil Case: dismissed on the ground that he was acquitted on the
ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill,
coupled with mistake
Spouses Elcano appealed
ISSUES:
1.
W/N the civil action should be barred by the acquittal of criminal action
- NO
2.
W/N the Civil Code can be applied to Atty. Marvin Hill even though
Reginald is already married -YES
HELD: order appealed from is reversed
1. NO.
negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and
convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he
could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and
case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal
is not a bar to the instant action against him.
2. YES
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible
the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty
to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for
In September 1975, Borilla was driving a jeep when he hit Arsenio Virata
thereby causing the latters death. The heirs of Virata sued Borilla through an
action for homicide through reckless imprudence in the CFI of Rizal. Viratas
lawyer reserved their right to file a separate civil action the he later withdrew
said motion. But in June 1976, pending the criminal case, the Viratas again
reserved their right to file a separate civil action. Borilla was eventually
acquitted as it was ruled that what happened was a mere accident. The heirs
of Virata then sued Borilla and Ochoa (the owner of the jeep and employer of
Borilla) for damages based on quasi delict. Ochoa assailed the civil suit
alleging that Borilla was already acquitted and that the Viratas were merely
trying to recover damages twice. The lower court agreed with Ochoa and
dismissed the civil suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Virata may file a separate civil suit.
HELD: Yes. It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may
choose between an action under the Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is prohibited by
Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the
same negligent act. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal
from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or
not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising
from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana. But said article forestalls a double recovery.
FACTS:
Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito for a vehicular
accident
At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved
to suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal
suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising
from the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be
suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the
criminal proceeding has been rendered
City Court: ordered the suspension of the civil case
CFI by certiorari: dismissed
ISSUE: W/N there can be an independent civil action for damage to property
during the pendency of the criminal action
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant
primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed
Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be
suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising
from the criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from
the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not
only injuries to persons but also damage to property
word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and
"reparation" for the harm done
means of inundation under Article 324 of the RPC and a civil action for
damages.
Issue: Whether petitioner spouses Andamo can claim damages for
destruction caused by respondents waterpaths and contrivances on the basis
of Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
Held: Yes. A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the
civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasidelicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages
suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some
other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioners complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners.
There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of
building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such
action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the
recovery of damages.
It must be stressed that the use of ones property is not without limitations.
Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that the owner of a thing cannot make
use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person. SIC
UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have
mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land
in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of
others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his
land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all
reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners
and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures
cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter
can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Caveat: Anyone who claims this digest as his own without proper
authority shall be held liable under the law of Karma.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral
damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and
that he cannot be adjudged to have violated Filipino customs and traditions
since he, being an Iranian, was not familiar with Filipino customs and
traditions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really
because of his breach of promise to marry her but based on Article 21 of the
Civil Code which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.
Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it
is the deceit and fraud employed by Gashem that constitutes a violation of
Article 21 of the Civil Code. His promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful
scheme to lure her into sexual congress. As found by the trial court, Marilou
was not a woman of loose morals. She was a virgin before she met Gashem.
She would not have surrendered herself to Gashem had Gashem not
promised to marry her. Gashems blatant disregard of Filipino traditions on
marriage and on the reputation of Filipinas is contrary to morals, good
customs, and public policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of
our country and even taking advantage of the opportunity to study here he is
expected to respect our traditions. Any act contrary will render him liable
under Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the
concepts of torts and quasi delict. It is meant to cover situations such as this
case where the breach complained of is not strictly covered by existing laws.
It was meant as a legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which
is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books such as the absence of a law penalizing a the breach of
promise to marry.
The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise
to marry was made and there was carnal knowledge because of it, then moral
damages may be recovered (presence of moral or criminal seduction), Except
if there was mutual lust; or if expenses were made because of the promise
(expenses for the wedding), then actual damages may be recovered.
FACTS:
security guard on duty at Big Bang Sa Alabang carnival, shot and killed
Atty. Napoleon Dulay
Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her
own behalf and in behalf of her minor children filed an action for damages
against Benigno Torzuela for wanton and reckless discharge of the
firearm and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., (Safeguard)
and/or Superguard Security Corp. (Superguard) as employers
for negligence having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury
Superguard:
Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of
his duties, and was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil
liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. Every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
HELD: YES. Petition for Review is Granted. remanded to RTC for trial on the
merits
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused
for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions
resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article
2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which
are voluntary and intentional.
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only
acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character; whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil
action against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards
made in the two cases vary
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111,
BERMUDEZ V MELENCIO-HERRERA
G.R. No. L-32055 February 26, 1988
REYNALDO BERMUDEZ, SR., and, ADONITA YABUT
BERMUDEZ petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HON. JUDGE A. MELENCIO-HERRERA, DOMINGO PONTINO y TACORDA
and CORDOVA NG SUN KWAN,respondents-appellees.
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when
it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist.
NOTES: But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in
the selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the
latter, whatever done within the scope of his employment or not, if the
damage done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract
between the master and the person injured.
The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a
voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere
negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another.
These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere
fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from
extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation
exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the
same act which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation had
no contract existed between the parties.
Manresa: Whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the
performance of a contractual undertaking or in itself the source of an extracontractual undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics are identical.
Vinculum Juris: (def) It means an obligation of law, or the right of the
obligee to enforce a civil matter in a court of law.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The foregoing substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish
plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran
leg; Second, That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish
first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, That there was bad faith
when petitioners employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class
accommodation berth after he was already seated and to take a seat in the
tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassment
and humiliation, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is
true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint.
But, the inference of bad faith is there; it may be drawn from the facts and
circumstances set forth therein. The contract was averred to establish the
relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful
expulsion.
NOTA BENE: Here there is a contract of carriage between the parties and such
contract was breached by Air France when it wrongfully forced Carrascoso to
vacate the first class seat which he paid for. The wrongful expulsion is
independent of the breach since even without the contract, such wrongful
expulsion may still make Air France liable for damages. In other words, the
wrongful expulsion is in itself a tort.
Bank and its president, Freixas, for damages in consequence of said illegal
freezing of plaintiffs' account.
After appropriate proceedings, the CFI Mla rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint upon the ground that plaintiffs cannot recover from the defendants
upon the basis of a quasi-delict, because the relation between the parties is
contractual in nature.
Issue: WON the existence of a contractual relation between the parties bar
recovery of damages.
Ruling: The judgment appealed from is reversed holding defendant BPI to pay
to the plaintiffs nominal damages, and attorney's fees, apart from the costs.
The SC have repeatedly held that the existence of a contract between the
parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the order
and the consequent recovery of damages therefore.
In view, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering,
particularly, the circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was
remedied as soon as the President of the bank realized the mistake they had
committed, the Court finds that an award of nominal damages the amount of
which need not be proven in the sum of P1,000, in addition to attorney's fees
in the sum of P500, would suffice to vindicate plaintiff's rights.
195 SCRA 147 Civil Law Torts and Damages Award of Exemplary
Damages
In January 1983, the spouses Flores and Minerva Timan sent a telegram to
their relatives Mr. and Mrs. Midoranda to express their condolences to the
Calalas v CA (Torts)
Calalas v CA. G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000 VICENTE
CALALAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA
and FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents.
FACTS:
At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza
Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education
at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by
petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24
passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a
wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to
let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave
way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck
driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear
portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas,
alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to
exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the
other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of
the Isuzu truck.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. RTC Dumaguete rendered judgment against Salva holding that the
driver of the Isuzu truck was responsible
It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas
against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same
court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage
to his jeepney.
2. CA reversed the RTC, awarding damages instead to Sunga as plaintiff in
an action for breach of contract of carriage since the cause of action was
based on such and not quasi delict.
Hence, current petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether (per ruling in Civil Case) negligence of Verena was the proximate
cause of the accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be