REPUBLIC vs.

COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and
Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony
performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court judge
of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the
knowledge of Castros parents. The marriage contract
states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in
the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in
Pasig, Metro Manila. The couple did not immediately
live together as husband and wife. Thus, it was only in
March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant
that the couple decided to live together. Their
cohabitation only lasted for four months and then the
couple parted ways. The baby was adopted by Castros
brother, with the consent of Cardenas. It was then
discovered that there was no marriage license issued
to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage
as confirmed by a certification from the Civil Register
of Pasig, Metro Manila. Her husband was duly served
with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the
petition but he chose to ignore it, thus, he was properly
declared in default. The trial court denied her petition
on the ground that the certification was inadequate to
establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage
license prior to the celebration of the marriage of the
contracting parties. The appellate court reversed the
decision of the trial court. Petitioner Republic of the
Philippines now assailed the decision of the appellate
court and posits that the certification of the local civil
registrar of due search and inability to find a record or
entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182
was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its
non-issuance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the documentary and
testimonial evidence presented by private respondent
are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the
celebration of the marriage or private respondent to
EdwinCardenas?
HELD:
The subject marriage is one of those commonly
known as a secret marriage, ordinarily used to refer
to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of
the relatives and/or friends of the contracting parties.
At the time the marriage was solemnized on June 24,
1970, the law governing marital relations was the New
Civil Code which provides that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a
local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites
of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render
the
marriage
void
ab
initio.
The certification of due search and inability to find
issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative
value, he being the officer charged under the law to

keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a

marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance
of suspicion and pursuant to section 29, rule 132 of the
rules of court, a certificate of due search and inability
to find sufficiently proved that his office did not issue
marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting
parties. There was absolutely no evidence on record to
show that there was collusion between private
respondent and her husband Cardenas. It is noteworthy
to mention that the finding of the appellate court that
the marriage between the contracting parties is null
and void for lack of marriage license does not discount
that fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license,
purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig,
may have been presented by Cardenas to the
solemnizing
officer.
This court holds that under the circumstances of the
case, the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently
established the absence of the subject marriage
license. The petition is Denied there being no showing
of any reversible error committed by respondent
appellate court.

REPUBLIC VS. NOLASCO

FACTS:
Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Antique a petition for the declarationof the
presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker,
invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The Republic of
the Philippines opposed the petition through
the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been
deputized to assist the Solicitor General in the case.
During trial, Nolasco testified that he was seaman and
that he had first met Parker, a British subject, in a bar
in England during one of his ships port calls. From that
chance meeting onwards, Parker lived with Nolasco on
his ship for six months until they returned to Nolascos
hometown of San Jose, Antique in 1980 after his
seamans contract expired. On January 1982, NOlasco
married Parker in San Jose, Antique. After the marriage
celebration, Nolasco obtained another employment as
a seaman and left his wife with his parents in Antique.
Sometime in 1983, while working overseas, Nolasco
received a letter from his mother informing him that
Parker had left Antique. Nolasco claimed he asked
permission to leave the ship and return home to look
for his wife. He testified that his efforts to look for her
whenever their ship docked in England were fruitless,
that the letters he sent to Parkers address in England
were all returned to him, and that their friends received
no news from Parker. He testified that he had no
knowledge of her family background even after the
marriage and did not report the disappearance to the
authorities. The petition was granted by lower court
and was also affirmed by the appellate court. As such,
the republic
appealed to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded
belief that his wife is already dead.

HELD:
The respondent failed to establish that he had
the well-founded belief required by law that his absent
wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance
of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead. In the case at bar, the Court
considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by
respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica
Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis
of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was
already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique
after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of
seeking the help of local authorities or of the British
Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract and
went to London, a vast city of many millions of
inhabitants, to look for her there. The Court also views
respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give
any information as to her personal background even
after she had married respondent 17 too convenient an
excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can
be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent
had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all
returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these
returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.

REPUBLIC vs. DAGDAG - MATIAS

FACTS:
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16
years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years
old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage certificate was
issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of on October 20, 1988. Erlinda and
Avelino begot two children. The birth certificates were
issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on October
20, 1988. A week after the wedding, Avelino started
leaving his family without explanation. He would
disappear for months, suddenly re-appear for a few
months, and then disappear again. During the times
when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking
sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He
would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse
and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries to
her.

In October 1993, he left his family again and

that was the last that they heard from him. Erlinda
learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime,
and that he escaped from jail and remains at large todate. In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of
Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located,
summons was served by publication in the Olongapo
News, a newspaper of general circulation. On the date
set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her
counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her
sister-in-law
as
her
only
witness.
The trial court issued an Order giving the
investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991 to
manifest in writing whether or not he would present

controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail

to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed
submitted for decision. The Investigating Prosecutor
conducted an investigation and found that there was
no collusion between the parties.
However, he intended to intervene in the case
to avoid fabrication of evidence. Without waiting for
the investigating prosecutors manifestation, the trial
court declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void
under Article 36. The investigating prosecutor filed a
Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the
decision was prematurely rendered since he was given
until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was
presenting controverting evidence. The Office of the
Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the
same is not in accordance with the evidence and the
law. Since the trial court denied the Motion for
Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed to the
CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court
holding that Avelino Dagdag is psychologically
incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the
duties and obligations of a married person but because
he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an
alcoholic,
and
a
criminal.

ISSUE:
Did the CA correctly declare the marriage as
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on
the ground that the husband suffers from psychological
incapacity, as he is emotionally immature and
irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from
justice?
HELD:
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists
in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage,
depends crucially, more than in any field of law, on the
facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard
to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment
of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all
fours with another case. The trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate
court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its
own judgment for that of the trial court.
In REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA (268 SCRA 198), the
Court laid down the GUIDELINES in the interpretation of
Article
36
of
the
Family
Code.
Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is
evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the abovementioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to
comply with guideline number 2 which requires that
the root cause of psychological incapacity must be
medically or clinically proven by experts, since no
psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the
alleged psychological incapacity of her husband.
Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive
from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the
crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged.
The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an
opportunity to present controverting evidence since
the trial courts decision was prematurely rendered.

1.
Yes, the trial court made an erroneous decision in the
case at bar.In Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina, the Court laid down the following GUIDELINES
in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and
(d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological
not
physical,
although
its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at
the time of the celebration of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent orincurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state.

SANTOS vs. BEDIA SANTOS

CHI MING CHOI vs. CA

MARCOS vs. MARCOS

FACTS:
Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in
1982 and they had five children. Alleging that the
husband failed to provide material support to the
family and have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the
marriage on the ground that Wilson Marcos has
psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the
marriage null and void under Article 36 which was
however reversed by the Court of Appeals
ISSUES:

2.

Whether personal medical or psychological

examination of the respondent by a
physician is a requirement for a declaration
of psychological incapacity.
Whether or not the totality of evidence
presented in this case show psychological
incapacity.

HELD:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for
declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established
by the totality of evidencepresented. There is no
requirement, however that the respondent should be
examined by a physician or a psychologist as a
conditionsince qua non for such declaration.Although
this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent
failed to provide material support to the family and
may
haveresorted
to
physical
abuse
and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on hispart.
There is absolutely no showing that his defects were
already present at the inception of the marriage or that
they areincurable.Verily, the behavior of respondent
can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job
and was not gainfully employed for aperiod of more
than six years. It was during this period that he
became intermittently drunk, failed to give material
and moral support,and even left the family home.Thus,
his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said
period and not to the inception of the marriage.
Equallyimportant, there is no evidence showing that his
condition is incurable, especially now that he is
gainfully employed as a taxi driver.In sum, this Court
cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for
failure of petitioner to show that the alleged
psychologicalincapacity is characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her
failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.

ANTONIO vs. REYES

FACTS:
Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie
Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989. Barely a
year after their first meeting, they got married at
Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding
at Pasig in December 1990. A child was born but died
5 months later. Reyes persistently lied about herself,
the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things.
She even did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child,
which she represented to her husband as adopted child
of their family. They were separated in August 1991
and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her
for good in November 1991. Petitioner then filed in
1993 a petition to have his marriage with Reyes
declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the
Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the
Family Code as basis for declaring their marriage null
and void.
HELD:

Psychological incapacity pertains to the

inability to understand the obligations of marriage as
opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The
petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a
psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that
constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is
abnormal and pathological and corroborated his
allegations on his wifes behavior, which amounts to
psychological incapacity. Respondents fantastic ability
to invent, fabricate stories and letters of fictitious
characters enabled her to live in a world of makebelieve that made her psychologically incapacitated as
it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes
psychological incapacity have been medically or
clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by
experts. The gravity of respondents psychological
incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive
clause was appended to the sentence of nullity
prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal from contracting marriage without their
consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate
pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust and
respect.
Furthermore, Reyes case is incurable
considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her
but her behavior remain unchanged.
Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has
established his cause of action for declaration of nullity
under Article 36 of the Family Code.

PEREZ FERRARIS vs. FERRARIS

FACTS:
Armida and Brix are a showbiz couple. The
couples relationship before the marriage and even
during their brief union (for well about a year or so)
was not all bad. During that relatively short period of
time, Armida was happy and contented with her life in
the company of Brix. Armida even admits that Brix
was a responsible and loving husband. Their problems
began when Armida started doubting Brix fidelity. It
was only when they started fighting about the calls
from women that Brix began to withdraw into his shell
and corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital
obligations. Brix could not understand Armidas lack of
trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought
her suspicions irrational. Brix could not relate to her
anger, temper and jealousy. Armida presented a
psychological expert (Dr. Dayan) who finds Brix to be a
schizoid and a dependent and avoidant type. This is
evidenced by Brixs
leaving-the-house attitude whenever they quarreled,
the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the
sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support,
and his preference to spend more time with his band
mates than his family.
ISSUE:
case at bar.
HELD:

Whether or not PI is attendant in the

The SC upheld the decision of the lower courts.

The alleged mixed personality disorder, the leavingthe-house attitude whenever they quarreled, the
violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual
infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and
his preference to spend more time with his band mates
than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage and these do not constitute PI. Further, the
expert was not able to prove her findings. Notably,
when asked as to the root cause of respondents
alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayans answer
was vague, evasive and inconclusive. She replied that
such disorder can be part of his family upbringing
She stated that there was a history of Brixs parents
having difficulties in their relationship- this is of course
inconclusive for such has no direct bearing to the case
at bar.
What is psychological incapacity?
The term psychological incapacity to be a
ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume. As all people may have certain
quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics
associated with certain personality disorders, there is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. It is for this reason that the Courts rely
heavily on psychological experts for its understanding
of the human personality. However, the root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature must be fully explained in court.

his parents home. Eventually they got married but

without a marriage license. Edward was prohibited
from getting out of the house unaccompanied and was
threatened by Rowena and her uncle. After a month,
Edward escaped from the house, and stayed with his
parents. Edwards parents wanted them to stay at
their house but Rowena refused and demanded that
they have a separate abode. In June 1996, she said
that it was better for them to live separate lives and
they then parted ways.
After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition
for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the
basis of the latters psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage contracted is void on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more
or less six months. They met in January 1996, eloped in
March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted
ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert
testimony
found
both
parties
psychologically
incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls
under the classification of dependent personality
disorder, and respondents, that of the narcissistic and
antisocial personality disorder
There is no requirement that the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated be personally
examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must
show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest
psychological
incapacity
and
the
psychological disorder itself.
The presentation of expert proof presupposes a
thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by
the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of
a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.

TE vs. TE
FACTS:
Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent
Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the FilipinoChinese association in their college. Initially, he was
attracted to Rowenas close friend but, as the latter
already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to
court Rowena, which happened in January 1996. It was
Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward refused
bickering that he was young and jobless. Her
persistence, however, made him relent. They left
Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing
their travel money of P80,000 and she, purchasing the
boat ticket.
They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996.
Rowena proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to

Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent

personality disorder, cannot assume the essential
marital obligations of living together, observing love,
respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for
he is unable to make everyday decisions without
advice from others, and allows others to make most of
his important decisions (such as where to live). As
clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed
everything dictated to him by the persons around him.
He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his
identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of,
and has no goals and clear direction in life.
As for the respondent, her being afflicted with
antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to
assume the essential marital obligations on account for
her disregard in the rights of others, her abuse,
mistreatment and control of others without remorse,
and her tendency to blame others. Moreover, as
shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and
domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating
petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of

committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe
and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous
marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is
thus, declared null and void.

CHOA vs. CHOA

FACTS:
Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent
Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the FilipinoChinese association in their college. Initially, he was
attracted to Rowenas close friend but, as the latter
already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to
court Rowena, which happened in January 1996. It was
Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward refused
bickering that he was young and jobless. Her
persistence, however, made him relent. They left
Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing
their travel money of P80,000 and she, purchasing the
boat ticket.
They decided to go back to Manila in April
1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncles house and
Edward to his parents home. Eventually they got
married but without a marriage license. Edward was
prohibited
from
getting
out
of
the
house
unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and
her uncle. After a month, Edward escaped from the
house, and stayed with his parents. Edwards parents
wanted them to stay at their house but Rowena
refused and demanded that they have a separate
abode. In June 1996, she said that it was better for
them to live separate lives and they then parted ways.
After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a
petition for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena
on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage contracted is void on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more
or less six months. They met in January 1996, eloped in
March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted
ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert
testimony
found
both
parties
psychologically
incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls
under the classification of dependent personality
disorder, and respondents, that of the narcissistic and
antisocial personality disorder
There is no requirement that the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated be personally
examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must
show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest
psychological
incapacity
and
the
psychological disorder itself.
The presentation of expert proof presupposes a
thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by
the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of

a grave, severe and

psychological incapacity.

incurable

presence

of

Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent

personality disorder, cannot assume the essential
marital obligations of living together, observing love,
respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for
he is unable to make everyday decisions without
advice from others, and allows others to make most of
his important decisions (such as where to live). As
clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed
everything dictated to him by the persons around him.
He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his
identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of,
and has no goals and clear direction in life.
As for the respondent, her being afflicted with
antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to
assume the essential marital obligations on account for
her disregard in the rights of others, her abuse,
mistreatment and control of others without remorse,
and her tendency to blame others. Moreover, as
shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and
domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating
petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of
committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe
and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous
marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is
thus, declared null and void.

DOMINGO vs. CA
FACTS:
Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto
Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did
not know that Domingo had been previously married to
Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the
previous marriage when the latter filed a suit of bigamy
against her. Furthermore, when she came home from
Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she
discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman
and had been disposing some of her properties which
is administered by Roberto. The latter claims that
because their marriage was void ab initio, the
declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and
superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the
declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the
purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis
for the separation and distribution of properties
acquired during the marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial
declaration should only be filed for purposes of
remarriage.
HELD:
The declaration of the nullity of marriage is
indeed required for purposed of remarriage. However,
it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent
spouse who believed in good faith that his or her
partner was not lawfully married marries the same.
With this, the said person is freed from being charged
with bigamy.

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law

states that final judgment shall provide for the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children and the delivery of their presumptive
legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings. Soledads prayer for
separation of property will simply be the necessary
consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of their marriage. Hence, the petitioners
suggestion that for their properties be separated, an
ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that
purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly
provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage, one of which is the separation of property
according to the regime of property relations governing
them.

of common property in unions without marriage.

During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a
joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their
father.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property regime should be
based on co-ownership.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void
marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties are governed by the rules on
co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union
is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through
their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in
the acquisition of the property shall be considered as
having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

NICDAO CARIO vs. YEE CARIO

WIEGEL vs. SEMPIO - Dy
FACTS:
Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July
1978. Lilia was married with a certain Eduardo Maxion
in 1972. Karl then filed a petition in the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Lilia on the ground of latters
former marriage. Having been allegedly force to enter
into a marital union, she contents that the first
marriage is null and void. Lilia likewise alleged that
Karl was married to another woman before their
marriage.
ISSUE:
void.

Whether Karls marriage with Lilia is

HELD:
It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her
first marriage was vitiated with force because it will not
be void but merely voidable. Such marriage is valid
until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been
made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she is still
validly married to her first husband. Consequently, her
marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is no need of
introducing evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for
then such marriage though void still needs a judicial
declaration before he can remarry. Accordingly, Karl
and Lilias marriage are regarded void under the law.

VALDES vs. RTC

FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were
married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a
petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code,
which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on
the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity.
Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their
mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose
which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in
the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation

FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago CArio married petitioner Susan
Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom he had two
children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982,
SPO4 Cario also married respondent Susan Yee. In
1988, SPO4 Cario became bedridden due to diabetes
and tuberculosis, and died on November 23, 1992,
under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical
and burial expenses. Both Susans filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance from
various government agencies pertaining to the
deceased. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from
MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig,
while Yee received a total of P21,000 from GSIS burial
and SSS burial insurance.
On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection
of money against NIcdao, praying that Nicdao be
ordered to return to her at least one-half of the
P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For failing to file her
answer, Nicdao was declared in default.
Yee admitted that her marriage to the
deceased took place during the subsistence of and
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of
the marriage between Nicdao and Cario. But she
claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the
previous marriage until at the funeral where she met
Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of the
deceased. Yee submitted that Carios marriage to
Nicdao was void because it was solemnized without the
required marriage license.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null
and void;
2. Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the
deceased is entitled to collect the death
benefits from government agencies despite the
nullity of their marriage.

HELD:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity
of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such marriage void. Meaning, where the

absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be

invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage,
the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not
limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution
of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even
after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the validity of
said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case.
Under the Civil Code which was the law in force
when the marriage of petitioner and the deceased was
solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage, and the absence therof, subject
to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab
initio.
It does not follow, however, that since the
marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void ab
initio, the death benefits would now be awarded to Yee.
To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for
purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage; otherwise, the second marriage would also
be void.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity
of marriage is the separation of the property.

MERCADO vs. TAN

FACTS:
Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with
Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he contracted marriage
with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she
did not know. Tan filed bigamy against Mercado and
after a month the latter filed an action for declaration
of nullity of marriage against Oliva. The decision in
1993 declared marriage between Mercado and Oliva
null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of
filing the declaration of nullity of the former marriage.
HELD:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be
legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies
even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as
void.
In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Oliva right after Tan filed
bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already
been consummated. He contracted second marriage
without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact

that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not

a defense in a bigamy charge.