You are on page 1of 13

E-FILED 2015 SEP 16 4:31 PM POLK - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR POLK COUNTY


DANNY HOMAN, RICH TAYLOR,
JERRY KEARNS, MARK SMITH,
THOMAS COURTNEY, JANET PETERSEN,
BRUCE HUNTER, CURT HANSON,
TONY BISIGNANO, HERMAN QUIRMBACH,
DICK DEARDEN, ART STAED,
AKO ABDUL-SAMAD, JO OLDSON,
RUTH ANN GAINES, SHARON STECKMAN,
TODD TAYLOR, MARY GASKILL,
KIRSTEN RUNNING-MARQUARDT,
TIMI BROWN-POWERS, and DAVE JACOBY,

CASE NO. CVCV050143

RULING ON DEFENDANTS MOTION TO


DISMISS AND MOTION TO RECAST

Plaintiffs,
vs.
TERRY E. BRANSTAD, GOVERNOR, STATE
OF IOWA and CHARLES M. PALMER,
DIRECTOR, IOWA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SERVICES,
Defendants.
This case was before the court on August 26, 2015 for hearing on the Defendants
Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Recast. Iowa Solicitor General Jeffrey Thompson and Iowa
Assistant Attorney General Meghan Gavin represented the defendants.

Attorneys Mark

Hedberg, Nathaniel Boulton and Sarah Wolfe represented the plaintiffs. Having considered the
motion, the resistance, and the written and oral arguments of counsel, the court makes the
following ruling.

E-FILED 2015 SEP 16 4:31 PM POLK - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

INTRODUCTION
A. Factual Background1
This action revolves around Iowa Governor Terry E. Branstads (the Governor) veto of
legislation passed during the 2015 session of the Iowa legislature. The legislation in question,
parts of Senate File 505 (SF 505) and House File 666 (HF 666), appropriated funding for the
states mental health institutes.2 2015 Iowa Acts 533, 705. On July 2, 2015, the Governor
approved the two bills; however, he used his line-item veto power to strike the provisions
which provided funding to the mental health institutes at Clarinda and Mount Pleasant
(hereinafter Clarinda and Mount Pleasant). 2015 Iowa Acts 597, 706. In his letters to the
Iowa Secretary of State issuing the vetoes, the Governor explained that the Clarinda and Mount
Pleasant facilities were in the process of being closed and further funding was not necessary.
B. Procedural Background
The plaintiffs filed their petition on July 9, 2015 and an amended petition (the petition) on
July 15, 2015. The named defendants are the Governor and the Director of the Iowa
Department of Human Services (the Director). The petition asserts a claim for temporary and
permanent injunctive relief in Count I and a claim for mandamus in Count II.
Paragraph 31 of the petition states: This action challenges the constitutionality of [the
Governors] unilateral decision to close [the Clarinda and Mount Pleasant mental health
institutes] and the actions taken by the [Governor] and the [Director] in furtherance of such
decision, including ceasing admissions to, and transferring existing patients from, Clarinda and
1

The facts set forth are either undisputed or viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Smith v.
Smith, 513 N.W.2d 728, 730 (Iowa 1994).
2
Iowa law designates four locations to serve as state hospitals for persons with mental illness. Iowa Code
226.1(1) (2015). The four locations are designated as the Mental Health Institutes at Mount Pleasant,
Independence, Clarinda, and Cherokee. Iowa Code 226.1(1)(a)(d) (2015).
2

E-FILED 2015 SEP 16 4:31 PM POLK - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

Mount Pleasant, and impounding funds appropriated to Clarinda and Mount Pleasant .
Paragraph 33 alleges that Iowa law mandates the existence of Clarinda and Mount Pleasant.
Paragraph 41 describes the Governors vetoes of parts of SF 505 and HF 666.
Paragraph 43 alleges: All the actions of the [Governor and Director] herein complained of
are beyond the scope of the [Governors and Directors] constitutional and statutory
authority.
Paragraph 47 alleges as the basis for the claim for injunctive relief that all of the actions
described in the preceding paragraphs of the petition [v]iolate the [Governors and Directors]
duty to faithfully execute the laws of the State of Iowa under Article IV, Section 9 of the Iowa
Constitution.
Paragraph 51 alleges as the basis for mandamus that the [Governor and Director] have a
legal obligation and duty to faithfully execute the laws of the State of Iowa, including to
maintain the existence of and operate [Clarinda and Mount Pleasant], and to appropriate all
funds apportioned to Clarinda and Mount Pleasant under SF 505 and HF 606.
On August 3, 2015, the defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss, claiming the plaintiffs
lack standing, have failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that the case
presents a nonjusticiable political question. Alternatively, the defendants seek an order
requiring the plaintiffs to recast the petition.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard for Motion to Dismiss
Rule 1.421 of the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions to dismiss. Rule 1.421(1)(f)
provides for the dismissal of a claim which fails to state a claim upon which any relief may be

E-FILED 2015 SEP 16 4:31 PM POLK - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

granted. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.421(1)(f); Mlynarik v. Bergantzel, 675 N.W.2d 584, 58586 (Iowa
2004). A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the challenged pleading. Southard v.
Visa U.S.A., Inc., 734 N.W.2d 192, 194 (Iowa 2007). The motion is granted only if the petition
shows no right of recovery under any state of the facts. Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 646 N.W.2d
440, 442 (Iowa 2002).
Iowa is a notice pleading State. Rieff v. Evans, 630 N.W.2d 278, 292 (Iowa 2001). Under
notice pleading, a petition must contain factual allegations that give the defendant fair notice
of the claim asserted so the defendant can adequately respond to the petition. Rees v. City of
Shenandoah, 682 N.W.2d 77, 79 (Iowa 2004). The fair notice requirement is met if a petition
informs the defendant of the incident giving rise to the claim and of the claims general nature.
U.S. Bank v. Barbour, 770 N.W.2d 350, 354 (Iowa 2009).
In assessing a motion to dismiss, the judge considers only the facts alleged in the petition
or those of which judicial notice may be taken. Mlynarik, 675 N.W.2d at 586; see also
Southard, 734 N.W.2d at 194 (Thus, the motion must stand or fall on the contents of the
petition and matters of which the court can take judicial notice.). In the context of a motion to
dismiss, the factual allegations of the petition are accepted as true, and any doubts are
construed in favor of the party resisting dismissal. Smith, 513 N.W.2d at 730.
B. Standing
Standing to sue has been defined to mean that a party must have sufficient stake in an
otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy. Birkhofer ex
rel Johannsen v. Brammeier, 610 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Iowa 2000) (quoting Blacks Law Dictionary
1405 (6th ed. 1990)). Whether litigants have standing does not depend on the legal merits of

E-FILED 2015 SEP 16 4:31 PM POLK - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

their claims, but rather whether, if the wrong alleged produces a legally cognizable injury, they
are among those who have sustained it. Citizens for Responsible Choices v. City of Shenandoah,
686 N.W.2d 470, 475 (Iowa 2004). In other words, the focus is on the party, not on the claim.
Alons v. Iowa Dist. Court for Woodbury Cnty., 698 N.W.2d 858, 864 (Iowa 2005).
Under Iowa law, a complaining party must (1) have a specific personal or legal interest in
the litigation and (2) be injuriously affected. Citizens for Responsible Choices, 686 N.W.2d at
475. The two elements are separate requirements, but they have much in common and often
are considered together. Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413, 41819 (Iowa 2008). The first
element examines whether the complaining party has a special interest in the action,
distinguished from a general interest. Id. at 419 (quoting City of Des Moines v. Pub. Employ.
Relations Bd., 275 N.W.2d 753, 759 (Iowa 1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
second element examines whether the complaining party was injured in fact and can show
some specific and perceptible harm. Id. (quoting United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
While the petition asserts merely that plaintiff Danny Homan is a taxpayer, resident, and
citizen of the State of Iowa, Homans affidavit attached to the petition states that he is also
President of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME)
Iowa Council 61. (Aff. Of Danny Homan, Ex. C.) As President of AFSCME Iowa Council 61, Homan
represents the interests of the workers at Clarinda and Mount Pleasant. Those workers are
members of AFSCME Iowa Council 61 and were laid off as part of the closure of the two
facilities.

E-FILED 2015 SEP 16 4:31 PM POLK - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

An association can sue in its own name or on behalf of its members. Iowa Beta Chapter of
Phi Delta Theta Fraternity v. State, 763 N.W.2d 250, 259 (Iowa 2009). In order for an association
to have standing, it must show that its members qualified under the test for standing . . . .
Northbrook Residents Assn v. Iowa State Dept of Health Office for Health Planning & Dev., 298
N.W.2d 330, 332 (Iowa 1980). Therefore, Homan has standing as President of AFSCME Iowa
Council 61 if the members of AFSCME Iowa Council 61, who he represents, qualified under the
test for standing.3 See id.
The first requirement for standing is met because the members can demonstrate a special
interest distinguishable from a general interest. See Godfrey, 752 N.W.2d at 419. The specific
injury suffered by the members herebeing laid offis different from any injury suffered by
the general public. See id. at 420 ([W]e require the litigant to allege some type of injury
different from the population in general.). The second requirement for standing is met
because the members were injured in fact and can show a specific and perceptible harm.
See id. at 419 (internal citations omitted). The members were laid off as a result of the closing
of Clarinda and Mount Pleasant. Because the two requirements of standing are satisfied, the
members have standing in this action, and Homan, as President of AFSCME Iowa Council 61, has
standing to represent their interests.
The remaining plaintiffs were all members of the Iowa Legislature when SF 505 and HF 666
were enacted. In addition, each of the remaining plaintiffs is also a citizen and taxpayer of the
State of Iowa.
Legislators have a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of
3

Although AFSCME itself is not a named party, the court regards Homan, as its president, as AFSCME for the
purpose of standing analysis.
6

E-FILED 2015 SEP 16 4:31 PM POLK - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

their votes. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1938). The defendants concede that under
this doctrine, legislators have standing to challenge the propriety of the Governors exercise of
his veto authority. As is discussed in more detail in the next section of this ruling, the plaintiffs
claim here is that the Governors line-item vetoes of SF 505 and HF 666 were illegal because
they conflicted with, and therefore violated, both his duty to faithfully execute the laws under
Article IV, Section 9 of the Iowa Constitution and Iowa Code 226.1, which they claim
mandates the existence of Clarinda and Mount Pleasant. Thus, they are challenging the
Governors exercise of his veto authority and have standing as legislators.
All of the plaintiffs also claim standing as taxpayers. Normally, taxpayer standing requires an
order increasing or diminishing any fund to which th[e] plaintiffs have contributed or will
contribute in the future. Alons, 698 N.W.2d at 871. [A] taxpayer acquires standing by showing
some link between higher taxes and the government action being challenged. Godfrey, 752
N.W.2d at 424. Here, Plaintiffs claim an interest in ensuring that constitutional and statutory
provisions are followed. In Godfrey v. State, that interest alone was insufficient to establish
taxpayer standing. Id.
However, as noted, this is a line-item veto challenge. In line-item veto cases, taxpayers have
often been assumed to have standing. See Welden v. Ray, 229 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Iowa 1975)
(holding the plaintiffs had standing to sue in a line-item veto case); State ex rel Turner v. Iowa
State Highway Commn, 186 N.W.2d 141, 147 (Iowa 1971) (holding that plaintiffs in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers to restrain allegedly illegal use of funds had standing in a
line-item veto case), abrogated on other grounds by Rants v. Vilsack, 684 N.W.2d 193, 21012
(Iowa 2004); see also Godfrey, 752 N.W.2d at 429 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) (discussing prior line-

E-FILED 2015 SEP 16 4:31 PM POLK - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

item veto cases and standing); Rants, 684 N.W.2d at 198 (citing Turners discussion of standing
in relation to line-item veto cases); Brent R. Appel, Item Veto Litigation in Iowa: Marking the
Boundaries Between Legislative and Executive Power, 41 Drake L. Rev. 1, 6 (1992) ([C]itizens
and taxpayers have standing to litigate item veto challenges.); but see Homan v. Branstad, 864
N.W.2d 321, 327 (Iowa 2015) (hereinafter Homan II) (acknowledging a possible conflict over
taxpayer standing). The weight of authority suggests that taxpayers have standing to challenge
uses of the line-item veto. Accordingly, all of the plaintiffs have standing as taxpayers.
Having decided that the plaintiffs have standing on multiple grounds, the court proceeds
to examine the defendants remaining arguments for dismissal.4
C. Failure to State a Claim
A motion to dismiss is properly granted only if a plaintiffs petition on its face shows no
right of recovery under any state of facts. Trobaugh v. Sondag, 668 N.W.2d 577, 580 (Iowa
2003) (quoting Ritz v. Wapello Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 595 N.W.2d 786, 789 (Iowa 1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Under notice pleading requirements, Plaintiffs are only
required to inform the defendant of the incident giving rise to the claim and of the claims
general nature. Barbour, 770 N.W.2d at 354. Here, it is discernible from the petition that the
incident giving rise to the plaintiffs claim was the Governors line-item veto of funding for
Clarinda and Mount Pleasant. It is also discernible that the plaintiffs claim the Governors lineitem veto authority is limited if its exercise would cause violations of other constitutional or

If any of the Plaintiffs have standing, the court may proceed to the merits of the motion to dismiss. See Sanchez v.
State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 821 (Iowa 2005) ([T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly held that if one party has standing
in an action, a court need not reach the issue of the standing of other parties when it makes no difference to the
merits of the case.) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
8

E-FILED 2015 SEP 16 4:31 PM POLK - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

statutory provisions.5 Thus, the general nature of the plaintiffs claims is a challenge to the
Governors exercise of his line-item veto authority.
The defendants also argue that even if the petition can be read to state a claim of
unconstitutional exercise of the Governors veto authority, such a claim cannot result in
injunctive relief or in the issuance of a writ of mandamus. The petition, in addition to
specifically requesting injunctive relief and mandamus, also seeks such other and further relief
as the Court deems fit under the circumstances. Even if the specific relief sought could not be
granted, there is no doubt that a successful challenge of the Governors veto authority could
result in the granting of relief of some nature. A petition cannot be dismissed for failure to state
a claim unless it fails to state a claim for which any relief could be granted. Turner v. Iowa
State Bank & Trust Co. of Fairfield, 743 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Iowa 2007). Thus, the petition cannot be
dismissed on the ground that the relief it seeks could not be granted under any circumstances.

Lastly, the defendants argue that if this case is a challenge of the Governors exercise of his
veto authority, it fails to state a claim against the Director upon which relief could be granted.
This is correct. The Director plainly has no authority to veto legislation and there is no allegation
that he did veto legislation. Therefore, there is no conceivable set of facts upon which relief
could be granted on the claim that the Director exercised an improper veto.
D. Political Question
The political question doctrine stands for the well-established principle that the courts will
not intervene to attempt to adjudicate a challenge to a legislative action involving a political

That this is the plaintiffs claim is clarified by their written responses to the motion to dismiss and by the
statements of counsel at the time of hearing on the motion to dismiss.
9

E-FILED 2015 SEP 16 4:31 PM POLK - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

question. King v. State, 818 N.W.2d 1, 16 (Iowa 2012). The nonjusticiability of political
questions is rooted in the separation of powers doctrine. Id. The political question doctrine is
rarely used in Iowa. Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp., 848 N.W.2d 58, 92 (Iowa 2014).
However, a political question may exist where one or more of the following factors are present:
(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; (2) a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving the issue; (3) the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; (4) the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing a lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; (5) an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or (6) the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
Des Moines Register & Tribune Co. v. Dwyer, 542 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Iowa 1996) (citing Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
The first factor is the most important. Freeman, 848 N.W.2d at 93. In Des Moines
Register & Tribune Co. v. Dwyer, the Court considered a dispute over Iowa Senate rules. 542
N.W.2d at 493. The Court determined the suit raised a political question because the Iowa
Constitution granted the Senate the power to make its own rules. Id. at 494, 501. Similarly, in
State ex rel Turner v. Scott, the Court found a political question in a dispute over removing a
member of the Senate because the Iowa Constitution granted each house the power to assess
the qualification of its members. 269 N.W.2d 828, 83031 (Iowa 1978). Here, while Art. III,
Section 16 of the Iowa Constitution gives the Governor the power to use the line-item veto, it
does not demonstrably commit the power to determine the constitutionality of a particular use
to the Governor, as is demonstrated by the history of litigation over the Governors use of that

10

E-FILED 2015 SEP 16 4:31 PM POLK - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

authority. Accordingly, the first factor is not present in this case.


The second factor is whether there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving the issue. Dwyer, 542 N.W.2d at 495. Line-item veto challenges occur
with some regularity. Homan II, 864 N.W.2d at 331. Consequently, Iowa courts have developed
standards for evaluating the use of the line-item veto. See, e.g., Homan I, 812 N.W.2d at 626
(holding the Governor could not veto a condition on an appropriation without vetoing entire
appropriation); Rants, 684 N.W.2d at 212 (invalidating line-item vetoes where the bill was not
an appropriations bill); Colton v. Branstad, 372 N.W.2d 184, 189192 (Iowa 1985) (discussing
the difference between a condition and a rider). Thus, there are judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving the issue of the propriety of the Governors exercise of his
veto authority.
Turning to the third factor, the court will not be required to make any initial policy
determination regarding the Governors use of the line-item veto in this instance. Rather, the
court will determine whether the use falls within the bounds of Iowa law. Whether to close
Clarinda and Mount Pleasant is a policy matter for the other branches of government. Whether
the Governors particular use of his line-item veto power is constitutional is a matter for the
courts.
Absent the presence of the first three factors, the remaining factors are likely not
sufficiently compelling to find a political question. See Freeman, 848 N.W.2d at 94 (With these
major factors removed, the remaining factors generally fall out of the equation. None of the
remaining Baker factors are very strong in any approach to the political question doctrine and
they certainly do not provide a basis for nonjusticiability in this case.). Additionally, for reasons

11

E-FILED 2015 SEP 16 4:31 PM POLK - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

discussed above, the court could make an independent resolution without being disrespectful
to the other branches; there is no unusual need for unquestioning adherence to the decision
already made; and there is little potential for embarrassment due to multiple pronouncements
from different departments on the issue. None of the factors outlined in Dwyer are compelling
in this case. Accordingly, this case does not pose a nonjusticiable political question.
E. Motion to Recast the Amended Petition
Rule 1.421(1)(d) of the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions to recast or strike.
The arguments raised in defendants alternative motion to recast are substantially the same as
the arguments raised in support of their motion to dismiss. The court has determined that the
plaintiffs have standing and, by notice pleading standards, have stated a claim upon which relief
may be granted, to-wit: a challenge to the Governors exercise of his veto authority. This being
the case, there is no need to order the plaintiffs to recast the petition.
ORDER
For all of the reasons just stated, the defendants motion to dismiss is granted as to the
defendant, Charles M. Palmer, Director, Iowa Department of Human Services, and is otherwise
denied. The defendants alternative motion to recast is also denied.

12

E-FILED 2015 SEP 16 4:31 PM POLK - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

State of Iowa Courts


Type:

OTHER ORDER

Case Number
CVCV050143

Case Title
HOMAN, TAYLOR, ET AL VS BRANSTAD AND PALMER
So Ordered

Electronically signed on 2015-09-16 16:31:54

page 13 of 13

You might also like