ENRILE VS SALAZAR

n February 1990, Sen Enrile was arrested. He was charged together with Mr. & Mrs. Panlilio, and Honasan for
the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder which allegedly occurred during their failed
coup attempt. Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed for the habeas corpus alleging that
the crime being charged against him is nonexistent. That he was charged with a criminal offense in an
information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was
denied due process; denied his right to bail; and arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued
without the judge who issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court should affirm the Hernandez ruling.
HELD: Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he was denied bail although ordinarily a charge of rebellion
would entitle one for bail. The crime of rebellion charged against him however is complexed with murder and
multiple frustrated murders the intention of the prosecution was to make rebellion in its most serious form
so as to make the penalty thereof in the maximum. The SC ruled that there is no such crime as Rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder. What Enrile et al can be charged of would be Simple Rebellion
because other crimes such as murder or all those that may be necessary to the commission of rebellion is
absorbed hence he should be entitiled for bail. The SC however noted that a petition for habeas corpus was
not the proper remedy so as to avail of bail. The proper step that should have been taken was for Enrile to file
a petition to be admitted for bail. He should have exhausted all other efforts before petitioning for habeas
corpus. The Hernandez ruling is still valid. All other crimes committed in carrying out rebellion are deemed
absorbed. The SC noted, however, that there may be a need to modify the rebellion law. Considering that the
essence of rebellion has been lost and that it is being used by a lo t of opportunists to attempt to grab power.
Read another version of this digest here. (Political Question)

NAPOLIS v COURT OF APPEALS

Complex Crime
FACTS:
About 1am of Oct 1, 1956, accused Nicanor
Napolis and some other men conspired, confederated
and helped one another, with the intent to gain and
armed with Grease Gun, pistols and revolvers,
entered the dwelling of the spouses Iganacio &
Casimira Penaflor by boring a hole under the
sidewall of the ground floor of the house.
Nicanor assaulted and hit Ignacio with the
gun causing him to fall on the ground and rendering

him unconscious, he tied Igancio's hands and feet

and then leave him. Then the accused approached
Casimira, threatened her at gun point and demanded
money. He tied the hands of Mrs Penaflor and her two
sons. Nicanor searched and ransacked the place and
carried away cash and articles belonging to the said
spouses.

PENALTIES, IN VIEW:
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court convicting Napolis an his band oF
the crime of robbery committed by armeD persons, in
an inhabited house, entry therein having been made
by breaking a wall, as provided in ART 229 (a) of
RPC and sentencing Napolis to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from 10 yrs & 1 day (prision mayor)
as minimum, to 17 yrs & 4 mos & 1day (reclusion
temporal) as maximum.
In performing said acts: used violence
against Ignacio and intimidation against his wife ,
thereby infringing ART 224 (5) which prescribes
penalty of prision correctional (in its maximum pd)
to prision mayor (in its medium pd).
Hence, Art 224 is lighter than that
prescribed in ARt 229.

ISSUE:
1. W/n the facts of the case constitute complex
crime?
2. W/n the penalties imposed by Ct of Appeals
correct?
SC HELD:
1. Yes. The elements of both provisions (Arts 299
(a) & 294 (5)) are present calling for the
imposition, as provided in Art 48 of the RPC, of the
penalty for the most serious offense, in its maximum
period.
2. SC modified the penalties imposed and affirmed
the decision of Ct of Appeals. Penalty should be
imposed in its maximum period- from 19 yrs, 1 mo &
11 days to 20 yrs of reclusion temporal- owing to
the prsence of the aggravating cicumstances of
nighttime.
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and
EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
The petition seeks the review of the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower courts
ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite the accuseds previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.
Facts:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for
injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the

spouses Ponces vehicle.

Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking
this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for certiorari while Ivler sought
from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial
question.
Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioners absence,
cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.
Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest.Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained
unresolved.
Issues:
(1) Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari when the MeTC ordered his arrest
following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries
sustained by respondent; and
(2) Whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband.
Ruling:
On Petition for Certiorari
The RTC dismissed Ivlers petition for certiorari, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioners forfeiture of standing to maintain
said petition arising from the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in the second
offense. Thus, without reaching the merits of the said petition, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but this proved unavailing.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision forfeiting petitioners standing to maintain his
petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence holding that light
offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less
grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for
the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, the Court granted the Office of the Solicitor Generals motion not to file a comment to the
petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel.
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are
governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio,
dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.
On Double Jeopardy
The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" protects him
from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid information.

Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The
MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense
from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not."
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or
simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing
new.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit
other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as
applied to Article 365.
These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional
right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing
formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution
for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it
is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only
the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less
grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of
penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler
y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.

BATULANON VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Case Digest

LEONILA BATULANON VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 139857 September 15, 2006
FACTS: Polomok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Leonila Batulanon as its
Cashier/Manager from May 1980 up to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits from
and releasing loans to the member of the cooperative.
During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the release of loans were
discovered. It was found that Batulanon falsified four commercial documents, all checks/cash vouchers
representing granted loans to different persons namely: Omadlao, Oracion, Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon,
making it appear that said names were granted a loan and received the amount of the checks/cash
vouchers when in truth and in fact the said persons never received a grant, never received the checks, and
never signed the check vouchers issued in their names. In furtherance, Batulanon released to herself the
checks and received the loans and thereafter misappropriated and converted it to her own use and benefit.

Thereafter, four Informations for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents were filed against
Batulanon. The prosecution presented Medallo, Gopio, Jr. and Jayoma as witnesses. Medallo, the posting
clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the preparation of cash vouchers testified that Batulanon forged
the signatures of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo. Gopio, Jr. stated that Oracion is Batulanon sister-in-law
and Dennis Batulanon is her son who was only 3 years old in 1982. He averred that membership in the
cooperative is not open to minors.
On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon of Estafa through Falsification of
Commercial Documents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the crime committed by Batulanon was Falsification of Private Documents.
HELD: Yes. Although the offense charged in the Information is Estafa through Falsification of Commercial
Documents, Batulanon could be convicted of Falsification of Private Documents under the well-settled rule
that it is the allegation in the information that determines the nature of the offense and not the technical
name given in the preamble of the information.
As there is no complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Private Documents, it is important to
ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with Falsification of a Private Document or with Estafa. If
the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be
charged is falsification. If the Estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the
proper crime is Estafa. We find that the Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Falsification of Private Documents in the cases of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo.
In the case of Dennis Batulanon, records show that Batulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What
she did was to sign: by: Ibatulanon to indicate that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of
Dennis. Said act does not fall under any of the modes of Falsification under Article 171 because there is
nothing untruthful about the fact that she used the name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter,
obtained the proceeds of the loan from PCCI. The essence of falsification is the act of making untruthful or
false statements, which is not attendant in this case. As to whether, such representation involves fraud
which caused damage to PCCI is a different matter which will make her liable for estafa, but not for
falsification. Hence, it was an error for the courts below to hold that Batulanon is also guilty of Falsification
of Private Document with respect to the case involving the cash voucher of Dennis Batulanon.

Santiago
vs
Garchitorena
G.R.
No.
109266
December,
2
1993
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Puno, JJ., concur.
Facts:

On May 1, 1991, petitioner Santiago was charged by the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified"
aliens
with
the
benefits
of
the
Alien
Legalization
Program.
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with
criminal case on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She
alleged that this was in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for
any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." The petition was dismissed on January 13,
1992.
On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which motion was set for
hearing on November 13, 1992. ten days after, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice Garchitorena is
a member, set the criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992. On November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to defer the
arraignment on the grounds that there was a pending motion for inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a motion for a
bill of particulars. However, on November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to defer the
arraignment.
More so, the petitioner cannot accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice Francis Garchitorena who would her from
going abroad for a Harvard scholarship because of graft charges against her. It appears that petitioner tried to leave the
country without first securing the permission of the Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the hold-departure order which. The
letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in defense of the dignity and integrity of the Sandiganbayan, merely stated
that all persons facing criminal charges in court, with no exception, have to secure permission to leave the country.
The court issued the Resolution dated March 25, 1993, ordering Presiding Justice Garchitorena "to CEASE and DESIST
from sitting in the case until the question of his disqualification is finally resolved by this Court and from enforcing the
resolution dated March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 Amended Informations and from proceeding
with
the
arraignment
on
April
12,
1993.
Issue:
(a) Whether the petitioner is charged with continued crime (delito continuado) under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code?
Held:
The 32 Amended Informations charged to the petitioner is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and sometimes
referred to as "continuous crime." In fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne in
mind that the concept of delito continuado has been a vexing problem in Criminal Law difficult as it is to define and more
difficult
to
apply.
The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to crimes penalized under
special laws, e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered following up claims for war
veteran's benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ). Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be
supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code
may
be
applied
in
a
supplementary
capacity
to
crimes
punished
under
special
laws.
In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act that of her approving the
application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege. The original information also averred
that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law - Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988, (ii)
caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October
17,
1988.
The Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) is affirmed and its
Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is modified in the sense that the Office of the Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos.
18371 to 18402) into one information charging only one offense under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698. The
temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 25, 1993 is lifted insofar as to the disqualification of Presiding
Justice
Francis
Garchitorena
is
concerned.