G.R. No.

L-31195

June 5, 1973

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION vs. PHILIPPINE

BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC.
Petitioners: Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization, Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio,
Padrigano Rufino, Roxas Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin
Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod
Respondents: Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. and Court of Industrial Relations
Ponente: J. Makasiar
Facts:
1) The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate
labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,
and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon,
Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and
members of the petitioner Union. PBMEO decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of
Malacaang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.
2) Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at
Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be
participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the
regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively);
and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.
3) The Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO after
learning about the planned mass demonstration. During the meeting, the planned demonstration
was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out by the union that the demonstration was not
a strike against the company but was in factual exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional
right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of
grievances.
4) The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course
of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of
the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally.
5) A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers
may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves
to participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the
rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the
No Strike and No Lockout clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.
6) The lower court decided in favour of Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and the officers of
the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. The PBMEOs motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two
days late.
Issue:
Whether or not to regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as a
violation of freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress
of grievances
Whether or not the collective bargaining agreement is an inhibition of the rights of free
expression, free assembly and petition of the employers
Held:

1) Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of
Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious
shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of
oligarchs political, economic or otherwise.
The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacaang was against alleged
abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm,
said demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom expression in
general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular
before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the
municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid
protection from what they believe were police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of
herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members from the
harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally
to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work
free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their
respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits.
2) To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of
bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement
and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches
unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting
speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional
guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees,
according to the respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the
"duty ... to observe regular working hours." The strain construction of the Court of Industrial
Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to stage mass
demonstration against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over
the mind and life the workers and deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom
should not be predicated on such a slender ground.
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the
part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass
demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8)
petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of
expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the
respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities
for ... mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an
employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in
Section Three.
The Supreme Court set aside as null and void the orders of Court of Industrial Relations. The
Supreme Court also directed the re-instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back
pay from the date of their separation from the service until re-instated, minus one day's pay and
whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources during their separation from the
service.