Case 1:14-cr-00448-RBJ Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 22

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,
vs.

Criminal Case No:

14-CR-00448-RBJ

HAROLD HENTHORN,
Defendant.
GOVERNMENTS NOTICE OF RULE 404(b) EVIDENCE
________________________________________
The government plans to introduce other acts evidence that it
anticipates will take no more than one trial day. Given the nature of this
case, that evidence is critical to proving Henthorns intent, motive, and plan.
It will also establish that the death of his wife Toni was no accident.
As admission of these acts will greatly affect overall trial strategy, the
government files this notice early so that it can be discussed at the March
2nd motions hearing and a ruling made in advance of trial.1

The government provided discovery today of the Rule 404(b) acts

discussed herein to defense counsel. Consistent with the deadline in the
Discovery Conference Memorandum, the government reserves the right to
provide notice of other Rule 404(b) evidence in the future.
1

Case 1:14-cr-00448-RBJ Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 22

BACKGROUND
Harold Henthorn has been charged with the first-degree murder of his
wife Toni Henthorn in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1111(a). The government
anticipates that the following will be established at trial.
In September 2012, Henthorn took his second wife Toni on a robust
hike in Rocky Mountain National Park to celebrate their 12th wedding
anniversary. It was an odd choice since 50-year-old Toni had bad knees that
had undergone two surgeries. Friends said that anything more strenuous
than a simple walk was not typical of Toni.
The two started on the Deer Mountain Trail around 1 p.m. The trail
climbs to over 10,000 feet in elevation. It is six miles round-trip. The
Henthorns left the established trail around 3:30 p.m. to eat lunch on a rocky
knob about a of a mile away. It is about 90 minutes from this knob to
Estes Park where the Henthorns had 7 p.m. dinner reservations for which
Toni would have wanted to freshen up.
Yet at 5 p.m., the Henthorns ensured they would be late by hiking
down a rock scree face to another knob, which sits atop a 140-foot cliff. The
loose rocks and steep incline would have been difficult on Tonis knees. The
two took a few photos and, then, Toni tumbled to her death.

Case 1:14-cr-00448-RBJ Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 USDC Colorado Page 3 of 22

Henthorn told several conflicting stories about how Toni died. He told
law enforcement and family members that he did not see her fall, but rather
witnessed a blur while he was reading text messages. He told another
witness that both he and Toni were checking text messages and Toni had
wandered too close to the edge. He told other witnesses that Toni was trying
to take pictures and slipped.
Henthorn said that he and Toni initially left the trail to find a romantic
spot and because of the crowds that day. They then hiked to the lower knob
to see wild turkeys, for an intimate moment, or to scout future hikes to take
with their seven-year-old daughter. But a map found in Henthorns car
suggested these detours were not spontaneous: it marked the spot near where
Toni fell with a pink X.
Henthorn had extensively scouted the hike. Contrary to what he told
law enforcement, he made nine different trips to the area around Rocky
Mountain National Park that summer. And in the fortnight before their
anniversary, Henthorn had hiked six trails to find the perfect one for the trip.
Henthorn told divergent accounts of Tonis death because, in fact, he
pushed her over the cliff as part of his plan to collect on multiple life
insurance policies. He is beneficiary or trustee of three policies on Toni,
totaling $4.5 million.

Case 1:14-cr-00448-RBJ Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 USDC Colorado Page 4 of 22

Toni is not Henthorns first spouse to die in bizarre circumstances

leaving her husband with significant insurance money. His first wife died
when a car allegedly fell on her as she allegedly crawled under it to allegedly
retrieve lug nuts. She was helping change a low not flat tire. As with
Toni, the first wife died in a remote area where Henthorn was the only
witness and told conflicting accounts of what happened.
The circumstances surrounding the death of Henthorns first wife
should be admitted as Rule 404(b) evidence to prove intent, motive,
preparation, plan, and lack of accident in Tonis death. So should evidence of
life insurance that he took out on a former sister-in-law without her
knowledge. A 2011 incident where Henthorn dropped a 20-foot wooden beam
on Toni at their Grand Lake cabin is intrinsic evidence of his premeditation
in killing her. But, in an abundance of caution, the government provides
404(b) notice of that incident as well.
ARGUMENT
To prove first-degree murder, the government must establish:
First: the defendant caused the death of the victim named in the
indictment;
Second: the defendant killed the victim with malice aforethought;
Third: the killing was premeditated; and

Case 1:14-cr-00448-RBJ Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 USDC Colorado Page 5 of 22

Fourth: the killing took place within the territorial jurisdiction of

the United States.
Pattern Crim. Jury Instr. 10th Cir. 2.52.
Malice aforethought requires that Henthorn acted deliberately and
intentionally or with callous and wanton disregard for human life. Id.
Premeditation demands that the killing was the result of planning or
deliberation. Id. Because Henthorn is the only witness to Tonis death, the
proof that he murdered her must rely on the circumstances leading up to her
death as well as prior actions that suggested he planned to kill her.
This is exactly the sort of evidence for which Rule 404(b) exists.
Extrinsic acts evidence may be critical to the establishment of the truth as to
a disputed issue, especially when the issue involves the actors state of mind
and the only means of ascertaining that mental state is by drawing
inferences from conduct. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685
(1988) (discussing 404(b) evidence).
Rule 404(b) precludes using other acts to prove that commission of the
charged crime conforms to the defendants character. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1).
But other acts evidence may be admitted to prove motive, . . . intent,
preparation, plan, . . . lack of accident or another purpose. Fed. R. Evid.

Case 1:14-cr-00448-RBJ Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 USDC Colorado Page 6 of 22

404(b)(2). The Rule is one of inclusion. United States v. Smalls, 752 F.3d
1227, 1237 (10th Cir. 2014).
When the four prerequisites for other acts evidence are met, the
evidence must be admitted. United States v. Davis, 636 F.3d 1281, 1298
(10th Cir. 2011) ([I]f the other act evidence is relevant and tends to prove a
material fact other than the defendants criminal disposition, it is offered for
a proper purpose under Rule 404(b) and may be excluded only under Rule
403.) (citation omitted).
Those prerequisites are:
(1) the evidence must be offered for a proper purpose under Rule
404(b);
(2) the evidence must be relevant;
(3) the court must determine that, under Rule 403, the probative
value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its
potential for unfair prejudice; and
(4) if requested under Rule 105, the court must instruct the jury
that the evidence is to be considered only for the purpose for
which it was admitted.
United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir. 1993).

Case 1:14-cr-00448-RBJ Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 USDC Colorado Page 7 of 22

I.

The evidence surrounding the death of Henthorns first

wife (Lynn) is admissible Rule 404(b) evidence.

The evidence that Harold Henthorn killed his first wife and collected
life insurance on her should be admitted under Rule 404(b) to establish
intent, motive, planning, preparation, and lack of accident.
A.

Lynn Henthorn died in unusual circumstances

where the only witness was her husband who
received nearly $500,000 from her death.

Henthorns first wife died in 1995 when she was crushed under their
Jeep. The two had stopped late at night in a remote area to change a low
tire. As a result of Lynns death, Henthorn earned almost $500,000 from
three life insurance policies on Lynn, one bought only four months earlier.
Henthorn told law enforcement that because his car jack was not
working properly, he had used two boat jacks to lift the Jeep. Lynn held a
flashlight and the lug nuts while Henthorn changed the tire. (Henthorn
oddly turned away a car that offered to shine its lights on the scene.) When
he later threw the low tire in the back of the car, the car fell off the jacks. He
heard Lynn call for help and found her pinned underneath the car.
Henthorn eventually flagged down another car. He initially told them
not to touch his wife and tried to stop them from performing CPR. Because it

Case 1:14-cr-00448-RBJ Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 USDC Colorado Page 8 of 22

was cold outside, the responders put their coats on Lynn. Harold was
wearing a coat, but had not covered his wife.
While Henthorn told law enforcement that the Jeep fell when he threw
the tire in the back, he told others that it fell when he closed the tailgate or
alternatively when he sat on the tailgate. The investigating officers noticed a
partial footprint mark on the vehicle near the rear fender that suggested yet
another possibility.
Henthorn told some people that Lynn had dropped the lug nuts or the
flashlight and went to retrieve them.2 He told others that he dropped the lug
nuts and Lynn went to retrieve them because of his bad back. Henthorn told
a first responder that the Jeep fell on Lynn when she was changing the tire,
because he did not know how to change it. But Henthorn also said that he
had warned Lynn not to touch the vehicle and to stay at least six feet away.
Henthorn told some that Lynn never spoke to him after the Jeep fell.
He told others that she called to him. He told some that he pulled her out
from under the Jeep and started CPR. He told others that he didnt
remember who pulled her out.

The person who found the flashlight under the car noticed that it was
in the off position, another oddity, if Lynn had been using it.
2

Case 1:14-cr-00448-RBJ Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 USDC Colorado Page 9 of 22

In the coming years, Henthorn offered more bizarre stories about

Lynns death: She was bending over in the trunk when the hatchback fell on
her neck and killed her. A lug nut shot out and pierced her lung. A rod from
one of the jacks shot into his wifes chest and killed her. The cabin on the
flight-for-life helicopter or plane depressurized and collapsed her lungs. She
died in a head-on car collision from which he escaped uninjured. He even told
a Sunday School class that she had died from cancer and lost a baby she was
carrying to chemotherapy.
B.

The evidence of Lynn Henthorns death mirrors

404(b) evidence admitted in other cases under the
doctrine of chances.

The evidence surrounding Lynn Henthorns death parallels the 404(b)

evidence admitted in the cases of United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343 (7th
Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562,
567 (7th Cir. 1999), and State v. Roth, 881 P.2d 268, 272-74 (Wash. App.
1994), abrogated on other grounds in State v. Hampton 332 P.3d 1020 (Wash.
App. 2014). York was charged with attempting to defraud an insurer by
means of arson and murder. York, 933 F.2d at 1345. When a business
partner died in an explosion that destroyed the bar she owned with York, he
collected the life insurance. Id. at 1345-46. Applying Rule 404(b), the district

Case 1:14-cr-00448-RBJ Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 USDC Colorado Page 10 of 22

court let the government introduce evidence that York had also killed his wife
for life insurance three years before the bar explosion. Id. at 1348-49.
In affirming, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Yorks collection of the
life insurance proceeds from murdering his wife was compelling evidence
that York intended the same result when he purchased a policy on his
business partner naming himself as the beneficiary. Id. at 1350. The
evidence of Lynn Henthorns death and insurance payout is likewise
compelling evidence that Henthorn intended the same result when he
purchased multiple policies on Toni. It is not hard to envision that an
individual might murder another to recover insurance proceeds resulting
from the others death. Cerro Gordo Charity v. Firemans Fund American
Life Insur. Co., 819 F.2d 1471, 1483 (8th Cir. 1987).
According to the doctrine of chances, the two deaths in York and
subsequent insurance payouts were likely the product of design rather than
the vagaries of chance. 933 F.2d at 1350. The deaths of both Henthorn
wives similarly show planning and preparation, not accident.
The doctrine of chances is an objective doctrine based on the
probability of events. Id. (citing 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 302 AT 241
(CHADBOURN REV. 1979)). The man who wins the lottery once is envied; the
one who wins it twice is investigated. Id. The doctrine of chances merely

10

Case 1:14-cr-00448-RBJ Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 USDC Colorado Page 11 of 22

recognizes that with extremely rare events like murder, once is an accident,
but twice is a pattern.
This doctrine is independent of inferences based on a defendants bad
character. People v. Everett, 250 P.3d 649, 657 (Colo. App. 2010). It instead
relies on the notion that it is objectively improbable that the accused would
be involved in multiple unusual events. Id. Hence, it can also establish the
actus reus that no accident occurred here. See id.
As in York and Roth, the doctrine of chances and the similarities
between the two deaths demonstrate the relevance of the earlier death. In
York, the Seventh Circuit said it was similarity enough to be probative of
intent that both murders were the product of trying to collect on life
insurance policies. Id. at 1351; see also Roth, 881 P.2d at 276 (discussing
similarities). The similarities are greater between Lynn and Tonis death
than in York, because both women were Henthorns wives.
Other similarities abound:
Both deaths involved bizarre accidents.
Both left Henthorn with significant insurance benefits.
Both occurred in remote locations.
Both times, Henthorn was the lone witness.
Both deaths occurred after about 12 years of marriage.

11

Case 1:14-cr-00448-RBJ Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 USDC Colorado Page 12 of 22

Henthorn told wildly varying stories about both deaths.

In both situations, the women were doing atypical things
when they died. Lynn Henthorn was fastidious in dress
and a cautious woman who would not ordinarily crawl
under a jacked-up car to search for lug nuts while wearing
a nice sweater, especially after exploratory surgery only
two weeks earlier. Toni Henthorn was not likely to
scramble down a rocky face on bad knees to look over a cliff
in the midst of a tough hike at elevation.
In both situations, Harold was eager to have the bodies
quickly cremated despite family requests against it.
And Harold spread both womens ashes on the same
mountain near Ouray, Colorado.
Of course there are differences between the deaths as well. But prior
acts need not be duplicates of the one for which the defendant is now being
tried. York, 933 F.2d at 1351 (citation omitted); Roth, 881 P.2d at 277
(despite certain differences, deaths were of same class).
Given the similarities between the two murders and the scarcity of
other evidence on point, the death of Lynn Henthorn is highly probative of
Harolds intent, motive, planning, and lack of accident in killing his second
wife. For that reason, it also meets the third requirement for admission:
compliance with Rule 403.

12

Case 1:14-cr-00448-RBJ Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 USDC Colorado Page 13 of 22

Exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy and

should be used sparingly. Smalls, 752 F.3d at 1238, n.4 (citation &
quotation marks omitted). [I]t is not enough that the risk of unfair prejudice
be greater than the probative value of the evidence; the danger of that
prejudice must substantially outweigh the evidences probative value.
United States v. Cerno, 529 F.3d 926, 936 (10th Cir. 2008). Henthorn cannot
show that introducing evidence of his first wifes death is unfair. Nor can he
show that the prejudice substantially outweighs the evidences high probative
value in ascertaining his intent, motive, and planning, as well as proving lack
of accident. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 18485 (1997) (scarcity
of evidence on point increases its probative value in Rule 403 balancing)).
Henthorn will raise two challenges. First, he will argue that Lynns
death is too old to be probative of the current crime. Second, he will argue
that there is insufficient evidence that he killed Lynn.
1.

The rarity of losing two spouses in bizarre accidents

makes Lynns death probative even after 17 years.

[T]here is no absolute rule regarding the number of years that can

separate offenses when it comes to deciding the admissibility of prior acts.
United States v. Franklin, 704 F.3d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 605 (2d. Cir. 1997) (admitting acts from 16 to

13

Case 1:14-cr-00448-RBJ Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 USDC Colorado Page 14 of 22

20 years prior because there is no bright-line rule as to how old is too old).
Courts have admitted incidents from 50 years prior to the charged offense.
United States v. Horse, 544 Fed. Appx. 678, 679 (9th Cir. 2013) (unpublished).
The nature of marriage suggests that 17 years is not too remote when
both victims were married to the same defendant. As a general matter, it
takes significant time to find a mate and decide to marry. Accord Roth, 881
P.2d at 272 (admitting death of wife nine years earlier). The Eighth Circuit
recently recognized as much. Considering that [the solicitation of murder]
involved a different husband, [a] lapse of three years is quite short. United
States v. Young, 753 F.3d 757, 769 (8th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added)
(reviewing 404(b) evidence).
The doctrine of chances also speaks to the passage of time. With
common occurrences, a tighter time frame is required for an earlier incident
to be probative of a later one because such events may occur relatively
frequently by random chance. But with rare events that are not expected
even once in a lifetime, i.e., a spouses death in a bizarre accident, the
probative value of two such incidents in 17 years is quite high for how and
why each event occurred. [I]t is not every day that ones wife is murdered.
York, 933 F.2d at 1350.

14

Case 1:14-cr-00448-RBJ Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 USDC Colorado Page 15 of 22

Even less common is when the only witness to the murder is the
primary beneficiary of the victims life insurance policies.
2.

A jury could find by a preponderance of the evidence

that Henthorn killed his first wife.

The admission of Lynns death requires only sufficient evidence that

Harold killed her under a preponderance of the evidence standard.
Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 685, 690. (The proof required to establish that he
killed Toni remains beyond a reasonable doubt.) But it is not this courts role
to decide whether Henthorn killed his first wife by a preponderance of the
evidence. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689. This court decides only whether a
jury could reasonably reach that conclusion. Id. at 690. Once that low
threshold is met, it is the jurys decision as to whether Henthorn actually
killed his first wife and what weight to give that finding in answering
whether he also killed his second wife.
Challenging the sufficiency of 404(b) evidence is a heavy burden,
York, 933 F.2d at 1352, which Henthorn cannot overcome. Henthorn was the
last person to see his wife alive, told bizarre and inconsistent stories about
what happened to her, had access to the means used to kill her, and was the
beneficiary of her life insurance. These factors led to the admission of 404(b)

15

Case 1:14-cr-00448-RBJ Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 USDC Colorado Page 16 of 22

evidence in York.3 Id. But there is even more here. Lynn died in a remote
area after Henthorn oddly rejected a stopping cars offer to illuminate the tire
change. The rejection of help and the remote location support an inference
that Henthorn sought to avoid witnesses. Roth, 881 P.2d at 276 (remote
recreational setting meant no witness). And Lynns quick cremation over
family wishes suggests a desire to dispose of evidence.
The one distinction of note between this case and York is that it was
implausible that the death of Yorks first wife was an accident. She had been
shot, which absent suicide, implied another actor. In this case, the deaths of
Henthorns wives taken individually could have been accidents. But, taken
together, the doctrine of chances removes that possibility. It is objectively
implausible that both of Henthorns wives would die in bizarre accidents in
remote areas where he was the lone witness and beneficiary of their life
insurance. That is what makes the 404(b) evidence here so probative.
Henthorn may argue that Lynns death was an accident, but what
matters is that a reasonable jury could find by a preponderance that it was
not. Roth, 881 P.2d at 272-74 (sufficiency standard met for other acts

York had told an inmate that he shot his first wife, but the Seventh
Circuit found that sufficient evidence existed even without the inmates
testimony. 933 F.2d at 1352.
3

16

Case 1:14-cr-00448-RBJ Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 USDC Colorado Page 17 of 22

evidence that defendant killed prior wife to receive life insurance even though
no one witnessed whether wife was pushed over 300-foot drop or slipped);
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 225, 227-28 (1941) (admitting evidence
that first wife drowned in bathtub); see also United States v. Mayle, 334 F.3d
552, 562-63 (6th Cir. 2003) (sufficient evidence that Newman was murdered
even though no direct evidence of murder or that he was even dead).
Nothing more is required for admission under Huddleston.
II.

The life insurance policy that Henthorn took out on Grace

Rishell without her approval is admissible under 404(b).

Grace Rishell is Harold Henthorns former sister-in-law, who was

married to his first wifes brother. In 2009, Rishell and Lynn Henthorns
brother were going through a divorce that had not yet been finalized.
Concerned for her financial stability, Rishell initially agreed to Harold
taking out a life insurance policy on her that would pay $50,000 to Graces
brother and each of her four daughters for a total of $250,000. (The evidence
will show that Henthorn had a romantic interest in Rishell.) Rishell went
through the physicals required for the policy, while Henthorn handled the
paperwork. But in the spring of 2010, Rishell decided that she no longer
wanted the policy and told the insurance agent to stop the policy from going
through. She took out a policy of her own at the time with another insurer.

17

Case 1:14-cr-00448-RBJ Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 USDC Colorado Page 18 of 22

Unknown to Rishell, her signature was forged to procure the original

policy as well. Henthorn made payments on the policy through December of
2012. And instead of listing her daughters and brother as beneficiaries, the
policy listed Henthorn. The policy was canceled in 2013 when the insurer
concluded that Henthorn had no insurable interest in Rishell.
That Henthorn took out a policy on Rishell is evidence both of a
common plan and of his motive, which are both appropriate under 404(b). As
in Roth, Henthorns interest in taking out life insurance policies on various
women in his life shows common plan. Roth, 881 P.2d at 272-73, 277 n.8.
Similarly in Young, it was proper to admit evidence that the defendant asked
the man she started dating right after her second husbands death to list her
as a beneficiary on the mans own policy. Id. at 769-70. It showed motive by
demonstrat[ing] her preoccupation with realizing a financial return on her
husbands deaths with life insurance proceeds. Id. at 770.
III.

The evidence that a beam fell on Toni Henthorn should be

admitted as intrinsic evidence of premeditation, but is
alternatively 404(b) evidence.

A little over a year before Tonis death, Harold dropped a 20-foot

wooden beam on her. Emergency personnel responded to the Henthorns
cabin in Grand Lake, Colorado. Toni and Harold were the only witnesses to
the falling beam.

18

Case 1:14-cr-00448-RBJ Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 USDC Colorado Page 19 of 22

Toni Henthorn told medical personnel that her husband was chucking
plywood over the deck and she could not get out of the way of the piece that
hit her.4 But since the beam hit Toni in the back of her neck, she was relying
on her husbands account of whether the beam was dropped, thrown, or
simply fell on her. And he had many accounts.
Henthorn told medical personnel that he did not know Toni was there
and had been blindly tossing wood off the deck. The Henthorns told others
that the board simply fell from the deck. Henthorn later told family members
and friends that he had been working on a ladder when he fell and dropped
the beam on Toni. Or the beam slipped from his hands while he was
standing on the ladder. He told another witness that Toni was holding the
ladder for him when the board fell. Henthorn told one friend in a joking
manner, I was trying to kill my wife. It was an odd joke for someone who
had already lost his first wife in tragedy.
The on-the-scene personnel will add that the incident was weird,
because it was an odd time of night to work on the cabin, and it was a lucky
shot and a hell of a shot for the board to hit Toni. As with Lynns death,
Toni had come outside to hold a flashlight for him.
Tonis statements are admissible under Rule 803(4), while her
husbands statements are admissible under Rule 801(d)(2).
4

19

Case 1:14-cr-00448-RBJ Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 USDC Colorado Page 20 of 22

Because the beam incident is direct evidence of the charged crime, it

does not fall within the ambit of the other-acts limitations set out by Rule
404(b). United States v. Green, 175 F.3d 822, 831 (10th Cir. 1999). The beam
incident shows that Henthorn committed the present murder after the
required deliberation; specifically, after already trying to kill Toni and
failing. That converts the beam incident into direct proof of his
premeditation, as it shows his continuing efforts to kill Toni.
While the beam incident should be admitted as intrinsic evidence of the
crime here, in an abundance of caution, the United States moves for its
admission under 404(b) as well. The beam incident is probative of intent in
the same manner as the prior act evidence admitted in Joe. In that case, the
defendants wife told a doctor that her husband raped her. Joe, 8 F.3d at
1491. When the husband was later charged with his wifes first degree
murder, the Tenth Circuit held that the rape was properly admitted under
Rule 404(b) to prove Joes intent to commit acts of violence against his wife.
Id. at 1496. The beam incident likewise shows Harolds malevolent intent
towards Toni.

20

Case 1:14-cr-00448-RBJ Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 USDC Colorado Page 21 of 22

CONCLUSION
The government accordingly notifies this court and the defendant that
it intends to offer evidence of the circumstances surrounding Lynn
Henthorns death, the life insurance that Henthorn took out on his former
sister-in-law, and the wooden beam dropped on Toni Henthorn.
DATED this 29th day of January, 2015.
Respectfully Submitted,
John F. Walsh
United States Attorney
s/ J. Bishop Grewell
J. Bishop Grewell
Suneeta Hazra
Valeria Spencer
Assistant United States Attorneys
1225 Seventeenth Street
Suite 700
Denver, Colorado 80202
Telephone: (303) 454-0100
Fax: (303) 454-0408
E-mail: bishop.grewell@usdoj.gov
Attorneys for the Government

21

Case 1:14-cr-00448-RBJ Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 USDC Colorado Page 22 of 22

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (CM/Colorado)
I hereby certify that on January 29, 2015, I electronically filed the
foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system.
Participants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be served by
the CM/ECF system.

/s/ J. Bishop Grewell

J. BISHOP GREWELL
Assistant U.S. Attorney
Attorney for the Government

22