G.R. No.

85750 September 28, 1990

INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC IMMIGRATION COMMISSION, petitioner
vs
HON. PURA CALLEJA IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS AND TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES (TUPAS)
WFTU respondents.
G.R. No. 89331 September 28, 1990
KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWA AT TAC SA IRRI-ORGANIZED LABOR ASSOCIATION IN LINE
INDUSTRIES AND AGRICULTURE, petitioner,
vs
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT AND INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, INC.,respondents.
Araullo, Zambrano, Gruba, Chua Law Firm for petitioner in 85750.
Dominguez, Armamento, Cabana & Associates for petitioner in G.R. No. 89331.
Jimenez & Associates for IRRI.
Alfredo L. Bentulan for private respondent in 85750.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Consolidated on 11 December 1989, these two cases involve the validity of the claim of immunity by
the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) and the International Rice Research
Institute, Inc. (IRRI) from the application of Philippine labor laws.
I
Facts and Issues
A. G.R. No. 85750 the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) Case.
As an aftermath of the Vietnam War, the plight of Vietnamese refugees fleeing from South Vietnam's
communist rule confronted the international community.
In response to this crisis, on 23 February 1981, an Agreement was forged between the Philippine
Government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees whereby an operating center
for processing Indo-Chinese refugees for eventual resettlement to other countries was to be
established in Bataan (Annex "A", Rollo, pp. 22-32).

ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee processing
center in Morong, Bataan. It was incorporated in New York, USA, at the request of the Holy See, as
a non-profit agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered
with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative Status,
Category II. As an international organization rendering voluntary and humanitarian services in the
Philippines, its activities are parallel to those of the International Committee for Migration (ICM) and
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) [DOLE Records of BLR Case No. A-2-6287, ICMC v. Calleja, Vol. 1].
On 14 July 1986, Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the then
Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election among the rank and file
members employed by ICMC The latter opposed the petition on the ground that it is an international
organization registered with the United Nations and, hence, enjoys diplomatic immunity.
On 5 February 1987, Med-Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin sustained ICMC and dismissed the petition for
lack of jurisdiction.
On appeal by TUPAS, Director Pura Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), reversed the
Med-Arbiter's Decision and ordered the immediate conduct of a certification election. At that time,
ICMC's request for recognition as a specialized agency was still pending with the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DEFORAF).
Subsequently, however, on 15 July 1988, the Philippine Government, through the DEFORAF,
granted ICMC the status of a specialized agency with corresponding diplomatic privileges and
immunities, as evidenced by a Memorandum of Agreement between the Government and ICMC
(Annex "E", Petition, Rollo, pp. 41-43), infra.
ICMC then sought the immediate dismissal of the TUPAS Petition for Certification Election invoking
the immunity expressly granted but the same was denied by respondent BLR Director who, again,
ordered the immediate conduct of a pre-election conference. ICMC's two Motions for
Reconsideration were denied despite an opinion rendered by DEFORAF on 17 October 1988 that
said BLR Order violated ICMC's diplomatic immunity.
Thus, on 24 November 1988, ICMC filed the present Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction
assailing the BLR Order.
On 28 November 1988, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the holding of the
certification election.
On 10 January 1989, the DEFORAF, through its Legal Adviser, retired Justice Jorge C. Coquia of the
Court of Appeals, filed a Motion for Intervention alleging that, as the highest executive department
with the competence and authority to act on matters involving diplomatic immunity and privileges,
and tasked with the conduct of Philippine diplomatic and consular relations with foreign governments
and UN organizations, it has a legal interest in the outcome of this case.
Over the opposition of the Solicitor General, the Court allowed DEFORAF intervention.

On 12 July 1989, the Second Division gave due course to the ICMC Petition and required the
submittal of memoranda by the parties, which has been complied with.
As initially stated, the issue is whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunites to
ICMC extends to immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws.
ICMC sustains the affirmative of the proposition citing (1) its Memorandum of Agreement with the
Philippine Government giving it the status of a specialized agency, (infra); (2) the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 21
November 1947 and concurred in by the Philippine Senate through Resolution No. 91 on 17 May
1949 (the Philippine Instrument of Ratification was signed by the President on 30 August 1949 and
deposited with the UN on 20 March 1950) infra; and (3) Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution,
which declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land.
Intervenor DEFORAF upholds ICMC'S claim of diplomatic immunity and seeks an affirmance of the
DEFORAF determination that the BLR Order for a certification election among the ICMC employees
is violative of the diplomatic immunity of said organization.
Respondent BLR Director, on the other hand, with whom the Solicitor General agrees, cites State
policy and Philippine labor laws to justify its assailed Order, particularly, Article II, Section 18 and
Article III, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution, infra; and Articles 243 and 246 of the Labor Code, as
amended, ibid. In addition, she contends that a certification election is not a litigation but a mere
investigation of a non-adversary, fact-finding character. It is not a suit against ICMC its property,
funds or assets, but is the sole concern of the workers themselves.
B. G.R. No. 89331 (The International Rice Research Institute [IRRI] Case).
Before a Decision could be rendered in the ICMC Case, the Third Division, on 11 December 1989,
resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 89331 pending before it with G.R. No. 85750, the lower-numbered
case pending with the Second Division, upon manifestation by the Solicitor General that both cases
involve similar issues.
The facts disclose that on 9 December 1959, the Philippine Government and the Ford and
Rockefeller Foundations signed a Memorandum of Understanding establishing the International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI) at Los Baos, Laguna. It was intended to be an autonomous, philanthropic,
tax-free, non-profit, non-stock organization designed to carry out the principal objective of conducting
"basic research on the rice plant, on all phases of rice production, management, distribution and
utilization with a view to attaining nutritive and economic advantage or benefit for the people of Asia
and other major rice-growing areas through improvement in quality and quantity of rice."
Initially, IRRI was organized and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as a
private corporation subject to all laws and regulations. However, by virtue of Pres. Decree No. 1620,
promulgated on 19 April 1979, IRRI was granted the status, prerogatives, privileges and immunities
of an international organization.

The Organized Labor Association in Line Industries and Agriculture (OLALIA), is a legitimate labor
organization with an existing local union, the Kapisanan ng Manggagawa at TAC sa IRRI
(Kapisanan, for short) in respondent IRRI.
On 20 April 1987, the Kapisanan filed a Petition for Direct Certification Election with Region IV,
Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
IRRI opposed the petition invoking Pres. Decree No. 1620 conferring upon it the status of an
international organization and granting it immunity from all civil, criminal and administrative
proceedings under Philippine laws.
On 7 July 1987, Med-Arbiter Leonardo M. Garcia, upheld the opposition on the basis of Pres.
Decree No. 1620 and dismissed the Petition for Direct Certification.
On appeal, the BLR Director, who is the public respondent in the ICMC Case, set aside the MedArbiter's Order and authorized the calling of a certification election among the rank-and-file
employees of IRRI. Said Director relied on Article 243 of the Labor Code, as amended, infra and
Article XIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, 1and held that "the immunities and privileges granted to
IRRI do not include exemption from coverage of our Labor Laws." Reconsideration sought by IRRI was
denied.
On appeal, the Secretary of Labor, in a Resolution of 5 July 1989, set aside the BLR Director's
Order, dismissed the Petition for Certification Election, and held that the grant of specialized agency
status by the Philippine Government to the IRRI bars DOLE from assuming and exercising
jurisdiction over IRRI Said Resolution reads in part as follows:
Presidential Decree No. 1620 which grants to the IRRI the status, prerogatives,
privileges and immunities of an international organization is clear and explicit. It
provides in categorical terms that:
Art. 3 The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative
proceedings, except insofar as immunity has been expressly waived by the DirectorGeneral of the Institution or his authorized representative.
Verily, unless and until the Institute expressly waives its immunity, no summons,
subpoena, orders, decisions or proceedings ordered by any court or administrative
or quasi-judicial agency are enforceable as against the Institute. In the case at bar
there was no such waiver made by the Director-General of the Institute. Indeed, the
Institute, at the very first opportunity already vehemently questioned the jurisdiction
of this Department by filing an ex-parte motion to dismiss the case.
Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari filed by Kapisanan alleging grave abuse of discretion by
respondent Secretary of Labor in upholding IRRI's diplomatic immunity.
The Third Division, to which the case was originally assigned, required the respondents to comment
on the petition. In a Manifestation filed on 4 August 1990, the Secretary of Labor declared that it

was "not adopting as his own" the decision of the BLR Director in the ICMC Case as well as the
Comment of the Solicitor General sustaining said Director. The last pleading was filed by IRRI on 14
August 1990.
Instead of a Comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that he be
excused from filing a comment "it appearing that in the earlier case of International Catholic
Migration Commission v. Hon. Pura Calleja, G.R. No. 85750. the Office of the Solicitor General had
sustained the stand of Director Calleja on the very same issue now before it, which position has
been superseded by respondent Secretary of Labor in G.R. No. 89331," the present case. The Court
acceded to the Solicitor General's prayer.
The Court is now asked to rule upon whether or not the Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing the Petition for Certification Election filed by Kapisanan.
Kapisanan contends that Article 3 of Pres. Decree No. 1620 granting IRRI the status, privileges,
prerogatives and immunities of an international organization, invoked by the Secretary of Labor, is
unconstitutional in so far as it deprives the Filipino workers of their fundamental and constitutional
right to form trade unions for the purpose of collective bargaining as enshrined in the 1987
Constitution.
A procedural issue is also raised. Kapisanan faults respondent Secretary of Labor for entertaining
IRRI'S appeal from the Order of the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations directing the holding of
a certification election. Kapisanan contends that pursuant to Sections 7, 8, 9 and 10 of Rule V 2 of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, the Order of the BLR Director had become final and
unappeable and that, therefore, the Secretary of Labor had no more jurisdiction over the said appeal.
On the other hand, in entertaining the appeal, the Secretary of Labor relied on Section 25 of Rep.
Act. No. 6715, which took effect on 21 March 1989, providing for the direct filing of appeal from the
Med-Arbiter to the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment instead of to the Director of the
Bureau of Labor Relations in cases involving certification election orders.
III
Findings in Both Cases.
There can be no question that diplomatic immunity has, in fact, been granted ICMC and IRRI.
Article II of the Memorandum of Agreement between the Philippine Government and ICMC provides
that ICMC shall have a status "similar to that of a specialized agency." Article III, Sections 4 and 5 of
the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies, adopted by the UN
General Assembly on 21 November 1947 and concurred in by the Philippine Senate through
Resolution No. 19 on 17 May 1949, explicitly provides:
Art. III, Section 4. The specialized agencies, their property and assets, wherever
located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal
process except insofar as in any particular case they have expressly waived their

immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any
measure of execution.
Sec. 5. The premises of the specialized agencies shall be inviolable. The property
and assets of the specialized agencies, wherever located and by whomsoever held
shall be immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other
form of interference, whether by executive, administrative, judicial or legislative
action. (Emphasis supplied).
IRRI is similarly situated, Pres. Decree No. 1620, Article 3, is explicit in its grant of immunity, thus:
Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any
penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been
expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized
representatives.
Thus it is that the DEFORAF, through its Legal Adviser, sustained ICMC'S invocation of immunity
when in a Memorandum, dated 17 October 1988, it expressed the view that "the Order of the
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated 21 September 1988 for the conduct of Certification
Election within ICMC violates the diplomatic immunity of the organization." Similarly, in respect of
IRRI, the DEFORAF speaking through The Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Jose D. Ingles, in a
letter, dated 17 June 1987, to the Secretary of Labor, maintained that "IRRI enjoys immunity from the
jurisdiction of DOLE in this particular instance."
The foregoing opinions constitute a categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the
Government that ICMC and IRRI enjoy immunities accorded to international organizations, which
determination has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to
embarrass a political department of Government.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of
powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should
refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government,
and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the
executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the
courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal
law officer of the government . . . or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in
adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their
jurisdiction . . . as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting
foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial department of
(this) government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the
latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction. 3
A brief look into the nature of international organizations and specialized agencies is in order. The
term "international organization" is generally used to describe an organization set up by agreement
between two or more states. 4 Under contemporary international law, such organizations are endowed
with some degree of international legal personality 5 such that they are capable of exercising specific

rights, duties and powers. 6 They are organized mainly as a means for conducting general international
business in which the member states have an interest. 7 The United Nations, for instance, is an
international organization dedicated to the propagation of world peace.

"Specialized agencies" are international organizations having functions in particular fields. The term
appears in Articles 57 8 and 63 9 of the Charter of the United Nations:
The Charter, while it invests the United Nations with the general task of promoting
progress and international cooperation in economic, social, health, cultural,
educational and related matters, contemplates that these tasks will be mainly fulfilled
not by organs of the United Nations itself but by autonomous international
organizations established by inter-governmental agreements outside the United
Nations. There are now many such international agencies having functions in many
different fields, e.g. in posts, telecommunications, railways, canals, rivers, sea
transport, civil aviation, meteorology, atomic energy, finance, trade, education and
culture, health and refugees. Some are virtually world-wide in their membership,
some are regional or otherwise limited in their membership. The Charter provides
that those agencies which have "wide international responsibilities" are to be brought
into relationship with the United Nations by agreements entered into between them
and the Economic and Social Council, are then to be known as "specialized
agencies." 10
The rapid growth of international organizations under contemporary international law has paved the
way for the development of the concept of international immunities.
It is now usual for the constitutions of international organizations to contain
provisions conferring certain immunities on the organizations themselves,
representatives of their member states and persons acting on behalf of the
organizations. A series of conventions, agreements and protocols defining the
immunities of various international organizations in relation to their members
generally are now widely in force; . . . 11
There are basically three propositions underlying the grant of international immunities to international
organizations. These principles, contained in the ILO Memorandum are stated thus: 1) international
institutions should have a status which protects them against control or interference by any one
government in the performance of functions for the effective discharge of which they are responsible
to democratically constituted international bodies in which all the nations concerned are represented;
2) no country should derive any national financial advantage by levying fiscal charges on common
international funds; and 3) the international organization should, as a collectivity of States members,
be accorded the facilities for the conduct of its official business customarily extended to each other
by its individual member States. 12 The theory behind all three propositions is said to be essentially
institutional in character. "It is not concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but with
the elements of functional independence necessary to free international institutions from national control
and to enable them to discharge their responsibilities impartially on behalf of all their
members. 13 The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their
functions by the agencies concerned.

The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC and IRRI is clearly necessitated by their
international character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and
interference by the host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the
Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to
shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from
political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the
organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions.
ICMC's and IRRI's immunity from local jurisdiction by no means deprives labor of its basic rights,
which are guaranteed by Article II, Section 18, 14 Article III, Section 8, 15 and Article XIII, Section 3
(supra), of the 1987 Constitution; and implemented by Articles 243 and 246 of the Labor Code, 16 relied on
by the BLR Director and by Kapisanan.
For, ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be settled. Section
31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United
Nations 17 provides that "each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of
settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the
specialized agency is a party." Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement
between ICMC the the Philippine Government, whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the
Government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded. Thus:
Art. IV. Cooperation with Government Authorities. 1. The Commission shall
cooperate at all times with the appropriate authorities of the Government to ensure
the observance of Philippine laws, rules and regulations, facilitate the proper
administration of justice and prevent the occurrences of any abuse of the privileges
and immunities granted its officials and alien employees in Article III of this
Agreement to the Commission.
2. In the event that the Government determines that there has been an abuse of the
privileges and immunities granted under this Agreement, consultations shall be held
between the Government and the Commission to determine whether any such abuse
has occurred and, if so, the Government shall withdraw the privileges and immunities
granted the Commission and its officials.
Neither are the employees of IRRI without remedy in case of dispute with management as, in fact,
there had been organized a forum for better management-employee relationship as evidenced by
the formation of the Council of IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM) wherein "both
management and employees were and still are represented for purposes of maintaining mutual and
beneficial cooperation between IRRI and its employees." The existence of this Union factually and
tellingly belies the argument that Pres. Decree No. 1620, which grants to IRRI the status, privileges
and immunities of an international organization, deprives its employees of the right to selforganization.
The immunity granted being "from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular
case they have expressly waived their immunity," it is inaccurate to state that a certification election
is beyond the scope of that immunity for the reason that it is not a suit against ICMC. A certification
election cannot be viewed as an independent or isolated process. It could tugger off a series of

events in the collective bargaining process together with related incidents and/or concerted activities,
which could inevitably involve ICMC in the "legal process," which includes "any penal, civil and
administrative proceedings." The eventuality of Court litigation is neither remote and from which
international organizations are precisely shielded to safeguard them from the disruption of their
functions. Clauses on jurisdictional immunity are said to be standard provisions in the constitutions
of international Organizations. "The immunity covers the organization concerned, its property and its
assets. It is equally applicable to proceedings in personam and proceedings in rem." 18
We take note of a Manifestation, dated 28 September 1989, in the ICMC Case (p. 161, Rollo),
wherein TUPAS calls attention to the case entitled "International Catholic Migration Commission v.
NLRC, et als., (G.R. No. 72222, 30 January 1989, 169 SCRA 606), and claims that, having taken
cognizance of that dispute (on the issue of payment of salary for the unexpired portion of a sixmonth probationary employment), the Court is now estopped from passing upon the question of
DOLE jurisdiction petition over ICMC.
We find no merit to said submission. Not only did the facts of said controversy occur between 19831985, or before the grant to ICMC on 15 July 1988 of the status of a specialized agency with
corresponding immunities, but also because ICMC in that case did not invoke its immunity and,
therefore, may be deemed to have waived it, assuming that during that period (1983-1985) it was
tacitly recognized as enjoying such immunity.
Anent the procedural issue raised in the IRRI Case, suffice it to state that the Decision of the BLR
Director, dated 15 February 1989, had not become final because of a Motion for Reconsideration
filed by IRRI Said Motion was acted upon only on 30 March 1989 when Rep. Act No. 6715, which
provides for direct appeals from the Orders of the Med-Arbiter to the Secretary of Labor in
certification election cases either from the order or the results of the election itself, was already in
effect, specifically since 21 March 1989. Hence, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to
respondent Secretary of Labor in his assumption of appellate jurisdiction, contrary to Kapisanan's
allegations. The pertinent portion of that law provides:
Art. 259. Any party to an election may appeal the order or results of the election as
determined by the Med-Arbiter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment on
the ground that the rules and regulations or parts thereof established by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment for the conduct of the election have been
violated. Such appeal shall be decided within 15 calendar days (Emphasis supplied).
En passant, the Court is gratified to note that the heretofore antagonistic positions assumed by two
departments of the executive branch of government have been rectified and the resultant
embarrassment to the Philippine Government in the eyes of the international community now,
hopefully, effaced.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 85750 (the ICMC Case), the Petition is GRANTED, the Order of the
Bureau of Labor Relations for certification election is SET ASIDE, and the Temporary Restraining
Order earlier issued is made PERMANENT.

In G.R. No. 89331 (the IRRI Case), the Petition is Dismissed, no grave abuse of discretion having
been committed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in dismissing the Petition for
Certification Election.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 113191 September 18, 1996

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. LABOR ARBITER NIEVES V. DE CASTRO
and JOSE C. MAGNAYI, respondents.

VITUG, J.:
The questions raised in the petition for certiorari are a few coincidental matters relative to the
diplomatic immunity extended to the Asian Development Bank ("ADB").
On 27 January 1993, private respondent initiated NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-01-0690-93 for his
alleged illegal dismissal by ADB and the latter's violation of the "labor-only" contracting law. Two
summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB and the other through the Department of
Foreign Affairs ("DFA"), both with a copy of the complaint. Forthwith, the ADB and the DFA notified
respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Office, were covered by an
immunity from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to
Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank (the
"Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank And The
Government Of The Philippines Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters
Agreement").
The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its
diplomatic immunity from suit. In time, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision, dated 31 August
1993, that concluded:
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
the complainant as a regular employee of respondent ADB, and the termination of his
services as illegal. Accordingly, respondent Bank is hereby ordered:
1. To immediately reinstate the complainant to his former position effective
September 16, 1993;
2. To pay complainant full backwages from December 1, 1992 to September 15,
1993 in the amount of P42,750.00 (P4,500.00 x 9 months);
3. And to pay complainants other benefits and without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and benefits due a regular employee of Asian Development Bank
from the time he was terminated on December 31, 1992;
4. To pay 10% attorney's fees of the total entitlements. 1

The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, on 03 November 1993, the DFA referred the matter to
the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC"); in its referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation
of the void judgment." Replying to the letter, the NLRC Chairman. wrote:
The undersigned submits that the request for the "investigation" of Labor Arbiter
Nieves de Castro, by the National Labor Relations Commission, has been
erroneously premised on Art. 218(c) of the Labor Code, as cited in the letter of
Secretary Padilla, considering that the provision deals with "a question, matter or
controversy within its (the Commission) jurisdiction" obviously referring to a labor
dispute within the ambit of Art. 217 (on jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the
Commission over labor cases).
The procedure, in the adjudication of labor cases, including raising of defenses, is
prescribed by law. The defense of immunity could have been raised before the Labor
Arbiter by a special appearance which, naturally, may not be considered as a waiver
of the very defense being raised. Any decision thereafter is subject to legal remedies,
including appeals to the appropriate division of the Commission and/or a petition
for certiorari with the Supreme Court, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Except
where an appeal is seasonably and properly made, neither the Commission nor the
undersigned may review, or even question, the property of any decision by a Labor
Arbiter. Incidentally, the Commission sits en banc (all fifteen Commissioners) only to
promulgate rules of procedure, or to formulate policies (Art. 213, Labor Code).
On the other hand, while the undersigned exercises "administrative supervision over
the Commission and its regional branches and all its personnel, including the
Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters" (penultimate paragraph, Art. 213, Labor
Code), he does not have the competence to investigate or review any decision of a
Labor Arbiter. However, on the purely administrative aspect of the decision-making
process, he may cause that an misconduct, malfeasance or misfeasance, upon
complaint properly made.
If the Department of Foreign Affairs feels that the action of Labor Arbiter Nieves de
Castro constitutes misconduct, malfeasance or misfeasance, it is suggested that an
appropriate complaint be lodged with the Office of the Ombudsman.
Thank you for kind attention. 2
Dissatisfied, the DFA lodged the instant petition for certiorari. In this Court's resolution of 31 January
1994, respondents were required to comment. Petitioner was later constrained to make an
application for a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction following the issuance, on 16
March 199, by the Labor Arbiter of a writ of execution. In a resolution, dated 07 April 1994, the Court
issued the temporary restraining order prayed for.
The Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG"), in its comment of 26 May 1994, initially assailed the
claim of immunity by the ADB. Subsequently, however, it submitted a Manifestation (dated 20 June
1994) stating, among other things, that "after a thorough review of the case and the records," it

became convinced that ADB, indeed, was correct in invoking its immunity from suit under the
Charter and the Headquarters Agreement.
The Court is of the same view.
Article 50(1) of the Charter provides:
The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in cases
arising out of or in connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to
guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of securities. 3
Under Article 55 thereof

All Governors, Directors, alternates, officers and employees of the Bank, including
experts performing missions for the Bank:
(1) shall be immune from legal process with respect of acts performed by them in
their official capacity, except when the Bank waives the immunity. 4
Like provisions are found in the Headquarters Agreement. Thus, its Section 5 reads:
The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in cases
arising out of, or in connection with, the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to
guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of securities. 5
And, with respect to certain officials of the bank, Section 44 of the agreement states:
Governors, other representatives of Members, Directors, the president, VicePresident and executive officers as may be agreed upon between the Government
and the Bank shall enjoy, during their stay in the Republic of the Philippines in
connection with their official duties with the Bank:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Immunity from legal process of every kind in respect of words spoken or written
and all acts done by them in their official
capacity. 6
The above stipulations of both the Charter and Headquarters Agreement should be able,
may well enough, to establish that, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee
operations, as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities, the ADB enjoys
immunity from legal process of every form. The Bank's officers, on their part, enjoy immunity
in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and the
Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and
commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippines government which must be respected.

In World Health Organization vs. Aquino. 7 we have declared:

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of
powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should
refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government,
and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the
executive branch of the government . . . it is then the duty of the courts to accept the
claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the
government, . . . or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to
the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to
embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is
accepted doctrine that in "such cases the judicial department of government follows
the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an
antagonistic
jurisdiction." 8
To the same effect is the decision in International Catholic Migration Commission vs. Calleja, 9 which
has similarly deemed the Memoranda of the Legal Adviser of the Department of Foreign Affairs to be "a
categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of Government that ICMC . . . enjoy(s) immunities
accorded to international organizations" and which determination must be held "conclusive upon the
Courts in order not to embarrass a political department of Government." In the instant case, the filing of
the petition by the DFA, in behalf of ADB, is itself an affirmance of the government's own recognition of
ADB's immunity.
Being an international organization that has been extended diplomatic status, the ADB is
independent of the municipal law. 10 In Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center vs. Acosta. 11 The
Court has cited with approval the opinion 12 of the Minister of justice; thus
One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local
jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the
tribunals of the country where it is found. (See Jenks, Id., pp. 37-44). The obvious
reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the
local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may
interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of
the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the
capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially behalf of its
member-states. 13
Contrary to private respondent's assertion, the claim of immunity is not here being raised for the first
time, it has been invoked before the forum of origin through communications sent by petitioner and
the ADB to the Labor Arbiter, as well as before the NLRC following the rendition of the questioned
judgment by the Labor Arbiter, but evidently to no avail.
In its communication of 27 May 1993, the DFA, through the Office of legal Affairs, has advised the
NLRC:

Respectfully returned to the Honorable Domingo B. Mabazza, Labor Arbitration

Associate Commission, National Labor Relations Commission, National Capital
Judicial Region, Arbitration Branch, Associated Bank Bldg., T.M. Kalaw St., Ermita,
Manila, the attached Notice of Hearing addressed to the Asian Development Bank, in
connection with the aforestated case, for the reason stated in the Department's 1st
Indoresment dated 23 March 1993, copy attached, which is self-explanatory.
In view of the fact that the Asian Development Bank (ADB) invokes its immunity
which is sustained by the Department of Foreign Affairs, a continuos hearing of this
case erodes the credibility of the Philippine government before the international
community, let alone the negative implication of such a suit on the official relationship
of the Philippine government with the ADB.
For the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
(Sgd.)
SIME
D.
HIDAL
GO
Assista
nt
Secreta
ry 14
The Office of the President, likewise, has issued on 18 May 1993 a letter to the Secretary of
Labor, viz
Dear Secretary Confesor,
I am writing to draw your attention to a case filed by a certain Jose C. Magnayi
against the Asian Development Bank and its President, Kimmasa Tarumizu, before
the National Labor Relations Commission, National Capital Region Arbitration Board
(NLRC NCR Case No. 00-01690-93).
Last March 8, the Labor Arbiter charged with the case, Ms. Nieves V. de Castro,
addressed a Notice of Resolution/Order to the Bank which brought it to the attention
of the Department of Foreign Affairs on the ground that the service of such notice
was in violation of the RP-ADB Headquarters Agreement which provided, inter alia,
for the immunity of the Bank, its President and officers from every form of legal
process, except only, in cases of borrowings, guarantees or the sale of securities.
The Department of Foreign Affairs, in turn, informed Labor Arbiter Nieves V. de
Castro of this fact by letter dated March 22, copied to you.

Despite this, the labor arbiter in question persited to send summons, the latest dated
May 4, herewith attached, regarding the Magnayi case.
The Supreme Court has long settled the matter of diplomatic immunities. In WHO
vs. Aquino, SCRA 48, it ruled that courts should respect diplomatic immunities of
foreign officials recognized by the Supreme Court forms part of the law of the land.
Perhaps you should point out to Labor Arbiter Nieves V. de Castro that ignorance of
the law is a ground for dismissal.
Very truly yours,
(
S
g
d
.
)
J
O
S
E
B
.
A
L
E
J
A
N
D
R
I
N
O
C
h
a
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a

n
,
P
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A
D
B
1
5

Private respondent argues that, by centering into service contracts with different private companies,
ADB has descended to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction giving rise to a
waiver of its immunity from suit. In the case of Holy See vs. Hon. Rosario, Jr., 16 the Court has held:
There are two conflicting concept of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot,
without its consent, be made a respondent in the Courts of another sovereign.
According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is
recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with
regard to private act or acts jure gestionis.
xxx xxx xxx
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party
cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The
logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in regular
course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or
trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is
in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperit,
especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit. 17
The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the ADB
for profit or gain but are official acts over which a waiver of immunity would not attack.
With regard to the issue of whether or not the DFA has the legal standing to file the present petition,
and whether or not petitioner has regarded the basic rule that certiorari can be availed of only when
there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, we hold
both in the affirmative.
The DFA's function includes, among its other mandates, the determination of persons and
institutions covered by diplomatic immunities, a determination which, when challenge, entitles it to
seek relief from the court so ass not to seriously impair the conduct of the country's foreign relations.

The DFA must be allowed to plead its case whenever necessary or advisable to enable it to help
keep the credibility of the Philippine government before the international community. When
international agreements are concluded, the parties therto are deemed to have likewise accepted
the responsibility of seeing to it that their agreements are duly regarded. In our country, this task falls
principally of the DFA as being the highest executive department with the competence and authority
to so act in this aspect of the international arena. 18 In Holy See vs. Hon. Rosario, Jr., 19 this Court has
explained the matter in good datail; viz:
In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead
sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of
the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to
immunity.
In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion," where
the foreign state or the international organization sued in an American court requests
the Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to
immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in
turn, asks the attorney General to submit to the court a "suggestion" that the
defendant is entitled to immunity. In England, a similar procedure is followed, only the
Foreign Office issues a certification to the effect instead of submitting a "suggestion"
(O'Connell, In International Law 130 [1965]; Note: Immunity from Suit of Foreign
Sovereign Instrumentalities and Obligations 50 Yale Law Journal 1088 [1941]).
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international
organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or
diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement
to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission vs. Calleja, 190
SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondentemployer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health
Organization vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent
the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer vs. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S.
Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to
make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo
City, Zambales, a "suggestion" to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied
the "suggestion" in a manifestation and memorandum as amicus curiae.
In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal
Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The
Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's
claim of sovereign immunity.
In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local
courts by the respondents through their private counsels (Raquiza vs. Bradford, 75
Phil. 50 [1945]; Miquiabas vs. Philippine-Ryukyus Command, 80 Phil. 262 [1948];
United States of America vs. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990] and companion cases).

In cases where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can in quire
into the facts and make their own determination as to the nature of the acts and
transactions involved. 20
Relative to the property of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the Court has, under special
circumstances, so allowed and entertained such a petition when (a) the questioned order or decision
is issued in excess of or without jurisdiction, 21 or (b) where the order or decision is a patent
nullity, 22 which, verily, are the circumstances that can be said to obtain in the present case. When an
adjudicator is devoid of jurisdiction on a matter before him, his action that assumes otherwise would be a
clear nullity.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED, and the decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated
31 August 1993 is VACATED, for being NULL AND VOID. The temporary restraining order issued by
this Court on 07 April 1994 is hereby made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-35131 November 29, 1972

THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION and DR. LEONCE VERSTUYFT, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, as Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of
Rizal, MAJOR WILFREDO CRUZ, MAJOR ANTONIO G. RELLEVE, and CAPTAIN PEDRO S.
NAVARRO of the Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC), respondents.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo and Feliciano for petitioners.
Emilio L. Baldia for respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:p
An original action for certiorari and prohibition to set aside respondent judge's refusal to quash a
search warrant issued by him at the instance of respondents COSAC (Constabulary Offshore Action
Center) officers for the search and seizure of the personal effects of petitioner official of the WHO
(World Health Organization) notwithstanding his being entitled to diplomatic immunity, as duly
recognized by the executive branch of the Philippine Government and to prohibit respondent judge
from further proceedings in the matter.
Upon filing of the petition, the Court issued on June 6, 1972 a restraining order enjoining
respondents from executing the search warrant in question.
Respondents COSAC officers filed their answer joining issue against petitioners and seeking to
justify their act of applying for and securing from respondent judge the warrant for the search and
seizure of ten crates consigned to petitioner Verstuyft and stored at the Eternit Corporation
warehouse on the ground that they "contain large quantities of highly dutiable goods" beyond the
official needs of said petitioner "and the only lawful way to reach these articles and effects for
purposes of taxation is through a search warrant." 1
The Court thereafter called for the parties' memoranda in lieu of oral argument, which were filed on
August 3, 1972 by respondents and on August 21, 1972 by petitioners, and the case was thereafter
deemed submitted for decision.
It is undisputed in the record that petitioner Dr. Leonce Verstuyft, who was assigned on December 6,
1971 by the WHO from his last station in Taipei to the Regional Office in Manila as Acting Assistant
Director of Health Services, is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the Host Agreement
executed on July 22, 1951 between the Philippine Government and the World Health Organization.
Such diplomatic immunity carries with it, among other diplomatic privileges and immunities, personal
inviolability, inviolability of the official's properties, exemption from local jurisdiction, and exemption
from taxation and customs duties.

When petitioner Verstuyft's personal effects contained in twelve (12) crates entered the Philippines
as unaccompanied baggage on January 10, 1972, they were accordingly allowed free entry from
duties and taxes. The crates were directly stored at the Eternit Corporation's warehouse at
Mandaluyong, Rizal, "pending his relocation into permanent quarters upon the offer of Mr. Berg, Vice
President of Eternit who was once a patient of Dr. Verstuyft in the Congo." 2
Nevertheless, as above stated, respondent judge issued on March 3, 1972 upon application on the
same date of respondents COSAC officers search warrant No. 72-138 for alleged violation of
Republic Act 4712 amending section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code 3 directing the search and
seizure of the dutiable items in said crates.
Upon protest of March 6, 1972 of Dr. Francisco Dy, WHO Regional Director for the Western Pacific
with station in Manila, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo, personally wired on the same
date respondent Judge advising that "Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect of
his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions" pursuant to the Host
Agreement and requesting suspension of the search warrant order "pending clarification of the
matter from the ASAC."
Respondent judge set the Foreign Secretary's request for hearing and heard the same on March 16,
1972, but notwithstanding the official plea of diplomatic immunity interposed by a duly authorized
representative of the Department of Foreign Affairs who furnished the respondent judge with a list of
the articles brought in by petitioner Verstuyft, respondent judge issued his order of the same date
maintaining the effectivity of the search warrant issued by him, unless restrained by a higher court. 4
Petitioner Verstuyft's special appearance on March 24, 1972 for the limited purpose of pleading his
diplomatic immunity and motion to quash search warrant of April 12, 1972 failed to move respondent
judge.
At the hearing thereof held on May 8, 1972, the Office of the Solicitor General appeared and filed an
extended comment stating the official position of the executive branch of the Philippine Government
that petitioner Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, he did not abuse his diplomatic
immunity, 5 and that court proceedings in the receiving or host State are not the proper remedy in the
case of abuse of diplomatic immunity. 6
The Solicitor General accordingly joined petitioner Verstuyft's prayer for the quashal of the search
warrant. Respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied quashal of the search warrant per his
order of May 9, 1972 "for the same reasons already stated in (his) aforesaid order of March 16,
1972" disregarding Foreign Secretary Romulo's plea of diplomatic immunity on behalf of Dr.
Verstuyft.
Hence, the petition at bar. Petitioner Verstuyft has in this Court been joined by the World Health
Organization (WHO) itself in full assertion of petitioner Verstuyft's being entitled "to all privileges and
immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys in accordance with international
law" under section 24 of the Host Agreement.
The writs of certiorari and prohibition should issue as prayed for.

1. The executive branch of the Philippine Government has expressly recognized that petitioner
Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The
Department of Foreign Affairs formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's
official position that accordingly "Dr. Verstuyft cannot be the subject of a Philippine court summons
without violating an obligation in international law of the Philippine Government" and asked for the
quashal of the search warrant, since his personal effects and baggages after having been allowed
free entry from all customs duties and taxes, may not be baselessly claimed to have been
"unlawfully imported" in violation of the tariff and customs code as claimed by respondents COSAC
officers. The Solicitor-General, as principal law officer of the Government, 7 likewise expressly affirmed
said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, 8 and where the plea of diplomatic immunity
is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the
duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer
of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his direction. 9 Hence, in
adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and
detention of property, as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign
relations, it is accepted doctrine that "in such cases the judicial department of (this) government follows
the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic
jurisdiction." 10
2. The unfortunate fact that respondent judge chose to rely on the suspicion of respondents COSAC
officers "that the other remaining crates unopened contain contraband items" 11 rather than on the
categorical assurance of the Solicitor-General that petitioner Verstuyft did not abuse his diplomatic
immunity, 12 which was based in turn on the official positions taken by the highest executive officials with
competence and authority to act on the matter, namely, the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and of Finance,
could not justify respondent judge's denial of the quashal of the search warrant.
As already stated above, and brought to respondent court's attention, 13 the Philippine Government is
bound by the procedure laid down in Article VII of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations 14 for consultations between the Host State and the United
Nations agency concerned to determine, in the first instance the fact of occurrence of the abuse alleged,
and if so, to ensure that no repetition occurs and for other recourses. This is a treaty commitment
voluntarily assumed by the Philippine Government and as such, has the force and effect of law.
Hence, even assuming arguendo as against the categorical assurance of the executive branch of
government that respondent judge had some ground to prefer respondents COSAC officers'
suspicion that there had been an abuse of diplomatic immunity, the continuation of the search
warrant proceedings before him was not the proper remedy. He should, nevertheless, in deference
to the exclusive competence and jurisdiction of the executive branch of government to act on the
matter, have acceded to the quashal of the search warrant, and forwarded his findings or grounds to
believe that there had been such abuse of diplomatic immunity to the Department of Foreign Affairs
for it to deal with, in accordance with the aforementioned Convention, if so warranted.

3. Finally, the Court has noted with concern the apparent lack of coordination between the various
departments involved in the subject-matter of the case at bar, which made it possible for a small unit,
the COSAC, to which respondents officers belong, seemingly to disregard and go against the
authoritative determination and pronouncements of both the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and of
Finance that petitioner Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, as confirmed by the SolicitorGeneral as the principal law officer of the Government. Such executive determination properly
implemented should have normally constrained respondents officers themselves to obtain the
quashal of the search warrant secured by them rather than oppose such quashal up to this Court, to
the embarrassment of said department heads, if not of the Philippine Government itself vis a vis the
petitioners. 15
The seriousness of the matter is underscored when the provisions of Republic Act 75 enacted since
October 21, 1946 to safeguard the jurisdictional immunity of diplomatic officials in the Philippines are
taken into account. Said Act declares as null and void writs or processes sued out or prosecuted
whereby inter alia the person of an ambassador or public minister is arrested or imprisoned or his
goods or chattels are seized or attached and makes it a penal offense for "every person by whom
the same is obtained or prosecuted, whether as party or as attorney, and every officer concerned in
executing it" to obtain or enforce such writ or process. 16
The Court, therefore, holds that respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the
diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft.
ACCORDINGLY, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for are hereby granted, and the
temporary restraining order heretofore issued against execution or enforcement of the questioned
search warrant, which is hereby declared null and void, is hereby made permanent. The respondent
court is hereby commanded to desist from further proceedings in the matter. No costs, none having
been prayed for.
The clerk of court is hereby directed to furnish a copy of this decision to the Secretary of Justice for
such action as he may find appropriate with regard to the matters mentioned in paragraph 3 hereof.
So ordered.

[G.R. No. 125865. January 28, 2000]

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB
worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by
the MeTC. After fixing petitioners bail at P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC
released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC
judge received an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of
the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the
Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. Based on the said
protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without
notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a motion
for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the
prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to
enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was
denied, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review arguing that
he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation
was held before the criminal cases were filed in court.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the
DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFAs determination that a
certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect
in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFAs advice and in motu proprio dismissing the
two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the latters right to due process

was violated. It should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it
is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the
time of the alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet
to be presented at the proper time. At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere
invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the
charges.
[1]

[2]

Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:

"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article
experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the
following privileges and immunities:
a.).......immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed
by them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives the
immunity."
the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the
act was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioners
case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been
given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to
present its controverting evidence, should it so desire.
Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the
name of official duty. The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of
official functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable
in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act
done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
It appears that even the governments chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does
not support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.
[3]

[4]

Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent,

assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the
receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or
commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside

his official functions. As already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not
part of official duty.
[5]

Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted,

suffice it to say that preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases
cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar. Being purely a statutory right,
preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by law. The
rule on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Besides, the absence of preliminary
investigation does not affect the courts jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of
the information or otherwise render it defective.
[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.