Linking Strategic Gains to the 'Responsibility to

Protect' (R2P) doctrine

MA International Relations and World Order

M14 International Security PL7505
Jo Majerus
Student Number: 129047454
Due 18 June, 2014
Word Count: 4324

I.) Introduction
The "Responsibility to Protect"-Doctrine (R2P) is not as much
an obstacle to ending human suffering in war-torn countries as its
detractors maintain. Originally conceived as a UN-sponsored attempt
to provide the international community with a more efficient
instrument for preventing or halting mass violence and human rights
violations, it was hoped that R2P would overcome the controversies
frequently associated with humanitarian interventions.1 Yet ever
since its conception, R2P has likewise met with extensive criticism in
regard to some of its key tenets.2 In particular it is argued that a
potential military intervention in governments' internal affairs not
only constitutes an encroachment upon state sovereignty,3 but also
merely serves as a pretext of stronger states to impose their will and
power upon weaker ones.4
In the context of western calls for foreign involvement in the
ongoing Syrian civil war, R2P accordingly figures as a particularly
delicate issue. Yet whereas international observers such as David
Petrasek contend that R2P's failure to stop human suffering in Syria
is primarily due to its "illusory military solutions",5 this essay will
argue instead that R2P has been unsuccessful because the human
tragedy presently unfolding in Syria is still not universally recognized
as an incidence of wide-scale aggression which beyond humanitarian
exigencies for intervention could ultimately also easily evolve into a
1

Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), pp. 35-65.
See in particular Philip Cunliffe (ed.), Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect:
Interrogating Theory and Practice (New York: Taylor and Francis e-Library, 2011).
3
Mohammed Ayoob, "Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty", The International Journal
of Human Rights, Vol. 6:1 (2002), p. 92.
4
Alex de Waal, "No Such Thing as Humanitarian Intervention: Why We Need to Rethink How to
Realize the 'Responsibility to Protect'", Harvard International Review, December 2007.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/154/26062.html [accessed 23 May 2014];
Aidan Hehir, Humanitarian Intervention: an Introduction (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2010), p. 121; "An idea whose time has comeand gone?", The Economist, 23 July 2009.
http://www.economist.com/node/14087788 [accessed 23 May 2014].
5
David Petrasek, "R2P-hindrance not a help in the Syrian crisis", Open Democracy, 13 September
2013.
http://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/david-petrasek/r2p-%E2%80%93hindrance-not-help-in-syrian-crisis [accessed 21 May 2014].
2

threat to the international community as well. In other words, since

humanitarian considerations are apparently unable to bring about a
peaceful resolution of the conflict by virtue of their own inherent
urgency and moral imperatives, an international consensus can
effectively only be reached by placing greater rather than less
emphasis on common strategic concerns as well, so that dialogue
between international actors for ending the slaughter in Syria must
also reflect mutual interests in relation to the safety and well-being of
all of them as opposed to only those of some. In order to further
substantiate that view, the essay will first critically engage R2P's
reference to military action before thereafter discussing the over-all
prospects for foreign intervention6 in Syria following a re-evaluation of
the principles of non-interference and state sovereignty. Finally, it will
seek to demonstrate the need for external interventions in states'
domestic affairs to be more systematically related to the dangers of
regional instabilities and transnational terrorism as a result of not
protecting civilian populations from intra-state violence in a timely
and expedient fashion.
II.) Analysis
R2P and military action
The "Responsibility to Protect-doctrine" was established as a
new

international

norm

by

the International

Commission

on

Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001 that regards national

sovereignty not as an inherent privilege of state actors, but rather as
a fundamental duty to shield their citizenry from any type of grave
and murderous harm such as ethnic cleansing, war crimes, genocide,

Humanitarian intervention shall be defined as the involvement of foreign powers in the internal
affairs of sovereign nation-states that need, however, not necessarily signify the use of military
force, but may instead primarily compromise other coercive and non-forcible means such as
international sanctions or material/financial assistance for ending human suffering within their
territorial boundaries. See David J. Scheffer, "Towards a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian
Intervention", University of Toledo Law Review, Vol 23. (1992), pp. 253-274.

and crimes against humanity.7 It further stipulates that the

international community has a responsibility to assist governments
meet that duty, yet that it will typically only do so at their explicit
request for helping them overcome internal disruptions, thereby
essentially respecting their national sovereignty. In extreme cases,
however, R2P also reserves for itself the right to interfere in states'
domestic affairs even without prior consent of its leaders if the latter
are not only deemed incapable to protect their own population, but
especially if they themselves are perceived to be the main originators
of intra-state violence and aggression.8
It is in particular this third provision of R2P which has received
a substantial amount of criticism these past few years, notably over
foreign military intervention outside the Security Council and the
arguably adverse long-term effects of interference in states' domestic
affairs on international peace and stability in general.9 In that regard,
Petrasek is certainly right that non-sanctioned military action is likely
to meet with profound reservations of many sovereign powers and
that a genuine consensus on alleviating human suffering in conflictridden regions is the only universally efficient solution to such
problems.10 After all, multilateral responses not only stand to
generate greater international support, but they are also less likely to
bring "the harmony and concord of the society of sovereign states into

ICISS, "The Responsibility to Protect", Report of the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty (New York: ICISS, December 2001). Document available at:
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf [accessed 21 May 2014]; United Nations
World Summit Outcome Document 2005 (New York: United Nations, 2005).
http://www.who.int/hiv/universalaccess2010/worldsummit.pdf [accessed 23 May 2014].
8
Cristina G. Badescu, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Security and
Human Rights (New York: Taylor and Francis e-library, 2010), p. 110; Aidan Hehir and Philip Cunliffe,
"The responsibility to protect and international law", in: Philip Cunliffe (ed.), Critical Perspectives on
the Responsibility to Protect: Interrogating Theory and Practice (New York: Taylor and Francis eLibrary, 2011), pp. 84100; Ban Ki-moon, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (A/63/677)
(New York: United Nations, 2009). http://www.unrol.org/files/SG_reportA_63_677_en.pdf [accessed
22 May 2014].
6
aban Karda, "Humanitarian Intervention as a Responsibility to Protect: An International Society
Approach", A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace, Vol. 2:1 (January 2013), pp. 27-29.
10
David Petrasek, "R2P-hindrance not a help in the Syrian crisis", op.cit.

jeopardy."11 However, such concerns should nevertheless not be

construed to suggest that seeking approval by the Security Council is
invariably the most reliable way for stopping atrocities. While every
effort to reach a consent on intervention should be pursued, one
must not forget that in the meantime, people will continue to suffer
under oppressive regimes even as political leaders are attempting to
unanimously decide on the proper course of action for ending their
suffering. After all, such agreements not only take time, but they are
also hampered by the composition of the UN Security Council itself.12
No matter how severe intra-state confrontations may be, a common
understanding on how to address them will arguably not materialize
for as long as not all SC members attach equal urgency to the need of
foreign intervention, let alone if they believe such methods to detract
from their own national interest. Accordingly one should perhaps not
too hastily dismiss the possibility of unauthorized action achieving at
least some successes in abating humanitarian crises as Kardas
reminds us. As long as it expresses "the collective will of at least a
certain part of the society states",13 it might nevertheless succeed in
obtaining a sufficient degree of legitimacy among the international
community,14 notably since such multilateral operations hardly pose
a risk to the over-all stability of the international order.15
A second line of criticism directed against R2P not only
challenges intervention outside the Security Council as such, but in
particular the use of force as a measure of last resort. In that context,
the very idea of military action is often seen as fundamentally
inadequate and even counter-productive to reaching an international
consensus on protecting civilian populations to begin with.16
11

Hedley Bull, Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 195.
C.A.J. Coady, "The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention", THE USIP Peaceworks No. 45
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2002), p. 26.
13
Karda, p. 28.
14
. Coady, p. 26
15
Karda, p. 28.
16
Justin Morris, "Libya and Syria: R2P and the Spectre of the Swinging Pendulum", International
Affairs, Vol. 89:5 (September 2013), p. 1272.
12

However, although Petrasek has a point that R2P will require

rethinking if human rights violations are to be prevented, it does
nevertheless not follow from that observation that the primary reason
why R2P failed to build an international consensus on Syria was
mainly due to its "illusory military solutions",17 or, put differently,
that the mere possibility of military operations has been chiefly
responsible for Russia and China's continued opposition to other
measures against the Syrian government.18
Admittedly, there can be no doubt that Russia and China are
traditionally overly wary of external interferences in states' territorial
jurisdiction.19 Above all the recent experience in Libya appears to
have reinforced their concerns over R2P, given that NATO's armed
intervention was widely perceived by them to having only worsened
the humanitarian situation there instead of improving it.20 On that
note, however, two important qualifications are in order. For one, it is
perfectly legitimate to question the results of NATO's mission in Libya
and to allege that regime change rather than humanitarian
considerations

alone

informed

the

former's

approach

to

that

conflict.21 Importantly, however, Libya in particular was a case in

which no genuine amelioration of the population's situation was de
facto possible without some form of regime change, if only because
those in power were after all responsible for their suffering in the first

17

Petrasek, "R2P-hindrance not a help in the Syrian crisis", op.cit.

Ibid.
19
Christopher Holland, "Chinese Attitudes to International Law: China, the Security Council,
Sovereignty and Intervention", NYU Journal of International Law and Politics Online Forum (2012),
pp. 1-44.http://nyujilp.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Christopher-Holland-China-the-SecurityCouncil-and-Intervention.pdf [accessed 23 May 2014]; Vladimir Baranovsky, "Humanitarian
Intervention: Russian Perspectives", Pugwash Occasional Papers, Vol 2:1 (January 2001).
http://www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/como_russia.htm [accessed 23 May 2014].
15
th
See minutes of 6627 UN Security Council Meeting. "Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft
Resolution Condemning Syrias Crackdown on Anti-Government Protestors, Owing to Veto by
th
Russian Federation, China", United Nations Security Council 6627 Meeting (New York: United
Nations, 4 October 2011). http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10403.doc.htm [accessed
21 May 2014].
21
Alan J. Kuperman, "A Model Humanitarian Intervention?: Reassessing NATO's Libya Campaign",
International Security, Vol. 38:1 (Summer 2013), pp. 113-115.
18

place.22 Secondly, what practical alternative did there actually exist

for ending atrocities at that point? Peaceful dialogue had clearly failed
to reduce violence and aggression within the country,23 and apart
from NATO, no other international actors were willing to actively
contribute their share to alleviating human suffering. Military
approaches to intra-state conflicts are certainly anything but ideal
solutions, so that a peaceful and political settlement is always
preferable.

Yet

despite

its

many

shortcomings,

the

military

intervention in Libya at least attempted to relieve civilian populations

of their agony even if some of the ensuing actions arguably added to
the latter as well.24 The only other option would have been to simply
trust that ultimately everything would have worked out fine even
without foreign involvement, knowing that such a procedure would,
however, only further have prolonged human suffering and violence.
Ultimately, it is rather widespread reluctance to question the
legitimacy of established regimes by identifying them as the true
sources of popular unrest and civilian distressand not merely the
supposedly adverse effects resulting from a military execution of
R2Pwhich forms the actual impediment to an international
consensus on Syria. From this perspective, it is simply unreasonable
to assume that without the threat of armed intervention, Russia and
China would more likely back other UN measures (financial
sanctions, referral to the International Criminal Court) for stopping
the killing in Syria.25 The truth of the matter is that Russia and
China are not only opposed to any resolutions that might lead to a
forceful enactment of R2P; rather they appear unwilling to support
22

On the Human Rights situation in Libya under Muammar Gaddafi, see in particular: Morayef Heba,
Truth and Justice Can't Wait: Human Rights Development in Libya and Institutional Obstacles (New
York: Human Rights Watch, 2009).
23
Chris McGreal, Harriet Sherwood, Nicholas Watt and Ian Traynor, "Libyan revolutionary council
rejects
African
Union's
peace
initiative",
The
Guardian,
11
April
2011.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/11/libyan-rebels-reject-peace-initiative [accessed 26
May 2014].
24
"Ban Ki-moon alarmed over rising civilian toll in Libya", The Telegraph, 12 August 2011.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8696961/Ban-Ki-moonalarmed-over-rising-civilian-toll-in-Libya.html [accessed 21 May 2014].
25
Petrasek, "R2P-hindrance not a help in the Syrian crisis", op.cit.

any truly comprehensive measures against the Assad regime as a

matter of principle. Such reluctance is after all evidenced by their
rejection of several UN resolutions urging the Syrian government to
moderate the use of force against its own civilian population,26 thus
essentially

confirming

their

apparent

disinclination

to

place

humanitarian considerations over the purported legitimacy of the

Assad regime.
That R2P's inclusion of military force is not per se opposed by
Russia and China is ultimately also substantiated by the fact that
they did not always block UN resolutions invoking R2P provided
that they did not impinge on their own national interests or run
counter to their axiomatic adherence to the principles of 'state
sovereignty' and 'non-interference in internal affairs'.27 In particular,
both countries seem to have been fine with limited military action so
long as it was not aimed at ruling governments themselves or
challenged their claim to national sovereignty. Accordingly, Russia
and China approved UN interventions in Cte d'Ivoire, Mali and Libya
for varying reasons not primarily related to humanitarian concerns,
for instance to strengthen internationally recognized President
Alassane Ouattara (Cte d'Ivoire) or to contain the threat of
widespread national subversion by terrorist networks (Mali).28 In
contrast, China initially opposed an armed intervention in Libya, but

26

"Russia, China block second draft of resolution on Syria", The Voice of Russia, 10 June 2011.
http://voiceofrussia.com/2011/06/10/51517343/ [accessed 7 April 2014]; "China and Russia veto UN
resolution condemning Syria", BBC News, 5 October 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldmiddle-east-15177114 [accessed 7 April 2014]; Steve Gutterman, "Russia won't back U.N. call for
Syria's Assad to go", Reuters, 27 January 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/27/us-syriarussia-idUSTRE80Q0I620120127 [accessed 7 April 2014]; Neil MacFarquhar and Anthony Shadid,
"Russia and China Block UN Action on Crisis in Syria, The New York Times, 4 February 2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/world/middleeast/syria-homs-death-toll-said-torise.html?pagewanted=1&hp&_r=0 [accessed 7 April 2014].
27
th
Minutes of 6627 UN Security Council Meeting, op.cit.
28
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1975 on Cte d'Ivoire (New York: United Nations,
2011). http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1975%282011%29 [accessed
21 May 2014];
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2085 on Mali (New York: United Nations, 2012).
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2085%20%282012%29 [accessed 21
May 2014].

ultimately only refrained from doing so in order to preserve its

relationship with several Arab countries supporting it.29 In all these
incidences, it were distinctly national concerns which mainly
informed their reasoning, not any categorical opposition to military
operations in general. Hence the argument that without R2P's threat
of military action, Russia and China might endorse less radical
measures against the Assad regime is essentially unfounded, if only
because, at least in Russia's case, its stability is still viewed of great
strategic importance to it.30
Altogether, R2P's provisions regarding military force outside the
Security Council are therefore but one aspect of Russian and Chinese
aversion to a more active role of the UN in Syria, though certainly not
the main one. Consequently, these provisions alone cannot effectively
account for why the doctrine has thus far failed to resolve the
precarious situation in Syria. If R2P has been unsuccessful, it is
rather because it has not given nearly enough attention to the
potential dangers involved in stolidly adhering to the idea that the
non-infringement of states' national sovereignty will by default always
and without fail form the most reliable guarantor of long-term
international peace and stability.
Prospects for Intervention
In the final analysis, the war in Syria and the attending
difficulties for implementing R2P in that conflict are less about the
possibility of military operations per se than about the problematic of
reconciling

the

supposedly

incompatible

principles

of

state

sovereignty and non-interference on the one hand and the promotion

of human rights on the other. In that regard, advocates of nonintervention typically refer to the Westphalian principles of state
29

Saibal Dasgupta, "China opposed to UN resolution on Libya", The Times of India, 18 March 2011.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/China-opposed-UN-resolution-onLibya/articleshow/7736989.cms?referral=PM [accessed 7 April 2014].
30
Azuolas Bagdonas, "Russias's Interests in the Syrian Conflict: Power, Prestige, Profit", European
Journal of Economic and Political Studies, Vol. 5:2 (December 2012), pp. 55-77.

sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction that sought to reduce interstate conflicts by not only prohibiting any outside interference in
states' domestic affairs,31 but by moreover assuming a primacy of the
state over the rights of individual citizens and thus, as Robert
Jackson notes, ultimately also of the principles of sovereignty and
non-intervention over human rights.32 As a result, strict adherence to
these norms is seen as a fundamental prerequisite for preserving the
peace and stability of the international order, in particular as
interference in states' internal activities is believed to produce
disruptive and destabilizing effects on the international community as
a whole.33 Since non-intervention thus basically serves the dual
purpose of protecting state autonomy and preventing the resurgence
of inter-state conflict, it is held as a cornerstone of international
stability that must be given absolute priority over any secondary
concerns arising from the imperfect nature of world politics,34
including

domestic

human

rights

violations

by

sovereign

government.35 By permitting even only sporadic interventions on

behalf of humanitarian exigencies, such practices are presumed to
invariably result in a long-term erosion of the norms of state
sovereignty and non-intervention and, before long, thus also of the
general well-being of the international community as well.36
However, it is questionable whether a blind attachment to these
principles still represents the most viable approach to the multifaceted realities of contemporary world politics. For one, the concept
31

R. J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1986), pp. 113-114.
32
Robert H. Jackson, "Armed Humanitarianism", International Journal, Vol. 48:4 (Autumn 1993), pp.
582-583.
33
Karda, p. 25, 27; Hedley Bull, Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p.
85.
34
Stanley Hoffmann, "Sovereignty and the Ethics of Intervention", in: Stanley Hoffmann (ed.), The
Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996),
p. 12; Lori F. Damrosch, "Introduction", in: Lori. F. Damrosch, Enforcing Restraint: Collective
Intervention in Internal Conflict (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), p. 8.
35
Karda, p. 27.
36
Nicholas Wheeler and Justin Morris, "Humanitarian Intervention and State Practice at the End of
the Cold War", in: Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins (eds.), International Society after the Cold War:
Anarchy and Order Reconsidered (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), p. 166.

of states allegedly possessing some form of absolute sovereignty not

only appears increasingly outmoded in light of economic globalization
and the establishment of supra-national bodies, but it is also widely
agreed that states have at least some minimal obligation to respect
the rights of their citizens.37 Accordingly, critics above all take issue
with the inherent rigidness of the principle of non-interference which
ultimately does not even allow for exceptions in cases where it
literally affronts the moral conscience of humanity itself.3839
Importantly, however, it are not only moral considerations
which guide the reasoning of those advocating greater flexibility in
the application of the norm of non-intervention in international
affairs. Just as its proponents routinely cite geo-political arguments
for upholding that standard, notably to maintain international
stability, so too may the latter, however, likewise be endangered by at
times not sufficiently taking into account the necessity to protect
civilian populations from genocide and state oppression. More
specifically, humanitarian interventions may well have a direct
bearing on the very peace and security of the international system
itself, notably since by offering at least some type of redress to the
pernicious long-term effects of intra-state confrontations on regional
stabilities, they essentially seek to preserve the fragile structures of
that system as well.40 Especially the fact that human rights abuses
and civil wars are no longer only of relevance to local authorities, but
may instead also affect the security and well-being of other nations
ultimately adds further substance and legitimacy to the argument of
not a priori excluding humanitarian intervention as a means for
resolving such crises.41 Consequently, it is that fundamental
interdependence between defending basic human rights and common
37

Coady, pp. 21-22.

Adam Roberts, "Humanitarian Action in War: Aid, Protection and Impartiality in a Policy Vacuum",
Adelphi Paper 305 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), p. 20.
39
Karda, p. 29; Hoffmann, "Sovereignty and the Ethics of Intervention", p. 22.
40
Karda, p. 25.
41
Francis Koi Abiew, "Assessing Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Period: Sources of
Consensus", International Relations, Vol. 14:2 (August 1998), p. 62.
38

10

strategic interests by way of ensuring continued international peace

and stability which altogether reinforces the need for occasional
interference in states' domestic activities for the sake of protecting
innocent civilian populations.42
Since

humanitarian

interventions

are,

however,

likewise

subject to the constraints of the existing world order, their

application may arguably never take on a universal form, but will
have to remain selective to some degree.43 After all, they must also
consider "the scale of likely outcomes of a military intervention" as
Coady remarks, given that "a response proportionate to one situation
may

be

disproportionate

to

another."44

Thus

humanitarian

interventions may not always be conducive to international peace and

security, notably in places where intervening on behalf of suffering
populations would almost certainly involve too grave a risk to over-all
world

peace

and

stability.45

Consequently,

supporters

of

humanitarian interventions must clearly identify such incidences

where ignoring the plight of civilian populations could also yield
negative consequences for the wider international community.
Serious human rights violations like genocide arguably comprise one
such case, yet even greater threats to international peace and
security issue in particular from such societies where civil unrest and
social chaos are likely to foster threats to regional or even
international stability as well.46 Accordingly, it is only by more
systematically linking humanitarian intervention to such geo-political
considerations that calls for actively protecting local populations may
ultimately reach a greater number of nations.

42

Albrecht Schnabel, "Humanitarian Intervention: A Conceptual Analysis", in: S. Neil MacFarlane and
Hans-Georg Ehrhart (eds.), Peacekeeping at a Crossroads (Clementsport: The Canadian Peacekeeping
Press, 1997), p. 27.
43
Ayoob, pp. 85-86.
44
Coady, p. 27.
45
For instance in Chechnya or Tibet. Coady, p. 25., 27.
46
See Stanley Hoffmann, World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the PostCold War Era (Lanham,
Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), pp. 161164.

11

To that end, however, western countries first need to provide

other nations with plausible justifications as to why exactly the
responsibility to protect civilian populations is ultimately of such
seminal significance to the proper functioning of the international
system. Accordingly, it must be made clear that a foreign involvement
in Syria would indeed only be undertaken if all other means of
coercive diplomacy have wholly failed.47 Above all, they must
persuade political decision-makers that a potential regime change in
Syria is not being pursued primarily for increasing western influence
in the region,48 but that it would over the long run inure to the
benefit of the entire international community instead.
Starting from that premise, subsequent debates must centre in
particular on the modern definition of state sovereignty and on
whether the Assad regime actually still has a legitimate claim to that
pivotal institution. In the context of R2P, views on and respect for
national sovereignty will therefore assume an indeed preeminent
significance, notably as that concept is after all central to the main
tenets and suppositions underlying it.49 This is especially true for the
third pillar of R2P according to which foreign powers have a
responsibility to interfere if local governments are themselves the
primary source of violence and aggression.50 In that event, the latter's
excessive use of force is basically held to nullify their arrogated right
of exercising absolute sovereignty, so that an external intervention
would consequently no longer constitute an assault on national
sovereignty itself, but rather form part of an international attempt to

47

Withdrawal of existing diplomatic support, termination of trade relationships, economic sanctions,

etc.. See Coady, pp. 28-29, and in particular Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive
Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991).
48
Holly Yan, "Syria allies: Why Russia, Iran and China are standing by the regime", CNN, 30 August
2013.
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/29/world/meast/syria-iran-china-russia-supporters/
[accessed 22 May 2014].
49
Bellamy, pp. 19-66.
50
Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocities Once and For All (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), p. 105.

12

return it to the very people currently suffering under those acting in

its name.51
Accordingly, R2P is firmly grounded in the belief that a state's
autonomy should not be construed as an end in itself, but rather "as
a means for realizing the basic human rights of individuals living
within the boundaries of sovereign states.52 It is that very rationale
which also informs Kofi Annan's reasoning on the two concepts of
sovereignty, meaning that instead of individual persons being merely
considered subjects of their states, it is the latter which instead ought
to serve the needs of its people, so that any international norms first
need to ensure the well-being of individual human beings as opposed
to protecting those who abuse them.53 From this point of view, an
outside interference would therefore only amount to an intrusion on
states' internal sovereignty for failure to guarantee their citizens basic
human rights, and thus not necessarily to an infringement of their
external sovereignty towards other nations as well.54 It is only when
governing authorities are unfit to assure their people's safety and
well-being that foreign interference becomes permissible according to
R2P,55 given that it does after all not seek to weaken a state's over-all
autonomy and territorial integrity, but only to rectify "the relationship
between the government and the governed and the way the internal
aspect of sovereignty is constructed."56 In such cases, a foreign
intervention may therefore be the only way for not only providing vital
goods and services to native populations,57 but for likewise restoring
the internal aspect of their national sovereignty in the process.58

51

Karda, p.35; Ban Ki-moon, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (A/63/677) (New York:
United Nations, 2009), pp. 7-8. http://www.unrol.org/files/SG_reportA_63_677_en.pdf [accessed 22
May 2014].
52
Karda, p. 31.
53
Kofi Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty", The Economist, 16 September 1999.
http://www.economist.com/node/324795 [accessed 27 May 2014].
54
Karda, pp. 31-32.
55
Paragraph 139 of United Nations World Summit Outcome Document 2005, op. cit.
56
Karda, p. 32.
57
Ayoob, p. 97.
58
Ban Ki-moon, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, pp. 7-8.

13

It is precisely such inability of the Syrian government to afford

its people elementary freedoms and

acceptable socioeconomic

conditions which has virtually forfeited all by itself any pretensions of

the Assad regime to further represent the interests of the Syrian
state.59 Yet its blatant dereliction of the duties vis--vis its own
citizens ultimately warrants foreign involvement not only for the sake
of reinforcing Syria's internal sovereignty. For since the country's
descent into civil war also stands to lastingly affect its relations with
other political entities, there exists an even greater need to consider
the erosion of its internal sovereignty also in light of the growing
threats which that development could before long spell for the
international community as well. More concretely, Syria is a supreme
example of the fact that civilian strife may not only be a danger to the
peace and stability of the concerned states themselves, but ultimately
also to those of other trans-regional actors and/or the international
order on the whole.60 As Glennon observes, it is simply no longer in
keeping with the realities of modern-day international relations to
hold on to the assumption "that the core threat to international
security still comes from interstate violence."61 Hence it is critical that
political leaders recognize that the forces which could severely
undermine the viability and efficiency of the international order may
nowadays just as easily originate from intra-state violence as they
once did from cross-border confrontations.62
Above

all

where

sovereign

authorities

are

unwilling

to

peacefully resolve internal problems, foreign interventions may

59

See Human Rights Watch World Report 2010 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2010), p. 555;
Amnesty International Report 2009: Syria. http://report2009.amnesty.org/en/regions/middle-eastnorth-africa/syria [accessed 23 May 2014]; Suzanne Saleeby, "Sowing the Seeds of Dissent: Economic
Grievances and the Syrian Social Contract's Unravelling", Jadaliyya, 16 February 2012.
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4383/sowing-the-seeds-of-dissent_economic-grievances-an
[accessed 23 May 2014].
60
See Stanley Hoffmann, "Sovereignty and the Ethics of Intervention", in: The Ethics and
Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996),
pp. 2829.
61
Michael J. Glennon, "The New Interventionism: The Search for a Just International Law", Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 78:3 (May/June 1999), p.2.
62
Glennon, pp. 3-5.

14

ultimately not only be required, but arguably even legitimate for

eliminating any threats emanating from within that state to the peace
and security of the wider international community.63 As Bull has
remarked, the norm of non-interference may after all not always
reflect the realities of the time, so that it should accordingly be
subject to at least some degree of modification in order to better meet
the requirements of the situation in question.64 Similarly, Hoffman
further notes that there may well be "cases in which the effects of
non-intervention might be worse than those of intervention",65 so that
continued reluctance to act against those responsible for intra-state
violence could ultimately rather harm than protect international
peace and stability.
Since the Syrian crisis arguably constitutes such a threat to
international peace and security, a more assertive role of foreign
powers in that conflict may indeed be indispensable for keeping its
inimical, trans-national implications at bay. Those in favour of
outside interference must therefore make every effort to persuade
other nations that an intervention would accordingly not only serve
national self-interest, but that failure to do so could eventually entail
even greater risks to the over-all peace and stability of the
international community.66 By re-shifting attention from chemical
weapons and moral imperatives to such dangers, western countries
in particular need to convince other nations that an intervention
would thus ultimately protect common strategic interests as well,
notably through avoiding a potentially disastrous state failure, stifling
the spread of transnational terrorism and, arguably just as
importantly, disavowing the perversive notion of unpunished state
aggression in the 21st century.

63

Schnabel, "Humanitarian Intervention", p. 27; Abiew, "Assessing Humanitarian Intervention", p.

62.
64
Hedley Bull, Intervention in World Politics, p. 187.
65
Hoffmann, "Sovereignty and the Ethics of Intervention", p. 20.
66
Glennon, pp. 4-5.

15

Humanitarian intervention as part of geostrategic concerns

The causal links between civil wars, failed states and

international terrorism have been explored at length,67 yet in public
discourses on Syria they still do not receive such consideration as
they deserve. However, the potential risks to international peace and
security by not appropriately reacting to such humanitarian crises
are indeed manifold as the chaos in that country clearly shows. In
particular, the destruction in Syria not only places tremendous
logistic, political and socioeconomic burdens on neighbouring
countries in the wake of mass refugee movements, but it has
moreover also sparked a renewed process of radicalization and
secessionist activities in several other populations.68 Above all,
however, it has simultaneously strengthened terrorist organizations
on a domestic and transnational level, with the result that their
operations will in all likelihood not remain confined to merely Syria
itself.69 The very fact that Syrian extremists have already established
connections with terrorist networks in Iraq is after all a clear
indication of the threat that the Syrian conflict ultimately poses to
both local and regional stabilities, notably by aiding terrorists reignite
civil wars in equally unstable territories.70
Accordingly, it is imperative to re-focus attention on these
highly relevant issues, notably since international peace and security
and, by extension, the question of foreign interference are inextricably

67

Ken Menkhaus, "Quasi-States, Nation-Building, and Terrorist Safe Havens", Journal of Conflict
Studies, Vol. 23:2 (Fall 2003), pp. 723; Stewart Patrick, "Failed States and Global Security: Empirical
Questions and Policy Dilemmas", International Studies Review, Vol. 9:4 (Winter 2007), pp. 644-662;
Robert I. Rodberg, State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 2003).
68

Kenneth M. Pollack and Ray Takeyh, "Near Eastern Promises. Why Washington Should Focus on
the Middle East", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93:3 (May/June 2014), pp. 96-99.
69
Andrew J. Tabler, "Syria's Collapse. And How Washington Can Stop It", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92:4
(July/August 2013), pp. 90-91.
70
Pollack and Takeyh, p. 96, 99; "Syrian War Worsens Lebanons Malaise", IISS Strategic Comments,
Vol. 19:25 (September 2013) (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2013).
http://www.iiss.org/-/media/Silos/Strategic%20comments/2013/Syrian-war-worsens-Lebanon--39-smalaise/Syrian-war-worsens-Lebanon--39-s-malaise.pdf [accessed May 26 2014].

16

related to them. In that context, non-interventionists first need to

critically re-evaluate their view that non-interference in states'
internal activities invariably makes for a guarantor of international
peace and stability,71 and finally embrace the possibility that intrastate confrontations may just as likely disrupt the operations of the
international system as cross-border combat might. With this mind,
any prospects for reaching an international consensus on Syria will
essentially boil down to the normative interpretation of 'national
sovereignty', i.e. whether sovereignty should solely be seen as a
vested right of individual nation-states, or rather as an obligation of
acting governments to not only ensure their own population's wellbeing

and

security,

but

ultimately

also

those

of

the

wider

international community.72
After all, a state may not only harm other countries through
offensive military operations against their immediate territorial
integrity; instead it might also endanger them by a repressive
handling of its own internal problems. In Syria, Assad's brutal
crackdown against his own people thus precipitated a situation that
could easily jeopardize other nations' security as well-not through
any direct external aggression, but rather through governmental
negligence to likewise meet the Syrian state' responsibilities towards
other nations, notably by maintaining such

societal peace and

stability within as is necessary for prohibiting the rise and spread of

any homegrown forces that might before long develop into an
imminent threat to the latter's safety as well.

73

Hence it is a

fundamentally mistaken view to believe the Assad regime capable of

bolstering regional stability when continued support for it does in fact

71

Chu Shulong, "China, Asia and Issues of Sovereignty and Intervention", Pugwash Occasional
Papers, Vol. 2:1 (January 2001). http://www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/como_china.htm [accessed 23
May 2014].
72
Ayoob, p. 84.
73
Richard Outzen, "The Flawed Strategic Debate on Syria", INSS CSR Strategic Forum No. 285,
January 2014 (Washington D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2014), pp. 1-12.
http://inss.dodlive.mil/files/2014/04/SF-285.pdf [accessed 26 May 2014].

17

nothing but only further prejudice the chances for sustained peace
and security.
In that regard, Russian and Chinese understanding of the
Assad regime as a reliable actor against trans-national terrorism is
essentially confusing cause for effect.74 More specifically, what now
appears a country riven by multiple terrorist networks was, at least
initially, not an instance of religiously motivated terrorism.75 Instead
popular opposition to the Assad regime was clearly national rather
than ideological in nature, with Islamic extremists only subsequently
joining in.76 Yet by continuing to back a repressive regime while
simultaneously ignoring those suffering under it, such an approach is
arguably more likely to spur rather than to contain or eliminate
regional terrorism.77 Consequently, it is crucial to no longer see
Assad's actions as a self-proclaimed attempt to crush international
terrorism,78 but rather as the root cause for helping it gain a foothold
in an already volatile region in the first place.
In so doing, even the Syrian governments' staunchest allies
should realize that Assad is ultimately anything but a safeguard
against international terrorism. Quite to the contrary, Assad has
allowed a situation to arise in which terrorist elements have found
fertile breeding grounds for eventually waging their ideological war
against other countries as well.79 If government malpractices can
74

See Vladimir V. Putin, "A Plea for Caution From Russia", The New York Times, 11 September 2013.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for-caution-from-russia-onsyria.html?_r=0 [accessed 22 May 2014].
75
On 'new terrorism', i.e. networked terrorist groups supposedly driven by religious rather than by
political objectives, see in particular Michael Stohl, "Myths, new fantasies and the enduring realities
of terrorism", Critical Studies on Terrorism, Vol. 1:1 (2008), pp. 5-16; and David Tucker, "What's New
About the New Terrorism and How Dangerous Is It", Terrorism and Political Violence 13 (Autumn
2011), pp. 1-14.
76
Tabler, p. 98.
77
Simon Tisdall, "Forget Ukraine, Syria is now the world's biggest threat", CNN, 3 April 2014.
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/04/03/opinion/syria-refugees-tisdall/index.html?hpt=hp_c1 [accessed
27 May 2014].
78
"Syria's Assad determined to 'eradicate terrorism'", The Voice of Russia, 18 August 2013.
http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2013_08_18/Syrias-Assad-determined-to-eradicate-terrorism-armykilled-jihadist-leader-5766/ [accessed 23 May 2014].
79
Brian Michael Jenkins, The Role of Terrorism and Terror in Syria's Civilian War (The Rand
Corporation,
November
2013).

18

therefore generate such a potential threat to the safety of others, one

needs to seriously reconsider arguments as to the inviolability of its
national sovereignty, notably since the risk of transnational terrorism
will arguably grow only further by not engaging it in due course in
those areas where it stands to gain most in strength80in particular
by permitting governments to indiscriminately murder large parts of
their own people.
The recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq should after all
serve as a warning example of how easily terrorist groups may exploit
local grievances for their own ends.81 In the process, these conflicts
turned into what Alexis Debat fittingly called "a public relations
windfall for their ideologues, a training ground for their 'rookies,' and
even a safe-haven for their leadership."82 In Iraq, it was American
unilateralism which resulted in a dangerous security vacuum that
allowed Al-Qaeda to take advantage of civil unrest83 and expand its
network of regional affiliates.84 However, a similar such strengthening
of Al-Qaeda may ultimately also occur by allowing it to thrive
unchecked in equally contested areas such as presently in Syria.85
In light of this, transnational terrorism therefore not only poses
an acute threat to western civilization, but to the wider international
community as well. After all there does already exist some evidence
that indifference to oppressive governments murdering innocent
Muslims has had some repercussions on non-western countries
too.86 At the very least, terrorist activities aimed against the proper
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT402/RAND_CT402.pdf
[accessed 22 May 2014].
80
Marc Sageman, "A Strategy for Fighting International Islamist Terrorists", Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 618 (July 2008), p. 229.
81
Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth Pollack, "Iraq's Long-Term Impact on Jihadist Terrorism", Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 618 (July 2008), p. 58.
82
Alexis Debat, "Vivisecting the jihad", The National Interest, Vol.76 (Summer 2004), p. 22.
83
Byman and Pollack, pp. 62-63.
84
Reid Sawyer and Michael Foster, "The Resurgent and Persistent Threat of Al Qaeda", Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 618 (July 2008), p. 200.
85
Tabler, pp. 90-92.
86
See, for instance, the recent repeated outbreaks of violence in China's western province Xinjiang
that have been traced back to Syrian extremists by Chinese authorities. Sui-Lee Wee, Michael
Martina, Li Hui and Nick Macfie, "China state media blame Syrian rebels for Xinjiang violence",

19

functioning of the international system might before long also

impinge upon their own national well-being, if only because the very
norms and institutions which Islamic extremism seeks to undermine
do after all in no small measure account for the over-all prosperity of
non-western societies as well. Hence it is in the best interests of the
entire international community to end human suffering in Syria
before it will only further contribute to the cause of jihadist terrorism
by providing it with the very assets and environments needed for
eventually turning its energies against other countries as well.

im Unterschied

Conclusion
Thus rather than detaching R2P from strategic concerns as some
have argued,87 it actually needs to be more systematically linked to
them instead.

Foreign intervention under the auspices of the UN Security Council

preferable, however if the Syrian conflict poses a threat to the
international system and thus by extension to the security and wellbeing of its constituent members states as well, then the latter
ultimately ought to have the right to protect themselves from such a
danger even without the assent of other major powers.
If Russia and China, who rightfully (by every right) ought to be
treated by western countries as equal and legitimate partners in the
Reuters,
1
July
2013.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/01/us-china-xinjiangidUSBRE96005I20130701 [accessed 28 May 2014]; Michael Martina, "China state media says five
suicide
bombers
carried
out
Xinjiang
attack",
Reuters,
23
May
2014.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/23/us-china-blast-idUSBREA4L01K20140523 [accessed 28
May 2014].
87
Jon Western and Joshua S. Goldstein, "R2P After Syria: To Save the Doctrine, Forget Regime
Change", Foreign Affairs, 26 March 2013. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139080/jonwestern-and-joshua-s-goldstein/r2p-after-syria [accessed 22 May 2014].

20

workings of the established international system, truly desire to

maintain and preserve the basic structures and operations of that
order by which their own people and economies after all benefit as
well, then they too will before long have to realize and acknowledge
that in modern-day world politics, threats to the long-term security
and stability of that order can ultimately just as well arise from intrastate rather than only from inter-state conflict and that, as a result,
the notion of state sovereignty needs to be reassessed and re-adapted
accordingly in order to better (more efficiently) meet the dangers and
adverse effects potentially emanating from such a reality.

The need for ending humanitarian suffering at the hand of oppressive

regimes is not merely borne out of some overly idealistic thinking or
morality; rather it forms part of the very essence of geo-political
realities in the 21st century. If political leaders therefore truly wish to
preserve the stability and peace of the present international system,
they will before long have to accept the fact that a responsibility to
protect innocent civilians in war-torn countries does ultimately not
only exist on purely ethical grounds, but essentially also for distinctly
strategic reasons in relation to their own long-term national security
and prosperity as well.
It may at the present time arguably prove impossible to enshrine the
responsibility to protect innocent populations as a universal norm in
international law, so that although moral conscience may demand it,
violations of human rights can ultimately not in all cases be entirely
prevented or adequately addressed by the international community. A
more systematic relation of humanitarian concerns to common
strategic interests will in that context certainly not serve as an ideal
solution either, yet it may at least help to relieve part of the suffering
in those regions where otherwise no action at all would likely have
been taken to actively resolve such humanitarian crises.

21

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