Professional Documents
Culture Documents
BANC
G.R.
No.
206248,
February
18,
2014
GRACE
M.
GRANDE,
Petitioner,
v.
PATRICIO
T.
ANTONIO,
Respondent.
D
E
C
I
S
I
O
N
VELASCO
JR.,
J.:
Before
this
Court
is
a
Petition
for
Review
on
Certiorari
under
Rule
45,
assailing
the
July
24,
2012
Decision1
and
March
5,
2013
Resolution2
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
(CA)
in
CAG.R.
CV
No.
96406.
As
culled
from
the
records,
the
facts
of
this
case
are:
Petitioner
Grace
Grande
(Grande)
and
respondent
Patricio
Antonio
(Antonio)
for
a
period
of
time
lived
together
as
husband
and
wife,
although
Antonio
was
at
that
time
already
married
to
someone
else.3
Out
of
this
illicit
relationship,
two
sons
were
born:
Andre
Lewis
(on
February
8,
1998)
and
Jerard
Patrick
(on
October
13,
1999).4
The
children
were
not
expressly
recognized
by
respondent
as
his
own
in
the
Record
of
Births
of
the
children
in
the
Civil
Registry.
The
parties
relationship,
however,
eventually
turned
sour,
and
Grande
left
for
the
United
States
with
her
two
children
in
May
2007.
This
prompted
respondent
Antonio
to
file
a
Petition
for
Judicial
Approval
of
Recognition
with
Prayer
to
take
Parental
Authority,
Parental
Physical
Custody,
Correction/Change
of
Surname
of
Minors
and
for
the
Issuance
of
Writ
of
Preliminary
Injunction
before
the
Regional
Trial
Court,
Branch
8
of
Aparri,
Cagayan
(RTC),
appending
a
notarized
Deed
of
Voluntary
Recognition
of
Paternity
of
the
children.5
On
September
28,
2010,
the
RTC
rendered
a
Decision
in
favor
of
herein
respondent
Antonio,
ruling
that
[t]he
evidence
at
d.
Father
7.1
For
Births
Not
Yet
Registered
7.1.1
The
illegitimate
child
shall
use
the
surname
of
the
father
if
a
public
document
is
executed
by
the
father,
either
at
the
back
of
the
Certificate
of
Live
Birth
or
in
a
separate
document.
7.1.2
If
admission
of
paternity
is
made
through
a
private
instrument,
the
child
shall
use
the
surname
of
the
father,
provided
the
registration
is
supported
by
the
following
documents:
x
x
x
x
7.2.
For
Births
Previously
Registered
under
the
Surname
of
the
Mother
7.2.1
If
filiation
has
been
expressly
recognized
by
the
father,
the
child
shall
use
the
surname
of
the
father
upon
the
submission
of
the
accomplished
AUSF
[Affidavit
of
Use
of
the
Surname
of
the
Father].
7.2.2
If
filiation
has
not
been
expressly
recognized
by
the
father,
the
child
shall
use
the
surname
of
the
father
upon
submission
of
a
public
document
or
a
private
handwritten
instrument
supported
by
the
documents
listed
in
Rule
7.1.2.
7.3
Except
in
Item
7.2.1,
the
consent
of
the
illegitimate
child
is
required
if
he/she
has
reached
the
age
of
majority.
The
consent
may
be
contained
in
a
separate
instrument
duly
notarized.
x
x
x
x
Rule
8.
Effects
of
Recognition
8.1
For
Births
Not
Yet
Registered
(Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus,
We
exercise
this
power
in
voiding
the
abovequoted
provisions
of
the
IRR
of
RA
9255
insofar
as
it
provides
the
mandatory
use
by
illegitimate
children
of
their
fathers
surname
upon
the
latters
recognition
of
his
paternity.
To
conclude,
the
use
of
the
word
shall
in
the
IRR
of
RA
9255
is
of
no
moment.
The
clear,
unambiguous,
and
unequivocal
use
of
may
in
Art.
176
rendering
the
use
of
an
illegitimate
fathers
surname
discretionary
controls,
and
illegitimate
children
are
given
the
choice
on
the
surnames
by
which
they
will
be
known.
At
this
juncture,
We
take
note
of
the
letters
submitted
by
the
children,
now
aged
thirteen
(13)
and
fifteen
(15)
years
old,
to
this
Court
declaring
their
opposition
to
have
their
names
changed
to
Antonio.26
However,
since
these
letters
were
not
offered
before
and
evaluated
by
the
trial
court,
they
do
not
provide
any
evidentiary
weight
to
sway
this
Court
to
rule
for
or
against
petitioner.27
A
proper
inquiry
into,
and
evaluation
of
the
evidence
of,
the
childrens
choice
of
surname
by
the
trial
court
is
necessary.
WHEREFORE,
the
instant
petition
is
PARTIALLY
GRANTED.
The
July
24,
2012
Decision
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
in
CAG.R.
CV
No.
96406
is
MODIFIED,
the
dispositive
portion
of
which
shall
read:
WHEREFORE,
the
appeal
is
partly
GRANTED.
Accordingly,
the
appealed
Decision
of
the
Regional
Trial
Court
Branch
8,
Aparri
Cagayan
in
SP
Proc.
Case
No.
114492
is
MODIFIED
in
part
and
shall
hereinafter
read
as
follows:
a.
3
Id.
at
25.
4
Id.
at
10,
25,
4446,
50.
5
Id.
at
79.
6
Id.
at
30.chanrobleslaw
7
Id.
at
2425.
8
Id.
at
30.
9
Id.
at
31.
10
Id.
at
3638.
11
Id.
at
38.
12
Id.
at
39.
13
Id.
14
An
Act
Allowing
Illegitimate
Children
to
Use
the
Surname
of
Registration:
RULE
13.
Posting
of
the
Pending
Application.
(1)
A
notice
to
the
public
on
the
pending
application
for
delayed
registration
shall
be
posted
in
the
bulletin
board
of
the
city/municipality
for
a
period
of
not
less
than
ten
(10)
days.
(2)
If
after
ten
(10)
days,
no
one
opposes
the
registration,
the
civil
registrar
shall
evaluate
the
veracity
of
the
statements
made
in
the
required
documents
submitted.
(3)
If
after
proper
evaluation
of
all
documents
presented
and
investigation
of
the
allegations
contained
therein,
the
civil
registrar
is
convinced
that
the
event
really
occurred
within
the
jurisdiction
of
the
civil
registry
office,
and
finding
out
that
said
event
was
not
registered,
he
shall
register
the
delayed
report
thereof.
(4)
The
civil
registrar,
in
all
cases
of
delayed
registration
of
birth,
death
and
marriage,
shall
conduct
an
investigation
whenever
an
opposition
is
filed
against
its
registration
by
taking
the
testimonies
of
the
parties
concerned
and
witnesses
in
the
form
of
questions
and
answers.
After
investigation,
the
civil
registrar
shall
forward
his
findings
and
recommendations
to
the
Office
of
the
Civil
RegistrarGeneral
for
appropriate
action.
(5)
The
Civil
RegistrarGeneral
may,
after
review
and
proper
evaluation,
deny
or
authorize
the
registration.
25Tan
v.
COMELEC,
G.R.
Nos.
16614347
&
166891,
November
Republic
of
the
Philippines
SUPREME
COURT
Manila
THIRD
DIVISION
G.R.
No.
175822
October
23,
2013
CALIFORNIA
CLOTHING
INC.
and
MICHELLE
S.
YBAEZ,
Petitioners,
vs.
SHIRLEY
G.
QUIONES,
Respondent.
D
E
C
I
S
I
O
N
PERALTA,
J.:
Assailed
in
this
petition
for
review
on
certiorari
under
Rule
45
of
the
;
Rules
of
Court
are
the
Court
of
Appeals
Decision1
dated
August
3,
2006
and
Resolution2
dated
November
14,
2006
in
CA-G.R.
CV
No.
80309.
The
assailed
decision
reversed
and
set
aside
the
June
20,
2003
Decision3
of
the
Regional
Trial
Court
of
Cebu
City
(RTC),
Branch
58,
in
Civil
Case
No.
CEB-26984;
while
the
assailed
resolution
denied
the
motion
for
reconsideration
filed
by
petitioner
Michelle
Ybaez
(Ybaez).
The
facts
of
the
case,
as
culled
from
the
records,
are
as
follows:
On
July
25,
2001,
respondent
Shirley
G.
Quiones,
a
Reservation
Ticketing
Agent
of
Cebu
Pacific
Air
in
Lapu
Lapu
City,
went
inside
the
Guess
USA
Boutique
at
the
second
floor
of
Robinsons
Department
Store
(Robinsons)
in
Cebu
City.
She
fitted
four
items:
two
jeans,
a
blouse
and
a
shorts,
then
decided
to
purchase
the
black
jeans
worth
P2,098.00.4
Respondent
allegedly
paid
to
the
cashier
evidenced
by
a
receipt5
issued
by
the
store.6
jeans
she
purchased
but
that
she
deliberately
took
the
same
without
paying
for
it
and
later
hurriedly
left
the
shop
to
evade
payment.
These
accusations
were
made
despite
the
issuance
of
the
receipt
of
payment
and
the
release
of
the
item
purchased.
There
was,
likewise,
no
showing
that
respondent
had
the
intention
to
evade
payment.
Contrary
to
petitioners
claim,
respondent
was
not
in
a
rush
in
leaving
the
shop
or
the
mall.
This
is
evidenced
by
the
fact
that
the
Guess
employees
did
not
have
a
hard
time
looking
for
her
when
they
realized
the
supposed
non-payment.
It
can
be
inferred
from
the
foregoing
that
in
sending
the
demand
letter
to
respondents
employer,
petitioners
intended
not
only
to
ask
for
assistance
in
collecting
the
disputed
amount
but
to
tarnish
respondents
reputation
in
the
eyes
of
her
employer.
To
malign
respondent
without
substantial
evidence
and
despite
the
latters
possession
of
enough
evidence
in
her
favor,
is
clearly
impermissible.
A
person
should
not
use
his
right
unjustly
or
contrary
to
honesty
and
good
faith,
otherwise,
he
opens
himself
to
liability.38
The
exercise
of
a
right
must
be
in
accordance
with
the
purpose
for
which
it
was
established
and
must
not
be
excessive
or
unduly
harsh.39
In
this
case,
petitioners
obviously
abused
their
rights.
Complementing
the
principle
of
abuse
of
rights
are
the
provisions
of
Articles
20
and
2
of
the
Civil
Code
which
read:40
Article
20.
Every
person
who,
contrary
to
law,
willfully
or
negligently
causes
damage
to
another,
shall
indemnify
the
latter
for
the
same.
Article
21.
Any
person
who
willfully
causes
loss
or
injury
to
another
in
a
manner
that
is
contrary
to
morals
or
good
ROBERTO
A.
ABAD
JOSE
CATRAL
MEN
Associate
Justice
Associate
Justi
MARVIC
MARIO
VICTOR
F.
LEONEN
Associate
Justice
A
T
T
E
S
T
A
T
I
O
N
I
attest
that
the
conclusions
in
the
above
Decision
had
been
reached
in
consultation
before
the
case
was
assigned
to
the
writer
of
the
opinion
of
the
Court
s
Division.
PRESBITERO
J.
VELASCO,
JR.
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third
Division
C
E
R
T
I
F
I
C
A
T
I
O
N
Pursuant
to
Section
13,
Article
VIII
of
the
Constitution
and
the
,
Division
Chairperson
s
Attestation,
I
certify
that
the
conclusions
n
the
above
Decision
had
been
reached
in
consultation
before
the
case
was
assigned
to
the
writer
of
the
opinion
of
the
Court
s
Division.
MARIA
LOURDES
P.
A.
SERENO
Chief
Justice
Footnotes
1
Penned
by
Associate
Justice
Agustin
S.
Dizon,
with
Associate
5
Records,
p.
8.
6
Id.
at
2.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
at
3.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
at
4.
14
Id.
at
5.
15
Id.
at
1-7.
16
Id.
at
5.
17
Id.
at
38-46.
18
Id.
at
41-42.
19
Id.
at
42.
20
Id.
at
43.
21
Id.
22
Id.
at
43-44.
23
Rollo,
pp.
49-51.
24
Id.
at
61.
(Italics
and
emphasis
in
the
original)
25
Id.
at
56.
26
Id.
at
57.
27
Id.
at
58.
28
Id.
at
61.
29
CA
rollo,
pp.
84-90.
30
Rollo,
p.
14.
31
481
Phil.
352
(2004).
32
Carpio
v.
Valmonte,
supra,
at
361-362.
33
Dart
Philippines,
Inc.
v.
Calogcog,
G.R.
No.
149241,
August
24,
2009,
596
SCRA
614,
624;
Carpio
v.
Valmonte,
supra
note
31,
at
362.
34
Villanueva
v.
Rosqueta,
G.R.
No.
180764,
January
19,
2010,
G.R.
No.
180257,
February
23,
2011,
644
SCRA
180,
202.
37
Rollo,
p.
59.
(Emphasis
and
italics
in
the
original)
38
Uypitching
v.
Quiamco,
G.R.
No.
146322,
December
6,
2006,
SO
ORDERED.
Ruling
of
the
CA
On
appeal,
the
CA
affirmed
the
RTC,7
sustaining
the
award
of
moral
damages.
It
opined
that
even
if
the
petitioner
had
been
acquitted
of
the
crime
charged,
the
acquittal
did
not
necessarily
mean
that
he
had
not
incurred
civil
liability
considering
that
the
Prosecution
had
preponderantly
established
the
sufferings
of
Hanz
as
the
result
of
the
circumcision.
The
petitioner
moved
for
reconsideration,
but
the
CA
denied
the
motion
on
April
28,
2004.8
Hence,
this
appeal.
Issue
Whether
the
CA
erred
in
affirming
the
petitioners
civil
liability
despite
his
acquittal
of
the
crime
of
reckless
imprudence
resulting
in
serious
physical
injuries.
Ruling
The
petition
for
review
lacks
merit.
It
is
axiomatic
that
every
person
criminally
liable
for
a
felony
is
also
civilly
liable.9
Nevertheless,
the
acquittal
of
an
accused
of
the
crime
charged
does
not
necessarily
extinguish
his
civil
liability.
In
Manantan
v.
Court
of
Appeals,10
the
Court
elucidates
on
the
two
kinds
of
acquittal
recognized
by
our
law
as
well
as
on
the
different
effects
of
acquittal
on
the
civil
liability
of
the
accused,
viz:
Our
law
recognizes
two
kinds
of
acquittal,
with
different
effects
on
the
civil
liability
of
the
accused.1wphi1
First
is
an
acquittal
on
the
ground
that
the
accused
is
not
the
author
of
the
act
or
omission
complained
of.
This
instance
closes
the
door
to
civil
liability,
for
a
person
who
has
been
found
to
be
not
the
perpetrator
of
any
act
or
omission
cannot
and
can
never
be
held
liable
for
such
act
or
omission.
There
being
no
delict,
civil
liability
ex
delicto
is
out
of
the
question,
and
the
civil
action,
if
any,
which
may
be
instituted
must
be
based
on
grounds
other
than
the
delict
complained
of.
This
is
the
situation
contemplated
in
Rule
111
of
the
Rules
of
Court.
The
second
instance
is
an
acquittal
based
on
reasonable
doubt
on
the
guilt
of
the
accused.
In
this
case,
even
if
the
guilt
of
the
accused
has
not
been
satisfactorily
established,
he
is
not
exempt
from
civil
liability
which
may
be
proved
by
preponderance
of
evidence
only.
The
Rules
of
Court
requires
that
in
case
of
an
acquittal,
the
judgment
shall
state
"whether
the
evidence
of
the
prosecution
absolutely
failed
to
prove
the
guilt
of
the
accused
or
merely
failed
to
prove
his
guilt
beyond
reasonable
doubt.
In
either
case,
the
judgment
shall
determine
if
the
act
or
omission
from
which
the
civil
liability
might
arise
did
not
exist."11
Conformably
with
the
foregoing,
therefore,
the
acquittal
of
an
accused
does
not
prevent
a
judgment
from
still
being
rendered
against
him
on
the
civil
aspect
of
the
criminal
case
unless
the
court
finds
and
declares
that
the
fact
from
which
the
civil
liability
might
arise
did
not
exist.
Although
it
found
the
Prosecutions
evidence
insufficient
to
sustain
a
judgment
of
conviction
against
the
petitioner
for
the
crime
charged,
the
RTC
did
not
err
in
determining
and
adjudging
his
civil
liability
for
the
same
act
complained
of
based
on
mere
preponderance
of
evidence.12
In
this
connection,
the
Court
reminds
that
the
acquittal
for
insufficiency
of
the
evidence
did
not
require
that
the
damages.
Many
years
have
gone
by
since
Hanz
suffered
the
injury.
Interest
of
6%
per
annum
should
then
be
imposed
on
the
award
as
a
sincere
means
of
adjusting
the
value
of
the
award
to
a
level
that
is
not
only
reasonable
but
just
and
commensurate.
Unless
we
make
the
adjustment
in
the
permissible
manner
by
prescribing
legal
interest
on
the
award,
his
sufferings
would
be
unduly
compounded.
For
that
purpose,
the
reckoning
of
interest
should
be
from
the
filing
of
the
criminal
information
on
April
17,
1997,
the
making
of
the
judicial
demand
for
the
liability
of
the
petitioner.
WHEREFORE,
the
Court
AFFIRMS
the
decision
promulgated
on
February
20,
2003,
with
the
modification
that
legal
interest
of
6%
per
annum
to
start
from
April
17,
1997
is
imposed
on
the
award
of:P50,000.00
as
moral
damages;
and
ORDERS
the
petitioner
to
pay
the
costs
of
suit.
SO
ORDERED.
LUCAS
P.
BERSAMIN
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
MARIA
LOURDES
P.
A.
SERENO
Chief
Justice
TERESITA
J.
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate
Justice
BIENVENIDO
L.
REYES
Associate
Justice
MARTIN
S.
VILLARA
Associate
Justi
C
E
R
T
I
F
I
C
A
T
I
O
N
Pursuant
to
Section
13,
Article
VIII
of
the
Constitution,
I
certify
that
the
conclusions
in
the
above
Decision
had
been
reached
in
consultation
before
the
case
was
assigned
to
the
writer
of
the
202,
206.
14
Id.
Republic
of
the
Philippines
SUPREME
COURT
Manila
EN
BANC
G.R.
No.
176830
February
11,
2014
SATURNINO
C.
OCAMPO,
Petitioner,
vs.
HON.
EPHREM
S.
ABANDO,
in
his
capacity
as
Presiding
Judge
of
the
Regional
Trial
Court
of
Hilongos,
Leyte,
Branch
18,
CESAR
M.
MERIN,
in.
his
capacity
as
Approving
Prosecutor
and
Officer-in-
Charge,
ROSULO
U.
VIVERO,
in
his
capacity
as
Investigating
Prosecutor,
RAUL
M.
GONZALEZ,
in
his
capacity
as
Secretary
of
the
Department
of
Justice,
Respondents.
x
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
x
G.R.
No.
185587
RANDALL
B.
ECHANIS,
Petitioner,
vs.
HON.
THELMA
BUNYl-
MEDINA,
in
her
capacity
as
Presiding
Judge
of
the
Regional
Trial
Court
of
Manila,
Branch
32,
HON.
EPHREM
S.
ABANDO,
in
his
capacity
as
Presiding
Judge
of
the
Regional
Trial
Court
of
Hilongos,
Leyte,
Branch
18,
CESAR
M.
MERIN,
in
his
capacity
as
Approving
Prosecutor
and
Officer-in-
Charge,
ROSULO
U.
VIVERO,
in
his
capacity
as
Investigating
Prosecutor,
RAUL
M.
GONZALEZ,
in
his
capacity
as
Secretary
of
the
Department
of
Justice,
Respondents.
x
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
x
G.R.
No.
185636
RAFAEL
G.
BAYLOSIS,
Petitioner,
vs.
HON.
THELMA
BUNYI-
MEDINA,
in
her
capacity
as
Presiding
Judge
of
the
Regional
Trial
Court
of
Manila,
Branch
32,
HON.
EPHREM
S.
counsel
should
not
expect
that
all
they
need
to
do
is
sit
back,
relax
and
await
the
outcome
of
their
case."106
Having
opted
to
remain
passive
during
the
preliminary
investigation,
petitioner
Ladlad
and
his
counsel
cannot
now
claim
a
denial
of
due
process,
since
their
failure
to
file
a
counter-affidavit
was
of
their
own
doing.
Neither
do
we
find
any
merit
in
petitioner
Ocampos
allegation
of
collusion
to
surreptitiously
insert
the
Supplemental
Affidavit
of
Zacarias
Piedad
in
the
records.
There
was
nothing
surreptitious
about
the
Supplemental
Affidavit
since
it
clearly
alludes
to
an
earlier
affidavit
and
admits
the
mistake
committed
regarding
the
date
of
the
alleged
meeting.
The
date
of
the
execution
of
the
Supplemental
Affidavit
was
also
clearly
stated.
Thus,
it
was
clear
that
it
was
executed
after
petitioner
Ocampo
had
submitted
his
counter-affidavit.
Should
the
case
go
to
trial,
that
will
provide
petitioner
Ocampo
with
the
opportunity
to
question
the
execution
of
Zacarias
Piedads
Supplemental
Affidavit.
Neither
can
we
uphold
petitioner
Ocampos
contention
that
he
was
denied
the
right
to
be
heard.
For
him
to
claim
that
he
was
denied
due
process
by
not
being
furnished
a
copy
of
the
Supplemental
Affidavit
of
Zacarias
Piedad
would
imply
that
the
entire
case
of
the
prosecution
rested
on
the
Supplemental
Affidavit.
The
OSG
has
asserted
that
the
indictment
of
petitioner
Ocampo
was
based
on
the
collective
affidavits
of
several
other
witnesses107
attesting
to
the
allegation
that
he
was
a
member
of
the
CPP/NPA/NDFP
Central
Committee,
which
had
ordered
the
launch
of
Operation
VD.
As
to
his
claim
that
he
was
denied
the
right
to
file
a
motion
for
reconsideration
or
to
appeal
the
Resolution
of
Prosecutor
Vivero
due
to
the
19-day
delay
in
the
service
of
the
Resolution,
it
must
be
pointed
out
that
the
period
for
filing
a
motion
for
Office,
PNP,
Region
VIII
and
Camp
Crame,
Quezon
City,
pictures
of
the
grave
site
and
skeletal
remains,
this
court
has
the
findings
[sic]
of
probable
cause
in
the
commission
by
all
mentioned
accused
of
the
crime
charged.119
At
bottom,
issues
involving
the
finding
of
probable
cause
for
an
indictment
and
issuance
of
a
warrant
of
arrest,
as
petitioners
are
doubtless
aware,
are
primarily
questions
of
fact
that
are
normally
not
within
the
purview
of
a
petition
for
certiorari,120
such
as
the
petitions
filed
in
the
instant
consolidated
cases.
The
political
offense
doctrine
is
not
a
ground
to
dismiss
the
charge
against
petitioners
prior
to
a
determination
by
the
trial
court
that
the
murders
were
committed
in
furtherance
of
rebellion.
Under
the
political
offense
doctrine,
"common
crimes,
perpetrated
in
furtherance
of
a
political
offense,
are
divested
of
their
character
as
"common"
offenses
and
assume
the
political
complexion
of
the
main
crime
of
which
they
are
mere
ingredients,
and,
consequently,
cannot
be
punished
separately
from
the
principal
offense,
or
complexed
with
the
same,
to
justify
the
imposition
of
a
graver
penalty."121
Any
ordinary
act
assumes
a
different
nature
by
being
absorbed
in
the
crime
of
rebellion.122
Thus,
when
a
killing
is
committed
in
furtherance
of
rebellion,
the
killing
is
not
homicide
or
murder.
Rather,
the
killing
assumes
the
political
complexion
of
rebellion
as
its
mere
ingredient
and
must
be
prosecuted
and
punished
as
rebellion
alone.
However,
this
is
not
to
say
that
public
prosecutors
are
obliged
to
consistently
charge
respondents
with
simple
rebellion
instead
of
common
crimes.
No
one
disputes
the
well-
entrenched
principle
in
criminal
procedure
that
the
institution
the
P100,000
cash
bond
posted
before
the
Office
of
the
Clerk
of
Court.
He
shall
remain
on
provisional
liberty
until
the
termination
of
the
proceedings
before
the
RTC
Manila.1wphi1
The
OSG
has
given
its
conformity
to
the
provisional
liberty
of
petitioners
Echanis,
Baylosis
and
Ladlad
in
view
of
the
ongoing
peace
negotiations.
Their
provisional
release
from
detention
under
the
cash
bond
of
P100,000
each
shall
continue
under
the
condition
that
their
temporary
release
shall
be
limited
to
the
period
of
their
actual
participation
as
CPP-NDF
consultants
in
the
peace
negotiations
with
the
government
or
until
the
termination
of
the
proceedings
before
the
RTC
Manila,
whichever
is
sooner.
It
shall
be
the
duty
of
the
government
to
inform
this
Court
the
moment
that
peace
negotiations
are
concluded.
WHEREFORE,
the
instant
consolidated
petitions
are
DISMISSED.
The
RTC
of
Manila,
Branch
32,
is
hereby
ORDERED
to
proceed
with
dispatch
with
the
hearing
of
Criminal
Case
No.
08-262163.
Petitioner
Saturnino
C.
Ocampo
shall
remain
on
temporary
liberty
under
the
same
bail
granted
by
this
Court
until
the
termination
of
the
proceedings
before
the
RTC
Manila.
Petitioners
Randall
B.
Echanis,
Rafael
G.
Baylosis
and
Vicente
P.
Ladlad
shall
remain
on
temporary
liberty
under
the
same
bail
granted
by
this
Court
until
their
actual
participation
as
CPP-
NDF
consultants
in
the
peace
negotiations
with
the
government
are
concluded
or
terminated,
or
until
the
termination
of
the
proceedings
before
the
RTC
Manila,
whichever
is
sooner.
SO
ORDERED.
MARIA
LOURDES
P.
A.
SERENO
Chief
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
276-278.
13
Id.
at
273,
287,
296,
309,
318
and
329.
14
Id.
at
289.
15
Id.
at
288,
310,
319
and
329.
16
Id.
at
319.
17
Id.
at
310,
319
and
329.
54
Id.
at
19.
55
Id.
at
487-519.
56
Id.
at
64-68.
57
Rollo
(G.R.
No.
190005),
pp.
162-218.
58
Rollo,
(G.R.
No.
185587),
pp.
3-63.
59
Id.
at
56.
60
Rollo
(G.R.
No.
185636),
pp.
7-71.
61
Id.
at
64.
62
Id.
at
564.
63
Rollo
(G.R.
No.
185587),
p.
587.
64
Id.
at
606-607.
65
Rollo
(G.R.
No.
176830),
pp.
736-740.
66
Id.
at
1029-1032.
67
Id.
at
742-743.
68
Rollo
(G.R.
No.
190005),
pp.
331-340.
69
Id.
at
347-348.
70
Id.
at
108-111.
71
Id.
at
112.
72
Id.
at
3-107.
73
Id.
at
860-861.
74
Id.
at
879-922.
75
Id.
at
932-933.
76
Id.
at
940-1003.
77
Rollo
(G.R.
No.
185587),
pp.
807-851.
78
Rollo
(G.R.
No.
185636),
pp.
1363-1391.
79
Rollo
(G.R.
No.
190005),
pp.
1006-1024.
80
Rollo
(G.R.
No.
185636),
pp.
1399-1402.
81
Rollo
(G.R.
No.
190005),
p.
1046;
rollo
(G.R.
No.
185636),
p.
1419.
82
Rollo
(G.R.
No.
190005),
pp.
1050-1053.
83
Id.
at
1073-1116.
84
Ang-Abaya
v.
Ang,
G.R.
No.
178511,
4
December
2008,
573
341,
369.
88
Kuizon
v.
Desierto,
406
Phil.
611,
630
(2001).
89
Id.
90
Pascual
v.
People,
547
Phil.
620,
627
(2007).
91
Rollo
(G.R.
No.
185587),
p.
31;
rollo
(G.R.
No.
185636),
p.
41.
92
Rollo
(G.R.
No.
190005),
pp.
49-50.
93
Id.
at
51-52.
94
Rollo
(G.R.
No.
176830),
pp.
75-76.
95
Id.
at
288-289.
96
Id.
at
45-46.
97
Id.
at
277.
98
Id.
at
74-75.
99
Id.
at
91.
100
Rodis,
Sr.
v.
Sandiganbayan,
248
Phil.
854,
859
(1988).
101
Id.
102
Rollo
(G.R.
No.
176830),
p.
136.
103
Rollo
(G.R.
No.
190005),
p.
51.
104
Id.
at
11.
105
Id.
at
51.
106
Balgami
v.
CA,
487
Phil.
102,
115
(2004),
citing
Salonga
v.
110 Allado v. Diokno, G.R. No. 113630, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA
192,
199-200.
111
De
los
Santos-Reyes
v.
Montesa,
Jr.,
317
Phil.
101,
111
(1995).
112
People
v.
Grey,
G.R.
No.
180109,
26
July
2010,
625
SCRA
523,
536.
113
Supra
note
111.
114
Rollo
(G.R.
No.
185587),
p.
27;
rollo
(G.R.
No.
185636),
p.
34.
115
Rollo
(G.R.
No.
176830),
p.
64.
116
Sarigumba
v.
Sandiganbayan,
491
Phil.
704,
720
(2005).
117
Id.
at
720-721.
118
Cuevas
v.
Muoz,
401
Phil.
752,
773-774
(2000).
119
Rollo
(G.R.
No.
176830),
p.
82.
120
Heirs
of
Marasigan
v.
Marasigan,
G.R.
No.
156078,
14
March
125
Id.
126
401
Phil.
945,
961
(2000).
127
Pacoy
v.
Cajigal,
G.R.
No.
157472,
28
September
2007,
534