THIRDDIVISION

[G.R.No.148126.November10,2003]
GEORGE T. VILLENA, CARLOS N. VILLENA, AURORA M. BONDOC and RONNIE C. FERNANDEZ, and their Respective Spouses,
petitioners
,
vs
.SpousesANTONIOC.CHAVEZandNOEMIMARCOSCHAVEZandCARLITAC.CHAVEZ,
respondents
.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN,
J
.:
Stare decisis
simply means that a judgment reached in one case should be applied to successive ones in whichthe factsare substantially
identical,eventhoughthepartiesmaybedifferent.Likecasesoughttobedecidedalike.
TheCase
[1]
[2]
Before this Court is a Petition for Review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the May 9, 2001 Decision
of the CourtofAppeals
(CA)inCAGRSPNo.58329.ThedecretalportionoftheDecisionreadsasfollows:
WHEREFORE,

thejudgmentdatedMarch29,2000ofBranch56oftheRTCofAngelesCityishereby
REVERSED
and
SETASIDE
,andanew
judgmententeredinfavorofthepetitioners,orderingtherespondentsandallpersonsclaimingrightsunderthemtovacatefromthesubjectlots
[3]
andtoremovetheirhousesand/oranyotherstructuresorconstructionsthereon.
[4]
The overturned Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 56,
affirmed in toto the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
[5]
AngelesCity,BranchII.
TheFacts
ThefactsofthecasearesummarizedbytheCAinthiswise:
InaComplaintforIllegalDetainerwithDamagesfiledonOctober15,1998,the[respondents]allegedthattheyaretheownersoffour(4)parcels
oflanddesignatedasLotNos.164,165,166,and167oftheCadastralSurveyofAngelesCity,andcovered,respectively,byTransfer
CertificatesofTitleNos.83247,83246,83248and83249,allissuedbytheRegisterofDeedsofAngelesCity.Thesefour(4)parcelsofland
havebeenconsolidatedandsubdividedintoseveralblocksandlots,andarenowcollectivelydesignatedasBagongSilangPhaseIIIC.Bymere
permissionandtoleranceofthe[respondents],the[petitioners]haveoccupiedanderectedtheirhomesonfour(4)ofthesaidlots,asfollows:
GeorgeT.Villenaandwife=Block5,Lot14
CarlosN.Villenaandwife=Block5,Lot13
AuroraM.Bondocandhusband=Block2,Lot4
RonnieC.Hernandezandwife=Block3,Lot5
Allthe[petitioners]aremembersoftheBagongSilangPhaseIIICHomeownersAssociation,Inc.,withofficeaddressatCutud,AngelesCity.
The[respondents]allowedthe[petitioners]andothermembersofthesaidhomeownersassociationtocontinueoccupyingthesubjectlotsand
ultimatelytoacquireownershipofthelotsoccupied,inconsiderationofacertainamounttobepaidtothe[respondents]asequity.
The[respondents]furtherallegedthattheothermembersofthesaidhomeownersassociationpaidtothe[respondents]theirrespectiveequity
fortheirrighttocontinueoccupyingandultimatelyacquiringownershipoftheoccupiedlots.However,notwithstandingrepeateddemandsmade
uponthe[petitioners],theyhaverefusedandfailedwithoutanyjustifiablegroundtopaytheirrespectiveequity.Inviewofsuchfailuretopay,the
[petitioners]haveforfeitedtheirrighttocontinueoccupyingthelotsinquestion.Formaldemandletterswerethensentbyregisteredmailtothe
[petitioners],whereintheyweregivenaperiodofthirty(30)daysfromreceiptwithinwhichtovacateandremovetheirhousesfromthesubject
lots.Theperiodgiventothe[petitioners]lapsedonApril11,1998,butuptothepresenttime,the[petitioners]refusedandfailedwithoutany
justifiablereasonorgroundtovacateandremovetheirhousesfromthesaidlots.
The[respondents]thenprayedintheirComplaintthatthe[petitioners]beorderedtovacateandremovetheirhousesfromthelotscurrently
occupiedthateachofthe[petitioners]beorderedtopaythe[respondents]P1,000.00amonthasreasonablerentalfortheuseandoccupation
ofthelotsstartingfromApril11,1998untiltheyhavefinallyvacatedandremovedtheirhousesfromsaidlotsandthatthe[petitioners]jointly
andseverallypaythe[respondents]P25,000.00asactualandcompensatorydamages,P2,000.00asappearancefeeperhearing,exemplary
damages,andthecostsofthesuit.
IntheiranswerwithcompulsorycounterclaimfiledonNovember3,1998,the[petitioners]counteredthatthe[respondents]havenocauseof
actiontoinstitutethepresentaction,consideringthatthepropertiesinquestionareunderthecommunitymortgageprogramimplementedbythe
NationalHomeMortgageFinanceCorporation.Moreover,the[petitioners]claimedthattheyarelawfultenantsofthepremises,andthatthey
havebeenpayingtheirequitytotheiroriginator,theUrbanLandandDevelopmentFoundation[,]Inc.However,theywerenotissuedthe
correspondingreceiptsevidencingpaymentandacopyoftheircontract.The[petitioners]furtheraverredthattheywerewillingtocontinue
payingtheirequityuntilthesameshallhavebeenfullypaid,buttheiroriginator,withoutjustifiablereason,refusedtoacceptthetenderof
paymentmadebythem.The[petitioners]subsequentlyagreedwiththeiroriginatorthatthepaymentofequityshouldbecontinuedonlyuponthe
releaseofaPurchaseCommitmentLine(PCL).

Inaddition,the[petitioners]allegedthattheyarequalifiedbeneficiariesunderRepublicActNo.7279,otherwiseknownastheUrban
DevelopmentandHousingActof1992hence,theycannotbesummarilyevictedandtheirdwellinghousesdemolishedunlessanduntilthey
havebeenrelocated.Accordingtothe[petitioners],theyarealsobuildersingoodfaithandshouldbeindemnifiedfortheimprovementsthey
constructedonthepropertiesinquestion.
The[petitioners]prayedintheiranswerthatthecomplaintbedismissedthattheybedeclaredlawfultenantsandqualifiedbeneficiariesunder
R.A.7279thatthe[respondents]beorderedtosellthelotsinquestiontothem,andtopayattorneysfeesandthecostsofsuit.
Afterthepretrialconference,bothpartiessubmittedtheirpositionpapers.OnSeptember15,1999,MTCBranchIIofAngelesCityrendereda
decisiondismissingboththe[respondents]complaintandthe[petitioners]counterclaim,onthegroundthatthefilingofanejectmentcasebased
ontheallegedviolationofthepartiesagreementwhichhasnotyetbeenrescindedispremature,andthatitisbeyondthecompetenceofthe
saidcourttoactonthecase,asrescissionorspecificperformanceisbeyondthejurisdictionofthesaidcourt.
The[respondents]appealedsuchadversejudgmenttotheRTCofAngelesCity,whichappealwasraffledtoBranch56ofthesaidcourt.On
[6]
March29,2000,RTCBranch56ofAngelesCityrenderedadecisionaffirmingintototheMTCjudgment.
RulingoftheCourtofAppeals
TheCAheldthattherightofpetitionerstocontinueoccupyingthe subject propertieshingedontheircontinuedpaymentoftheagreedamountas
[7]
equity.
Evenafterformallettersofdemandtovacatethepremiseshadbeen senttothem,however,they stilldidnotmakeanyefforttopaytheir
equity to protect their right to continue occupying those lots. Thus, the appellate court ruled that their failure to pay made their occupancy
unlawful,inconsequenceofwhichtheybecamesubjecttoanejectmentsuit.
The CA rejected the contention of petitioners that they were protected by RA 7279. According to the appellate court, there was no express
declaration by the local government unit that the parcels of land owned by respondents were to be used for socialized housing. Neither was
there proof of the allegation that they had applied therefor under the Community Mortgage Program of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation under Section 31 of RA 7279. Besides, even granting that petitioners were protected under RA7279, they were still liable to pay
amortizationorfaceeviction.
Likewise debunked was the allegation of petitioners that respondents were nottherealpartiesininterest.Beingtheownersofthelotsoccupied
bytheformer,thelatterhadamaterialinterestinthesuitandstoodtobebenefitedorinjuredbyanyjudgmentaffectingthoseparcelsofland.
[8]
Hence,thisPetition.
TheIssues
Petitionersraisethefollowingissuesforourconsideration:
I.WhetherornottheHonorableCourtofAppealscommittedgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictioninreversing
andsettingasidetheDecisionsoftheMunicipalTrialCourt,BranchIIandoftheRegionalTrialCourt,Branch56bothofAngelesCity[]
II.WhetherornottheHonorableMunicipalTrialCourthasjurisdictionoverthecase
III.WhetherornotthenoninclusionoftheBagongSilangHomeownersAssociationInc.,isfataltorespondents[]causeofaction[]
IV.Whetherornotejectmentisproperinthecaseatbar
V.Whetherornottheabsenceofcontractualrelation[s]betweentherespondentsandthepetitionersbar[s]thefilingofanyactionbythe
[9]
respondentsagainstthepetitioner.
The primordial issue to be resolved is whether unlawful detainer is the proper action to resolve this case. If it is, then theMTC indeedhad
jurisdictionoverthecase,andtheCAwascorrectinoverturningtheRTCsrulingthattheMTChadnojurisdictionoverthecase.
TheCourtsRuling
ThePetitionismeritorious.
MainIssue:
ProprietyofUnlawfulDetainer
TheCA ruled that petitioners possession or occupancy of the subjectpremiseswasbymeretolerance of respondents.Hence,oncepetitioners
failedtopaytheagreedamountasequity,theirrighttocontinueoccupyingthelotswaslost.
Wedisagree.Contradictorywerethestatementsoftheappellate courtthat, onthe one hand, therewasnocontractbetweenthepartiesandyet,
on the other, that petitioners failed topaythe
agreed
equity. Thefact that theCAfoundthattherewasfailuretopaytheequitywasanindication
ofanagreement.Tobesure,petitionerspossessionofthesubjectpremiseswasnotbymeretoleranceofrespondents.
[10]
In theComplaint
of respondents, filed before Branch II of the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City,theythemselves allegedthepresenceof
anagreementbetweenthepartiesasfollows:
10.Thatinconsiderationofacertainamounttobepaidtothe[respondents]byeachofthe[petitioners]asequityfortheirrighttocontinue
occupyingandultimatelyacquireownershipofthelotsthattheyoccupy,thesaidhomeownersassociationhasmadearrangementswiththe

[respondents]toallowthe[petitioners]andothermembersofthesaidhomeownersassociationtocontinueoccupyingandultimatelyacquire
[11]
ownershipofthelotsthattheyoccupy[.]
[12]
Further, in the Special Power of Attorney
annexed to their Complaint, they constituted and appointedTeodoricoB.Sanchezand/orArturoM.
Yadanastheirattorneysinfacttodo,amongothers,thefollowing:
1.Tocollectandreceiveanyamountoramountsasequityforthesalethereoftothemfromtheoccupantsoranyotherinterestedbuyeror
buyersofanyportionorportionsofthefollowingdescribedparcelsofland:
xxxxxxxxx
ofwhichwearetheabsoluteandexclusiveowners,andwhichcomprisetheparcelsoflandbeingacquiredbythemembersorbeneficiariesof
[13]
theBAGONGSILANGPHASEIIICHOMEOWNERSASSOCIATION,atBrgy.Cutud,AngelesCity[.]
Based on the admissions of respondents themselves, they entered intoanagreement withpetitioners.Necessarily,thelattersoccupancyofthe
lots in question was not based merely on the formers tolerance or permission. Thus, petitioners were not necessarily bound by animplied
promisetovacateupondemand,failingwhich,asummaryactionforejectmentwouldhavebecomeproper.
TheMTCsfindingsoffactonthispointareinstructive:
Abouttheonlythingthatthepartieshavemetonacommongroundisthat:[Respondents]haveenteredintoanarrangement/agreementwith
BagongSilangHomeownersAssociation,Inc.thatcalledforthepaymentofcertainamountsasequityfor[petitioners]righttocontinue
occupyingthelotswiththeendinviewofeventuallybecomingtheownersthereof,thatpursuanttosuchagreement[petitioners]havepaid
certainamountsasacquisitionfeesorasequitybutlaterdiscontinuedmakingpaymentsinviewofthenonissuanceofthesocalledpurchase
commitmentline/loan,andasaconsequence,[respondents]arenowaccusing[petitioners]forviolatingtheagreementandonthebasisofsuch
[14]
breachoftheagreementby[petitioners],demandsforthelattertovacatethelotsweremadeby[respondents].
When respondents alleged that the Bagong Silang Phase IIICHomeownersAssociationmadearrangementswiththemtoallowpetitionersand
other members of the association to continue to occupy and ultimately to acquire ownership of the lots in question, respondents explicitly
admitted that a contract had indeed been entered into. The eventual transfer of ownership of real property evidenced that obligation. What is
clearisthatintheirComplaint,respondentsallegedthatpetitionershadviolatedthestipulationsoftheiragreementasfollows:
11.ThattheothermembersoftheBa[g]ongSilangPhaseIIICHomeownersAssociation,Inc.,paidtothe[respondents]theirrespectiveequity
fortheirrighttocontinueoccupyingandultimatelyacquireownershipofthelotsthattheyoccupy,butnotwithstandingrepeateddemandsmade
onthem,uptothepresenttime,the[petitioners]haverefusedandfailedwithoutanyjustifiablegroundorreasontopaytheirrespectiveequityto
the[respondents],and,inviewofsuchrefusalandfailure,the[petitioners]haveforfeitedtheirrighttocontinueoccupyingandultimatelyacquire
[15]
ownershipofthelotsthattheyoccupy[.]
Petitioners, on the other hand, deniedanybreach ontheirpartandarguedthattheprincipalissuewasoneofinterpretation,enforcementand/or
rescission of the contract. Under thesecircumstances,proofofviolation of theprovisionsofthecontract isaconditionprecedenttoresolutionor
[16]
rescission.
The contract can be declared rescindedonlywhenitsnature hasbeen clarifiedandthe eventualviolationthereof,ifany,hasbeen
established. Upon such rescission, in turn, hinges a pronouncement that the possession of the realty hasbecome unlawful. Thus, the basic
issueisnotpossessionbutinterpretation,enforcementand/orrescission of thecontracta matter that isbeyond thejurisdictionoftheMunicipal
TrialCourttohearanddetermine.
Anallegation of a violation of a contract or agreement in a detainer suitmaybeprovedby thepresentationofcompetentevidence,uponwhich
an MTC judge might make a finding tothateffect.Butcertainly,thatcourtcannotdeclareandholdthatthecontractisrescinded,assuchpower
[17]
isvestedintheRTC.
[18]
Therescission of the contract is the basis of, and therefore a conditionprecedentfor, theillegalityofa partyspossessionofapieceofrealty.

Withoutjudicial interventionanddetermination,evenastipulationentitling one partytotakepossessionofthelandandbuildingincasetheother

[19]
partyviolatesthecontractcannotconferupontheformertherighttotakepossessionthereof,ifthatmoveisobjectedto.
[20]
Tobesure,thejurisdictionofacourtisdeterminedbytheallegationsin thecomplaint.Thus,inascertainingwhetherornotanactionisonefor
unlawfuldetainerfallingwithintheexclusivejurisdictionoftheinferior courts, theavermentsofthecomplaintandthecharacterofthereliefsought
shouldbeexamined.
Also,as correctlypleaded by petitioners, a similar case had been decided by the CA in CAGR SPNo.58679, inwhichitruledthattheproper
action should have been a complaint for rescission or specific performance, not for illegal detainer. In that case,the sameplaintiffsfiled the
samechargesagainstadifferentbutsimilarlysituatedsetofdefendants.
[21]
Theappellate court ruled thereinthattherewasanexistingagreement orcontractthatdeterminedthe natureofthepartiesrelationship.
Thus,
[22]
it heldthattheproperactionshouldhavebeenforrescission of contractorspecificperformance, notunlawfuldetainer.WhentheCADecision
was elevated, this Court denied the appeal for failure to show that areversibleerror had beencommitted bytheappellatecourt.Thereafter,the
[23]
DecisionbecamefinalandexecutoryonApril23,2002.

Saidtheappellatecourtinthepreviouscase:
Inasmuchastherelationshipexistingbetweenthepartiesisnotalessorlesseerelationshipbutonethatemanatedfromtheagreementbetween
appellantsandtheUrbanLandandDevelopmentFoundation,Inc.,thesocalledoriginatoroftheBagongSilangHomeownersAssociation,Inc.,
thereliefbeingsoughtthenbyappellantsappearstobeimproper.Ifevertherewasnopaymentofequityasprovidedforunderthesaid
agreement,thesamecannotbeconsideredasnonpaymentofrentals.Thus,itcannotbeasufficientbasisforfilinganejectmentcaseagainst
[24]
appellees,theproperremedybeinganactionforrescissionofcontractorspecificperformance.
We stress that when a court haslaiddownaprincipleoflawasapplicabletoa certain state of facts,itwilladheretothatprincipleandapplyitto
[25]
all futurecases in which the factsaresubstantiallythesame.

Staredecisisetnonquietamovere.
Stand bythedecisionsanddisturbnotwhat
issettled.
Stare decisis
simply means thatforthesakeofcertainty,aconclusionreachedin one caseshouldbe appliedtothosethatfollowifthe
[26]
facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different.
It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any
[27]
powerfulcountervailingconsiderations,likecasesoughttobedecidedalike.
Having ruledthattheMTChadindeednojurisdictiontotake cognizanceofthiscasein thefirst place, weseenomoreneedtoaddresstheother
issuesraisedbypetitioners.
WHEREFORE
, the Petition is hereby
GRANTED
and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
OVERTURNED.
Consequently, the
DecisionsoftheMTCandtheRTCofAngelesCityare
REINSTATED.
Nopronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED.
Puno,(Chairman),SandovalGutierrez,Corona,
and
CarpioMorales,JJ.,
concur
.

SECONDDIVISION
[G.R.No.102737.August21,1996]
FRANCISCO A. VELOSO,
petitioner,
vs
. COURT OF APPEALS, AGLALOMA B. ESCARIO, assisted by her husband GREGORIO L.
ESCARIO,theREGISTEROFDEEDSFORTHECITYOFMANILA,
respondents.
DECISION
TORRES,JR.,
J
.:
ThispetitionforreviewassailsthedecisionoftheCourtofAppeals,datedJuly29,1991,thedispositiveportionofwhichreads:
[1]
WHEREFORE,thedecisionappealedfromisherebyAFFIRMED
INTOTO
.Costsagainstappellant.
Thefollowingaretheantecedentfacts:
PetitionerFranciscoVelosowastheownerofaparceloflandsituatedinthedistrictofTondo,Manila,withanareaofonehundredseventy
[2]
seven(177)squaremetersandcoveredbyTransferCertificateofTitleNo.49138issuedbytheRegistryofDeedsofManila.
Thetitlewas
[3]
[4]
registeredinthenameofFranciscoA.Veloso,single,onOctober4,1957.Thesaidtitlewassubsequentlycanceledandanewone,Transfer
[5]
CertificateofTitleNo.180685,wasissuedinthenameofAglalomaB.Escario,marriedtoGregorioL.Escario,onMay24,1988.
OnAugust24,1988,petitionerVelosofiledanactionforannulmentofdocuments,reconveyanceofpropertywithdamagesandpreliminary
injunctionand/orrestrainingorder.Thecomplaint,docketedasCivilCaseNo.8845926,wasraffledtotheRegionalTrialCourt,Branch45,
Manila.Petitionerallegedthereinthathewastheabsoluteownerofthesubjectpropertyandheneverauthorizedanybody,notevenhiswife,to
sellit.Heallegedthathewasinpossessionofthetitlebutwhenhiswife,Irma,leftforabroad,hefoundoutthathiscopywasmissing.Hethen
verifiedwiththeRegistryofDeedsofManilaandtherehediscoveredthathistitlewasalreadycanceledinfavorofdefendantAglalomaEscario.
[6]
ThetransferofpropertywassupportedbyaGeneralPowerofAttorney
datedNovember29,1985andDeedofAbsoluteSale,dated
[7]
November2,1987,executedbyIrmaVeloso,wifeofthepetitionerandappearingashisattorneyinfact,anddefendantAglalomaEscario.

PetitionerVeloso,however,deniedhavingexecutedthepowerofattorneyandallegedthathissignaturewasfalsified.Healsodeniedhaving
seenorevenknownRosemarieReyesandImeldaSantos,thesupposedwitnessesintheexecutionofthepowerofattorney.Hevehemently
deniedhavingmetortransactedwiththedefendant.Thus,hecontendedthatthesaleoftheproperty,andthesubsequenttransferthereof,were
nullandvoid.PetitionerVeloso,therefore,prayedthatatemporaryrestrainingorderbeissuedtopreventthetransferofthesubjectproperty
thattheGeneralPowerofAttorney,theDeedofAbsoluteSaleandtheTransferCertificateofTitleNo.180685beannulledandthesubject
propertybereconveyedtohim.
Defendant Aglaloma Escario in her answer allegedthat shewasabuyeringoodfaith and deniedanyknowledgeoftheallegedirregularity.She
allegedly relied on the general power of attorney of Irma Veloso which was sufficient in form and substance and was duly notarized. She
contended that plaintiff (herein petitioner), had no cause of action againsther.Inseekingforthedeclarationofnullityofthedocuments,thereal
partyin interest was Irma Veloso, the wife of the plaintiff.Sheshould have beenimpleaded inthe case.Infact,Plaintiffscauseofactionshould
have been against his wife, Irma. Consequently, defendant Escario prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and the payment to her of
[8]
damages.

[9]
Pretrialwasconducted.Thesoleissuetoberesolvedbythetrialcourtwaswhetherornottherewasavalidsaleofthesubjectproperty.
During the trial, plaintiff (herein petitioner) Francisco Veloso testified that he acquired the subject property from the Philippine Building
[10]
[11]
Corporation, as evidencedbyaDeedofSaledated October1,1957.
He marriedIrmaLazatinonJanuary20,1962.
Hence,thepropertydid
notbelong to their conjugal partnership. Plaintiff further asserted that he did not sign the power ofattorneyandasproofthathissignaturewas
falsified,hepresentedAlliedBankChecksNos.16634640,16634641and16634643,whichallegedlyborehisgenuinesignature.
Witnessforthe plaintiff Atty. Julian G. Tubig denied any participation in the execution of the general powerofattorney.Heattestedthathedid
notsignthereon,andthesamewasneverenteredinhisNotarialRegisteronNovember29,1985.
[12]
In thedecision of the trial court dated March 9, 1990,
defendant Aglaloma Escaro wasadjudgedthelawfulownerofthepropertyasshewas
deemed an innocent purchaser for value. The assailed general power of attorney was held to be valid and sufficient for the purpose. Thetrial
court ruled that there was no need for a special power of attorney when the special power was already mentioned inthe general one. It also
declared that plaintifffailedtosubstantiatehisallegationoffraud.The courtalsostressed that plaintiffwasnotentirelyblamelessforalthoughhe
admitted to be the only person who had access to the title and other important documents, his wife was still able to possess thecopy. Citing
Section 55 of Act 496, the court held that Irmas possessionandproductionofthecertificateoftitlewasdeemedaconclusiveauthorityfromthe
plaintifftotheRegisterofDeedstoenteranewcertificate.Thenapplyingthe principleofequitableestoppel,plaintiffwasheldtobearthelossfor
itwashewhomadethewrongpossible.Thus:
WHEREFORE,theCourtfindsforthedefendantsandagainstplaintiff
a.declaringthattherewasavalidsaleofthesubjectpropertyinfavorofthedefendant
b.denyingallotherclaimsofthepartiesforwantoflegalandfactualbasis.
Withoutpronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED.
Notsatisfied with the decision, petitioner Veloso filed his appeal with the CourtofAppeals. Therespondentcourtaffirmed
intotothefindingsof
thetrialcourt.
Hence,thispetitionforreviewbeforeus.
This petition for review was initially dismissed for failure to submit an affidavit of service of a copy of the petition on the counsel for private
[13]
[14]
respondent.
Amotionforreconsiderationoftheresolutionwas filed butitwas denied ina resolution datedMarch30,1992.
Asecondmotion
[15]
forreconsiderationwasfiledandinaresolutiondatedAug.3,1992,themotionwasgrantedandthepetitionforreviewwasreinstated.
AsupplementalpetitionwasfiledonOctober9,1992withthefollowingassignmentoferrors:
I
TheCourtofAppealscommittedagraveerrorinnotfindingthattheforgeryofthepowerofattorney(Exh.C)hadbeenadequatelyproven,
despitethepreponderantevidence,andindoingso,ithassofardepartedfromtheapplicableprovisionsoflawandthedecisionsofthis
HonorableCourt,astowarrantthegrantofthispetitionforreviewoncertiorari.
II
Thereareprinciplesofjusticeandequitythatwarrantareviewofthedecision.
III
TheCourtofAppealserredinaffirmingthedecisionofthetrialcourtwhichmisappliedtheprincipleofequitableestoppelsincethepetitionerdid
notfailinhisdutyofobservingduediligenceinthesafekeepingofthetitletotheproperty.
Wefindpetitionerscontentionsnotmeritorious.
An examination of the records showed that the assailed power of attorney was valid and regular on its face. Itwas notarized and as such, it
carries theevidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. While itistrue that it wasdenominatedasageneralpowerof
attorney,aperusalthereofrevealedthatitstatedanauthoritytosell,towit:
2.Tobuyorsell,hireorlease,mortgageorotherwisehypothecatelands,tenementsandhereditamentsorotherformsofrealproperty,more
[16]
specificallyTCTNo.49138,uponsuchtermsandconditionsandundersuchcovenantsasmysaidattorneyshalldeemfitandproper.
Thus, there was no need to execute a separate andspecial powerofattorney since thegeneralpowerofattorneyhadexpresslyauthorizedthe
agent or attorney in fact the power to sell the subject property. The special power of attorney can be includedin thegeneral power when itis
specifiedthereintheactortransactionforwhichthespecialpowerisrequired.
Thegeneral power of attorney was acceptedbytheRegisterofDeeds whenthetitle to thesubjectpropertywascanceledandtransferredinthe
nameofprivaterespondent.InLRCConsultaNo.123,RegisterofDeedsofAlbay,Nov.10,1956,itstatedthat:
Whethertheinstrumentbedenominatedasgeneralpowerofattorneyorspecialpowerofattorney,whatmattersistheextentofthepoweror
powerscontemplatedupontheagentorattorneyinfact.Ifthepoweriscouchedingeneralterms,thensuchpowercannotgobeyondactsof
administration.However,wherethepowertosellisspecific,itnotbeingmerelyimplied,muchlesscouchedingeneralterms,therecannotbe

anydoubtthattheattorneyinfactmayexecuteavalidsale.Aninstrumentmaybecaptionedasspecialpowerofattorneybutifthepowers
grantedarecouchedingeneraltermswithoutmentioninganyspecificpowertosellormortgageortodootherspecificactsofstrictdominion,
theninthatcaseonlyactsofadministrationmaybedeemedconferred.
Petitioner contends that hissignatureonthepowerofattorneywas falsified. Healsoallegesthatthe samewasnotdulynotarizedforastestified
byAtty.Tubig himself, he did notsignthereonnorwasiteverrecordedin hisnotarialregister. To bolster hisargument,petitionerhadpresented
checks, marriage certificate and his residence certificate to prove his alleged genuine signature which when compared to thesignature in the
powerofattorney,showedsomedifference.
We found, however, that the basis presented by the petitioner was inadequate to sustain his allegation of forgery. Mere variance of the
[17]
signatures cannot be considered as conclusive proof that the same were forged. Forgery cannot be presumed.
Petitioner,however,failedto
provehisallegationandsimplyreliedontheapparent differenceofthesignatures. Hisdenialhadnotestablishedthatthesignatureonthepower
ofattorneywasnothis.
We agreewith the conclusion of the lower court that private respondent was an innocent purchaser for value. Respondent Aglalomareliedon
thepower of attorney presented by petitioners wife, Irma. Being the wifeofthe ownerandhaving withherthetitleoftheproperty,therewasno
reasonfor the private respondent not to believe in her authority. Moreover, the power of attorneywasnotarizedandassuch,carriedwithitthe
presumption of its due execution.Thus, having had no inkling on any irregularity and having no participationthereof, private respondentwasa
buyer in good faith. It has been consistently held that a purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, withoutnoticethatsome
other person has a rightto,orinterestinsuchpropertyand paysa fullandfair price for thesame,atthe timeofsuchpurchase,orbeforehehas
[18]
noticeoftheclaimorinterestofsomeotherpersonintheproperty.
Documents acknowledged before a notary public have the evidentiary weight with respect to their due execution. Thequestioned power of
attorney and deed of sale, were notarized and therefore, presumed to be valid and duly executed.Atty.Tubigdeniedhavingnotarizedthesaid
documents and alleged that hissignaturehadalsobeenfalsified.Hepresented samplesofhis signaturetoprovehiscontention.Forgeryshould
be proved by clear and convincing evidence and whoever alleges it has the burden of provingthe same. Just like the petitioner, witnessAtty.
Tubig merely pointed out that his signature wasdifferentfromthat inthe powerofattorney and deedofsale.Therehadneverbeenanaccurate
[19]
examination of the signature, even that of the petitioner. To determine forgery, it washeld inCesar
vs
.Sandiganbayan
(quotingOsborn,The
ProblemofProof)that:
Theprocessofidentification,therefore,mustincludethedeterminationoftheextent,kind,andsignificanceofthisresemblanceaswellasofthe
variation.Itthenbecomesnecessarytodeterminewhetherthevariationisduetotheoperationofadifferentpersonality,orisonlytheexpected
andinevitablevariationfoundinthegenuinewritingofthesamewriter.Itisalsonecessarytodecidewhethertheresemblanceistheresultofa
moreorlessskillfulimitation,oristhehabitualandcharacteristicresemblancewhichnaturallyappearsinagenuinewriting.Whenthesetwo
questionsarecorrectlyansweredthewholeproblemofidentificationissolved.
Even granting for the sakeofargument,thatthepetitionerssignaturewas falsifiedandconsequently,thepowerofattorneyandthedeedofsale
were null and void, such fact would not revoke the title subsequently issued in favor of private respondent Aglaloma. In the case of
[20]
TenioObsequio
vs
.CourtofAppeals,
itwasheld,
viz
.:
Therightofaninnocentpurchaserforvaluemustberespectedandprotected,evenifthesellerobtainedhistitlethroughfraud.Theremedyof
thepersonprejudicedistobringanactionfordamagesagainstthosewhocausedoremployedthefraud,andifthelatterareinsolvent,anaction
againsttheTreasurerofthePhilippinesmaybefiledforrecoveryofdamagesagainsttheAssuranceFund.
Finally, the trial court did not err in applying equitable estoppel in this case. The principle of equitable estoppel states that where one or two
innocent persons must suffer a loss, he who by his conduct made the loss possible must bear it. Fromtheevidenceadduced,itshouldbethe
petitionerwhoshouldbeartheloss.Asthecourt
aquo
found:
Besides,therecordsofthiscasedisclosedthattheplaintiffisnotentirelyfreefromblame.Headmittedthatheisthesolepersonwhohas
accesstoTCTNo.49138andotherdocumentsappertainingthereto(TSN,May23,1989,pp.712).However,thefactremainsthatthe
CertificateofTitle,aswellasotherdocumentsnecessaryforthetransferoftitlewereinthepossessionofplaintiffswife,IrmaL.Veloso,
consequentlyleavingnodoubtoranysuspiciononthepartofthedefendantastoherauthority.UnderSection55ofAct496,asamended,
IrmaspossessionandproductionoftheCertificateofTitletodefendantoperatedasconclusiveauthorityfromtheplaintifftotheRegisterof
[21]
Deedstoenteranewcertificate.
Considering the foregoing premises, We found no error inthe appreciationoffactsandapplication of lawbythelowercourtthatwillwarrantthe
reversalormodificationoftheappealeddecision.
ACCORDINGLY
,thepetitionforreviewisherebyDENIEDforlackofmerit.
SOORDERED.
Regalado(Chairman),Romero,Puno,
and
Mendoza,JJ
.,concur.

THIRDDIVISION
[G.R.No.107846.April18,1997]
LEOVILLOC.AGUSTIN,
petitioner,vs.
COURTOFAPPEALSandFILINVESTFINANCECORP.,
respondents.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO,
J
.:
[1]
Thisis anappeal by
certiorari from the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CAG.R. No. 24684
which affirmed the order ofRegional
[2]
TrialCourt,Branch40,Manila,inCivilCaseNo.84804.
The dispute stemmed from an unpaid promissory note dated October 28, 1970, executed by petitioner Leovillo C. Agustin in favor of ERM
[3]
Commercial for the amount of P43,480.80. The note was payable in monthly installments
and secured by a chattel mortgageover an Isuzu
[4]
[5]
diesel truck,
both of which were subsequently assigned to private respondent Filinvest Finance Corporation.
When petitioner defaulted in
paying the installments, private respondent demanded from him the payment of the entire balance or, in
lieu thereof, the possession of the
mortgaged vehicle. Neither payment nor surrender was made.Aggrieved, private respondent filed a complaint with theRegional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 26 (RTC Branch 26) against petitioner praying for the issuance of a
writ of replevin or, in the alternative,forthe payment of
[6]
P32,723.97 plus interest at the rate of 14%perannumfromduedate until fullypaid.
Trialensued and,thereafter,a
writofreplevinwasissued
byRTC Branch 26. By virtue thereof, private respondent acquired possession of the vehicle. Uponrepossession,thelatterdiscoveredthatthe
vehicle was no longer in running condition and that several parts were missing which private respondent replaced. The vehicle was then
foreclosedandsoldatpublicauction.
Private respondent subsequently filed a supplemental complaint claiming additional reimbursement worth P8,852.76 asvalue of replacement
[7]
parts
andfor expenses incurred in transporting the mortgaged vehicle from Cagayan to Manila. In response, petitioner moved todismissthe
supplementalcomplaintarguingthatRTCBranch26hadalreadylostjurisdiction overthe casebecauseoftheearlierextrajudicialforeclosureof
[8]
themortgage. The lower court granted the motion and the casewas dismissed.
Private respondent elevatedthemattertotheappellatecourt,
docketed as CAG.R. No. 56718R, which setasidetheorderofdismissalandruledthatrepossession expensesincurredbyprivaterespondent
[9]
should be reimbursed.
This decision became final and executory, hence the case was accordingly remanded tothe Regional Trial Court of
[10]
Manila,Branch 40 (RTC Branch 40) for reception of evidence to determine the amount due from petitioner.
After trial,RTCBranch40found
petitioner liable for the repossession expenses, attorney's fees, liquidated damages, bonding fees and other expenses inthe seizure of the
vehicle in the aggregate sum of P18,547.38. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Acting thereon, RTC Branch 40 modified its decision by
[11]
loweringthe monetary award to P8,852.76, the amount originally prayed for in the supplementalcomplaint.
Privaterespondentappealedthe
case withrespect to the reduction of the amount awarded. Petitioner, likewise, appealed impugning the trial courtsorderforhimtopayprivate
respondentP8,852.76, an amountoverandabove thevaluereceivedfromtheforeclosuresale.BothappealswereconsolidatedandinCAG.R.
[12]
No.24684, the modified orderofRTCBranch40wasaffirmed.Petitionerfiledamotionforreconsideration,buttonoavail
Hence,thispetition
forreviewon
certiorari
.
Petitioner contends that the award of repossession expenses to private respondent as mortgagee is"contrary to the letter, intent and spiritof
[13]
[14]
Article 1484
of the Civil Code".
He assertsthatprivate respondents repossessionexpenseshavebeen amply coveredbythe foreclosureof
thechattelmortgage,hencehecouldnolongerbeheldliable.Theargumentsaredevoidofmerit.
Petitioners contentions, we note, were previously rejected by respondent court in itsdecisioninCAG.R. No.56718Rthedispositiveportionof
whichprovidesasfollows:
"WHEREFORE,theorderdismissingthecaseisherebysetasideandthecaseisremandedtothelowercourtforreceptionofevidenceof
`expensesproperlyincurredineffectingseizureofthechattel(and)ofrecoverableattorney'sfeesinprosecutingtheactionforreplevin'as
[15]
`repossessionexpenses'prayedforinthesupplementalcomplaint,withoutpronouncementastocosts."
whichruling has long acquired finality. It is clear, therefore, that the appellate court had already settledtheproprietyofawardingrepossession
expenses infavorofprivaterespondent.TheremandofthecasetoRTCBranch40was for thesolepurpose ofthreshingoutthecorrectamount
of expenses and not for relitigating the accuracy of the award. Thus, the findings of RTC Branch 40, as affirmed by the appellate court in
CAG.R. No. 24684, was confined to the appreciation of evidence relative to therepossession expensesforthequeryorissuepasseduponby
therespondent courtinCAG.R.No.56718R(proprietyoftheawardforrepossession expenses)hasbecomethe lawofthecase.Thisprinciple
isdefined as a term applied to an establishedrulethatwhenanappellatecourt passes ona questionandremandsthecausetothelowercourt
[16]
for furtherproceedings, thequestiontheresettledbecomesthe law of thecase uponsubsequentappeal.
Havingexactlythesamepartiesand
issues, the decision in the former appeal (CAG.R. No. 56718R) is now the established and controlling rule. Petitionermay not therefore be
allowedin a subsequent appeal (CAG.R. No. 24684) and in this petition to resuscitate and revive formerly settledissues. Judgmentofcourts
shouldattainfinalityatsomepointintime,asinthiscase,otherwise,therewillbenoendtolitigation.

At anyrate, even if we were to brush aside the law of the case doctrine we find the award for repossession expenses stillproper.In
Filipinas
Investment& Finance Corporation v. Ridad
,[17]
the Court recognized an exception to therulestatedunder Article1484(3)uponwhichpetitioner
relies.Thus:
xxxWherethemortgagorplainlyrefusestodeliverthechattelsubjectofthemortgageuponhisfailuretopaytwoormoreinstallments,orifhe
concealsthechatteltoplaceitbeyondthereachofthemortgagee,whatthenisthemortgageeexpectedtodo?xxxItlogicallyfollowsasa
matterofcommonsense,thatthenecessaryexpensesincurredintheprosecutionbythemortgageeoftheactionforreplevinsothathecan
regainpossessionofthechattel,shouldbebornebythemortgagor.Recoverableexpenseswould,inourview,includeexpensesproperly
[18]
incurredineffectingseizureofthechattelandreasonableattorneysfeesinprosecutingtheactionforreplevin.
Anent the denial of the award for attorneys fees, we find the same in order. The trial court, as well as respondent court, foundnoevidenceto
[19]
support the claim for attorney's fees which factual finding is binding on us.
We find no compelling reason, and none was presented, to set
asidethisruling.
ACCORDINGLY
,thepetitionisDENIEDforlackofmerit,andthedecisionoftheCourtofAppealsisherebyAFFIRMED
intoto.
SOORDERED.
Narvasa,C.J.(Chairman),Davide,Jr.,Melo,
and
Panganiban,JJ.,
concur
.

FIRSTDIVISION
[G.R.Nos.15306370.August19,2005]
AMELIA D. DE MESA, ARACELI ADATO, RODRIGO ALVARAN, AIDA CASTRO, BALTAZAR ESTRELLES, ANTONIO A. FERRER,
DANILO GARCIA, JULIO M. GONZALES, MARRIETA A. JOSE, PEPITA JUNTADO, EDUARDO U. LAGO, NESTOR RODA, JAIME
SANCHEZandJUANITASANCHEZ,
petitioners
,
vs
.PEPSICOLAPRODUCTSPHILS.,INC.andPEPSICOINC.,
respondents
.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING,
J
.:
For reviewon
certiorari is the
Order
,[1]
dated April 18, 2002, of theRegionalTrialCourt of MakatiCity,Branch142inCivilCasesNos. 942414
to 942421. In the said
Order
, the RTC granted herein respondents motion to dismiss the complaints filed by petitionersherein based on the
principleof
staredecisis
.
Theinstant case arose from the samesetoffactsas(1)
Mendozav.PepsiCola ProductsPhilippines,Inc.,etal.
,G.R. No.153183promulgated
[2]
[3]
on July 24, 2002 affirming the Court of Appeals
Decision
, dated April 16, 2002, in CAG.R. CV No. 53860 and (2)
Rodrigo v. Pepsi Cola
Products(Phils.),Inc.andPepsico,Inc.,G.R.No.149411,datedOctober 1, 2001, whichalsoaffirmed theCourt of Appeals
DecisionofMay21,
[4]
2001inCAG.R.CVNo.62837.
Thefactsareculledfromtheaforesaid
Decisions
oftheCourtofAppealsasaffirmedbythisCourt.
Petitioners are holders of softdrinkbottlecapsbearingthenumber349,allegedly awinningcombinationinacontestsponsoredbyrespondents
PepsiColaProductsPhils.,Inc.(PCPPI)andPEPSICO,Inc.(PI).
Respondent PCPPI is a domestic corporationengagedintheproduction,bottling,anddistributionofcarbonateddrinks,whilerespondentPIisa
foreigncorporationlicensedtodobusinessinthePhilippinesandisthemajorstockholderofPCPPI.
D.G.Consultores, a Mexican consulting firm that handled similar promotions in other countries, was tasked to randomlypreselect thewinning
numbersand sendtorespondentsalistofthe60winningnumbers withtheircorrespondingsecurity codes.Theprocessofselectingthewinning
numberswasimplementedwiththeapprovaloftheDepartmentofTradeandIndustry(DTI).
During the initial promotion period, from February 17 to May 8, 1992, respondents seeded 1000 numbers,60 ofwhichwerewinningnumbers,
510 nonwinning numbers, while the remaining 430 were unused.Toensurethatthe winningnumberswouldnotbetampered,theDTIrequired
[5]
respondentstosubmitthelistofwinningnumbersincludingtheirsecuritycodeswhichwasthendepositedinasafetydepositboxinabank.
Owing to the promotional campaigns success, respondents extended the Number Fever by five more weeks, from May 10 to June12, 1992.
PepsiagaintappedD.G.Consultorestopredeterminethe25additionalwinningnumbersfromthelistofunusednumbers.
On May 25, 1992, respondents announced 349 as the winning number for the May 26 draw. Later thesame night, Quintin Gomez, Jr., then
PCPPIs Marketing Services Manager called DTI Director Madarang informingherthat due to somesecuritycodeproblems amistake hadbeen
[6]
madeintheannouncementofnumber349asthewinningnumber.
Numerous holders of the supposedly winning349crownswerenot honored and paidbyrespondents,whichledtheserejectedcrownholdersto
fileseparatecomplaintsforspecificperformanceanddamages.
CivilCaseNo.9368351wasoriginallyfiledbeforetheRegionalTrialCourt of Manila,Branch16,but theplaintiffsinthesaidcasewithdrewtheir
complaint,leaving Gerson Mendoza as the soleplaintiffin
Gerson M.Mendozav. PepsiColaProducts Phils.,Inc. and Pepsico,Inc
.[7]
Theother

plaintiffs refiled their complaints before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50, entitled
Romulo Rodrigo, et al. v. Pepsi ColaProducts
[8]
Philippines,Inc.,etal.
,docketedasCivilCaseNo.9471403.
For their part, petitioners herein filed their separate complaints, docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 942414 to 942421, before theRegional Trial
CourtofMakati,Branch142.
In the
Mendoza case, the RTC dismissed the complaint filed against herein respondents for specific performance and damages inconnection
[9]
[10]
with the Number Fever fiasco.
Mendoza appealedtotheCourtofAppeals, inCAG.R.CVNo. 53860,whichwasdismissed for lackofmerit.

Unfazed, MendozafiledwiththisCourtapetitionforreview,whichwasdeniedforfailuretosufficientlyshowthatthe CourtofAppealscommitted

[11]
anyreversibleerror.
In the
Rodrigo case, the RTC likewise dismissed the complaint against herein respondents for specificperformance anddamagesarisingfrom
[12]
[13]
thesaid promotion.
On appeal, docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 62837, the Court of AppealsaffirmedtheRTC decision.
Apetitionforreview
was subsequently filed with this Court, which was denied for failure to show that a reversible error was committed by the appellate court.The
[14]
[15]
motionforreconsiderationwasalsodeniedwithfinality
andentryofjudgmentwasmade.
However,priorto the resolution of the
Mendoza and
Rodrigo cases, herein petitioners filed with the RTC,onDecember11,2000,amotionfor
[16]
leave
to(1) adopt the previous testimonial and documentary evidence in the
Mendoza and
Rodrigo cases or (2)archive the caseuntilfinal
resolution of the said two cases, which were then pending withtheCourtofAppeals.The RTCgrantedthe saidmotiononJanuary8,2001and
[17]
thecasewasaccordinglyarchived.
Meantime, the
Rodrigo case became final and executory on February 5, 2002 in view of our denial of therein petitionerspetitionforreviewon
certiorari
andmotionforreconsideration.
[18]
Hence, onFebruary20,2002,hereinrespondents filed withthe RTCamotiontodismiss
the complaintsfiledby petitionershereininvokingthe
[19]
principleof
staredecisis
.TheRTC,initsassailedOrder,grantedthemotiontodismissratiocinatingasfollows:
TheCourtfindstheinstantmotionmeritoriousundertheprincipleof
stare

decisis
.Thesaiddoctrineembodiesthelegalmaximthataprincipleor
ruleoflawwhichhasbeenestablishedbythedecisionofacourtofcontrollingjurisdictionwillbefollowedinothercasesinvolvingsimilar
situation.Itisfoundedonthenecessityforsecuringcertaintyandstabilityinthelawanddoesnotrequireidentityorprivyofparties.Thisis
explicitlyordainedinArticle8oftheCivilCodewhichprovidesthatdecisionsapplyingorinterpretingthelawsortheConstitutionshallformpart
ofthelegalsystem.Suchdecisionsassumethesameauthorityasthestatuteitselfand,untilauthoritativelyabandoned,necessarilybecome,to
theextentthattheyareapplicable,thecriteriawhichmustcontroltheactuationsnotonlyofthosecalledupontoabidetherebybutalsoofthose
indutyboundtoenforceobediencethereto(Kilosbayan,Inc.etal.vs.ManuelMorato,G.R.No.118910,July17,1995).
IntheinstantcasesaswellasinCivilCaseNo.9368351(theMendozacase),notonlyarethelegalrightsandrelationsoftheparties
substantiallythesameasthosepasseduponinCivilCaseNo.9471403(theRodrigocase),butthefacts,theapplicablelaws,thecausesof
action,theissues,andthetestimonialanddocumentaryevidenceareidenticalsuchthatarulinginonecase,i.e.theRodrigocaseinCivilCase
[20]
No.9471403,undertheruleof
stare

decisis
,isabartoanyattempttorelitigatethesameissue.
Petitioners now come to us in this petition for review claiming that (1) the principle of
res judicata does not apply and (2)the dismissalofthe
complaint was premature as petitioners motion to archive the case and the grant thereof was based on the condition that there be a final
[21]
resolutioninthe
Mendoza
and
Rodrigo
cases.
Simplyput,thesoleissueiswhetherthepresentcaseisbarredbythisCourtsrulinginthe
Mendoza
and
Rodrigo
cases.
Petitioners contend that
res judicata
does not apply as thereis noidentityofpartiestobeginwith.Moreover,theyarguethat
staredecisisisnot
a hard and fast rule. They insist another review should be taken on the cause of action in this case because the Courtof Appeals, in the
Mendoza
and
Rodrigo
cases, erred in rulingthatthesecuritycodedeterminestherealwinning crowns.They claim thatthetrialcourtsdismissal
of their complaintwaspremature.Lastly,petitionerspositthattherewasabreachedcontract betweenthe partiestherefore,respondentsshould
bemadetoperformtheircontractualobligation.
For their part, respondents counter that the RTC correctly dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground of
resjudicata
.Respondentscontend
that, like the
Mendoza
and
Rodrigo cases, the civil cases filed by petitioners arose from the conduct of respondents NumberFever promotion.
Petitioners causes of action, testimonial and documentary evidence, are the same as those in the
Mendoza and
Rodrigo cases. Lastly,
respondents pointoutthatthefindingsoffactinthesaidtwocasesare also thesame,
i.e
.:(i)Respondentsdidnotbreachanycontractsincethe
349 crowns with securitycodeL2560FQarenotwinningcrownsand(ii)Respondentswerenot negligentin theconductoftheirpromotionand
theyexertedeffortstoensuretheintegrityandsmoothconductofthesame.
Theinstantpetitionmustbedenied.
Theprincipleof
staredecisisetnonquietamovere[22]
isentrenchedinArticle8oftheCivilCode,towit:
ART.8.JudicialdecisionsapplyingorinterpretingthelawsortheConstitutionshallformapartofthelegalsystemofthePhilippines.

Itenjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires our courts to follow a rule already established in a final decision of the SupremeCourt.
Thatdecisionbecomesajudicialprecedenttobefollowedinsubsequentcases byallcourtsintheland.Thedoctrineof
staredecisisisbasedon
[23]
theprinciplethatonceaquestionoflawhasbeenexaminedanddecided,itshouldbedeemedsettledandclosedtofurtherargument.
In theinstant case, the legal rights and relationsoftheparties, thefacts,the applicable laws,the causesofaction,theissues,andtheevidence
are exactlythe same as those in the decided cases of
Mendoza
and
Rodrigo
,
supra
. Hence, nothingis left to beargued. The issuehasbeen
settled and this Courts final decision in the said cases must be respected. This Courtshandsarenowtied bythefinalityofthesaidjudgments.
Wehavenorecoursebuttodenytheinstantpetition.
WHEREFORE
, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed OrderoftheRegional TrialCourtofMakati City, Branch 142,inCivilCases
Nos.942414to942421,isAFFIRMED.Costsagainstpetitioners.
SOORDERED.
Davide,Jr.,C.J.,(Chairman),YnaresSantiago,Carpio,
and
Azcuna,JJ.,
concur
.
ENBANC
[G.R.No.159357.April28,2004]
BrotherMARIANOMIKEZ.VELARDE,
petitioner,vs.
SOCIALJUSTICESOCIETY,
respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN,
J.:
Adecisionthatdoesnotconformtotheformandsubstance required bytheConstitutionandthelawis voidanddeemedlegallyinexistent.Tobe
valid, decisions should comply withtheform,theprocedureand thesubstantiverequirementslaid outin theConstitution,theRulesofCourtand
relevantcirculars/orders of the Supreme Court. Fortheguidanceofthebench and thebar,the Courtherebydiscussestheseforms,procedures
andrequirements.
TheCase
[1]
[2]
[3]
Before us is a Petition for Review
underRule45oftheRulesofCourt, assailingtheJune12, 2003Decision
andJuly29,2003Order
ofthe
[4]
RegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofManila(Branch49).
[5]
Thechallenged Decision was the offshoot of aPetitionforDeclaratory Relief
filedbeforetheRTCManilaby hereinRespondentSocialJustice
Society (SJS) against herein Petitioner Mariano Mike Z. Velarde, together with His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erao
Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano as corespondents. The Petition prayed for the resolution of the question
whether or not the act of a religious leader like any of herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in
urging or requiring the members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate, isviolative of theletteror spiritofthe constitutionalprovisionsxx
[6]
x.
Alleging that the questioned Decision did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositiveportion,hereinpetitionerfiledaClarificatoryMotion
and Motion for Reconsideration before the trial court. Soriano, his corespondent, similarly filed a separate Motion for Reconsideration. In
response,thetrialcourtissuedtheassailedOrder,whichheldasfollows:
xxx[T]hisCourtcannotreconsider,becausewhatitwasaskedtodo,wasonlytoclarifyaConstitutionalprovisionandtodeclarewhetheracts
areviolativethereof.TheDecisiondidnotmakeadispositiveportionbecauseadispositiveportionisrequiredonlyincoercivereliefs,wherea
redressfromwrongsufferedandthebenefitthattheprevailingpartywrongedshouldget.Thestepthatthesemovantshavetotake,isdirect
[7]
appealunderRule45oftheRulesofCourt,foraconclusiveinterpretationoftheConstitutionalprovisiontotheSupremeCourt.
TheAntecedentProceedings
On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief (SJS Petition) before the RTCManila against Velarde and his aforesaid
[8]
corespondents. SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretationofseveralconstitutionalprovisions,
specificallyontheseparationof
church and state and a declaratory judgment ontheconstitutionalityofthe acts of religiousleaders endorsingacandidateforanelectiveoffice,
orurgingorrequiringthemembersoftheirflocktovoteforaspecifiedcandidate.
ThesubsequentproceedingswererecountedinthechallengedDecisioninthesewords:
xxx.Bro.EddieVillanuevasubmitted,withintheoriginalperiod[tofileanAnswer],aMotiontoDismiss.Subsequently,ExecutiveMinisterErao
ManaloandBro.MikeVelarde,filedtheirMotionstoDismiss.WhileHisEminenceJaimeCardinalL.Sin,filedaCommentandBro.EliSoriano,
filedanAnswerwithintheextendedperiodandsimilarlyprayedforthedismissalofthePetition.AllsoughtthedismissalofthePetitiononthe
commongroundsthatitdoesnotstateacauseofactionandthatthereisnojusticiablecontroversy.Theywereorderedtosubmitapleadingby
wayofadvisement,whichwascloselyfollowedbyanotherOrderdenyingalltheMotionstoDismiss.Bro.MikeVelarde,Bro.EddieVillanueva
andExecutiveMinisterEraoManalomovedtoreconsiderthedenial.HisEminenceJaimeCardinalL.Sin,askedforextensiontofile
memorandum.OnlyBro.EliSorianocompliedwiththefirstOrderbysubmittinghisMemorandum.xxx.

xxxtheCourtdeniedtheMotionstoDismiss,andtheMotionsforReconsiderationfiledbyBro.MikeVelarde,Bro.EddieVillanuevaand
[9]
ExecutiveMinisterEraoManalo,whichraisednonewargumentsotherthanthosealreadyconsideredinthemotionstodismissxxx.
After narrating the above incidents, the trial court said that it had jurisdiction over the Petition, because in prayingfora determination as to
whether the actions imputed to the respondents are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law,[thePetition] has raised only a
[10]
question of law.
It thenproceededtoalengthydiscussionofthe issue raisedin thePetitiontheseparationofchurchandstateeventracing,to
some extent, the historical background of the principle. Through its discourse, the court
a quo
opined at somepointthatthe [e]ndorsement of
[11]
specificcandidatesinanelectiontoanypublicofficeisaclearviolationoftheseparationclause.
After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a dispositive portion in its assailed Decision.Thus,Velarde and
SorianofiledseparateMotionsforReconsiderationwhich,asmentionedearlier,weredeniedbythelowercourt.
[12]
Hence,thisPetitionforReview.
[13]
ThisCourt, ina Resolution dated September 2, 2003, required SJS and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to submit theirrespective
comments.Inthe same Resolution, the Court gave the other partiesimpleadedasrespondentsintheoriginalcasebelowtheopportunityto
comment,iftheysodesired.
[14]
OnApril13,2004,theCourtenbancconductedanOralArgument.
TheIssues
InhisPetition,BrotherMikeVelardesubmitsthefollowingissuesforthisCourtsresolution:
1.WhetherornottheDecisiondated12June2003renderedbythecourt
aquo
wasproperandvalid
2.WhetherornotthereexistsjusticeablecontroversyinhereinrespondentsPetitionfordeclaratoryrelief
3.WhetherornothereinrespondenthaslegalinterestinfilingthePetitionfordeclaratoryrelief
4.Whetherornottheconstitutionalquestionsoughttoberesolvedbyhereinrespondentisripeforjudicialdetermination
5.Whetherornotthereisadequateremedyotherthanthedeclaratoryreliefand,
[15]
6.Whetherornotthecourt
aquo
hasjurisdictionoverthePetitionfordeclaratoryreliefofhereinrespondent.
DuringtheOralArgument,theissueswerenarroweddownandclassifiedasfollows:
A.ProceduralIssues
DidthePetitionforDeclaratoryReliefraiseajusticiablecontroversy?Diditstateacauseofaction?Didrespondenthaveanylegal
standingtofilethePetitionforDeclaratoryRelief?
B.SubstantiveIssues
1.DidtheRTCDecisionconformtotheformandsubstancerequiredbytheConstitution,thelawandtheRulesofCourt?
2.Mayreligiousleaderslikehereinpetitioner,Bro.MikeVelarde,beprohibitedfromendorsingcandidatesforpublicoffice?Corollarily,maythey
bebannedfromcampaigningagainstsaidcandidates?
TheCourtsRuling
ThePetitionofBrotherMikeVelardeismeritorious.
ProceduralIssues:
RequisitesofPetitions
forDeclaratoryRelief
Section1ofRule63oftheRulesofCourt,whichdealswithpetitionsfordeclaratoryrelief,providesinpart:
Section1.
Whomayfilepetition
.Anypersoninterestedunderadeed,will,contractorotherwritteninstrument,whoserightsareaffectedbya
statute,executiveorderorregulation,ordinance,oranyothergovernmentalregulationmay,beforebreachorviolationthereof,bringanactionin
theappropriateRegionalTrialCourttodetermineanyquestionofconstructionorvalidityarising,andforadeclarationofhisrightsorduties
thereunder.
Based on the foregoing, an action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to
[16]
interpret orto determine the validity of the written instrument
and
to seek a judicial declarationofthe parties rightsor dutiesthereunder.
The
essential requisites of the actionareasfollows:(1)thereisajusticiable controversy(2) thecontroversyisbetweenpersonswhoseinterestsare
[17]
adverse(3)thepartyseekingthereliefhasalegalinterestinthecontroversyand(4)theissueisripeforjudicialdetermination.
JusticiableControversy
Brother Mike Velarde contends that the SJS Petition failed to allege, much less establish before the trial court, thatthere existed a justiciable
controversy oran adverse legal interest between them and that SJS had a legal right that was being violated or threatened to be violated by
petitioner. On the contrary, Velarde alleges that SJS premised its action on mere speculations, contingentevents,andhypotheticalissuesthat
hadnotyetripenedintoanactualcontroversy.Thus,itsPetitionforDeclaratoryReliefmustfail.

A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case orcontroversythatisappropriateor ripe for judicialdetermination,notonethatisconjectural

[18]
or merely anticipatory.
The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief fell short of this test. It miserably failed to allege an existing controversy or
dispute between the petitioner and the named respondents therein. Further, the Petition did not sufficientlystatewhatspecificlegalrightofthe
petitioner was violated by the respondents therein and what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the
Constitution.
[19]
As pointed out by Brother Eliseo F. Soriano in his Comment,
what exactly has he done thatmeritedthe attention ofSJS?Heconfessesthat
he does not know the answer, because the SJS Petition (as well as the assailed Decision of the RTC) yields nothing in this respect. His
Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, adds that, at the time SJS filed its Petition on January 28, 2003, the electionseason hadnotevenstartedyet
andthat,inanyevent,hehasnotbeenactivelyinvolvedinpartisanpolitics.
Aninitiatory complaint or petition filed with the trial court should contain a plain, conciseanddirect statementoftheultimatefactsonwhichthe
[20]
partypleadingreliesforhisclaimxxx.
Yet,theSJSPetitionstatednoultimatefacts.
Indeed, SJS merely speculated or anticipated without factual moorings that, as religious leaders, the petitioner and his corespondents below
had endorsed or threatened to endorse a candidate or candidates for elective offices and that such actual or threatened endorsement will
[21]
enable [them] to elect men to publicofficewho[would]inturnbe foreverbeholdentotheir leaders,enablingthemtocontrolthegovernment[]

and pos[ing] a clear and present danger of serious erosion of the peoples faith in the electoral process[] and reinforc[ing] their belief that
[22]
religiousleadersdeterminetheultimateresultofelections,
whichwouldthenbeviolativeoftheseparationclause.
Such premise is highly speculativeandmerelytheoretical,tosaytheleast.Clearly, it does notsufficetoconstituteajusticiablecontroversy.The
Petitiondoesnotevenallegeanyindicationormanifestintenton thepartofanyoftherespondentsbelowtochampionanelectoralcandidate,or
to urgetheirsocalledflocktovotefor,ornottovotefor,aparticular candidate.It isatimehonored rule that sheer speculationdoesnotgiverise
toanactionableright.
Obviously, there is no factual allegation that SJS rights are being subjected to any threatened, imminentandinevitableviolationthatshouldbe
prevented by the declaratory relief sought.Thejudicialpower and dutyofthecourts to settleactualcontroversiesinvolvingrightsthatarelegally
[23]
demandableandenforceable
cannotbeexercisedwhenthereisnoactualorthreatenedviolationofalegalright.
[24]
All that the 5page SJS Petitionprayedforwasthatthequestion raisedin paragraph9hereofberesolved.
Inotherwords,itmerelysoughtan
opinion of the trial court on whether the speculated acts of religious leaders endorsing elective candidates for political offices violated the
constitutional principle on the separation of church and state. SJS did not ask for adeclarationofitsrightsanddutiesneitherdiditprayforthe
[25]
stoppageofanythreatenedviolationofitsdeclaredrights.Courts,however,areproscribedfromrenderinganadvisoryopinion.
CauseofAction
Respondent SJS asserts that in order to maintain a petition for declaratory relief,acauseofactionneed notbeallegedorproven.Supposedly,
forsuchpetitiontoprosper,thereneednotbeanyviolationofaright,breachofdutyoractualwrongcommittedbyonepartyagainsttheother.
Petitioner,ontheotherhand,arguesthatthesubjectmatterofanactionfordeclaratory relief shouldbeadeed,awill,acontract(orotherwritten
instrument), astatute,anexecutiveorder,aregulationoranordinance.Butthesubjectmatterofthe SJS Petitionistheconstitutionalityofanact
of a religious leader to endorse the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or to urge or require the members of the flockto vote for a
[26]
[27]
specified candidate.
Accordingtopetitioner,thissubjectmatterisbeyond therealmofan action for declaratoryrelief.
Petitioneraversthatin
theabsence of a validsubjectmatter,thePetitionfailstostatea cause of action and,hence,shouldhavebeendismissedoutrightbythecourt
a
quo
.
[28]
A causeofactionisanactoranomissionofonepartyinviolation of thelegal rightor rightsofanother,causinginjurytothelatter.
Itsessential
elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate
such right and (3) such defendants act or omission that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of theobligation of the
[29]
formertothelatter.
[30]
Thefailure of a complainttostateacauseofactionisagroundforitsoutrightdismissal.
However,in specialcivilactionsfordeclaratoryrelief,
theconcept of a cause ofactionunderordinarycivilactions does notstrictlyapply.Thereason for thisexceptionisthatanactionfordeclaratory
[31]
relief presupposes that there has been no actual breachoftheinstrumentsinvolvedor of rightsarisingthereunder.
Nevertheless,abreachor
violationshouldbeimpending,imminentoratleastthreatened.
A perusal of the Petition filed by SJS before the RTC disclosesnoexplicit allegationthatthe formerhadany legalrightinitsfavorthatitsought
to protect. We can only infer the interest, supposedly in its favor, from its bare allegation that it has thousands of members who are
citizenstaxpayersregistered voters and who are keenly interested in a judicial clarification of theconstitutionalityofthepartisanparticipationof
[32]
religiousleadersinPhilippinepoliticsandintheprocesstoinsureadherencetotheConstitutionbyeveryonexxx.

Such general averment does not, however, suffice to constitute a legal right or interest. Not only is the presumed interest not personal in
[33]
character it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain.
The Rules require that the interest must be material tothe issue and
[34]
affectedbythequestionedactorinstrument,asdistinguishedfromsimplecuriosityorincidentalinterestinthequestionraised.
To bolster its stance, SJS cites the
Corpus Juris Secundum and submits that the [p]laintiff in a declaratory judgment action does notseek to
enforce a claim against [the] defendant, but seeks a judicial declaration of [the] rights of the parties for thepurpose of guiding [their] future
conduct, and the essential distinction between a declaratory judgment action and the usual action is that no actual wrong need have been
committed or loss have occurred in order to sustain the declaratory judgment action, although there must be no uncertainty that the loss will
[35]
occurorthattheassertedrightswillbeinvaded.
SJS has,however, ignored the crucial point of its own reference
that there must be no uncertainty that the loss will occur orthattheasserted
rights will be invaded.
Precisely, as discussed earlier, it merely conjectures that herein petitioner (and his corespondents below)
mightactively
participate in partisan politics, use the awesome voting strengthofitsfaithful flock[to]enableittoelectmen to publicofficexxx,enabling[it]to
[36]
controlthegovernment.
During the Oral Argument, though, Petitioner Velarde and his corespondents below all strongly asserted thattheyhadnotinanywayengaged
orintended to participate in partisan politics. They all firmlyassuredthisCourtthattheyhadnot doneanythingtotriggertheissueraisedandto
entitleSJStothereliefsought.
Indeed, the Court finds in the Petition for Declaratory Relief no single allegation of fact upon which SJS could base aright of relief from the
namedrespondents. In any event, even granting that it sufficiently asserted alegal rightitsoughttoprotect,therewasnevertheless
nocertainty
that such right would be invaded by the saidrespondents.Noteventhe allegedproximityoftheelectionstothetimethePetitionwasfiledbelow
(January28,2003)wouldhaveprovidedthecertaintythatithadalegalrightthatwouldbejeopardizedorviolatedbyanyofthoserespondents.
LegalStanding
Legal standing or
locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case,such that the party has sustained or will
[37]
sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act.

Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or
[38]
instrument,asdistinguishedfromamereincidentalinterestinthequestioninvolved.
Petitioner alleges that [i]n seeking declaratory relief as to the constitutionality of anactofareligious leadertoendorse,orrequirethemembers
[39]
of thereligious flock to vote for a specific candidate, hereinRespondentSJShasno legalinterestin thecontroversy
ithasfailedtoestablish
howtheresolutionoftheprofferedquestionwouldbenefitorinjureit.
Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of alaw,an act orastatutemustshownot only that thelaw[oract]isinvalid,butalsothat
[theyhave]sustainedor[are]inimmediateorimminentdangerofsustainingsomedirect injuryasa resultofitsenforcement,andnotmerelythat
[40]
[they] suffer thereby in some indefinite way.
They mustdemonstratethattheyhavebeen,or areabouttobe, deniedsomerightorprivilegeto
whichthey are lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some burdensorpenaltiesbyreasonofthestatuteoractcomplained
[41]
of.
First
,partiessuing as taxpayers mustspecificallyprovethattheyhavesufficientinterest inpreventingthe illegalexpenditureofmoneyraisedby
[42]
[43]
taxation.
A taxpayers action may be properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spendingpower.
Inthe
presentcase,thereisnoallegation,whetherexpressorimplied,thattaxpayersmoneyisbeingillegallydisbursed.
Second
, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party or its members as registeredvoterswouldbe
adversely affected by the allegedactsoftherespondentsbelow, if thequestion at issue wasnot resolved.TherewasnoallegationthatSJShad
suffered or would be deprived of votes due to the acts imputed to the said respondents. Neither diditallegethatanyofitsmemberswouldbe
deniedtherightofsuffrageortheprivilegetobevotedforapublicofficetheyareseeking.
[44]
Finally
, theallegedly keen interest of its thousands of members who are citizenstaxpayersregistered voters is too general
andbeyond the
contemplation of the standards set by our jurisprudence. Not only is the presumed interest impersonal in character it is likewise too vague,
[45]
highlyspeculativeanduncertaintosatisfytherequirementofstanding.
TranscendentalImportance
In any event, SJS urges the Court to take cognizance of the Petition, even sans legal standing, considering that the issues raised are of
paramountpublicinterest.
In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized the
locus standi requirement when a petition raises an issue of transcendental significance or
[46]
paramount importance to the people.
Recently, after holding that the IBP had no
locus standi to bringthe suit,theCourtin
IBPv.Zamora[47]

nevertheless entertainedthePetitiontherein.Itnoted that theIBP hasadvancedconstitutionalissueswhichdeservetheattentionofthisCourtin

[48]
viewoftheirseriousness,noveltyandweightasprecedents.

Similarly in the instant case, the Court deemed the constitutional issue raised in the SJS Petition to be of paramount interest to the Filipino
people. The issue did not simply concern a delineation of the separation between church and state,but ransmack into thegovernanceofour
country.Theissuewasbothtranscendentalinimportanceandnovelinnature,sinceithadneverbeendecidedbefore.
The Court, thus, called for Oral Argument to determine with certainty whether it could resolve the constitutional issue despite the barren
allegations in the SJS Petition as well as the abbreviated proceedingsin thecourtbelow. Muchtoitschagrin,however,counselsfortheparties
particularly for Respondent SJS madenosatisfactoryallegationsorclarificationsthatwouldsupplythe deficiencieshereinabovediscussed.
Hence, even if the Court would exempt this case from the stringent
locus standi
requirement, such heroic effort would be futile because the
transcendentalissuecannotberesolvedanyway.
ProperProceedingsBefore
theTrialCourt
To prevent a repetition of this waste of precious judicial time and effort, and for the guidanceofthe benchandthebar,theCourtreiteratesthe
[49]
[50]
elementary
procedure
thatmustbefollowedbytrialcourtsintheconductofcivilcases.
[51]
Prefatorily, the trial court may
motu proprio or upon motion of thedefendantdismissacomplaint
(orpetition,inaspecialcivilaction)that
[52]
does not allege the plaintiffs (or petitioners) cause or causes of action. A complaint or petition should contain a plain,concise and direct
[53]
[54]
statementoftheultimatefactsonwhichthepartypleadingreliesforhisclaimordefense.
Itshouldlikewiseclearlyspecifythereliefsought.
Upon the filing of the complaint/petition and the payment of the requisite legal fees, the clerk of court shallforthwith issue the corresponding
[55]
summons to the defendants or therespondents,withadirective that thedefendant answer
within15days,unlessadifferentperiodisfixedby
[56]
thecourt.Thesummonsshallalsocontainanoticethatifsuchanswer isnotfiled,theplaintiffs/petitioners shalltakea judgmentbydefaultand
[57]
maybe granted the relief applied for.
The court, however, may uponsuch terms asmaybejustallowan answertobe filed after thetime
[58]
fixedbytheRules.
[59]
Ifthe answer sets forth a counterclaim or crossclaim, it must be answered within ten (10) days from service.
Areplymaybefiledwithinten
[60]
(10)daysfromserviceofthepleadingrespondedto.
When an answerfailstotenderanissueoradmitsthematerialallegationsofthe adversepartyspleading, thecourtmay,onmotionofthatparty,
[61]
direct judgment on such pleading (except in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legalseparation).
Meanwhile,a
partyseekingtorecoveruponaclaim,acounterclaimorcrossclaimortoobtainadeclaratoryreliefmay,atany timeaftertheanswer thereto
[62]
has been served, move for a summaryjudgmentinitsfavor.
Similarly,apartyagainstwhomaclaim,acounterclaimor crossclaimisasserted
[63]
ora declaratory relief sought may, at any time,moveforasummaryjudgmentinitsfavor.
Afterthemotionisheard,the judgmentsought
shallbe rendered forthwith if thereisashowingthat,exceptas to theamountofdamages,thereisnogenuineissueastoanymaterialfactand
[64]
thatthemovingpartyisentitledtoajudgmentasamatteroflaw.
Within the timefor but before filing the answer to the complaint or petition, the defendantmayfileamotiontodismissbasedonanyofthe
grounds stated in Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. During the hearing of the motion, the partiesshallsubmittheirargumentsonthe
[65]
questions of law, and their evidence on the questions of fact.
After the hearing, thecourtmay dismiss theactionorclaim,denythemotion,or
order the amendment of thepleadings.Itshallnotdeferthe resolution of themotionforthereasonthatthegroundrelieduponisnotindubitable.
[66]
Ineverycase,theresolutionshallstateclearlyanddistinctlythereasonstherefor.
Ifthe motion is denied, the movant may file an answer within the balance of the periodoriginallyprescribedtofileananswer,butnotlessthan
five(5) daysinanyevent,computedfromthereceiptofthenoticeofthedenial.Ifthe pleadingis orderedtobeamended,thedefendantshallfile
[67]
ananswerwithinfifteen(15)days,countedfromtheserviceoftheamendedpleading,unlessthecourtprovidesalongerperiod.
[68]
[69]
After the last pleading has been served andfiled, thecase shallbe set for pretrial, whichisa mandatoryproceeding.Aplaintiffs/petitioners
(or its duly authorized representatives) nonappearance at the pretrial, if without valid cause, shall result in the dismissal of the action with
prejudice, unless the court orders otherwise. A similar failure on the part of the defendantshall bea cause forallowingtheplaintiff/petitionerto
[70]
presentevidence
exparte,
andthecourttorenderjudgmentonthebasisthereof.
[71]
The parties are required to file their pretrial briefs failure to do so shall have the same effect as failure to appear atthe pretrial.
Upon the
termination thereof, the court shall issue an order reciting in detail the matters taken up at the conference the action taken on them, the
amendments allowed to the pleadings and the agreements or admissions, if any, made by the parties regarding any of the matters
[72]
[73]
considered.
Thepartiesmayfurtheravailthemselvesofanyofthemodesofdiscovery,
iftheysowish.
[74]
Thereafter,the caseshallbesetfortrial,inwhichthepartiesshalladducetheir respectiveevidencein support of theirclaimsand/ordefenses.
By their written consent or upon the application of either party, or on its own motion, the court may also order any or allofthe issues to be
[75]
referredtoacommissioner,whoistobeappointedbyitortobe agreedupon bytheparties.
Thetrialorhearingbeforethecommissionershall
[76]
proceedinallrespectsasitwouldifheldbeforethecourt.

[77]
Uponthecompletionofsuchproceedings,thecommissionershallfilewith thecourta writtenreporton themattersreferredbytheparties.
The
report shall be set for hearing, after which the court shall issue an orderadopting,modifying orrejecting it inwholeorinpartorrecommittingit
[78]
withinstructionsorrequiringthepartiestopresentfurtherevidencebeforethecommissionerorthecourt.
Finally, ajudgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be rendered. The decision shall be in writing,personallyanddirectly
prepared by thejudge,statingclearlyanddistinctlythefactsandthelawonwhichitis based, signedbytheissuingmagistrate,andfiledwiththe
[79]
clerkofcourt.
Basedontheseelementaryguidelines,letusexaminetheproceedingsbeforethetrialcourtintheinstantcase.
First, with respect to the initiatory pleading of the SJS. Even a cursory perusal of the Petition immediately reveals its gross inadequacy. It
contained no statement of ultimate facts upon which the petitioner relied foritsclaim. Furthermore,itdidnot specifythe reliefitsoughtfromthe
court,butmerelyaskedittoanswerahypotheticalquestion.
Relief
, ascontemplated in a legal action, refers to a specific coercive measureprayedforas aresult of aviolationoftherightsofaplaintiffora
[80]
[81]
petitioner.
As already discussed earlier, the Petition before the trial court had no allegations of fact
or of any specific violation of the
petitioners rights, which the respondents had a duty to respect.Such deficiency amounted to a failure to state acauseof action hence, no
coercive relief could be sought and adjudicated. The Petition evidently lacked substantive requirements and, we repeat, should have been
dismissedattheoutset.
Second
, with respect to the trial court proceedings. Withintheperiod set to filetheirrespectiveanswers to theSJSPetition,Velarde,Villanueva
and Manalo filed Motions to Dismiss Cardinal Sin, a Comment and Soriano, within a priorly granted extended period,an Answer inwhichhe
[82]
likewise prayed for the dismissal of the Petition.
SJS filed a Rejoinder to the Motion of Velarde, who subsequently filed aSurRejoinder.
[83]
Supposedly, there were several scheduled settings, in which the [c]ourt was apprisedofthe respectivepositionsoftheparties.
Thenatureof
such settings whether pretrial or trial hearings was not disclosed in the records. Before ruling on the Motions to Dismiss, the trial court
[84]
[85]
issuedanOrder
datedMay8,2003,directingthepartiestosubmittheirmemoranda. Issuedshortlythereafter wasanotherOrder
datedMay
14,2003,denyingalltheMotionstoDismiss.
InthelatterOrder,thetrialcourtperfunctorilyruled:
TheCourtnowresolvestodenytheMotionstoDismiss,andafterallthememorandaaresubmitted,then,thecaseshallbedeemedas
[86]
submittedforresolution.
Apparently, contrary to the requirement of Section 2ofRule16 of theRulesofCourt, theMotionswerenotheard.Worse,theOrderpurportedly
resolving the Motions to Dismiss did not state any reason at all fortheirdenial,in contravention of Section 3ofthesaidRule16.Therewasnot
evenanystatementofthegroundsrelieduponbytheMotionsmuchless,ofthelegalfindingsandconclusionsofthetrialcourt.
Thus,Velarde,VillanuevaandManalomovedforreconsideration.Pendingthe resolution of theseMotionsforReconsideration,Villanuevafileda
Motion to suspend thefilingofthepartiesmemoranda.Butinstead of separatelyresolvingthe pendingMotionsfairlyandsquarely,thetrialcourt
again transgressed the Rules of Court when it immediately proceeded to issue its Decision, even before tackling theissuesraised inthose
Motions.
Furthermore, the RTC issued its Decision without allowing thepartiestofiletheiranswers.Forthisreason,therewas nojoinderoftheissues.If
only it had allowed the filing of those answers, the trial court would have known, as the Oral Argument revealed, that thepetitioner and his
corespondents below had not committed or threatened to commit the act attributed to them (endorsing candidates) the act that was
supposedlythefactualbasisofthesuit.
Parenthetically, the court
a quo furtherfailedtogiveanoticeofthePetitiontothe OSG, whichwas entitledtobehearduponquestionsinvolving
[87]
theconstitutionalityorvalidityofstatutesandothermeasures.
Moreover, aswillbediscussedinmoredetail,thequestionedDecisionofthetrialcourtwasutterlywantingin therequirementsprescribedbythe
ConstitutionandtheRulesofCourt.
All inall, during the loosely abbreviated proceedings of the case, the trial court indeed actedwithinexplicablehaste,withtotalignoranceofthe
lawor,worse,incavalierdisregardoftherulesofprocedureandwithgraveabuseofdiscretion.
Contrary to the contentions of the trial judge and of SJS, proceedings for declaratory relief must still follow the processdescribedabovethe
petition must state a cause of action the proceedingsmustundergothe procedure outlined intheRulesofCourtandthedecisionmustadhere
toconstitutionalandlegalrequirements.
FirstSubstantiveIssue:
FundamentalRequirements
ofaDecision

TheConstitution commands that [n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing thereinclearlyanddistinctlythefactsandthe
law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied
[88]
withoutstatingthebasistherefor.
Consistentwiththisconstitutionalmandate,Section1ofRule36oftheRulesonCivilProceduresimilarlyprovides:
Sec.1.
Renditionofjudgmentsandfinalorders
.Ajudgmentorfinalorderdeterminingthemeritsofthecaseshallbeinwritingpersonallyand
directlypreparedbythejudge,statingclearlyanddistinctlythefactsandthelawonwhichitisbased,signedbyhimandfiledwiththeclerkof
court.
Inthesamevein,Section2ofRule120oftheRulesofCourtonCriminalProcedurereadsasfollows:
Sec.2.
Formandcontentsofjudgments
.Thejudgmentmustbewrittenintheofficiallanguage,personallyanddirectlypreparedbythejudge
andsignedbyhimandshallcontainclearlyanddistinctlyastatementofthefactsprovedoradmittedbytheaccusedandthelawuponwhichthe
judgmentisbased.
xxxxxxxxx.
Pursuant to the Constitution, this Court also issued on January 28, 1988, Administrative Circular No.1,prompting all judgestomakecomplete
findings of facts in their decisions, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of thecase inthe light of theevidencepresented.Theyshouldavoid
thetendencytogeneralizeandformconclusionswithoutdetailingthefactsfromwhichsuchconclusionsarededuced.
[89]
In many cases,
this Court has time and time again reminded magistrates to heed the demand of Section 14, Article VIII of theConstitution.
The Court, through Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. in
Yao v. Court of Appeals
,[90]
discussed at length the implications of this provision and
stronglyexhortedthus:
FaithfuladherencetotherequirementsofSection14,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitutionisindisputablyaparamountcomponentofdueprocessand
fairplay.ItislikewisedemandedbythedueprocessclauseoftheConstitution.Thepartiestoalitigationshouldbeinformedofhowitwas
decided,withanexplanationofthefactualandlegalreasonsthatledtotheconclusionsofthecourt.Thecourtcannotsimplysaythatjudgment
isrenderedinfavorofXandagainstYandjustleaveitatthatwithoutanyjustificationwhatsoeverforitsaction.Thelosingpartyisentitledto
knowwhyhelost,sohemayappealtothehighercourt,ifpermitted,shouldhebelievethatthedecisionshouldbereversed.Adecisionthat
doesnotclearlyanddistinctlystatethefactsandthelawonwhichitisbasedleavesthepartiesinthedarkastohowitwasreachedandis
preciselyprejudicialtothelosingparty,whoisunabletopinpointthepossibleerrorsofthecourtforreviewbyahighertribunal.Morethanthat,
therequirementisanassurancetothepartiesthat,inreachingjudgment,thejudgedidsothroughtheprocessesoflegalreasoning.Itis,thus,a
safeguardagainsttheimpetuosityofthejudge,preventinghimfromdeciding
ipsedixit
.Vouchsafedneithertheswordnorthepursebythe
Constitutionbutnonethelessvestedwiththesovereignprerogativeofpassingjudgmentonthelife,libertyorpropertyofhisfellowmen,thejudge
mustultimatelydependonthepowerofreasonforsustainedpublicconfidenceinthejustnessofhisdecision.
In
Peoplev.Bugarin,[91]

theCourtalsoexplained:
Therequirementthatthedecisionsofcourtsmustbeinwritingandthattheymustsetforthclearlyanddistinctlythefactsandthelawonwhich
theyarebasedservesmanyfunctions.Itisintended,amongotherthings,toinformthepartiesofthereasonorreasonsforthedecisionsothatif
anyofthemappeals,hecanpointouttotheappellatecourtthefindingoffactsortherulingsonpointsoflawwithwhichhedisagrees.Morethan
that,therequirementisanassurancetothepartiesthat,inreachingjudgment,thejudgedidsothroughtheprocessesoflegalreasoning.xxx.
Indeed, elementary due process demands that the parties to a litigation be given information on how the case was decided, as well as an
[92]
explanationofthefactualandlegalreasonsthatledtotheconclusionsofthecourt.
In
Madrid v. Court of Appeals
,[93]
this Court had instructed magistrates to exert effort to ensure that their decisions would present a
comprehensiveanalysisoraccountofthefactualandlegalfindingsthatwouldsubstantiallyaddresstheissuesraisedbytheparties.
In thepresentcase,itisstarklyobviousthattheassailedDecisioncontains nostatement of factsmuchless anassessmentoranalysisthereof
orofthe courtsfindingsastotheprobablefacts.TheassailedDecisionbeginswith astatementofthe natureoftheactionandthequestionor
issue presented. Then follows a brief explanation of the constitutional provisions involved, and what thePetitionsoughttoachieve.Thereafter,
theensuing procedural incidents beforethetrialcourt aretracked. TheDecisionproceeds to afulllengthopiniononthenatureandtheextentof
theseparation of church and state. Without expressly statingthe final conclusionshe hasreachedorspecifyingthereliefgrantedordenied,the
trialjudgeendsherDecisionwiththeclauseSOORDERED.
What were the antecedents that necessitated the filing ofthe Petition?Whatexactly were thedistinct factsthatgaverisetothequestionsought
to be resolved by SJS?More important, what were the factual findings and analysis on which the trial court based its legal findings and
conclusions? None were stated or implied. Indeed, the RTCs Decision cannot be upheld for its failuretoexpressclearlyanddistinctlythefacts
onwhichitwasbased.Thus,thetrialcourtclearlytransgressedtheconstitutionaldirective.

The significance of factual findings lies in the value of the decision as a precedent. How can it be so if one cannot apply the ruling to similar
circumstances, simply because such circumstances are unknown? Otherwise stated, how will the ruling be applied in the future, if thereis no
pointoffactualcomparison?
Moreover, the court
a quo did not include a resolutory or dispositive portion in its socalled Decision. The importance of such portion was
explainedintheearlycase
Manalangv.TuasondeRickards
,[94]
fromwhichwequote:
TheresolutionoftheCourtonagivenissueasembodiedinthedispositivepartofthedecisionororderistheinvestitiveorcontrollingfactorthat
determinesandsettlestherightsofthepartiesandthequestionspresentedtherein,notwithstandingtheexistenceofstatementsordeclaration
inthebodyofsaidorderthatmaybeconfusing.
Theassailed Decision in the present case leaves us in the dark as to its final resolution of the Petition. To recall, the original Petition was for
declaratory relief. So, what relief did the trial court grant or deny? What rightsofthe parties did it conclusivelydeclare?Itsfinalstatementsays,
SOORDERED.Butwhatexactlydidthecourtorder?IthadthetemeritytolabelitsissuanceaDecision,whennothingwasinfactdecided.
Respondent SJS insists that the dispositive portion can befoundin thebodyoftheassailedDecision.Itclaimsthattheissueisdisposedofand
thePetition finally resolved by the statement of the trial court found on page 10 of its 14page Decision, whichreads:Endorsementofspecific
[95]
candidatesinanelectiontoanypublicofficeisaclearviolationoftheseparationclause.
Wecannotagree.
In
Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag,[96]

the obligation of the party imposed by the Court was allegedly contained in the text of the original
Decision.TheCourt,however,held:
xxxThequotedfindingofthelowercourtcannotsupplydeficienciesinthedispositiveportion.Itisamereopinionofthecourtandtheruleis
settledthatwherethereisaconflictbetweenthe
dispositivepart
andthe
opinion
,theformermustprevailoverthelatteronthetheorythatthe
dispositiveportionisthefinalorderwhiletheopinionismerelyastatementorderingnothing.(Italicsintheoriginal)
Thus, the dispositive portion cannot be deemed to be the statement quoted by SJS and embedded in the last paragraph of page 10 of the
assailed 14page Decision. If at all, that statement is merely an answer to a hypothetical legalquestionandjustapartoftheopinionofthetrial
court. Itdoes not conclusivelydeclaretherights(orobligations)of thepartiestothePetition.Neitherdoesitgrantanymuchless,theproper
reliefunderthecircumstances,asrequiredofadispositiveportion.
Failuretocomply with the constitutional injunction is a graveabuse of discretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction.Decisionsororders
[97]
issuedincarelessdisregardoftheconstitutionalmandateareapatentnullityandmustbestruckdownasvoid.
PartsofaDecision
In general, the essential parts of a good decision consist of the following: (1) statement of the case (2) statement of facts (3) issues or
assignment of errors (4) court ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule, separatelyconsideredandresolved and,finally,(5) dispositiveportion.
The
ponente may also opt to include an introduction or a prologue as well as an epilogue, especiallyin cases inwhich controversial or novel
[98]
issuesareinvolved.
An introduction may consist of a concise but comprehensive statement of the principal factual or legal issue/s of thecase. In somecases
particularly those concerning public interest or involving complicated commercial, scientific, technical or otherwise rare subject matters a
longer introduction or prologue may serve to acquaint readers with the specific nature of the controversy andthe issuesinvolved.Anepilogue
maybe asummation of the important principles applied to the resolution of the issues of paramount public interestorsignificance.Itmayalso
laydownanenduringphilosophyoflaworguidingprinciple.
Letusnow,againfortheguidanceofthebenchandthebar,discusstheessentialpartsofagooddecision.
1.StatementoftheCase
The
Statement of the Case
consists of a legal definition of the nature of the action. At the first instance, thispartstateswhethertheactionisa
civil case for collection, ejectment, quieting of title, foreclosure of mortgage, and soonor,ifitis acriminal case,thispart describesthespecific
chargequotedusuallyfromtheaccusatoryportionoftheinformationandtheplea of theaccused.Also mentionedherearewhetherthecase
isbeing decided on appeal or on a petition for certiorari, the court of origin,the casenumber inthe trialcourt,andthedispositiveportionofthe
assaileddecision.
In a criminal case, the verbatim reproduction of the criminal information serves as a guide in determining the nature and the gravity of the
offense for which the accused may be found culpable. As a rule, the accused cannot be convicted of acrimedifferentfromorgraverthanthat
charged.
Also,quoting verbatim the text of theinformationisespeciallyimportant whenthere isaquestionon thesufficiencyofthecharge,oronwhether
qualifyingandmodifyingcircumstanceshavebeenadequatelyallegedtherein.
To ensure thatdueprocessisaccorded,itisimportanttogiveashortdescriptionoftheproceedingsregardingthepleaoftheaccused.Absence
of an arraignment, or a serious irregularity therein, may render the judgment void, and further consideration by the appellatecourt would be

futile.Insome instances,especiallyinappealedcases,itwould also beusefultomention thefact of theappellantsdetention,inordertodispose

ofthepreliminaryquerywhetherornottheyhaveabandonedtheirappealbyabscondingorjumpingbail.
Mentioning the courtoforiginandthecasenumberoriginally assigned helpsin facilitatingthe consolidationoftherecordsofthecaseinboththe
trialandtheappellatecourts,afterentryoffinaljudgment.
Finally, thereproduction of the decretalportionoftheassaileddecisioninforms thereaderofhowthe appealedcasewasdecidedbythecourt
a
quo
.
2.StatementofFacts
There are different ways of relating the facts of the case.
First
, under the objective or reportorial method, the judge summarizes without
comment the testimony of each witness and the contents of each exhibit.
Second
, under the synthesis method, the factual theory of the
plaintiff or prosecution and then that of the defendant or defense is summarized according to the judges best light.
Third
, in the subjective
method, the version of the facts accepted by the judge is simply narrated without explaining what the partiesversions are.
Finally
, through a
combination of objective and subjective means, the testimony of each witness is reportedandthejudgethenformulateshisorherownversion
ofthefacts.
In criminal cases, it isbettertopresentboththeversionoftheprosecutionandthatofthe defense, intheinterestoffairnessanddueprocess.A
detailed evaluation ofthecontentionsofthe parties must follow. Theresolutionofmostcriminal cases,unlike civil andothercases,dependstoa
largeextent on the factual issues and the appreciation of the evidence. The plausibility or the implausibility of eachversioncansometimesbe
initiallydrawnfromareadingofthefacts.Thereafter,thebasesofthecourtinarrivingatitsfindingsandconclusionsshouldbeexplained.
On appeal, the fact thattheassaileddecisionofthelower courtfully,intelligentlyandcorrectly resolvedallfactualandlegalissuesinvolvedmay
partly explain why the reviewing court findsnoreasontoreversethefindingsandconclusionsofthe former. Conversely,thelowercourtspatent
misappreciationofthefactsormisapplicationofthelawwouldaidinabetterunderstandingofwhyitsrulingisreversedormodified.
In appealed civil cases, the opposing sets of facts no longer need tobe presented.Issuesforresolutionusuallyinvolvequestionsoflaw,grave
abuse of discretion, or want of jurisdiction hence, the facts of the case areoften undisputedbythe parties.Withfewexceptions,factualissues
are not entertained in noncriminal cases. Consequently, the narration of facts by the lower court, if exhaustive andclear,maybereproduced
otherwise,thematerialfactualantecedentsshouldberestatedinthewordsofthereviewingmagistrate.
In addition, the reasoning of the lower court or body whose decision is under review should be laid out,in order that the parties may clearly
understandwhythelowercourtruledinacertainway,andwhythereviewingcourteitherfindsnoreasontoreverseitorconcludesotherwise.
3.IssuesorAssignmentofErrors
Bothfactual and legal issues should bestated.Onappeal, theassignment of errors,asmentionedintheappellantsbrief,maybereproducedin
toto and tackled seriatim,so as to avoid motions for reconsideration of the final decision on the ground that the court failed to consider all
assigned errors that could affect the outcome of the case. But whentheappellant presents repetitiveissuesorwhentheassignederrorsdonot
strikeatthemainissue,thesemayberestatedinclearerandmorecoherentterms.
Though not specifically questioned by the parties, additional issues may also be included, if deemed important for substantial justice to be
rendered. Note that appealed criminal cases aregiven
denovoreview,in contrasttononcriminal casesinwhichthereviewingcourtisgenerally
limitedtoissues specificallyraisedintheappeal.Thefewexceptions areerrorsofjurisdictionquestions notraisedbut necessaryinarrivingata
justdecision on the case or unassigned errors that are closely related to thoseproperlyassigned, oruponwhichdependsthedeterminationof
thequestionproperlyraised.
4.TheCourtsRuling
Thispart contains a full discussion of the specific errors or issues raised in the complaint, petitionor appeal,as thecasemaybeaswellasof
other issues the court deems essential to a just dispositionofthecase. Wherethereare severalissues, each oneofthemshouldbeseparately
addressed, as much as practicable. The respective contentions of the parties should also be mentionedhere. When procedural questionsare
raisedinadditiontosubstantiveones,itisbettertoresolvetheformerpreliminarily.
5.TheDispositionorDispositivePortion
In a criminal case, the disposition should include a finding of innocence or guilt, the specific crime committed, the penalty imposed, the
participation of the accused, the modifying circumstances if any, and the civil liability and costs. In casean acquittalisdecreed,thecourtmust
order the immediate release of the accused, if detained, (unless they are being held for another cause)andorderthedirectoroftheBureauof
Corrections (or wherever the accused is detained) to report, within a maximum of ten (10) days from notice, the exact datewhen theaccused
weresetfree.
In acivilcase as well as in a special civil action, the dispositionshould state whetherthecomplaintorpetition isgrantedordenied,thespecific
relief granted, and the costs.The following test of completeness may be applied.
First, the parties should know their rights and obligations.
Second, they should know how to execute the decision under alternative contingencies.
Third,thereshouldbenoneedforfurtherproceedings

to dispose of the issues.

Fourth, the case should be terminated by according the properrelief.Theproper reliefusuallydependsuponwhatthe
parties seek in their pleadings. Itmaydeclaretheirrightsandduties, commandtheperformanceofpositiveprestations,ororderthemtoabstain
fromspecificacts.Thedispositionmustalsoadjudicatecosts.
Theforegoingpartsneednotalwaysbediscussedin sequence.Butthey shouldallbepresentandplainlyidentifiableinthedecision.Depending
on the writers character, genre and style, the language should be fresh and freeflowing, not necessarily stereotypedor ina fixed form much
lesshighfalutin,hackneyedandpretentious.Atalltimes,however,thedecisionmustbe
clear,concise,complete
and
correct
.
SecondSubstantiveIssue:
ReligiousLeadersEndorsement
ofCandidatesforPublicOffice
The basic question posed in the SJS Petition WHETHER ENDORSEMENTS OF CANDIDACIES BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL undoubtedly deserves serious consideration. As stated earlier, the Court deems this constitutional issue to be of
paramount interest to the Filipino citizenry, for it concerns the governance of our country and its people. Thus, despitetheobviousprocedural
transgressions by both SJS and the trial court, this CourtstillcalledforOral Argument,so asnottoleave anydoubtthattheremightberoomto
entertainanddisposeoftheSJSPetitiononthemerits.
Counsel for SJS hasutterlyfailed,however,toconvincetheCourtthatthere areenoughfactualandlegalbasestoresolvetheparamountissue.
On theother hand, the Office of the Solicitor General has sided with petitionerinsofaras thereareno factssupportingtheSJSPetitionandthe
assailedDecision.
We reiterate that the said Petition failed to state directly the ultimate facts that it reliedupon for its claim.DuringtheOral Argument,counselfor
SJS candidly admitted that there were no factual allegations in its Petition for Declaratory Relief. Neither were there factual findings in the
assailed Decision. Atbest,SJSmerelyaskedthetrialcourttoanswerahypotheticalquestion. In effect,itmerelysoughtanadvisoryopinion,the
[99]
renditionofwhichwasbeyondthecourtsconstitutionalmandateandjurisdiction.
Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it made nofindings of facts and final disposition.
Hence,itisvoidanddeemedlegallyinexistent.Consequently,thereisnothingforthisCourttoreview,affirm,reverseorevenjustmodify.
Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court to take up, on the merits, the paramount question involving a constitutional principle. It is a
timehonored rule that the constitutionality of a statute [or act] will be passed upon only if, and to the extentthat, it isdirectlyand necessarily
[100]
involvedinajusticiablecontroversyandisessentialtotheprotectionoftherightsofthepartiesconcerned.
WHEREFORE
, the Petition for Review of Brother Mike Velarde is
GRANTED.
The
assailedJune12, 2003DecisionandJuly 29,2003Orderof
theRegional Trial Court of Manila(Branch49)arehereby
DECLAREDNULL ANDVOID
andthus
SETASIDE
. TheSJSPetitionforDeclaratory
Reliefis
DISMISSED
forfailuretostateacauseofaction.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator to evaluate and recommend whether the trial judgemay,after
observing due process, be held administratively liable for rendering a decision violative of the Constitution, the RulesofCourt and relevant
circularsofthisCourt.Nocosts.
SOORDERED.
Davide,Jr.,C.J.,Puno,Quisumbing,SandovalGutierrez,Carpio,AustriaMartinez,CarpioMorales,Callejo,Sr.,Azcuna,
and
Tinga,JJ.,
concur.
Vitug,J.,
intheresult.
YnaresSantiago,J.,
nopart.
Corona,J.,
onleave.
FIRSTDIVISION
[G.R.No.144412.November18,2003]
ALLIEDBANKINGCORPORATION,
petitioner,vs
.COURTOFAPPEALSandPOTENCIANOL.GALANIDA,
respondents
.
DECISION
CARPIO,
J
.:
TheCase
[1]
[2]
Before theCourtisapetitionforreview
assailingtheDecision
of27April2000 and theResolutionof8 August2000oftheCourtofAppealsin
[3]
CAG.R. SP No. 51451.The Court of Appeals upheld the Decision
of 18 September 1998 and the Resolution of 24 December 1998 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V00018098. The NLRC modified the Decisiondated23 December1997of
Labor Arbiter Dominador
A. Almirante (Labor Arbiter) in NLRC Case No. RAB VII05054594 holding that Allied Banking Corporation (Allied
Bank) illegally dismissed Potenciano L. Galanida (Galanida). The NLRC awarded Galanida separation pay, backwages, moral and exemplary
damages,andotheramountstotalingP1,264,933.33.
AntecedentFacts

Forabackgroundofthiscase,wequoteinpartfromtheDecisionoftheCourtofAppeals:
PrivaterespondentPotencianoGalanidawashiredbypetitionerAlliedBankingCorporationon11January1978androsefrom
accountantbook(k)eepertoassistantmanagerin1991.HisappointmentwascoveredbyaNoticeofPersonnelActionwhichprovidesasoneof
theconditionsofemploymenttheprovisiononpetitionersrighttotransferemployees:
REGULARAPPOINTMENT:xxxItisunderstoodthatthebankreservestherighttotransferorassignyoutootherdepartmentsorbranchesof
thebankastheneedarisesandintheinterestofmaintainingsmoothanduninterruptedservicetothepublic.
Privaterespondentwaspromotedseveraltimesandwastransferredtoseveralbranchesasfollows:
a)January,1978toMarch,1982
TagbilaranCityBranch
b)April,1982toMay,1984
LapulapuCityBranch
c)June,1984
MandaueCityBranch
d)July,1984toApril,1986
TagbilaranCityBranch
e)May,1986toMay,1987
DumagueteCityBranch
f)June,1987toAugust,1987
CarbonBranch,CebuCity
g)September,1987toSept.1989
LapulapuCityBranch,Cebu
h)October,1989toSept.1992
CarbonBranch,CebuCity
i)October1992toSept.1994
JakosalemRegionalBranch,
CebuCity(Rollo,p.47)
Effectingarotation/movementofofficersassignedintheCebuhomebase,petitionerlistedrespondentassecondintheorderofpriorityof
assistantmanagerstobeassignedoutsideofCebuCityhavingbeenstationedinCebuforsevenyearsalready.Privaterespondentmanifested
hisrefusaltobetransferredtoBacolodCityinaletterdated19April1994citingasreasonparentalobligations,expenses,andtheanguishthat
wouldresultifheisawayfromhisfamily.HethenfiledacomplaintbeforetheLaborArbiterforconstructivedismissal.
Subsequently,petitionerbankinformedprivaterespondent(Rollo,p.86)thathewastoreporttotheTagbilaranCityBrancheffective23May
1994.Privaterespondentrefused.Inaletterdated13June1994,petitionerwarnedandrequiredofprivaterespondentasfollows:
Thereisnodiscriminationinyourtransfer.Infact,amongtheofficersmentioned,onlyyouhaverefusedthenewassignmentcitingdifficultyof
workingawayfromyourfamilyasiftheotherofficersconcerneddonotsufferthesamepredicament.Toexemptyoufromtheofficertransfer
wouldresultinfavoritisminyourfavoranddiscriminationasagainsttheotherofficersconcerned.
Infurtheranceofmaintainingasmoothanduninterruptedservicetothepublic,andinaccordancewiththeBanksorderofpriorityofrotatingits
accountantsplacesofassignments,youarewellawarethatRobertoIsla,AM/Accountant,assignedinCebuformorethanten(10)years,was,
onFebruary14,1994,reassignedtoIliganCityBranchandthentoCagayandeOroCityBranchonJune8,1994.Hence,yourobjectiononthe
groundofyourlengthofserviceiswithoutmerit.
xxx
Asdiscussed,yourrefusaltofollowinstructionconcerningyourtransferandreassignmenttoBacolodCityandtoTagbilaranCityispenalized
underArticleXIIoftheBanksEmployeeDisciplinePolicyandProcedure[which]provides:
XIITransferandReassignment
Refusaltofollowinstructionconcerningtransfersandreassignments.
Firstandsubsequentoffenses
Thepenaltymayrangefromsuspensiontodismissalasdeterminedbymanagement.Theemployeeshallberequiredtocomplywiththeorderof
transferandreassignment,ifthepenaltyisnotterminationofemployment.
Inviewoftheforegoing,pleaseexplaininwritingwithinthree(3)daysfromreceipthereofwhynodisciplinaryactionshouldbemetedagainst
[4]
youforyourhavingrefusedtofollowinstructionsconcerningtheforegoingtransferandreassignment.xxx

On 16 June 1994, Galanida replied that (w)hether the banks penalty for my refusal beSuspensionorDismissalxxxitwillallthemoreestablish
[5]
and fortify mycomplaintnowpendingatNLRC,RAB7.
Inthesameletter,he chargedAlliedBank withdiscriminationandfavoritisminordering
histransfer,thus:
xxxWhatIcannotdeciphernowundertheheadshipof
Mr.Olveda
ismanagementsdiscriminatoryactoftransferringonlythelongstaying
accountantsofCebuintheguiseofitsexerciseofmanagementprerogativewhenintruthandinfact,theulteriormotiveistoaccommodate
somenewofficerswhohappentoenjoyfavorableconnectionwithmanagement.HowcanthebankeverjustifythetransferofMelindaT.Co,a
newofficerwhohadexperiencedbeingassignedoutsideofCebuformorethanayearonlytoTabunokBranch?Ifthepurposeisforcheckand
balance,ismanagementimplyingthatMelindaCocanbettercarryoutsuchfunctionoverMr.LarrySabelino,whoisaseasonedand
experiencedaccountantoranyoftheMetroCebuaccountantsforthatmatter?Isntthisactofmanagementanobviousdisplayoffavoritism?
[6]
xxx
[7]
On 5October 1994, Galanida received an interoffice communication
(Memo) dated 8 September 1994 from Allied Banks VicePresident for
Personnel, Mr. Leonso C. Pe.The Memo informed Galanida that Allied Bank had terminated his services effective 1 September 1994. The
reasons given for the dismissal were: (1) Galanidas continued refusal to be transferred from the Jakosalem, Cebu City branchand(2) his
refusaltoreportforworkdespitethedenialofhisapplicationforadditionalvacationleave.ThesalientportionoftheMemoreads:
Therefore,yourrefusaltofollowinstructionconcerningyourtransferandreassignmenttoBacolodCityandtoTagbilaranCityiswithoutany
justifiablereasonandconstitutedviolationsofArticleXIIoftheBanksEDPPxxx
Inviewoftheforegoing,
pleasebeinformedthattheBankhasterminatedyourserviceseffectiveSeptember1,1994
andconsidered
whateverbenefit,ifany,thatyouareentitledasforfeitedinaccordancewith04,VAdministrativePenalties,page6oftheBanksEDPPwhich
providesasfollows:
04.Dismissal.
Dismissalisapermanentseparationforcausexxx
NoticeofterminationshallbeissuedbytheInvestigationCommitteesubjecttotheconfirmationofthePresidentorhisauthorizedrepresentative
asofficer/employeewhoisterminatedforcauseshallnotbeeligibletoreceiveanybenefitarisingfromher/hisemploymentwiththeBankorto
terminationpay.
ItisunderstoodthattheterminationofyourserviceshallbewithoutprejudicetowhateverlegalremedieswhichtheBankmayhavealready
undertakenand/orwillundertakeagainstyou.
[8]
Pleasebeguidedaccordingly.(Emphasissupplied)
TheRulingoftheLaborArbiter
After several hearings, the Labor Arbiter heldthatAlliedBank had abuseditsmanagementprerogativeinorderingthetransferofGalanidatoits
Bacolod and Tagbilaran branches. In ruling that Galanidas refusal to transfer did not amount to insubordination, the Labor Arbiter
misquoted
thisCourtsdecisionin
Doschv.NLRC
,[9]
thus:
Asageneralrule,therighttotransferorreassignanemployeeisrecognizedasanemployersexclusiverightandtheprerogativeof
management(AbbottLaboratoriesvs.NLRC,154SCRA713[1987]).
Theexerciseofthisright,isnothowever,absolute.Ithascertainlimitations.Thus,inHelmutDoschvs.NLRC,etal.123SCRA296(1983),the
SupremeCourt,ruled:
Whileitmaybetruethattherighttotransferorreassignanemployeeisanemployersexclusiverightandtheprerogativeofmanagement,
such
rightisnotabsolute
.Therightofanemployertofreelyselectordischargehisemployeeislimitedbytheparamountpolicepowerxxxforthe
relationsbetweencapitalandlaborarenotmerelycontractualbutimpressedwithpublicinterest.xxxAndneithercapitalnorlaborshallact
oppressivelyagainsteachother.
Refusaltoobeyatransferordercannotbeconsideredinsubordinationwhereemployeecitedreasonforsaidrefusal,such(sic)asthatofbeing
awayfromthefamily
.[10]
(UnderscoringsuppliedbytheLaborArbiter)
TheLabor Arbiter reasoned thatGalanidastransferwasinconvenientandprejudicialbecause Galanidawouldhavetoincuradditionalexpenses
for board, lodging and travel. On the other hand, the Labor Arbiter held that Allied Bank failed to showanybusinessurgencythatwouldjustify
thetransfer.
TheLabor Arbiter also gave credence to Galanidas claim that Allied Bank gave Ms. Co special treatment. The Labor ArbiterstatedthatAllied
Bank deliberately left out Ms. Cos namefromthelistofaccountantstransferredtoCebuas contained inAlliedBanksletterdated13June1994.
However,Mr. Regidor Olveda, AlliedBanksVicePresidentforOperationsAccounting, testifiedthatthe bank transferred Ms.CototheTabunok,
Cebubranchwithinthefirsthalfof1994.

Still,the Labor Arbiter declined to award Galanida back wages because he was not entirely free from blame. Since anotherbank hadalready
employed Galanida, the Labor Arbiter granted Galanida separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiters
Decisionof23December1997provides:
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,judgmentisherebyrenderedorderingrespondentAlliedBankingCorporationtopaycomplainantthe
aggregatetotalamountofThreeHundredTwentyFourThousandPesos(P324,000.00)representingthefollowingawards:
a)SeparationpayforP272,000.00
b)Quarterbonusfor1994P16,000.00
th
c)13
monthpayfor1994P16,000.00
d)RefundofcontributiontoProvidentFundP20,000.00.
[11]
SOORDERED.
TheRulingoftheNLRC
On appeal, the NLRC likewise ruled that Allied Bank terminated Galanida without just cause. The NLRC agreed thatthe transfer order was
unreasonable and unjustified,consideringthefamily considerationsmentionedby Galanida.TheNLRCcharacterizedthetransferasademotion
since the Bacolod and Tagbilaran branchesweresmallerthantheJakosalembranch,aregional office, andbecausethebankwantedGalanida,
an assistant manager, to replace an assistant accountant in the Tagbilaran branch. The NLRC found unlawful discriminationsinceAlliedBank
did not transfer several junior accountants in Cebu. The NLRC also held that Allied Bank gave Ms. Co special treatment byassigning her to
Cebueventhoughshehadworkedforthebankforlessthantwoyears.
TheNLRC ruled that Galanidas termination was illegal for lack of due process. The NLRC statedthatAllied Bankdidnotconductanyhearing.
TheNLRC declared that Allied Bank failed tosendaterminationnotice,asrequiredby law for avalidtermination. TheMemomerelystatedthat
AlliedBankwouldissueanoticeoftermination,butthebankdidnotissueanynotice.
The NLRC concluded that Allied Bank dismissed Galanida in bad faith, tantamount to an unfair labor practiceas the dismissal undermined
Galanidas right to security of tenure and equal protection of the laws. On these grounds, the NLRC promulgateditsDecisionof18September
1998,therelevantportionofwhichstates:
Inthisparticularcase,Weviewasimpractical,unrealisticandnolongeradvantageoustobothpartiestoorderreinstatementofthecomplainant.
xxxForlackofsufficientbasis,Wedenytheclaimfor1994quarterbonus.Likewise,noattorneysfeesisawardedascounselsfor
complainantappelleearefromtheCityProsecutorsOfficeofCebu.
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,thedecisionoftheLaborArbiterdatedDecember23,1997isherebyMODIFIEDbyincreasingtheaward
ofseparationpayandgrantinginadditiontheretobackwages,moralandexemplarydamages.Therespondentappellant,ALLIEDBANKING
CORPORATION,isthusorderedtopaytohereincomplainantappellee,POTENCIANOL.GALANIDA,thefollowingamounts:
a)P336,000.00,representingseparationpay
b)P833,600.00,representingbackwages
th
c)P5,333.23representingproportional199413
monthpay
d)P20,000.00representingrefundofProvidentFundContribution
e)P50,000.00representingmoraldamages
f)P20,000.00representingexemplarydamages
===========
P1,264,933.33TOTALAWARD
Allotherclaimsaredismissedforlackofbasis.Theotherrespondentsaredroppedforlackofsufficientbasisthattheyactedinexcessoftheir
corporatepowers.
[12]
SOORDERED.
[13]
AlliedBankfiledamotionforreconsiderationwhichtheNLRCdeniedinitsResolutionof24December1998.
Dissatisfied,AlliedBankfiledapetitionforreviewquestioningtheDecisionandResolutionoftheNLRCbeforetheCourtofAppeals.
TheRulingoftheCourtofAppeals
Citing
Dosch v. NLRC
,[14]
theCourt of Appeals held that Galanidas refusaltocomplywith thetransferordersdidnot warrant hisdismissal. The
appellate court ruled that the transfer from a regional office to the smaller Bacolod or Tagbilaran branches was effectivelya demotion. The
appellate court agreed that Allied Bank did not afford Galanida procedural due process because there was no hearing and no notice of
termination.TheMemomerelystatedthatthebankwouldissueanoticeofterminationbuttherewasnosuchnotice.
TheCourtofAppealsaffirmedtherulingoftheNLRCinitsDecisionof27April2000,thus:
WHEREFORE,forlackofmerit,thepetitionisDISMISSEDandtheassailedDecisionofpublicrespondentNLRCisAFFIRMED.

[15]
SOORDERED.

[16]
AlliedBankfiledamotionforreconsiderationwhichtheappellatecourtdeniedinitsResolutionof8August2000.
On 26 April 2001, AlliedBankappealedtheappellatecourts decision and resolution to theSupremeCourt.AlliedBankprayedthattheSupreme
Court: (1) issue a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction
ex parte to restrain the implementation or execution of the
questioned Decision and Resolution (2) declare Galanidas termination as valid and legal (3) set aside the Court of Appeals Decision and
Resolution (4) make permanent the restrainingorderorpreliminaryinjunction (5)orderGalanidatopay thecosts and (6)orderotherequitable
reliefs.
TheIssues
AlliedBankraisesthefollowingissues:
1. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED THERE IS LEGAL BASIS IN PETITIONERS EXERCISE OF ITS MANAGEMENT
PREROGATIVE.
2. WHETHERPRIVATE RESPONDENTS VIOLATIONSOFCOMPANYRULESCONSTITUTEAGROUNDTOWARRANTTHEPENALTYOF
DISMISSAL.
3. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED, THERE IS LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD THAT ALLIED BANK AFFORDED PRIVATE
RESPONDENTTHEREQUIREDDUEPROCESS.
4. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS, THERE IS LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT CANNOT RECOVER ANY
[17]
MONETARYAWARD.
In sum, Allied Bank argues that the transfer of Galanida was a valid exercise of its management prerogative. Allied Bank contends that
Galanidas continued refusal to obey the transfer orders constituted willful disobedience orinsubordination,whichisajustcausefortermination
undertheLaborCode.
On theother hand, Galanida defended his right to refuse the transfer order. The memorandum for Galanidafiledwith thisCourt, prepared by
Atty.LoretoM.Durano,again
misquoted
theCourtsrulingin
Doschv.NLRC
,thus:
xxxHis[Galanidas]refusaltotransferfallswellwithintherulingoftheSupremeCourtinHelmutDoschvs.NLRC,et.al.,123SCRA296(1983)
quotedasfollows:
xxx
Refusaltoobeyatransferordercannotbeconsideredinsubordinationwhereemployeecitedreasonforsaidrefusal,suchasthatofbeingaway
[18]
fromthefamily.
TheRulingoftheCourt
Thepetitionispartlymeritorious.
PreliminaryMatter:MisquotingDecisionsoftheSupremeCourt
Thememorandum prepared by Atty. Durano and,worse,theassailedDecisionoftheLabor Arbiter,both
misquoted
theSupremeCourtsruling
in
Doschv.NLRC
.

TheCourtheldin
Dosch
:
WecannotagreetoNorthwestssubmissionthatpetitionerwasguiltyofdisobedienceandinsubordinationwhichrespondentCommission
sustained.TheonlypieceofevidenceonwhichNorthwestbasesthechargeofcontumaciousrefusalispetitionersletterdatedAugust28,1975
toR.C.JenkinswhereinpetitioneracknowledgedreceiptoftheformersmemorandumdatedAugust18,1975,appreciatedhispromotionto
DirectorofInternationalSalesbutatthesametimeregrettedthatatthistimeforpersonalreasonsandreasonsofmyfamily,Iamunableto
acceptthetransferfromthePhilippinesandthereafterexpressedhispreferencetoremaininhisposition,saying:Iwould,therefore,preferto
remaininmypositionofManagerPhilippinesuntilsuchtimethatmyservicesinthatcapacityarenolongerrequiredbyNorthwestAirlines.From
[19]
thisevidence,Wecannotdiscerneventheslightesthintofdefiance,muchlessimplyinsubordinationonthepartofpetitioner.
Thephrase [r]efusal toobeyatransferordercannotbeconsidered insubordinationwhere employeecitedreasonforsaidrefusal,suchasthatof
being away from the family does not appear anywhere in the
Dosch
decision. Galanidas counsel lifted the erroneous phrase from one of the
italicizedlinesinthe
syllabus
of
Dosch
foundintheSupremeCourtReportsAnnotated(SCRA).
Thesyllabus of cases in official or unofficial reports ofSupremeCourtdecisionsorresolutionsis nottheworkoftheCourt, nordoesitstatethis
Courts decision.
The syllabus is simply the workofthereporterwhogiveshisunderstanding of thedecision. Thereporterwrites thesyllabusfor
[20]
theconvenience of lawyers in reading the reports. Asyllabusis notapart of thecourtsdecision.
Acounsel shouldnotciteasyllabusinplace
ofthecarefullyconsideredtextinthedecisionoftheCourt.
In the present case, Labor Arbiter Almirante and Atty. Durano began by quoting from
Dosch
, but substituted
a portion of thedecision with a
headnote from the SCRA syllabus, which they even underscored. Inshort,theydeliberatelymadethequotefromtheSCRAsyllabusappearas
thewordsof the SupremeCourt.Weadmonishthemforwhatisattheleast patentcarelessness,ifnotanoutrightattempttomisleadtheparties
and the courts taking cognizanceofthiscase.Rule10.02, Canon10oftheCode of ProfessionalResponsibilitymandatesthatalawyershallnot

knowinglymisquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority.Itis thedutyofallofficers of thecourttocite therulingsanddecisionsof

[21]
theSupremeCourtaccurately.
WhetherGalanidawasdismissedforjustcause
We accord great weight andevenfinalitytothefactualfindings of theCourt of Appeals,particularlywhentheyaffirmthefindingsoftheNLRCor
the lower courts. However, there are recognized exceptions to this rule. These exceptions are: (1) when the findings are grounded on
speculation,surmiseandconjecture(2)whentheinferencemadeismanifestlymistaken,absurdor impossible (3)whenthereisgraveabuseof
discretion in theappreciationoffacts(4)whenthefactualfindingsofthetrialandappellatecourts areconflicting(5)whentheCourtofAppeals,
in making its findings, has gone beyond the issues of the caseandsuchfindings arecontrarytotheadmissionsofbothappellantandappellee
(6)when the judgment of the appellate court is premised on a misapprehension of facts or when it hasfailedtoconsidercertainrelevantfacts
which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion (7) whenthefindingsoffact areconclusions without citationofspecificevidence
on whichtheyarebasedand(8)whenthefindings of factofthe CourtofAppealsare premisedontheabsenceofevidencebutarecontradicted
[22]
bytheevidenceonrecord.
Afterascrutinyoftherecords,wefindthatsomeoftheseexceptionsobtaininthepresentcase.
[23]
The rule is that the transfer of an employee ordinarily lies within the ambit of the employers prerogatives.
The employer exercises the
prerogative to transfer an employee for valid reasons and according to the requirement of its business, providedthetransferdoesnotresultin
[24]
demotion in rank or diminution of the employees salary, benefits and otherprivileges.
Inillegal dismissalcases, theemployerhastheburden
[25]
ofshowingthatthetransferisnotunnecessary,inconvenientandprejudicialtothedisplacedemployee.
Theconstant transfer of bank officers and personnel with accounting responsibilitiesfromonebranchtoanotherisastandardpracticeofAllied
[26]
Bank, which has more than a hundred branches throughout the country.
Allied Bank does this primarily for internal control.It also enables
bank employees to gain the necessary experience for eventual promotion. The
Bangko Sentral ngPilipinas,
in its Manual of Regulations for
[27]
Banks and Other Financial Intermediaries,
requires the rotation of these personnel. The Manual directs that thedutiesofpersonnelhandling
cash,securities and bookkeeping records should be rotated and that suchrotationshouldbeirregular,unannouncedandlongenoughtopermit
[28]
disclosureofanyirregularitiesormanipulations.
Galanida was well aware of Allied Banks policy of periodically transferring personnel to different branches. As the Court ofAppeals found,
assignment to the different branches of Allied Bank was a condition of Galanidas employment. Galanida consentedto this condition when he
[29]
signedtheNoticeofPersonnelAction.
Theevidence on record contradictsthechargethatAlliedBankdiscriminatedagainst Galanida and wasinbadfaithwhenitorderedhistransfer.
[30]
AlliedBanksletterof13June1994
showedthatatleast14 accounting officersandpersonnelfromvariousbranches,includingGalanida,were
transferred to other branches. Allied Bank did not single out Galanida. The same letter explained that Galanida was second in line for
assignment outside Cebu because he had been in Cebu for seven years already. Theperson firstinline,AssistantManagerRobertoIsla,who
had been in Cebu for more than ten years, had already transferred to a branch in Cagayan de Oro City. We note that none of the other
transfereesjoinedGalanidainhiscomplaintorcorroboratedhisallegationsofwidespreaddiscriminationandfavoritism.
As regards Ms. Co, Galanidas letter of 16 June 1994 itself showed that her assignment to Cebu was not in any way relatedtoGalanidas
transfer. Ms. Co was supposed to replace a certain Larry Sabelino in the Tabunok branch. The employer has the prerogative, based on its
assessment of the employees qualifications and competence, to rotate them in the various areas of itsbusinessoperationstoascertainwhere
[31]
theywillfunctionwithmaximumbenefittothecompany.
Neither was Galanidas transfer in the nature of a demotion. Galanida did not present evidence showing that thetransfer would diminish his
salary, benefits or other privileges. Instead, Allied Banks letter of 13June1994 assuredGalanidathathewouldnotsufferanyreductioninrank
orgrade, andthatthetransferwouldinvolvethesamerank, duties and obligations.Mr. Olveda explainedthisfurtherintheaffidavithesubmitted
totheLaborArbiter,thus:
19.Thereisnodemotioninposition/rankordiminutionofcomplainantssalary,benefitsandotherprivilegesasthetransfer/assignmentofbranch
officersispremisedontherole/functionsthattheywillassumeinthemanagementandoperationsofthebranch,asshownbelow:
(a)TheBranchAccountant,ascontrollerofthebranchisresponsiblefortheproperdischargeofthefunctionsoftheaccountingsectionofthe
branch,reviewofdocumentation/properaccountingandcontroloftransaction.Assuch,theaccountingfunctionsinthebranchcanbeassumed
byanyofthefollowingofficerswiththerankof:SeniorManager/Acctg.Manager/Acctg.SeniorAsst.Manager/Acctg.Asst.Manager/Acctg.
AccountantorAsst.Accountant.
xxx
20.Thetransfer/assignmentofbranchofficerfromonebranch,toanotherbranch/officeislateralinnatureandcarrieswithitthesame
position/rank,salary,benefitsandotherprivileges.Theassignment/transferisfortheofficertoassumethefunctionsrelativetohisjobandNOT
theposition/rankoftheofficertobereplaced.

There is also no basis for the finding thatAlliedBankwasguilty of unfair laborpracticein dismissing Galanida.Unfairlaborpracticesrelateonly
[32]
to violations of the constitutional right of workers and employees to selforganization
and are limited to theactsenumeratedinArticle248of
theLabor Code, noneofwhichappliestothepresent case.There isno evidence that Galanidatookpartinformingaunion,oreventhataunion
existedinAlliedBank.
ThisleavestheissueofwhetherGalanidacouldvalidlyrefusethetransfer orders onthe groundofparentalobligations,additionalexpenses,and
theanguishhewouldsufferifassignedawayfromhisfamily.
TheCourthasruledonthisissuebefore.Inthecaseof
HomeownersSavingsandLoanAssociation,Inc.v.NLRC
,[33]
weheld:
Theacceptabilityofthepropositionthattransfermadebyanemployerforanillicitorunderhandedpurposei.e.,todefeatanemployeesrightto
selforganization,toridhimselfofanundesirableworker,ortopenalizeanemployeeforunionactivitiescannotbeupheldisselfevidentand
cannotbegainsaid.Thedifficultyliesinthesituationwherenosuchillicit,improperorunderhandedpurposecanbeascribedtotheemployer,
theobjectiontothetransferbeinggroundedsolelyuponthepersonalinconvenienceorhardshipthatwillbecausedtotheemployeebyreason
ofthetransfer.Whatthen?
Thiswastheverysamesituationwefacedin
Phil.TelegraphandTelephoneCorp.v.Laplana
.
Inthatcase,theemployee,AliciaLaplana,
wasacashierattheBaguioCityBranchofPT&TwhowasdirectedtotransfertothecompanysbranchofficeatLaoagCity.Inrefusingthe
transfer,theemployeeaverredthatshehadestablishedBaguioCityasherpermanentresidenceandthatsuchtransferwillinvolveadditional
expensesonherpart,plusthefactthatanassignmenttoafarplacewillbeabigsacrificeforherasshewillbekeptawayfromherfamilywhich
mightadverselyaffectherefficiency.Inrulingfortheemployer,theCourtupheldthetransferfromonecitytoanotherwithinthecountryasvalid
aslongasthereisnobadfaithonthepartoftheemployer.Weheldthen:
CertainlytheCourtcannotacceptthepropositionthatwhenanemployeeopposeshisemployersdecisiontotransferhimtoanotherworkplace,
therebeingnobadfaithorunderhandedmotivesonthepartofeitherparty,itistheemployeeswishesthatshouldbemadetoprevail.
Galanida, through counsel, invokes the Courts ruling in
Dosch v. NLRC
.[34]

Dosch
,
however, is not applicable to the present case. Helmut
Dosch
refused a transferconsequentialtoapromotion.Weupheldthe refusal becausenolawcompelsanemployeetoacceptapromotion,and
[35]
because the position Dosch was supposed to be promoted to did not even exist at that time.
This left as the only basis for the charge of
[36]
insubordinationaletterfromDoschinwhichtheCourtfoundnoteventheslightesthintofdefiance,muchlessxxxinsubordination.
Moreover, the transfer of anemployeetoanoverseaspost,as inthe
Dosch
case,cannotbelikenedtoatransferfromonecitytoanotherwithin
[37]
thecountry,
which is the situation in thepresentcase.ThedistancefromCebuCity to BacolodCity orfromCebuCity to TagbilaranCitydoes
not exceed the distance from Baguio City to Laoag City or from Baguio City to Manila, which the Court considered a reasonabledistance in
PT&Tv.Laplana
.[38]

[39]
Therefusal to obey avalidtransferorderconstituteswillfuldisobedienceofalawful order of anemployer.
Employeesmay objectto,negotiate
and seek redress against employers for rules or orders that they regard asunjustorillegal.However, until and unlesstheserulesorordersare
[40]
declared illegal or improper by competent authority, the employees ignore or disobey them at their peril.
For Galanidas continued refusal to
obey Allied Banks transfer orders, we hold that the bank dismissed Galanida for just cause in accordance with Article282(a) of the Labor
[41]
Code.
Galanidaisthusnotentitledtoreinstatementortoseparationpay.
WhetherGalanidasdismissalviolatedthe
requirementofnoticeandhearing
To be effective, a dismissal must comply with Section 2 (d), Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code (Omnibus
Rules),whichprovides:
ForterminationofemploymentbasedonjustcausesasdefinedinArticle282oftheLaborCode:
(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds of termination, and giving said employee reasonable
opportunitywithinwhichtoexplainhisside.
(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so desiresisgivenopportunityto
respondtothecharge,presenthisevidence,orrebuttheevidencepresentedagainsthim.
(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all thecircumstances,groundshave
beenestablishedtojustifyhistermination.
The first written notice was embodied in Allied Banks letter of 13 June 1994. The first notice required Galanida toexplainwhy no disciplinary
actionshouldbetakenagainsthimforhisrefusaltocomplywiththetransferorders.
[42]
Ontherequirementofahearing,thisCourthasheldthatthe essenceofdueprocessissimplyanopportunitytobeheard.
Anactualhearingis
notnecessary. The exchange of several letters, inwhichGalanidaswife,a lawyerwith theCityProsecutorsOffice, assisted him,gaveGalanida
anopportunitytorespondtothechargesagainsthim.

Theremaining issue is whethertheMemodated8September1994sent to Galanida constitutesthe writtennoticeofterminationrequiredbythe

Omnibus Rules. In finding that it did not, the Court of Appeals and the NLRC cited Allied Banks rule on dismissals, quoted in theMemo,that,
Notice of termination shall be issued by the Investigation Committee subject to the confirmation of the President or his authorized
[43]
representative.
The appellate court and NLRC held that Allied Bank did not send any notice of termination to Galanida.TheMemo,withthe
headingTransferandReassignment,wasnottheterminationnoticerequiredbylaw.
Wedonotagree.
Even a cursory reading of the Memo will show that it unequivocally informed Galanida of Allied Banksdecisiontodismisshim.Thestatement,
please be informed that
theBankhasterminatedyourservices
effective September1,1994andconsideredwhateverbenefit,ifany,thatyou
[44]
are entitled [to] as forfeited xxx
is plainly worded and needs no interpretation. The Memo also discussed the findingsofthe Investigation
Committee that served as grounds for Galanidas dismissal. The Memo referred to Galanidas open defiance and refusal to transferfirst to the
Bacolod City branch and then to the Tagbilaran City branch. The Memo also mentioned his continued refusaltoreport for work despite the
[45]
denial of his application for additional vacation leave.
The Memo also refuted Galanidas charges of discrimination and demotion, and
concludedthathehadviolatedArticleXIIofthebanksEmployeeDisciplinePolicyandProcedure.
TheMemo, although captioned Transfer and Reassignment, did not preclude it from being a notice of termination.TheCourthasheldthatthe
[46]
nature of an instrument is characterized not by the title given to it but by its body and contents.
Moreover, it appears that Galanida himself
regardedtheMemoasanoticeoftermination.WequotefromtheMemorandumforPrivateRespondentAppellee,asfollows:
Theproceedingsmaybecapsulizedasfollows:
[47]
1.OnMarch13,1994
PrivateRespondentAppelleefiledbeforetheRegionVIIArbitrationBranchaComplaintforConstructiveDismissal.A
copyoftheComplaintisattachedtothePetitionasAnnexH
xxx
5.
OnSeptember8,1994,PetitionerAppellantissuedhimaLetterofTermination
.AcopyofsaidletterisattachedtothePetitionasAnnex
N
6.PrivateRespondentAppelleefiledanAmended/SupplementalComplaintwhereinheallegedillegaldismissal.Acopyofthe
[48]
Amended/SupplementalComplaintisattachedtothePetitionasAnnexOxxx
(Emphasissupplied)
TheMemorandum for Private RespondentAppelleereferstotheMemoasa LetterofTermination.Further,Galanidaamendedhiscomplaintfor
[49]
[50]
constructive dismissal
to one for illegal dismissal
after he received the Memo. Clearly, Galanida had understood the Memo to mean that
AlliedBankhadterminatedhisservices.
TheMemo complied with Allied BanksinternalruleswhichrequiredthebanksPresident
or
hisauthorized representative to confirmthe notice
of termination. The banks VicePresident for Personnel, as the head of the department that handles the movement of personnel within Allied
Bank,cancertainlyrepresentthebankpresidentincasesinvolvingthedismissalofemployees.
Nevertheless, we agree that the Memo suffered from certain errors. Although the Memo stated that AlliedBankterminatedGalanidasservices
as of 1 September 1994, the Memo bore the date 8 September 1994. More importantly, Galanida only received a copy of the Memo on 5
October1994, or more than a monthafterthesupposeddateofhis dismissal.Tobe effective, awritten notice ofterminationmustbe
servedon
[51]
theemployee.
Allied BankcouldnotterminateGalanidaon 1September1994 becausehehadnotreceivedasofthatdatethenoticeofAllied
Banks decision to dismiss him. Galanidas dismissal could only take effect on 5 October 1994, upon his receipt of theMemo. For this reason,
Galanidaisentitledtobackwagesfortheperiodfrom1September1994to4October1994.
Under the circumstances, we also find an award of P10,000 in nominal damages proper. Courts award nominal damages to recognize or
[52]
vindicate the right of a person that another has violated.
ThelawentitlesGalanidatoreceivetimelynoticeofAlliedBanksdecisiontodismiss
him.AlliedBankshouldhaveexercisedmorecareinissuingthenoticeoftermination.
WHEREFORE
, the Decision of 27April2000oftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.SPNo.51451upholdingtheDecisionof18September1998of
theNLRCinNLRCCaseNo.V00018098isAFFIRMED,withthefollowingMODIFICATIONS:
1)Theawardsofseparationpay,moraldamagesandexemplarydamagesareherebydeletedforlackofbasis
2)Reducingtheawardofbackwagestocoveronlytheperiodfrom1September1994to4October1994and
3)AwardingnominaldamagestoprivaterespondentforP10,000.
This case is REMANDED
to the Labor Arbiter for the computation, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Decision, of the backwages,
inclusive of allowances and other benefits, duetoPotencianoL.Galanidaforthetime hisdismissalwas ineffectualfrom1September1994until
4October1994.
LaborArbiter Dominador A. Almirante and Atty. Loreto M. Durano are ADMONISHED tobe morecarefulincitingthedecisionsofthe Supreme
Courtinthefuture.
SOORDERED.

Davide,Jr.,C.J.,(Chairman),Panganiban,YnaresSantiago,
and
Azcuna,JJ.,
concur
.

SECONDDIVISION
[G.R.No.131502.June8,2000]
WILSONONGCHINGKIANCHUNGandTHEDIRECTOROFTHENATIONALLIBRARY,
petitioners,vs
.CHINANATIONALCEREALS
OILANDFOODSTUFFSIMPORTANDEXPORTCORP.,CEROILFOODSHANDONGCEREALANDOILSandBENJAMINIRAO,JR.,
respondents
.
DECISION
BUENA,
J .
:
[1]
Thisisanappealbywayofapetitionforreviewon
certiorari
underRule45ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedureoftheDecision
inCivilCase
No.9468836datedNovember20,1997oftheRegionalTrialCourt,Branch33,Manila,whichrenderedajudgmentonthepleadingsagainst
hereinpetitioners,thedispositiveportionofwhichreads:
"WHEREFORE,judgmentisherebyrenderedinfavorofplaintiffs,andagainstdefendant:
"1.DecreeingthecancellationorannulmentoftheCopyrightedRegistrationNo.093491ofdefendantWILSONONG
"2.DirectingdefendantDirectoroftheNationalLibrarytoeffectthecancellationorannulmentoftheCopyrightedRegistrationNo.093491of
defendantWILSONONGand
"DamagescannotbeawardedtoPlaintiffsasnoevidencewaspresentedtosubstantiatetheirclaims.
"WithcostsagainstdefendantWILSONONG.
[2]
"SOORDERED."
Theantecedentfactsareundisputed.
OnSeptember16,1993,petitionerWilsonOngChingKianChuan,doingbusinessunderthefirmnameofC.K.C.Trading,filedaComplaintfor
InfringementofCopyrightwithprayerforwritofinjunctionbeforetheRegionalTrialCourt,Branch94ofQuezonCity(hereinafterQuezonCity
Court)againstLorenzoTan,doingbusinessunderthefirmnameMcmasterInternationalSales,anddocketedasQ9317628.Onthesameday,
saidcourtissuedatemporaryrestrainingorderenjoiningthedefendant,hisdistributorsandretailersfromsellingvermicelli(
sotanghon
)"using
theplaintiffscopyrightedcellophanewrapperwiththetwodragonsdesignedlabel,andsettingthehearingoftheinjunctivereliefforSeptember
21,1993."
OnOctober13,1993,theQuezonCityCourtissuedaResolutionwhichgrantedawritofpreliminaryinjunctioninfavorofthepetitioner,denied
thereindefendantsapplicationforawritofpreliminaryinjunctionand,issueshavingbeenjoined,setthecaseforpretrialonNovember12,
1993.OnDecember15,1993,theQuezonCityCourtdenieddefendantsmotionfordissolutionofthewritofpreliminaryinjunction.
OnJanuary5,1994,theChinaNationalCerealsOils&FoodstuffsImportandExportCorporation(CEROILFOODSHANDONG),andBenjamin
[3]
Irao,Jr.,asrepresentativeandattorneyinfactofCEROILFOODSHANDONG,hereinrespondents,filedacomplaint
for
Annulment/CancellationofCopyrightedCertificateNo.093491anddamageswithprayerforrestrainingorder/writofpreliminaryinjunction
beforetheRegionalTrialCourtofManila,(hereinafterManilaCourt)againstWilsonOngChingKianChuan,doingbusinessunderthefirmname
andstyleC.K.C.TradingandtheDirectoroftheNationalLibrary,docketedasCivilCaseNo.9468836.
[4]
OnJanuary7,1994,JudgeRodolfoG.PalattaooftheManilaCourtissuedatemporaryrestrainingorder
enjoiningpetitionerfromusinghis
copyrightedlabelsandsellinghisvermicelliproductswhichissimilartothatofrespondents.OnJanuary14,1994,petitionerfiledamotionto
[5]
dissolvetemporaryrestrainingorder
prayingthatthecomplaintbedismissedonthefollowinggrounds:1.)
litispendentia
,2.)theissueinvolved
isoneofcopyrightunderPDNo.49anddoesnotinvolvetrademarksunderRepublicAct166,3.)courtsofcoequalandcoordinatejurisdiction
cannotinterferewiththeordersofothercourtshavingthesamepowerandjurisdiction,4.)plaintiffCEROILFOODSHANDONG,beingaforeign
corporationandwithnolicensetodobusinessinthePhilippines,hasnolegalcapacitytosue,and5.)courtsshouldnotissueinjunctionswhich
wouldineffectdisposeofthemaincasewithouttrial.
[6]
OnJanuary27,1994,theManilaCourtissuedanOrder
grantingawritofpreliminaryinjunctioninfavorofrespondentsanddenyingpetitioners
motiontodismiss.
OnJanuary31,1994,petitionerfiledbeforetheCourtofAppealsapetitionfor
certiorari
docketedasCAG.R.SPNo.33178,seekingforthe
annulmentoftheJanuary27,1994OrderoftheManilaCourt.
OnJuly22,1994,afterthepartieshaveexpoundedtheirrespectivepositionsbywayoftheircomment,replyandrejoinder,theCourtofAppeals
[7]
rendereditsDecision,
thedispositiveportionofwhichreads:

"WHEREFORE,theinstantpetitionisherebyGRANTED,andasprayedforbypetitioner,theOrderdatedJanuary27,1994issuedinCivilCase
9468836byBranch33,RegionalTrialCourt,NationalCapitalJudicialRegion,Manila,isherebyANNULLEDandSETASIDE,althoughthe
prayerfordismissalofthecomplaintinManilamaybepursuedbeforesaidcourtduringtheproceedings."
InthesameDecision,theCourtofAppealsruledthatthecasewasdismissibleongroundsof
litispendentia,
multiplicityofsuits,andforum
shopping.
[8]
OnSeptember5,1994,theCourtofAppealsdeniedrespondentsmotionforreconsideration.
TheCourtofAppealsDecisionbecamefinalon
[9]
October3,1994.EntryofJudgmentwasmadeonNovember15,1994.
[10]
OnNovember21,1994,petitionerfiledamotion
prayingforthedismissaloftheManilacaseonthestrengthofthefindingsoftheCourtof
[11]
Appeals,particularlyon"forumshopping."InanOrder
datedMarch8,1995,theManilaCourtheldinabeyancetheresolutionofthemotionto
dismissuntilfurtherreceptionofevidence,statingthereinthatthedispositiveportionoftheCourtofAppealsDecisiondidnotorderthedismissal
ofthecase.Inthemeantime,respondentsfiledamotiontodeclarepetitionersindefaultforfailingtofileanAnswerdespitetheMarch8Order,
whichmotionwasopposedbypetitioners,therebeingatthattimeapendingmotiontodismisswhichthecourt
aquo
refusedtoresolveonthe
merits.
[12]
InanOrder
datedJuly19,1996,theManilacourtdeniedthemotiontodeclarepetitionersindefault,admitted
motuproprio
themotionto
dismissfiledbypetitionerasitsanswer,anddirectedthepartiestosubmittheirrespectivepretrialbriefs.
[13]
OnSeptember17,1996,petitionerfileda"MotionfortheIssuanceofaWritofExecution"
prayingthatamotionforexecutiondismissingthe
Manilacasebeissued,andcitingAtty.BenjaminIrao,Jr.,counselofCEROILFOODSHANDONGandhiscocounsel,Atty.AntonioAlbano,
guiltyofforumshopping,pursuanttotheDecisionoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.SP.No.33178.
OnJanuary23,1997,respondentsfiledbeforetheManilacourtaSupplementToMotionForJudgmentOnThePleadings,claimingthat
[14]
petitionerfailedtotenderanissue.
OnNovember20,1997,JudgeRodolfoG.PalattaooftheManilaCourtrenderedaJudgmentonthePleadingsinfavorofrespondents,and
ruledthat
litispendentia
,multiplicityofsuits,andforumshoppingwerenotpresentinthecase.
Hence,thepresentappealonpurequestionsoflaw.
Petitionersraisethefollowingissues:
I
WhetherornotthelegalpronouncementsoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.SPNo.33178thattheManilacaseisdismissibleongroundsof
litispendentia
,multiplicityofsuitsandforumshoppingconstitutethe"LawoftheCase."
II
WhetherornottheRegionalTrialJudgeofBranch33,Manilaerredinnotapplyingthelawofthecase.
III
Whetherornotthecourt
aquo
canreviewthelegalconclusionsofanappellatecourtinthesamecase,onissuessquarelysubmittedtoand
passeduponbytheappellatecourtunderidenticalsetoffactsandcircumstancesobtaininginthecourt
aquo
.
IV
Whetherornotthecourt
aquo
erredin
motuproprio
consideringamotiontodismissastheanswertothecomplaintand,thereafter,rendera
[15]
judgmentonthepleadingsonthegroundthatthemotiontodismissdidnottenderanissue.
Insupportthereof,petitionersquotetherulingoftheCourtofAppealsontheissueofwhethertherewas
litispendentia
andmultiplicityofsuitsin
thepresentcase,asfollows:
"TheManilacourtshouldhaveconsideredalsothatCivilCaseQ9317628involvespracticallythesameparties,samesubjectmatterandsame
reliefasinCivilCase09468836.PetitionerfiledthefirstcaseonSeptember16,1993,forINFRINGEMENTOFHISREGISTERED
COPYRIGHT,whichcoversthecellophanewrapperthatheusesinpackagingthevermicelliwhichheimportsfromtheCHINANATIONAL
CEREALSOILS&FOODSTUFFSIMPORTANDEXPORTCORPORATIONBASEDINBEIJING,CHINA,themainorprincipalofprivate
respondentCEROILFOODSHANDONG,thelatterbeingthebranchofCEROILFOODinQuingdao,China,andofwhichinCivilCase
Q9317628,LORENZOTANaversinhisanswerheistheexclusiveandsoledistributor.InCivilCase9468836subsequentlyfiledinManila,on
January5,1994,LORENZOTANadmittedthatheisthesoledistributorofplaintiffChinaNationalCerealsOilandFoodstuffsImportandExport
CorporationofthelattersPAGODABRANDvermicelliproducts.Atty.BenjaminIrao,Jr.,theattorneyofprivaterespondents,alsothe
attorneyinfactofCeroilfoodShandong,admittedthathisprincipaldoesnotdobusinessinthePhilippines,andnamedLORENZOTANashis
principalsexclusivedistributorofsaidproductinthePhilippines.Thus,LorenzoTaninbothCivilCasesQ9317628and9468836appearsas
principaldefendantinthefirst,andassoledistributorofCerealFoodShandong,inthesecond.Indicatively,heisdefendingandcomplaining
substantivelythesamerightsandinterestsinbothcases,andineffectthereisidentityofpartiesrepresentingthesameinterests.Whileitis
againstTANwithwhomtheQCRTCissuedaninjunction,thatwritshouldalsoapplytoCEROILFOODSHANDONG,asTanisitsexclusiveand

soledistributorinthePhilippines,asprivaterespondentcorporationdoesbusinessinthePhilippinesthroughTANwhoimportshisvermicelli
whollyfromsaidforeigncorporation.Andmostimportantly,TANassertsrightstothetrademarkPAGODA,alsoallegedlyownedby
CEROILFOODbetweenTANandCEROILFOODSHANDONGthatheisitscorporatedistributor.Alsoin9317628,petitionersprayerfor
injunctionisbasedonhisregisteredcopyrightcertificate,whileTANaverredinhisanswerthereonthatpetitionerscopyrightshouldbeannulled
andcancelled,andalsoprayedforinjunction.In9468836,privaterespondentCEROILFOODSHANDONG,asplaintiff,alsoprayedfor
ANNULMENTANDCANCELLATIONOFCOPYRIGHTCERTIFICATENo.093491WITHDAMAGESANDPRAYERFORRESTRAINING
ORDER/WRITOFPRELIMINARYINJUNCTION.Ascanwellbeseenfromthosepertinentallegations/averments/prayersinbothcases,they
areidenticalwitheachother.TheyinvolvedoneandthesameCERTIFICATEOFCOPYRIGHTREGISTRATION.Thoughthefirstcaseisfor
INFRINGEMENTofcopyrightregistration,whilethesecondisforANNULMENTANDCANCELLATIONofthesamecopyright,sincethefirst
involvesabreach,infraction,transgression,andthesecondforinvalidation,discontinuance,terminationandsuppressionofthesamecopyright
certificate,whatthefirstseekstopreserveistheexclusiveuseofthecopyright,andthesecondseekstoterminatetheveryuseofthesame
copyrightbytheregistrant/owner.Thoughthequestofpetitionerandprivaterespondentsinthetwocasesareaimedtowardsdifferentendsthe
firsttoupholdthevalidityandeffectivenessofthesamecopyright,thesecondismerelyaconsequenceofthefirst,therealmatterin
controversycanbefullydeterminedandresolvedbeforetheQuezonCitycourt,andwouldrendertheManilacaseasurplusageandalso
constitutesmultiplicityofsuitsanddismissibleonthatground,althoughsuchdismissalshouldbeconsideredaswithoutprejudicetothe
continuanceoftheproceedingsbeforetheQuezonCitycourt.(pp.810,CADecision,Annex"B"ofthePetition)"
Ontheissueofforumshopping,theCourtofAppealsruledfurther,thus:
"Finally,theManilacourtshouldalsohaveconsideredforumshoppingasathirddrawbacktoprivaterespondentscause.Itisatermoriginally
usedtodenominatealitigantsprivilegeofchoosingthevenueofhisactionwherethelawallowshimtodoso,orofanelectionofremediesof
oneoftwoormorecoexistingrights.Ineitherofwhichsituations,thelitigantactuallyshopsforaforumofhisaction.However,insteadof
makingachoiceoftheforumoftheiractions,litigantsthroughtheencouragementoftheirlawyers,filetheiractionsonallavailablecourts,or
invokeirrelevantremediessimultaneously,orevenfileactionsoneaftertheother,apracticewhichhadnotonlyresultedconflicting
adjudicationsamongdifferentcourts,confusioninimicaltoanorderlyadministrationofjusticeandcreatedextremeinconveniencetosomeofthe
partiestotheaction.AndthusithasbeenheldinVillanuevavs.Andres,172SCRA876,thatforumshoppingapplieswheneverasaresultofan
adverseopinioninoneforum,apartyseeksafavorableopinion(otherthanbyappealorcertiorari),inanotherforum.xxx
"Observedly,Attys.IRAOandALBANO,whoareTANslawyersinQuezonCity,arealsoprivaterespondentslawyersinManila.ATTY.IRAO
whoenteredhisappearanceascounselforprivaterespondentsintheManilacase,isalsotheauthorizedrepresentativeandattorneyinfactof
privaterespondentcorporationintheManilacase.WhileAtty.IraowithdrewascounselofTANintheQuezonCity,thatdidnotremovethecase
filedinManilaoutsidethesphereoftheruleonforumshopping."(pp.1011,CADecision,Annex"B"ofthePetition)
PetitionerscontendthattheforegoingconclusionsoffactandlawoftheCourtofAppealsarecorrectandshouldnotbedisturbed,especially
sincethedecisionoftheCourtofAppealshadalreadybecomefinalandenteredintheBooksofJudgmentthatthepartiestothecaseandthe
RegionalTrialJudgeinBranch33,Manilaareboundbythesaidconclusionsoffactandlawandthesameshouldnotbereopenedonremandof
thecaseandthatitisnotwithintheTrialJudgesdiscretiontotakeexceptionto,muchlessoverturn,anyfactualorlegalconclusionslaiddown
bytheCourtofAppealsinitsverdictandtodisposeofthecaseinamannerdiametricallyopposedthereto,citingthecaseof
PNBvs.NoahsArk
SugarRefinery
,226SCRA36,48.
Petitionersfurtherallegethattheactsofthetrialjudgesufferfromproceduralinfirmity:andthatitmakesnosenseforthetrialjudgetorefuseto
resolvethemotiontodismissonthemeritsto
motuproprio
considerthemotiontodismissastheanswertothecomplaintandtolaterrulethat
themotiontodismissdidnottenderanissueand,therefore,ajudgmentonthepleadingsisinorder.Petitionersalsoaverthatamotionto
dismissisnotaresponsivepleading(citing
PrudenceRealtyDevelopmentCorporationvs.CA
,231SCRA379)thatatthetimethetrial
judgeconsideredthemotiontodismisstobetheanswertothecomplaint,heknewverywell,oratleastshouldhaveknownthatthemotionto
dismissdidnottenderanissueforindeed,itisnotwithintheprovinceofthemotiontoadmitordenytheallegationsofthecomplaint,andthere
beingnolegitimateanswerandnorealjoinderofissues,therenditionofthesubjectJudgmentonthePleadingsbecomessuspect.Accordingto
petitioners,indeviatingfromtheusualprocedure,thecourt
aquo
gaveunduebenefitandadvantagetotherespondentsattheexpenseof
hereinpetitionersandthattheexplanationgivenbythetrialjudgethatthedispositiveportionoftheCourtofAppealsdecisiondidnotexpressly
orderhimtodismissthecaseisflimsyanduntenable.
Ontheotherhand,respondentsassertthatthedoctrineoflawofthecaseisnotapplicabletothepresentcasebecausetheCourtofAppeals
neverorderedthedismissalofthecaseandthattheOrderoftheManilaCourtdatedJanuary27,1994wasannulledandsetasideonlyinsofar
asthepreliminaryinjunctionisconcerned.Respondentscitethecaseof
MagdalenaEstate,Inc.vs.Caluag
,11SCRA333whichruledthatthe
deficienciesinthedispositivepartofthedecisioncannotbesuppliedbyanyfindingoropinionfoundinthebodyofthedecision.Respondents

alsoallegethatwhilepetitionerWilsonOnghadbelatedlyfaultedtheCourtbelowinconsideringhismotiontodismissashisanswer,henever
questionedthecorrectnessofthefindingsofthecourt
aquo
intheassaileddecision.
Afterareviewoftherecordsofthecaseandanexaminationofthepleadingsfiledbytheparties,theCourtfindsthepetitiontobemeritorious.
Beinginterrelated,thefirst,secondandthirdissuesshallbediscussedjointly.
Indeed,thecourt
aquo
erredinnotresolvingthepetitionersmotiontodismissinaccordancewiththedecisionoftheCourtofAppealswhich
foundthat"TheManilacourtshouldhaveconsideredalsothatCivilCaseQ9317628involvespracticallythesameparties,samesubjectmatter
andsamereliefasinCivilCase9468836"that"therealmatterincontroversycanbefullydeterminedandresolvedbeforetheQuezonCity
courtandwouldrendertheManilacaseasurplusageandalsoconstitutesmultiplicityofsuitsanddismissibleonthatground,althoughsuch
dismissalshouldbeconsideredaswithoutprejudicetothecontinuanceoftheproceedingsbeforetheQuezonCitycourt"andthat"theManila
courtshouldalsohaveconsideredforumshoppingasathirddrawbacktoprivaterespondentscause."
WhiletheCourtofAppealsstatedinthedispositiveportionofitsdecisionthat"theprayerfordismissalofthecomplaintinManilamaybe
pursuedbeforesaidcourtduringtheproceedings,"itisclearfromthebodyoftheCourtofAppealsDecisionthatthecasebeforetheManila
courtshouldbedismissedongroundsof
litispendentia
,andforumshopping.
Whilethegeneralruleisthattheportionofadecisionthatbecomesthesubjectofexecutionisthatordainedordecreedinthedispositivepart
thereof,thereareexceptionstothisrule.
Theexceptionswherethedispositivepartofthejudgmentdoesnotalwaysprevailoverthebodyoftheopinionare:
(a)....wherethereisambiguityoruncertainty,thebodyoftheopinionmaybereferredtoforpurposesofconstruingthejudgmentbecausethe
dispositivepartofadecisionmustfindsupportfromthedecisions
ratiodecidendi
[16]

[17]
(b)....whereextensiveandexplicitdiscussionandsettlementoftheissueisfoundinthebodyofthedecision.
Consideringthecircumstancesoftheinstantcase,theCourtfindsthattheexceptiontothegeneralruleappliestotheinstantcase.Sincethe
statementoftheCourtofAppealsregardingtheprayerforthedismissalofthecaseseeminglygavetheManilacourtthediscretiontodismissor
nottodismissCivilCaseNo.9468836,theManilacourtshouldhavereferredtothebodyofthedecisionforpurposesofconstruingtheissueof
whetherornotthecomplaintshouldbedismissed,becausethedispositivepartofadecisionmustfindsupportfromthedecisions
ratio
[18]
decidendi
.Findingsofthecourtaretobeconsideredintheinterpretationofthedispositiveportionofthejudgment.
Moreover,extensiveand
explicitdiscussionandsettlementoftheissuesarefoundinthebodyoftheCourtofAppealsdecisionsothatitisgraveerrorforthecourt
aquo
toruleagain,asitdid,ontheissuesof
litispendentia
andforumshoppinginitsdecision,andtooverturnthatoftheCourtofAppeals,thus:
"TheargumentofDefendantOnginhismotionforexecutionthatthecaseatbenchshouldnowbedismissedonthegroundsofforumshopping
andlitispendentiaasallegedlyruledbytheCourtofAppeals,doesnotimpressthisCourt.ForwhiletheappellatecourturgedthisCourtto
consider
litispendentia
andforumshoppinginthetrialresolutionofthecaseatbench,nowhereinits(CA)decisioncoulditbededucedthatthis
[19]
Courtismandatedtodismissthecaseontheseprecisegrounds.Thedispositiveportionofthedecisiondoesnotcontainsuchamandate."
[20]
InVivaProductions,Inc.vs.CourtofAppeals,thisCourtsetasidethedecisionoftheMakaticourtanddeclarednullandvoidallordersofthe
RTCofMakatiafterrulingthat:
"Thus,wefindgraveabuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheMakaticourt,beingamerecoequaloftheParaaquecourt,innotgivingdue
deferencetothelatterbeforewhichtheissueoftheallegedviolationofthesubjudicerulehadalreadybeenraisedandsubmitted.Insuch
instance,the
Makaticourt,ifitwaswaryofdismissingtheactionoutrightlyunderadministrativeCircularNo.0494,shouldhave,at
leastorderedtheconsolidationofitscasewiththatoftheParaaquecourt,whichhadfirstacquiredjurisdictionovertherelatedcase
inaccordancewithRule31oftheRevisedRulesofCourt."
(emphasisours.)
TheQuezonCitycourtandtheManilacourthaveconcurrentjurisdictionoverthecase.However,whentheQuezonCitycourtacquired
jurisdictionoverthecase,itexcludedallothercourtsofconcurrentjurisdictionfromacquiringjurisdictionoverthesame.TheManilacourtis,
therefore,devoidofjurisdictionoverthecomplaintfiledresultinginthehereinassaileddecisionwhichmustperforcebedeclarednullandvoid.
[21]
Toholdotherwisewouldbetoriskinstanceswherecourtsofconcurrentjurisdictionmighthaveconflictingorders.
WHEREFORE
,theassaileddecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourtofManila,Branch33inCivilCaseNo.9468836isANNULLEDandSET
ASIDE.SaidcaseisordereddismissedwithoutprejudicetothecontinuanceoftheproceedingsbeforetheQuezonCitycourtwhereCivilCase
No.Q9317628ispending.
SOORDERED.
Bellosillo,(Chairman),Mendoza,Quisumbing,
and
DeLeon,Jr.,JJ.,
concur.