Samartino v.

Raon, CA Digest

Facts:

1.
Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G. Crisostomo are the surviving sister
and spouse, respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, who passed away on May
17, 1994. Among the properties left by the deceased was her one-half share in a parcel of land
in Noveleta, Cavite, registered under in the name of co-owners Lido Beach Corporation and
Filomena Bernardo.
2.
2. In 1996, respondents instituted a complaint for ejectment against petitioner Regalado
P. Samartino a complaint for ejectment alleging that during the lifetime of Filomena, she leased
her share to petitioner for a period of five years counted from 1986; that the said lease expired
and was not extended thereafter; and that petitioner refused to vacate the property despite
demands therefor.
3.
Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother of petitioner. At the time of service,
he was not at home as he was then confined at the NBI rehab center since January 19, 1996,
where he was undergoing treatment and rehabilitation for drug dependency. Thus, on February
2, 1996, a liaison officer of the NBI-TRC appeared before the trial court with a certification that
petitioner will be unable to comply with the directive to answer the complaint within the
reglementary period, inasmuch as it will take six months for him to complete the rehabilitation
program and before he can be recommended for discharge by the Rehabilitation Committee.]
4.
The trial court, despite the written certification from NBI-TRC, declared petitioner in
default and ordered them to present evidence ex-parte. On March 21, 1996, the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of respondents. Counsel of respondent filed a motion to set aside
judgement at the RTC, RTC affirmed lower court decision. This decision became final, the
property was sold in an auction to the respondents, Petitioner filed petition for relief from
judgement alleging that the parcel of land from which he was being evicted had been sold to
him by Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
December 13, 1988. Petition was dismissed by RTC. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari before
CA which was also dismissed, including his MR, hence this petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not the court (MTC & RTC) acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner

NO. The summon was ineffective. There being no valid substituted service of summons, the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. In actions in personam,
summons on the defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in
person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. If efforts to serve the summons

personally to defendant is impossible, service may be effected by leaving copies of the

summons at the defendants dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion residing therein, or by leaving the copies at the defendants office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.

1.
Service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service first and only when
the defendant cannot be promptly served in person will substituted service be availed of.
2.
The impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted service should be
explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed. The
pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the
proof of service or Officers Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld.
3.
It is only under exceptional terms that the circumstances warranting substituted service of
summons may be proved by evidence aliunde. It bears stressing that since service of summons,
especially for actions in personam, is essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant, the resort to a substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would
invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds

4. Furthermore, nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of this case is it shown that
petitioners brother, on whom substituted service of summons was effected, was a person of
suitable age and discretion residing at petitioners residence.
2. LIM VS CA
YNOT VS IAC ;G.R.NO. 74457; 20 M AR 1987]
Facts:
Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from
oneprovince to another. The carabaos of petitioner were confiscated for violation of Executive
OrderNo 626-A while he was transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged
theconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. The government argued that Executive Order
No.626-A was issued in the exercise of police power to conserve the carabaos that were still fit
forfarm work or breeding.
Issue:
Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of Substantive Due Process.
Held:
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power, because it is not
reasonablynecessary for the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. It is difficult to see
how prohibitingthe transfer of carabaos from one province to another can prevent their

indiscriminate killing.Retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter
there. Prohibiting thetransfer of carabeef, after the slaughter of the carabaos, will not prevent
the slaughter either.

E
RMITA
-M
ALATE
H
OTEL
A
ND
M
OTEL
O
PERATORS
A
SSO
.

V
S
.

M
AYOR
O

F
M
ANILA

[20

SCRA

849;

G.R.

N
O
.L-24693;

31

J
ULY
1967]
Facts:
Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association with one of its members,
Hoteldel Mar Inc., and Go Chiu, the president and general manager of the second petitioner,
filed apetition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 against the respondent Mayor of the
City ofManila who was sued in his capacity as such charged with the general power and duty to
enforceordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the execution
andenforcement of such ordinances. It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation
isdedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen members operating

hotelsand motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and
cityauthorities and regularly paying taxes. It was alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal
Boardof the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then
actingCity Mayor, Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga. After which the alleged grievances against
theordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of
theMunicipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it regulate motels, on the ground
that inthe revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to
motels. italso being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging
houseswould be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their
dulyauthorized representatives. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary
injunctionordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from
and after July8, 1963.
Issue:
Whether or Not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional, therefore, null
andvoid.
Held:
A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to
haveadmonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged
ordinance.Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has been the accepted
standardsof constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.Primarily
what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset
thepresumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was
expressedcategorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The
action ofthe elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors
must, in thevery nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality
and with allthe facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The
locallegislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations
areessential to the well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set
asidelegislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the
guiseof police regulation.It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of
validity, the necessity forevidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is
void on its face which is notthe case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed
than in the leading case ofO'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. where the
American Supreme Court throughJustice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter
thus: The statute here questioneddeals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police
power. We are asked to declare it voidon the ground that the specific method of regulation
prescribed is unreasonable and hencedeprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying
questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record
for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the
lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of
validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside

P
EOPLE V
.

M
ENGOTE

[210

SCRA

174;

G.R.

N
O
.

87059;

22

J
UN
1992]

Facts:
The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were
threesuspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in
Tondo,Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place.
Thepatrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his abdomen.
Theyapproached the persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried
to runbut unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were
thensearched. One of them the accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live
ammunitionsin it, while his companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them and
they wereturned over to the police headquarters for investigation. An information was filed
before the RTCconvicting the accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness testified
that the weaponwas among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police
including the revolver.For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm
or that he was licensedto possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on
him at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. In hisappeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence
against him because it hadbeen illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.
Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.
Held:
An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any
proceedingfor any purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of
the Rules ofCourt, provides arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested
has committed,is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when the
offense in fact has justbeen committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating
the person arrested hascommitted it and (c) the person to be arrested has escaped from a
penal establishment or aplace where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or hasescaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the
arrest inquestion, the accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his
abdomen,according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that
has justbeen committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempt by Mengote
in theirpresence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and frisked in a broad daylight or on a
busystreet on unexplained suspicion.Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is
acquitted.
P
EOPLE
V

S
.

A
MMINUDIN

[163 SCRA 402; G.R. L-74869; 6 Jul 1988]

Facts:
Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after
disembarkingfrom the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers
who were in factwaiting for him because of a tip from one their informers simply accosted him,
inspected his bagand finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters
for investigation.The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken
to the NBIlaboratory for examination. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later
analyzed asmarijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. An information for violation of the
DangerousDrugs Act was filed against him. Later, the information was amended to include
Farida Ali yHassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise
investigated. Bothwere arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion
to dismiss thecharge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers
absolving her after a'thorough investigation." The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only
against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted . In his defense, Aminnudin
disclaimed the marijuana,averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a
jacket, two shirts and two pairsof pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and
immediately handcuffed. His bag wasconfiscated without a search warrant. At the PC
headquarters, he was manhandled to force himto admit he was carrying the marijuana, the
investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in thechest and arms even as he parried the blows
while he was still handcuffed. He insisted he did noteven know what marijuana looked like and
that his business was selling watches and sometimescigarettes. However the RTC rejected his
allegations. Saying that he only has two watches duringthat time and that he did not sufficiently
proved the injuries allegedly sustained.
Issue:
Whether or not search of defendants bag is legal.

Held:

The search was illegal. Defendant was not caught in flagrante delicto, which could
allowwarrantless arrest or search. At the moment of his arrest, he was not committing a crime.
Norwas he about to do so or had just done so. To all appearances, he was like any of the
otherpassengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. The said marijuana therefore could
not beappreciated as evidence against the defendant, and furthermore he is acquitted of the
crime ascharged