G.R. No.

L-14639
March 25, 1919
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which this
application forhabeas corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be expected to be met with in
this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet, after all, the cause presents no great difficulty
if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the basic principles of popular government, and if we
give expression to the paramount purpose for which the courts, as an independent power of
such a government, were constituted. The primary question is Shall the judiciary permit a
government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands?
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which might prove
profitable reading for other departments of the government, the facts are these: The Mayor of
the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the
segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in
the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept
confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city
authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to
Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard
cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At any rate,
about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police,
Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses,
hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that
awaited their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and
apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an
investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had
not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly
given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the
steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers.
The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October
25.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and
receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano
Yigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yigo, who appear as parties in the
case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from
the city of Manila. The further happenings to these women and the serious charges growing out
of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not essential to the disposition of this case.
Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women married, others assumed more or less
clandestine relations with men, others went to work in different capacities, others assumed a life
unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to return to Manila.
To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in
to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees
presented an application forhabeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently,
the application, through stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the women who
were sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the
application will be considered as including them. The application set forth the salient facts, which
need not be repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by
Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila,
and by certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before the full court. The city
fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to
sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the
petitioners were not proper parties, because the action should have been begun in the Court of

First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not
have any of the women under their custody or control, and because their jurisdiction did not
extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. According to an exhibit attached to the
answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on
the haciendas of Yigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to
question of a member of the court, that these women had been sent out of Manila without their
consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban,
Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco
Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of Davao, to bring
before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December
2, 1918.
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense.
On motion of counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken before the clerk of the Supreme
Court sitting as commissioners. On the day named in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of
the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the respondents. It
has been shown that three of those who had been able to come back to Manila through their
own efforts, were notified by the police and the secret service to appear before the court. The
fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him
when pleading to the original petition copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to
the provincial governor of Davao and the answer thereto, and telegrams that had passed
between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and offered
certain affidavits showing that the women were contained with their life in Mindanao and did not
wish to return to Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill
the order of the Supreme Court because the women had never been under his control, because
they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they had married or signed contracts
as laborers. Respondent Yigo answered alleging that he did not have any of the women under
his control and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the mandate. The court, after due
deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a second order, which related that the
respondents had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the court nor
explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be
brought before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yigo on January 13,
1919, unless the women should, in written statements voluntarily made before the judge of first
instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents should
demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was further stated
that the question of whether the respondents were in contempt of court would later be decided
and the reasons for the order announced in the final decision.
Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women, of certain
detectives and policemen, and of the provincial governor of Davao, was taken before the clerk of
the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Davao
acting in the same capacity. On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically presented before
the Court the women who had returned to the city through their own efforts and eight others who
had been brought to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns,
once again recounted the facts and further endeavored to account for all of the persons involved
in the habeas corpus. In substance, it was stated that the respondents, through their
representatives and agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao with their consent eight
women; that eighty-one women were found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they
could return to Manila, transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn statements; that
fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and that despite all efforts to find them
twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to
submit memoranda. The first formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of
Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando
Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of
Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the
city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that the replica al memorandum de

los recurridos, (reply to respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the
record.
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas
corpus in the final decision. We will now proceed to do so.
One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled these one hundred and seventy women were
isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to
consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for
transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left
voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of
the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose
the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to
refute and practically admitted by the respondents.
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question By authority of what law
did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from
Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we
find
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of
congress. The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing
from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised
Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and punishment by a court of justice
of any person who is a common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the
United States, who may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and other
States have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of women convicted
of being common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the health authorities compel
vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous person in the Culion leper colony, it is
done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation,
which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to
force citizens of the Philippine Islands and these women despite their being in a sense lepers
of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same
constitutional guaranties as are other citizens to change their domicile from Manila to another
locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not
being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence.
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to
be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional system,
liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so
elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional sanction. Even the GovernorGeneral of the Philippine Islands, even the President of the United States, who has often been
said to exercise more power than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either
inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts within a
sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police could, at their mere behest or
even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the citizen so insecure, then the
presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of the Philippines have the
same privilege. If these officials can take to themselves such power, then any other official can
do the same. And if any official can exercise the power, then all persons would have just as
much right to do so. And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no law from
one locality to another within the country, then officialdom can hold the same club over the head
of any citizen.
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that "No freeman shall be taken, or
imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or

exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer
to any man either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at
Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which
functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law," said
Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only
supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office
participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to
observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives."
(U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same
high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of
living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems
to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself."
(Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ
of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very beginning that the primary question
was whether the courts should permit a government of men or a government of laws to be
established in the Philippine Islands.
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the citizen
are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.
The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup money
damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but it was never
intended effectively and promptly to meet any such situation as that now before us.
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands provides:
Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general
character in force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to a place more than
two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by virtue of the
judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not less than three hundred and
twenty-five and not more than three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.
Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a
general character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any person to change
his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of not less
than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two hundred and
fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)
We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find that
any public officer has violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will institute and press a
criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they have defended the same official in this action.
Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be proceeded
against, is no bar to the instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case
which will later be referred to "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application
by one unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient answer that the
confinement was a crime, and therefore might be continued indefinitely until the guilty party was
tried and punished therefor by the slow process of criminal procedure." (In the matter of Jackson
[1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on
the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific
objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in

parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the
person in question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that
the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city
limits and that perforce they could not bring the women from Davao.
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives
and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it
impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for
the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code
of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it
the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the
court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no
application be made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in
court.
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance
of Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good
practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas
corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a
hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any
judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec.
79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the
Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is
dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of
First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which to advance
their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their
attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that
the case involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the women
might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to
accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the
appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to grant the
writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was
prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint; the
women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police
did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer
examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of the
writ of habeas corpus.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible
taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other
parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion
just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or
personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where
they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties
were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief
executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen
and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend
his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint
and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true

principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his
power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should
be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with
the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not
issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these
women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same
means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may
not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile
and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of
liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for decision.
Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close examination of the authorities fails to reveal any
analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable courts are however very persuasive in nature.
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to
whether or not a writ ofhabeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person within
the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor child under guardianship in the State,
who has been and continues to be detained in another State. The membership of the Michigan
Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley,
Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the question presented the court was equally divided.
Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be quashed. Cooley,
J., one of the most distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom concurred
Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell was
predicated to a large extent on his conception of the English decisions, and since, as will
hereafter appear, the English courts have taken a contrary view, only the following eloquent
passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:
I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the
present writ on the petition which was laid before us. . . .
It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries and a
half have been expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its
establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke could declare in his speech on
the petition of right that "Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will have no
sovereign," and after the extension of its benefits and securities by the petition of right,
bill of rights and habeas corpus acts, it should now be discovered that evasion of that
great clause for the protection of personal liberty, which is the life and soul of the
whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is important that it be
determined without delay, that the legislature may apply the proper remedy, as I can
not doubt they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. . . .
The second proposition that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of
imprisonment within the state seems to me to be based upon a misconception as to
the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in England that the court of king's
bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes
were not passed to give the right, but to compel the observance of rights which
existed. . . .
The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ is,
that it is directed to and served upon, not the person confined, but his jailor. It does not
reach the former except through the latter. The officer or person who serves it does
not unbar the prison doors, and set the prisoner free, but the court relieves him by
compelling the oppressor to release his constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent
upon the respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the means to be resorted to for the

purposes of compulsion are fine and imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode of
affording relief, and if any other means are resorted to, they are only auxiliary to those
which are usual. The place of confinement is, therefore, not important to the relief, if
the guilty party is within reach of process, so that by the power of the court he can be
compelled to release his grasp. The difficulty of affording redress is not increased by
the confinement being beyond the limits of the state, except as greater distance may
affect it. The important question is, where the power of control exercised? And I am
aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts.
(Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep.,
1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)
The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been taken
out of English by the respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Queen's Bench
Division upon the application of the mother and her husband directing the defendant to produce
the child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce the child, but he
did not do so. His return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed
over by him to another; that it was no longer in his custody or control, and that it was impossible
for him to obey the writ. He was found in contempt of court. On appeal, the court, through Lord
Esher, M. R., said:
A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That
writ commanded the defendant to have the body of the child before a judge in
chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the writ,
together with the cause of her being taken and detained. That is a command to bring
the child before the judge and must be obeyed, unless some lawful reason can be
shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it could be shown that by reason of
his having lawfully parted with the possession of the child before the issuing of the
writ, the defendant had no longer power to produce the child, that might be an answer;
but in the absence of any lawful reason he is bound to produce the child, and, if he
does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ without lawful excuse .
Many efforts have been made in argument to shift the question of contempt to some
anterior period for the purpose of showing that what was done at some time prior to
the writ cannot be a contempt. But the question is not as to what was done before the
issue of the writ. The question is whether there has been a contempt in disobeying the
writ it was issued by not producing the child in obedience to its commands. (The
Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to the same effect the Irish
case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], 233; The Queen vs. Barnardo,
Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was directed to
the defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored persons,
with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that he had
purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they were
removed beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and
that they were then beyond his control and out of his custody. The evidence tended to show that
Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ of habeas
corpus. The court held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to
produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and refusing to produce them, ordered
that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until he should produce the negroes, or be
otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released
upon the production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and been
lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of the term. (United
States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb vs. Connolly
[1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)

We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by the
respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders of the
Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they did not, whether
the contempt should be punished or be taken as purged.
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and
Feliciano Yigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court on December 2, 1918.
The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus given ample time,
practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record discloses, the Mayor of the
city of Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the provincial
governor of Davao. According to the response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the
telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but who
should not be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort
naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on the day
named.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1)
They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or
(2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons
could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show
that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal
Procedure, sec. 87.) They did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ
was granted; they did not show impossibility of performance; and they did not present writings
that waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits
purporting to show that the women were contended with their life in Davao, some of which have
since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary
diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to
Manila is demonstrated to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number
either returned at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the
respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted
summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until
they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-production of the persons were far from
sufficient. The, authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate
with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case,
supra, the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought that,
having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act, he must take the consequences ;
and we said that he was bound to use every effort to get the child back; that he must do much
more than write letters for the purpose; that he must advertise in America, and even if necessary
himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal man could do in the matter; and that the
court would only accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other
words, the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the
respondents. That the court forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it did not
wish to see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a clash between executive officials and
the judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents another chance to demonstrate
their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more
zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were
posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a
steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and counter-charges in
such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record might
reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a

substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our
sincere desire to see this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated
in Davao, it should receive an executive investigation. If any particular individual is still restrained
of her liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas corpus proceedings.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it,
nothing further in this connection remains to be done.
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of
the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and
Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the
attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yigo, anhacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz,
Fiscal of the city of Manila.

In resume as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The
respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yigo, and Diaz are found not to be in
contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the office
of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The
motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de
los Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So
ordered.
In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the hope
that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to
protect individual liberty from illegal encroachment.

The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on
the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to
retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless
when one is commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a
valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of
contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to produce the body
of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is a contempt
committed in the face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888],
99 N. C., 407.)
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human imperfections,
we cannot say that any of the respondents, with the possible exception of the first named, has
flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann,
Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law
of public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating
circumstance. The hacendero Yigo appears to have been drawn into the case through a
misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would
seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city
government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike
from the record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into this
undesirable position, must be granted. When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses,
the official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to
accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who
conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head of the city
government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate women to Manila,
was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was
commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by
the court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.
It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof to require respondent
Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as P400 each, which would reach to many
thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal with him as for a contempt. Some members of the
court are inclined to this stern view. It would also be possible to find that since respondent
Lukban did comply substantially with the second order of the court, he has purged his contempt
of the first order. Some members of the court are inclined to this merciful view. Between the two
extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first
mandate of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the administration of justice to such an
extent that his later activity may be considered only as extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine
will at once command such respect without being unduly oppressive such an amount is P100.

G.R. No. L-2662

March 26, 1949
SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner,
vs.
Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel
MARGARITO TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO TABUENA,
Major FEDERICO ARANAS, MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT, respondents.
MORAN, C.J.:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and
Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a period
covering 19433 and 19444 who is now charged before a military Commission convened by the
Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed
"to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other
high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in
violation of the laws and customs of war" comes before this Court seeking to establish the
illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit
respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of
petitioner's case before the Military Commission and to permanently prohibit respondents from
proceeding with the case of petitioners.
In support of his case petitioner tenders the following principal arguments.
First. "That Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the
provision of our constitutional law but also our local laws to say nothing of the fact (that) the
Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and
Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based on
law, national and international." Hence petitioner argues "That in view off the fact that this
commission has been empanelled by virtue of an unconstitutional law an illegal order this
commission is without jurisdiction to try herein petitioner."
Second. That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the
Commission in behalf of the United State of America of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert
Port who are not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is
a diminution of our personality as an independent state and their appointment as prosecutor are
a violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to practice law in the
Philippines.
Third. That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecution the United State
not being a party in interest in the case.
Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office prescribing rule and
regulation governing the trial of accused war criminals, was issued by the President of the
Philippines on the 29th days of July, 1947 This Court holds that this order is valid and
constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day
including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of
international jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian
who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the
commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws
and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in
the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines

has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are
part of the our Constitution.
The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his power as
Commander in chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this Court in the case of
Yamashita vs. Styer (L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 664) 1when we said
War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed
hostilities incident of war may remain pending which should be disposed of as in time
of war. An importance incident to a conduct of war is the adoption of measure by the
military command not only to repel and defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to
disciplinary measure those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our
military effort have violated the law of war. (Ex parte Quirin 317 U.S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct.,
2.) Indeed the power to create a military commission for the trial and punishment of
war criminals is an aspect of waging war. And in the language of a writer a military
commission has jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues. This
includes the period of an armistice or military occupation up to the effective of a treaty
of peace and may extend beyond by treaty agreement. (Cowles Trial of War Criminals
by Military Tribunals, America Bar Association Journal June, 1944.)
Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this
unfinished aspect of war namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through the issuance
and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try petitioner for
acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the
Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied
that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly
based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and
principles were accepted by the two belligerent nation the United State and Japan who were
signatories to the two Convention, Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our
nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our
Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the
recognition of rule and principle of international law as continued inn treaties to which our
government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the
Philippines was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound
together with the United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the
treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and obligation were not erased by our
assumption of full sovereignty. If at all our emergency as a free state entitles us to enforce the
right on our own of trying and punishing those who committed crimes against crimes against our
people. In this connection it is well to remember what we have said in the case of Laurel vs.
Misa (76 Phil., 372):
. . . The change of our form government from Commonwealth to Republic does not
affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during
then Commonwealth because it is an offense against the same sovereign people. . . .
By the same token war crimes committed against our people and our government while we were
a Commonwealth are triable and punishable by our present Republic.
Petitioner challenges the participation of two American attorneys namely Melville S. Hussey and
Robert Port in the prosecution of his case on the ground that said attorney's are not qualified to

practice law in Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and the appointment of said
attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our national sovereignty.
In the first place respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a
special law and not by the Rules of court which govern ordinary civil court. It has already been
shown that Executive Order No. 68 which provides for the organization of such military
commission is a valid and constitutional law. There is nothing in said executive order which
requires that counsel appearing before said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice
law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In facts it is common in military
tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are neither attorneys nor
even possessed of legal training.
Secondly the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our nation
sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that United States, which has submitted the vindication of
crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation should be allowed
representation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has been any relinquishment of
sovereignty it has not been by our government but by the United State Government which has
yielded to us the trial and punishment of her enemies. The least that we could do in the spirit of
comity is to allow them representation in said trials.
Alleging that the United State is not a party in interest in the case petitioner challenges the
personality of attorneys Hussey and Port as prosecutors. It is of common knowledge that the
United State and its people have been equally if not more greatly aggrieved by the crimes with
which petitioner stands charged before the Military Commission. It can be considered a privilege
for our Republic that a leader nation should submit the vindication of the honor of its citizens and
its government to a military tribunal of our country.
The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law with jurisdiction over the
crimes charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having said
petitioner in its custody, this Court will not interfere with the due process of such Military
commission.
For all the foregoing the petition is denied with costs de oficio.
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979

LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner; HON. JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Minister of National Defense; HON. ALFREDO L.
JUINIO, in his capacity as Minister Of Public Works, Transportation and Communications;
and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his capacity as Minister of Public
Highways, respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
The validity of a letter of Instruction 1 providing for an early seaming device for motor vehicles is
assailed in this prohibition proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due
process and, insofar as the rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned, for
transgressing the fundamental principle of non- delegation of legislative power. The Letter of
Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner who is possessed of the requisite standing, as being
arbitrary and oppressive. A temporary restraining order as issued and respondents Romeo F.
Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of National Defense;
Alfredo L. Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and Baltazar
Aquino, Minister of Public Highways; were to answer. That they did in a pleading submitted by
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza. 2 Impressed with a highly persuasive quality, it makes
devoid clear that the imputation of a constitutional infirmity is devoid of justification The Letter of
Instruction on is a valid police power measure. Nor could the implementing rules and regulations
issued by respondent Edu be considered as amounting to an exercise of legislative power.
Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed.
The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued
on December 2, 1974, reads in full: "[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major causes of
fatal or serious accidents in land transportation is the presence of disabled, stalled or parked
motor vehicles along streets or highways without any appropriate early warning device to signal
approaching motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to
traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968
Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.);
[Whereas], the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government under
P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety
signs and devices; [Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos], President of the Philippines, in the
interest of safety on all streets and highways, including expressways or limited access roads, do
hereby direct: 1. That all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in their
motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning device consisting of triangular, collapsible
reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors at least 15 cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the
sides. 2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled or disabled or is parked for thirty (30) minutes or
more on any street or highway, including expressways or limited access roads, the owner, user
or driver thereof shall cause the warning device mentioned herein to be installed at least four
meters away to the front and rear of the motor vehicle staged, disabled or parked. 3. The Land

Transportation Commissioner shall cause Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning Devices, as

herein described, to be prepared and issued to registered owners of motor vehicles, except
motorcycles and trailers, charging for each piece not more than 15 % of the acquisition cost. He
shall also promulgate such rules and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this
order. 4. All hereby concerned shall closely coordinate and take such measures as are
necessary or appropriate to carry into effect then instruction. 3 Thereafter, on November 15,
1976, it was amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 in this wise. "Paragraph 3 of Letter of
Instruction No. 229 is hereby amended to read as follows: 3. The Land transportation
Commissioner shall require every motor vehicle owner to procure from any and present at the
registration of his vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized early warning device, as d bed of any brand
or make chosen by mid motor vehicle . The Land Transportation Commissioner shall also
promulgate such rule and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this
order.'" 4 There was issued accordingly, by respondent Edu, the implementing rules and
regulations on December 10, 1976. 5 They were not enforced as President Marcos on January
25, 1977, ordered a six-month period of suspension insofar as the installation of early warning
device as a pre-registration requirement for motor vehicle was concerned. 6 Then on June 30,
1978, another Letter of Instruction 7 the lifting of such suspension and directed the immediate
implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended. 8 It was not until August 29, 1978
that respondent Edu issued Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded thus: "In pursuance of Letter
of Instruction No. 716, dated June 30, 1978, the implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229,
as amended by Letter of Instructions No. 479, requiring the use of Early Warning Devices (EWD)
on motor vehicle, the following rules and regulations are hereby issued: 1. LTC Administrative
Order No. 1, dated December 10, 1976; shall now be implemented provided that the device may
come from whatever source and that it shall have substantially complied with the EWD
specifications contained in Section 2 of said administrative order; 2. In order to insure that every
motor vehicle , except motorcycles, is equipped with the device, a pair of serially numbered
stickers, to be issued free of charge by this Commission, shall be attached to each EWD. The
EWD. serial number shall be indicated on the registration certificate and official receipt of
payment of current registration fees of the motor vehicle concerned. All Orders, Circulars, and
Memoranda in conflict herewith are hereby superseded, This Order shall take effect
immediately. 9 It was for immediate implementation by respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as Minister
of Public Works, transportation, and Communications. 10
Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035,
already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and
aft, which could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies
mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules and
regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation
Commission," 11 alleged that said Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, "clearly violates the
provisions and delegation of police power, [sic] * * *: " For him they are "oppressive,
unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our
compassionate New Society." 12 He contended that they are "infected with arbitrariness because
it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public;" 13 are "one-sided, onerous and
patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant
millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early
warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." 14are unlawful and unconstitutional and
contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and
confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road
safety device, or a better substitute to the specified set of EWD's." 15 He therefore prayed for a

judgment both the assailed Letters of Instructions and Memorandum Circular void and
unconstitutional and for a restraining order in the meanwhile.
A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on October 19, 1978: "L-49112
(Leovillo C. Agustin v. Hon. Romeo F. Edu, etc., et al.) Considering the allegations contained,
the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for prohibition with writ of p
prohibitory and/or mandatory injunction, the Court Resolved to (require) the respondents to file
an answer thereto within ton (10) days from notice and not to move to dismiss the petition. The
Court further Resolved to [issue] a [temporary restraining order] effective as of this date and
continuing until otherwise ordered by this Court. 16
Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and granted. Then on
November 15, 1978, he Answer for respondents was submitted. After admitting the factual
allegations and stating that they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle car," they "specifically deny the allegations and stating
they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a
Volkswagen Beetle Car, 17 they specifically deny the allegations in paragraphs X and XI
(including its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition to the effect that Letter of Instruction No. 229
as amended by Letters of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716 as well as Land transportation
Commission Administrative Order No. 1 and its Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the
constitutional provisions on due process of law, equal protection of law and undue delegation of
police power, and that the same are likewise oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided,
onerous, immoral unreasonable and illegal the truth being that said allegations are without legal
and factual basis and for the reasons alleged in the Special and Affirmative Defenses of this
Answer." 18 Unlike petitioner who contented himself with a rhetorical recital of his litany of
grievances and merely invoked the sacramental phrases of constitutional litigation, the Answer,
in demonstrating that the assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of the police power
and implementing rules and regulations of respondent Edu not susceptible to the charge that
there was unlawful delegation of legislative power, there was in the portion captioned Special
and Affirmative Defenses, a citation of what respondents believed to be the authoritative
decisions of this Tribunal calling for application. They are Calalang v. Williams, 19 Morfe v.
Mutuc, 20 and Edu v. Ericta. 21 Reference was likewise made to the 1968 Vienna Conventions of
the United Nations on road traffic, road signs, and signals, of which the Philippines was a
signatory and which was duly ratified. 22 Solicitor General Mendoza took pains to refute in detail,
in language calm and dispassionate, the vigorous, at times intemperate, accusation of petitioner
that the assailed Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations cannot survive
the test of rigorous scrutiny. To repeat, its highly-persuasive quality cannot be denied.
This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the issues being clearly joined. As
noted at the outset, it is far from meritorious and must be dismissed.
1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is
conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the
former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due
process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was
mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was
originally Identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision
as "nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty" 23 was
stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: "Justice Laurel, in the first leading
decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, Identified police power with

state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus 'be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to we the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.'
Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a
competence being referred to as 'the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The concept
was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as 'that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted
by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the
greatest and most powerful at. tribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, 'the
most essential, insistent, and at least table powers, I extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed
out 'to all the great public needs.' Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times,
even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the
language of Justice Cardozo: 'Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be
interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes
with the time.' The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely
defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an
individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." 24
2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the
particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It
would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of
that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The
latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, 25 an enactment
conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a
statute, the purpose of which was: "To promote safe transit upon, and. avoid obstruction on
roads and streets designated as national roads * * *. 26 As a matter of fact, the first law sought to
be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, 27 with
petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.
3. The futility of petitioner's effort to nullify both the Letter of Instruction and the implementing
rules and regulations becomes even more apparent considering his failure to lay the necessary
factual foundation to rebut the presumption of validity. So it was held in Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. 28 The rationale was clearly set forth in
an excerpt from a decision of Justice Branders of the American Supreme Court, quoted in the
opinion: "The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police
power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation
prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying
questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record
in overthrowing the statute. 29
4. Nor did the Solicitor General as he very well could, rely solely on such rebutted presumption
of validity. As was pointed out in his Answer "The President certainly had in his possession the
necessary statistical information and data at the time he issued said letter of instructions, and
such factual foundation cannot be defeated by petitioner's naked assertion that early warning

devices 'are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents' because allegedly
only 390 or 1.5 per cent of the supposed 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that in 1976 involved
rear-end collisions (p. 12 of petition). Petitioner's statistics is not backed up by demonstrable
data on record. As aptly stated by this Honorable Court: Further: "It admits of no doubt therefore
that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable,
unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case here"' * * *. But even as
g the verity of petitioner's statistics, is that not reason enough to require the installation of early
warning devices to prevent another 390 rear-end collisions that could mean the death of 390 or
more Filipinos and the deaths that could likewise result from head-on or frontal collisions with
stalled vehicles?" 30 It is quite manifest then that the issuance of such Letter of Instruction is
encased in the armor of prior, careful study by the Executive Department. To set it aside for
alleged repugnancy to the due process clause is to give sanction to conjectural claims that
exceeded even the broadest permissible limits of a pleader's well known penchant for
exaggeration.
5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of
Instruction was exposed in the Answer of the Solicitor General thus: "Such early warning device
requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are
already equipped with 1) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,' 2) "batterypowered blinking lights inside motor vehicles," 3) "built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear
bumpers of motor vehicles," or 4) "well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) * * *
because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions,
and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist
from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early
seaming device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking,
that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a
motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing
traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built in warning
devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he
will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law
enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist
will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision. 31
6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go unrefuted in the
Answer of the Solicitor General "There is nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229,
as amended, or in Administrative Order No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle owners
to purchase the early warning device prescribed thereby. All that is required is for motor vehicle
owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of this early warning
device in question, procuring or obtaining the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of
industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even personally make or produce this
early warning device so long as the same substantially conforms with the specifications laid
down in said letter of instruction and administrative order. Accordingly the early warning device
requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it
make manufacturers and dealers of said devices 'instant millionaires at the expense of car
owners' as petitioner so sweepingly concludes * * *. Petitioner's fear that with the early warning
device requirement 'a more subtle racket may be committed by those called upon to enforce it *
* * is an unfounded speculation. Besides, that unscrupulous officials may try to enforce said
requirement in an unreasonable manner or to an unreasonable degree, does not render the
same illegal or immoral where, as in the instant case, the challenged Letter of Instruction No.
229 and implementing order disclose none of the constitutional defects alleged against it. 32

7 It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised on
lack of power, the justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to
say negative, view he entertains as to its wisdom. That approach, it put it at its mildest, is
distinguished, if that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It bears repeating "that this
Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, 'does not pass upon questions of wisdom justice or
expediency of legislation.' As expressed by Justice Tuason: 'It is not the province of the courts to
supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is
primarily and exclusively a legislative concern.' There can be no possible objection then to the
observation of Justice Montemayor. 'As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision,
the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or
salutary. For they, according to Justice Labrador, 'are not supposed to override legitimate policy
and * * * never inquire into the wisdom of the law.' It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice
Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional power or
competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid.
This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated
the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There
would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of
a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of
law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants
submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and
prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may
be objections, even if valid and cogent on is wisdom cannot be sustained. 33
8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power is
equally without any support well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken the trouble to
acquaint himself with authoritative pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would not have the
temerity to make such an assertion. An exempt from the aforecited decision of Edu v.
Ericta sheds light on the matter: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a
standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle
and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to
repel A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its maps out its boundaries and specifies
the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command
is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter,
the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied.
If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to
be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered
as a whole. In the Reflector Law clearly, the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought
to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads.' This is to adhere to the
recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too long after the
Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to
adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain
limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but
in practically all modern governments.' He continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity
of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased
difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation
of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.'
Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is
authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands
of Congress being assumed." 34

10

9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this
consideration. The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of
Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized
by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs
and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vionna Convention,
which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the
enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; * * * " 35 It
cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses
relevance: "The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land * * *." 36 The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is
impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it
had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude,
which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.

I. The case and issue, in general

10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference to equal protection did not
even elicit any attempt on the Part of Petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and
categorical why such a casual observation should be taken seriously. In no case is there a more
appropriate occasion for insistence on what was referred to as "the general rule" in Santiago v.
Far Eastern Broadcasting Co., 37 namely, "that the constitutionality of a law wig not be
considered unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately
argued."38 "Equal protection" is not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party
to a lawsuit can rightfully expect that success will crown his efforts. The law is anything but that.

II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180

WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is
immediately executory. No costs.

This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a
legislative enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in significance. The enactment poses
questions of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an
important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy
really or actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic
impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country from the alien retailer. Through it, and
within the field of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for
economic independence and national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival
and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures designed to free the national retailer from
the competing dominance of the alien, so that the country and the nation may be free from a
supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts and circumstances justify the
enactment?

Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it
nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition
against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in
favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue
to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their
death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of
the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in
favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of
licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, control
weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a
prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business
of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually
engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified
statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business,
their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a
provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue
such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.
III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto

G.R. No. L-7995

May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations
and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer
of Manila,respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action
to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of
Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from
enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it
denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or
comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the
Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of
their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization
for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of
Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was
passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the
Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject

11

embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards
hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and
the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.
IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved
a. The police power.
There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but petitioner
claims that its exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of the constitutional
requirements of due process and equal protection of the laws. But before proceeding to the
consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would be well to bear in mind
certain basic and fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in the determination of the ever
recurrent conflict between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection
of the laws. What is the scope of police power, and how are the due process and equal
protection clauses related to it? What is the province and power of the legislature, and what is
the function and duty of the courts? These consideration must be clearly and correctly
understood that their application to the facts of the case may be brought forth with clarity and the
issue accordingly resolved.
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself,
it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with selfprotection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern
democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost
unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless,
just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and
have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and
demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we
cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the
State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the
scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations
thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection
clause.
b. Limitations on police power.
The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of
our Constitution:
SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III,
Phil. Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in
democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application,
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L.
ed. 220, 226.)
c. The, equal protection clause.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is
to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824825.)
d. The due process clause.
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance
of the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the
Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not
unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with
the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the
aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference
with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the
guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society.
There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can
neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive
persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be
classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law.
The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded
on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and
means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for
said distinction.
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review.
Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It
must not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional
repository of police power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is
by force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and
wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of the measures adopted
to implement the public policy or to achieve public interest. On the other hand, courts, although
zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to
interfere with the exercise of the legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there
has been a clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the legislative
prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts never
inquire into the wisdom of the law.
V. Economic problems sought to be remedied
With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue
involved. If the disputed legislation were merely a regulation, as its title indicates, there would be
no question that it falls within the legitimate scope of legislative power. But it goes further and
prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from engaging therein. The problem becomes more
complex because its subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old as society itself, which

12

from the immemorial has always been open to residents, irrespective of race, color or
citizenship.
a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation.
In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that they
produce, the dealer, of course, is unknown. But as group life develops and families begin to live
in communities producing more than what they consume and needing an infinite number of
things they do not produce, the dealer comes into existence. As villages develop into big
communities and specialization in production begins, the dealer's importance is enhanced.
Under modern conditions and standards of living, in which man's needs have multiplied and
diversified to unlimited extents and proportions, the retailer comes as essential as the producer,
because thru him the infinite variety of articles, goods and needed for daily life are placed within
the easy reach of consumers. Retail dealers perform the functions of capillaries in the human
body, thru which all the needed food and supplies are ministered to members of the communities
comprising the nation.
There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the community.
He ministers to the resident's daily needs, food in all its increasing forms, and the various little
gadgets and things needed for home and daily life. He provides his customers around his store
with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices needed for the daily cooking. He
has cloths to sell, even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes that wear out.
The retailer, therefore, from the lowly peddler, the owner of a small sari-sari store, to the
operator of a department store or, a supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day existence.

is merely the result of radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it is said, is not
an element of control; also so many unmanageable factors in the retail business make control
virtually impossible. The first argument which brings up an issue of fact merits serious
consideration. The others are matters of opinion within the exclusive competence of the
legislature and beyond our prerogative to pass upon and decide.
The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and
white. Between the constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination and
control of the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and
the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official statistics
unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien of the retail
trade, as witness the following tables:
Assets
Year and Retailers
Nationality

Filipino ..........

Pesos

106,671

200,323,138

55.82

174,181,924

Chinese ...........

15,356

118,348,692

32.98

148,813,239

Others ............

1,646

40,187,090

11.20

13,630,239

111,107

208,658,946

65.05

279,583,333

13,774

106,156,218

33.56

205,701,134

354

8,761,260

.49

4,927,168

Filipino ..........

113,631

213,342,264

67.30

467,161,667

Chinese ..........

12,087

93,155,459

29.38

294,894,227

422

10,514,675

3.32

9,995,402

Filipino ..........
Chinese ...........
Others ...........
1948: (Census)

There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about the
controlling and dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and
other essentials, clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly through him.
In big cities and centers of population he has acquired not only predominance, but apparent
control over distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles,
groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles. And were it not for
some national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the Acefa, his control
over principal foods and products would easily become full and complete.
Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one breath it
is said that the fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in another, it is charged that the law

Per cent
Distribution

1947:

Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of ill-bred
and insolent neighbors and customers are made in his face, but he heeds them not, and he
forgets and forgives. The community takes note of him, as he appears to be harmless and
extremely useful.
c. Alleged alien control and dominance.

Pesos

1941:

b. The alien retailer's trait.

The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the bigger centers of
population (Time there was when he was unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly but
gradually be invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in the cities and big centers of
population. He even pioneers, in far away nooks where the beginnings of community life appear,
ministering to the daily needs of the residents and purchasing their agricultural produce for sale
in the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many communities the alien has replaced the native
retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry without limit, and the patience and forbearance of a
slave.

No.Establishments

Gross Sal

Others ..........
1949:

13

Filipino ..........
Chinese ..........
Others ..........

113,659
16,248

213,451,602
125,223,336

486

12,056,365

60.89
35.72
3.39

462,532,901

Others ..........

119,352

224,053,620

61.09

466,058,052

17,429

134,325,303

36.60

404,481,384

347

8,614,025

2.31

7,645,327

Item
Assets
(Pesos)

Others ..............................................

24,749

13,919

Filipino .............................................

1,878

4,111

Chinese .............................................

7,707

24,398

Others ..............................................

24,916

23,686

Filipino .............................................

1,878

4,069

Chinese ..............................................

7,707

24,152

Others ..............................................

24,807

20,737

(Census)

1949:

AVERAGE
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT

Year and Retailer's

Nationality

14,934

10,078,364
1948:

Chinese ..........

7,707

392,414,875

1951:
Filipino .........

Chinese ...........................................

Gross Sales
(Pesos)

1941:

1951:

Filipino .............................................

1,878

1,633

Chinese ..............................................

7,707

9,691

Filipino .............................................

1,877

3,905

Others ...............................................

24,415

8,281

Chinese .............................................

7,707

33,207

Others ...............................................

24,824

22,033

1947:

Filipino .............................................

1,878

2,516

(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and Nationality
of Owners, Benchmark: 1948 Census, issued by the Bureau of Census and Statistics,
Department of Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)

14

The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on Filipino
establishments already include mere market vendors, whose capital is necessarily small..
The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales, alien
participation has steadily increased during the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the
edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap through
their assests and gross sales which average between six and seven times those of the very
many Filipino retailers. Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien invests
more capital, buys and sells six to seven times more, and gains much more. The same official
report, pointing out to the known predominance of foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks
that the Filipino retailers were largely engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As observed by
respondents, the native investment is thinly spread, and the Filipino retailer is practically
helpless in matters of capital, credit, price and supply.
d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention.
It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is the
legislature's target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization would never have been
adopted. The framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence of this alien dominance
and control when they approved a resolution categorically declaring among other things, that "it
is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of the retail
trade; . . . ." (II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, 662-663, quoted on page 67
of Petitioner.) That was twenty-two years ago; and the events since then have not been either
pleasant or comforting. Dean Sinco of the University of the Philippines College of Law,
commenting on the patrimony clause of the Preamble opines that the fathers of our Constitution
were merely translating the general preoccupation of Filipinos "of the dangers from alien
interests that had already brought under their control the commercial and other economic
activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 114); and analyzing the concern
of the members of the constitutional convention for the economic life of the citizens, in
connection with the nationalistic provisions of the Constitution, he says:
But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of
the country is not desirable and that if such a situation should remain, political
independence alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength. Filipino private
capital is not big enough to wrest from alien hands the control of the national
economy. Moreover, it is but of recent formation and hence, largely inexperienced,
timid and hesitant. Under such conditions, the government as the instrumentality of
the national will, has to step in and assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the
struggle for the economic freedom of the nation in somewhat the same way that it did
in the crusade for political freedom. Thus . . . it (the Constitution) envisages an
organized movement for the protection of the nation not only against the possibilities
of armed invasion but also against its economic subjugation by alien interests in the
economic field. (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p. 476.)
Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino
businessmen, manufacturers and producers believe so; they fear the dangers coming from alien
control, and they express sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is Resolution
No. 1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National convention of Filipino Businessmen, and
a similar resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second National Convention of
Manufacturers and Producers. The man in the street also believes, and fears, alien
predominance and control; so our newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not only to
control but to alien stranglehold. We, therefore, find alien domination and control to be a fact, a
reality proved by official statistics, and felt by all the sections and groups that compose the
Filipino community.

e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail.

But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the
predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly endanger
the national interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and action and thorough organization,
alien retailers and merchants can act in such complete unison and concert on such vital matters
as the fixing of prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles to be made available
in the market, and even the choice of the goods or articles they would or would not patronize or
distribute, that fears of dislocation of the national economy and of the complete subservience of
national economy and of the consuming public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers
and consumers alike can be placed completely at their mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose
an article of daily use is desired to be prescribed by the aliens, because the producer or importer
does not offer them sufficient profits, or because a new competing article offers bigger profits for
its introduction. All that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article, eliminating it
from their stocks, offering the new one as a substitute. Hence, the producers or importers of the
prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of the prescribed article, or its
consumers, find the article suddenly out of circulation. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and
free enterprise correspondingly suppressed.
We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of alien
domination. Grave abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is a
fact within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly overlook or ignore in the
interests of truth and justice, that there exists a general feeling on the part of the public that alien
participation in the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable practices, the
mention of a few of which would suffice for our purposes; that at some time or other they have
cornered the market of essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to
justify and enhance profits to unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded essential foods
to the inconvenience and prejudice of the consuming public, so much so that the Government
has had to establish the National Rice and Corn Corporation to save the public from their
continuous hoarding practices and tendencies; that they have violated price control laws,
especially on foods and essential commodities, such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec.
9, Republic Act No. 1168), authorizing their immediate and automatic deportation for price
control convictions; that they have secret combinations among themselves to control prices,
cheating the operation of the law of supply and demand; that they have connived to boycott
honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to their demands, in unlawful
restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise. They are believed by the public to have evaded tax
laws, smuggled goods and money into and out of the land, violated import and export
prohibitions, control laws and the like, in derision and contempt of lawful authority. It is also
believed that they have engaged in corrupting public officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly
causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government. As a matter of fact appeals to
unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the Government and by their own lawful
diplomatic representatives, action which impliedly admits a prevailing feeling about the existence
of many of the above practices.
The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come in the
future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population,
therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do
not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals;
what we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods
and commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or
loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While
the national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the
alien may even become the potential enemy of the State.
f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security.

15

We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed
law is not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the
legitimate desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized representatives, to free
the nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or
wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national
security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which
the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.
VI. The Equal Protection Limitation
a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. The next question that now poses solution
is, Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of
alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader.
The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay
here is for personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or
purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that
spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living,
or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would
prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting them. The faster he makes
his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to his beloved country and his beloved kin and
countrymen. The experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter
disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit, that it has been found
necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may seem.
Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine
contribution to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution,
but the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the country's
economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this country being merely transient
and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function of
retail distribution to his hands.
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out above,
their secret manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the
welfare of their customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which
they are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and disregard do not attend the exercise
of the trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental
differences between an alien and a national which fully justify the legislative classification
adopted in the retail trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State
to prefer the national over the alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and
reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for a legitimate distinction can be found
between one and the other.
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction.
The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which
are actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into
nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To
this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds that
the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike,
and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in
duty bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not
declare that the act transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among
persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative

power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional
limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities
we have earlier cited, we can also refer to the case of Linsey vs. Natural Carbonic Fas Co.
(1911), 55 L. ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly defined the application of equal protection
clause to a law sought to be voided as contrary thereto:
. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from
the state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the
exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only
when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A
classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause
merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it
results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in
question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the
existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4.
One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that
it does not rest upon any reasonable basis but is essentially arbitrary."
c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification.
The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has
already been affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United
States. In the case of Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity of Act No.
2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in issue, because of a condition therein limiting the
ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens of the
Philippine Islands or the United States, thus denying the right to aliens, it was held that the
Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights.
The legislature in enacting the law had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine
shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from foreign interlopers. We held that this was a
valid exercise of the police power, and all presumptions are in favor of its constitutionality. In
substance, we held that the limitation of domestic ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise
trade to citizens of the Philippines does not violate the equal protection of the law and due
process or law clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering said decision we quoted with
approval the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat.,
I, as follows:
"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example,
acts licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this
instance, is distinctly of that character, and forms part of an extensive system, the
object of which is to encourage American shipping, and place them on an equal
footing with the shipping of other nations. Almost every commercial nation reserves to
its own subjects a monopoly of its coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in
favor of American shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United
States on this subject. It is not to give the vessel an American character, that the
license is granted; that effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment.
But it is to confer on her American privileges, as contra distinguished from foreign; and
to preserve the Government from fraud by foreigners; in surreptitiously intruding
themselves into the American commercial marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue
in the trade coastwise, that this whole system is projected."
The rule in general is as follows:
Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification
otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of
nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class

16

than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly
speaking, the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for
reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)
In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing of
hawkers and peddlers, which provided that no one can obtain a license unless he is, or has
declared his intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was held valid, for the following
reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to limit the business of those who are supposed to
have regard for the welfare, good order and happiness of the community, and the court cannot
question this judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N. E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a
statute which prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of
liquors, was found not to be the result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose to
discriminate, but was based on the belief that an alien cannot be sufficiently acquainted with "our
institutions and our life as to enable him to appreciate the relation of this particular business to
our entire social fabric", and was not, therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach,
274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115 (1926), the U.S. Supreme Court had under consideration an
ordinance of the city of Cincinnati prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard rooms)
to aliens. It held that plainly irrational discrimination against aliens is prohibited, but it does not
follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear in some instances such a relation to a
legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis of permitted classification, and that it
could not state that the legislation is clearly wrong; and that latitude must be allowed for the
legislative appraisement of local conditions and for the legislative choice of methods for
controlling an apprehended evil. The case of State vs. Carrol, 124 N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a
parallel case to the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30 (Washington, 1922), the
business of pawn brooking was considered as having tendencies injuring public interest, and
limiting it to citizens is within the scope of police power. A similar statute denying aliens the right
to engage in auctioneering was also sustained in Wright vs. May, L.R.A., 1915 P. 151
(Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said
that aliens are judicially known to have different interests, knowledge, attitude, psychology and
loyalty, hence the prohibitions of issuance of licenses to them for the business of pawnbroker,
pool, billiard, card room, dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional rights. In Templar vs.
Michigan State Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the
licensing of aliens as barbers was held void, but the reason for the decision was the court's
findings that the exercise of the business by the aliens does not in any way affect the morals, the
health, or even the convenience of the community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game
Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479 (1947), a California statute banning the issuance of commercial
fishing licenses to person ineligible to citizenship was held void, because the law conflicts with
Federal power over immigration, and because there is no public interest in the mere claim of
ownership of the waters and the fish in them, so there was no adequate justification for the
discrimination. It further added that the law was the outgrowth of antagonism toward the persons
of Japanese ancestry. However, two Justices dissented on the theory that fishing rights have
been treated traditionally as natural resources. In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82 Fed.
257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law which imposed a tax on every employer of foreign-born
unnaturalized male persons over 21 years of age, was declared void because the court found
that there was no reason for the classification and the tax was an arbitrary deduction from the
daily wage of an employee.
d. Authorities contra explained.
It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United States
hold that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not a valid ground for classification. But in
this decision the laws declared invalid were found to be either arbitrary, unreasonable or
capricious, or were the result or product of racial antagonism and hostility, and there was no
question of public interest involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059
(1925), the United States Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine law making unlawful the
keeping of books of account in any language other than English, Spanish or any other local
dialect, but the main reasons for the decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of

business there would be no other system of distribution, and (2) that the Chinese would fall prey
to all kinds of fraud, because they would be deprived of their right to be advised of their business
and to direct its conduct. The real reason for the decision, therefore, is the court's belief that no
public benefit would be derived from the operations of the law and on the other hand it would
deprive Chinese of something indispensable for carrying on their business. In Yick Wo vs.
Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220 (1885) an ordinance conferring powers on officials to withhold consent in
the operation of laundries both as to persons and place, was declared invalid, but the court said
that the power granted was arbitrary, that there was no reason for the discrimination which
attended the administration and implementation of the law, and that the motive thereof was mere
racial hostility. In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900), a law prohibiting aliens to
engage as hawkers and peddlers was declared void, because the discrimination bore no
reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification was proposed.
The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have said,
aliens do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers with
whom they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy,
except in so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national owes
to the land. These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been shown on many
occasions and instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency. We can do no better than
borrow the language of Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality and
significance of the distinction between the alien and the national, thus:
. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming into this country are
without the intimate knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that our own people
have. So it is likewise known that certain classes of aliens are of different psychology
from our fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to suppose that
the foreign born, whose allegiance is first to their own country, and whose ideals of
governmental environment and control have been engendered and formed under
entirely different regimes and political systems, have not the same inspiration for the
public weal, nor are they as well disposed toward the United States, as those who by
citizenship, are a part of the government itself. Further enlargement, is unnecessary. I
have said enough so that obviously it cannot be affirmed with absolute confidence that
the Legislature was without plausible reason for making the classification, and
therefore appropriate discriminations against aliens as it relates to the subject of
legislation. . . . .
VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.
a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive.
We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been
stated by the highest authority in the United States that:
. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the
law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected
shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. . . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other
constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may
reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by
legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare
such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed

17

are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial
determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. . . . (Nebbia vs. New York,
78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)
Another authority states the principle thus:
. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering
the scope of the police power in a constitutional sense, for the test used to determine
the constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to inquire whether the
restriction it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are
unreasonable, and not whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . .
xxx

xxx

The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and
ignores the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the
retail trade unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious
form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated
the answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the
desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It
is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp.
1080-1081.) The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all
circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test,
disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered
not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied the
bill, which later was enacted into law:

xxx

. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon
the persons whom it affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular class, and
must not be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302., 1:1)- 1074-1075.)
In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:
. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. . . .
Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of
constitutionality:
In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the
police power to regulate the operation of a business, is or is not constitutional, one of
the first questions to be considered by the court is whether the power as exercised
has a sufficient foundation in reason in connection with the matter involved, or is an
arbitrary, oppressive, and capricious use of that power, without substantial relation to
the health, safety, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the public.

This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons
who are not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic
life. If the persons who control this vital artery of our economic life are the ones who
owe no allegiance to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our free
institutions, and who have no permanent stake in our people's welfare, we are not
really the masters of our destiny. All aspects of our life, even our national security, will
be at the mercy of other people.
In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive
persons who are not citizens of the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this
bill seeks to take away from the hands of persons who are not citizens of the
Philippines a power that can be wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life and
endanger our national security it respects existing rights.
The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.
If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is
none the less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject
to the economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country.
The removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and domination, is one
of the noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that
legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation of due process.
The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of legislative
authority.

b. Petitioner's argument considered.

Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those
privileges long ago recognized as essential to the orderly pursuant of happiness by free men;
that it is a gainful and honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to
prohibit and penalized. This arguments overlooks fact and reality and rests on an incorrect
assumption and premise, i.e., that in this country where the occupation is engaged in by
petitioner, it has been so engaged by him, by the alien in an honest creditable and
unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to the citizens and without ultimate danger to
their economic peace, tranquility and welfare. But the Legislature has found, as we have also
found and indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly abused by the alien, thru the
illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys a monopolistic control of
the occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's economy endangering the
national security in times of crisis and emergency.

c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative action.

The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional restrictions
of due process on the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom from economic control and
domination, thru the exercise of the police power. The fathers of the Constitution must have
given to the legislature full authority and power to enact legislation that would promote the
supreme happiness of the people, their freedom and liberty. On the precise issue now before us,
they expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a resolution expressing their belief that the
legislation in question is within the scope of the legislative power. Thus they declared the their
Resolution:
That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the
nationalization of retail trade; but it abstain from approving the amendment introduced

18

by the Delegate for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter because it is
convinced that the National Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law which limits to
Filipino and American citizens the privilege to engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego,
The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the
Memorandum for the Petitioner.)
It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the
Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a principle objective is the conservation of the patrimony of
the nation and as corollary the provision limiting to citizens of the Philippines the exploitation,
development and utilization of its natural resources. And in Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided
that "no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of the public
utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines." The nationalization of the retail trade
is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective of the
Constitution. Can it be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying many
of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid and unconstitutional?
The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in the
approval of the radical measures is, therefore, fully justified. It would have been recreant to its
duties towards the country and its people would it view the sorry plight of the nationals with the
complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the demands of
public interest and national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of legislation, the
Legislature was in duty bound to face the problem and meet, through adequate measures, the
danger and threat that alien domination of retail trade poses to national economy.
d. Provisions of law not unreasonable.
A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable
the Legislature has been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of
those already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives; and
similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations of aliens. The right or
privilege is denied to those only upon conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations of the
Court on this case, attention was called to the fact that the privilege should not have been
denied to children and heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would
defeat the law itself, its aims and purposes. Beside, the exercise of legislative discretion is not
subject to judicial review. It is well settled that the Court will not inquire into the motives of the
Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative judgment. The Legislature is primarily
the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is
in favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the
law, it may not annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative power.
Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a violation of due process, is not its
reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find the provisions are not unreasonable.
These principles also answer various other arguments raised against the law, some of which
are: that the law does not promote general welfare; that thousands of aliens would be thrown out
of employment; that prices will increase because of the elimination of competition; that there is
no need for the legislation; that adequate replacement is problematical; that there may be
general breakdown; that there would be repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of these
arguments are directed against the supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within the
legislative prerogative; they do not import invalidity.
VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law
A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title
thereof is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to
nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional
provision which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which reads:

No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the bill.
What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to appraise the
legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation (I
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of the title and
the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate"
does not and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and
"prohibition", which terms express the two main purposes and objectives of the law. But
"regulate" is a broader term than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always
been included within the term regulation.
Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Legislature
may prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors. (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7;
quoted in page 41 of Answer.)
Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the
Legislature shall be stated in the tale, the title to regulate the sale of intoxicating
liquors, etc." sufficiently expresses the subject of an act prohibiting the sale of such
liquors to minors and to persons in the habit of getting intoxicated; such matters being
properly included within the subject of regulating the sale. (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind.
306, 308, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The word "regulate" is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree of
restraint and prohibition of acts usually done in connection with the thing to be
regulated. While word regulate does not ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit, there is
no absolute reason why it should not have such meaning when used in delegating
police power in connection with a thing the best or only efficacious regulation of which
involves suppression. (State vs. Morton, 162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of
Answer.)
The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said that the
title need not be an index to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction,
See. 4803, p. 345.) The above rule was followed the title of the Act in question adopted the more
general term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore, the law also contains
other rules for the regulation of the retail trade which may not be included in the terms
"nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were the title changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or
"prohibit", there would have been many provisions not falling within the scope of the title which
would have made the Act invalid. The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in accord with the
principle governing the drafting of statutes, under which a simple or general term should be
adopted in the title, which would include all other provisions found in the body of the Act.
One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title
is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent
the enactment into law of matters which have received the notice, action and study of the
legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be claimed that the legislators have been
appraised of the nature of the law, especially the nationalization and the prohibition provisions.
The legislators took active interest in the discussion of the law, and a great many of the persons
affected by the prohibitions in the law conducted a campaign against its approval. It cannot be
claimed, therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed. The objection must
therefore, be overruled.
IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations

19

Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation thereby of
the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly. We find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes no strict or
legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the
United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing
more than a mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of
Human Rights can be inferred the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such
as Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of
the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April
18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is
equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any
other country." But the nationals of China are not discriminating against because nationals of all
other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the
Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law
infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a
subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or
restrict the scope of the police power of the State (plaston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)
X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a
real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the
retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment
clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects
its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between
alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause,
because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already
engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy
of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it
seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls
within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial
department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly
embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the
segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict
with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the
police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional
agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have
been made less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should
have been given in the law for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time comes for
them to close. Our legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope of
legislative authority and does not transcend the limitations of due process and equal protection
guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the law should be addressed
to the Legislature; they are beyond our power and jurisdiction.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and
Felix, JJ., concur.

20

G.R. No. L-21897

October 22, 1963

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, as Executive Secretary, MACARIO PERALTA, JR., as Secretary
of Defense, PEDRO GIMENEZ, as Auditor General, CORNELIO BALMACEDA, as Secretary
of Commerce and Industry, and SALVADOR MARINO, Secretary of Justice, respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction.
It is not disputed that on September 22, 1963, respondent Executive Secretary authorized the
importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and created a
rice procurement committee composed of the other respondents herein 1 for the implementation
of said proposed importation. Thereupon, or September 25, 1963, herein petitioner, Ramon A.
Gonzales a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association,
whose members are, likewise, engaged in the production of rice and corn filed the petition
herein, averring that, in making or attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the
aforementioned respondents "are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because
Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act No. 220 explicitly
prohibits the importation of rice and corn "the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
government agency;" that petitioner has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law; and that a preliminary injunction is necessary for the preservation of the
rights of the parties during the pendency this case and to prevent the judgment therein from
coming ineffectual. Petitioner prayed, therefore, that said petition be given due course; that a writ
of preliminary injunction be forthwith issued restraining respondent their agents or
representatives from implementing the decision of the Executive Secretary to import the
aforementioned foreign rice; and that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered making said
injunction permanent.
Forthwith, respondents were required to file their answer to the petition which they did, and
petitioner's pray for a writ of preliminary injunction was set for hearing at which both parties
appeared and argued orally. Moreover, a memorandum was filed, shortly thereafter, by the
respondents. Considering, later on, that the resolution said incident may require some
pronouncements that would be more appropriate in a decision on the merits of the case, the
same was set for hearing on the merits thereafter. The parties, however, waived the right to
argue orally, although counsel for respondents filed their memoranda.
I. Sufficiency of petitioner's interest.
Respondents maintain that the status of petitioner as a rice planter does not give him sufficient
interest to file the petition herein and secure the relief therein prayed for. We find no merit in this
pretense. Apart from prohibiting the importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency". Republic Act No. 3452 declares, in Section 1
thereof, that "the policy of the Government" is to "engage in the purchase of these basic
foods directly from those tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners in the
Philippines who wish to dispose of their products at a price that will afford them a fair and just
return for their labor and capital investment. ... ." Pursuant to this provision, petitioner, as a

planter with a rice land of substantial proportion, 2 is entitled to a chance to sell to the
Government the rice it now seeks to buy abroad. Moreover, since the purchase of said
commodity will have to be effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation, and as a rice
producer and landowner petitioner must necessarily be a taxpayer, it follows that he has
sufficient personality and interest to seek judicial assistance with a view to restraining what he
believes to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse said funds.
II. Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Respondents assail petitioner's right to the reliefs prayed for because he "has not exhausted all
administrative remedies available to him before coming to court". We have already held,
however, that the principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
applicable where the question in dispute is purely a legal one", 3 or where the controverted act is
"patently illegal" or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, 4 or where the
respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the
implied or assumed approval of the latter,5 unless actually disapproved by him,6 or where there
are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. 7 The case at bar fails under
each one of the foregoing exceptions to the general rule. Respondents' contention is, therefore,
untenable.
III. Merits of petitioner's cause of action.
Respondents question the sufficiency of petitioner's cause of action upon the theory that the
proposed importation in question is not governed by Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, but was
authorized by the President as Commander-in-Chief "for military stock pile purposes" in the
exercise of his alleged authority under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1; 8 that in cases of
necessity, the President "or his subordinates may take such preventive measure for the
restoration of good order and maintenance of peace"; and that, as Commander-in-Chief of our
armed forces, "the President ... is duty-bound to prepare for the challenge of threats of war or
emergency without waiting for any special authority".
Regardless of whether Republic Act No. 3452 repeals Republic Act No. 2207, as contended by
petitioner herein - on which our view need not be expressed we are unanimously of the
opinion - assuming that said Republic Act No. 2207 is still in force that the two Acts are
applicable to the proposed importation in question because the language of said laws is such as
to include within the purview thereof all importations of rice and corn into the Philippines".
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 2207, "it shall be unlawful for any person, association, corporation
orgovernment agency to import rice and corn into any point in the Philippines", although, by way
of exception, it adds, that "the President of the Philippines may authorize the importation of
these commodities through any government agency that he may designate", is the conditions
prescribed in Section 2 of said Act are present. Similarly, Republic Act No. 3452 explicitly enjoins
"the Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency" from importing rice and corn.
Respondents allege, however, that said provisions of Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452,
prohibiting the importation of rice and corn by any "government agency", do not apply to
importations "made by the Government itself", because the latter is not a "government agency".
This theory is devoid of merit. The Department of National Defense and the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, as well as respondents herein, and each and every officer and employee of our
Government, our government agencies and/or agents. The applicability of said laws even to
importations by the Government as such, becomes more apparent when we consider that:
1. The importation permitted in Republic Act No. 2207 is to be authorized by the "President of
the Philippines"and, hence, by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines;

21

2. Immediately after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and any other government
agency from importing rice and corn, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 adds "that the
importation of rice and corn is left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes",
thus indicating that only "private parties" may import rice under its provisions; and
3. Aside from prescribing a fine not exceeding P10,000.00 and imprisonment of not more than
five (5) years for those who shall violate any provision of Republic Act No. 3452 or any rule and
regulation promulgated pursuant thereto, Section 15 of said Act provides that "if the offender is
a public official and/or employees", he shall be subject to the additional penalty specified therein.
A public official is an officer of the Government itself, as distinguished from officers or employees
of instrumentalities of the Government. Hence, the duly authorized acts of the former are those
of the Government, unlike those of a government instrumentality which may have a personality
of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government, as such. The provisions of
Republic Act No. 2207 are, in this respect, even more explicit. Section 3 thereof provides a
similar additional penalty for any "officer or employee of the Government" who "violates, abets or
tolerates the violation of any provision" of said Act. Hence, the intent to apply the same to
transactions made by the very government is patent.
Indeed, the restrictions imposed in said Republic Acts are merely additional to those prescribed
in Commonwealth Act No. 138, entitled "An Act to give native products and domestic entities the
preference in the purchase of articles for the Government." Pursuant to Section 1 thereof:
The Purchase and Equipment Division of the Government of the Philippines and other
officers and employees of the municipal and provincial governments and the
Government of the Philippines and of chartered cities, boards, commissions, bureaus,
departments, offices, agencies, branches, and bodies of any description, including
government-owned companies, authorized to requisition, purchase, or contract or
make disbursements for articles, materials, and supplies for public use, public
buildings, or public works shall give preference to materials ... produced ... in the
Philippines or in the United States, and to domestic entities, subject to the conditions
hereinbelow specified. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under this provision, in all purchases by the Government, including those made by and/or for the
armed forces,preference shall be given to materials produced in the Philippines. The importation
involved in the case at bar violates this general policy of our Government, aside from the
provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.
The attempt to justify the proposed importation by invoking reasons of national security
predicated upon the "worsening situation in Laos and Vietnam", and "the recent tension created
by the Malaysia problem" - and the alleged powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief of
all armed forces in the Philippines, under Section 2 of the National Defense Act (Commonwealth
Act No. 1), overlooks the fact that the protection of local planters of rice and corn in a manner
that would foster and accelerate self-sufficiency in the local production of said commodities
constitutes a factor that is vital to our ability to meet possible national emergency. Even if the
intent in importing goods in anticipation of such emergency were to bolster up that ability, the
latter would, instead, be impaired if the importation were so made as to discourage our farmers
from engaging in the production of rice.
Besides, the stockpiling of rice and corn for purpose of national security and/or national
emergency is within the purview of Republic Act No. 3452. Section 3 thereof expressly
authorizes the Rice and Corn Administration "to accumulate stocks as a national reserve in such
quantities as it may deem proper and necessary to meet any contingencies". Moreover, it
ordains that "the buffer stocks held as a national reserve ... be deposited by the administration
throughout the country under the proper dispersal plans ... and may be released only upon the
occurrence of calamities or emergencies ...". (Emphasis applied.)

Again, the provisions of Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, upon which respondents rely so
much, are not self-executory. They merely outline the general objectives of said legislation. The
means for the attainment of those objectives are subject to congressional legislation. Thus, the
conditions under which the services of citizens, as indicated in said Section 2, may be availed of,
are provided for in Sections 3, 4 and 51 to 88 of said Commonwealth Act No. 1. Similarly,
Section 5 thereof specifies the manner in which resources necessary for our national defense
may be secured by the Government of the Philippines, but only "during a national
mobilization",9which does not exist. Inferentially, therefore, in the absence of a national
mobilization, said resources shall be produced in such manner as Congress may by other laws
provide from time to time. Insofar as rice and corn are concerned, Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and
3452, and Commonwealth Act No. 138 are such laws.
Respondents cite Corwin in support of their pretense, but in vain. An examination of the work
cited10 shows that Corwin referred to the powers of the President during "war time" 11 or when he
has placed the country or a part thereof under "martial law". 12 Since neither condition obtains in
the case at bar, said work merely proves that respondents' theory, if accepted, would, in effect,
place the Philippines under martial law, without a declaration of the Executive to that effect.
What is worse, it would keep us perpetually under martial law.
It has been suggested that even if the proposed importation violated Republic Acts Nos. 2207
and 3452, it should, nevertheless, be permitted because "it redounds to the benefit of the
people". Salus populi est suprema lex, it is said.
If there were a local shortage of rice, the argument might have some value. But the respondents,
as officials of this Government, have expressly affirmed again and again that there is no rice
shortage. And the importation is avowedly for stockpile of the Army not the civilian population.
But let us follow the respondents' trend of thought. It has a more serious implication that appears
on the surface. It implies that if an executive officer believes that compliance with a certain
statute will not benefit the people, he is at liberty to disregard it. That idea must be rejected - we
still live under a rule of law.
And then, "the people" are either producers or consumers. Now as respondents explicitly
admit Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 were approved by the Legislature for the benefit of
producers and consumers, i.e., the people, it must follow that the welfare of the people lies
precisely in the compliance with said Acts.
It is not for respondent executive officers now to set their own opinions against that of the
Legislature, and adopt means or ways to set those Acts at naught. Anyway, those laws permit
importation but under certain conditions, which have not been, and should be complied with.
IV. The contracts with Vietnam and Burma
It is lastly contended that the Government of the Philippines has already entered into two (2)
contracts for the Purchase of rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and another with the
Government of Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive agreements under
international law; that such agreements became binding effective upon the signing thereof by
representatives the parties thereto; that in case of conflict between Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and
3452 on the one hand, and aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter should prevail,
because, if a treaty and a statute are inconsistent with each other, the conflict must be resolved
under the American jurisprudence in favor of the one which is latest in point of time; that
petitioner herein assails the validity of acts of the Executive relative to foreign relations in the
conduct of which the Supreme Court cannot interfere; and the aforementioned contracts have
already been consummated, the Government of the Philippines having already paid the price of

22

the rice involved therein through irrevocable letters of credit in favor of the sell of the said
commodity. We find no merit in this pretense.
The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive agreements has
been sufficiently established. The parties to said contracts do not pear to have regarded the
same as executive agreements. But, even assuming that said contracts may properly
considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a
constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts
Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional system
enter into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive
agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under
the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The
former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the
exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the
status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the
performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.

The members of the Court have divergent opinions on the question whether or not respondents
herein should be enjoined from implementing the aforementioned proposed importation.
However, the majority favors the negative view, for which reason the injunction prayed for cannot
be granted.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that respondent Executive Secretary had
and has no power to authorize the importation in question; that he exceeded his jurisdiction in
granting said authority; said importation is not sanctioned by law and is contrary to its provisions;
and that, for lack of the requisite majority, the injunction prayed for must be and is, accordingly
denied. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, CJ, Padilla, Labrador, Reyes,
Paredes and Regala, JJ., concur in the result.

J.B.L.,

Dizon

and

Makalintal,

JJ., concur.

The American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the
one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, for
respondents not only admit, but, alsoinsist that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. Said
theory may be justified upon the ground that treaties to which the United States is signatory
require the advice and consent of its Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the legislative
department. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized
by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and
the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up and that
of the United States.
As regards the question whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts,
suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by
providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived "of its
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the
law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in (1) All
cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or
regulation is in question". In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty,
not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of
Congress.
The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with Vietnam and Burma
does not render this case academic, Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our Government not
from entering into contracts for the purchase of rice, but from importing rice, except under the
conditions Prescribed in said Act. Upon the other hand, Republic Act No. 3452 has two (2) main
features, namely: (a) it requires the Government to purchase rice and corn directlyfrom our local
planters, growers or landowners; and (b) it prohibits importations of rice by the Government, and
leaves such importations to private parties. The pivotal issue in this case is whether the
proposed importation which has not been consummated as yet is legally feasible.
Lastly, a judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our
Government to default in the performance of such obligations as it may have contracted with the
sellers of the rice in question, because, aside from the fact that said obligations may be
complied with without importing the commodity into the Philippines, the proposed importation
may still be legalized by complying with the provisions of the aforementioned laws.
V. The writ of preliminary injunction.

23

The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degree or diplomas to
practice the liberal professions in either of the Contracting States, issued by
competent national authorities, shall be deemed competent to exercise said
professions in the territory of the Other, subject to the laws and regulations of the
latter. . . ..

August 15, 1961

IN RE: PETITION OF ARTURO EFREN GARCIA for admission to the Philippine Bar without
taking the examination. ARTURO EFREN GARCIA, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
BARRERA, J.:
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without
submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among others, that
he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolor City, Province of Negros Occidental, of Filipino parentage;
that he had taken and finished in Spain, the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was
approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central
University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course graduating there as
"Licenciado En Derecho"; that thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain;
and that under the provision of the Treaty of Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions
between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state, he is entitled to practice the law
profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.

It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made
expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting State in whose territory it is
desired to exercise the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections
2,9, and 16 thereof, which have the force of law, require that before anyone can practice the
legal profession in the Philippine he must first successfully pass the required bar examinations;
and
(3) The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Spanish State could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department
may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the lower to repeal, alter or supplement
such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines. (See Sec. 13, Art VIII, Phil.
Constitution).

After due consideration, the Court resolved to deny the petition on the following grounds:
(1) the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between
the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State can not be invoked by applicant. Under
Article 11 thereof;
The Nationals of each of the two countries who shall have obtained recognition of the
validity of their academic degrees by virtue of the stipulations of this Treaty, can
practice their professions within the territory of the Other, . . .. (Emphasis supplied).
from which it could clearly be discerned that said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens
desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their
professions in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal
profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not
entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines.
(2) Article I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part, provides .

24

In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the accused were
sentenced, is impugned on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution of the Philippines provides as follows:
SEC. 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment
of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil
service.
The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go
against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The
duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To
leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the
Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist
therein.1vvphl.nt
G.R. No. L-45892
July 13, 1938
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TRANQUILINO LAGMAN, defendant-appellant.
----------------------------G.R. No. L-45893
July 13, 1938
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PRIMITIVO DE SOSA, defendant-appellant.

AVANCEA, J.:
In these two cases (G.R. Nos. L-45892 and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino and Primitivo de
Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the
National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached
the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military service
between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been
required to do so. The evidence shows that these two appellants were duly notified by the
corresponding authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military
service in accordance with law, and that the said appellants, in spite of these notices, had not
registered up to the date of the filing of the information.
The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not registered
in the military service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother
eight years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military
learnings, and does not wish to kill or be killed.

In the United States the courts have held in a series of decisions that the compulsory military
service adopted by reason of the civil war and the world war does not violate the Constitution,
because the power to establish it is derived from that granted to Congress to declare war and to
organize and maintain an army. This is so because the right of the Government to require
compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal
with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case of Jacobson vs.
Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the
Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his
pecuniary interests, and even against his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the
ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. In the
case of United States vs. Olson (253 Fed., 233), it was also said that this is not deprivation of
property without due process of law, because, in its just sense, there is no right of property to an
office or employment.
The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by reason on the actual existence
of war does not make our case any different, inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what justifies
compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation
to make it more effective, in case of need. The circumstance that the appellants have dependent
families to support does not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the
Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for determent in
complying with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to
attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1).
The appealed judgment rendered in these two cases is affirmed, with the costs to the appellants.
So ordered.

Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one month and one
day of imprisonment, with the costs.

25

"In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are
blue, green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1,094 inches. The denominations
are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos." The said stamps were actually issued and sold though
the greater part thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought to
be prevented by the petitioner herein.
The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the
instant case, although he admits that the writ may properly restrain ministerial functions. While,
generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the
performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J., 6580, its issuance and
enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to . . . inferior tribunals,
corporations, boards, or persons, whether excercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are
without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person, . . . ."
(Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with
reference to "functions" in the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the
challenged act of the respondent Director of Posts in the present case, which act because
alleged to be violative of the Constitution is a fortiorari "without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction."
The statutory rule, therefore, in the jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined
exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to
prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in
appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority.
Not infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of
justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner,
or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)

G.R. No. L-45459

March 13, 1937

GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,

vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church,
seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of
Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the
issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third
international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in
the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of
the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the
protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United
States the designs of the postage stamps for printing as follows:

The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the
respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third
International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of
the provisions of section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which
provides as follows:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
secretarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any
priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when
such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any
penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and
state. Without the necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our
country, it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught
us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for ocassions might arise when the
estate will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their
recognized this principle of separation of church and state in the early stages of our
constitutional development; it was inserted in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and
Spain of December 10, 1898, reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions of the Philippine
Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the autonomy Act of August 29,
1916, and finally embodied in the constitution of the Philippines as the supreme expression of
the Filipino people. It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and
civil freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their

26

oath to support and defend the constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized
implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty,
not mere religious toleration.
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence
for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to
an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it
instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid
of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve
and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves
and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and
nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In
fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively
to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1,
subsec. 4, Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344, par. [c]. Adm. Code).
Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher or
dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or
leprosarium 9 sec. 13, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious
instruction in the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII,
Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy
Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays and made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm.
Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is conclusive to beneficial moral results.
The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious
worship are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133,
Revised Penal Code).
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in
question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. This Act is as
follows:
No. 4052. AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS
AND MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR
TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND
PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Legislature assembled and by the authority of the same:
SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made immediately
available out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the costs of
plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs, and other expenses incident thereto.
SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is hereby authorized to dispose of the whole or any portion of the amount

herein appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may be deemed advantageous to
the Government.
SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not revert to the
Treasury.
SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, February 21, 1933.
It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the costs of plates
and printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and
authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often
as may be deemed advantageous to the Government". The printing and issuance of the postage
stamps in question appears to have been approved by authority of the President of the
Philippines in a letter dated September 1, 1936, made part of the respondent's memorandum as
Exhibit A. The respondent alleges that the Government of the Philippines would suffer losses if
the writ prayed for is granted. He estimates the revenue to be derived from the sale of the
postage stamps in question at P1,618,17.10 and states that there still remain to be sold stamps
worth P1,402,279.02.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is
the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be
"advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government"
does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use
or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or
church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the
Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by
any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman
Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On
the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on
page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was
"to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned
merely, took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to
the Philippines and its people" (Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works and
Communications to the President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It
is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of
showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and
the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International
Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself
but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the
issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event
of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic
Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the
Government should not be embarassed in its activities simply because of incidental results,
more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be
undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its

27

subordinate to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S.,
295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)
We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain
inviolate the complete separation of church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by
indirection a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religious
intolerance and prescription, care should be taken that at this stage of our political development
nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may lead to the belief that the Government
is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution. But, upon very serious
reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have
come to the conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No.
4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be
deemed advantageous to the Government." Even if we were to assume that these officials made
use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the
petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the
unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in
setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.
The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.

[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.]

MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.
Maximo Calalang in his own behalf.
Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Amparo for respondents
Williams, Fragante and Bayan
City Fiscal Mabanag for the other respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 648;
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS TO PROMULGATE RULES
AND REGULATIONS. The provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not
confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy
demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said
Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets
designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the
President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic
"whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or
advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not
the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and
circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules
and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national
road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the
requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be
directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other
government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion
exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the
making
of
the
law.
2. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; PERSONAL LIBERTY; GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY.
Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations
complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the
National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was
inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public
safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order
to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v.
Gomer Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should
not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should
authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The
citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education
and, personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which
means peace and order and happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon
the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the
people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very
means
of
insuring
its
preservation.
3. ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception
may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the

28

people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of
all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est
suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should
be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic
life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest
number."
DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought
before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works;
Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as
Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940,
resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street
extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m.
and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at
Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the
date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the
measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads; that on August 2, 1940, the Director
of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue
to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad
crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public
Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be
closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above
indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic;
that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to
be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such
enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the
places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public
Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on
national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power. This contention is untenable. As was observed by this court in Rubi v.
Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil, 660, 700), "The rule has nowhere been better stated than
in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of cases,
namely: The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot
be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Commrs.
Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v.

Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or

official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or subordinate officials
thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S.
v. Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the
necessity
of
the
case."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
Section

of

Commonwealth

Act

No.

548

reads

as

follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets
designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the
President of the Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations,
with the approval of the President, may contain provisions controlling or regulating the
construction of buildings or other structures within a reasonable distance from along the national
roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the Director of
Public Works and his duly authorized representatives whenever the condition of the road or the
traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest,
or for a specified period, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works
and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon
them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to
determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by
the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions
on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by
executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all
classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary
or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is
not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and
circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules
and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national
road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the
requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be
directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other
government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion
exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the
making of the law. As was said in Lockes Appeal (72 Pa. 491): "To assert that a law is less than
a law, because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the
power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs
not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know." The proper distinction the
court said was this: "The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can make
a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes,
or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of
government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which
cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and
determination outside of the halls of legislation." (Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed.
294.)
In the case of People v. Rosenthal and Osmea, G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June
12, 1939, and in Pangasinan Transportation v. The Public Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065,
promulgated June 26, 1940, this Court had occasion to observe that the principle of separation
of powers has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise
to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the
United States and England but in practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the
growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations,
and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of

29

governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the delegation of greater
powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative and
executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain
rules
and
regulations
calculated
to
promote
public
interest.
The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference
with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of
locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of
the
paramount
police
power
of
the
state.
Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to
promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and
convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted
by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve
congestion of traffic. which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then,
lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure
the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To
this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority
because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over
liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required
balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that
there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so
much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in
the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preservation.
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was said in the case of Dobbins v.
Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), "the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one,
and a business lawful today may in the future, because of the changed situation, the growth of population or
other causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public good."
And in People v. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was observed that "advancing civilization is bringing within the police
power of the state today things which were not thought of as being within such power yesterday. The
development of civilization, the rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing
desire on the part of the masses and of the government to look after and care for the interests of the
individuals of the state, have brought within the police power many questions for regulation which formerly
were
not
so
considered."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. The
promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given
group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization
of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability
of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium
in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures
legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments
on
the
time-honored
principle
of
salus
populi
est
suprema
lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all
groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount
objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the
greatest
good
to
the
greatest
number."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So
ordered.

G.R. No. L-43800 July 29, 1977

LEONILA LAUREL ALMEDA and VENANCIO ALMEDA, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and EULOGIO GONZALES, respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
This is an agrarian case. Three questions of consequential effects are raised: first is there a
tenant's right of redemption in sugar and coconut lands; second, is prior tender or judicial
consignation of the redemption price a condition precedent for the valid exercise of the right of
redemption; and third, does the Court of Agrarian Relations have jurisdiction over complaints for
redemption of sugar and coconut lands.
Respondent Eulogio Gonzales is an agricultural share tenant of Glicerio, Sinfroso, Susana,
Maria, Sebastian, Rufina, Bienvenido, Besmark and Cesar, all surnamed Angeles, on their
46,529-square land situated in Tanauan, Batangas, and devoted to sugar cane and coconuts.
On September 30, 1968, the landowners sold the property to petitioners-spouses Leonila Laurel
Almeda and Venancio Almeda without notifying respondent-tenant in writing of the sale. The
document of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas on March 27,
1969. Respondent-tenant thus seeks the redemption of the land in a complaint filed on March
27, 1971, pursuant to the provisions of Sections 11 and 12 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms, with
the Court of Agrarian Relations at Lipa City.
Answering the complaint, petitioners-spouses state, among other things, that long before the
execution of the deed of sale, Glicerio Angeles and his nephew Cesar Angeles first offered the
sale of the land to respondent Gonzales, but the latter said that he had no money; that
respondent-tenant, instead, went personally to the house of petitioners-spouses and implored
them to buy the land for fear that if someone else would buy the land, he may not be taken in as
tenant; that respondent-tenant is a mere dummy of someone deeply interested in buying the
land, that respondent-tenant made to tender of payment or any valid consignation in court at the
time he filed the complaint for redemption.
At the hearing of May 29, 1973 the parties waived their right to present evidence and, instead,
agreed to file simultaneous memoranda upon which the decision of the court would be based.
On October 10, 1973, the Agrarian Court rendered judgment authorizing, the respondent-tenant,
Eulogio Gonzales, to redeem the tenanted land for P24,000.00, the said amount to be deposited
by him with the Clerk of Court within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision.
Petitioners-spouses excepted to the ruling of the Agrarian Court and appealed the case to the
Court of Appeals. On January 30, 1976, the Appellate Court, however, affirmed the decision of
the Agrarian Court. Denied of their motions for reconsideration, petitioners- spouses instituted
the present petition for review.
We find the appeal to be impressed with merits.

30

1. Prior to the enactment of the Agricultural Land Reform Code RA 3844), no right of preference
in the sale of the land under cultivation was enjoyed by the tenant-farmer. The absence of this
right freely opened the way to the landlords to ease out their tenants from the land by ostensible
conveyance of said land to another tenant who, in turn, sues for the ejectment of the first tenant
on ground of personal cultivation. While many of these sales were simulated, the tenant is
oftenly evicted from the land because of the formal transfer of ownership in the land. 1 On August
8, 1963, the Agricultural Land Reform Code was passed, impressed with the policy of the State,
among other things, "(t)o establish owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as
the basis of Philippine agriculture; to achieve a dignified existence of the small farmers free from
pernicious institutional restraints and practices; to make the small farmers more independent,
self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our democratic
society."2 More importantly, a new right was given to the tenants-farmers: the right of preemption and redemption. It bolsters their security of tenure and further encourages them to
become owner-cultivators.3 Thus, Section II provides: "In case the agricultural lessor decides to
sell the landholding, the agricultural lessee shall have the preferential right to buy the same
under reasonable terms and conditions. ... The right of pre-emption under this Section may be
exercised within one hundred eighty days from notice in writing, which shall be served by the
owner on all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform.. If the agricultural lessee
agrees with the terms and conditions of the sale, he must give notice in writing to the agricultural
lessor of his intention to exercise his right of pre-emption within the balance of one hundred
eighty days' period still available to him, but in any case not less than thirty days. He must either
tender payment of, or present a certificate of the land bank that t shall make payment pursuant
to section eighty of this Code on the price of the landholding to the agricultural lessor. If the
latter refuses to accept such tender or presentment, he may consign it with the court. " As
protection of this right, Section 12 was inserted: "In case the landholding is sold to a third person
without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the
same at a reasonable price and consideration. ... The right of redemption under this section may
be exercised within one hundred eighty days from notice in writing which shall be served by the
vendee on all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform upon the registration of
the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption. The redemption price
shall be the reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale. 4 In the precedential case
of Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 5 this right was held applicable to both leaseholdtenants
and share tenants.
Presently, We are faced with an intricate question: is this right of redemption available to tenants
in sugar and coconut lands? We answer yes. Among those exempted from the automatic
conversion to agricultural leasehold upon the effectivity of the Agricultural Land Reform Code in
1963 or even after its amendments (Code of Agrarian Reforms) are sugar lands. Section 4
thereof states: Agricultural share tenancy throughout the country, as herein defined, is hereby
declared contrary to public policy and shall be automatically converted to agricultural leasehold
upon the effectivity of this section. ... Provided, That in order not to jeopardize international
commitments, lands devoted to crops covered by marketing allotments shall be made the
subject of a separate proclamation by the President upon recommendation of' the department
head that adequate provisions, such as the organization of cooperatives marketing agreement,
or similar other workable arrangements, have been made to insure efficient management on all
matters requiring synchronization of the agricultural with the processing phases of such crops ..."
Sugar is, of course, one crop covered by marketing allotments. In other words this section
recognizes sharetenancy in sugar lands until after a special proclamation is made, which
proclamation shall have the same effect of an executive proclamation of the operation of the
Department of Agrarian Reform in any region or locality; the share tenants in the lands affected

will become agricultural lessees at the beginning of the agricultural year next succeeding the
year in which the proclamation is made. 6 But, there is nothing readable or even discernible in
the lawdenying to tenants in sugar lands the right of pre-emption and redemption under the
Code. The exemption is purely limited to the tenancy system; it does not exclude the other rights
conferred by the Code, such as the right of pre-emption and redemption. In the same manner,
coconut lands are exempted from the Code only with respect to the consideration and tenancy
system prevailing, implying that in other matters the right of pre-emption and redemption
which does not refer to the consideration of the tenancy the provisions of the Code apply.
Thus, Section 35 states: "Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Sections, in the case
of fishponds, saltbeds and lands principally planted to citrus, coconuts, cacao, coffee, durian,
and other similar permanent trees at the time of the approval of this Code, the consideration as
well as the tenancy system prevailing, shall be governed by the provisions of Republic Act
Numbered Eleven Hundred and Ninety-Nine, as amended."
It is to be noted that under the new Constitution, property ownership is impressed with social
function. Property use must not only be for the benefit of the owner but of society as well. The
State, in the promotion of social justice, may "regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
enjoyment and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property ... ownership and
profits." 7 One governmental policy of recent date project emancipation of tenants from the
bondage of the soil and the transfer to them of the ownership of the land they till. This is
Presidential Decree No. 27 of October 21, 1972, ordaining that all tenant farmers "of private
agricultural lands devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease tenancy
whether classified as landed estates or not shall be deemed "owner of a portion constituting a
family-size farm of five (5) hectares if not irrigated and three (3) hectares if irrigated." 8
2. Nevertheless, while the Code secures to the tenant-farmer this right of redemption, in
particular, the exercise thereof must be in accordance with law in order to be valid. "The timely
exercise of the right of legal redemption," said the Court in Basbas v. Entena.9 "requires either
tender of the price or valid consignation thereof." The statutory periods within which the right
must be exercised "would be rendered meaningless and of easy evasion unless the
redemptioner is required to make an actual tender in good faith of what he believed to be
reasonable price of the land sought to be redeemed." "The existence of the right of redemption
operates to depress the market value of the land until the period expires, and to render that
period indefinite by permitting the tenant to file a suit for redemption, with either party unable to
foresee when final judgment will terminate the action, would render nugatory the period of two
years (180 days under the new law) fixed by the statute for making the redemption and virtually
paralyze any efforts of the landowner to realize the value of his land. No buyer can be expected
to acquire it without any certainty as to the amount for which least his investment in case of
redemption. In the meantime, the landowner's needs and obligations cannot be met. It is
doubtful if any such result was intended by the statute, absent clear wording to that
effect."10 Bona fide redemption necessarily imports a seasonable and valid tender of the entire
repurchase price. The right of a redemptioner to pay a "reasonable price" does not excuse him
from the duty to make proper tender of the price that can be honestly deemed reasonable under
the circumstances, without prejudice to final arbitration by the courts. "It is not difficult to discern
why the redemption price should either be fully offered in legal tender or else validly consigned
in court. Only by such means can the buyer become certain that the offer to redeem is one made
seriously and in good faith. A buyer cannot be expected to entertain an offer of redemption
without attendant evidence that the redemptioner can, and is willing to accomplish the
repurchase immediately. A different rule would leave the buyer open to harassment by
speculators or crackpots as well as to unnecessary prolongation of the redemption period,

31

contrary to the policy of the law. While consignation of the tendered price is not always
necessary because legal redemption is not made to discharge a pre-existing debt (Asturias
Sugar Central v. Cane Molasses Co., 60 Phil. 253), a valid tender is indispensable, for the
reasons already stated. Of course, consignation of the price would remove all controversy as to
the redemptioner's ability to pay at the proper time." 11
In the case before Us, neither prior tender nor judicial consignation of the redemption price
accompanied the filing of the redemption suit. In fact, the Agrarian court had yet to order, when it
rendered its decision on October 10, 1973 (complaint was filed on March 27, 1971), respondenttenant to deposit the amount of M,000.00 as redemption price with the Clerk of Court within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision. The absence of such tender or consignation leaves
Us, therefore, with no alternative but to declare that respondent-tenant had failed to exercise his
right of redemption in accordance with law.
3. Reliance cannot be placed upon the case of Hidalgo v. Hidalgo 12 as excuse for the failure to
make the requisite tender or consignation in court, because the Court did not rule therein that
prior tender or judicial consignation of the redemption price is not required for the valid exercise
of the right of redemption. In that case, the spouse Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Resales were
the share tenants of Policarpio Hidalgo on his 22, 876-square meter agricultural land in Lumil,
San Jose, Batangas, while the spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo were his tenants on a
square meter land. Policarpio Hidalgo sold these lands without notifying his tenants: and so, the
tenants filed petitions before the Court of Agrarian Relations seeking the redemption of the lands
under Section 12 of the Code. The Agrarian Court dismiss the petitioners for the reason that the
right of redemption is available to leasehold tenants only but not to share tenants. On review, the
Court ruled that while the Agrarian Court "correctly focused on the sole issue of law" whether
the right of redemption granted 12 of Republic Act No. 3844 is applicable to share tenants it
(Agrarian Court) "arrived at its erroneous conclusion that the right of redemption granted by
Section 12 of the Land Reform Code is available to leasehold tenants only but not to share
tenants." The Court said that '(t)he Code intended ... to afford the farmers
who transitionally continued to be share tenants after its enactment but who inexorably would be
agricultural lessees by virtue of the Code's proclaimed abolition of tenancy, the same priority and
preferential right as those other share tenants, who upon the enactment of the Code or soon
thereafter were earlier converted by fortuitous circumstance into agricultural lessees, to acquire
the lands under their cultivation in the event of their voluntary sale by the owner or of their
acquisition, by expropriation or otherwise, by the Land Authority." But, the Court did not rule that
tender of payment or consignation of the redemption price in court is not a requisite in the valid
exercise of the right of redemption. In fact, it said that "(i)n the absence of any provision in the
Code as to the manner of and amounts payable on redemption, the pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code apply in a suppletory character" which, of course, imposes tender of payment or
judicial consignation of the repurchase price as condition for valid redemption. Besides, it is
noteworthy that in that case petitioners-tenants' possession of funds and compliance the
requirements of redemption were not questioned, the case having been submitted and decided
on the sole legal issue of the right of redemption being available to them as share tenants.
4. As a consequence, the Court of Agrarian Relations has jurisdiction over suits for redemption,
like the present case, of sugar and coconut lands. Section 154 of the Agricultural Land Reform
Code, as amended, states: "The Court of Agrarian Relations shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over (1) all cases or actions involvingmatters, controversies, disputes, or
money claims arising from agrarian relations ..." Since this case involves a matter, controversy
or dispute "arising from agrarian relations" whether respondent-tenant on sugar and coconut

lands has the right of redemption it is definite that the Agrarian Court has jurisdiction to hear
and decide the same. 13 The Court of Agrarian Relations came into being for the enforcement of
all laws and regulations governing the relations between capital and labor on all agricultural
lands under any system of cultivation with original and exclusive jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide and settle all questions, matters, controversies, or
disputes involving or arising from such relationship. 14
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and set
aside. Respondent Eulogio Gonzales is hereby held not to have validly exercised his right of
redemption over his tenanted agricultural land. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-47178 May 16, 1980

ESTRELLA B. ONDOY, petitioner,
vs.
VIRGILIO IGNACIO, Proprietor M/B LADY ESTRELLITA and/or IMPERIAL FISHING
ENTERPRISES and/or THE SECRETARY OF LABOR and/or THE COMPENSATION
APPEALS AND REVIEW STAFF, Department of Labor, respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:t.hqw
The undisputed facts argue strongly for the granting of the claim for compensation filed by
petitioner, the mother of one Jose Ondoy, who was drowned while in the employ of private
respondent, Virgilio Ignacio. Whatever be the cause for the failure to do so, it is admitted that
there was no controversion. Such omission, fatal in character, was sought to be minimized by
the filing of a motion to dismissed based on the alleged absence of an employment relationship.
What cannot be ignored, however, is that subsequently, in the hearing of such claim private
respondent submitted affidavits executed by the chief engineer and oiler of the fishing vessel
that the deceased a fisherman, was in that ship, undeniably a member of the working force, but
after being invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the vessel, and thereafter was found dead.
The referee summarily ignored the affidavit of the chief-mate of respondent employer to the
effect "that sometime in October, 1968, while Jose Ondoy, my co-worker, was in the actual
performance of his work with said fishing enterprises, he was drowned and died on October 22,

32

1968. That the deceased died in line of Duty." 1 The hearing officer or referee dismissed the
claim for lack of merit. 2 A motion for reconsideration was duly filed, but in an order dated August
29, 1977, the then Secretary of Labor, now Minister Blas F. Ople, denied such motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit. 3 Hence this petition for review.
1. In La Mallorca v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 4 this Court explicitly held that the
failure to controvert "is fatal to any defense that petitioner could interpose. So we have held in a
host of decisions in compliance with the clear and express language of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. Any Assertion to the contrary is doomed to futility. 5 The opinion noted thirty
decisions
starting
from Bachrach
Motor
Co.
v.
Workmen's
Compensation
Commission 6 to Northwest
Orient
Airlines,
Inc.
v.
Workmen's
Compensation
Commission. 7 Thereafter, in Regal Auto Works, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, 8 such a doctrine was reaffirmed. It was further noted that nine more decisions had
been rendered by this Court starting from Republic v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission 9 to Abong v. Workmen's Compensation Commission. 10 By the time respondent
secretary of Labor denied the motion for reconsideration, a host of decisions that speaks to the
same effect had been promulgated. 11 It clearly, appears, therefore, that the failure of the referee
to grant the award ought to have been remedied and the motion for reconsideration granted.
2. The deceased in this case met his death because of drowning. In Camotes Shipping
Corporation v. Otadoy, 12there was not even any direct testimony that the deceased was
drowned while in the performance of his duty. All that could be alleged was that he "was lost at
sea while in the employ of petitioner. 13 Nonetheless, the award for compensation was sustained.
Likewise, the ruling in Caltex (Phil.) Inc. v. Villanueva 14 was cited with approval. Thus: "The fact
that the employee was found missing while on board the petitioner's vessel MV 'Caltex
Mindanao' became known to the captain of the vessel on 10 October 1956 but it was only on 6
November 1956 when the petitioner transmitted to the respondent Compensation WCC For in
No. 3 stating that the employee was 'Lost at sea and presumed dead as of October 10, 1956,'
and that it was controverting the respondent's claim. 15 In the present case, there is evidence of
the fact of death due to drowning. That was not controverted. Under the circumstances, the
failure to grant the claim finds no justification in law.
3. It bears repeating that there is evidence, direct and categorical, to the effect that the deceased
was drowned while "in the actual performance of his work" with the shipping enterprise of private
respondent. Even without such evidence, the petitioner could have relied on the presumption of
compensability under the Act once it is shown that the death or disability arose in the course of
employment, with the burden of overthrowing it being cast on the person or entity resisting the
claim. Time and time again this Court has stressed such statutory provision. It suffices to
mention cases decided from January to April of this year. 16 An appraisal of the counter-affidavits
submitted by two employees of private respondent and thereafter beholden to him to the effect
that the deceased left the vessel for a drinking spree certainly cannot meet the standard
required to negate the force of the presumption of compensability.
4. Nor is an affirmance of the finding of the referee adverse to the claim warranted because of
the doctrine that the findings of facts of an administrative agency must be accorded due weight
and consideration. An excerpt from the recent case of Uy v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission 17 finds pertinence: "The claim merits scant consideration for this Court is
authorized to inquire into the facts when the conclusions are not supported by substantial or
credible evidence. 18

5. This Court, in recognizing the right of petitioner to the award, merely adheres to the
interpretation uninterruptedly followed by this Court resolving all doubts in favor of the claimant.
So it has been since the first leading case of Francisco v. Conching 19 decided a year after the
1935 Constitution took effect. What was said inVictorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission 20 is not amiss: "There is need, it seems, even at this late date, for
[private respondent] and other employers to be reminded of the high estate accorded the
Workmen's Compensation Act in the constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to
labor. 21 Further: "No other judicial attitude may be expected in the face of a clearly expressed
legislative determination which antedated the constitutionally avowed concern for social justice
and protection to labor. It is easily understandable why the judiciary frowns on resort to
doctrines, which even if deceptively plausible, would result in frustrating such a national
policy. 22 Lastly, to quote from the opinion therein rendered: "To be more specific, the principle of
social justice is in this sphere strengthened and vitalized. A realistic view is that expressed
in Agustin v. Workmen's Compensation Commission: 'As between a laborer, usually poor and
unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason
to demand from the latter stricter compliance. Social justice in these cases is not equality but
protection.' 23
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted and petitioner Estrelita B. Ondoy is awarded the
sum of, P6,000.00 as compensation for the death of her son, Jose Ondoy; P300.00 for burial
expenses; and P600.00 as attorney's fees. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against
private respondent Virgilio Ignacio.

262 U.S. 390 (1923)

MEYER
v.
STATE OF NEBRASKA.
No. 325.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued February 23, 1923.
Decided June 4, 1923.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEBRASKA.
391*391 Mr. Charles E. Sandall, with whom Mr. I.L. Albert, Mr. Arthur G. Wray and Mr. August
Wagner were on the briefs, for plaintiff in error.

33

Mr. Mason Wheeler and Mr. O.S. Spillman, with whom Mr. Clarence A. Davis,Attorney General
of the State of Nebraska, and Mr. Hugh La Master were on the brief, for defendant in error.
Mr. William D. Guthrie and Mr. Bernard Hershkopf, by leave of court, filed a brief asamici curice.
396*396 MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiff in error was tried and convicted in the District Court for Hamilton County,Nebraska,
under an information which charged that on May 25, 1920, while an instructor in Zion Parochial
School, he unlawfully taught the subject of reading in the German language to Raymond
Parpart, a child of ten years, who had not attained397*397 and successfully passed the eighth
grade. The information is based upon "An act relating to the teaching of foreign languages in the
State of Nebraska," approved April 9, 1919, which follows [Laws 1919, c. 249.]:
"Section 1. No person, individually or as a teacher, shall, in any private, denominational,
parochial or public school, teach any subject to any person in any language other than the
English language.
"Sec. 2. Languages, other than the English language, may be taught as languages only after a
pupil shall have attained and successfully passed the eighth grade as evidenced by a certificate
of graduation issued by the county superintendent of the county in which the child resides.
"Sec. 3. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this act shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor and upon conviction, shall be subject to a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars
($25), nor more than one hundred dollars ($100) or be confined in the county jail for any period
not exceeding thirty days for each offense.
"Sec. 4. Whereas, an emergency exists, this act shall be in force from and after its passage and
approval."
The Supreme Court of the State affirmed the judgment of conviction. 107 Neb. 657. It declared
the offense charged and established was "the direct and intentional teaching of the German
language as a distinct subject to a child who had not passed the eighth grade," in the parochial
school maintained by Zion Evangelical Lutheran Congregation, a collection of Biblical stories
being used therefor. And it held that the statute forbidding this did not conflict with the Fourteenth
Amendment, but was a valid exercise of the police power. The following excerpts from the
opinion sufficiently indicate the reasons advanced to support the conclusion.
"The salutary purpose of the statute is clear. The legislature had seen the baneful effects of
permitting foreigners, 398*398 who had taken residence in this country, to rear and educate their
children in the language of their native land. The result of that condition was found to be inimical
to our own safety. To allow the children of foreigners, who had emigrated here, to be taught from
early childhood the language of the country of their parents was to rear them with that language
as their mother tongue. It was to educate them so that they must always think in that language,
and, as a consequence, naturally inculcate in them the ideas and sentiments foreign to the best
interests of this country. The statute, therefore, was intended not only to require that the
education of all children be conducted in the English language, but that, until they had grown
into that language and until it had become a part of them, they should not in the schools be
taught any other language. The obvious purpose of this statute was that the English language
should be and become the mother tongue of all children reared in this state. The enactment of
such a statute comes reasonably within the police power of the state. Pohl v. State, 132 N.E.
(Ohio) 20; State v.Bartels, 181 N.W. (Ia.) 508.

"It is suggested that the law is an unwarranted restriction, in that it applies to all citizens of the
state and arbitrarily interferes with the rights of citizens who are not of foreign ancestry, and
prevents them, without reason, from having their children taught foreign languages in school.
That argument is not well taken, for it assumes that every citizen finds himself restrained by the
statute. The hours which a child is able to devote to study in the confinement of school are
limited. It must have ample time for exercise or play. Its daily capacity for learning is
comparatively small. A selection of subjects for its education, therefore, from among the many
that might be taught, is obviously necessary. The legislature no doubt had in mind the practical
operation of the law. The law affects few citizens, except those of foreign lineage.399*399 Other
citizens, in their selection of studies, except perhaps in rare instances, have never deemed it of
importance to teach their children foreign languages before such children have reached the
eighth grade. In the legislative mind, the salutary effect of the statute no doubt outweighed the
restriction upon the citizens generally, which, it appears, was a restriction of no real
consequence."
The problem for our determination is whether the statute as construed and applied unreasonably
infringes the liberty guaranteed to the plaintiff in error by the Fourteenth Amendment. "No State
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term
has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated.
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Slaughter-House
Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746; Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313; Allgeyer v.Louisiana, 165 U.S.
578; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45; Twining v. New Jersey,211 U.S. 78; Chicago, Burlington
&
Quincy
R.R.
Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549;Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33; Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590; New
York Life Ins. Co.v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312; Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525; Wyeth v. Cambridge Board of Health, 200 Mass. 474. The established
doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered 400*400 with, under the guise of protecting the
public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the State to effect. Determination by the legislature of what
constitutes proper exercise of police power is not final or conclusive but is subject to supervision
by the courts. Lawton v.Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137.
The American people have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters
of supreme importance which should be diligently promoted. The Ordinance of 1787 declares,
"Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of
mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." Corresponding to
the right of control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to
their station in life; and nearly all the States, including Nebraska, enforce this obligation by
compulsory laws.
Practically, education of the young is only possible in schools conducted by especially qualified
persons who devote themselves thereto. The calling always has been regarded as useful and
honorable, essential, indeed, to the public welfare. Mere knowledge of the German language
cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful. Heretofore it has been commonly looked upon as
helpful and desirable. Plaintiff in error taught this language in school as part of his occupation.
His right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children, we
think, are within the liberty of the Amendment.

34

The challenged statute forbids the teaching in school of any subject except in English; also the
teaching of any other language until the pupil has attained and successfully passed the eighth
grade, which is not usually accomplished before the age of twelve. The Supreme Court of the
State has held that "the so-called ancient or dead languages" are not "within the spirit or the
purpose of 401*401 the act." NebraskaDistrict of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie, 187
N.W. 927. Latin, Greek, Hebrew are not proscribed; but German, French, Spanish, Italian and
every other alien speech are within the ban. Evidently the legislature has attempted materially to
interfere with the calling of modern language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire
knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the education of their own.
It is said the purpose of the legislation was to promote civic development by inhibiting training
and education of the immature in foreign tongues and ideals before they could learn English and
acquire American ideals; and "that the English language should be and become the mother
tongue of all children reared in this State." It is also affirmed that the foreign born population is
very large, that certain communities commonly use foreign words, follow foreign leaders, move
in a foreign atmosphere, and that the children are thereby hindered from becoming citizens of
the most useful type and the public safety is imperiled.

inhibition with the consequent infringement of rights long freely enjoyed. We are constrained to
conclude that the statute as applied is arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within
the competency of the State.
As the statute undertakes to interfere only with teaching which involves a modern language,
leaving complete freedom as to other matters, there seems no adequate foundation for the
suggestion that the purpose was to protect the child's health by limiting his mental activities. It is
well known that proficiency in a foreign language seldom comes to one not instructed at an early
age, and experience shows that this is not injurious to the health, morals or understanding of the
ordinary child.
The judgment of the court below must be reversed and the cause remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.

That the State may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens,
physically, mentally and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights which
must be respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other
languages as well as to those born with English on the tongue. Perhaps it would be highly
advantageous if all had ready understanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced
by methods which conflict with the Constitution a desirable end cannot be promoted by
prohibited means.
For the welfare of his Ideal Commonwealth, Plato suggested a law which should provide: "That
the wives of our guardians are to be common, and their children are to be common, and no
parent is to know his own child, 402*402 nor any child his parent. . . . The proper officers will
take the offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold, and there they will deposit them with
certain nurses who dwell in a separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better
when they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious, unknown place, as they
should be." In order to submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled the
males at seven into barracks and intrusted their subsequent education and training to official
guardians. Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of great genius,
their ideas touching the relation between individual and State were wholly different from those
upon which our institutions rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any legislature could impose
such restrictions upon the people of a State without doing violence to both letter and spirit of the
Constitution.
The desire of the legislature to foster a homogeneous people with American ideals prepared
readily to understand current discussions of civic matters is easy to appreciate. Unfortunate
experiences during the late war and aversion toward every characteristic of truculent adversaries
were certainly enough to quicken that aspiration. But the means adopted, we think, exceed the
limitations upon the power of the State and conflict with rights assured to plaintiff in error. The
interference is plain enough and no adequate reason therefor in time of peace and domestic
tranquility has been shown.

268 U.S. 510 (1925)

PIERCE, GOVERNOR OF OREGON, ET AL.
v.
SOCIETY OF SISTERS.
PIERCE, GOVERNOR OF OREGON, ET AL.
v.
HILL MILITARY ACADEMY.

The power of the State to compel attendance at some school and to make reasonable
regulations for all schools, including a requirement that they shall give instructions in English, is
not questioned. Nor has challenge been made of the State's power to prescribe a curriculum for
institutions which it supports. Those matters are not within the present controversy. Our concern
is with the prohibition approved by the Supreme Court. Adams v. 403*403 Tanner, supra, p. 594,
pointed out that mere abuse incident to an occupation ordinarily useful is not enough to justify its
abolition, although regulation may be entirely proper. No emergency has arisen which renders
knowledge by a child of some language other than English so clearly harmful as to justify its

Nos. 583, 584.

Supreme Court of United States.
Argued March 16, 17, 1925.
Decided June 1, 1925.
APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF
OREGON.

35

511*511 Mr. Willis S. Moore, Assistant Attorney General of Oregon, with whom Mr. I.H. Van
Winkle, Attorney General, was on the brief, for appellant Van Winkle.
Mr. William D. Guthrie, with whom Mr. Bernard Hershkopf was on the brief, for appellee in No.
583.
Mr. J.P. Kavanaugh, with whom Messrs. Jay Bowerman, Dan J. Malarkey, Hall S. Lusk, E.B.
Seabrook and F.J. Lonergan were on the brief, for appellee in No. 583.
Messrs. George E. Chamberlain and Albert H. Putney, with whom Mr. P.Q. Nycewas on the
brief, for the Governor of Oregon.
Mr. John C. Veatch, for appellee in No. 584.
529*529 MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
These appeals are from decrees, based upon undenied allegations, which granted preliminary
orders restraining 530*530 appellants from threatening or attempting to enforce the Compulsory
Education Act[*] adopted November 7, 1922, under the initiative provision of her Constitution by
the voters of Oregon. Jud. Code, 266. They present the same points of law; there are no
controverted questions of fact. Rights said to be guaranteed by the federal Constitution were
specially set up, and appropriate prayers asked for their protection.
The challenged Act, effective September 1, 1926, requires every parent, guardian or other
person having control or charge or custody of a child between eight and sixteen years to send
him "to a public school for the period of time a public school shall be held during the current
year" in the district where the child resides; and failure so to do is declared a misdemeanor.
There are 531*531 exemptions not specially important here for children who are not
normal, or who have completed the eighth grade, or who reside at considerable distances from
any public school, or whose parents or guardians hold special permits from the County
Superintendent. The manifest purpose is to compel general attendance at public schools by
normal children, between eight and sixteen, who have not completed the eighth grade. And
without doubt enforcement of the statute would seriously impair, perhaps destroy, the profitable
features of appellees' business and greatly diminish the value of their property.
Appellee, the Society of Sisters, is an Oregon corporation, organized in 1880, with power to
care for orphans, educate and instruct the youth, establish and maintain academies or schools,
and acquire necessary real and personal 532*532 property. It has long devoted its property and
effort to the secular and religious education and care of children, and has acquired the valuable
good will of many parents and guardians. It conducts interdependent primary and high schools
and junior colleges, and maintains orphanages for the custody and control of children between
eight and sixteen. In its primary schools many children between those ages are taught the
subjects usually pursued in Oregon public schools during the first eight years. Systematic
religious instruction and moral training according to the tenets of the Roman Catholic Church are
also regularly provided. All courses of study, both temporal and religious, contemplate continuity
of training under appellee's charge; the primary schools are essential to the system and the
most profitable. It owns valuable buildings, especially constructed and equipped for school
purposes. The business is remunerative the annual income from primary schools exceeds
thirty thousand dollars and the successful conduct of this requires long time contracts with
teachers and parents. The Compulsory Education Act of 1922 has already caused the
withdrawal from its schools of children who would otherwise continue, and their income has
steadily declined. The appellants, public officers, have proclaimed their purpose strictly to
enforce the statute.

After setting out the above facts the Society's bill alleges that the enactment conflicts with the
right of parents to choose schools where their children will receive appropriate mental and
religious training, the right of the child to influence the parents' choice of a school, the right of
schools and teachers therein to engage in a useful business or profession, and is accordingly
repugnant to the Constitution and void. And, further, that unless enforcement of the measure is
enjoined the corporation's business and property will suffer irreparable injury.
Appellee, Hill Military Academy, is a private corporation organized in 1908 under the laws of
Oregon, engaged 533*533 in owning, operating and conducting for profit an elementary, college
preparatory and military training school for boys between the ages of five and twenty-one years.
The average attendance is one hundred, and the annual fees received for each student amount
to some eight hundred dollars. The elementary department is divided into eight grades, as in the
public schools; the college preparatory department has four grades, similar to those of the public
high schools; the courses of study conform to the requirements of the State Board of Education.
Military instruction and training are also given, under the supervision of an Army officer. It owns
considerable real and personal property, some useful only for school purposes. The business
and incident good will are very valuable. In order to conduct its affairs long time contracts must
be made for supplies, equipment, teachers and pupils. Appellants, law officers of the State and
County, have publicly announced that the Act of November 7, 1922, is valid and have declared
their intention to enforce it. By reason of the statute and threat of enforcement appellee's
business is being destroyed and its property depreciated; parents and guardians are refusing to
make contracts for the future instruction of their sons, and some are being withdrawn.
The Academy's bill states the foregoing facts and then alleges that the challenged Act
contravenes the corporation's rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and that unless
appellants are restrained from proclaiming its validity and threatening to enforce it irreparable
injury will result. The prayer is for an appropriate injunction.
No answer was interposed in either cause, and after proper notices they were heard by three
judges (Jud. Code 266) on motions for preliminary injunctions upon the specifically alleged
facts. The court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed appellees against
the 534*534 deprivation of their property without due process of law consequent upon the
unlawful interference by appellants with the free choice of patrons, present and prospective. It
declared the right to conduct schools was property and that parents and guardians, as a part of
their liberty, might direct the education of children by selecting reputable teachers and places.
Also, that these schools were not unfit or harmful to the public, and that enforcement of the
challenged statute would unlawfully deprive them of patronage and thereby destroy their owners'
business and property. Finally, that the threats to enforce the Act would continue to cause
irreparable injury; and the suits were not premature.
No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to
inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of
proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic
disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that
nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.
The inevitable practical result of enforcing the Act under consideration would be destruction of
appellees' primary schools, and perhaps all other private primary schools for normal children
within the State of Oregon. These parties are engaged in a kind of undertaking not inherently
harmful, but long regarded as useful and meritorious. Certainly there is nothing in the present
records to indicate that they have failed to discharge their obligations to patrons, students or the
State. And there are no peculiar circumstances or present emergencies which demand
extraordinary measures relative to primary education.

36

Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, we think it entirely plain that the Act of
1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
and education of children 535*535 under their control. As often heretofore pointed out, rights
guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable
relation to some purpose within the competency of the State. The fundamental theory of liberty
upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child
is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.
Appellees are corporations and therefore, it is said, they cannot claim for themselves the liberty
which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. Accepted in the proper sense, this is
true. Northwestern
Life
Ins.
Co. v. Riggs, 203
U.S.
243,
255; Western
Turf
Association v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363. But they have business and property for which
they claim protection. These are threatened with destruction through the unwarranted
compulsion which appellants are exercising over present and prospective patrons of their
schools. And this court has gone very far to protect against loss threatened by such
action. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33; Truax v.Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312; Terrace v. Thompson, 263
U.S. 197.
The courts of the State have not construed the Act, and we must determine its meaning for
ourselves. Evidently it was expected to have general application and cannot be construed as
though merely intended to amend the charters of certain private corporations, as in Berea
College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45. No argument in favor of such view has been advanced.
Generally it is entirely true, as urged by counsel, that no person in any business has such an
interest in possible customers as to enable him to restrain exercise of proper power of the State
upon the ground that he will be deprived 536*536 of patronage. But the injunctions here sought
are not against the exercise of any proper power. Plaintiffs asked protection against arbitrary,
unreasonable and unlawful interference with their patrons and the consequent destruction of
their business and property. Their interest is clear and immediate, within the rule approved
in Truax v. Raich, Truax v. Corrigan and Terrace v. Thompson, supra, and many other cases
where injunctions have issued to protect business enterprises against interference with the
freedom of patrons or customers. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229; Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443; American Steel Foundriesv. Tri-City Central Trades
Council, 257 U.S. 184; Nebraska District v. McKelvie, 262 U.S. 404; Truax v. Corrigan,
supra, and cases there cited.
The suits were not premature. The injury to appellees was present and very real, not a mere
possibility in the remote future. If no relief had been possible prior to the effective date of the Act,
the injury would have become irreparable. Prevention of impending injury by unlawful action is a
well recognized function of courts of equity.
The decrees below are
Affirmed.

of sixteen years and of the age of eight years or over at the commencement of a term of public
school of the district in which said child resides, who shall fail or neglect or refuse to send such
child to a public school for the period of time a public school shall be held during the current year
in said district, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and each day's failure to send such child to a
public school shall constitute a separate offense; provided, that in the following cases, children
shall not be required to attend public schools:
(a) Children Physically Unable Any child who is abnormal, subnormal or physically unable to
attend school.
(b) Children Who Have Completed the Eighth Grade Any child who has completed the eighth
grade, in accordance with the provisions of the state course of study.
(c) Distance from school Children between the ages of eight and ten years, inclusive, whose
place of residence is more than one and one-half miles, and children over ten years of age
whose place of residence is more than three miles, by the nearest traveled road, from a public
school; provided, however, that if transportation to and from school is furnished by the school
district, this exemption shall not apply.
(d) Private Instruction Any child who is being taught for a like period of time by the parent or
private teacher such subjects as are usually taught in the first eight years in the public school;
but before such child can be taught by a parent or a private teacher, such parent or private
teacher must receive written permission from the county superintendent, and such permission
shall not extend longer than the end of the current school year. Such child must report to the
county school superintendent or some person designated by him at least once every three
months and take an examination in the work covered. If, after such examination, the county
superintendent shall determine that such child is not being properly taught, then the county
superintendent shall order the parent, guardian or other person, to send such child to the public
school the remainder of the school year.
If any parent, guardian or other person having control or charge or custody of any child between
the ages of eight and sixteen years, shall fail to comply with any provision of this section, he
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, on conviction thereof, be subject to a fine of not less
than $5, nor more than $100, or to imprisonment in the county jail not less than two nor more
than thirty days, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.
This Act shall take effect and be and remain in force from and after the first day of September,
1926.
G.R. No. L-47841 March 21, 1978
FRANCISCO VIRTOUSO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF MARIVELES, BATAAN, and CHIEF OF POLICE OF MARIVELES,
BATAAN,respondents.

[*] Be it Enacted by the People of the State of Oregon:

Section 1. That Section 5259, Oregon Laws, be and the same is hereby amended so as to read
as follows:

RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:

Sec. 5259. Children Between the Ages of Eight and Sixteen Years Any parent, guardian or
other person in the State of Oregon, having control or charge or custody of a child under the age

37

Petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., who filed an application for the writ of habeas corpus on
February 23, 1978, premised his plea for liberty primarily on the ground that the pre examination
which led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him was a useless formality as
respondent Municipal Judge of Mariveles, Bataan, 1 failed to meet the strict standard required by
the Constitution to ascertain whether there was a probable cause. 2 He likewise alleged that
aside from the constitutional infirmity that tainted the procedure followed in the preliminary
examination, the bail imposed was clearly excessive. 3 It was in the amount of Pl6,000.00, the
alleged robbery of a TV set being imputed to petitioner. As prayed for, the Court issued a writ of
habeas corpus, returnable to it on Wednesday, March 15, 1978. Respondent Judge, in his return
filed on March 8, 1978, justified the issuance of the warrant of arrest, alleging that there was no
impropriety in the way the preliminary examination was conducted. As to the excessive character
of the bail, he asserted that while it was fixed in accordance with the Revised Bail Bond Guide
issued by the Executive Judge of Bataan in 1977, he nevertheless reduced the amount to P
8,000.00.

permissible function of money bail is to assure the accused's presence at

trial, and declared that "bail set at a higher figure than an amount
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is 'excessive' under the Eighth
Amendment. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in accordance with the terms of the Resolution of this
Court of March 15, 1978 as set forth above.

Petitioner's counsel and respondent Municipal Judge orally argued the matter on March 15,
1978. In the course of intensive questioning by the members of this Court, especially Justices
Barredo, Aquino and Santos, it was ascertained that petitioner is a seventeen-year old minor
entitled to the protection and benefits of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. 4 a youthful offender
being defined therein as "one who is over nine years but under eighteen years of age at the time
of the commission of the offense." 5 As such, he could be provisionally released on recognizance
in the discretion of a court. 6 According accordingly, after the hearing, the Court issued the
following resolution: "Acting on the verbal petition of counsel for petitioner Francisco Virtouso,
Jr., the Court Resolved pursuant to section 191 of Presidential Decree No. 603, petitioner being
a 17-year old minor, to [order] the release of the petitioner on the recognizance of his parents
Francisco Virtouso, Sr. and Manuela Virtouso and his counsel, Atty. Guillermo B. Bandonil, who,
in open court, agreed to act in such capacity, without prejudice to further proceedings in a
pending case against petitioner being taken in accordance with law." 7 This Court should,
whenever appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code, which is an
implementation of this specific constitutional mandate: "The State recognizes the vital role of the
youth in nation-building and shall promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being." 8
Thus was the petition resolved, without the need of passing upon the issue of whether or not the
procedure by respondent Judge in ascertaining the existence of probable cause was
constitutionally deficient. Nonetheless, it must ever be kept in mind by occupants of the bench
that they should always be on the alert lest by sloth or indifference or due to the economic or
social standing of the alleged offended party, as was intimated in this petition, the rights of an
accused, instead of being honored, are disregarded. There is much more importance attached to
the immunities of an individual during a period of martial law, which in itself is a creature of the
Constitution as a mode of coping with grave emergency situations. It is equally pertinent to state
that there should be fealty to the constitutional ban against excessive bail being required. There
is relevance to this excerpt fromDe la Camara v. Enage: 9
Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory
by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. It is
understandable why. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail
becomes meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no mention of
such a guarantee were found in the fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight
of that that United States Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against
excessive bail. As construed in the latest American decision, 'the sole

G.R. No. 204819

April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their
minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and
MAGNIFICAT
CHILD
DEVELOPMENT
CENTER,
INC., Petitioners,

38

vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204934
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its
President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro,
Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez,
Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S.
Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol
Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese
Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco,
Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta &
Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z.
Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C.
Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z.
Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela
Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine
V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana
Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R.
Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel
Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and
Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R.
Laws,Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare
and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and
NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its
Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE
CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF
PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez,
and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
President Donato Marcos, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204957
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S.
AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D.,
as President and in his personal capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by
Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and in his personal capacity,
ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY
G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP,Petitioners,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205003
EXPEDITO
A.
BUGARIN,
JR., Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE
PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON.
SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205043
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS
SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205138
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National
President, Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B.
Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly
Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr.,
Landrito
M.
Diokno
and
Baldomero
Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development,
HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and Development
Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration,
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on Women, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205478
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D.,
AND JOSEPHINE MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and
ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO
JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as
Filipinos
For
Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the
Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205491
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for
themselves, their Posterity, and the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.

39

x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205720
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive
Director, and in her personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL
A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY,
WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE
T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 206355
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA
BORROMEO-GARCIA,
STELLAACEDERA,
ATTY.
BERTENI
CATALUNA
CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207111
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH
MARTIN
Q.
VERDEJO,
ANTONIA
EMMA
R.
ROXAS
and
LOTA LATGUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department
of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and
Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207172
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI
SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS
FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207563
ALMARIM
CENTI
TILLAH
and
ABDULHUSSEIN
M.
KASHIM, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of
the Department of Health, and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management,Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And
this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to
protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his

conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent
with the liberty of others and with the common good."1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed
country, leaving our people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While
governmental policies have been geared towards the revitalization of the economy, the
bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the poor,
but every member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the
realization of its very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the
development of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a
representative government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy looming
societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement these measures and bring
concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the
judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful
eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when
called into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation
vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society together - the
supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth
control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views
on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From
television debates2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political activists to mass
gatherings organized by members of the clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical
ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in
every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various
sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that
strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its
decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14)
petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong
and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and
taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming
Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines,
Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche 7 and several others8 in
their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and
Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City,
Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned educational institution,
and several others,13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);

40

(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic
Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines, 16 in their capacities as a citizens and
taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of
Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several others19 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers
(PAX);
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others, 21 in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria
Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and
on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity
as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
23

(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation
Inc.24 and several others,25 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf
of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys.
Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia
Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several
others,29 in their capacities as citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation,
Inc. and several others,31 in their capacities as citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim
in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a
citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an
accredited political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality
of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:
The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners,
notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law
would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and
injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception.35

contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other
health problems.36
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the
RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the
use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use
of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included
in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer
patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full
and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their
religious beliefs and convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RHIRR),39 provides that skilled health professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited
to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health
physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are
specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors.40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in
schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs. 41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they
argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling
state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to
free speech.42
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According
to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude
because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to
provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of
criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment. 43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical
practitioner would effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of
PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to
avail of the practitioners services.44
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH
Law discriminates against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the
government program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that,
rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to
introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.45
The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it
is vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of
the RH Law.46

The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access to

41

In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by
removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of
health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer." 47 It ignores the
management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in
accordance with their own discretion and judgment.
The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full
range of family planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own
preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note that although exemption is
granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to
refer their patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or
procedure.48
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the
Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive
health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in
accordance with their beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health
procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right
of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In
the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are
deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use contraceptives.50
The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative
authority. The petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power
to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the
Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51
The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ),
Article VI of the Constitution.52
The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs)
and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the
RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local government level and
the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the
Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-inintervention in defense of the constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in behalf of the
respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr.
Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez, 57 the Filipino Catholic
Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De
Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction with several others.
On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the
dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy
and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack
standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory
relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took
effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the
Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed
legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to
determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which
these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on
August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the
SQAO was ordered extended until further orders of the Court.63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60)
days and, at the same time posed several questions for their clarification on some contentions of
the parties.64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and
distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country
enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution
of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed,
they could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution
is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner."65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to
"dispensing of abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37
thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or device capable of provoking
abortion or preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be
delivered or sold to any person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which
recognized that the population problem should be considered as the principal element for longterm economic development, enacted measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal
ligation to mitigate population growth. 67 Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365,
approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population,
Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that
"family planning will be made part of a broad educational program; safe and effective means will
be provided to couples desiring to space or limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be
further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential
Decree. (P.D.) No. 79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a
part of a broad educational program," provided "family planning services as a part of over-all
health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to
all Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."

42

Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved
from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of
public health, particularly, reproductive health.69 Under that policy, the country gave priority to
one's right to freely choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its
adherence to the commitments made in the International Conference on Population and
Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna
Carta for Women, " which, among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive
health services and programs for women, including family planning and sex education.71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an
uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the
population of the country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in
2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate. To
rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the
marginalized, access and information to the full range of modem family planning methods, and
to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved.
To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide
information on the full range of modem family planning methods, supplies and services, and for
schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes
certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.

1] Power of Judicial Review

2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech

Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the
current laws on contraception, women's health and population control.

4] The Family

Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo

5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner
ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very
essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the
State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the
situation prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:

6] Due Process

x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As
provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of
contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a physician.
What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State
and its agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay
officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the implementation of the
contraception program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will
be the funder and provider of all forms of family planning methods and the implementer of the
program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range of
family planning methods, devices and supplies.74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has
synthesized and refined them to the following principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.

7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves
the Court to resolve some procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should
submit to the legislative and political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in
the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic process" 75 and

43

"characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency."76 The OSG posits that the authority of
the Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the
Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with
the political departments, in particular, with Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the
Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 78 the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts of the
legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that
the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government
has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law
cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive
and the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and
accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of
separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes
and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government.85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of
powers which imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and
of their respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the acts of the Executive
or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and
caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability,
the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated.87 In order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the
acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at
the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific
point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null
because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion. 88 Thus, while the Court may not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an
attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results. 89 The Court must demonstrate
its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the
Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be
limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to
judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes
back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative
and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to
make sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as
mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional
violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under
review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara, 91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review
and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as there is no other
plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied
in Macalintal v. COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless others.
In Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial
rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of
constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal
issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review
is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing
of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and
maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is
the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary
in that balancing operation.95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled
authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete
with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there
must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or
controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented. 97 They claim that the questions
raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been
charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the
petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation. 98 In short, it is contended that
judicial review of the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe
for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to
an advisory opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to
satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciabledefinite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In
other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the
one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not

44

merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. 101 A
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect
on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a
court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the
Philippines,103 where the constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on
the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that the Court has no
authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could
possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that
the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete
acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of
the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same
is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have
already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been
passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier,
when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or
medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague
violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the
service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the
matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions,
contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating
measure.105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment
Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected
speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. 106 These include religious freedom,
freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom,
freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's
freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial
challenges to strictly penal statues, 108 it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only

regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights.109 The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the
U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but
also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. 110 Verily,
the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to
maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned
above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance
of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional
scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or
controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the
Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It
contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the
assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them, 111 and the government has yet to
distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and
their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act.113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge
the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits
one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of
third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party
standing.115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers,
and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest."116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, 117 the Court held that in cases of paramount
importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may
be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party
claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 118 ordinary citizens
and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although
they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.

45

With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "asapplied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi
requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or
with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of
transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural
technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing
non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in
the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any
other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for
prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we
set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot
deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral
well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure
are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis
supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to
the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH
Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of
religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the
issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a
broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of
transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly,
considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the
Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in
the Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother
or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory
relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the
petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions
for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has farreaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions
for prohibition under Rule 65.121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section
26(1 ), Article VI of the Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to
them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation
violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a
population control measure.123

To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population
control measure,124and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health"
are both interrelated as they are inseparable.125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally
a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the
country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it
also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the
need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information
on the full range of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning
methods, natural or modem, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of
births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well.
A large portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on
access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive
health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent
pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception
pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the
provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very
foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth
attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of
reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for
Women."128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E.
Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was
written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in
the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and
where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of
the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather
than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases
supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive
health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to
control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right
to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in
accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood.

46

The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting
any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act."129

to various studies and consultations with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other
experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a
determination and pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as
an abortive.135

Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood"
which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as
stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to
deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is
not violated considering that various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the
implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional
since the law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation
of the fertilized ovum are allowed.136

II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

The Court's Position

1-The Right to Life

Position of the Petitioners

It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.137

The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn
child under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to
abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the
RH Law considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after
fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to
afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective family planning products and supplies, medical research shows that contraceptives use
results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life.131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that
the State sanction of contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of
man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient,
the assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also
considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of
these products and supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a
certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient purposes.133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the
Constitution was simply the prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not
violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive
health care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the
public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are
not abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration

Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and,
therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes
and transcends any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines
is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The
Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966,
prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization, 138 to the
promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation, 139 and the ratification of numerous international
agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote population control through
the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the
years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being
a component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health,
particularly, reproductive health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health
and the overall promotion of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No.
6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The
Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine
national population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of
no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion." 141 As will be discussed later, these principles
are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional
protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a
scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and
evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of
the Court could express their own views on this matter.

47

In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of
Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable
because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that
the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The
problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded
the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life
begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with
"fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are
those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the
uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute
are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est
recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words
in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and
second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the
people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule
of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as
described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at
fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant,
formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing
into a being like its parents.145

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the
female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and
maturation under normal conditions.146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano, 147 it was
written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before
he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life
of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child
being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that
the State "has respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and
substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus
was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers
regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their
deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment
of conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the
sperm that there is human life. x x x.150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it
was explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs
to be answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized
ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself.
It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from
within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All
these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically the
fertilized ovum has life.

48

The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of
conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes
from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes.
A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the
fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized
ovum is both alive and human, then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is
human.151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the
moment of fertilization" was not because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before
with the scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people;
we want to use the simpler phrase "from the moment of conception."152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution,
it was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a
Constitution, without specifying "from the moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the
Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So,
Congress can define life to begin from six months after fertilization; and that would really be very,
very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from the moment of conception.
There can be no doubt about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too.153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is
one of the questions I was going to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been
expressed already. The provision, as proposed right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment
of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the
sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain
contraceptives that we know today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the
so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already
occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root.
What happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum
to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called
contraceptives should be banned.

Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and,
therefore, would be unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not
these certain contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is
now proposed, they are already considered abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution
emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child
from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm
and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to
prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas,
spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the
determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which
should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence.155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be
deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the
union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that
I would like not only to protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in
the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured of the legal and
pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception." I raised some of these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the
interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a categorical
answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception" we are also actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are
already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or does it
disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no
unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives,
such as the intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized
from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of conception," what really occurs
is that some of these contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156

49

The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by
petitioners during the oral arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even
condoms are not classified as abortifacients.157
Atty. Noche: Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
Justice Bersamin: There is no life.
Atty. Noche: So, there is no life to be protected.
Justice Bersamin: To be protected.
Atty. Noche: Under Section 12, yes.
Justice Bersamin: So you have no objection to condoms?
Atty. Noche: Not under Section 12, Article II.
Justice Bersamin: Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?
Atty. Noche: Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I
am discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin: Alright.
Atty. Noche: And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical,
Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually
taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote."159
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which
the embryo develops."160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics), 161 used by medical schools
in the Philippines, also concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of
fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual,
with a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins
after the union of male and female gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization
(conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with the contact of a sperm
(spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the
haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new
cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or
primordium, of a human being."162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology 163 mirror the same position. They wrote:
"Although life is a continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary
circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby formed.... The combination
of 23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus
the diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now exists as
a genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the
Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its
strong position that fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus
human life, begins. Human lives are sacred from the moment of conception, and that destroying
those new lives is never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of

biology and human embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that,
there is no point along the continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a "potential"
human being can be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this
objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the
life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception."
This conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and independent of any
specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos.164
Conclusion:
Fertilization

The

Moment

of

Conception

is

Reckoned

from

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and
more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable
conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman
that life begins at implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct
and successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and
synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the
implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after
implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected."167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It
does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote
is not an inanimate object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and 46
chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had
population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law
but also to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or
device that would prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be
provocative and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of
the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing
abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the
Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from
conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by
Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed by the Supreme Court.169

50

A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes
abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life
begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the
moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions
that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded
safe travel to the uterus for implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised
Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:

Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of
fertilization. By using the word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent
implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:

1] xx x.
(a) Induces abortion; or
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined
as follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services
and supplies that contribute to reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive
health-related problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement
of life and personal relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and
responsibly whether or not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to
make other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to
have the information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health
and reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include
abortion, and access to abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential
decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation
contrary to or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392,
otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be
clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:

(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or

(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon
determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent
with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a
bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits
any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above,
refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second,
prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb
(third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to
mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not
declare either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise
suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which
already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes existent
- all the way until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized
and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to
prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum,
the RH Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at
fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its
viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It
started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is,
which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any
product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA
that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an
abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a
drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in
every instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be used.171

51

Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient
contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend
to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or supply included or to be included in the
EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on
the condition that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the
proviso under the second paragraph of the same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means
emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose
and their other forms or equivalent.

Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is
indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared
invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the
approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such
qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered
as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the
implantation of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of
contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism.174

Abortifacients under the RH-IRR

At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their
office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as
follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as
follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:

Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these
contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient
under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion, the undeniable
conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those
contraceptives that do not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not have the secondary action of acting
the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle
that laws should be construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and
its implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word
" primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the
validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have
the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of
contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in
violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution."175

a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
[Emphasis supplied]

To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the
constitutional protection of life must be upheld.

Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:

The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the
inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and
supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of
essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals. 176 Citing various studies on the matter,
the petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in
women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. They point out
that the risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is
contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold
increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and
an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction. 177 Given the definition of "reproductive
health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p) 178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners
assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and
satisfying sex lives.180

j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family
planning method, device, or health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy
but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted
in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as
"abortifacient" only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb.172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they
pointed out, with the insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RHIRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.

2-The Right to Health

The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory,
it being a mere statement of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it were selfexecutory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a
danger to the health of women.181

52

The Court's Position

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution
is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the
Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of
the people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services
available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to
provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system
and undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the
country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation,
self-development, and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question
contraception and contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A.
No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when
they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained. 185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the
provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law
and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation
of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated
proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive
drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in
place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are
safe are made available to the public. As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:
D.
dispensed
prescription

Contraceptives
and

cannot
used

be
without

108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed
and used without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice
of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for
Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not
inconsistent with the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices
are particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in full:

Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or
hazardous products.

"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or
otherwise distribute whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device,
unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the
provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered
self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions.182 In
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:

"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:

x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a

constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are selfexecuting. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of selfexecuting, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of
the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has
always been, that
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-selfexecuting. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should
be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to
the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing
to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)

"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used
exclusively for the purpose of preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced
into the female reproductive system for the primary purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be
punished with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six
months or more than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"

53

111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine,
pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed,
sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the consuming public except through a
prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the provisions
of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant
statutes, the pretension of the petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated
proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and
baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which
provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure,
distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The
DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies to plan and implement this
procurement and distribution program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on,
among others, the current levels and projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their
children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program
consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the
provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will
procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out
by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in
supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness
or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use. 187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the
FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or
devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and
medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds
that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various
kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded
herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal
contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of
Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the
mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated,
and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a
particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The
provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a
particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives,
intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory.
There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient
and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by
Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective"
without the proper scientific examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the
constitutional proscription, there are those who, because of their religious education and
background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of
these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of
contraceptives but also the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with
contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital
chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of
the spouses; it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of
Human life."188
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the
expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since
contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious
sentiments by making provisions for a conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is
nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to
refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would
be able to provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the
conscientious objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her
religious beliefs.190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the
recognition is unduly limited, because although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23
(a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive health services and information - no
escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient
seeking reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to

54

conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to in Section
7; b) public officers involved in the implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c)
teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not recognize. 191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement
to refer the matter to another health care service provider is still considered a compulsion on
those objecting healthcare service providers. They add that compelling them to do the act
against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law
are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of
contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive
health services to indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon whom they are
required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person
seeking reproductive health care services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of
religion as it forces the objector to become an unwilling participant in the commission of a
serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by
the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor
injury to the public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify
regulation of religious freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers
state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the people (to equality, non-discrimination of
rights, sustainable human development, health, education, information, choice and to make
decisions according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of
responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment
of religious freedom.194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to
attend family planning and responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of
compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals to participate in the implementation
of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs. 195 As the assailed law dangles the
threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the
petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and
information to contraception against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific
mode or type of contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor
sanctions any religion or belief.196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public
interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health services to ensure
maternal and child health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health
guarantees of the Constitution, 197 and that what the law only prohibits are those acts or
practices, which deprive others of their right to reproductive health. 198 They assert that the
assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is an assurance that no one will be
compelled to violate his religion against his free will. 199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the
petitioners are effectively going against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same
right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH Law.200 In other words, by seeking the
declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court
recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose
this on the entire citizenry.201

With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between
the interests of the religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is required
to refer -and that of the citizen who needs access to information and who has the right to expect
that the health care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the
concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the
right to freely exercise one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others. 202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is
limited in duration, location and impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it
is a reasonable regulation providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to
information regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued
that those who object to any information received on account of their attendance in the required
seminars are not compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely free to
reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters of
family life without intervention of the State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is
the only method acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and
surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception
throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its
followers in planning their families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of
people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us
that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social
and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is
tolerant towards all - the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The
undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to
be, and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus,
the preamble of the present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and
humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations,
promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and
our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime
of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in
our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this
is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of
religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality. 205 Moreover, in
recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions
contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of
church property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious
instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not
encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and
State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

55

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual
respect.1wphi1 Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much
less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate
against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the
State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it
sincerely believes that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the
Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which
refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically
symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations
collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect
the State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following
mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.

protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent
with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is
to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the
religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.
(Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates
conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to
advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious
observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden.
(Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory
purposes. They have a single goal-to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and
practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause
prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and
practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power
to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of
religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on
one's belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education: 211

Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution,
or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as
such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces,
or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring
any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious
groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of public
resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the
human conscience.207 Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited
from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith. 208 Explaining the
concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union 209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets
or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of
any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148,
1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost
amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and
thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One
may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear
to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But
between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to
travel.212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be
enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief
is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to
the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v.
Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether
mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine
Constitution."215 In the same case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions,
accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The
purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or
institution's religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration
of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its
'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts."217

56

In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is
proper.218Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a
fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny. 219 In Escritor, it
was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the
first case on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear
and present danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in
subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of
permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates the established institutions of society and
law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as the
doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the
least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit
inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back to the
Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the
Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present
danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which
employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one
form or another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression.
On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious freedom will not
prevail over established institutions of society and law. Gerona, however, which was the
authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave and
immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that employed the "compelling state
interest" test, but as explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the
case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni
Cristo where the "clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were
appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German
doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality
approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case
involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is proper
where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the
state's interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and farreaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil,
whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state
would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that
enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all
human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free
Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited
government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos
implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane society and establish a
government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests
can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a
colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the
state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to
carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter
religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining which shall
prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The
"compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time
affording protection to the paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert
which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state
interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state,
without which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining
supplied.]

In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of
contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is
moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one's
dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine,
form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably
ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts." 220 The jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in
the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated
otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard
of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the
guarantee of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs
and convictions. It is replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets
of his religion or defy his religious convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law
respecting religious freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to
equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the
right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the
right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section 2,
Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the
family which in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of
family planning, including effective natural and modern methods which have been proven
medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidencebased medical research standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the
poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of
identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to
promote modern natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method,
consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration
of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number
of children they desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the
resources available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws, public morals
and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that
are in accordance with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration
the State's obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's
organizations, civil society, faith-based organizations, the religious sector and communities is
crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and development policies, plans, and
programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]

The Court's Position

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7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and
aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to
determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their children
according to their own family life aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness,
health status, sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions.
[Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives.
To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema.
Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with
religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can
neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can
they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause
the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance
its population control program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of
contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to
pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one
religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The
demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things
that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects
diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot
be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly
mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health
care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their
conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation
or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of
Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector's
claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law,
unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the
accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious
objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious
freedom has been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues
a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the abandonment
of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of
penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose
religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.

The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious
belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will,
refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services,
procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to
perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas)
has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the
human conscience.222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false
compromise because it makes pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act
that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they
cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive
act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free
speech, it being an externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the
right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection
that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the
protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to
utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. 223 While the RH Law
seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the
liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether
direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion.224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one
hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to
determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong
view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be
accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with
the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and
conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional
right to free exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the
case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board, 225 that the
midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act
of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward who
were involved in abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined
according to whether the person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean
more complexity and uncertainty."227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they
could not be forced to assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of
the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to
refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for
being violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in
relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs
and services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of
health care service providers should be respected.

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In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive
Secretary228 it was stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And
this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to
protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent
with the liberty of others and with the common good."10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure
compliance. Without set consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law
tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective
implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its
disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient
because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which
the Court cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers,
chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office
are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these
Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection
clause should be equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no
perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law.
The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical
practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the
freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free
exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of
human values. The mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious
sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and, thus, seek
other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in
such concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and
petition, and freedom of association.229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law
itself but also because it is violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting
respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must
prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you
mentioned RH Law is replete with provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting
religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you have read, I
presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?

Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly
dissected the nuances of the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR
it says: " .... skilled health professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief
of hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are
specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules,
cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be
conscientious objectors, skilled health professionals cannot be considered conscientious
objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the religious
belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail.230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of
the subject provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain
conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the burden of
proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the
objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG
was curiously silent in the establishment of a more compelling state interest that would
rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an action contrary to
his religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and
evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest
in imposing this duty to refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his
religious belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

59

Ahh, Your Honor, ..

Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this
is an ordinary health legislation involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a
pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation by the State of the relationship between medical
doctors and their patients.231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise
clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the
infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. 232

responsible parenthood, and the right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices,
interventions, and substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address
pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family
planning;

Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to
act or not to act according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is
compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one's belief.233

(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health
services without prejudice to the primary right and duty of parents to
educate their children;

Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in
the perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number
and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or
not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given to her
or whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed
upon those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient
seeks consultation on reproductive health matters.

(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including

sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS;

Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the
conscientious objector's religious freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a person's
fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any
government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state
objective is the least intrusive means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring would
only be momentary, considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very
action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to
demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without
violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still be
addressed by other practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with
open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in
utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional
freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the
right to health is protected. Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or
the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No.
9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in
relation to health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on
comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at
all times, provide for a comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services
and programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which addresses the major causes
of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health
services, due respect shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the
spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of

(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast

and cervical cancers, and other gynecological conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related
complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children
victims and survivors shall be provided with comprehensive health services
that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and
assistance towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction
pursuant to ethical norms and medical standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of
women and girls. In addition, healthy lifestyle activities are encouraged and
promoted through programs and projects as strategies in the prevention of
diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all
sectors with appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate information and education on all the
above-stated aspects of women's health in government education and training programs, with
due regard to the following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth and the development of moral character and the right of children to be
brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment
and strengthening of character;

60

(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including
fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state
interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended
pregnancies, lives changed, x x x." 235 He, however, failed to substantiate this point by concrete
facts and figures from reputable sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino
maternal mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no
RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that such number of
maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs
for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable
stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law.
While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care
procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in lifethreatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations,
the right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical
practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a
mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC,
manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom
of religion does not contemplate an emergency."237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally
obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one
should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the
House of Representatives of the principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of
either the mother of the child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict
situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged
always to try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother)
when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the
other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not
intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or
murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because both their lives are equally
valuable.238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the
child may be resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As
quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have
been more than justified considering the life he would be able to save.
Family Planning Seminars

Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage
license, the Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the
government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the
petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar
on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the
type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or
artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during their
attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them,
are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to
decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions
of the Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates
disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and total
development.240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social
institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.
ARTICLE
THE FAMILY

XV

Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection
from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of
policies and programs that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains
provisions which tend to wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or
the father from participating in the decision making process regarding their common future
progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply
because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.

61

The Family and Spousal Consent

is fully deserving of constitutional protection." 244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:

Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:

The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of
legal age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of the following persons in the
following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the
decision of the one undergoing the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy
which, by their very nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the husband
and the wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV
of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a
family." One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the
same Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and
programs that affect them " is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute
authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from
participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result
in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the
population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as
an inviolable social institution.241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to
the couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a
family because the size of the family or the number of their children significantly matters. The
decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both
spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed
private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the
State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise
known as the "Magna Carta for Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all
matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the joint decision on the number and
spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states,
is a shared responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be
allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to
only one spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive health
procedure.242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and
such state intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the
Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first recognized in Marje v.
Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to
privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it

We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older
than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of
life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a
criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to
privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by
couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be
undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law
provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural
or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision making process of
the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental
authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and
guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it
comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is
clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional
mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government." 247 In this regard,
Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports
the assertion that the right of parents is superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]

62

To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their
minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the
very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in
the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and
strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that
the State affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming
the foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care
and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental
authority.

students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United States and statistical data gathered in
the country, the petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of
out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and
euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and promotion of promiscuity
among the youth.251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is
premature because the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a
curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the
content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and
whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court
declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.

First Exception: Access to Information

Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second
paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a
distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation between access to information about
family planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and
modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is
concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the
minor referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable
her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article
II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the
unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make informed decisions is
essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with
respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be
deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise
parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept
or reject the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening
cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the
minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave
risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be denied the
appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) 249 should be struck down. By
effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it
denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is involved are "nonsurgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an
abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be
deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an
affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the
teaching of Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of
fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom . According to the
petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive health
education even if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their

At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935
Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents
in preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places more
importance on the role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said
role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that
of the State.252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral
development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of
developing the youth and their important role in nation building. 253 Considering that Section 14
provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values
formation; the development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination;
sexual abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of gender based
violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women's
rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and
responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the
RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and
physical and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate
provided under the assailed provision supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties
of the parents in the moral development of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education
program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school
officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line with the religious
beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners'
contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit. 254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their
participation in the reproductive health education program provided under Section 14 of the RH
Law on the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment
should an actual case be filed before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due
process clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private
health service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is a
"private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7
only makes reference to a "private health care institution."

63

The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals
operated by religious groups from rendering reproductive health service and modern family
planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving
reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health
procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of
incorrect information, but at the same time fails to define "incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid;
and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used
in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning
alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed
together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service
provider," reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health
service provider," viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly
licensed and accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for
health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from
illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and
nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a
midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4)
barangay health worker who has undergone training programs under any accredited
government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the
community after having been accredited to function as such by the local health board in
accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of
"private health care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason
that they are used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to
render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, includes exemption
from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health
procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to
be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family
planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive
health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and
"methods" are broad enough to include the providing of information and the rendering of medical
procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care
service providers who intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding

reproductive health programs and services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is
hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally
provide incorrect information regarding programs and services on reproductive health including
the right to informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient
and effective family planning methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model
or with established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty,
morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand, the word
"knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional. 258 Used together in
relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive
health. Public health and safety demand that health care service providers give their honest and
correct medical information in accordance with what is acceptable in medical practice. While
health care service providers are not barred from expressing their own personal opinions
regarding the programs and services on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with
the need to provide public health and safety. The public deserves no less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the
Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the
government program that promotes contraceptive use . They argue that, rather than promoting
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively
reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing
with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles 259 and definition of terms260 of
the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive
health education program imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, 261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the
concept of equal protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right
which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the
laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to
provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause.
But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper
weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a

64

state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted
authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that
are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature.
Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through
whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is
not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all
persons who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the
members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations
imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense
that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree.
Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the
classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class
differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all
others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to
preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace
all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or
"underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied;
citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care
program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11,
Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of
the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development
of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services
available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to
provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who
are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the
contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH
Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As
Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is
incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."

Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does
not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise
that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children only if they would
raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law
seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government
programs to promote basic reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive
health education program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children
of those who are less fortunate attend public educational institutions does not amount to
substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial
distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational institutions,
particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational
institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards
the teaching of reproductive health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional
prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation
requiring private and non-government health care service providers to render forty-eight (48)
hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude
because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will.262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly
be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service
providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover,
the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation
of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public
interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect
and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right
but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A
fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress 263 to prescribe the qualifications for the
practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public
morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the
point of revoking such right altogether.264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence
of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion. 265 A reading of
the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and non- government
reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than nonaccreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private
and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose
which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether
to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render
pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite
to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable
burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived
legitimate state interest.

65

Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that
conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and
convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.

"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health
products, whether or not registered with the FDA Provided, That for registered health
products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended
for sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been observed;

9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA

"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product
found to have caused death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient,
or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to
require all concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a requirement
for the issuance of the appropriate authorization;

The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to
determine whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List
(EDL).266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but
also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only
government entity empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It should
be understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are
associated with what is ordinarily understood as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration
shall be under the Office of the Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers and
duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and
regulations issued pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of
this Act;

x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to
enable the agency to carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole
agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was
equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle
of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and
safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods."
From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be
given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective
in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards. The philosophy
behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice, 267 as
follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability
of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of
society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has
become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the
required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.

"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health
products standards, and to recommend standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy,
quality and fill of container;

10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region

"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis

for the issuance of appropriate authorization and spot-check for compliance with
regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors,
wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health products,
as determined by the FDA;

As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon
the powers devolved to local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local
Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to
the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:

"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the
issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters,
wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-consumer users of health products to
report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has caused
or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient,
or any person;

of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities.

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue
exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon
them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies
and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall
likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective
provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.

66

While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and
responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the national
agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective
jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of
cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services.268Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and
infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the
National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws,
pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources,
are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government
unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects,
facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an
LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for
which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general
appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the
jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter
of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself
weighs against it.270

With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it to say that the
Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only
guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived
as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in
conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover,
natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists,
philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as
an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present. 277 Unless, a natural right has
been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic
v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not
duty-bound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution
and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of
circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does
not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program
of the government by providing information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more
readily available to the public, especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law

In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment
of health care facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay
health workers,273 it will be the national government that will provide for the funding of its
implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when
it comes to national priority programs which the local government is called upon to implement
like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide
these services. There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the
availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the
RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy
enjoyed by the local governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally
applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III,
Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner
Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to
the policy statements for the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied upon
by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional
government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its
power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable
autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now
stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and the
regional governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the
Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to
legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or common interest.275
11 - Natural Law

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide
access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive
healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the
religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law
hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that
man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be
allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough
room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that
peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that
what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it
be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population but the unequal
distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the
country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The
European and Asian countries, which embarked on such a program generations ago , are now
burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling with adverse
effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant human capital which
could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now
trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with
incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino
Workers. This is because we have an ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would
happen if the country would be weighed down by an ageing population and the fewer younger
generation would not be able to support them? This would be the situation when our total fertility
rate would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman.280

67

Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use
coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to
solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what
the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law
should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the
judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative
branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise
from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that
would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality,
the Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution
and existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore
limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as
enacted by the lawmaking body.281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of
the prior existing contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even
if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act
(R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women
or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed
legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any
family planning method should be maintained.

the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support
reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation
of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the
rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the
conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier
"primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and,
therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order,
dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have
been herein declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A.
No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which
are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require
private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a
miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from
their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or
refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive
health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they
allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the
consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they
limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails
and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within

68

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors,
and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE
SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO,
AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their
parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her
parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all
surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA,
BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE
PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA
VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents
FREDENIL
and
JANE
CASTRO,
JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN
T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY
NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all
surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ,
KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING,
minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and
THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents
BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA,
minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO,
JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO
and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed
OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA,
PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors,
represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO,
ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their
parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL
NETWORK,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful
ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational
responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the
said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of
Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66
(Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The
principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and

joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological
Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the
purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment
and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,
then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His
substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was
subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as
a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the
Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and
others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous
that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that
they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed
for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons
acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100
islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and
verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found;
these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are
also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished
since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and
healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per
cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial,
commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of
deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages
resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers,
brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt
water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the
Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and
agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000)
cubic meters per annum approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the
endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the
disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's
indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of
corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g)
recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing
velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of
lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests,
(j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and

69

operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of
electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases
which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of
global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and

deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable
injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and their successors who
may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural
resource treasure.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted
as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present
expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the
trial.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of

the natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff
minors and succeeding generations.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as
the parens patriae.

CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million
hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's
office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to
cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as
Annex "B".

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than
1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the
country's land area.

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the
continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin oldgrowth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the
Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and
uneconomical secondary growth forests.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an
act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be
left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the
wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had
been abundantly blessed with.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted
timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the
aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto
attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per
annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays included the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after
the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and
irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff
minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and
incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages
enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and
suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly

contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental
Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man
and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and
future generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to
a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the
aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the
State to

70

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth"

and "make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1,
Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)"
(Section 14, Article XIV,id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16,
Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind
the natural law and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and
perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than
the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital
life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against
him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion,
the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action,
(2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the
defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no
cause of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent
Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the
concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural
law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No.
192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of
discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than
what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause,
petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts.
They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well
settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an
"environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in
its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause
of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted
in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or
legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not
to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban
logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be
done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain
period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be
revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have
violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners'
proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be
violative of the requirements of due process.

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted
Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did
not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a
class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to
several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it,
becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise
declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit
under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case
and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it
contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles
19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that
they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that
the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents
of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this
case. 8

71

class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such
rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations
to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the
merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and
evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find
for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of
the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court
cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that
plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging,
with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce
and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and
redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the
Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based
on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its
Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being
impressed with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not
be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred
principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the
Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we
stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to
cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease
and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to
"impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A
reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the
preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs
to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and
self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which
may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic
rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is
because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all
else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations
which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner
Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA: Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of
pollution air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA: Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily
carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be
provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of
the country's forests.

72

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby

disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to
health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation,
development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C.
Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates
that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the
country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral,
resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain,
as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in
order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present
and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State
to ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality
of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the
population to the development and the use of the country's natural
resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as
well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value
system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their
utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987, 15specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of
the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of
the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas
and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a
sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and
utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different
segments of the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that
takes into account social and environmental cost implications relative to the
utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the
other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular
reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section
provides:

Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural

Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the
foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out
the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural
resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve
as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific
statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future
generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152
(Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the
State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can
thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and
other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the
attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As
its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the
environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to
the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the
said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect
or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the
TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs
should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of
the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation
of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint
fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered;
furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such
alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in

73

the complaint? 20 InMilitante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary
should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the
ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct
appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or
recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself
stands in disrepute."

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less
tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the
issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon
us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII,
Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the
introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading
CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It
bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the
need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of
contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy
formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not
squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies
already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the
political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial
power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz,
a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial
power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The
second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to
enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to
wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the
Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of
the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The
catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a
very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition
of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we

stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to
cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease
and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to
"impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a
sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious
reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he
would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted
benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the
Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions
regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware
that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20
of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may
amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit,
licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It
is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of
the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due
process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or
municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license
does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights
(People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).

74

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal
instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly
be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable
right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They
may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections
3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of
Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the
common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.

31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply
with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no
contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal,
the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is
hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants
the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

27

cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case
does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification
of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause.
This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the
exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.
In Abe
vs.
Foster
Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to
be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative
regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and
welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of
obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the
State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine
American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of
contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The
general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But
neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government
cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his
fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally

G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Branch 127,
Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY
GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN,respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan to dispose off the 350
tons of garbage it collects daily and the growing concern and sensitivity to a pollution-free
environment of the residents of Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City where these tons
of garbage are dumped everyday is the hub of this controversy elevated by the protagonists to
the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) for adjudication.
The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with this Court by Laguna Lake
Development
Authority
(LLDA
for
short)
docketed
as
G.R.
No. 107542 against the City Government of Caloocan, et al. In the Resolution of November 10,
1992, this Court referred G.R. No. 107542 to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition.
Docketed
therein
as
CA-G.R.
SP
No. 29449, the Court of Appeals, in a decision 1 promulgated on January 29, 1993 ruled that the
LLDA has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of
garbage in Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City. The LLDA now seeks, in this petition,
a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed.
On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint 2 with the Laguna Lake Development Authority
seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate,

75

Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and
the possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.
On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and test
sampling of the leachate 3 that seeps from said dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a tributary
of the Marilao River. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of
Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential
Decree No. 1586, 4 and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850, 5 as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. 6
After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting on the complaint of
Task Force Camarin Dumpsite, found that the water collected from the leachate and the
receiving streams could considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it
indicates the presence of bacteria, other than coliform, which may have contaminated the
sample during collection or handling. 7 On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and
Desist Order 8 ordering the City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their
contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind
of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.
The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan. However,
sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting held in July 1992
among the City Government of Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite
and LLDA at the Office of Environmental Management Bureau Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes
failed to settle the problem.
After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August 14, 1992, the LLDA
issued another order reiterating the December 5, 1991, order and issued an Alias Cease and
Desist Order enjoining the City Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping operations
at the Camarin area.
On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police,
enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks
into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a dumpsite.
Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on September 17, 1992 with the
LLDA, the City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an
action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of
writ of injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15598. In its complaint, the City Government of
Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health and
safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its
territorial jurisdiction. 9
On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the LLDA from enforcing its cease and desist
order. Subsequently, the case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 126 of Caloocan
which, at the time, was presided over by Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 127, the pairing judge of the recently-retired presiding judge.

The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion to dismiss on the ground, among
others, that under Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 984,
otherwise known as the Pollution Control Law, the cease and desist order issued by it which is
the subject matter of the complaint is reviewable both upon the law and the facts of the case by
the Court of Appeals and not by the Regional Trial Court. 10
On October 12, 1992 Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio issued an order consolidating Civil Case No. C15598 with Civil Case No. C-15580, an earlier case filed by the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite
entitled "Fr. John Moran, et al. vs. Hon. Macario Asistio." The LLDA, however, maintained during
the trial that the foregoing cases, being independent of each other, should have been treated
separately.
On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in
the consolidated cases an order 11 denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and granting the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and on
its behalf, from enforcing or implementing its cease and desist order which prevents plaintiff City
of Caloocan from dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite during the pendency of this case
and/or until further orders of the court.
On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with
prayer for restraining order with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 107542, seeking to
nullify the aforesaid order dated October 16, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
127 of Caloocan City denying its motion to dismiss.
The Court, acting on the petition, issued a Resolution 12 on November 10, 1992 referring the
case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition and at the same time, without giving due
course to the petition, required the respondents to comment on the petition and file the same
with the Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from notice. In the meantime, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from it,
ordering the respondents: (1) Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 127, Caloocan City to cease and desist from exercising jurisdiction over the case for
declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order issued by the Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA); and (2) City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to
cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan
City.
Respondents City Government of Caloocan and Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. filed on November
12, 1992 a motion for reconsideration and/or to quash/recall the temporary restraining order and
an urgent motion for reconsideration alleging that ". . . in view of the calamitous situation that
would arise if the respondent city government fails to collect 350 tons of garbage daily for lack of
dumpsite (i)t is therefore, imperative that the issue be resolved with dispatch or with sufficient
leeway to allow the respondents to find alternative solutions to this garbage problem."
On November 17, 1992, the Court issued a Resolution 13 directing the Court of Appeals to
immediately set the case for hearing for the purpose of determining whether or not the
temporary restraining order issued by the Court should be lifted and what conditions, if any, may
be required if it is to be so lifted or whether the restraining order should be maintained or
converted into a preliminary injunction.

76

The Court of Appeals set the case for hearing on November 27, 1992, at 10:00 in the morning at
the Hearing Room, 3rd Floor, New Building, Court of Appeals. 14 After the oral argument, a
conference was set on December 8, 1992 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning where the Mayor of
Caloocan City, the General Manager of LLDA, the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized
representative and the Secretary of DILG or his duly authorized representative were required to
appear.
It was agreed at the conference that the LLDA had until December 15, 1992 to finish its study
and review of respondent's technical plan with respect to the dumping of its garbage and in the
event of a rejection of respondent's technical plan or a failure of settlement, the parties will
submit within 10 days from notice their respective memoranda on the merits of the case, after
which the petition shall be deemed submitted for resolution. 15 Notwithstanding such efforts, the
parties failed to settle the dispute.
On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that: (1) the Regional
Trial Court has no jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action for annulment of
LLDA's cease and desist order, including the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction in relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is within the exclusive and
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9, par. (3), of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129; and (2) the Laguna Lake Development Authority has no power and authority to issue a
cease and desist order under its enabling law, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No.
813
and
Executive
Order
No. 927, series of 1983.
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No. 15598 and the preliminary injunction issued
in the said case was set aside; the cease and desist order of LLDA was likewise set aside and
the temporary restraining order enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City
Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City was lifted, subject, however, to the condition that any future
dumping of garbage in said area, shall be in conformity with the procedure and protective works
contained in the proposal attached to the records of this case and found on pages 152-160 of
the Rollo, which was thereby adopted by reference and made an integral part of the decision,
until the corresponding restraining and/or injunctive relief is granted by the proper Court upon
LLDA's institution of the necessary legal proceedings.
Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the instant petition for review on certiorari,
now docketed as G.R. No. 110120, with prayer that the temporary restraining order lifted by the
Court of Appeals be re-issued until after final determination by this Court of the issue on the
proper interpretation of the powers and authority of the LLDA under its enabling law.
On July, 19, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order 16 enjoining the City Mayor of
Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its
garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, effective as of this date and
containing until otherwise ordered by the Court.
It is significant to note that while both parties in this case agree on the need to protect the
environment and to maintain the ecological balance of the surrounding areas of the Camarin
open dumpsite, the question as to which agency can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the
matter remains highly open to question.

The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a local government unit,
pursuant to the general welfare provision of the Local Government Code, 17 to determine the
effects of the operation of the dumpsite on the ecological balance and to see that such balance
is maintained. On the basis of said contention, it questioned, from the inception of the dispute
before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, the power and authority of the LLDA to issue a
cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in the Barangay Camarin over which
the City Government of Caloocan has territorial jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of Caloocan on the theory that Section 7
of Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control law, authorizing the
defunct National Pollution Control Commission to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order was
not incorporated in Presidential Decree No. 813 nor in Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act No. 4850, as
amended, the LLDA is instead required "to institute the necessary legal proceeding against any
person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or
program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the Authority."
The LLDA now assails, in this partition for review, the abovementioned ruling of the Court of
Appeals, contending that, as an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and
adjudicatory powers and functions by Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws,
Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, it is invested with the
power and authority to issue a cease and desist order pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e), (f)
and (g) of Executive Order No. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus:
Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the
following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of
this Executive Order and its implementing rules and regulations only after
proper notice and hearing.
(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution
specifying the conditions and the time within which such discontinuance
must be accomplished.
(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may
determine to be reasonable, for the prevention and abatement of pollution,
for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the installation or
operation of sewage works and industrial disposal system or parts thereof.
(f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also revoke, suspend or
modify any permit issued under this Order whenever the same is necessary
to prevent or abate pollution.
(g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government
agencies or instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing this Executive

77

Order and its implementing rules and regulations and the orders and
decisions of the Authority.
The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately suppressed and totally disregarded the
above provisions of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, which granted administrative
quasi-judicial functions to LLDA on pollution abatement cases.
In light of the relevant environmental protection laws cited which are applicable in this case, and
the corresponding overlapping jurisdiction of government agencies implementing these laws, the
resolution of the issue of whether or not the LLDA has the authority and power to issue an order
which, in its nature and effect was injunctive, necessarily requires a determination of the
threshold question: Does the Laguna Lake Development Authority, under its Charter and its
amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage
in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan
which is allegedly endangering the health, safety, and welfare of the residents therein and the
sanitation and quality of the water in the area brought about by exposure to pollution caused by
such open garbage dumpsite?
The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment that requires
control, if not prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment is essentially addressed
to the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of
Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987, 18 has assumed the powers and functions of the
defunct National Pollution Control Commission created under Republic Act No. 3931. Under said
Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary
now assumes the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with
respect to adjudication of pollution cases. 19
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It
must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is
specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and
make effective the declared national policy 20 of promoting and accelerating the development and
balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna
and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan 21 with due regard and
adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of
human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances,
deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by
virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the
Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of
wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the
LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs,
and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region, public
corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are
related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region. 22
In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes
Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its letter-complaint before the LLDA, the latter's
jurisdiction under its charter was validly invoked by complainant on the basis of its allegation that
the open dumpsite project of the City Government of Caloocan in Barangay Camarin was

undertaken without a clearance from the LLDA, as required under Section 4, par. (d), of
Republic Act. No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927. While there
is also an allegation that the said project was without an Environmental Compliance Certificate
from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR, the primary jurisdiction of the
LLDA over this case was recognized by the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR
when the latter acted as intermediary at the meeting among the representatives of the City
Government of Caloocan, Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July 1992 to
discuss
the
possibility
of
re-opening the open dumpsite.
Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows down to the following
issue: Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts presented in this case,
enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.
The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to
stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done
in violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment
laws, 23 cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its
express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No.
927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the
discontinuance or pollution." 24(Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the
LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and ex-parte cease and
desist order" in a language, as suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, similar to the
express grant to the defunct National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No.
984 which, admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983.
However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial of the
power to issue the order in question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring
the discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive
Order No. 927, series of 1983.
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were not expressly
conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such authority
need not necessarily be express.25 While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency
has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an
administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its
express powers. 26 In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the
authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may
well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et
al., 27 the Court ruled that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has the power to issue an exparte cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding

78

the allowable standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the country. Theponente, Associate
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, declared:
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in
situations like that here presented precisely because stopping the
continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and
other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until
protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders
has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as
those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The
relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were
enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power
to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public,
as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as
the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of
protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise
of police power. . . .

of such broad powers may not be obeyed, resulting in the thwarting of its laudabe objective. To
meet such contingencies, then the writs of mandamus and injunction which are beyond the
power of the LLDA to issue, may be sought from the proper courts.
Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the Laguna Lake region and its
surrounding provinces, cities and towns are concerned, the Court will not dwell further on the
related issues raised which are more appropriately addressed to an administrative agency with
the special knowledge and expertise of the LLDA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court
on July 19, 1993 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan
from dumping their garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City is hereby
made permanent.
SO ORDERED.

The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public interests"
gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides:
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of nonimpairment. This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state "to protect and
promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them." 28 It is to
be borne in mind that the Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human
right. 29
The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of
procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority
under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA
been complied with by the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further
legal steps would have been necessary.
The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of conferring upon the LLDA
the means of directly enforcing such orders, has provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to
institute "necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or
continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna de Bay region
without previous clearance from the LLDA."
Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad powers in the
regulation of all projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region, whether by the government or the
private sector, insofar as the implementation of these projects is concerned. It was meant to deal
with cases which might possibly arise where decisions or orders issued pursuant to the exercise

79

The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also tell of the elemental
forces of life and death, of men and women who, like Antaeus need the sustaining strength of
the precious earth to stay alive.

G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of
this precious resource among our people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding
centuries, it has become a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the
dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D.

GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE,
CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA,
REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B.
MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO,
CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S.
FERRER, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989
ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA,
HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC.,
Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental, petitioners,
vs.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM
COUNCIL, respondents.
G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989
INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
HON. JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
and Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCENA and
ROBERTO TAAY, respondents.
G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989
NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondents.

Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure
the well-being and economic security of all the people," 1 especially the less privileged. In 1973,
the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the
acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse
property ownership and profits." 2 Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to
"formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from
the bondage of the soil." 3

CRUZ, J.:

Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had
already been enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the
above-stated principles. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No.
27, which was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the
compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify
maximum retention limits for landowners.

In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and challenged Hercules for his
life on his way to Mycenae after performing his eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and
Hercules flung his adversary to the ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even stronger to
resume their struggle. This happened several times to Hercules' increasing amazement. Finally,
as they continued grappling, it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the son of Gaea and could
never die as long as any part of his body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned,
Hercules then held Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and crushed
him to death.
Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose invigorating touch even the
powerful Antaeus weakened and died.

The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also
adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing
grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include
a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program:
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless,
to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the
State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural
lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the
Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or
equity considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small
landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary landsharing.

The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even energized the thrust for
agrarian reform. Thus, on July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the
valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment.
This was followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for
its implementation.

80

Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over
legislative power from the President and started its own deliberations, including extensive public
hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of
spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while
considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory
effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. 4
The above-captioned cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal
questions, including serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures
mentioned above. They will be the subject of one common discussion and resolution, The
different antecedents of each case will require separate treatment, however, and will first be
explained hereunder.
G.R. No. 79777
Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and
R.A. No. 6657.
The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by
petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and
owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands
by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no
private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No.
228. The said measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution,
for failure to provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to
Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.
In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the same
may be made only by a court of justice and not by the President of the Philippines. They invoke
the recent cases of EPZA v. Dulay 5and Manotok v. National Food Authority. 6 Moreover, the just
compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in money or in cash and not in the
form of bonds or other things of value.
In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives
the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause
is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the
owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other
properties.
The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the
owners of the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so
violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even

the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the
Constitution.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General stresses that P.D. No. 27 has already been upheld in the
earlier cases ofChavez v. Zobel, 7 Gonzales v. Estrella, 8 and Association of Rice and Corn
Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land Reform Council. 9 The determination of
just compensation by the executive authorities conformably to the formula prescribed under the
questioned order is at best initial or preliminary only. It does not foreclose judicial intervention
whenever sought or warranted. At any rate, the challenge to the order is premature because no
valuation of their property has as yet been made by the Department of Agrarian Reform. The
petitioners are also not proper parties because the lands owned by them do not exceed the
maximum retention limit of 7 hectares.
Replying, the petitioners insist they are proper parties because P.D. No. 27 does not provide for
retention limits on tenanted lands and that in any event their petition is a class suit brought in
behalf of landowners with landholdings below 24 hectares. They maintain that the determination
of just compensation by the administrative authorities is a final ascertainment. As for the cases
invoked by the public respondent, the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 was merely assumed
in Chavez, while what was decided in Gonzales was the validity of the imposition of martial law.
In the amended petition dated November 22, 1588, it is contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos.
228 and 229 (except Sections 20 and 21) have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657.
Nevertheless, this statute should itself also be declared unconstitutional because it suffers from
substantially the same infirmities as the earlier measures.
A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court on June 1, 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner of
a 1. 83- hectare land, who complained that the DAR was insisting on the implementation of P.D.
No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 despite a compromise agreement he had reached with his tenant on
the payment of rentals. In a subsequent motion dated April 10, 1989, he adopted the allegations
in the basic amended petition that the above- mentioned enactments have been impliedly
repealed by R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79310
The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias,
Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of
1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and
E.O. No. 229.
The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although they agree
that the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, she could
do so only to enact emergency measures during the transition period. At that, even assuming
that the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and
E.O. No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just
compensation, due process, and equal protection.
They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 which provides:

81

Agrarian Reform Fund.-There is hereby created a special fund, to be known as the Agrarian
Reform Fund, an initial amount of FIFTY BILLION PESOS (P50,000,000,000.00) to cover the
estimated cost of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program from 1987 to 1992 which shall
be sourced from the receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset Privatization Trust and
Receipts of sale of ill-gotten wealth received through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government and such other sources as government may deem appropriate. The amounts
collected and accruing to this special fund shall be considered automatically appropriated for the
purpose authorized in this Proclamation the amount appropriated is in futuro, not in esse. The
money needed to cover the cost of the contemplated expropriation has yet to be raised and
cannot be appropriated at this time.
Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation
as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated
in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229. On the contrary, Section 6, thereof provides that the Land Bank
of the Philippines "shall compensate the landowner in an amount to be established by the
government, which shall be based on the owner's declaration of current fair market value as
provided in Section 4 hereof, but subject to certain controls to be defined and promulgated by
the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council." This compensation may not be paid fully in money
but in any of several modes that may consist of part cash and part bond, with interest, maturing
periodically, or direct payment in cash or bond as may be mutually agreed upon by the
beneficiary and the landowner or as may be prescribed or approved by the PARC.
The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no effort was made to make
a careful study of the sugar planters' situation. There is no tenancy problem in the sugar areas
that can justify the application of the CARP to them. To the extent that the sugar planters have
been lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, although they are a separate group with
problems exclusively their own, their right to equal protection has been violated.

In his consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General first invokes the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. He also justifies the necessity for the
expropriation as explained in the "whereas" clauses of the Proclamation and submits that,
contrary to the petitioner's contention, a pilot project to determine the feasibility of CARP and a
general survey on the people's opinion thereon are not indispensable prerequisites to its
promulgation.
On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show
that they belong to a different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also
suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the
expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition
would be premature.
The public respondent also points out that the constitutional prohibition is against the payment of
public money without the corresponding appropriation. There is no rule that only money already
in existence can be the subject of an appropriation law. Finally, the earmarking of fifty billion
pesos as Agrarian Reform Fund, although denominated as an initial amount, is actually the
maximum sum appropriated. The word "initial" simply means that additional amounts may be
appropriated later when necessary.
On April 11, 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed a petition on his own behalf,
assailing the constitutionality of E.O. No. 229. In addition to the arguments already raised,
Serrano contends that the measure is unconstitutional because:
(1) Only public lands should be included in the CARP;
(2) E.O. No. 229 embraces more than one subject which is not expressed in
the title;

A motion for intervention was filed on August 27,1987 by the National Federation of Sugarcane
Planters (NASP) which claims a membership of at least 20,000 individual sugar planters all over
the country. On September 10, 1987, another motion for intervention was filed, this time by
Manuel Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland owners. Both motions were granted
by the Court.
NASP alleges that President Aquino had no authority to fund the Agrarian Reform Program and
that, in any event, the appropriation is invalid because of uncertainty in the amount appropriated.
Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229 provide for an initial
appropriation of fifty billion pesos and thus specifies the minimum rather than the maximum
authorized amount. This is not allowed. Furthermore, the stated initial amount has not been
certified to by the National Treasurer as actually available.
Two additional arguments are made by Barcelona, to wit, the failure to establish by clear and
convincing evidence the necessity for the exercise of the powers of eminent domain, and the
violation of the fundamental right to own property.
The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which is the expropriation
of the said land for an amount equal to the government assessor's valuation of the land for tax
purposes. On the other hand, if the landowner declares his own valuation he is unjustly required
to immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of the uniformity rule.

(3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on July 2, 1987;
and
(4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the National
Treasury did not originate from the House of Representatives.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of
due process and the requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding under the
coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to
the private respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him.
On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding
under Operation Land transfer and asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of
Land Transfer in the name of the private respondents. He claims that on December 24, 1986, his
petition was denied without hearing. On February 17, 1987, he filed a motion for reconsideration,
which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued. These orders

82

rendered his motion moot and academic because they directly effected the transfer of his land to
the private respondents.
The petitioner now argues that:
(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the
Philippines.

In his Reply to the public respondents, the petitioner maintains that the motion he filed was
resolved on December 14, 1987. An appeal to the Office of the President would be useless with
the promulgation of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, which in effect sanctioned the validity of the public
respondent's acts.
G.R. No. 78742

(2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that
no private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.

The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice
and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to
cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by
tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.

(3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for
under the 1987 Constitution.

According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:

The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress
convened is anomalous and arbitrary, besides violating the doctrine of separation of powers. The
legislative power granted to the President under the Transitory Provisions refers only to
emergency measures that may be promulgated in the proper exercise of the police power.
The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due process of
law and to the retention of his small parcels of riceholding as guaranteed under Article XIII,
Section 4 of the Constitution. He likewise argues that, besides denying him just compensation
for his land, the provisions of E.O. No. 228 declaring that:
Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October
21, 1972 shall be considered as advance payment for the land.
is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property right. It is also his contention that the inclusion
of even small landowners in the program along with other landowners with lands consisting of
seven hectares or more is undemocratic.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General submits that the petition is premature because the motion
for reconsideration filed with the Minister of Agrarian Reform is still unresolved. As for the validity
of the issuance of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, he argues that they were enacted pursuant to Section
6, Article XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
The incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is
convened.
On the issue of just compensation, his position is that when P.D. No. 27 was promulgated on
October 21. 1972, the tenant-farmer of agricultural land was deemed the owner of the land he
was tilling. The leasehold rentals paid after that date should therefore be considered
amortization payments.

No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn

shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the
respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been
determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D.
No. 27.
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of
retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing
rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of
mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules.
In his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474
removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7
hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other
purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the
petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already
been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by
Small Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No.
11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No.
18-81 dated December 29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and
Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing
for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their
Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the
corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners are now barred
from invoking this right.
The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have prematurely initiated this case
notwithstanding the pendency of their appeal to the President of the Philippines. Moreover, the
issuance of the implementing rules, assuming this has not yet been done, involves the exercise
of discretion which cannot be controlled through the writ of mandamus. This is especially true if
this function is entrusted, as in this case, to a separate department of the government.
In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them
because they do not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming

83

arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless
not in force because they have not been published as required by law and the ruling of this
Court in Tanada v. Tuvera. 10 As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional reason that
a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential decree.
I
Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three
departments of the government, the judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to annul the
acts of either the legislative or the executive or of both when not conformable to the fundamental
law. This is the reason for what some quarters call the doctrine of judicial supremacy. Even so,
this power is not lightly assumed or readily exercised. The doctrine of separation of powers
imposes upon the courts a proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their
respect for the other departments, in striking down the acts of the legislative and the executive
as unconstitutional. The policy, indeed, is a blend of courtesy and caution. To doubt is to sustain.
The theory is that before the act was done or the law was enacted, earnest studies were made
by Congress or the President, or both, to insure that the Constitution would not be breached.
In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of
unconstitutionality, requiring therefor the concurrence of a majority of the members of the
Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations and voted on the issue during their session en
banc. 11 And as established by judge made doctrine, the Court will assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into
such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have
been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably
necessary to the decision of the case itself. 12
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, we
hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has
sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures
complained of. 13 And even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it is still
within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment
to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 14 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although
they were invoking only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The
Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly
and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." We have since then
applied this exception in many other cases. 15
The other above-mentioned requisites have also been met in the present petitions.
In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with
constitutional issues like the ones now before it, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid
when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be
the Constitution as God and its conscience give it the light to probe its meaning and discover its

purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its
decision. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation.
For all the awesome power of the Congress and the Executive, the Court will not hesitate to
"make the hammer fall, and heavily," to use Justice Laurel's pithy language, where the acts of
these departments, or of any public official, betray the people's will as expressed in the
Constitution.
It need only be added, to borrow again the words of Justice Laurel, that
... when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does
not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn
and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
"judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution. 16
The cases before us categorically raise constitutional questions that this Court must
categorically resolve. And so we shall.
II
We proceed first to the examination of the preliminary issues before resolving the more serious
challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures involved in these petitions.
The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial
law has already been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no reason to modify or
reverse it on that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and
E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of
the 1987 Constitution, quoted above.
The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress
of the Philippines was formally convened and took over legislative power from her. They are not
"midnight" enactments intended to pre-empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on
July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were both issued
on July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid when she
lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or
repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso
facto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By
the same token, President Aquino's loss of legislative power did not have the effect of
invalidating all the measures enacted by her when and as long as she possessed it.
Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact
substantially affirmed the challenged measures and has specifically provided that they shall be
suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its provisions. 17 Indeed, some

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portions of the said measures, like the creation of the P50 billion fund in Section 2 of Proc. No.
131, and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229, have been incorporated by reference in the CARP
Law.18
That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not conform to
the requirements of a valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc.
No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of said fund, for
that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific purpose of
which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury.19 The creation of the fund is
only incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
It should follow that the specific constitutional provisions invoked, to wit, Section 24 and Section
25(4) of Article VI, are not applicable. With particular reference to Section 24, this obviously
could not have been complied with for the simple reason that the House of Representatives,
which now has the exclusive power to initiate appropriation measures, had not yet been
convened when the proclamation was issued. The legislative power was then solely vested in
the President of the Philippines, who embodied, as it were, both houses of Congress.

letter of instruction. The important thing is that it was issued by President Marcos, whose word
was law during that time.
But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos still had to comply
with the requirement for publication as this Court held in Tanada v. Tuvera. 21 Hence, unless
published in the Official Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, they could not
have any force and effect if they were among those enactments successfully challenged in that
case. LOI 474 was published, though, in the Official Gazette dated November 29,1976.)
Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of
mandamus cannot issue to compel the performance of a discretionary act, especially by a
specific department of the government. That is true as a general proposition but is subject to one
important qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that mandamus will lie to
compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be
exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action.
Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and
unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty
imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy
of mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely ministerial, the courts
will require specific action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the courts
by mandamus will require action only. For example, if an inferior court,
public official, or board should, for an unreasonable length of time, fail to
decide a particular question to the great detriment of all parties concerned,
or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the law clearly
gave it jurisdiction mandamus will issue, in the first case to require a
decision, and in the second to require that jurisdiction be taken of the
cause. 22

The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be
invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4
of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in
Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This section
declares:
Retention Limits. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person
may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural
land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable
family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and
soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner
exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child
of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least
fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly
managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been
covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area
originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead
grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at
the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as
they continue to cultivate said homestead.
The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only
one subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title of
the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in
the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title. 20
The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by
whatever name it was called, had the force and effect of law because it came from President
Marcos. Such are the ways of despots. Hence, it is futile to argue, as the petitioners do in G.R.
No. 79744, that LOI 474 could not have repealed P.D. No. 27 because the former was only a

And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not be proper as long as there is still a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy available from the administrative authorities, resort to the courts may still
be permitted if the issue raised is a question of law. 23
III
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain
that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. In
the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, 24 for example, where a law required the transfer of all
municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value,
the Court held that the power being exercised was eminent domain because the property
involved was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police
power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse,
which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be
destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable,
unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just
compensation to the owner.
In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 25 Justice Holmes laid down the limits of the
police power in a famous aphorism: "The general rule at least is that while property may be

85

regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." The
regulation that went "too far" was a law prohibiting mining which might cause the subsidence of
structures for human habitation constructed on the land surface. This was resisted by a coal
company which had earlier granted a deed to the land over its mine but reserved all mining
rights thereunder, with the grantee assuming all risks and waiving any damage claim. The Court
held the law could not be sustained without compensating the grantor. Justice Brandeis filed a
lone dissent in which he argued that there was a valid exercise of the police power. He said:
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the
police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is,
in that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in property without
making compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public health,
safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction
here in question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use. The property so
restricted remains in the possession of its owner. The state does not
appropriate it or make any use of it. The state merely prevents the owner
from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of the public.
Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious as it may because of
further changes in local or social conditions the restriction will have to be
removed and the owner will again be free to enjoy his property as
heretofore.
Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power and
the power of eminent domain, with the latter being used as an implement of the former like the
power of taxation. The employment of the taxing power to achieve a police purpose has long
been accepted. 26 As for the power of expropriation, Prof. John J. Costonis of the University of
Illinois College of Law (referring to the earlier case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365,
which sustained a zoning law under the police power) makes the following significant remarks:
Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges located the Police and
eminent domain powers on different planets. Generally speaking, they
viewed eminent domain as encompassing public acquisition of private
property for improvements that would be available for public use," literally
construed. To the police power, on the other hand, they assigned the less
intrusive task of preventing harmful externalities a point reflected in the
Euclid opinion's reliance on an analogy to nuisance law to bolster its support
of zoning. So long as suppression of a privately authored harm bore a
plausible relation to some legitimate "public purpose," the pertinent measure
need have afforded no compensation whatever. With the progressive growth
of government's involvement in land use, the distance between the two
powers has contracted considerably. Today government often employs
eminent domain interchangeably with or as a useful complement to the
police power-- a trend expressly approved in the Supreme Court's 1954
decision in Berman v. Parker, which broadened the reach of eminent
domain's "public use" test to match that of the police power's standard of
"public purpose." 27
The Berman case sustained a redevelopment project and the improvement of blighted areas in
the District of Columbia as a proper exercise of the police power. On the role of eminent domain
in the attainment of this purpose, Justice Douglas declared:

If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital
should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth
Amendment that stands in the way.
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it
through the exercise of eminent domain is clear.
For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. 28
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 29 decided by a 6-3 vote in 1978, the U.S
Supreme Court sustained the respondent's Landmarks Preservation Law under which the
owners of the Grand Central Terminal had not been allowed to construct a multi-story office
building over the Terminal, which had been designated a historic landmark. Preservation of the
landmark was held to be a valid objective of the police power. The problem, however, was that
the owners of the Terminal would be deprived of the right to use the airspace above it although
other landowners in the area could do so over their respective properties. While insisting that
there was here no taking, the Court nonetheless recognized certain compensatory rights
accruing to Grand Central Terminal which it said would "undoubtedly mitigate" the loss caused
by the regulation. This "fair compensation," as he called it, was explained by Prof. Costonis in
this wise:
In return for retaining the Terminal site in its pristine landmark status, Penn Central was
authorized to transfer to neighboring properties the authorized but unused rights accruing to the
site prior to the Terminal's designation as a landmark the rights which would have been
exhausted by the 59-story building that the city refused to countenance atop the Terminal.
Prevailing bulk restrictions on neighboring sites were proportionately relaxed, theoretically
enabling Penn Central to recoup its losses at the Terminal site by constructing or selling to
others the right to construct larger, hence more profitable buildings on the transferee sites. 30
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable
taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention
limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private
property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes
necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum
area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment
of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of
the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said
excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is
definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain.
Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent domain, the several
measures before us are challenged as violative of the due process and equal protection clauses.
The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 299 on the ground that no retention limits
are prescribed has already been discussed and dismissed. It is noted that although they excited
many bitter exchanges during the deliberation of the CARP Law in Congress, the retention limits
finally agreed upon are, curiously enough, not being questioned in these petitions. We therefore
do not discuss them here. The Court will come to the other claimed violations of due process in

86

connection with our examination of the adequacy of just compensation as required under the
power of expropriation.
The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the
absence of retention limits has also become academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657.
Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint
that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by
the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of
their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid
classification have been violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in
certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. 31 To be valid, it must
conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it
must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. 32 The Court finds that all these
requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.

That right covers the person's life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution. With regard to his property, the owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9,
which reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
This brings us now to the power of eminent domain.
IV
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly
acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just
compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate
where the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the
purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by
the parties. 35 It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept
the price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of
eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of the
State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield
to the irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored
justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of the
people is the supreme law.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike
both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. 33 The petitioners have not shown that
they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of
implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two
classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to
elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a
valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice
except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.

But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as
indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant
jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the
requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.

It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power only
if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests
of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require the interference
of the State and, no less important, the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. 34 As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the
Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be
examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional goal.

Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the State
should first distribute public agricultural lands in the pursuit of agrarian reform instead of
immediately disturbing property rights by forcibly acquiring private agricultural lands.
Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the
CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event, the
decision to redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was
made by the legislative and executive departments in the exercise of their discretion. We are not
justified in reviewing that discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has been abused.

One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are
concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it
is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution.
Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the
strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable
exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a,
person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even
as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right.

A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when
they decide what is known as the political question. As explained by Chief Justice Concepcion in
the case of Taada v. Cuenco: 36
The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. It refers to "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government." It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

87

It is true that the concept of the political question has been constricted with the enlargement of
judicial power, which now includes the authority of the courts "to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 37 Even so, this should not be construed as a
license for us to reverse the other departments simply because their views may not coincide with
ours.
The legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in their wisdom, to include in the CARP the
redistribution of private landholdings (even as the distribution of public agricultural lands is first
provided for, while also continuing apace under the Public Land Act and other cognate laws).
The Court sees no justification to interpose its authority, which we may assert only if we believe
that the political decision is not unwise, but illegal. We do not find it to be so.
In U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company, 38 it was held:
Congress having determined, as it did by the Act of March 3,1909 that the
entire St. Mary's river between the American bank and the international line,
as well as all of the upland north of the present ship canal, throughout its
entire length, was "necessary for the purpose of navigation of said waters,
and the waters connected therewith," that determination is conclusive in
condemnation proceedings instituted by the United States under that Act,
and there is no room for judicial review of the judgment of Congress ... .
As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has already been settled for us by the
Constitution itself No less than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform, which is the reason
why private agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the prescribed
maximum retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A. No.
6657 are only an elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the State adopt the necessary
measures "to encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands to enable
farmers who are landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till." That public use, as
pronounced by the fundamental law itself, must be binding on us.
The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just compensation, needs a longer and more
thoughtful examination.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator. 39 It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the
taker's gain but the owner's loss. 40 The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word
"compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be
taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample. 41
It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a
mere regulation of the use of private lands under the police power. We deal here with an actual
taking of private agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their property and
deprived them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the just compensation
mandated by the Constitution.

As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, 42 there is compensable taking when the
following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must
be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal
authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as
to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these requisites
are envisioned in the measures before us.
Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon its
taking possession of the condemned property, as "the compensation is a public charge, the
good faith of the public is pledged for its payment, and all the resources of taxation may be
employed in raising the amount." 43 Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the CARP Law provides that:
Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of
rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an
accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in
LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to
issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the
land to the qualified beneficiaries.
Objection is raised, however, to the manner of fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is
entrusted to the administrative authorities in violation of judicial prerogatives. Specific reference
is made to Section 16(d), which provides that in case of the rejection or disregard by the owner
of the offer of the government to buy his land... the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine
the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and
other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for
the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the
expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision.
The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for
decision.
To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of
justice and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. EPZA v.
Dulay 44 resolved a challenge to several decrees promulgated by President Marcos providing
that the just compensation for property under expropriation should be either the assessment of
the property by the government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner, whichever was
lower. In declaring these decrees unconstitutional, the Court held through Mr. Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr.:
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees
constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to
render this Court inutile in a matter which under this Constitution is reserved
to it for final determination.

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Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would

still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property,
following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply
stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or
the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the
court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in the taking of private
property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial
proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the strict
application of the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short of
a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the
valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always
limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or
independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil
could substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional
just compensation is concerned.
xxx
In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same
question of whether the courts under P.D. No. 1533, which contains the
same provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have
the power and authority to determine just compensation, independent of
what is stated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for
such purpose.
This time, we answer in the affirmative.
xxx
It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that
the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to
the basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a
minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court
promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the
property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented,
and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just
determination have been judiciously evaluated.
A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the
arbitrariness that rendered the challenged decrees constitutionally objectionable. Although the
proceedings are described as summary, the landowner and other interested parties are
nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. But
more importantly, the determination of the just compensation by the DAR is not by any means
final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly
provides:
Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court
of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.

The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties
concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right to review with finality the said
determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.
The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just compensation is not as easily
resolved.
This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows:
SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. The LBP shall
compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the
landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in accordance with the criteria
provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or
as may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for the
land.
The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option
of the landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:
(a) For lands above fifty (50)
hectares, insofar as the excess
hectarage is concerned Twentyfive percent (25%) cash, the
balance to be paid in government
financial instruments negotiable at
any time.
(b) For lands above twenty-four
(24) hectares and up to fifty (50)
hectares Thirty percent (30%)
cash, the balance to be paid in
government financial instruments
negotiable at any time.
(c) For lands twenty-four (24)
hectares and below Thirty-five
percent (35%) cash, the balance to
be paid in government financial
instruments negotiable at any time.
(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP
preferred shares, physical assets or other qualified investments in
accordance with guidelines set by the PARC;
(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;

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(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:

(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. Ten percent (10%) of the face
value of the bonds shall mature every year from the date of issuance until the tenth (10th) year:
Provided, That should the landowner choose to forego the cash portion, whether in full or in part,
he shall be paid correspondingly in LBP bonds;

neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than
the money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has always been
understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the
owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the
expropriation . 45 (Emphasis supplied.)
In J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, 46 this Court held:

(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used by the landowner, his
successors-in- interest or his assigns, up to the amount of their face value, for any of the
following:
(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government, including assets
under the Asset Privatization Program and other assets foreclosed by government
financial institutions in the same province or region where the lands for which the
bonds were paid are situated;
(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or controlled corporations or
shares of stock owned by the government in private corporations;
(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of accused persons,
or for performance bonds;
(iv) Security for loans with any government financial institution, provided the proceeds
of the loans shall be invested in an economic enterprise, preferably in a small and
medium- scale industry, in the same province or region as the land for which the
bonds are paid;
(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to government: Provided, That the use of these
bonds for these purposes will be limited to a certain percentage of the outstanding
balance of the financial instruments; Provided, further, That the PARC shall determine
the percentages mentioned above;
(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in
government universities, colleges, trade schools, and other institutions;
(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in government
hospitals; and
(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow.
The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the above provision is unconstitutional
insofar as it requires the owners of the expropriated properties to accept just compensation
therefor in less than money, which is the only medium of payment allowed. In support of this
contention, they cite jurisprudence holding that:
The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the
property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should be

It is well-settled that just compensation means the equivalent for the value
of the property at the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is more, and
anything short of that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not
whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity. The market value of
the land taken is the just compensation to which the owner of condemned
property is entitled, the market value being that sum of money which a
person desirous, but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing, but not
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received for
such property. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the United States, where much of our jurisprudence on the subject has been derived, the
weight of authority is also to the effect that just compensation for property expropriated is
payable only in money and not otherwise. Thus
The medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. The
condemnor cannot compel the owner to accept anything but money, nor can
the owner compel or require the condemnor to pay him on any other basis
than the value of the property in money at the time and in the manner
prescribed by the Constitution and the statutes. When the power of eminent
domain is resorted to, there must be a standard medium of payment,
binding upon both parties, and the law has fixed that standard as money in
cash. 47 (Emphasis supplied.)
Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of
things, be regarded as a reliable and constant standard of compensation. 48
"Just compensation" for property taken by condemnation means a fair
equivalent in money, which must be paid at least within a reasonable time
after the taking, and it is not within the power of the Legislature to substitute
for such payment future obligations, bonds, or other valuable
advantage. 49 (Emphasis supplied.)
It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of just
compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in
the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional excercise of the
power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of
relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and
perhaps local purpose.

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What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.

The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever
kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This
kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small
segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society, from the
impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover only the whole
territory of this country but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to
secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos.
Generations yet to come are as involved in this program as we are today, although hopefully
only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life we will guarantee to them tomorrow
through our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be forgotten that it is no less than the
Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the farms, calling for "a just distribution"
among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can now
become the key at least to their deliverance.
Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous.
Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we
estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the amount of
P50 billion initially appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our present standards.
Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time.
We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for
agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this assumption that
when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just
compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more
practical method. There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial limitations of the
government and had no illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for
the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. We may therefore assume that their
intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law,
particularly the payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or indeed
of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other things of value. We may also suppose
that what they had in mind was a similar scheme of payment as that prescribed in P.D. No. 27,
which was the law in force at the time they deliberated on the new Charter and with which they
presumably agreed in principle.
The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical
agreement among the members regarding the meaning to be given the concept of just
compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform program being contemplated.
There was the suggestion to "fine tune" the requirement to suit the demands of the project even
as it was also felt that they should "leave it to Congress" to determine how payment should be
made to the landowner and reimbursement required from the farmer-beneficiaries. Such
innovations as "progressive compensation" and "State-subsidized compensation" were also
proposed. In the end, however, no special definition of the just compensation for the lands to be
expropriated was reached by the Commission. 50

On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the assumptions
we are making of the general sentiments and intention of the members on the content and
manner of the payment to be made to the landowner in the light of the magnitude of the
expenditure and the limitations of the expropriator.
With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just
compensation provided for in the afore- quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of
the Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced
our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the
realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The Court is as
acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after
the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades.
We are aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire
program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the
spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention
of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today.
Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made
fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value
constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated,
is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the
payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big
landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less
importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are
"negotiable at any time." The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his
option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds,
other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just
compensation.
Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and small,
not a little inconvenience. As already remarked, this cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it is
devoutly hoped that these countrymen of ours, conscious as we know they are of the need for
their forebearance and even sacrifice, will not begrudge us their indispensable share in the
attainment of the ideal of agrarian reform. Otherwise, our pursuit of this elusive goal will be like
the quest for the Holy Grail.
The complaint against the effects of non-registration of the land under E.O. No. 229 does not
seem to be viable any more as it appears that Section 4 of the said Order has been superseded
by Section 14 of the CARP Law. This repeats the requisites of registration as embodied in the
earlier measure but does not provide, as the latter did, that in case of failure or refusal to register
the land, the valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city assessor for tax
purposes. On the contrary, the CARP Law says that the just compensation shall be ascertained
on the basis of the factors mentioned in its Section 17 and in the manner provided for in Section
16.
The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before
actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well- accepted principle
of eminent domain.

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The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner
to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this
settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. Thus:
Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor
until the judgment fixing just compensation is entered and paid, but the condemnor's title relates
back to the date on which the petition under the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioner's
report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed. 51
... although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of
entry, title to the property taken remains in the owner until payment is actually
made. 52 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 53 the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to
property does not pass to the condemnor until just compensation had actually been made. In
fact, the decisions appear to be uniformly to this effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v.
McLure, 54 it was held that "actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was a
condition precedent to the investment of the title to the property in the State" albeit "not to the
appropriation of it to public use." In Rexford v. Knight, 55 the Court of Appeals of New York said
that the construction upon the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State until the
payment of the compensation although the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land was
complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further said that "both on principle and authority the rule
is ... that the right to enter on and use the property is complete, as soon as the property is
actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public use, but that the title does not pass
from the owner without his consent, until just compensation has been made to him."
Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, 56 that:
If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are
attentively examined it will be apparent that the method of expropriation
adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no
piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner
until compensation is paid ... . (Emphasis supplied.)
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21,
1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a
family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him
unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers'
cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to
be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October
21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27.
(Emphasis supplied.)

it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of
full-fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation.
Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease
rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer- beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer
of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance payment
for the land."
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to
the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the
DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also
remains with the landowner. 57 No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring
title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.
It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27,
as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even now under R.A. No. 6657. This
should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners
whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the
area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct
compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall
retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."
In connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal
filed by the petitioners with the Office of the President has already been resolved. Although we
have said that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not preclude
immediate resort to judicial action, there are factual issues that have yet to be examined on the
administrative level, especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474 because
they do not own other agricultural lands than the subjects of their petition.
Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming that the petitioners
have not yet exercised their retention rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that they
are entitled to the new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the
whole more liberal than those granted by the decree.
V
The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the subject of
bitter attack from those who point to the shortcomings of these measures and ask that they be
scrapped entirely. To be sure, these enactments are less than perfect; indeed, they should be
continuously re-examined and rehoned, that they may be sharper instruments for the better
protection of the farmer's rights. But we have to start somewhere. In the pursuit of agrarian
reform, we do not tread on familiar ground but grope on terrain fraught with pitfalls and expected
difficulties. This is inevitable. The CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On the contrary, to
use Justice Holmes's words, "it is an experiment, as all life is an experiment," and so we learn as
we venture forward, and, if necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot expect perfection
although we should strive for it by all means. Meantime, we struggle as best we can in freeing
the farmer from the iron shackles that have unconscionably, and for so long, fettered his soul to
the soil.

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By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform
program are removed, to clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse
the day he will be released not only from want but also from the exploitation and disdain of the
past and from his own feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last his servitude will be
ended forever. At last the farm on which he toils will be his farm. It will be his portion of the
Mother Earth that will give him not only the staff of life but also the joy of living. And where once
it bred for him only deep despair, now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling
future. Now at last can he banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities and dark
resentments and "rebuild in it the music and the dream."

ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND

LORENZO SANCHEZ,petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent.
PARAS, J.:
A TV ad proudly announces:
"The new PAGCOR responding through responsible gaming."

WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:

1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229
are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein
petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only
upon full payment of compensation to their respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are
retained and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under
P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under
the conditions therein prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED,
without pronouncement as to costs.

But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter PD 1869, because it is
allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because
A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized
by law. It waived the Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license fees,
which is recognized by law;
B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has
intruded into the local government's right to impose local taxes and license fees. This,
in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy;
C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes
PAGCOR conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed,
together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;
D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and
crony economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization. (p. 2, Amended Petition;
p. 7, Rollo)
In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared
national policy of the "new restored democracy" and the people's will as expressed in the 1987
Constitution. The decree is said to have a "gambling objective" and therefore is contrary to
Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV, of the
present Constitution (p. 3, Second Amended Petition; p. 21, Rollo).

SO ORDERED.

The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner
Basco being also the Chairman of the Committee on Laws of the City Council of Manila), can
question and seek the annulment of PD 1869 on the alleged grounds mentioned above.

G.R. No. 91649

May 14, 1991

The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D.
1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated
January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." Its operation was originally conducted in the well
known floating casino "Philippine Tourist." The operation was considered a success for it proved
to be a potential source of revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-economic projects, thus, P.D.
1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this objective.
Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the
Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or
permitted by law, under the following declared policy

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Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to

centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing
franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the following objectives:
(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games of
chance into one corporate entity to be controlled, administered and supervised by the
Government.
(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation,
including sports gaming pools, (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other
forms of amusement and recreation including games of chance, which may be
allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: (1)
generate sources of additional revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-civic projects,
such as flood control programs, beautification, sewerage and sewage projects,
Tulungan ng Bayan Centers, Nutritional Programs, Population Control and such other
essential public services; (2) create recreation and integrated facilities which will
expand and improve the country's existing tourist attractions; and (3) minimize, if not
totally eradicate, all the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are normally prevalent
on the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without direct
government involvement. (Section 1, P.D. 1869)
To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under
its Charter's repealing clause, all laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations,
inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed, amended or modified.
It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR earned P3.43
Billion, and directly remitted to the National Government a total of P2.5 Billion in form of
franchise tax, government's income share, the President's Social Fund and Host Cities' share. In
addition, PAGCOR sponsored other socio-cultural and charitable projects on its own or in
cooperation with various governmental agencies, and other private associations and
organizations. In its 3 1/2 years of operation under the present administration, PAGCOR remitted
to the government a total of P6.2 Billion. As of December 31, 1989, PAGCOR was employing
4,494 employees in its nine (9) casinos nationwide, directly supporting the livelihood of Four
Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Four (4,494) families.

As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate
branch of the government We need not be reminded of the time-honored principle, deeply
ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must
be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This is not to say that We approach Our task with
diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear that the legislature or the executive for that matter, has
over-stepped the limits of its authority under the constitution, We should not hesitate to wield the
axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the offending statute (Lozano v. Martinez, supra).
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr. Justice
Zaldivar underscored the
. . . thoroughly established principle which must be followed in all cases where
questions of constitutionality as obtain in the instant cases are involved. All
presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute
alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a
law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis
may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld and the challenger
must negate all possible basis; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom,
justice, policy or expediency of a statute and that a liberal interpretation of the
constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted. (Danner v.
Hass, 194 N.W. 2nd 534, 539; Spurbeck v. Statton, 106 N.W. 2nd 660, 663; 59 SCRA
66; see also e.g. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 739 [1970]; Peralta v. Commission
on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55 [1978]; and Heirs of Ordona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220,
241-242 [1983] cited in Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy
Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521, 540)
Of course, there is first, the procedural issue. The respondents are questioning the legal
personality of petitioners to file the instant petition.
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the
Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they
have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of
procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. (Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa
Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371)

But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869. They allege that the same is
"null and void" for being "contrary to morals, public policy and public order," monopolistic and
tends toward "crony economy", and is violative of the equal protection clause and local
autonomy as well as for running counter to the state policies enunciated in Sections 11
(Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1
(Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution.

With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases
before us, We hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors
because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury
as a result of the acts or measures complained of. And even if, strictly speaking they
are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to
waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving
the serious constitutional questions raised.

This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and the most
deliberate consideration by the Court, involving as it does the exercise of what has been
described as "the highest and most delicate function which belongs to the judicial department of
the government." (State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323).

In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino
although they were involving only an indirect and general interest shared in common
with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties
and ruled that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands
that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must technicalities of
procedure." We have since then applied the exception in many other cases.
(Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform,
175 SCRA 343).
Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now discuss the substantive issues raised.

94

Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the prohibition of
gambling does not mean that the Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police
power.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the
"state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare." (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an
imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not
capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its
all-comprehensive embrace. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163
SCRA 386).

(2) Income and other taxes. a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form,
income or otherwise as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether
National or Local, shall be assessed and collected under this franchise from the
Corporation; nor shall any form or tax or charge attach in any way to the earnings of
the Corporation, except a franchise tax of five (5%) percent of the gross revenues or
earnings derived by the Corporation from its operations under this franchise. Such tax
shall be due and payable quarterly to the National Government and shall be in lieu of
all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or assessments of any kind, nature or description,
levied, established or collected by any municipal, provincial or national government
authority (Section 13 [2]).
Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons:

Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions
and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra)
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the
charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of
statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to
perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been
credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the state "to govern its citizens". (Tribe,
American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978). The police power of the State is a power co-extensive
with self-protection and is most aptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v.
Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable
of powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force that enables the
state to meet the agencies of the winds of change.
What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869?
P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and centralize thru
an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by
law" (1st whereas clause, PD 1869). As was subsequently proved, regulating and centralizing
gambling operations in one corporate entity the PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the
Government but to society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the
cash strapped Government. It provided funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling
to "close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of the Government" (4th Whereas Clause,
PD 1869). With the creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the Government, the evil
practices and corruptions that go with gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated. Public
welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896.
Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to
impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle
of local autonomy. They must be referring to Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts
PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise,
as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local."

(a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes
(Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v.
Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent
to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it" (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 SCRA
62). Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having
been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax" (Bernas, the Revised
[1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).
(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that
"municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909,
January 18, 1957) which has the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its
"general legislative powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA
541). Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes,
G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax
certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
(c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As
early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise,
licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National
Government, thus:
Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority of chartered
cities and other local governments to issue license, permit or other form of franchise to
operate, maintain and establish horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of
gambling is hereby revoked.
Sec. 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and establish, horse
and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling shall be issued by the
national government upon proper application and verification of the qualification of the
applicant . . .
Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the
operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a
consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila.
(d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.
PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All
of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. In addition to its corporate
powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers thus:

95

Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the

affiliated entities, and shall exercise all the powers, authority and the responsibilities
vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission over such affiliating entities
mentioned under the preceding section, including, but not limited to amendments of
Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, changes in corporate term, structure,
capitalization and other matters concerning the operation of the affiliated entities, the
provisions of the Corporation Code of the Philippines to the contrary notwithstanding,
except only with respect to original incorporation.
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is
governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government.
Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from
local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a
mere Local government.
The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in
any manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry
into execution the powers vested in the federal government. (MC Culloch v. Marland, 4
Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)
This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local
governments.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire
absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the
instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be
agreed that no state or political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in
such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to
seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them. (Antieau, Modern Constitutional
Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, emphasis supplied)
Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what
local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as
"a tool for regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42).
The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (Mc Culloch v.
Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity
which has the inherent power to wield it.
(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by
P.D. 1869. This is a pointless argument. Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on Local Autonomy)
provides:
Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of
revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and
limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
government. (emphasis supplied)
The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations"
which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended,
repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as
an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It
cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.

Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
"decentralization" (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in
Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It
does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio."
Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state
which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary
system of government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution,
local governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation,
it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only
mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government. (emphasis
supplied)
As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local
government units remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political
question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA
539).
What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a
State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local
governments.
As gambling is usually an offense against the State, legislative grant or express
charter power is generally necessary to empower the local corporation to deal with the
subject. . . . In the absence of express grant of power to enact, ordinance provisions
on this subject which are inconsistent with the state laws are void . (Ligan v. Gadsden,
Ala App. 107 So. 733 Ex-Parte Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757 following in re Ah
You, 88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC 974, 22 Am St. Rep. 280, 11 LRA 480, as cited in Mc Quinllan
Vol. 3 Ibid, p. 548, emphasis supplied)
Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution,
because "it legalized PAGCOR conducted gambling, while most gambling are outlawed
together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices" (p. 82, Rollo).
We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores the
well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not
preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as
long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155).
A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21,
1989).
The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of
individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847).
The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in
law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).
Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal
protection is not clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like
cockfighting (P.D 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries
and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others
are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.

96

If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown
because there are other instances to which it might have been applied. (Gomez v.
Palomar, 25 SCRA 827)
The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all
occupations called by the same name must be treated the same way; the state may
do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those cases in
which harm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the public that would
insure if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact. (Dominican Hotel v.
Arizona, 249 US 2651).
Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of the Cory Government
away from monopolies and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization" suffice
it to state that this is not a ground for this Court to nullify P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs
counter to the government's policies then it is for the Executive Department to recommend to
Congress its repeal or amendment.
The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is
and not what the law should be.1wphi1 Under our system of government, policy
issues are within the domain of the political branches of government and of the people
themselves as the repository of all state power. (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA
256).
On the issue of "monopoly," however, the Constitution provides that:
Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so
requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.
(Art. XII, National Economy and Patrimony)

petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is therefore,
inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation considering the issues of
"morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization as well as the state principles on social
justice, role of youth and educational values" being raised, is up for Congress to determine.
As this Court held in Citizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162
SCRA 521
Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 has, in any
case, in its favor the presumption of validity and constitutionality which petitioners
Valmonte and the KMU have not overturned. Petitioners have not undertaken to
identify the provisions in the Constitution which they claim to have been violated by
that statute. This Court, however, is not compelled to speculate and to imagine how
the assailed legislation may possibly offend some provision of the Constitution. The
Court notes, further, in this respect that petitioners have in the main put in question the
wisdom, justice and expediency of the establishment of the OPSF, issues which are
not properly addressed to this Court and which this Court may not constitutionally
pass upon. Those issues should be addressed rather to the political departments of
government: the President and the Congress.
Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral, and this is precisely so
when the gambling resorted to is excessive. This excessiveness necessarily depends not only
on the financial resources of the gambler and his family but also on his mental, social, and
spiritual outlook on life. However, the mere fact that some persons may have lost their material
fortunes, mental control, physical health, or even their lives does not necessarily mean that the
same are directly attributable to gambling. Gambling may have been the antecedent, but
certainly not necessarily the cause. For the same consequences could have been preceded by
an overdose of food, drink, exercise, work, and even sex.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are not necessarily prohibited by
the Constitution. The state must still decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be
regulated or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide.

SO ORDERED.

On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12 (Family)
and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2
(Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are
merely statements of principles and, policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing,
meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles.
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing
principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives
addressed to the executive and the legislature. If the executive and the legislature
failed to heed the directives of the articles the available remedy was not judicial or
political. The electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the
executive and the legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil.
387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179
SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In other words,
the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec, supra)
Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly
establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the
grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that

97

G.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989

SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner,
vs.
CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD
TOMAWIS, GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO
PALOMARES, JR., RAUL DAGALANGIT, and BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in this petition. The
antecedent facts are as follows:
1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was
appointed as a member of the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional
Autonomous Government, Region XII, representing Lanao del Sur.
2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional
Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly
for brevity).
3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said
members, respondents Acmad Tomawis and Pakil Dagalangit, filed on
March 23, 1987 with the Commission on Elections their respective
certificates of candidacy in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections for the
district of Lanao del Sur but they later withdrew from the aforesaid election
and thereafter resumed again their positions as members of the Assembly.
4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of
the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited
Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the
petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a letter
which reads:
The Committee on Muslim Affairs well undertake
consultations and dialogues with local government
officials, civic, religious organizations and traditional

98

leaders on the recent and present political

developments and other issues affecting Regions IX
and XII.

3. Dagalangit, Rakil

The result of the conference, consultations and

dialogues would hopefully chart the autonomous
governments of the two regions as envisioned and may
prod the President to constitute immediately the
Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by the
Commission.

5. Mangelen, Conte

You are requested to invite some members of the

Pampook Assembly of your respective assembly on
November 1 to 15, 1987, with venue at the Congress of
the Philippines. Your presence, unstinted support and
cooperation is (sic) indispensable.

8. Sinsuat, Bimbo

5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting

Secretary Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that
there shall be no session in November as "our presence in the house
committee hearing of Congress take (sic) precedence over any pending
business in batasang pampook ... ."
6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting
Secretary Alimbuyao sent to the members of the Assembly the following
telegram:
TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM SPEAKER
LIMBONA
QUOTE
CONGRESSMAN
JIMMY
MATALAM CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE
ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS REQUESTED ME TO ASSIST
SAID COMMITTEE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE
PROPOSED AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV. 1ST TO 15.
HENCE WERE ALL ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE
SHALL BE NO SESSION IN NOVEMBER AS OUR
PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE COMMITTEE HEARING
OF CONGRESS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY
PENDING BUSINESS IN BATASANG PAMPOOK OF
MATALAM FOLLOWS UNQUOTE REGARDS.
7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of
petitioner's advice, with the following assemblymen present:
1. Sali, Salic
2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)

4. Dela Fuente, Antonio

6. Ortiz, Jesus
7. Palomares, Diego

9. Tomawis, Acmad
10. Tomawis, Jerry
After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was
authorized to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the
Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative,
hence, the chair declared said seat of the Speaker vacant. 8. On November
5, 1987, the session of the Assembly resumed with the following
Assemblymen present:
1. Mangelen Conte-Presiding Officer
2. Ali Salic
3. Ali Salindatu
4. Aratuc, Malik
5. Cajelo, Rene
6. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)
7. Dagalangit, Rakil
8. Dela Fuente, Antonio
9. Ortiz, Jesus
10 Palomares, Diego
11. Quijano, Jesus

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12. Sinsuat, Bimbo

13. Tomawis, Acmad
14. Tomawis, Jerry
An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said session reads:
HON. DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of the House, with
the presence of our colleagues who have come to attend the session today,
I move to call the names of the new comers in order for them to cast their
votes on the previous motion to declare the position of the Speaker vacant.
But before doing so, I move also that the designation of the Speaker Pro
Tempore as the Presiding Officer and Mr. Johnny Evangelists as Acting
Secretary in the session last November 2, 1987 be reconfirmed in today's
session.

Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution filed by the
Sangguniang Pampook, "EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF
THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK AUTONOMOUS REGION XII," 3 on the grounds, among other
things, that the petitioner "had caused to be prepared and signed by him paying [sic] the salaries
and emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after filing his Certificate of
Candidacy for Congressmen for the First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections. . .
and nothing in the record of the Assembly will show that any request for reinstatement by Abdula
was ever made . . ." 4 and that "such action of Mr. Lim bona in paying Abdula his salaries and
emoluments without authority from the Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation of the power of the
Assembly," 5 that the petitioner "had recently caused withdrawal of so much amount of cash from
the Assembly resulting to the non-payment of the salaries and emoluments of some Assembly
[sic]," 6 and that he had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the
Assembly on question which should have been resolved within the confines of the
Assembly," 7 for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and
academic". 8
The first question, evidently, is whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation)
has made the case moot and academic.

HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions.

PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two motions
presented? Me chair hears none and the said motions are approved. ...
Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat of the
Speaker vacant; one abstained and none voted against. 1
Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that(a) This Petition be given due course;
(b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be
issued enjoining respondents from proceeding with their session to be held
on November 5, 1987, and on any day thereafter;
(c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by
respondents of their session on November 2, 1987 as null and void;
(d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative
Assembly or Batasan Pampook, Region XII held on March 12, 1987 valid
and subsisting, and
(e) Making the injunction permanent.
Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable. 2

We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by reason simply of the
expulsion resolution so issued. For, if the petitioner's expulsion was done purposely to make this
petition moot and academic, and to preempt the Court, it will not make it academic.
On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold that the expulsion in
question is of no force and effect. In the first place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had
conducted an investigation, and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his defense,
assuming that there was an investigation, or otherwise given the opportunity to do so. On the
other hand, what appears in the records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the
respondents) that "since November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner has not set foot at the
Sangguniang Pampook." 9 "To be sure, the private respondents aver that "[t]he Assemblymen, in
a conciliatory gesture, wanted him to come to Cotabato City," 10 but that was "so that their
differences could be threshed out and settled." 11 Certainly, that avowed wanting or desire to
thresh out and settle, no matter how conciliatory it may be cannot be a substitute for the notice
and hearing contemplated by law.
While we have held that due process, as the term is known in administrative law, does not
absolutely require notice and that a party need only be given the opportunity to be heard, 12 it
does not appear herein that the petitioner had, to begin with, been made aware that he had in
fact stood charged of graft and corruption before his collegues. It cannot be said therefore that
he was accorded any opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now
levelled amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion.
In the second place, (the resolution) appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other
Assemblymen against the petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be abduracy on the
part of the latter. Indeed, it (the resolution) speaks of "a case [having been filed] [by the
petitioner] before the Supreme Court . . . on question which should have been resolved within
the confines of the Assemblyman act which some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly
assails their integrity and character as representative of the people" 13 an act that cannot
possibly justify expulsion. Access to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution, 14 and,

100

unless the recourse amounts to malicious prosecution, no one may be punished for seeking
redress in the courts.

(10) Citizenship and naturalization;

(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and

We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner
indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to commence
proper proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of due process. And
while it is within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring
colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in the event
that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse.
It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s) are "autonomous,"
the courts may not rightfully intervene in their affairs, much less strike down their acts. We come,
therefore, to the second issue: Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they
are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the
extent of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by
Presidential Decree No. 1618 15 promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things, the Decree
established "internal autonomy" 16 in the two regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution," 17 with
legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities 18 specified
therein.
It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal administrative
matters for the respective regions," 19 except to "act on matters which are within the jurisdiction
and competence of the National Government," 20 "which include, but are not limited to, the
following:
(1) National defense and security;
(2) Foreign relations;
(3) Foreign trade;
(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasibanking, and external borrowing,
(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all
natural resources;
(6) Air and sea transport
(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;
(8) Customs and quarantine;
(9) Immigration and deportation;

(12) General auditing. 21

In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have the power of
general supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions ..." 22
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers
to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to
make local governments "more responsive and accountable," 23 "and ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress." 24 At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" 25 over them, but only to "ensure that
local affairs are administered according to law." 26 He has no control over their acts in the sense
that he can substitute their judgments with his own. 27
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the
favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to
"self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to
the central authorities but to its constituency. 28
But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy Muslim Mindanao under the 1987
Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere administration is a
question foreign to this petition, since what is involved herein is a local government unit
constituted prior to the ratification of the present Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve
that controversy now, in this case, since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the
proper time and in the proper case.
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. Here
shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided. 29
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. 30
xxx xxx xxx
See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and

101

geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural

heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics
within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as
well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. 31
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X,
sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on
the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the
former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through
the President (and the Department of Local Government). 32 If the Sangguniang Pampook (of
Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain
of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the
Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it
comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree
creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to
exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act
of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he
President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous
Regions." 33 In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to
discharge chiefly administrative services, thus:
SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook. The Sangguniang Pampook
shall exercise local legislative powers over regional affairs within the
framework of national development plans, policies and goals, in the
following areas:
(1) Organization of regional administrative system;
(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region;
(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the Autonomous
Region;
(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region;
(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;
(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this
Decree;
(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established by the
Autonomous Region;
(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other
social services, programs and facilities;

(9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and

culture indigenous to the Autonomous Region; and
(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,including the
enactment of such measures as may be necessary for the promotion of the
general welfare of the people in the Autonomous Region.
The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure
that enactment and acts of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong
Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance with this Decree, national
legislation, policies, plans and programs.
The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang
Pambansa. 34
Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in
question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.
Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on the grounds that: (1) the
Sanggunian, in convening on November 2 and 5, 1987 (for the sole purpose of declaring the
office of the Speaker vacant), did so in violation of the Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook since
the Assembly was then on recess; and (2) assuming that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective
nevertheless for lack of quorum.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is
true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be
suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook," 35 but it provides
likewise that "the Speaker may, on [sic] his discretion, declare a recess of "short intervals." 36 Of
course, there is disagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not the recess called
by the petitioner effective November 1 through 15, 1987 is the "recess of short intervals" referred
to; the petitioner says that it is while the respondents insist that, to all intents and purposes, it
was an adjournment and that "recess" as used by their Rules only refers to "a recess when
arguments get heated up so that protagonists in a debate can talk things out informally and
obviate dissenssion [sic] and disunity. 37 The Court agrees with the respondents on this regard,
since clearly, the Rules speak of "short intervals." Secondly, the Court likewise agrees that the
Speaker could not have validly called a recess since the Assembly had yet to convene on
November 1, the date session opens under the same Rules. 38 Hence, there can be no recess to
speak of that could possibly interrupt any session. But while this opinion is in accord with the
respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the
petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could. do so. In the
second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of
Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that
a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to
this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his
back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this
reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.

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It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted to the aforesaid "recess" in
order to forestall the Assembly from bringing about his ouster. This is not apparent from the
pleadings before us. We are convinced that the invitation was what precipitated it.
In holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are not to be taken as establishing a
precedent, since, as we said, a recess can not be validly declared without a session having
been first opened. In upholding the petitioner herein, we are not giving him a carte blanche to
order recesses in the future in violation of the Rules, or otherwise to prevent the lawful meetings
thereof.
Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the Sanggunian from reorganizing itself
pursuant to its lawful prerogatives. Certainly, it can do so at the proper time. In the event that be
petitioner should initiate obstructive moves, the Court is certain that it is armed with enough
coercive remedies to thwart them. 39
In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of quorum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Sangguniang Pampook,
Region XII, is ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the petitioner as Member, Sangguniang Pampook,
Region XII; and (2) REINSTATE him as Speaker thereof. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and directing the
court of origin to proceed with the case.
G.R. No. L-18630

December 17, 1966

APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS, respondents.
P. Carreon and G. O. Veneracion, Jr. for petitioner.
Antonio V. Bonoan for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R) revoking an order of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No. Q-4797) dismissing appellant's action for
support and damages.
The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from December, 1957, the
defendant (appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being
of adult age; that "defendant expressed and professed his undying love and affection for plaintiff
who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in consideration of defendant's
promise of marriage plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal knowledge;
that regularly until December 1959, through his protestations of love and promises of marriage,
defendant succeeded in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter
conceived a child; that due to her pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and social
humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was
receiving P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff became unable to support herself and her baby;
that due to defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff, as promised, the latter suffered mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. The prayer was
for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was bearing; to
pay her not less than P430.00 a month for her support and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in
moral and exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00 attorney's fees.
Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first instance dismissed the complaint for failure
to state a cause of action.
Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter ultimately decided the case,
holding with the lower court that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of a child
as yet unborn, nor for its support, but decreed that the complaint did state a cause of action for
damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, prescribing as follows:

Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach of a promise to marry
are not permissible in this jurisdiction, and invoking the rulings of this Court in Estopa vs.
Piansay, L-14733, September 30, 1960; Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, January
29, 1962; and De Jesus vs. SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.
We find this appeal meritorious.
In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under Article 21 above
mentioned, the Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted from the memorandum submitted by
the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to support the original draft of the Civil Code.
Referring to Article 23 of the draft (now Article 21 of the Code), the Commission stated:
But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or
determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the
statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they
have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it
necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the
following rule:
"ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteenyear old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not
be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as
the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of
promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been
committed, and though the girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral
damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. But under the
proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code
Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential
feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise
of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura,
27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that

104

To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or

inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If
she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there
is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must be induced to depart
from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles,
which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately
submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).

VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff started conceiving which
was confirmed by a doctor sometime in July, 1959;
VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff informed the
defendant and pleaded with him to make good his promises of marriage, but instead
of honoring his promises and righting his wrong, the defendant stopped and refrained
from seeing the plaintiff since about July, 1959 has not visited the plaintiff and to all
intents and purposes has broken their engagement and his promises.

And in American Jurisprudence we find:

On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or
deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to
warrant a recover.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or
curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity
for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all
such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a
reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit." (47
Am. Jur. 662)
Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The material allegations there
are as follows:
I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South E. Diliman, Quezon
City, while defendant is also of legal age, single and residing at 525 Padre Faura,
Manila, where he may be served with summons;

Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958
to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with
appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of
seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of
the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year,
without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart
all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we
conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action
being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint.
Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever actions may
correspond to the child of the plaintiff against the defendant-appellant, if any. On that point, this
Court makes no pronouncement, since the child's own rights are not here involved.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of
the Court of First Instance is affirmed. No costs.

II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with each other sometime
in December, 1957 and soon thereafter, the defendant started visiting and courting the
plaintiff;
III. That the defendant's visits were regular and frequent and in due time the defendant
expressed and professed his undying love and affection for the plaintiff who also in
due time reciprocated the tender feelings;
IV. That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff and the defendant as are wont
of young people in love had frequent outings and dates, became very close and
intimate to each other and sometime in July, 1958, in consideration of the defendant's
promises of marriage, the plaintiff consented and acceded to the former's earnest and
repeated pleas to have carnal knowledge with him;
V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959 except for a short
period in December, 1958 when the defendant was out of the country, the defendant
through his protestations of love and promises of marriage succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with the plaintiff;

105

their use by petitioners attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute malpractice or gross
misconduct. For this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondents complaint.
[G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.]
CECILIA

ZULUETA, petitioner,
MARTIN, respondents.

vs. COURT

OF

APPEALS

and

ALFREDO

Petitioners contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment.
Among other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged
that in using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross
misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against
Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix, Jr. which it found to be
impressed with merit:2

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and
papers taken by her from private respondents clinic without the latters knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of
her mother, a driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet
in her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between
Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a
case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner
had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for
damages against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him
the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiffs Complaint or
those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and
any person acting in her behalf to immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him
P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorneys fees; and to pay
the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and
petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or
submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner,
without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the documents and
papers to be properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private
respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the trial courts decision, petitioners only ground is that in Alfredo
Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes
A-i to J-7 of respondents comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore,

On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he

maintains that:
xxx xxx xxx
4. When respondent refiled Cecilias case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial Court, there
was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents
Annex A-I to J-7. On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court on a
petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set
aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Courts order, respondents request
for petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon as
malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned
annexes. At that point in time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use petitioners admission
as evidence against him in the legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati?
Respondent submits it is- not malpractice.
Significantly, petitioners admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself
under oath. Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in
evidence against him. Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of
her husbands admission and use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated
as malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a
declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martins
admission as to their genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive
order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of
the documents and papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating
the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he
used the documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily
restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial courts order was dismissed and, therefore, the
prohibition against the further use of the documents and papers became effective again.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]

106

inviolable3is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court
or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.4 Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy
as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. 6 Neither may be examined without the consent
of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

107