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Luke Roy
Ms. Johnson
English 102
October 2, 2014
Article Review
I am considering researching the harmful effects of anthropocentrism upon the
environment and the feasibility of adopting an ecocentric or biocentric ethic to reorient how
humans view the environment and to repair human inflicted damage upon the environment. In
Rethinking Cosmopolitan Ethics, author Hugh P. McDonald addresses the problems of
anthropocentric or humanist ethics and the effect of said ethic on the environment, in an effort to
establish an ecocentric cosmopolitan ethic that would include the environment in our ethical
system. Moving away from anthropocentrism, as proposed by McDonald, is of the utmost
importance because it could prevent further environmental damage and resituate humanity in its
rightful place in the environment. Unfortunately, McDonalds analysis of anthropocentrism and
recommendation of an ecocentric cosmopolitan ethic, while insightful, is ultimately useless in
the context of my research because of flaws in McDonald's reasoning.
Hugh P. McDonald is overly qualified to write on the subject of environmental ethics.
McDonald has a Ph.D. in philosophy from New School University and currently teaches at the
New York City College of Technology (New York City College of Technology). Additionally,
McDonald is an expert on environmental ethics; he has written numerous articles on how to
properly address environmental problems such as "Pragmatism and the Problem of the Intrinsic
Value of the Environment and John Dewey and Environmental Philosophy. McDonald also

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edited Pragmatism and Environmentalism. As shown by his accolades and by the vast works
that he has completed within the academy, McDonalds possesses a vast knowledge of
environmental ethics and rightly deserves the title of expert in his field (Hugh McDonald).
In Rethinking Cosmopolitan Ethics, McDonald argues that anthropocentrism is a
misguided and almost tribal ethical system. Anthropocentrism or the belief that humans are the
most valuable species on the planet is inherently exclusionary and violent, similar to how native
tribes excluded and exterminated one another (McDonald 54). When humans adopt an
anthropocentric ethic, they otherize the nonhuman. According to McDonald, this is a
fundamental injustice because it overlooks other species that have the same intrinsic value as
humans. Additionally, this ethic is unjust because it justifies the exploitation of natural resources,
overconsumption, and destruction of natural resources in order to further human progress; for in
a world where humans are of the utmost importance, any atrocity against nature can be justified
for the sake of the human (McDonald 58). McDonald shows humans to be on the same level as
nature by attempting to disprove the existence of the elements of human nature, specifically
uniquely human reason and morality, which are commonly used to distinguish humanity from the
natural world. McDonald disproves the existence of human reason by asserting that not every
human can reason with the same proficiency and therefore reason alone does not act as a
qualification for worth because humans who lack certain logistic capabilities still hold value in
our society (McDonald 59). McDonald then explains that morality can also not be used as a
qualification for worth because morality is not intrinsic to humanity. He uses examples of
genocide and racism to show that not all humans have the capability to act ethically (McDonald
59, 60, 61). Additionally he posits that nonhumans have means of evaluation that cannot be
accessed by humans, such as the size of an elephant or the root structure of a tree for example

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(McDonald 59). McDonald then moves on to explain how humans could transcend an
anthropocentric ethic. His solution to the problems of anthropocentrism would be to adopt an
ecocentric cosmopolitan ethic. Ecocentric cosmopolitanism puts the environment as most
valuable and makes humanity along with nonhuman parts of the environment equally responsible
for the environment because they are all cosmopolitan citizens. McDonald also postulates that
this ethic has a melioristic demand in which human action is key not only to save the
environment but also assign value to the nonhuman to repair the damage that has been done over
the course of the Anthropocene (McDonald 71). In theory, if everyone accepted ecocentric
cosmopolitanism, an action would only considered moral if it upheld the environment.
McDonalds argument appears to be very effective; he takes into account the usual
responses to a rejection of anthropocentrism and provides a feasible ethical model for ecocentric
cosmopolitanism. Unfortunately, McDonald makes logical errors on his criticism of
anthropocentrism that decrease the validity of his points on nonhumans as being a valued part of
the ethical community. When McDonald says that humans are on the same level as nonhumans
because differences in reason exist between both, he fails to present any evidence that
nonhumans have the ability to reason. His argument is predicated off of the fact that because
humans have differing level of reason yet are all morally valuable; reason, therefore, cannot be
used as a justification for moral worth because of the existing differences in ability (McDonald
59). This misses the fact that all humans have at least the base ability for some form of reason
and are thus valuable. When he does not show that nonhumans can reason, he inadvertently
creates a scenario for which they are less than human. For while differences in reason exist, at
some base level all humans have the ability to reason which intern sets them apart from the
nonhuman. Additionally, McDonalds refutation of humanity as a moral creature is very

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lackluster. He only presents examples in which humanity acted immorally; unfortunately, this
does not disprove humanitys ability to take moral action. His examples only show that
humanity retains the capability to willingly become amoral (McDonald 59, 60, 61). Also,
McDonalds refutation of uniquely human morality is just as fallacious as his refutation of
uniquely human reason. McDonald fails to show that nonhumans can act morally which creates
another reason to separate humans from nonhumans, for if nonhumans, as is currently viewed
from an anthropocentric standpoint, are incapable of acting morally, they do not belong in any
ethical system. McDonald repeatedly tries to reduce humans to that of nonhuman instead of
explaining equal footing, this is inadequate to prove a place for the nonhuman as it just devalues
the human and does not show that the nonhuman belongs in the system. Additionally, McDonald
perpetuates anthropocentrism when he purposes that human adoption of ecocentric
cosmopolitanism is key to prevent the woes of anthropocentrism (McDonald 71). This
melioristic stance on ecocentric cosmopolitanism shows the inevitability of anthropocentrism,
for according to McDonald, the only way for ecocentric cosmopolitanism is if humans get
involved. This reflects a subtle anthropocentric bias in McDonalds thought for he views humans
as being the necessary catalyst for social change.
In conclusion, I have found that although McDonald makes a few good points on the
injustice of anthropocentrism and the possible workability of ecocentric cosmopolitanism, his
logical flaws discredit his conclusions as a whole. I would not use his article in my research
because it fails to adequately address the problems of anthropocentrism. However, I would use
his article in conjunction with another to show the possibility of ecocentric cosmopolitanism as a
starting point to develop an ethical system that would include the environment. McDonalds
argument has increased my interest in environmental ethics by showing the effect of a

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cosmopolitan standpoint on human interactions with the nonhuman. By researching McDonalds

work on ecocentric cosmopolitanism I have been able to find the works of Peter Singer and Aldo
Leopold which I believe will lead me to find a more holistic approach to adequately addressing
the problems of anthropocentrism. I hope that this analysis of McDonalds work along with my
research on anthropocentrism will allow me to compose a response to anthropocentric ethics
with a pragmatic alternative.

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Works Cited
"Hugh McDonald." HF UNI Koeln. Universitt Zu Kln, n.d. Web. 30 Sept. 2014.
McDonald, Hugh P. "Rethinking Cosmopolitan Ethics." Value Inquiry Book Series 273.(2014):
51-83. Academic Search Complete. Web. 30 Sept. 2014
"New York City College of Technology - Social Sciences - Faculty - Hugh P. McDonald." New
York City College of Technology - Social Sciences - Faculty - Hugh P. McDonald. N.p., n.d. Web.
30 Sept. 2014.