On 29 December 1961 the trial court promulgated
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 156273 October 15, 2003
HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO and MARIA
ROTEA, namely: ESPERANZA R. EDJEC,
BERNARDA R. SUELA, RUBY C. ROTEA,
BERNARDA R. ROTEA, ELIA R. VDA. DE
LIMBAGA, VIRGINIA R. ARBON, ROSALINDA R.
ARQUISOLA, CORAZON ROTEA, FE R. EBORA,
CARIDAD ROTEA, ANGELES VDA. DE RENACIA,
JORGE ROTEA, MARIA LUISA ROTEA-VILLEGAS,
ALFREDO R. ROTEA, represented by his heirs
LIZBETH ROTEA and ELEPETH ROTEA; LUIS
ROTEA, represented by his heir JENNIFER
ROTEA; and ROLANDO R. ROTEA, represented
by his heir ROLANDO R. ROTEA JR., petitioners,
vs.
MACTAN - CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AUTHORITY, respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
THE HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO AND MARIA
ROTEA, petitioners herein, are the successors-in-
interest of the former registered owners of two (2)
parcels of land situated in Lahug, Cebu City,
designated as Lot No. 916 with an area of 2,355
square meters under TCT No. RT-7543 (106) T-
13694, and Lot No. 920 consisting of 3,097 square
meters under TCT No. RT-7544 (107) T-13695.1
In 1949 the National Airport Corporation as the
predecessor agency of respondent Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority (MCIAA) wanted to
acquire Lots Nos. 916 and 920 above described
among other parcels of land for the proposed
expansion of Lahug Airport.2 To entice the
landowners to cede their properties, the
government assured them that they could
repurchase their lands once Lahug Airport was
closed or its operations transferred to Mactan
Airport.3 Some of the landowners executed deeds of
sale with right of repurchase in favor of the
government but many others, including the owners
of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 herein mentioned, refused
the offer because the payment was perceived to be
way below the market price.4
On 16 April 1952, as the negotiations for the
purchase of the lots necessary for the expansion
and improvement of Lahug Airport irredeemably
broke down, the Civil Aeronautics Administration as
the successor agency of the National Airport
Corporation filed a complaint with the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, for the expropriation of Lots Nos.
916 and 920 and other subject realties, docketed as
Civil Case No. R-1881.
its Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 condemning
Lots Nos. 916 and 920 and other lots for public use
upon payment of just compensation.5 Petitioners’
predecessors were paid P7,065.00 for Lot No. 916
and P9,291.00 for Lot No. 920 with consequential
damages by way of legal interest from 16 November
1947. No appeal was taken from the Decision on
Lots Nos. 916 and 920, and the judgment of
condemnation became final and executory.6
Thereafter, the certificates of title for these parcels
of land were issued in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines under TCT No. 58691 for Lot No. 916
and TCT No. 58692 for Lot No. 920, which under RA
6958 (1990) were subsequently transferred in favor
of respondent MCIAA.7
At the end of 1991, or soon after the transfer of Lots
Nos. 916 and 920 to MCIAA, Lahug Airport ceased
operations as the Mactan Airport was opened for
incoming and outgoing flights.8 Lots Nos. 916 and
920 which had been expropriated for the extension
of Lahug Airport were not utilized.9 In fact, no
expansion of Lahug Airport was undertaken by
MCIAA and its predecessors-in-interest.10 Hence,
petitioners wrote then President Fidel V. Ramos and
the airport manager begging them for the exercise
of their alleged right to repurchase Lots Nos. 916
and 920.11 Their pleas were not heeded.12
On 11 March 1997 petitioners filed a complaint for
reconveyance and damages with RTC of Cebu City
against respondent MCIAA to compel the repurchase
of Lots Nos. 916 and 920, docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-20015. In the main, petitioners averred that
they had been convinced by the officers of the
predecessor agency of respondent MCIAA not to
oppose the expropriation proceedings since in the
future they could repurchase the properties if the
airport expansion would not push through. MCIAA
did not object to petitioners’ evidence establishing
these allegations.
When the civil case was pending, one Richard E.
Enchuan filed a Motion for Transfer of Interest
alleging that he acquired through deeds of
assignment the rights of some of herein petitioners
over Lots Nos. 916 and 920.13 The Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) also sought to
intervene in the civil case claiming that it leased in
good faith Lot No. 920 from the predecessor
agencies of respondent MCIAA and that it built
thereon its Regional Equipment Services and its
Region 7 Office.14
On 12 April 1999 the trial court found merit in the
claims of petitioners and granted them the right to
repurchase the properties at the amount pegged as
just compensation in Civil Case No. R-1881 but
subject to the alleged property rights of Richard E.
Enchuan and the leasehold of DPWH.15 The trial
court opined that the expropriation became illegal
or functus officio when the purpose for which it was
intended was no longer there.16
Respondent MCIAA appealed the Decision of the trial their properties;24 other landowners held out and
court to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 64456.1ªvvphi1.nét
On 20 December 2001 the Court of Appeals
reversed the assailed Decision on the ground that
the judgment of condemnation in Civil Case No. R-
1881 was unconditional so that the rights gained
therefrom by respondent MCIAA were indicative of
ownership in fee simple.17 The appellate court cited with the ownership of their lands.26
Fery v. Municpality of Cabanatuan18 which held that
mere deviation from the public purpose for which
the power of eminent domain was exercised does
not justify the reversion of the property to its former
owners, and Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority v. Court of Appeals19 which is allegedly
stare decisis to the instant case to prevent the
exercise of the right of repurchase as the former
dealt with a parcel of land similarly expropriated
under Civil Case No. R-1881.20
On 28 November 2002 reconsideration of the
Decision was denied. 21 Hence, this petition for
review.
Petitioners argue that Fery v. Municpality of
Cabanatuan does not apply to the case at bar since
what was involved therein was the "right of
reversion" and not the "right of repurchase" which
they are invoking. They also differentiate Mactan-
Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of
Appeals22 from the instant case in that the
landowners in the MCIAA case offered inadmissible
evidence to show their entitlement to a right of
repurchase, while petitioners herein offered
evidence based on personal knowledge for which
reason MCIAA did not object and thus waived
whatever objection it might have had to the
admissibility thereof. Finally, petitioners allege that
their right to equal protection of the laws would be
infringed if some landowners are given the right to
repurchase their former properties even as they are
denied the exercise of such prerogative.
On the other hand, respondent MCIAA clings to our
decisions in Fery v. Municpality of Cabanatuan and
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court
of Appeals. According to respondent MCIAA "there is
only one instance when expropriated land may be
repurchased by its previous owners, and that is, if
the decision of expropriation itself provides [the]
condition for such repurchase." Respondent asserts
that the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 is
absolute and without conditions, thus, no
repurchase could be validly exercised.
This is a difficult case calling for a difficult but just
solution. To begin with, there exists an undeniable
historical narrative that the predecessors of
respondent MCIAA had suggested to the landowners
of the properties covered by the Lahug Airport
expansion scheme that they could repurchase their
properties at the termination of the airport’s
venture.23 Some acted on this assurance and sold
waited for the exercise of eminent domain to take
its course until finally coming to terms with
respondent’s predecessors that they would not
appeal nor block further the judgment of
condemnation if the same right of repurchase was
extended to them.25 A handful failed to prove that
they acted on such assurance when they parted
In resolving this dispute, we must reckon with the
rulings of this Court in Fery v. Municpality of
Cabanatuan and Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority v. Court of Appeals, which define the
rights and obligations of landowners whose
properties were expropriated when the public
purpose for which eminent domain was exercised no
longer subsists. In Fery, which was cited in the
recent case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals,27 we
declared that the government acquires only such
rights in expropriated parcels of land as may be
allowed by the character of its title over the
properties -
If x x x land is expropriated for a particular purpose,
with the condition that when that purpose is ended
or abandoned the property shall return to its former
owner, then, of course, when the purpose is
terminated or abandoned the former owner
reacquires the property so expropriated. If x x x
land is expropriated for a public street and the
expropriation is granted upon condition that the city
can only use it for a public street, then, of course,
when the city abandons its use as a public street, it
returns to the former owner, unless there is some
statutory provision to the contrary x x x x If, upon
the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation
gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course,
the land becomes the absolute property of the
expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or
municipality, and in that case the non-user does not
have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the
expropriation proceedings x x x x When land has
been acquired for public use in fee simple,
unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent
domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no
rights in the land, and the public use may be
abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a
different use, without any impairment of the estate
or title acquired, or any reversion to the former
owner x x x x28
In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority,
respondent Chiongbian sought to enforce an alleged
right of repurchase over her properties that had
been expropriated in Civil Case No. R-1881. This
Court did not allow her to adduce evidence of her
claim, for to do so would unsettle as to her
properties the judgment of condemnation in the
eminent domain proceedings. We also held therein
that Chiongbian’s evidence was both inadmissible
and lacking in probative value -
The terms of the judgment are clear and
unequivocal and grant title to Lot No. 941 in fee
simple to the Republic of the Philippines. There was
no condition imposed to the effect that the lot would
return to CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN had a
right to repurchase the same if the purpose for
which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or
if the property was to be used other than as the
Lahug Airport. CHIONGBIAN cannot rely on the
ruling in Mactan-Cebu International Airport vs. Court
of Appeals wherein the presentation of parol
evidence was allowed to prove the existence of a
written agreement containing the right to
repurchase. Said case did not involve expropriation
proceedings but a contract of sale x x x x To permit
CHIONGBIAN to prove the existence of a
compromise settlement which she claims to have
entered into with the Republic of the Philippines
prior to the rendition of judgment in the
expropriation case would result in a modification of
the judgment of a court which has long become final
and executory x x x x And even assuming for the
sake of argument that CHIONGBIAN could prove the
existence of the alleged written agreement
acknowledging her right to repurchase Lot No. 941
through parol evidence, the Court of Appeals erred
in holding that the evidence presented by
CHIONGBIAN was admissible x x x x Aside from
being inadmissible under the provisions of the
Statute of Frauds, [the] testimonies are also
inadmissible for being hearsay in nature x x x x29
We adhere to the principles enunciated in Fery and
in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, and
do not overrule them. Nonetheless the weight of
their import, particularly our ruling as regards the
properties of respondent Chiongbian in Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority, must be
commensurate to the facts that were established
therein as distinguished from those extant in the
case at bar. Chiongbian put forth inadmissible and
inconclusive evidence, while in the instant case we
have preponderant proof as found by the trial court
of the existence of the right of repurchase in favor
of petitioners.
Moreover, respondent MCIAA has brought to our
attention a significant and telling portion in the
Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 validating our
discernment that the expropriation by the
predecessors of respondent was ordered under the
running impression that Lahug Airport would
continue in operation -
As for the public purpose of the expropriation
proceeding, it cannot now be doubted. Although
Mactan Airport is being constructed, it does not take there should be no doubt that our present reading of
away the actual usefulness and importance of the
Lahug Airport: it is handling the air traffic both
civilian and military. From it aircrafts fly to Mindanao afore-quoted is sanctioned by the rule that a final
and Visayas and pass thru it on their flights to the
North and Manila. Then, no evidence was adduced
to show how soon is the Mactan Airport to be placed
in operation and whether the Lahug Airport will be
closed immediately thereafter. It is up to the other
departments of the Government to determine said
matters. The Court cannot substitute its judgment
for those of the said departments or agencies. In the
absence of such showing, the Court will presume
that the Lahug Airport will continue to be in
operation (emphasis supplied).301awphi1.nét
While the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1881 could
have simply acknowledged the presence of public
purpose for the exercise of eminent domain
regardless of the survival of Lahug Airport, the trial
court in its Decision chose not to do so but instead
prefixed its finding of public purpose upon its
understanding that "Lahug Airport will continue to
be in operation." Verily, these meaningful
statements in the body of the Decision warrant the
conclusion that the expropriated properties would
remain to be so until it was confirmed that Lahug
Airport was no longer "in operation." This inference
further implies two (2) things: (a) after the Lahug
Airport ceased its undertaking as such and the
expropriated lots were not being used for any
airport expansion project, the rights vis-à-vis the
expropriated Lots Nos. 916 and 920 as between the
State and their former owners, petitioners herein,
must be equitably adjusted; and, (b) the foregoing
unmistakable declarations in the body of the
Decision should merge with and become an intrinsic
part of the fallo thereof which under the premises is
clearly inadequate since the dispositive portion is
not in accord with the findings as contained in the
body thereof.31
Significantly, in light of the discussion above, the
admission of petitioners during the pre-trial of Civil
Case No. CEB-20015 for reconveyance and damages
that respondent MCIAA was the absolute owner of
Lots Nos. 916 and 920 does not prejudice
petitioners’ interests. This is as it should be not only
because the admission concerns a legal conclusion
fiercely debated by the parties32 but more so since
respondent was truly the absolute owner of the
realties until it was apparent that Lahug Airport had
stopped doing business.
To sum up what we have said so far, the attendance
in the case at bar of standing admissible evidence
validating the claim of petitioners as well as the
portions above-quoted of the Decision in the
expropriation case volunteered no less than by
respondent itself, takes this case away from the
ambit of Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority
v. Court of Appeals33 but within the principles
enunciated in Fery as mentioned earlier. In addition,
the fallo of the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 so
as to include the statements in the body thereof
and executory judgment may nonetheless be
"clarified" by reference to other portions of the
decision of which it forms a part. In Republic v. De
Los Angeles34 we ruled -
This Court has promulgated many cases x x x
wherein it was held that a judgment must not be
read separately but in connection with the other
portions of the decision of which it forms a part.
Hence x x x the decision of the court below should
be taken as a whole and considered in its entirety to
get the true meaning and intent of any particular
portion thereof x x x x Neither is this Court inclined
to confine itself to a reading of the said fallo
literally. On the contrary, the judgment portion of a
decision should be interpreted and construed in
harmony with the ratio decidendi thereof x x x x As
stated in the case of Policarpio vs. Philippine
Veterans Board, et al., supra, to get the true intent
and meaning of a decision, no specific portion
thereof should be resorted to but the same must be
considered in its entirety. Hence, a resolution or
ruling may and does appear in other parts of the
decision and not merely in the fallo thereof x x x x
The foregoing pronouncements find support in the
case of Locsin, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 63 Phil., 87,
91-92, wherein this Court allowed a judgment that
had become final and executory to be "clarified" by
supplying a word which had been inadvertently
omitted and which, when supplied, in effect
changed the literal import of the original
phraseology x x x x This is so because, in the first
place, if an already final judgment can still be
amended to supply an omission committed through
oversight, this simply means that in the construction
or interpretation of an already final decision, the
fallo or dispositive portion thereof must be
correlated with the body of such final decision x x x
x [I]f an amendment may be allowed after a
decision has already become final x x x such
amendment may consist x x x either in the x x x
interpretation of an ambiguous phrase therein in
relation to the body of the decision which gives it
life.35
We now resolve to harmonize the respective rights
of the State and petitioners to the expropriated Lots
Nos. 916 and 920.
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority36 is
correct in stating that one would not find an express
statement in the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881
to the effect that "the [condemned] lot would return
to [the landowner] or that [the landowner] had a
right to repurchase the same if the purpose for
which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or
if the property was to be used other than as the
Lahug Airport." This omission notwithstanding, and
while the inclusion of this pronouncement in the
judgment of condemnation would have been ideal,
such precision is not absolutely necessary nor is it
fatal to the cause of petitioners herein. No doubt,
the return or repurchase of the condemned
properties of petitioners could be readily justified as
the manifest legal effect or consequence of the trial
court’s underlying presumption that "Lahug Airport
will continue to be in operation" when it granted the
complaint for eminent domain and the airport
discontinued its activities.
The predicament of petitioners involves a
constructive trust, one that is akin37 to the implied
trust referred to in Art. 1454 of the Civil Code, "If an
absolute conveyance of property is made in order to
secure the performance of an obligation of the
grantor toward the grantee, a trust by virtue of law
is established. If the fulfillment of the obligation is
offered by the grantor when it becomes due, he may
demand the reconveyance of the property to him."
In the case at bar, petitioners conveyed Lots Nos.
916 and 920 to the government with the latter
obliging itself to use the realties for the expansion of
Lahug Airport; failing to keep its bargain, the
government can be compelled by petitioners to
reconvey the parcels of land to them, otherwise,
petitioners would be denied the use of their
properties upon a state of affairs that was not
conceived nor contemplated when the expropriation
was authorized.
Although the symmetry between the instant case
and the situation contemplated by Art. 1454 is not
perfect, the provision is undoubtedly applicable. For,
as explained by an expert on the law of trusts: "The
only problem of great importance in the field of
constructive trusts is to decide whether in the
numerous and varying fact situations presented to
the courts there is a wrongful holding of property
and hence a threatened unjust enrichment of the
defendant."38 Constructive trusts are fictions of
equity which are bound by no unyielding formula
when they are used by courts as devices to remedy
any situation in which the holder of the legal title
may not in good conscience retain the beneficial
interest.39
In constructive trusts, the arrangement is temporary
and passive in which the trustee’s sole duty is to
transfer the title and possession over the property
to the plaintiff-beneficiary.40 Of course, the
"wronged party seeking the aid of a court of equity
in establishing a constructive trust must himself do
equity."41 Accordingly, the court will exercise its
discretion in deciding what acts are required of the
plaintiff-beneficiary as conditions precedent to
obtaining such decree and has the obligation to
reimburse the trustee the consideration received
from the latter just as the plaintiff-beneficiary would
if he proceeded on the theory of rescission.42 In the
good judgment of the court, the trustee may also be
paid the necessary expenses he may have incurred
in sustaining the property, his fixed costs for
improvements thereon, and the monetary value of
his services in managing the property to the extent
that plaintiff-beneficiary will secure a benefit from
his acts.43
The rights and obligations between the constructive
trustee and the beneficiary, in this case, respondent
MCIAA and petitioners over Lots Nos. 916 and 920,
are echoed in Art. 1190 of the Civil Code, "When the
conditions have for their purpose the
extinguishment of an obligation to give, the parties,
upon the fulfillment of said conditions, shall return
to each other what they have received x x x x In
case of the loss, deterioration or improvement of the
thing, the provisions which, with respect to the
debtor, are laid down in the preceding article shall
be applied to the party who is bound to return x x x
x"
Hence, respondent MCIAA as representative of the
State is obliged to reconvey Lots Nos. 916 and 920
to petitioners who shall hold the same subject to
existing liens thereon, i.e., leasehold right of DPWH.
In return, petitioners as if they were plaintiff-
beneficiaries of a constructive trust must restore to
respondent MCIAA what they received as just
compensation for the expropriation of Lots Nos. 916
and 920 in Civil Case No. R-1881, i.e., P7,065.00 for
Lot No. 916 and P9,291.00 for Lot No. 920 with
consequential damages by way of legal interest
from 16 November 1947. Petitioners must likewise
pay respondent MCIAA the necessary expenses it
may have incurred in sustaining the properties and
the monetary value of its services in managing
them to the extent that petitioners will be benefited
thereby. The government however may keep
whatever income or fruits it may have obtained
from the parcels of land, in the same way that
petitioners need not account for the interests that
the amounts they received as just compensation
may have earned in the meantime. As a matter of
justice and convenience, the law considers the fruits
and interests as the equivalent of each other.44
Under Art. 1189 of the Civil Code, "If the thing is
improved by its nature, or by time, the improvement
shall inure to the benefit of the creditor x x x," the
creditor being the person who stands to receive
something as a result of the process of restitution.
Consequently, petitioners as creditors do not have
to settle as part of the process of restitution the
appreciation in value of Lots Nos. 916 and 920
which is the natural consequence of nature and
time.
Petitioners need not also pay for improvements
introduced by third parties, i.e., DPWH, as the
disposition of these properties is governed by
existing contracts and relevant provisions of law. As
for the improvements that respondent MCIAA may
have made on Lots Nos. 916 and 920, if any,
petitioners must pay respondent their prevailing
free market price in case petitioners opt to buy
them and respondent decides to sell. In other words,
if petitioners do not want to appropriate such
improvements or respondent does not choose to sell
them, the improvements would have to be removed
without any obligation on the part of petitioners to
pay any compensation to respondent MCIAA for
whatever it may have tangibly introduced therein.45
The medium of compensation for the restitution
shall be ready money or cash payable within a
period of three hundred sixty five (365) days from
the date that the amount to be returned by
petitioners is determined with finality, unless the
parties herein stipulate and agree upon a different
scheme, medium or schedule of payment. If after
the period of three hundred sixty five (365) days or
the lapse of the compromise scheme or schedule of
payment such amount owed is not settled, the right
of repurchase of petitioners and the obligation of
respondent MCIAA to reconvey Lots Nos. 916 and
920 and/or the latter’s improvements as set forth
herein shall be deemed forfeited and the ownership
of those parcels of land shall vest absolutely upon
respondent MCIAA.
Finally, we delete the award of P60,000.00 for
attorney’s fees and P15,000.00 for litigation
expenses in favor of petitioners as decreed in the
assailed Decision of 12 April 1999 of the trial court.
It is not sound public policy to set a premium upon
the right to litigate where such right is exercised in
good faith, as in the present case, albeit the
decision to resist the claim is erroneous.46
The rule on awards of attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses is found in Art. 2208 of the Civil Code -
In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs,
cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has
compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interests;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution
against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action
or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and
evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiff's valid and demandable
claim;1awphi1.nét
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of
household helpers, laborers and skilled
workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's
compensation and employer's liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil
liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are
awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court
deems it just and equitable that attorney's
 fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation must be reasonable.
As noted in Mirasol v. De la Cruz,47 Art. 2208
intends to retain the award of attorney’s fees as the
exception in our law and the general rule remains
that attorney’s fees are not recoverable in the
absence of a stipulation thereto.
In the case at bar, considering the established
absence of any stipulation regarding attorney’s fees,
the trial court cannot base its award on any of the
exceptions enumerated in Art. 2208. The records of
the instant case do not disclose any proof presented
by petitioners to substantiate that the actuations of
respondent MCIAA were clearly unfounded or purely
for the purpose of harassment; neither does the trial
court make any finding to that effect in its appealed
Decision.
While Art. 2208, par. (4), allows attorney’s fees in
cases of clearly unfounded civil actions, this
exception must be understood to mean those where
the defenses are so untenable as to amount to gross
and evident bad faith. Evidence must be presented
to the court as to the facts and circumstances
constituting the alleged bad faith, otherwise, the
award of attorney’s fees is not justified where there
is no proof other than the bare statement of
harassment that a party to be so adjudged had
acted in bad faith. The exercise of judicial discretion
in the award of attorney’s fees under Art. 2208, par.
(11), demands a factual, legal or equitable
justification that would bring the case within the
exception and justify the grant of such award.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 64456 dated 20 December 2001 and
its Resolution of 28 November 2002 denying
reconsideration of the Decision are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
The Decision of RTC-Br. 19 of Cebu City dated 12
April 1999 in Civil Case No. CEB-20015 is MODIFIED
IN PART by -
(a) ORDERING respondent Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority (MCIAA) TO
RECONVEY to petitioner Heirs of Timoteo
Moreno and Maria Rotea, namely: Esperanza
R. Edjec, Bernarda R. Suela, Ruby C. Rotea,
Bernarda R. Rotea, Elia R. Vda De Limbaga,
Virginia R. Arbon, Rosalinda R. Arquisola,
Corazon Rotea, Fe R. Ebora, Caridad Rotea,
Angeles Vda. De Renacia, Jorge Rotea, Maria
Luisa Rotea-Villegas, Alfredo R. Rotea,
represented by his heirs, namely: Lizbeth
Rotea and Elepeth Rotea; Luis Rotea,
represented by his heir Jennifer Rotea; and
Rolando R. Rotea, represented by his heir
Rolando R. Rotea Jr., Lot No. 916 with an
area of 2,355 square meters and Lot No. 920
consisting of 3,097 square meters in Lahug,
Cebu City, with all the improvements thereon
evolving through nature or time, but
excluding those that were introduced by
third parties, i.e., DPWH, which shall be
governed by existing contracts and relevant
provisions of law;
(b) ORDERING petitioner Heirs of Timoteo
Moreno and Maria Rotea TO PAY respondent
MCIAA what the former received as just
compensation for the expropriation of Lots
Nos. 916 and 920 in Civil Case No. R-1881,
i.e., P7,065.00 for Lot No. 916 and P9,291.00
for Lot No. 920 with consequential damages
by way of legal interest from 16 November
1947. Petitioners must likewise PAY
respondent MCIAA the necessary expenses
that the latter may have incurred in
sustaining the properties and the monetary
value of its services in managing the
properties to the extent that petitioners will
secure a benefit from such acts. Respondent
MCIAA however may keep whatever income
or fruits it may have obtained from the
parcels of land, in the same way that
petitioners need not account for the interests
that the amounts they received as just
compensation may have earned in the
meantime;
(c) ORDERING respondent MCIAA TO CONVEY
to petitioners the improvements it may have
built on Lots Nos. 916 and 920, if any, in
which case petitioners SHALL PAY for these
improvements at the prevailing free market
price, otherwise, if petitioners do not want to
appropriate such improvements, or if
respondent does not choose to sell them,
respondent MCIAA SHALL REMOVE these
improvements WITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION on
the part of petitioners to pay any
compensation to respondent MCIAA for them;
(d) ORDERING petitioners TO PAY the amount
so determined under letter (b) of this
dispositive portion as consideration for the
reconveyance of Lots Nos. 916 and 920, as
well as the prevailing free market price of the
improvements built thereon by respondent
MCIAA, if any and desired to be bought and
sold by the parties, in ready money or cash
PAYABLE within a period of three hundred
sixty five (365) days from the date that the
amount under letter (b) above is determined
with finality, unless the parties herein
stipulate a different scheme or schedule of
payment, otherwise, after the period of three
hundred sixty five (365) days or the lapse of
the compromise scheme or schedule of
payment and the amount so payable is not
settled, the right of repurchase of petitioners
 and the obligation of respondent MCIAA to so
reconvey Lots Nos. 916 and 920 and/or the
improvements shall be DEEMED FORFEITED
and the ownership of those parcels of land
shall VEST ABSOLUTELY upon respondent
MCIAA;
(e) REMANDING the instant case to RTC-Br.
19 of Cebu City for purposes of determining
the amount of compensation for Lots Nos.
916 and 920 to be paid by petitioners as
mandated in letter (b) hereof, and the value
of the prevailing free market price of the
improvements built thereon by respondent
MCIAA, if any and desired to be bought and
sold by the parties, and in general, securing
the immediate execution of this Decision
under the premises;
(f) ORDERING petitioners to respect the right
of the Department of Public Works and
Highways to its lease contract until the
expiration of the lease period; and
(g) DELETING the award of P60,000.00 for
attorney’s fees and P15,000.00 for litigation
expenses against respondent MCIAA and in
favor of petitioners.
This Decision is without prejudice to the claim of
intervenor one Richard E. Enchuan on his allegation
that he acquired through deeds of assignment the
rights of some of herein petitioners over Lots Nos.
916 and 920.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, and Tinga, JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 15, 75-78.
2 Id., p. 154.
3 Ibid.
4 Id., p. 68.
5 Decision penned by Judge Mateo Canonoy,
RTC-Br. 3, Cebu City; Rollo, pp. 84-110.
6 Rollo, p. 17.
7 Id., pp. 17, 79-82.
8 Id., p. 154.
9 Id., p. 157.
10 Ibid.; see also Mactan-Cebu International
Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 139495, 27 November 2000, 346 SCRA
126.
11 Rollo, pp. 82-83.
12 Id., p. 71.
13 Id., p. 52.
14 Ibid.
15 Decision penned by Judge Ramon G.
Codilla Jr., RTC-Br. 19, Cebu City; Rollo, pp.
149-159.
16 Rollo, pp. 157-158.
17 Decision penned by Associate Justice
Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, concurred in by
Associate Justices Eriberto U. Rosario Jr. and
Amelita G. Tolentino, Seventeenth Division;
Rollo, pp. 48-63.
18 42 Phil. 28 (1921).
19 See Note 10.
20 Rollo, pp. 56-63.
21 Resolution penned by Associate Justice
Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, concurred in by
Associate Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero
and Amelita G. Tolentino, Special Former
Seventeenth Division; Rollo, pp. 63-65.
22 See Note 10.
23 Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
121506, 30 October 1996, 263 SCRA 736.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid; Republic v. Escaño, CA-G.R. No.
33045-R, 27 July 1964 as cited in Mactan-
Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 139495, 27 November
2000, 346 SCRA 126.
26 See Note 10.
27 G.R. No. 147511, 20 January 2003.
28 42 Phil. 28, 29-30 (1921).
29 G.R. No. 139495, 27 November 2000, 346
SCRA 126, 135-137.
30 Rollo, p. 224; Comment of the Solicitor
General, p. 22.
31 Rosales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
137566, 28 February 2001, 353 SCRA 179;
People v. Lacbayan, G.R. No. 125006, 31
August 2000, 339 SCRA 396.
32 See Mercy’s Incorporated v. Verde, No. L-
21571, 29 September 1966, 18 SCRA 171.
33 See Note 10.
34 No. L-26112, 4 October 1971, 41 SCRA
422.
35 Id., pp. 441-446.
36 See Note 10.
37 The statutory enumeration of implied
trusts in the Civil Code is not exclusive,
hence, Art. 1447 of the Civil Code provides
"The enumeration of the following cases of
implied trust does not exclude others
established by the general law of trust, but
the limitation laid down in article 1442 shall
be applicable."
38 G.G. Bogert, Handbook of the Law of
Trusts, 210 (1963).
39 Id., pp. 208-209.
40 Id., pp. 209-210.
41 Id., p. 209.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Civil Code, Art. 1187, "The effects of a
conditional obligation to give, once the
condition has been fulfilled, shall retroact to
the day of the constitution of the obligation.
Nevertheless, when the obligation imposes
reciprocal prestations upon the parties, the
fruits and interests during the pendency of
the condition shall be deemed to have been
mutually compensated. If the obligation is
unilateral, the debtor shall appropriate the
fruits and interests received, unless from the
nature and circumstances of the obligation it
should be inferred that the intention of the
person constituting the same was different."
45 See Coleongco v. Regalado, 92 Phil. 387
(1952).
46 Mirasol v. De la Cruz, No. L-32552, 31 July
1978, 84 SCRA 337.
47 Ibid.