Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2. CAUSATION
General rule: if the negligence of the defendant is the proximate
cause of the injury/ damage to property, then plaintiff may claim
damages.
Exception: If the negligence of the plaintiff is the proximate cause
of the injury or damage, the plaintiff is wholly responsible for the
same and he cannot recover damages.
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DAY SIX
to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area
where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was
more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach
the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from
them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to
be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the
bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside
help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be
attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its
conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor
were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the
driver should and must have known that in the position in which
the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from
the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this
aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a
large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and
yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have
cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the
lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the
agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions abovereproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
Proximate cause- that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.'
And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of
the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect
at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.
FACTS:
HELD
CFI:
Page 2 of 18
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IAC:
Upon appeal to the IAC, that court affirmed the CFIs decision.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: WON Dionisios negligence was an intervening, efficient
cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained
DECISION:
NO. Although Dionisio was found to be negligent, his negligence
was not an intervening,
efficient cause. The legal and proximate cause of the accident and
of Dionisios injuries was the
negligence of Carbonel in the manner by which he parked the
dump truck. Petitioners are liable for damages, but these damages
must be mitigated because of Dionisios contributory negligence.
Decision modified whereby Dionisio will shoulder 20% of awarded
damages.
The Court held that on that night, Dionisio was driving without a
curfew pass. Since he was without a curfew pass, he was hurrying
home, driving at a fast speed in order to avoid the police. Worse,
he turned off his headlights as he was driving down that street in
order to escape notice from the nearby police station. However,
the Court held that that the one or two shots of liquor he had did
not show that he was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to
constitute an act of reckless imprudence. Taken all together,
however, the Court drew the conclusion that Dionisio was negligent
on the night of the accident.[Note: During the period of Martial
Law, no person was allowed to be outside his home during curfew
hours, unless he has a curfew pass.]
Cause vs. Condition; Almost no distinction between them
Petitioners urge that the Carbonels negligence was merelt a
passive and static condition and that Dionisios negligence was
an efficient intervening cause, and that consequently Dionisios
negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of
the accident rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel.
However, the distinctions between cause and condition have
been almost entirely discredited.
The Court quotes significantly from
Prosser and Keeton
. The following parts were quoted with emphasis:
Cause and condition So far as the fact of causation is
concerned, in the sense of necessary
antecedents which have played an important part in producing the
result, it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces
and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case,
the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone
before Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the
condition remains static will not necessarily affect liability
Cause andcondition
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still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is
now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all,
it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation
by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent
safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it
is not the distinction between cause and condition which is
important, but the nature of the risk and the ch aracter of the
intervening cause.
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Petitioners ask the application of the last clear chance doctrine.
It cannot apply.
The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported
into our jurisdiction by
failing
to supervise
its
BELARMINO VS EEC
FERNANDO VS CA
FACTS: November 7, 1975: Bibiano Morta, market master of the
Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of
Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the
septic tank in Agdao wherein Bascon won.
November 22, 1975: bidder Bertulano with four other companions
namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose
Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank.
o The bodies were removed by a fireman.
The body of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle,
Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but he
expired there.
The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned they
entered the septic tank without clearance from it nor with the
knowledge and consent of the market master.
o Since the septic tank was found to be almost empty,
they were presumed to be the ones who did the reemptying.
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Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office found them to have died
from "asphyxia" - diminution of oxygen supply in the body
and intake of toxic gas
November 26, 1975: Bascon signed the purchase order
RTC: Dismissed the case
CA: Reversed - law intended to protect the plight of the poor and
the needy, the ignorant and the indigent
ISSUE: W/N Davao city is negligent and its negligence is the
proximate cause therefore can be liable for damages
HELD: NO. CA affirmed.
Test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case:
o Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act
use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation? If
not, then he is guilty of negligence
Standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet pater familias of the Roman law.
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position
of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to
another was sufficiently probable warrant his foregoing the conduct
or guarding against its consequences
o The question as to what would constitute the conduct
of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be
always determined in the light of human experience and in
view of the facts involved in the particular case
o Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring
of the suggestion born of this provision, is always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist
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MeTC
dismissed
the
case.
RTC
affirmed
the
dismissal.
crossing
Katipunan
despite
the
concrete
ISSUE:
when the Ford Expedition (heading North) hit the rear right
due
diligence
supervision of Rodel.
in the
selection
RULING:
NO. The Altiss violation in crossing Katipunan despite the barrier is
the proximate cause of the collision.
and
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case,
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Aquilinos act of crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda
Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintiffs own
it was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any
accident.
Thus it is unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodels
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
owner)
this case would benefit only the petitioner; it could not eliminate
the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
respondents
seeks
to
liability
recover
for
from
Aquilinos
respondent
negligence
whatever
which
is
the
If
Aquilino
heeded
the
MMDA
prohibition
against
crossing
Page 8 of 18
DAY SIX
flagman or switchman to warn the public of approaching train that
would pass through the crossing, filed the instant action for
Damages against defendants. The defendants, in their Answer
traversed the material allegation of the Complaint and as
affirmative defense alleged that the collision was caused by the
negligence, imprudence and lack of foresight of plaintiff's bus
driver, Romeo Hughes.
ISSUES:
Who between the driver Romeo Hughes of the Baliuag Transit
Incorporated and HonorioCabardo, train Engineer of the Philippine
National Railways was negligent in the operation of their respective
vehicles, or whether or both were negligent? Could either of the
companies Baliuag Transit Incorporated and the Philippine National
Railways be held accountable for the collision because of
negligence?
HELD:
It was established that the weather condition was characterized
with intermittent rain which should have prompted the train
engineer to exercise extra precaution. Also, the train reached
Calumpit, Bulacan ahead of scheduled arrival thereat, indicating
that the train was travelling more than the normal speed of 30
kilometers per hour. If the train were really running at 30
kilometers per hour when it was approaching the intersection, it
would probably not have travelled 190 meters more from the place
of the accident.
All of these factors, taken collectively, engendered the concrete
and yes, correct conclusion that the train engineer was negligent
who, moreover, despite the last opportunity within his hands vis-avisthe weather condition including the presence of people near the
intersection, could have obviated the impending collision had he
slackened his speed and applied the brakes. These considerations
were addressed to the trial judge was in a better position to assign
weight on factual questions. Having resolved the question of
negligence between the train engineer and the bus driver after
collating the mass of evidence, the conclusion reached thereafter
thus commands great respect especially so in this case where
ISSUE:
Whether Joels reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. dela
Llanas
whiplash injury
HELD:
Page 9 of 18
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Dra. delaLlana failed to establish her case by preponderance of
evidence
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is a quasi-delict." Under this provision, the elements
necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are:
(1) damages to the plaintiff;
(2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some
person for whose acts the defendant must respond, was guilty; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence
and the damages.28
These elements show that the source of obligation in a quasi-delict
case is the breach or omission of mutual duties that civilized
society imposes upon its members, or which arise from noncontractual relations of certain members of society to others. 29
Based on these requisites, Dra. delaLlana must first establish by
preponderance of evidence the three elements of quasi-delict
before we determine Rebeccas liability as Joels employer.
She should show the chain of causation between Joels reckless
driving and her whiplash injury.
Only after she has laid this foundation can the presumption - that
Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of Joel - arise. 30
Once negligence, the damages and the proximate causation are
established, this Court can then proceed with the application and
the interpretation of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.31
Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the fifth
paragraph of Article 2180, "an action predicated on an employees
act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held
liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his
employee."32
The rationale for these graduated levels of analyses is that it is
essentially the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which
creates the vinculum juris in extra-contractual obligations.33
In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving
it.
He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by
preponderance of evidence or greater weight of credible
evidence.34
The reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by
evidence, are not equivalent to proof.
In short, mere allegations are not evidence. 35
In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation
between Joels negligence and Dra.delaLlanas whiplash injury
rests on Dra. delaLlana. She must establish by preponderance of
evidence that Joels negligence, in its natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced
her whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury would
not have occurred.36
Notably, Dra.delaLlana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of
evidence:
(1) the pictures of her damaged car,
(2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and
(3) her testimonial evidence. However, none of these pieces of
evidence show the causal relation between the vehicular accident
and the whiplash injury. In other words,
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Dra. delaLlana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or
the evidentiary facts by which the factum probandum or the
ultimate fact can be established, as fully discussed below
ndeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by the parties
before the trial court shows that Dra. DelaLlana did not present
any testimonial or documentary evidence that directly
shows the causal relation between the vehicular accident
and Dra. DelaLlanas injury. Her claim that Joels negligence
causes her whiplash injury was not established because of the
deficiency of the presented evidence during trial. We point out in
this respect that courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular
ccidents cause whiplash injuries. This proportion is not public
knowledge, or is capable of unquestionable demonstration, or
ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions.46 We have no expertise in the field of medicine. Justices
and judges are only tasked to apply and interpret the law on the
basis of the parties pieces of evidence and their corresponding
legal arguments.
UMALI VS BACANI
Facts: On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the
Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan. During the storm, the banana
plants standing near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric
Plant (AEP) were blown down and fell on the electric wire. The live
electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the
electric post and the other fell to the ground. The following
morning,
barrio
captain
Bueno
of
San
Pedro
saw
CiprianoBaldomero, a laborer of the AEP, asked him to fix it, but
the latter told the barrio captain that he could not do it but that he
was going to look for the lineman to fix it. Sometime thereafter, a
small boy of 3 years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel P.
Saynes, whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went
to the place where the broken line wire was and got in contact with
it. The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was only
after the electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.
Issues: (1) WON the proximate cause of the boy's death is due to
a fortuitous event- storm; (2) WON boys parents negligence
exempts petitioner from liability.
Page 11 of 18
DAY SIX
which were about 30 feet high and which were higher than the
electric post supporting the electric line, and yet the employees
of the defendant who, with ordinary foresight, could have
easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the
electric line would be endangered by banana plants being
blown down, did not even take the necessary precaution to
eliminate that source of danger to the electric line. Second,
even after the employees of the Alcala Electric Plant were
already aware of the possible damage the storm of May14,
1972, could have caused their electric lines, thus becoming
a possible threat to life and property, they did not cut off
from the plant the flow of electricity along the lines, an act
they could have easily done pending inspection of the wires to see
if they had been cut. Third, employee CiprianoBaldomero was
negligent on the morning of the incident because even if he
was already madeaware of the live cut wire, he did not
have the foresight to realize that the same posed a danger
to life and property, and that he should have taken the
necessary precaution to prevent anybody from approaching the
live wire; instead Baldomero left the premises because what
was foremost in his mind was the repair of the line,
obviously forgetting that if left unattended to it could
endanger life and property.
Page 12 of 18
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The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work
after noticing the slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a
nature as to constitute negligence, barring his recovery under the
severe American rule. While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear
that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but
were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers
of the company and three of the workmen testify that there was a
general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against
walking by the side of the car, and the foreman swears that he
repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load.
On this contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in
favor of the defendant's contention to the extent of the general
order being made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience
of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some
degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary
cause.
Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between
the event itself, without which there could have been no accident,
and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it,
but contributing under review was the displacement of the
crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this produced the event
giving occasion for damages that is, the sinking of the track and
the sliding of the iron rails.
1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. In order to enforce the liability
of an employer for injuries to his employee, it is not necessary that
a criminal action be first prosecuted against the employer or his
representative primarily chargeable with the accident. No criminal
proceeding having been taken, the civil action may proceed to
judgment.
2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. The responsibility of
an employer to his employee of a fellow-servant of the employee
injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.
3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. Sua cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine
known as the "Fellow-servant rule," exonerating the employer
where the injury was incurred through the negligence of a fellowservant of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine
jurisprudence.
Page 13 of 18
DAY SIX
and had he not picked up and carried away the property of the
defendant which he found on its premises, and had he not
thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a
match to its contents.
Children are actuated by similar childish instincts and impulses.
Drawn by curiosity and impelled by the restless spirit of youth,
boys here will usually be found whenever the public is permitted to
congregate. The movement of machinery, and indeed anything
which arouses the attention of the young and inquiring mind, will
draw them to the neighborhood as inevitably as does the magnet
draw the iron which comes within the range of its magnetic
influence. The owners of premises, therefore, whereon things
attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the public are
expressly or impliedly permitted to enter or upon which the owner
knows or ought to know children are likely to roam about for
pastime and in play, "must calculate upon this, and take
precautions accordingly."
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's
property without defendant's express invitation or permission
would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries
incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such
injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are
of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the
negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the
plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable
to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we
are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating
cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of
the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the
plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible
for the injuries thus incurred.
As was said in case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout, "While it is the
general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover
damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of
another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the
rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution
required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only,
and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of
the case." In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident
was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and
physically than the average boy of his age. The evidence of record
leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness
stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which
he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in
his attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation.
His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed
by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final
success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a
match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what
he was about.
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient
capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which
he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the
cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his
experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the
necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would
have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act;
and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the
direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so
that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been
incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the
caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was
the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted
the injury
TEAGUE VS FERNANDEZ
Doctrine: Violation of Rules and Statutes
Page 14 of 18
DAY SIX
FACTS: The Realistic Institute situated on the second floor of the
Gil-Armi Building, a two-storey, semi-concrete edifice located at the
corner of Quezon Boulevard and Soler Street, Quiapo, Manila was
owned and operated by Teague. The said second floor was
unpartitioned, had a total area of about 400 square meters, and
although it had only one stairway, of about 1.50 meters in width, it
had eight windows, each of which was provided with two fireescape ladders and the presence of each of said fire-exits was
indicated on the wall.
October 24, 1955, around 4pm, a fire broke out in a store for
surplus materials located about ten meters away from the institute
(across the street). Upon seeing the fire, some of the students in
the Realistic Institute shouted Fire! Fire! and thereafter, a panic
ensued. Four instructresses and six assistant instructress of the
Institute were present and they, together with the registrar, tried to
calm down the students, who numbered about 180 at the time. The
panic, however, could not be subdued and the students, with the
exception of the few who made use of fire-escapes kept on rushing
and pushing their way through the stairs, thereby causing
stampede therein. No part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But,
after the panic was over, four students, including Lourdes
Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-appellants, were found dead and
several others injured on account of the stampede. The deceaseds
five brothers and sisters filed an action for damages against
Mercedes M. Teague as owner and operator of Realistic Institute.
CFI found for the defendant and dismissed the case. This was
however, reversed by the CA. The CA held that petitioner was
negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the
death of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of negligence is based
primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491 Of the
Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied
with in connection with the construction and use of the Gil-Armi
building. The alleged violation of the ordinance consisted in the
fact that the second storey of the Gil-Armi building had only one
stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of at least 1.2 meters
each, although at the time of the fire the owner of the building had
a second stairway under construction.
The petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted in the death
of Lourdes Fernandez as follows: (1) violation of ordinance; (2) fire
at a neighboring place; (3) shouts of Fire!, Fire!; (4) panic in the
Institute; (5) stampede; and (6) injuries and death. As thus
projected the violation of the ordinance, it is argued, was only a
remote cause, if at all, and cannot be the basis of liability since
there intervened a number of independent causes which produced
the injury complained of. According to the petitioner the events of
fire, panic and stampede were independent causes with no causal
connection at all with the violation of the ordinance.
ISSUE: Whether a violation of a statute constitutes negligence
HELD:
It is true that the petitioners non-compliance with the ordinance in
question was ahead of and prior to the other events in point of
time, in the sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the
building. But the violation was a continuing one, since the
ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent a specific
situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of the
building. That situation was undue overcrowding in case it should
become necessary to evacuate the building, which, it could be
reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under emergency
conditions if there was only one stairway available.
The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance
is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the
intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in
the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the
statute or ordinance was intended to prevent. To consider the
violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the injury does
not portray the situation in its true perspective; it would be more
accurate to say that the overcrowding at the stairway was the
proximate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance
Page 15 of 18
DAY SIX
intended to prevent by requiring that there be two stairways
instead of only one. Under the doctrine of the cases cited by the
respondents, the principle of proximate cause applies to such
violation.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
MCKEE VS IAC
FACTS: A head-on-collision took place between an International
cargo truck, Loadstar owned by private respondents, and driven by
Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh along
MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City and San Fernando,
Pampanga. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh
McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh
McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all
passengers of the Ford Escort.
Jose Koh was the father of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee, the mother
of minors George, Christopher and Kim Koh McKee. Loida Bondoc,
on the other hand, was the baby sitter of one and a half year old
Kim. At the time of the collision, Kim was seated on the lap of Loida
Bondoc who was at the front passenger's seat of the car while
Araceli and her two (2) sons were seated at the car's back seat.
Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded
with two hundred (200) cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos,
was traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando
Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the
other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando.
When the northbound car was about (10) meters away from the
southern approach of the bridge, two (2) boys suddenly darted
from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. The
boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all
the way to the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of
the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he
then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and
thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so,
his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of
the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge.
Civil Case No. 4477 and No. 4478, were filed on 31 January 1977
before the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga. While an
Information charging Ruben Galang with the crime of "Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Multiple Homicide and Physical
Injuries and Damage to Property" was filed with the trial court.
CFI rendered a decision against the accused Ruben Galang in the
aforesaid criminal case finding the accused Ruben Galang guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to (sic) Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and
Damage to Property. Upon the other hand, the two (2) civil cases
were dismisse and awarded the private respondents moral
damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
CA reversed and set aside and another one is rendered, ordering
defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants damages. The
decision is anchored principally on the respondent Court's findings
that it was Ruben Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence
which caused the accident. The appellate court further said that
the law presumes negligence on the part of the defendants
(private respondents), as employers of Galang, in the selection and
supervision of the latter; it was further asserted that these
defendants did not allege in their Answers the defense of having
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and
supervising the said employee.
A motion for reconsideration alleging improper appreciation of the
facts was subsequently filed by private respondents on the basis of
which the respondent Court, reconsidered and set aside its earlier
decision and affirmed in toto the trial court's judgment. A motion to
reconsider this Resolution was denied by the respondent
Court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the findings of respondent court is supported by
evience
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DAY SIX
RULING:
The test of negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is
manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any
reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid
running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where
they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane.
Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take
particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several
meters away and could very well slow down, move to the side of
the road and give way to the oncoming car. Moreover, under what
is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself
in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider
the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a
better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is
brought about by his own negligence."
Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the lane
of the car, We find that Jose Koh adopted the best means possible
in the given situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above
test, therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of negligence.
In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it
cannot be said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the
collision. Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which,
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having
a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
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DAY SIX
Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's subsequent negligence
in failing to take the proper measures and degree of care
necessary to avoid the collision which was the proximate cause of
the resulting accident.
Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear
chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the
law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the
party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown
that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and
prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the
injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear
chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible
for the consequences thereof. 56
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