Professional Documents
Culture Documents
LAUREL VS DESIERTO
The Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau
of the Office of the Ombudsman directed petitioner,
Chairman of the National Centennial Commission
(NCC), to submit his counter affidavit on the charges
of anomalies found by the Senate Blue Ribbon and
Saguisag Committees. The Blue Ribbon Committee
recommended his prosecution for violation of the
rules on public bidding on the award of centennial
contracts and manifest bias in the issuance of the
Notice to Proceed in the absence of a valid contract,
while the Saguisag Committee recommended the
further investigation of petitioner for violations of
Section 3 (e) of RA. No. 3019, Section 4 (a) in relation
to Section 11 of R.A. 6713, and Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code. Petitioner moved to dismiss on
ground of lack of jurisdiction claiming that he is not a
public officer and that NCC is a private organization.
The motion was denied by the Ombudsman, hence,
the instant recourse.
The NCC was created under Administrative Order No.
223 and Executive Order No. 128 to ensure a more
coordinated and synchronized celebrations of the
Philippine Centennial and wider participation from
the government and nongovernment or private
organizations. It aims to implement the state policies
on the promotion of the nation's historical and
cultural heritage and resources. It is thus a public
office performing executive functions. Thus, the
Chairman of this Committee is a public officer who
may be investigated by the Office of the
Ombudsman.
A definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence is
that provided by Mechem, a recognized authority on
the subject: A public office is the right, authority and
duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him
for the benefit of the public. The individual so
invested is a public officer.
In the Court's decision in Uy, we held that "it is the
prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the
authority to file the corresponding information/s
against petitioner in the regional trial court. The
Ombudsman exercise prosecutorial powers only in
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan." The
foregoing ruling in Uy, however, was short-lived.
Upon motion for clarification by the Ombudsman in
the same case, the Court set aside the foregoing
pronouncement in its Resolution dated March 20,
2001. The Court explained the rationale for this
reversal. The power to investigate and to prosecute
granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and
unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any
public officer or employee when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
The law does not make a distinction between cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those
cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that
the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public
official" is broad enough to embrace any crime
committed by a public officer or employee.
Sandiganbayan
correctly
convicted
malversation of public property.
him
of
MENESES VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that any public officer who, by reason of the
duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, or through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other
person to take such public funds or property, wholly
or partially, shall be guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property
(Emphasis supplied).
The grant of loans through the "vale" system is a
clear case of an accountable officer consenting to the
improper or unauthorized use of public funds by
other persons, which is punishable by the law. To
tolerate such a practice is to give a license to every
disbursing officer to conduct a lending operation with
the use of public funds. There is no law or regulation
allowing accountable officers to extend loans to
anyone against "vale" or chits given in exchange by
the borrowers. On the other hand, in Cabello vs.
Sandiganbayan, we held that the giving of "vales" by
public officers out of their accountable funds is
prohibited by P.D. No. 1145, otherwise known as the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines and
Memorandum Circular No. 570, dated June 24, 1968
of the General Auditing Office.
CABRERA ET. AL VS MARCELO
Facts: Before the Ombudsman, complaints were filed
by private respondent Franco P. Casanova against
incumbent Taal, Batangas mayor Librado M. Cabrera,
his wife, former Mayor Fe M. Cabrera, and Taal
Municipal Councilor Luther Leonor, for violation of
Article 217 in relation to Articles 171 and 48 of the
Revised Penal Code (i.e., the complex crime of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Public Documents), and Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The cases pertained to the allegedly unauthorized
travels of the spouses Cabrera, and the allegedly
anomalous purchase of medicines involving Leonor
and the Cabreras. The complaint pertaining to the
alleged unauthorized travel, docketed as OMB-1-010873-J, alleges that during his previous term, Librado
Cabrera had, on 13 March 1998 and 22 June 1998,
collected
and
received
from
the
Municipal
Government of Taal, reimbursement of alleged travel
expenses incurred outside of the Province of
Batangas in the respective amounts of Thirteen
Thousand Six Hundred Seventy Pesos and TwentyNine Centavos (P13,670.29) and Thirteen Thousand
Nine Hundred Eighty-One Pesos and Fifty Four
Centavos (P13,981.54). Likewise, Fe Cabrera, during
her own term, obtained reimbursement for alleged
travel expenses incurred outside the province of
Batangas in the total amount of One Hundred
Seventy Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-Seven Pesos
and Sixty-Six Centavos
(P170,987.66). 1 The Cabreras, prior to undertaking
the questioned trips, did not secure formal approval
from the Provincial Governor of Batangas as required
under the Local Government Code. It is also alleged
that the Cabreras forged the signature of then
CABAL VS KAPUNAN
ANTI-GRAFT
LAW;
FORFEITURE
OF
UNEXPLAINED WEALTH; NATURE OF FORFEITURE AS
PENALTY. The purpose of the charge against
petitioner is to apply the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1379, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the
State of property of a public officer or employee
which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
such public officer or employee and his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired
property. Such forfeiture has been held, however, to
partake of the nature of a penalty.
EXEMPTION OF DEFENDANTS FROM OBLIGATION TO
BE WITNESS AGAINST THEMSELVES. Proceedings for
forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal,
and hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal
cases from the obligation to be witness against
themselves are applicable thereto.
FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY IN SUBSTANCE IS A
CRIMINAL PROCEEDING FOR THE PURPOSE OF
PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; CASE OF BOYD vs.
U.S. and THURSTON vs. CLARK, CITED. In Boyd vs.
U.S. (116 U.S. 616, 29 L. ed., 746), it was held that
the information, in a proceeding to declare a
forfeiture of certain property because of the evasion
of a certain revenue law, "though technically a civil
proceeding, is in substance and effect a criminal
one", and that suits for penalties and forfeitures are
within the reason of criminal proceedings for the
purposes of that portion of the Fifth Amendment of
the Constitution of the U.S. which declares that no
person shall be compelled in a criminal to be a
witness against himself. Similarly, a proceeding for
the removal of an officer was held, in Thurston vs.
Clark (107 Cal. 285, 40 pp. 435, 437), to be in
substance criminal, for said portion of the Fifth
Amendment applies "to all cases in which the action
prosecuted is not to establish, recover or redress
private and civil rights, but to try and punish persons
charged with the commission of public offenses" and
"a criminal case is an action, suit or cause instituted
to punish an infraction of the criminal laws, and, with
this object in view, it matters not in what form a
statute may clothe it; it is still a criminal case . . . ."
CASE
OF
ALMEDA
vs.
PEREZ,
DISTINGUISHED.
In Almeda vs. Perez, L-18428
(August 30, 1962) the theory that, after the filing of
respondents' answer to a petition for forfeiture under
Republic Act No. 1379, said petition may not be
amended as to substance pursuant to our rules of
criminal procedure, was rejected by this Court upon
the
full
CASTILLO-CO VS BARBERS
Congressman Junie Cua, in the course of the
congressional investigation, discovered irregularities
in the purchase of heavy equipment by petitioner
and the Provincial Engineer constituting overpricing,
purchase of reconditioned and not brand new
equipments, absence of public bidding and
inspection, and advance payment prior to delivery.
He filed a complaint against the two before the Office
of the Ombudsman for violation of Sections 3(e) and
3 (g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended. Petitioner was placed under preventive
suspension for 6 months a week after the filing of the
complaint. The order was approved by the Deputy
Ombudsman
for
Luzon.
Their
motions
for
reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed
the present recourse contesting the authority of the
Deputy Ombudsman to sign the order of preventive
suspension, the period of suspension was excessive,
and denial of due process.
The Supreme Court held that R.A. 7975 (An Act to
Strengthen the Functional and Standard Organization
of the Sandiganbayan, as amended) does not
suggest that only the Ombudsman and not his
deputy may order the preventive suspension of
officials occupying positions classified as grade 27 or
above; that the Ombudsman and his deputy may
order preventive suspension pursuant to the
provisions of Section 24 of R.A. 6770 and Section 9,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman; that preventive suspension, being
merely a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation, may be decreed even before the
charges are heard; and that the six-month
suspension of petitioner is within the limits
prescribed by Section 24 of R.A. 6770.
PUBLIC
OFFICERS;
PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION; A PUBLIC OFFICER WITH A SALARY
GRADE OF 27 OR ABOVE MAY BE SUSPENDED BY THE
OMBUDSMAN OR HIS DEPUTY. Under the provisions of
Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 6770 and Section 9, Rule
III of the Rules of Procedure of the office of the
Ombudsman, there cannot be any doubt that the
Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend
an officer or employee, where appropriate, as
indicated
by
the
word
"or"
between
the
"Ombudsman" and "his Deputy." The word "or" is a
disjunctive term signifying disassociation and
independence of one thing from each of the other