TRICIA CRUZ

DLSU LAW | JDCTR

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS | ATTY. CUSTODIO
Quo Warranto
Municipality of San Narciso v Mendez 239 SCRA 11

On August 1959, Pres. Carlos P. Garcia issued EO 353 creating the

Municipality of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the
Municipality of San Narciso of Quezon, six (6) barrios along with
their respective sitios. Said EO was issued upon request,
addressed to the Pres and coursed through the Provincial Board of
Quezon, of the municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon in its
Resolution no. 8.

By virtue of another EO issued by Pres. Diosdado Macapagal, the

municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to
have gained the status of a fifth class municipality by operation of
Sec. 2 of RA 1515.

Petitioner Municipality filed a petition for quo warranto with the RTC
against the officials of the Municipality of San Andres. It sought the
declaration of nullity of EO 353 and prayed that respondent local
officials of the Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered
to refrain from performing the duties and functions of their
respective offices. It contended that EO 353, a presidential act, was
a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in
violation of the principle of separation of powers.

Respondents asked for the dismissal of the petition averring that

since it was at the instance of petitioner municipality that the
Municipality of San Andres was given life with the issuance of EO
353, petitioner Municipality should have been estopped from
questioning the creation of the new municipality. They also averred
that petitioner Municipality is not the property party to bring the
action, that prerogative being reserved to the State acting through
the SolGen.

Municipality of San Andres filed a new MTD alleging that the case
had become moot and academic with the enactment of RA
7160/LocGov Code particularly Sec. 442 thereof.

Motion was opposed by petitioner Municipality contending that such

provision of law was inapplicable OTH that the enactment referred
to legally exisiting municipalities and not to those whose mode of
creation had been void ab initio.

LC finally dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action on what

it felt was a matter that belonged to the State. It also ruled that the
alleged defects in the creation of municipal districts by the Pres
were cured by the LocGov code.

Petitioner Municipality filed a petition for review on certiorari. It

asserts that the existence of a municipality created by a null and
void PD may be attacked either directly or even collaterally by
anyone whose interests/rights are affected and that an
unconstitutional act is not a law, creates no office and is
inoperative.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner Municipality is entitled to a petition for quo warranto?

NOT ANYMORE
SC: The special civil action of quo warranto is a prerogative writ by which the
Govt can call upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a public
office or exercises a public franchise. When the inquiry is focused on the
legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a
proceeding for quo warranto or any other credit proceeding. It must be
brought in the name of the Rep of Phils and commenced by the SolGen or
fiscal when directed by the Pres. Such officers may, under certain
circumstances, bring such an action at the request and upon relation of
another person with the permission of the court. The RoC also allows an
individual to commence an action for quo warranto in his own name but this
initiative can be done when he claims to be entitled to a public office or
position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.
While the quo warranto proceedings filed below by petitioner municipality
has so named only by the officials of the Municipality of San Andres as
respondents, it is virtually, however, a denunciation of the authority of the
Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres to exist and to act in that
capacity.
Petitioners theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been
seasonably brought. EO 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres
was issued on 20 Aug 1959 but it was only after almost thirty years or on 05
June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge
the legality of the EO. The Municipal District, and later the Municipality, of
San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a
duly created LGU. In the same manner that the failure of a public officer to
question his ouster or the right of another to hold a position within a one-year
period can abrogate an action belatedly filed, so also, if not indeed with
greatest imperativeness, must a quo warranto proceeding assailing the
lawful authority of a political subdivision be timely raised. Public interest
demands it.

Tarrosa v Singson 232 S 553

A case for Prohibition was filed by Petitioner as taxpayer

questioning the appointment of respondent Gabriel Singson as
Governor of the BSP for not having been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments (CA). The petition seeks to enjoin
respondent Singson from the performance of his functions as such
official until his appointment is confirmed by the CA and respondent
Salvador M. Enriquez (Sec of DBM), from disbursing public funds in
payment of the salaries and emoluments of resp Singson.

Resp Singson was appointed Gov of BSP by Pres Ramos on July

2, 1993, effective only July 6, 1993. Tarrosa argues that Singsons
appointment is null and void since it was not submitted for
confirmation to the CA. The petition is anchored on Sec. 6 of RA
7653.

Respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative powers

in requiring the confirmation of CA of the appointment of the Gov of
BSP citing Sec. 16 of Art. 7 of the CONSTI. Respondents also aver
that the BSP has its own budget and accordingly, its budgetary
requirements are not subject to the provisions of the GAA.
ISSUE: W/N a petition for quo warranto lies against respondent? NO
SC: The instant petition is in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding as it
seeks the ouster of respondent Singson and alleges that the latter is
unlawfully holding or exercising the powers of Gov of BSP.
Such a special civil action can only be commenced by the SolGen or a
person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position unlawfully
held or exercised by another.
The action is improvidently brought by petitioner. To uphold the action would
encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to the courts, thereby causing
incalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of the
governmental machinery.
Lota v CA 2 S 715

Moises Sangalang alleged in his petition for quo warranto, that as a

duly appointed caretaker of the municipal cemetery of Taal,
Batangas, he was unlawfully ousted from office. Respondents are
Flaviano Lota, mayor of Taal, who allegedly ousted Moises from

office; Jose Sangalang, the new appointee for the position; and
Aurelio Beron, in this capacity as municipal treasurer.
Respondent Lota contends that Moises was unlawfully occupying
the position of cemetery caretaker and the latter having abandoned
it after all, he appointed Jose in his place in the interest of the
public.
After hearing, the CFI of Batangas declared plaintiff Moises
Sangalang to be legally appointed cemetery porter of Taal,
Batangas. Only Mayor Lota appealed from the decision.
CA declared that plaintiff is entitled to hold and continue in the office
as cemetery caretaker.
Lota et al contended that the respondent court erred in holding that
the present action is one of quo warranto and NOT mandamus
(which shouldve been the proper remedy accdg to him); in not
dismissing the action for failure of the plaintiff to join therein the
Municipality of Taal, Batangas, as party defendant, and in declaring
that Moises Sangalang is entitled to hold, and continue in the office
of caretaker of the municipal cemetery of that municipality.

ISSUE: W/N a petition for quo warranto lies against respondent? YES
SC: The claim that the instant action is one of mandamus, not quo warranto
is DEVOID of basis. While quo warranto and mandamus are often
concurrent remedies, however, there exists a clear distinction between the
two. Quo warranto is the remedy to try the right to an office or franchise and
to oust the holder from its enjoyment, while mandamus only lies to enforce
legal duties, not to try disputed titles; that where there is usurpation or
intrusion into an office, quo warranto is the proper remedy, and that where
the respondent without claiming any right to an office, excludes the petitioner
therefrom, the remedy is mandamus, not quo warranto.
The instant action is clearly one of quo warranto although mandamus is also
invoked as an ancillary remedy. The facts show that respondent Moises
Sangalang was holding the position of cemetery caretaker from 1951 until
he was extended a new appointment on July 1, 1955 by Dr. Noche; that until
then he had no resigned nor intended to abandon the office; that petitioner
Lota appointed defendant Jose Sangalang in his stead and that Jose still
claims to be the duly appointed caretaker. Moises, then alleged in his
petition that he had the right to possession and enjoyment of said office to
which he had been legally appointed, and asks that Jose be lawfully ousted.

TRICIA CRUZ
DLSU LAW | JDCTR
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS | ATTY. CUSTODIO
Therefore, the action is one whose purpose is to try the right or title to a
public office and oust the alleged unlawful holder from its enjoyment.
Failure to implead the Municipality is also untenable. According to
jurisprudence, any person claiming to be entitled to a public office may bring
an action of quo warranto, without the intervention of the SolGen or the
Fiscal and that only the person who is in unlawful possession of the office,
and all who claim to be entitled to that office, may be made parties in order
to determine their respective rights thereto in the same action.
Calleja v Panday GR 168696 (Feb 28, 2006)

Respondents filed a petition with the RTC of CamSur for quo

warranto with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction, Damages and Issuance of TRO against
petitioners.

Respondents alleged that since 1985 they had been members of

the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Inc., but
sometime in May 2005, petitioners, who are also among the
incorporators and stockholders of said corporation, forcibly usurped
the powers which supposedly belonged to respondents.

RTC CamSur issued an Order transferring the case to the RTC in

Naga City. According to RTC CamSur, since the verified petition
showed petitioners (herein respondents) to be residents of Naga,
then pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 66 of the RoC, the action for quo
warranto should be brought in the RTC exercising jurisdiction over
the territorial area where the respondents or any of the respondents
resides. However, exec judge of RTC refused to receive the case.

Petitioners raised affirmative defenses such as improper venue,

lack of jurisdiction, and wrong remedy of quo warranto.

RTC denied MTD pursuant to the Interim Rules of Procedure for

Intra-Corporate Controversies being a prohibited pleading. Case
was remanded to the RTC Br 23, Naga city which under AM No. 0011-03-SC has been designated as special court to try and decide
intra-corporate controversies under RA 8799 or the SRC.

Petitioners no longer moved for reconsideration and instead

immediately elevated the case to this Court via petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45.

Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Restore Status Quo Ante,

alleging that respondent Jose Pierre Panday, with the aid of 14

armed men, assaulted the premises of St. John Hospital taking

away the daily hospital collections.
ISSUE: W/N a petition for quo warranto lies against respondents?
SC: The Court notes that, indeed, petitioners chose the wrong remedy to
assail the Order remanding the case to RTC Naga. It is hornbook principle
that Rule 45 of the 1997 RoC governs appeals from judgments or final
orders. The said Order is a denial of petitioners prayer in their Answer for
the dismissal of respondents case against them which is considered an
interlocutory order.
It should be noted that allegations in a complaint for quo warranto that
certain persons usurped the offices, powers and functions of duly elected
members of the board, trustees and/or officers make out a case for an intracorporate controversy.
The present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo warranto against persons
who usurp a public office, position, or franchise; public officers who forfeit
their office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally
incorporated despite the passage of RA 8799. It is, therefore, The Interim
Rules of Procedure Granting Intra-Corporate Controversies Under RA No.
8799 which applies to the petition for quo warranto filed by respondents
before the trial court since what is being questioned is the authority of
respondents to assume the office and act as the BoD and officers of St. John
Hospital, Inc.
Garces v CA GR 114795 (July 17, 1996)

Petitioner Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of

Gutalac, Zamboanga Del Norte. She was to replace respondent
Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in turn, was
transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga. Such appointments were
approved by the CSC and which were to take effect upon
assumption of office.

However, it was found that Concepcion refused to transfer post as

he did not request for it. Garces, OTOH, was directed by the Office
of Asst. Director for Operations to assume the Gutalac post but she
was not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued by
respondent Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado
that prohibited her from assuming office in Gutalac as the same is
not vacant. She was also directed by the same officer to defer her
assumption of the Gutalac post.

Garces received a letter from the Acting Mngr of the Finance Dept.
addressed to her as the ER of Gutalac which she interpreted to
mean as superseding the deferment order. Meanwhile, since
Concepcion continued occupying the Gutalac officer, the
COMELEC En banc cancelled his apptment to Liloy.
Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and damages
against Empeynado and Concepcion.
COMELEC En Banc through a Reso, resolved to recognize
respondent Concepcion as the Election Registrar of Gutalac, and
ordered that the appointments of Garces to Gutalac and of
Concepcion to Liloy be cancelled.
Respondent Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for
mandamus alleging that the same was rendered moot and
academic by the said COMELEC Resolution, and that the same is
cognizable only by the COMELEC under Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the
1987 Constitution. RTC dismissed petition for mandamus on two
grounds: 1) that quo warranto is the proper remedy, and 2) that the
cases or matters referred under the constitution pertain only to
those involving the conduct of elections. Respondent CA affirmed
RTCs dismissal.

ISSUE/S: W/N petitioners action for mandamus proper? W/N this case is
cognizable by the RTC or by the SC?
SC:
(1) NO. Considering that Concepcion continuously occupies the
disputed position and exercises corresponding functions therefor,
the proper remedy should have been quo warranto and not
mandamus. Quo warranto tests the title to ones office claimed by
another and has as its object the ouster of the holder from its
enjoyment, while mandamus avails to enforce clear legal duties and
not to try disputed titles.
In this case, there was no vacancy in the Gutalac post and
petitioners appointment to which she could case her claim was
revoked making her claim uncertain.
(2) RTC. The controversy involves an appointive, not an elective,
official. Hardly can this matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the
SC. To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial

administrative questions that are best ventilated before the RTC, a

court which the law vest with the power to exercise original
jurisdiction over all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction over
of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions.
Mendoza v Allas GR 131977 (Feb 4, 1999)

Petitioner Mendoza joined the Bureau of Customs (BoC) in 1972.

He held the positions of Port Security Chief from March 1972
August 1972, Deputy Commissioner of Customs from Aug 1972
Sep 1975, Acting Commissioner from Sep 1975 - April 1977 and
Customs Operations Chief I from Oct 1987 to Feb 1988.

On March 1 1988, he was appointed Customs Service Chief of the

Customs Intelligence Investigation Service (CIIS). Such position
was reclassified by the CS as Director III.

Petitioner was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector of

CDO. In his place, resp Ray Allas was appointed as Acting Dir III
of the CIIS. Despite petitioners new assignment as Acting District
Collector, however, he continued to receive the salary and benefits
of the position of Director III.

Petitioner received a letter from Deputy Customs Commissioner

Cesar Dario informing him of his termination from BoC in view of
Allas appointment as Dir III by President Ramos. Petitioner wrote
the Commissioner demanding reinstatement with full backwages
and without loss of seniority rights. No reply was made.

Petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto against Allas before the
RTC. The case was tried and subsequently granted. It found the
petitioner to be illegally terminated from office without due process,
and in violation of security of tenure and that as he was deemed not
to have vacated his post, the appointment of Allas is void ab initio.

Respondent Allas appealed to the CA. Allas was subsequently

promoted by Ramos to the position of Deputy Commissioner of
Customs for Assessment and operations. Petitioner then moved to
dismiss the petition. Petitioner filed a Motion for Execution of its
decision. CA denied the motion OTG that the contested position
was now being occupied by Olores who was not a party tot he quo
warranto petition. Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari
and mandamus with the CA.

TRICIA CRUZ
DLSU LAW | JDCTR
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS | ATTY. CUSTODIO
ISSUE: W/N the quo warranto judgment against Allas is binding against
his successor Olores? NO
SC: Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he
is entitled to the controverted position, otherwise respondent has a right
to the undisturbed possession of the office. If the court finds for the
respondent, the judgment should simply state that the respondent is
entitled to the office. If, however, the court finds for the petitioner and
declares the respondent guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully
holding or exercising the office, court may order: 1) ouster; 2) recovery
of costs; 3) determination of rights.
The trial court found that respondent Allas usurped the position of
Director III, CIID. Consequently, the court ordered Allas be ousted from
the contested position and petitioner be reinstated in his stead.
Although, petitioner did not specifically pray for back salaries, the court
ordered the payment of full back wages. The decision of RTC became
F&E and petitioner prays for its execution.
Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right
binds his successor in office. This rule, however, is not applicable in quo
warranto cases. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the
respondents successor in office, even though such successor may
trace his title to the same source. It is never directed to an officer a
such, but always against the person to determine whether he is
constitutionally or legally authorized to perform any act in, or exercise
any function of the office to which he lays his claim.
In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner
solely against respondent Allas and not against Olores. The CA did not
err in denying the execution of the trial courts decision.

Expropriation
Republic v Gingoyan GR 166429 (December 19, 2005)

This is an offshoot of Agan v. Piatco (2004) where the contracts

which the Govt had with PIATCO were voided for being contrary to
law and public policy. The agreement had authorized PIATCO, to
build a new international airport terminal (NAIA 3), as well as a
franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the
concession period of 25 yrs pursuant to a Concession Agreement
for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement. The present case
involves the matter of just compensation due the contractor for the
terminal complex it built.

The holding of the SC at the 2004 Resolution states that since the
structures comprising the NAIA IPT III facility are almost complete
and that funds have been spent by PIATCO, for the Govt to take
over the said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as
builder of the said structures. The compensation must be just and in
accordance with law and equity for the Govt cannot unjustly enrich
itself at the expense of PIATCO and its investors.

After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities

have remained in the possession of PIATCO, despite the avowed
intent of the Government to put the airport terminal into immediate
operation.

The Govt filed a Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay City
RTC, together with an Application for Special Raffle. It sought upon
the filing of the complaint the issuance of a writ of possession
authorizing it to take immediate possession and control over the
NAIA 3 facilities. It had also declared that it had deposited the
amount of P3B in cash with the LBP representing the NAIA 3
terminals assessed value for taxation purposes.

The case was raffled to Br 117 presided by respondent Judge

Gingoyon. On the same da that the Complaint was filed, RTC
issued an order directing the issuance of a WoP to the Govt
authorizing it to take or enter upon the possession of the NAIA 3
facilities.
However, the RTC issued another Order supplementing the
previous order. The RTC noted that its earlier issuance of its writ of

possession was pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of

Civil Procedure. However, it was observed that Republic Act No.
8974 (Rep. Act No. 8974), otherwise known as "An Act to
Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for
National Government Infrastructure Projects and For Other
Purposes" and its IRR had amended Rule 67 in many respects.
Accordingly, on the basis of Sections 4 and 7 of RA No. 8974 and
Section 10 of the IRR, the RTC made the ff. qualifications: (1) it
directed the LBP to immediately release the amount of
US$62,343,175.77 to PIATCO, an amount which the RTC
characterized as that which the Government "specifically made
available for the purpose of this expropriation;" and such amount to
be deducted from the amount of just compensation due PIATCO as
eventually determined by the RTC; (2) Govt was directed to submit
to the RTC a Certificate of Availability of Funds signed by
authorized officials to cover
RULE 67
the
payment
of
just

compensation; (3) Govt was

directed
"to
maintain,
preserve and safeguard" the
NAIA 3 facilities or "perform
such as acts or activities in
preparation for their direct
operation" of the airport
terminal,
pending
expropriation
proceedings
and full payment of just
compensation. However, the
Government was prohibited
"from performing acts of
ownership like awarding
concessions or leasing any
part of [NAIA 3] to other
parties.
The very next day, the
Government filed an Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration.
The RTC issued another
Order, which appointed three
(3)
Commissioners
to
ascertain the amount of just

The Govt is required

only to make an initial
deposit
with
an
authorized
govt
depositary.

The initial deposit must

be equivalent to the
assessed value of the
property for purposes
of taxation.

Upon compliance with

the requirements of
Sec. 2, Rule 67, the
plaintiff can enter the
property concerned via
WoP.

compensation for the NAIA 3 Complex. The Government also filed

a Motion for Inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon.
The RTC denied these motions through an Omnibus Order.
Nonetheless, while the Omnibus Order affirmed the earlier
dispositions in the 4 January 2005 Order, it excepted from
affirmance "the superfluous part of the Order prohibiting the
plaintiffs from awarding concessions or leasing any part of [NAIA 3]
to other parties."
Thus, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule
65 was filed. The petition prayed for the nullification of the RTC
orders and for the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon from taking further
action on the expropriation case. A concurrent prayer for the
issuance of a TRO and PI was granted by the SC in a Resolution.

ISSUE/S:
RA 8974

The Govt is required to make immediate

payment to the property owner upon the
filing of the complaint to be entitled to a
writ of possession.
The relevant standard for initial
compensation is equivalent to 100% of
the market value of the property as
stated in the tax declaration or the
current relevant zonal valuation of the
BIR, whichever is higher and the value
of the improvements and/or structures
using the replacement cost method.
In case the completion of a govt
infrastructure proj is of utmost urgency
and importance, and there is no existing
valuation of the area concerned, the
implementing agency shall immediately
pay the owner of the property its
proferred value taking into consideration
the standards prescribed in Sec. 5
hereof.
Before the court can issue a WoP, the
implementing agency shall present to a
court a cert of availability of funds from
the proper official.

(1) Whether Rule 67 of the Rules of

Court or RA 8974 governs the
expropriation proceedings in this
case? RA 8974
(2) What is the Proper Amount/Just
Compensation to be paid?
(3) What is/are the right/rights of the
Govt upon issuance of the WoP?
(4) Is
the
Appointment
of
Commissioners necessary to
determine JC? NO
SC:
(1) The pronouncement in the 2004
Resolution is especially significant to this
case in two aspects, namely: (i) that
PIATCO must receive payment of just
compensation determined in accordance
with law and equity; and (ii) that the
government is barred from taking over
NAIA 3 until such just compensation is
paid. The parties cannot be allowed to
evade the directives laid down by this
Court through any mode of judicial action,
such as the complaint for eminent domain.

TRICIA CRUZ
DLSU LAW | JDCTR
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS | ATTY. CUSTODIO
The Government insists that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court governs the
expropriation proceedings in this case to the exclusion of all other laws. On
the other hand, PIATCO claims that it is Rep. Act No. 8974 which does
apply.
RA No. 8974 is intended to cover expropriation proceedings intended for
national government infrastructure projects. Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 8974
explains what are considered as "national government projects." As
acknowledged in the 2003 Decision, the development of NAIA 3 was made
pursuant to a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement pursuant to Republic
Act No. 6957, as amended, which pertains to infrastructure or development
projects normally financed by the public sector but which are now wholly or
partly implemented by the private sector. Under the build-operate-andtransfer scheme, it is the project proponent which undertakes the
construction, including the financing, of a given infrastructure facility.
There can be no doubt that PIATCO has ownership rights over the facilities
which it had financed and constructed. The 2004 Resolution squarely
recognized that right when it mandated the payment of just compensation to
PIATCO prior to the takeover by the Government of NAIA 3. The fact that the
Government resorted to eminent domain proceedings in the first place is a
concession on its part of PIATCOs ownership. Indeed, if no such right is
recognized, then there should be no impediment for the Government to
seize control of NAIA 3 through ordinary ejectment proceedings.
The law classifies the NAIA 3 facilities as real properties just like the soil to
which they are adhered. Any sub-classifications of real property and
divergent treatment based thereupon for purposes of expropriation must be
based on substantial distinctions, otherwise the equal protection clause of
the Constitution is violated.
Moreover, if Section 2 of Rule 67 were to apply, PIATCO would be enjoined
from receiving a single centavo as just compensation before the
Government takes over the NAIA 3 facility by virtue of a writ of possession.
Such an injunction squarely contradicts the letter and intent of the 2004
Resolution. Thus, at the very least, Rule 67 cannot apply in this case without
violating the 2004 Resolution. Even assuming that Rep. Act No. 8974 does
not govern in this case, it does not necessarily follow that Rule 67 should
then apply. After all, adherence to the letter of Section 2, Rule 67 would in
turn violate the Courts requirement in the 2004 Resolution that there must
first be payment of just compensation to PIATCO before the Government

may take over the property.

(2) As correctly observed by the OSG, there can be no "BIR zonal valuations"
on the NAIA 3 facility, as provided in Rep. Act No. 8974, since zonal
valuations are only for parcels of land, not for airport terminals. However, the
Court does not see this an impediment to the application of RA 8974.
It must be clarified that PIATCO cannot be reimbursed or justly compensated
for the value of the parcel of land on which NAIA 3 stands. PIATCO is not the
owner of the land on which the NAIA 3 facility is constructed, and it should
not be entitled to just compensation that is inclusive of the value of the land
itself. It would be highly disingenuous to compensate PIATCO for the value
of land it does not own. Its entitlement to just compensation should be
limited to the value of the improvements and/or structures themselves.
Under RA No. 8974, the Government is required to "immediately pay" the
owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of 100% of the value
of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the [BIR];
and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined
under Section 7. As stated above, the BIR zonal valuation cannot apply in
this case, thus the amount subject to immediate payment should be limited
to "the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under
Section 7 which refers to the "implementing rules and regulations for the
equitable valuation of the improvements and/or structures on the land."
Under the present IRR, the valuation of the improvements/structures are to
be based using "the replacement cost method." However, the replacement
cost is only one of the factors to be considered in determining the just
compensation.
In addition to Rep. Act No. 8974, the 2004 Resolution in Agan also
mandated that the payment of just compensation should be in accordance
with equity as well. Thus, in ascertaining the ultimate amount of just
compensation, the duty of the trial court is to ensure that such amount
conforms not only to the law, such as Rep. Act No. 8974, but to principles of
equity as well.
Notably, RA No. 8974 permits an expedited means by which the Government
can immediately take possession of the property without having to await
precise determination of the valuation. Section 4(c) of the law states that, "in
case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost
urgency and importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area

concerned, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of

the property its proferred value, taking into consideration the standards
prescribed in Section 5 [of the law]."
In the initial determination of the proffered value, the Government is not
strictly required to adhere to any predetermined standards, although its
proffered value may later be subjected to judicial review using the standards
enumerated under Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 8974. The SC agrees that the
P3B should be considered as the correct proferred value, however, it still
cannot deem the Govt as having faithfully complied with the law for the law
plainly requires direct payment to the owner and not a mere deposit with the
authorized govt depositary. Without such direct payment, no writ of
possession may be obtained.
The Court has the duty to implement RA No. 8974 and to direct compliance
with the requirement of immediate payment in this case. Accordingly, the
Writ of Possession dated 21 December 2004 should be held in abeyance,
pending proof of actual payment by the Government to PIATCO of the
proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities, which totals P3,002,125,000.00.
(3) Once the Government pays PIATCO the amount of the proffered value of P3
Billion, it will be entitled to the Writ of Possession.
Sec. 4 of RA No. 8974 provides the appropriate answer for the standard that
governs the extent of the acts the Government may be authorized to perform
upon the issuance of the writ of possession. It states that "the court shall
immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession
of the property and start the implementation of the project." Accordingly,
once the Writ of Possession is effective, the Government itself is authorized
to perform the acts that are essential to the operation of the NAIA 3 as an
international airport terminal upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession.
These would include the repair, reconditioning and improvement of the
complex, maintenance of the existing facilities and equipment, installation of
new facilities and equipment, provision of services and facilities pertaining to
the facilitation of air traffic and transport, and other services that are integral
to a modern-day international airport.
As regards the title to the property, the recognized rule is that title to the
property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only
upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled
principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. The

Republics acquisition of ownership is conditioned upon the full payment of

just compensation within a reasonable time.
Expropriation is not completed until payment to the property owner of just
compensation. The proffered value stands as merely a provisional
determination of the amount of just compensation, the payment of which is
sufficient to transfer possession of the property to the Government. However,
to effectuate the transfer of ownership, it is necessary for the Government to
pay the property owner the final just compensation.
RA No. 8974 mandates a speedy method by which the final determination of
just compensation may be had. Section 4 provides that in the event that the
owner of the property contests the implementing agencys proffered value,
the court shall determine the just compensation to be paid the owner within
sixty (60) days from the date of filing of the expropriation case.
(4) It must be noted that RA No. 8974 is silent on the appointment of
commissioners tasked with the ascertainment of just compensation. This
protocol though is sanctioned under Rule 67. The Court rules that the
appointment of commissioners under Rule 67 may be resorted to, even in
expropriation proceedings under Rep. Act No. 8974, since the application of
the provisions of Rule 67 in that regard do not conflict with the statute.
Nothing in Rule 67 or Rep. Act No. 8974 requires that the RTC consult with
the parties in the expropriation case on who should be appointed as
commissioners. Neither does the Court feel that such a requirement should
be imposed in this case.
National Power Corp v Manubay Agro-Industrial GR 150936

NPC, a GOCC created for the purpose of undertaking the

development and generation of hydroelectric power, commenced its
350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project. Such
project aims to transmit electricity coming Leyte to Luzon and
various load centers in its vision to interconnect the entire country
into single power grid.

One of these lands, where only a portion will be traversed by the

transmission lines, is owned by respondent MANUBAY.

NPC filed a complaint for expropriation before the RTC of Naga

against in order to acquire an easement of right of way over the
land which the latter owns.

TRICIA CRUZ
DLSU LAW | JDCTR
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS | ATTY. CUSTODIO

Respondent filed its answer. RTC issued an order authorizing the

immediate issuance of a WoP and directing Ex-Officio Provincial
Sheriff to immediately place NPC in possession of the subject land.
Subsequently, RTC directed the issuance of a writ of condemnation
in favor of NPC. The court also appointed three (3) commissioners
composed of 1 rep of NPC, 1 rep of MANUBAY and 1 rep of the
court.
Accordingly, the commissioners submitted their individual
appraisal/valuation reports. Taking into consideration the condition,
surroundings and the potentials of respondents expropriated
property,
RTC
approved
Chairperson
Teoxons
(NPC)
recommendation in the amount of P550/sqm. The trial court opined
that the installation thereon of the 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC
Power Transmission Project would impose a limitation on the use of
the land for an indefinite period of time, thereby justifying the
payment of the full value of the property.
RTC held that it was not bound by the provision cited by petitioner
Sec.3-A of RA 6395 which prescribes that the just compensation for
the acquired easement of a right of way over an expropriated
property an easement fee in an amount not exceeding 10 percent
of the market value of such property. The trial court relied on the
earlier pronouncements of this Court that the determination of just
compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. Thus,
valuations made by the executive branch or the legislature are at
best initial or preliminary only.
CA affirmed the RTCs ruling. It observed that, given their nature,
high-powered electric lines traversing respondents property would
necessarily diminish -- if not damage entirely -- the value and the
use of the affected property; as well as endanger lives and limbs
because of the high-tension current.

ISSUE: W/N an easement of right of way is considered taking of property

so as to warrant expropriation proceedings over the subject property? YES
SC: The acquisition of such an easement falls within the purview of the
power of eminent domain.
True, an easement of a right of way transmits no rights except the easement
itself, and respondent retains full ownership of the property. The acquisition
of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly observed by the
CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation power lines, the

limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive
respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the latter is
entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor
less than the monetary equivalent of the land.
The parcels of land sought to be expropriated are undeniably undeveloped,
raw agricultural land. But a dominant portion thereof has been reclassified by
the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Naga as residential.
The chairperson of the Board of Commissioners, in adopting the
recommendation of Commissioner Bulaos, made a careful study of the
property. Factors considered in arriving at a reasonable estimate of just
compensation for respondent were the location; the most profitable likely use
of the remaining area; and the size, shape, accessibility as well as listings of
other properties within the vicinity. Averments pertaining to these factors
were supported by documentary evidence.
Inasmuch as the determination of just compensation in eminent domain
cases is a judicial function, and the trial court apparently did not act
capriciously or arbitrarily in setting the price at P550 per square meter -- an
award affirmed by the CA -- we see no reason to disturb the factual findings
as to the valuation of the property. Both the Report of Commissioner Bulao
and the commissioners majority Report were based on uncontroverted facts
supported by documentary evidence and confirmed by their ocular
inspection of the property.
SC DOCTRINES:
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is
not the takers gain, but the owners loss.
In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the just
compensation to which the owner of a condemned property is
entitled is generally the market value. Market value is "that sum of
money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an
owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to
be given and received therefor."
Republic v CA and Heirs of Cris Santos GR 146587 (July 2, 2002)

Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings before the RTC

covering a total of 544,980 sqm of contiguous land situated along
MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the

10

continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities

for the Voice of the Philippines project.
Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558, the sum provisionally fixed
as being the reasonable value of the property.
More than nine (9) years after the institution of the expropriation
proceedings (1979), the trial court issued an order condemning the
properties of defendants located at Bulacan. The court also ordered
plaintiff to pay the defendants the just compensation for said
property which is at the FMV of the land condemned, computed at
the rate of 6%/sqm with legal interest.
It would appear that the national government failed to pay to herein
respondents the compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision,
such that a little over five years later, respondents filed a
manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated
property.
On 07 June 1984, the Bulacan RTC, after ascertaining that the
heirs remained unpaid in the sum of P1,058,655.05, issued a writ of
execution served on the plaintiff, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, for the implementation thereof. When the order was not
complied with, respondents again filed a motion urging the trial
court to direct the provincial treasurer of Bulacan to release to them
the amount of P72,683.55, a portion of the sum deposited by
petitioner at the inception of the expropriation proceedings in 1969,
corresponding to their share of the deposit. The trial court granted
the motion.
Pres. Estrada issued Proclamation no. 22 transferring 20 hectares
of the expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for the
expansion of its facilities and another 5 hectares to be used
exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. The
remaining portion was retained by PIA. The Santos heirs remained
unpaid, and no action was taken on their case until 16 September
1999 when petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the
deposit in court of the amount of P4,664,000 by way of just
compensation for the expropriated property of the late Luis Santos
subject to such final computation as might be approved by the
court.
The Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation and motion,
submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from
P6/sqm. previously fixed to its current zonal value pegged at

P5K/sqm. RTC ruled in favor of respondents. Petitioner brought that

the matter to the CA but the petition was outrightly denied.
Petitioner posited that a motion which respondents had filed on 17
February 1984, followed up by other motions subsequent thereto,
was made within the reglementary period that thereby interrupted
the 5-year prescriptive period within which to enforce the 1979
judgment. Furthermore, the receipt by respondents of partial
compensation in the sum of P72,683.55 constituted partial
compliance on the part of petitioners and effectively estopped
respondents from invoking prescription expressed in Section 6,
Rule 39, of the Rules of Court.
Respondents advanced the view that pursuant to Section 6, Rule
39, of the Rules of Court, the failure of petitioner to execute the
judgment, dated 26 February 1979, within five years after it had
become final and executory, rendered it unenforceable by mere
motion.

ISSUE:
(1) W/N the change in present use of the expropriated property from what
was originally intended and agreed upon by the agency and the original
owner justifies reversion? NO
(2) W/N non-payment of just compensation will automatically warrant
reversion of the expropriated property back to its owner? NO
SC DOCTRINES:
The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate
right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its
territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. Fundamental to the
independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the
Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely
confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the
due exercise of the power. It reaches to every form of property the
State needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all
separate interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit
agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the
right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public
interest so requires it.
Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional
sense, for the condemning authority is not required to assert any
conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the
condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and

TRICIA CRUZ
DLSU LAW | JDCTR
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS | ATTY. CUSTODIO

possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or

interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to
prove a right to compensation for the taking.
Expropriation is not without its limits: first, the taking must be for
public use, and second, that just compensation must be given to
the private owner of the property. These twin proscriptions have
their origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving balance
between the State interests, on the one hand, and private rights,
upon the other hand, by effectively restraining the former and
affording protection to the latter. In determining "public use," two
approaches are utilized - the first is public employment or the actual
use by the public, and the second is public advantage or benefit. It
is also useful to view the matter as being subject to constant
growth, which is to say that as society advances, its demands upon
the individual so increases, and each demand is a new use to
which the resources of the individual may be devoted.

RULING:
(1) The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued
utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof being ceded for
the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and
for the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line
with the requirements of public purpose.
The property has assumed a public character upon its
expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as the condemnor and as the
owner of the property, is well within its rights to alter and decide the
use of that property, the only limitation being that it be for public
use, which, decidedly, it is. It follows that both by virtue of the
judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as the
annotations upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to
recover possession of their expropriated lots - which are still
devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated - but
only to demand the fair market value of the same.
The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the
expropriation proceedings provides not only for the payment of just
compensation to herein respondents but likewise adjudges the
property condemned in favor of petitioner over which parties, as
well as their privies, are bound. Petitioner has occupied, utilized
and, for all intents and purposes, exercised dominion over the

property pursuant to the judgment. The exercise of such rights

vested to it as the condemnee indeed has amounted to at least a
partial compliance or satisfaction of the 1979 judgment, thereby
preempting any claim of bar by prescription on grounds of nonexecution.
(2) In arguing for the return of their property on the basis of nonpayment, respondents ignore the fact that the right of the
expropriatory authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary
sales, to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. An in
rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property. After
condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and
independent title; thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a
disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process
for securing better title against all the world than may be obtained
by voluntary conveyance.
Respondents first instituted proceedings for payment against
petitioner five years after the 1979 judgment had become final. The
unusually long delay in bringing the action to compel payment
against herein petitioner would militate against them. Consistently
with the rule that one should take good care of his own concern,
respondents should have commenced the proper action upon the
finality of the judgment, which, indeed, resulted in a permanent
deprivation of their ownership and possession of the property.
Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation v City of Pasig GR 152230

The Municipality (now City) of Pasig needed an access road from

ER Santos St., a municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, to
Brgy. Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses were
located. The road had to be at least three meters in width, as
required by the Fire Code, so that fire trucks could pass through in
case of conflagration. Likewise, the residents in the area needed
the road for water and electrical outlets. The municipality then
decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791- square meter
property of respondents Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching
Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho (Ching Cuangcos) which is
abutting E. R. Santos Street.

The Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance

authorizing the municipal to initiate expropriation proceedings to
acquire the said property and appropriate the fund therefor. The

12

ordinance stated that the property owners were notified of the

municipalitys intent to purchase the property for public use as an
access road but they rejected the offer.
Municipality filed a complaint against the Ching Cuangcos for the
expropriation of the property under Sec. 19 of RA 7160. It
appended to the complaint a photocopy of the letter addressed to
defendant Lorenzo Ching Chuangco.
Plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of the
property based on the latest tax declaration covering the property.
On plaintiffs motion, RTC issued a WoP. Plaintiff caused the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion of the
TCT under the name of Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation
(JILCSFI) which had purchased the property.
Plaintiff constructed therein a cemented road with a width of three
meters; the road was called Damayan Street.
Defendants claimed, in their answer that, as early as Feb 93 they
had already sold the property to JILCSFI via DoS. JILCSFI filed a
motion to intervene as defendant-in-intervention which the RTC
granted. It averred that the plaintiffs exercise of eminent domain
was only for a particular class and not for the benefit of the poor
and the landless.
The plaintiff offered in evidence a photocopy of the letter of Engr.
Jose Reyes addressed to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco to prove that the
plaintiff made a definite and valid offer to acquire the property to the
co-owners. However, the RTC rejected the same letter for being a
mere photocopy.
RTC issued an order in favor of plaintiff. The plaintiff and intervenor
are hereby directed to submit at least two (2) names of their
recommended commissioners for the determination of just
compensation within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
RTC held that, as gleaned from the declaration in Ordinance No.
21, there was substantial compliance with the definite and valid
offer requirement of Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, and that the
expropriated portion is the most convenient access to the interior of
Sto. Tomas Bukid.
CA affirmed the order of the RTC. CA declared that the letter of
Engr. Reyes, inviting Lorenzo Ching Cuanco to a conference to
discuss with him the road project and the price of the lot, was a
substantial compliance with the "valid and definite offer"
requirement under said Section 19. In addition, the CA noted that

there was also constructive notice to the defendants of the

expropriation proceedings since a notice of lis pendens was
annotated at the dorsal portion of the TCT. Finally. CA upheld the
public necessity for the subject property based on the findings of
the trial court that the portion of the property sought to be
expropriated appears to be, not only the most convenient access to
the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid, but also an easy path for vehicles
entering the area, particularly fire trucks. Moreover, the CA took into
consideration the provision of Article 33 of the LGCs IRR, which
regards the "construction or extension of roads, streets, sidewalks"
as public use, purpose or welfare.
JILCSFI filed a MR. CA denied the MR.

ISSUE/S:
(1) W/N there was a valid expropriation on the part of the Municipality?
NONE
(2) W/N the expropriation of the subject property is subject to the
essential requisites for an easement of right of way? NO
SC DOCTRINES:
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the
State or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of
private rights. It is one of the harshest proceedings known to the
law. Consequently, when the sovereign delegates the power to a
political unit or agency, a strict construction will be given against the
agency asserting the power. The authority to condemn is to be
strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor.
When the power is granted, the extent to which it may be exercised
is limited to the express terms or clear implication of the statute in
which the grant is contained.
Corollarily, the respondent, which is the condemnor, has the burden
of proving all the essentials necessary to show the right of
condemnation. It has the burden of proof to establish that it has
complied with all the requirements provided by law for the valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain.
The Court declared that the following requisites for the valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain by a local government unit
must be complied with:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council
authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local
government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or

TRICIA CRUZ
DLSU LAW | JDCTR
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS | ATTY. CUSTODIO
pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use,
purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under
Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner
of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not
accepted.
RULING:
(1) The respondent Municipality was burdened to prove the mandatory
requirement of a valid and definite offer to the owner of the property
before filing its complaint and the rejection thereof by the latter. It is
incumbent upon the condemnor to exhaust all reasonable efforts to
obtain the land it desires by agreement. Failure to prove
compliance with the mandatory requirement will result in the
dismissal of the complaint.
The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be
first made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary
acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid
the expense and delay of a court action. A reasonable offer in good
faith, not merely perfunctory or pro forma offer, to acquire the
property for a reasonable price must be made to the owner or his
privy. A single bona fide offer that is rejected by the owner will
suffice.
In the present case, the respondent failed to prove that before it
filed its complaint, it made a written definite and valid offer to
acquire the property for public use as an access road. The only
evidence adduced by the respondent to prove its compliance with
the law is the photocopy of the letter purportedly bearing the
signature of Engr. Jose Reyes, to only one of the co-owners,
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco.
It bears stressing, however, that the respondent offered the letter
only to prove its desire or intent to acquire the property for a rightof-way. The document was not offered to prove that the respondent
made a definite and valid offer to acquire the property. Moreover,
the RTC rejected the document because the respondent failed to
adduce in evidence the original copy thereof. The respondent,

likewise, failed to adduce evidence that copies of the letter were

sent to and received by all the co-owners of the property.
(2) The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing
a road. The respondent is not mandated to comply with the
essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New
Civil Code. Case law has it that in the absence of legislative
restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may
determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless
such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious.
Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public good and
there is genuine necessity of public character. Government may not
capriciously choose what private property should be taken.
The respondent has demonstrated the necessity for constructing a
road from E. R. Santos Street to Sto. Tomas Bukid. The witnesses,
who were residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that although
there were other ways through which one can enter the vicinity, no
vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter the area except
through the newly constructed Damayan Street. This is more than
sufficient to establish that there is a genuine necessity for the
construction of a road in the area. After all, absolute necessity is not
required, only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice.
NONETHELESS, the respondent failed to show the necessity for
constructing the road particularly in the petitioners property and not
elsewhere. The respondent failed to adduce a preponderance of
evidence to prove its claims.
There is no showing in the record that an ocular inspection was
conducted during the trial. If, at all, the trial court conducted an
ocular inspection of the subject property during the trial, the
petitioner was not notified thereof. The petitioner was, therefore,
deprived of its right to due process. It bears stressing that an ocular
inspection is part of the trial as evidence is thereby received and
the parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the trial.
Consequently, where, as in this case, the petitioner was not notified
of any ocular inspection of the property, any factual finding of the
court based on the said inspection has no probative weight. The
findings of the trial court based on the conduct of the ocular
inspection must, therefore, be rejected.

14

Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage

Limpin and Sarmiento v IAC and Ponce 166 S 88

Two (2) lots covered by TCTs, together with two (2) others, were
originally mortgaged in 1973 to Ponce by Sps. Aquino. These two
lots were afterwards sold in 1978 by the same Aquino Spouses to
Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation (Butuan Bay).

Limpin obtained against Butuan Bay a money judgment in 1979;

and to satisfy the judgment, the two lots were levied on and sold at
public auction in 1980, Limpin being the highest bidder. Limpin later
sold the lots to his co-petitioner, Sarmiento.

A day before levy was made on the two lots in execution of the
judgment, Ponce had initiated judicial proceedings for the
foreclosure of the mortgage over said two lots. Judgment was
rendered in his favor. At the foreclosure sale, Ponce as the highest
bidder acquired the lots.

Ponce moved for confirmation of the foreclosure sale, but the Court
confirmed the sale of only two lots, refusing to do so as regards the
two, which had been subject of the execution sale in Limpins favor.

Ponce then instituted a special civil action in the IAC, impleading

Limpin and Sarmiento as indispensable parties respondents.

The court rendered judgment in Ponces favor. IAC declared that

the sale to Ponce, as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of
the two lots in question should have been confirmed, subject to
Limpins (and now Sarmientos) equity of redemption. Limpin and
Sarmiento appealed.

SC affirmed IACs dismissal of petitioners petition for review on

certiorari. It affirmed the decision of the IAC which ordered the TC
to confirm the sale of the two lots and issue a WoP in favor of
Ponce.

Rogelio Sarmiento was aware that the Trial Court had the
ministerial duty to execute the IACs decision (i.e. to confirm the
sale and issue a WoP subject to equity of redemption). He knew
that he had the prerogative right to exercise his equity of

redemption, if not from the moment that the judgment of this Court
became F&E, at least until the lower court, subsequently confirmed
the sale and issued a WoP in favor of Ponce. BUT Sarmiento did
not try to exercise that right before, at or about the time of the
confirmation of the foreclosure sale by Judge Solano. Instead, he
instituted no less than two (2) actions in the same RTC which were
assigned to another branch - attempting to relitigate precisely the
same issues which the SC and the IAC had already passed upon
and resolved adversely to him. It was not until the lapse of nine
(9) months or so after entry of the judgment recognizing his
equity of redemption as successor-in-interest of the original
mortgagors that Sarmiento finally attempted to exercise his
unforeclosed equity of redemption.
Sarmiento filed a motion with the RTC manifesting that he would
exercise the right and asked the Court to fix the redemption
price. RTC opined that "this should be the subject of the agreement
between Ponce and Sarmiento.
Sarmiento then wrote to Ponce offering P2.6M as redemption price
for the two lots. Ponce rejected the offer and averred that the period
within which Sarmiento could have exercised such right had lapsed.
Ponce states that the term, equity of redemption, means "the right
of the mortgagor to redeem the mortgaged property after his default
in the performance of the conditions of the mortgage but before the
sale of the property or the judicial confirmation of the Sheriffs sale."
He postulates that from the date Sarmiento's predecessors-ininterest defaulted in their obligations over the mortgaged properties,
up to the time when the lower court confirmed the auction sale of
those properties, Sarmiento could have exercised his 'equity of
redemption."' Not having done so within that time, his equity of
redemption had been extinguished.
Sarmiento, OTOH, alleges that the confirmation of the sale of the
two lots could not have cut off his equity of redemption;" in fact,
"Ponce himself, in his 'Urgent Motion' precisely prayed for the
issuance of a WoP 'subject to the equity of redemption of Rogelio
M. Sarmiento' thereby recognizing Sarmiento's equity of redemption
beyond confirmation date. He also argues that he had not been
informed of the time when his right of redemption would be cut-off,
because he "never received a copy of any Motion for Confirmation,
much less notice of hearing thereon in violation of his right to due
process" and that he is entitled to a reasonable time, e.g., a year,
for the exercise of his equity of redemption.

TRICIA CRUZ
DLSU LAW | JDCTR
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS | ATTY. CUSTODIO
ISSUE: W/N Sarmiento may still exercise equity of redemption as transferee
of the mortgaged property? NOT ANYMORE
SC: The equity of redemption is, to be sure, different from and should not be
confused with the right of redemption. The right of redemption in relation to a
mortgage-understood in the sense of a prerogative to re-acquire mortgaged
property after registration of the foreclosure sale- exists only in the case of
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. No such right is recognized in
a judicial foreclosure except only where the mortgagee is the Philippine
National Bank or a bank or banking institution.
Where a mortgage is foreclosed extra-judicially, Act 3135 grants to the
mortgagor the right of redemption within one (1) year from the registration of
the sheriffs certificate of foreclosure sale.
Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, however, no equivalent right of
redemption exists. The law declares that a judicial foreclosure sale, "when
confirmed by an order of the court, ... shall operate to divest the rights of all
the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to
such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law. Such rights
exceptionally "allowed by law" (i.e., even after confirmation by an order of
the court) are those granted by the charter of the Philippine National Bank
(Acts No. 2747 and 2938), and the General Banking Act (R.A. 337). These
laws confer on the mortgagor, his successors in interest or any judgment
creditor of the mortgagor, the right to redeem the property sold on
foreclosure-after confirmation by the court of the foreclosure sale-which right
may be exercised within a period of one (1) year, counted from the date of
registration of the certificate of sale in the Registry of Property.
But, to repeat, no such right of redemption exists in case of judicial
foreclosure of a mortgage if the mortgagee is not the PNB or a bank or
banking institution.
In such a case, the foreclosure sale, "when confirmed by an order of the
court shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to
vest their rights in the purchaser." There then exists only what is known as
the equity of redemption. This is simply the right of the defendant mortgagor
to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying
the secured debt within the 90-day period after the judgment becomes final,

in accordance with Rule 68, or even after the foreclosure sale but prior to its
confirmation.
Section 2, Rule 68 is the mortgagor's equity (not right) of
redemption which, may be exercised by him even beyond the 90-day period
"from the date of service of the order,' and even after the foreclosure sale
itself, provided it be before the order of confirmation of the sale. After such
order of confirmation, no redemption can be effected any longer.
It is this same equity of redemption that is conferred by law on the
mortgagor's successors-in-interest, or third persons acquiring rights over the
mortgaged property subsequent, and therefore subordinate, to the
mortgagee's lien. If these subsequent or junior lienholders be not joined in
the foreclosure action, the judgment in the mortgagor's favor is ineffective as
to them, of course. In that case, they retain what is known as
the "unforeclosed equity of redemption," and a separate foreclosure
proceeding should be brought to require them to redeem from the first
mortgagee, or the party acquiring title to the mortgaged property at the
foreclosure sale, within 90 days, under penalty of losing that prerogative to
redeem.
In the case at bar, however, there is no occasion to speak of any
"unforeclosed equity of redemption' in Sarmiento's favor since he was
properly impleaded in the judicial proceeding where his and Ponce's rights
over the mortgaged property were ventilated and specifically adjudicated.
The judgment cannot be construed as contemplating or requiring the
institution of a separate suit by Ponce to compel Sarmiento to exercise his
unforeclosed equity of redemption, or as granting Sarmiento the option to
redeem at any time that he pleases, subject only to prescription. This would
give rise to that multiplicity of proceedings which the law eschews. The
judgment plainly intended that Sarmiento exercise his option to redeem,
as successor of the mortgagor.
Dayot v Shell Chemical Company GR 156542 (June 26, 2007)

Panay Railways, Inc. (PRI) executed a REM contract over six (6)
parcels of land located in Iloilo City in favor of Traders Royal Bank
(TRB) for purposes of securing its loan obligations to TRB.

PRI failed to pay its loan and so as a consequence, the mortgaged

properties were foreclosed and sold at public auction to TRB as the
highest bidder. PRI failed to redeem the foreclosed properties.

16

Hence, TRB consolidated its ownership over the subject parcels of

land and, thereafter, certificates of title were issued in its name.
Thereafter, TRB filed a Petition for WoP with the RTC. Trial court
granted the petition and ordered the issuance of the said writ.
However, the writ was not fully implemented.
TRB sold to spouses Dayot five (5) of the subject parcels of land by
virtue of a DoS.
Dayot filed a Supplemental Pleading before the RTC praying that
she, being the transferee of all the rights and interest of TRB over
the parcels of land subject of the Petition for WoP, be substituted as
the new petitioner. RTC granted and issued an Alias WoP.
Sps Dayot filed with the RTC a complaint for Recovery of
Ownership
and
Possession,
Annulment,
Cancellation,
Reconveyance, and Damages against TRB, Petron and Shell
praying that Shell be directed to vacate the portion of one of the
subject parcels of land which it actually possess and for both Petron
and Shell to surrender ownership and possession of portions of the
said parcels of land.
Petitioner spouses filed a Supplemental Motion for the Issuance of
Writ of Possession praying that Shell be ejected from the portion it
possesses.
Shell lodged an opposition to petitioners Motion alleging that
petitioner is guilty of forum shopping.
RTC denied petitioners motion for issuance of WoP insofar as
Shell is concerned.
Petitioner filed two successive motions praying for an issuance of
Alias WoP. Shell opposed. RTC conceded and issued the WoP.
Sheriff served upon Shell a Notice to Vacate. Shell and Petron
moved for the reconsideration but the trial court denied it.
Shell filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA praying
for the nullification of RTC orders. CA granted the petition.
Petitoner filed a MR which was denied by the CA. Hence, a petition
for review on certiorari was filed.
Petitioner argues that a WoP can still be validly issued and
implemented in consonance with the rule that proceedings incident
to extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgages to resolve the possession
of third-party claimants may proceed independently of the action
which said claimants may bring to enforce or protect their claim of
ownership over the property.

Respondent contends that it has the right to possess the disputed

property as it has satisfactorily shown that it is the registered owner
of and has title over the subject property.

ISSUE: W/N Shell (as third party to the foreclosure proceedings) may be
ejected from the property by means of an ex parte WoP? NO
SC: The Court finds that under applicable laws and jurisprudence,
respondent cannot be ejected from the property by means of an ex-parte writ
of possession.
Under Art. 443 of the NCC, one who claims to be the owner of a property
possessed by another must bring the appropriate judicial action for its
physical recovery. The term "judicial process" could mean no less than an
ejectment suit or reivindicatory action, in which the ownership claims of the
contending parties may be properly heard and adjudicated.
The ex-parte petition for issuance of a possessory writ filed by petitioner's
predecessor, TRB, strictly speaking, is not the kind of "judicial process"
contemplated above. Even if the same may be considered a judicial
proceeding for the enforcement of ones right of possession as purchaser in
a foreclosure sale, it is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party
"sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention
or redress of a wrong."
Section 33, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court relating to the right of possession
of a purchaser of property in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale provides that
upon the expiration of the period of the right of redemption, the possession
of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the
same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property
adversely to the judgment obligor.
The obligation of a court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the
purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale of a mortgaged property
ceases to be ministerial once it is shown that there is a third party in
possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the
mortgagor and that such third party is a stranger to the foreclosure
proceedings in which the ex-partewrit of possession was applied for.
It bears emphasis that an ex-parte petition for issuance of a writ of
possession is a non-litigious proceeding authorized in an extra-judicial
foreclosure of mortgage pursuant to Act 3135, as amended. It is brought for

TRICIA CRUZ
DLSU LAW | JDCTR
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS | ATTY. CUSTODIO
the benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or consent by any person
adversely interested.
Furthermore, unlike a judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage under Rule
68 of the Rules of Court where an action for foreclosure is brought before the
RTC where the mortgaged property or any part thereof is situated, any
property brought within the ambit of Act 3135 is foreclosed by the filing of a
petition, not with any court of justice, but with the office of the sheriff of the
province where the sale is to be made.
As such, a third person in possession of an extra-judicially foreclosed
property, who claims a right superior to that of the original mortgagor,
is thus given no opportunity to be heard in his claim. It stands to reason,
therefore, that such third person may not be dispossessed on the strength of
a mere ex-parte possessory writ, since to do so would be tantamount to his
summary ejectment, in violation of the basic tenets of due process.
Sulit v CA and Iluminada Cayco GR 114795 (Feb 17, 1997)

Iluminada Cayco executed a REM over her lot in Caloocan City in

favor of Cesar Sulit, to secure a loan of P4 Million.

Upon petitioner's failure to pay said loan within the stipulated

period, Sulit resorted to extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage as
authorized in the contract. Hence, in a public auction, the lot was
sold to the mortgagee Sulit who submitted a winning bid of P7
Million. As stated in the Certificate of Sale executed by the notary
public, the mortgaged property was sold at public auction to satisfy
the mortgage indebtedness of P4 Million.

Sulit petitioned the RTC for the issuance of a WoP in his favor. RTC
granted the issuance upon the posting of an indemnity bond of
P120K.

Cayco filed a motion to have the auction sale of the mortgaged

property set aside and to defer the issuance of WoP. In the same
motion, Cayco prayed as an alternative relief that Sulit be directed
to pay the sum of P3M which represents the balance of his winning
bid of P7M less the mortgage indebtedness of P4M. Respondent
Judge denied Caycos motion.

Cayco then filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction

and/or TRO before respondent CA which immediately issued a
status quo order restraining respondent judge from implementing
his order and the WoP issued pursuant thereto.

Sulit asserts that CA gravely erred when it failed to appreciate and

consider the supposed legal significance of the bouncing checks
which Cayco issued and delivered to Sulit as payment for the
agreed or stipulated interest on the mortgage obligation.
Petitioner argues that it is ministerial upon the court to issue a WoP
after the foreclosure sale and during the redemption period,
invoking Secs. 7 and 8 of Act 3135.

ISSUE: W/N the mortgagee or purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale

is entitled to the issuance of a WoP over the mortgaged property despite his
failure to pay the surplus proceeds of the sale to the mortgagor or the person
entitled thereto? NO
SC: The application of the proceeds from the sale of the mortgaged property
to the mortgagor's obligation is an act of payment, not payment by dation;
hence, it is the mortgagee's duty to return any surplus in the selling price to
the mortgagor. Perforce, a mortgagee who exercises the power of sale
contained in a mortgage is considered a custodian of the fund, and, being
bound to apply it properly, is liable to the persons entitled thereto if he fails to
do so. And even though the mortgagee is not strictly considered a trustee in
a purely equitable sense, but as far as concerns the unconsumed balance,
the mortgagee is deemed a trustee for the mortgagor or owner of the equity
of redemption.
Surplus money, in case of a foreclosure sale, gains much significance where
there are junior encumbrancers on the mortgaged property. Jurisprudence
has it that when there are several liens upon the premises, the surplus
money must be applied to their discharge in the order of their priority. A junior
mortgagee may have his rights protected by an appropriate decree as to the
application of the surplus, if there be any, after satisfying the prior mortgage.
His lien on the land is transferred to the surplus fund. And a senior
mortgagee, realizing more than the amount of his debt on a foreclosure sale,
is regarded as a trustee for the benefit of junior encumbrancers.
The general rule that mere inadequacy of price is not sufficient to set aside a
foreclosure sale is based on the theory that the lesser the price the easier it
will be for the owner to effect the redemption. The same thing cannot be said
where the amount of the bid is in excess of the total mortgage debt. The
reason is that in case the mortgagor decides to exercise his right of
redemption, Section 30 of Rule 39 provides that the redemption price should
be equivalent to the amount of the purchase price, plus one per cent monthly

18

interest up to the time of the redemption, together with the amount of any
assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after
purchase, and interest on such last-named amount at the same rate.
Section 4 of Rule 68, merely provides that where there is a balance or
residue after payment of the mortgage, the same shall be paid to the
mortgagor. If the mortgagee is retaining more of the proceeds of the sale
than he is entitled to, this fact alone will not affect the validity of the sale but
simply gives the mortgagor a cause of action to recover such surplus. This is
likewise in harmony with the decisional rule that in suing for the return of the
surplus proceeds, the mortgagor is deemed to have affirmed the validity of
the sale since nothing is due if no valid sale has been made.
Spouses Saguan v PBC GR 159882 (Nove 23, 2007)

Petitioners Sps. Ruben Saguan and Violeta Saguan obtained a

loan of P3M from Philippine Bank of Communications (PBC). To
secure the obligation, they mortgaged five parcels of land.

Because petitioners defaulted in the payment of their mortgage

indebtedness, PBC extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgage. In the
auction sale, respondent PBC was the only and highest bidder for
P6M. And so sheriffs certificate of sale was executed and
annotated at the back of the petitioners titles.

As petitioners failed to redeem the properties within the one-year

period, TCTs covering the subject parcels of land were issued in the
name of PBC in lieu of the old ones. PBC consolidated ownership
of properties in its favor.

Since the parcels of land were in physical possession of petitioners

and other persons, PBC, after due demand, filed a petition for WoP
with the RTC.

Petitioners filed an Opposition to the petition for WoP to which

respondent filed a Comment.

Petitioners argued that a writ of possession should not issue

considering respondents failure to return the excess or surplus
proceeds of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale based on the ruling in
Sulit v. Court of Appeals.

In refutation, respondent points to petitioners remaining unsecured

obligations with the former to which the excess or surplus proceeds
were applied.

RTC issued two separate orders requiring respondent to file a

Formal Offer of Evidence. Respondent failed to comply with the
aforesaid orders thus prompting petitioners to file a MTD.
Respondent belatedly filed its Formal Offer of Evidence. RTC
issued an order denying petitioners Motion to Present Evidence
and granted the petition for WoP.
Upon petition for certiorari and mandamus, CA rejected petitioners
allegations of GAD. CA affirmed respondents entitlement to a WoP
as a matter of right, the latter having consolidated its ownership
over the parcels of land upon expiration of redemption period. It
emphasized that the issue on the failure to return the excess or
surplus proceeds of the auction sale had been squarely met by the
respondent, and therefore, the case was distinguishable from Sulit
v. Court of Appeals. In all, the CA upheld the general rule that the
issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale becomes merely a ministerial function of the court.

ISSUE/S:
(1) W/N a WoP should issue in favor of respondents? YES
(2) W/N the excess or surplus proceeds of the foreclosure sale were
validly applied to petitioners remaining unsecured obligations? NO
SC: A writ of possession may be issued either 1) within the one-year
redemption period, upon the filing of a bond, or 2) after the lapse of the
redemption period, without need of a bond.
A writ of possession is an order enforcing a judgment to allow a persons
recovery of possession of real or personal property. An instance when a writ
of possession may issue is under Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.
4118, on extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
Within the redemption period the purchaser in a foreclosure sale may apply
for a writ of possession by filing for that purpose an ex-parte motion under
oath, in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of
property covered by a Torrens title. Upon the filing of an ex-parte motion and
the approval of the corresponding bond, the court is expressly directed to
issue the WoP.
On the other hand, after the lapse of the redemption period, a writ of
possession may be issued in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure sale as
the mortgagor is now considered to have lost interest over the foreclosed

TRICIA CRUZ
DLSU LAW | JDCTR
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS | ATTY. CUSTODIO
property. Consequently, the purchaser, who has a right to possession after
the expiration of the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the
property when no redemption is made. In this regard, the bond is no longer
needed. The purchaser can demand possession at any time following the
consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new
TCT. After consolidation of title in the purchasers name for failure of the
mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchasers right to possession ripens
into the absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a
writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title, to a purchaser
in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely a ministerial function.
Effectively, the court cannot exercise its discretion.
(1) Having discussed the rules on foreclosure, the issuance by the RTC of a
writ of possession in favor of the respondent in this case is proper. The SC
has consistently held that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of
possession in such instances is ministerial, and the court may not exercise
discretion or judgment. The propriety of the issuance of the writ was
heightened in this case where the respondents right to possession of the
properties extended after the expiration of the redemption period, and
became absolute upon the petitioners failure to redeem the mortgaged
properties.
A careful reading of Sulit will readily show that it was decided under a
different factual milieu. In Sulit, the plea for a writ of possession was made
during the redemption period and title to the property had not, as yet, been
consolidated in favor of the purchaser in the foreclosure sale. In stark
contrast, the herein petitioners failed to exercise their right of redemption
within the one-year reglementary period provided under Section 6 of Act No.
3135, as amended, and ownership over the properties was consolidated in,
and corresponding titles issued in favor of, the respondent.
The proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex-parte and
summary in nature. It is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one
party only and without need of notice to any person claiming an adverse
interest. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted even without giving the
person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard. By its
very nature, an ex-parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a
non-litigious proceeding authorized under Act No. 3135, as amended. Be
that as it may, the debtor or mortgagor is not without recourse. A party may
file a petition to set aside the foreclosure sale and to cancel the writ of

possession in the same proceedings where the writ of possession was

requested.
(2) The foreclosure of petitioners properties was meant to answer only the
obligation secured by the mortgage. Article 2126 of the Civil Code
unequivocally states: The mortgage directly and immediately subjects the
property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the
fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted.
Even if petitioners have remaining obligations with respondent, these
obligations, as conceded by respondent itself, were not collateralized by the
foreclosed properties. Furthermore, under Section 1 of Act No. 3135 as
amended, the special power of attorney authorizing the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage must be either (1) inserted or stated
in the mortgage deed itself; or (2) the authority is attached thereto. Thus,
petitioners supposed remaining obligations which were not secured by the
mortgage cannot be made subject, or even susceptible, to the extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage.
However, petitioners remedy lies in a separate civil action for collection of a
sum of money. The SC has previously held in Sulit v. CA that where the
mortgagee retains more of the proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to,
this fact alone will not affect the validity of the sale but simply give the
mortgagor a cause of action to recover such surplus.
Monzon v Addio Properties GR 171827 (Sep 17, 2008)

Sps. Relova and the Sps. Perez alleged that on Dec. 28, 1998,
Monzon executed a PN in favor of the sps. Perez for the amount of
P600K with interest at 5% per month. This was secured by a 300 sq
m lot in Tagaytay. On Dec. 31, 1998, Monzon executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land in favor of Sps. Perez.

On March 29, 1999, Monzon executed another PN, this time in

favor of the spouses Relova for the amount of P200K with interest
of 5%/month. This loan was secured by a 200 sq. m. lot, another
portion of the Tagaytay lot. On Dec. 27, 1999, Monzon executed a
Deed of Conditional Sale over said parcel of land in favor of Sps.
Relova.

On Oct 23, 1999, the Coastal Lending Corporation, a corporation

which Monzon was indebted to for the amount of P3M, extrajudicially foreclosed the entire property including the portions
mortgaged and subsequently sold to respondents. The winning

20

bidder in the foreclosure, Addio Properties Inc., paid the amount of

P5M leaving P1M residue.
According to respondents, this residue amount, which is in the
custody of Atty. Luna as Branch CoC should be turned over to them
pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 68 of the RoC. Thus, respondents pray in
their Petition for Injunction for a judgment (1) finding Monzon liable
to the spouses Perez in the amount of P1,215,000.00 and to the
spouses Relova in the amount of P385,000.00; (2) ordering Atty.
Luna to deliver said amounts to respondents; and (3) restraining
Atty. Luna from delivering any amount to Monzon pending such
delivery in number (2).
Monzon claimed that the Petition for Injunction should be dismissed
for failure to state a cause of action. She likewise claimed that
respondents could no longer ask for the enforcement of the two
promissory notes because she had already performed her
obligation to them by dacion en pago as evidenced by the Deed of
Conditional Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale. As regards the
fund in the custody of Atty. Luna, respondents cannot acquire the
same without a writ of preliminary attachment or a writ of
garnishment in accordance with the provisions of Rule 57 and
Section 9(c), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
RTC, citing the absence of petitioner and her counsel on said
hearing date despite due notice, granted an oral Motion by the
respondents by issuing an Order allowing the ex parte presentation
of evidence by respondents. RTC then rendered a decision in favor
of respondents.
Monzon filed a Notice of Appeal. She claims that the RTC gravely
erred in rendering its Decision immediately after respondents
presented their evidence ex parte without giving her a chance to
present her evidence, thereby violating her right to due process of
law.
Addio Properties Inc. filed before the TC a Motion for Intervention
which was granted.
CA dismissed the appeal. Monzon filed the instant pet for review on
certiorari.

ISSUE: (only re: foreclosure) W/N respondents are entitled to the residue of
the amount paid in the foreclosure sale? NO

SC: Section 4, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court is the basis of respondents

alleged cause of action entitling them to the residue of the amount paid in
the foreclosure sale. However, Rule 68 governs the judicial foreclosure of
mortgages. Extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgages, which was what
transpired in the case at bar, is governed by Act No. 3135, as amended by
Act No. 4118, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7353, Section 18 of Republic Act
No. 7906, and Section 47 of Republic Act No. 8791.
Unlike Rule 68, which governs judicial foreclosure sales, neither Act No.
3135 as amended, nor A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 grants to junior
encumbrancers the right to receive the balance of the purchase price.
The only right given to second mortgagees in said issuances is the right to
redeem the foreclosed property pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act No. 4118.
In view of the foregoing discussions, the SC finds that respondents do not
have a cause of action against Atty. Ana Liza Luna for the delivery of the
subject amounts on the basis of Section 4, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, for
the reason that the foregoing Rule does not apply to extrajudicial foreclosure
of mortgages.
However, while the case should indeed be dismissed insofar as Atty. Luna is
concerned, the same is not necessarily true with respect to Monzon. Other
than respondents prayer that the amount due to respondents be delivered
by Atty. Luna to them, they also pray for a judgment declaring Monzon liable
for such amounts. Said prayer, as argued by Monzon herself, may constitute
a cause of action for collection of sum of money against Monzon.
The rule is now settled that a mortgage creditor may elect to waive his
security and bring, instead, an ordinary action to recover the indebtedness
with the right to execute a judgment thereon on all the properties of the
debtor including the subject matter of the mortgage, subject to the
qualification that if he fails in the remedy elected by him, he cannot pursue
further the remedy he has waived.
However, due to the fact that construing respondents Petition for Injunction
to be one for a collection of sum of money would entail a waiver by the
respondents of the mortgage executed over the subject properties, we
should proceed with caution before making such construction. The Court,
therefore, resolves that upon the remand of this case to the trial court,
respondents should be ordered to manifest whether the Petition for

TRICIA CRUZ
DLSU LAW | JDCTR
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS | ATTY. CUSTODIO
Injunction should be treated as a complaint for the collection of a sum of
money.
If respondents answer in the AFFIRMATIVE the case shall proceed with
the presentation of evidence for defense. If respondents answer in the
NEGATIVE the case shall be dismissed, without prejudice to the exercise
of respondents right as mortgage creditors. If respondents mortgage
contract was executed BEFORE the execution of mortgage contract with
Addio, respondents would be first mortgagors, and thus would be entitled to
foreclose the property as against any subsequent possessor pursuant to Art.
2126 of the NCC. If respondents mortgage contract was executed AFTER
the execution of the MC with Addio, respondents as second mortgagors are
entitled to a right of redemption pursuant to Sec. 6 of Art. 3135.
Unionbank v CA and Fermina & Reynaldo Dario GR 133366

The case stemmed a REM executed by Sps. Leopoldo and Jessica

Dario (mortgagors) in favor of Unionbank to secure a P3M loan. For
non-payment of obligation, Unionbank extrajudicially foreclosed the
property mortgaged and sold the same at public auction, with itself
posting the highest bid.

One week before the redemption period expired, private

respondents filed a complaint for Annulment of sale and REM
reconveyance and prayer for restraining notice of lis pendens with
the RTC of QC against mortgagors, Unionbank, the RD, and the
City Sheriff of QC.

RTC issued a TRO enjoining the redemption of property within the

statutory period and its consolidation under Unionbanks name.
RTC judge subsequently settled the motion in favor of Unionbank
and dismissed the complaint.

PR Sps Dario filed a MR of the dismissal. Without notifying PR,

Unionbank consolidated its title over the foreclosed property.

Private respondents filed an amended complaint and alleged that

they, not the mortgagors, are the true owners of the property
mortgaged and insisting on the invalidity of both the mortgage and
its subsequent extrajudicial foreclosure.

RTC held the mortgagors and the City Sheriff of QC in default and
sustained Unionbanks contention that the act sought to be enjoined
had been enforced negating the need of hearing the application for
PI.

CA nullified the consolidationof ownership and ordered the RD to

cancel the certificate of title in Unionbanks name. Hence,
Unionbank came to the SC claiming to be a mortgagee in GF and
for value with a right to consolidate ownership over the foreclosed
property with the redemption period having expired and there
having been no redemptioners.

ISSUE: Was the consolidation of title in Unionbanks name proper? YES

SC: It is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute
owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of
one year after the registration of the sale. Consolidation took place as a
matter of right since there was no redemption of the foreclosed property and
the TRO expired upon dismissal of the complaint. UNIONBANK need not
have informed private respondent that it was consolidaint its title over the
property, upon the expiration of the redemption period, without the judgment
debtor having made use of his right of redemption, the ownership of the
property sold becomes consolidated in the purchaser.13 Notice to the
mortgagors and with more reason, to private respondents who are not even
parties to the mortgage contract nor to the extra judicial sale is not
necessary.
In a public bidding during extra-judicial foreclosure, the creditor
mortgagee, trustee, or other person authorized to act for the creditor may
participate and purchase the mortgaged property as any other bidder.
Thereafter the mortgagor has one year within which to redeem the property
from and after registration of sale with the Register of Deeds. 15 In case of
non-redemption, the purchaser at foreclosure sale shall file with the Register
of Deeds, either a final deed of sale executed by the person authorized by
virtue of the power of attorney embodied in the deed or mortgage, or his
sworn statement attesting to the fact of non-redemption; whereupon, the
Register of Deeds Shall issue a new certificate of title in favor of the
purchaser after the owner's duplicate of the certificate has been previously
delivered and canceled. Thus, upon failure to redeem foreclosed realty,
consolidation of title becomes a matter of right on the part of the auction
buyer, and the issuance of a certificate of title in favor of the purchaser
becomes ministerial upon the Register of Deeds.
There is nothing erroneous with the denial of private respondents'
application for preliminary prohibitory injunction. The acts complained of
have already been consummated. It is impossible to restrain the

22

performance of consummated acts through the issuance of prohibitory

injunction. When the act sought to be prevented had long been
consummated, the remedy of injunction could no longer be entertained,
hearing the application for preliminary injunction would just be an exercise in
futility.
In the case at bar, the consolidation of ownership over the mortgaged
property in favor of UNIONBANK and the issuance of a new title in its name
during the pendency of an action for annulment and reconveyance will not
cause irreparable injury to private respondents who are plaintiffs in the said
preliminary injunction. This is because as purchaser at a public auction,
UNIONBANK is only substituted to and acquires the right, title, interest and
claim of the judgment debtors or mortgagors to the property at the time of
levy.
Ardiente v Provincial Sheriff GR 148448 (August 17, 2004)

Sps. Ardiente obtained a loan in the amount of P100K from the

Peninsula Development Bank (PDB) to be amortized in six (6)
years on account of which they executed a PN. To secure the loan,
the Ardientes executed in favor of PDB a REM over a parcel of land
at Mabutag, Quezon and three (3) parcels of land at Guinayangan,
Quezon. Out of the proceeds of the loan, the Ardientes purchased a
minibus costing P81K.

The minibus met an accident and as a result of which, it sustained

heavy damages and rendered the Ardientes unable to pay their
loan. They later on were granted by PDB an addtl loan of P43K.

After several demands for the payment of their obligation to the

bank, the Ardientes failed to settle the same.

PDB then extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and the parcels of

land were sold at a public auction to the bank, which was the
highest bidder.

The bank later notified the Ardientes that they had one (1) year to
redeem the property. Two days before expiration of the period to
redeem, the sps filed before the RTC a complaint against the bank,
sheriff and the RD for Annulment of Auction Sale with PI and
Damages. They capitalized on the alleged lack of notice to them of
the judicial foreclosure auction sale.

The defendants maintained that there was notice, coupled with a

publication of Notice of Public Auction Sale in a newspaper of gen

circulation supported by publishers affidavit attached to the record

in the office of the Provincial Sheriff.
The TC, noting the absence of documentary evidence showing
strict compliance with the statutory reqs on publication of notice of
extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, declared the foreclosure and
the sale of the mortgaged properties null and void.
PDB appealed to the CA. CA reversed the decision of the trial court
after finding the argument of the PDB tenable that the lack of
required notice and publication of the extra-judicial foreclosure of
mortgage was not averred in the complaint cannot be the basis of
an adverse judgment. The issue of lack of posting and publication
was not even discussed nor even touched in the testimony of
Rustico Ardiente. Moreover, lack of personal notice to the
mortgagors is not a ground to set aside the foreclosure sale.

ISSUE: W/N the lack of notice to the mortgagors warrants the nullity of a
foreclosure sale? NO
SC: It is settled that personal notice to the mortgagor in extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings is not necessary, hence, not a ground to set aside
the foreclosure sale.
Despite petitioners non-allegation of lack of publication of notice of
foreclosure in their Complaint, the bank pleaded in its Answer (1) "that
petitioners were duly notified of the extrajudicial foreclosure and public
auction sale" and "there was sufficient notice and publication served to all
concerned of said public auction sale," and (2) that it and the Office of the
provincial Sheriff "fully complied with the requirements of law under Act
3135, more specifically with regard to notices of the public auction as well as
the extra-judicial foreclosure in accordance with law."
Unfortunately, petitioner presented no evidence before the trial court to prove
the absence of publication of the notice despite the fact that PDB in its
Answer, squarely pleaded as a defense the foreclosure sale and petitioners
receipt of the "notice of the sale which was published in a newspaper of
general circulation." That the lack of publication of the notice of foreclosure
was never raised in issue by petitioner and that it is not within the issues
framed by the parties in the trial court are then too obvious.
BPI Family Savings Bank v SpsVeloso 436 S 1

Respondent spouses obtained a loan from petitioners predecessor

TRICIA CRUZ
DLSU LAW | JDCTR
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS | ATTY. CUSTODIO

Family Bank and Trust Co. To secure payment of the loan,

respondent spouses executed in favor of the bank a deed of
mortgage over three (3) parcels of land with improvements.
Respondents, for value, executed a PN for P1.3M. However,
respondents defaulted in the monthly installments due on their loan.
Family Bank then instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on
the mortgaged properties. Properties were subsequently sold at
public auction with the bank as the highest bidder. Family Bank
assigned all its rights and interests in the foreclosed prop to BPI.
The sheriffs cert of sale was registered with the RD. Respondents
wrote BPI offering to redeem the foreclosed properties for
P1,872,935. This was, however, rejected.
Respondents filed in the RTC a complaint for annulment of
foreclosure with consignation and prayer for damages. On motion
of respondents, RTC allowed respondents to deposit with the CoC
the amount of P1.5M representing the redemption price.
Meanwhile, BPI was able to secure a WoP over the foreclosed
properties. Respondents filed a pet for certiorari with PI before the
CA. CA granted respondents motion for issuance of PMI.
Eventually, however, CA resolved the issue of possession in favor
of BPI and lifted the PMI.
Upon motion of respondents, RTC ordered the released of P1.4M
of the consigned amount to respondents with the balance of P100K
to take the place of the injunction bond to answer for whatever
petitioner might suffer from the injunction.
After almost a decade, RTC rendered a decision declaring the
validity of the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties
of respondents but allowed the redemption of the same for the
amount of P2,140,000. BPI elevated the matter to the CA which
affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification declaring
P2,678,639 as the redemption price.

ISSUE: Did respondent sppuses comply with all the requirements for the
redemption of the subject properties? NO
SC: The general rule in redemption is that it is not sufficient that a person
offering to redeem manifests his desire to do so. The statement of intention
must be accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment.
This constitutes the exercise of the right to repurchase.

Consequently, in this case, the offer by respondents to redeem the

foreclosed properties for P1,872,935 and the subsequent consignation in
court of P1,500,000, while made within the period of redemption, was
ineffective since the amount offered and actually consigned not only did not
include the interest but was in fact also way below the P2,782,554.66 paid
by the highest bidder/purchaser of the properties during the auction sale.
In order to effect a redemption, the judgment debtor must pay the purchaser
the redemption price composed of the following: (1) the price which the
purchaser paid for the property; (2) interest of 1% per month on the
purchase price; (3) the amount of any assessments or taxes which the
purchaser may have paid on the property after the purchase; and (4) interest
of 1% per month on such assessments and taxes x x x.
Furthermore, Article 1616 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that
the vendor cannot avail himself of the right to repurchase without returning to
the vendee the price of the sale. It is not difficult to understand why the
redemption price should either be fully offered in legal tender or else validly
consigned in court. Only by such means can the auction winner be assured
that the offer to redeem is being made in good faith.
The sum of P1,400,000 consigned by respondents in Branch 94 was
subsequently withdrawn by them, leaving only P100,000 to take the place of
the injunction bond. This would have been tantamount to requiring petitioner
to accept payment by installments as there would have necessarily been an
indefinite extension of the redemption period.
The law granted respondents the right of redemption. But in so granting that
right, the law intended that their offer to redeem be valid and effective,
accompanied by an actual tender of the redemption price. Fixing a definite
term within which the property should be redeemed is meant to avoid
prolonged economic uncertainty over the ownership of the thing sold. In the
case at bar, the offer was not a legal and effective exercise of the right of
redemption contemplated by law, hence, refusal of the offer by petitioner was
completely justified.

24

Partition
FiguracionGerilla v Vda de Figuracion GR 154322 (August 22, 2006)

Spouses Leandro and respondent Carolina Figuracion (now both

deceased) had six children: petitioner AND respondents Elena
Figuracion-Ancheta (now deceased), Hilaria Figuracion, Felipa
Figuracion-Manuel, Quintin Figuracion and Mary Figuracion-Ginez.

Leandro executed a deed of quitclaim over his real properties in

favor of his six (6) children. When he died, he left behind two (2)
parcels of land. Leandro sold a portion to Lazaro Adviento.

What gave rise to the complaint for partition was a dispute between
petitioner and her sister, respondent Mary over the eastern half
portion of Lot 707.

Lot 707 belonged to Eulalio Adviento. When Adviento died, his two
daughters Agripina and respondent Carolina Figuracion succeeded
him to it. Agripina executed a deed of quitclaim in favor of petitioner
over the eastern half portion of lot 707. Before Agripinas death,
however, respondent Carolina adjudicated unto herself via affidavit
Rule 74 the entire lot which she later sold to respondents Felipa
and Hilaria Figuracion.

Petitioner went to the US and stayed there for ten years. When she
returned, she built a house on the eastern half-portion of Lot 707.
Petitioner sought the extra-judicial partition of all the properties held
in common by her and respondents. She filed a complaint in the
RTC for partition, annulment of docs, reconveyance, quieting of
titile and damages against respondents praying for the ff: 1) the
partition of Lots 2299 and 705; (2) the nullification of the affidavit of
self-adjudication executed by respondent Carolina over Lot 707, the
deed of absolute sale in favor of respondents Felipa and Hilaria,
and TCT No. 42244; (3) a declaration that petitioner was the owner
of one-half of Lot 707 and (4) damages. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. U-5826.
OTOH, respondents took the position that Leandros estate should
first undergo settlement proceedings before partition among the
heirs could take place. And they claimed that an accounting of
expenses chargeable to the estate was necessary for such
settlement.
RTC rendered judgment nullifying Carolinas affidavit of selfadjudication and deed of absolute sale of Lot 707. It also declared
Lots 2299 and 705 as exclusive properties of Leandro Figuracion
and therefore part of his estate. The RTC, however, dismissed the
complaint for partition, reconveyance and damages on the ground
that it could not grant the reliefs prayed for by petitioner without any
(prior) settlement proceedings wherein the transfer of title of the
properties should first be effected.
On appeal, the CA upheld the dismissal of petitioners action for
partition for being premature. The CA reversed the decision,
however, with respect to the nullification of the self-adjudication and
the deed of sale. Upholding the validity of the affidavit of selfadjudication and deed of sale as to Carolinas one-half proindiviso share, it instead partitioned Lot 707. Dissatisfied,
respondents elevated the CA decision to SC.

ISSUE: W/N there needs to be a prior settlement of Leandros intestate

estate (an accounting of the income of Lots 2299 and 705, the payment of
expenses, liabilities and taxes, plus compliance with other legal
requirements, etc.) before the properties can be partitioned or distributed?
YES

TRICIA CRUZ
DLSU LAW | JDCTR
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS | ATTY. CUSTODIO
SC: There are two ways by which partition can take place under Rule 69: by
agreement under Section 2 and through commissioners when such
agreement cannot be reached, under Sections 3 to 6.

Neither method specifies a procedure for determining expenses chargeable

to the decedents estate. While Section 8 of Rule 69 provides that there shall
be an accounting of the real propertys income (rentals and profits) in the
course of an action for partition, here is no provision for the accounting of
expenses for which property belonging to the decedents estate may be
answerable, such as funeral expenses, inheritance taxes and similar
expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.
In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable
to the estate, partition is inappropriate. While petitioner points out that the
estate is allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are Leandro
Figuracions only legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that
"certain expenses" including those related to her fathers final illness and
burial have not been properly settled. hus, the heirs (petitioner and
respondents) have to submit their fathers estate to settlement because the
determination of these expenses cannot be done in an action for partition. In
estate settlement proceedings, there is a proper procedure for the
accounting of all expenses for which the estate must answer. If it is any
consolation at all to petitioner, the heirs or distributees of the properties may
take possession thereof even before the settlement of accounts, as long as
they first file a bond conditioned on the payment of the estates obligations.
Sepulveda Sr v AttyPelaez GR 151295 (January 31, 2005)

The eleven (11) lots were among the twenty-five (25) parcels of
land which Atty. Pelaezs mother, Dulce Sepulveda, inherited from
her grandmother, Dionisia Sepulveda under the Project of Partition
submitted by petitioner Pedro Sepulveda Sr as administrator of the
formers estate.

Under the said deed, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. appeared to be the

owner of an undivided portion of one of the subject parcels of land,
while his brother and Dulces uncle Santiago Sepulveda, was the
undivided owner of one-half (1/2) of the parcels of land covered by
two (2) of the subject parcels of land. Dulce and her uncles, Pedro
and Santiago, were likewise indicated therein as the co-owners of
the eleven other parcels of land, each with an undivided one-third
(1/3) share thereof.

PR Atty. Pelaez filed a complaint against his granduncle Pedro

Sepulveda Sr. with the CFI of Cebu for the recovery of possession
and ownership of his undivided share of the subject parcels of
land, and for the partition among co-owners. Atty. Pelaez alleged
that his mother Dulce died intestate on March 2, 1944, and aside
from himself, was survived by her husband Rodolfo Pelaez and her
mother Carlota Sepulveda. Dulces grandfather Vicente Sepulveda
died intestate on October 25, 1920, and Dulce was then only about
four years old. According to Pelaez, Carlota (his grandmother
mom of Dulce) repeatedly demanded the delivery of her mothers
(Dionisa) share in the eleven (11) parcels of land, but petitioner who
was then the Municipal Mayor refused to do so.
Dulce, likewise, demanded the delivery of her share in the eleven
(11) parcels of land but petitioner still refused, claiming that he
needed to continue to possess the property to reap the produce
therefrom which he used for the payment of realty taxes on the
subject properties. Atty. Pelaez alleged that he himself demanded
the delivery of his mothers (Dulce) share on several occasions, but
to no avail.
Atty. Pelaez further alleged that petitioner executed an affidavit
stating that he was the sole heir of Dionisia when in fact she was
survived by her three (3) sons (Santiago, Pedro and Vicente); that
petitioner also executed a DoS over one of the subject parcels of
land in favor of the City of Danao and received the proceeds thereto
without his knowledge. Thus, Atty Pelaez prays for the ff: 1.
Declaring Atty Pelaez as the absolute owner of 1/2 portion of the 2
parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of the complaint; 2.
Declaring the plaintiff the absolute owner of the 1/3 portion of the 9
parcels of land described in paragraph 3 of the complaint; 3.
Ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff the latters 1/3
share of P7,492.00 representing the purchase price of the parcel of
land described in paragraph 3(a) of the complaint with interest
thereon until the amount is fully paid; 4. Ordering the partition and
segregation of the 1/2 portion belonging to the plaintiff of the 2
parcels of land; 5. Ordering the partition and segregation of the 1/3
portion belonging to the plaintiff of the remaining 8 parcels of land.
Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. admitted having executed a deed of sale over
one of the parcels of land in favor of Danao City, but averred that
the latter failed to pay the purchase price thereof; besides, Atty.
Pelaez had no right to share in the proceeds of the said sale. He
likewise denied having received any demand for the delivery of

26

Dulces share of the subject properties from the latters mother

Carlota, or from Atty. Pelaez himself.
During the trial, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. died intestate. A petition for
the settlement of his estate was filed. His daughter, petitioner
Socorro Sepulveda Lawas, was appointed administratrix of his
estate and who substituted petitioner in this case.
To prove delivery of Dulces share under the project of partition, the
petitioner presented an Affidavit of Consolidation covering thirteen
(13) parcels of land which were deeded to her under the PoP as
well as the Order from the CFI declaring that Dulce, through her
grandchildren and her mother Carlota, had received her share of
the estate from petitioner Pedro Sepulveda Sr.
According to the petitioner, Dulce and Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. had a
verbal agreement wherein the eleven parcels of land covered by
the complaint would serve as the latters compensation for his
services as administrator of Dionisias estate. Thus, upon the
termination of Special Proceeding No. 778-0, and subsequent to
the distribution of the shares of Dionisias heirs, Pedro Sepulveda,
Sr. then became the sole owner of Dulces shares. The petitioner
likewise adduced evidence that Santiago Sepulveda died intestate
and was survived by his wife, Paz Velez Sepulveda and their then
minor children. It was pointed out that Atty. Pelaez failed to implead
Paz Sepulveda and her minor children as parties-defendants in the
complaint. It was further claimed that Pedro Sepulveda, Sr.
declared one of the parcels of land under his name for taxation
purposes since the beginning of 1948. It was likewise alleged that
the eleven (11) parcels of land deeded to Dulce under the Project of
Partition had been declared for taxation purposes under the name
of Pedro Sepulveda since 1974, and that he and his heirs paid the
realty taxes thereon.
CFI rendered judgment in favor of Atty. Pelaez. The trial court ruled
that Atty. Pelaezs action for reconveyance based on constructive
trust had not yet prescribed when the complaint was filed; that he
was entitled to a share in the proceeds of the sale of the property to
Danao City; and that the partition of the subject property among the
adjudicatees thereof was in order.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA, which rendered
judgment on January 31, 2002, affirming the appealed decision with
modification.

ISSUE: W/N partition in this case is proper? NOT YET

SC: The petition is granted for the sole reason that the respondent failed to
implead as parties, all the indispensable parties in his complaint.
It appears that when Atty. Pelaez filed the complaint, his father, Rodolfo
Pelaez, was still alive. Thus, when his mother Dulce Pelaez died intestate,
she was survived by her husband Rodolfo and their son, the private
respondent. Under Article 996 of the New Civil Code, Rodolfo Pelaez, as
surviving spouse, is entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to that
corresponding by way of legitime to each of the legitimate children who has
not received any betterment.
Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides that in an action for
partition, all persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants.
Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are
indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the
joinder of the said parties.
The mere fact that Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. has repudiated the co-ownership
between him and Atty. Pelaez does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the action for partition, for, in a complaint for partition,
the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject
property; and, second, the conveyance of his lawful shares.
In the present action, Atty. Pelaez as the plaintiff in the trial court, failed to
implead the following indispensable parties: his father, Rodolfo Pelaez; the
heirs of Santiago Sepulveda, namely, Paz Sepulveda and their children; and
the City of Danao which purchased one of the subject parcels of land from
Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. and maintained that it had failed to pay for the
purchase price of the property.
Rodolfo Pelaez is an indispensable party he being entitled to a share in
usufruct, equal to the share of the respondent in the subject properties.
There is no showing that Rodolfo Pelaez had waived his right to usufruct.
Indeed, the presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua
non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely when an indispensable
party is not before the court that the action should be dismissed. Thus, the
plaintiff is mandated to implead all the indispensable parties, considering that
the absence of one such party renders all subsequent actions of the court
null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but

TRICIA CRUZ
DLSU LAW | JDCTR
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS | ATTY. CUSTODIO
even as to those present. One who is a party to a case is not bound by any
decision of the court, otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to due
process. Without the presence of all the other heirs as plaintiffs, the trial
court could not validly render judgment and grant relief in favor of the private
respondent. The failure of the private respondent to implead the other heirs
as parties-plaintiffs constituted a legal obstacle to the trial court and the
appellate courts exercise of judicial power over the said case, and rendered
any orders or judgments rendered therein a nullity.
SC DOCTRINES:
The first stage of an action for judicial partition and/or accounting is
concerned with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership
in fact exists and a partition is proper, that is, it is not otherwise
legally proscribed and may be made by voluntary agreement of all
the parties interested in the property. This phase may end in a
declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to the desired partition either
because a co-ownership does not exist or a partition is legally
prohibited. It may also end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment
that a co-ownership does in truth exist, that partition is proper in the
premises, and that an accounting of rents and profits received by
the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the
latter case, "the parties may, if they are able to agree, make
partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance,
and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the
parties." In either case, whether the action is dismissed or partition
and/or accounting is decreed, the order is a final one and may be
appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.
The second stage commences when the parties are unable to
agree upon the partition ordered by the court. In that event, partition
shall be effected for the parties by the court with the assistance of
not more than three (3) commissioners. This second phase may
also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval
by the Court after the parties have been accorded the opportunity to
be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or
parties thereto entitled of their just shares in the rents and profits of
the real estate in question.
Balo v CA GR 129704 (Sep 30, 2005)

A complaint for Judicial Partition of Real Properties and Accounting

with Damages was filed by PR Josefina Garrido against petitioners
(the Balos) before the RTC, alleging that she and petitioners are the

co-owners of undivided parcels of land located at Mayorga, Leyte.

According to her, these lands were originally owned by the spouses
Eugenio Balo, Sr. and Ma. Pasagui-Balo, who, at the time of the
filing of the complaint, were already deceased. The Balo spouses
were survived by their two (2) children, Ulpiano, Sr. and Maximino,
the latter likewise deceased. PR Josefina Garrido is the daughter of
Maximino Balo and Salvacion Sabulao. Petitioner Ulpiano Balo is
the son of Eugenio Balo, Sr., while the other petitioners, the
children of Ulpiano, are Eugenios grandchildren.
PR Josefina Garrido further alleged that immediately upon the
death of her grandfather, Eugenio Sr., the petitioners took
possession of the said real properties without her knowledge and
consent. The petitioners being her uncle and cousins, private
respondent earnestly requested them that they come up with a fair
and equal partition of the properties left by her grandparents. The
petitioners having outrightly refused her proposal, PR filed the
complaint.
Petitioners filed a MTD and averred several grounds, one of which
is predicated on the fact that plaintiff, though she claims to be a
daughter of Maximino who died sometime in 1946, failed to allege
whether or not she is a legitimate child. Plaintiffs failure to allege
legitimacy is fatal considering the provision of Article 992 of the Civil
Code. To allow Plaintiff to inherit from the estate of the spouses
Eugenio and Maria Balo in representation of her father Maximino
Balo would be to permit intestate succession by an illegitimate child
from the legitimate parent of his father, assuming that she is the
child of Maximino Balo.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Petitioners filed
a MR which the RTC also denied. Petitioners filed a Petition for
Certiorari before the CA which also denied the petition and
accordingly dismissed the same.

ISSUE: W/N partition is proper in this case? YES

SC: The allegations of PR Josefina Garrido show substantial compliance
with the formal and substantial requirements of a Complaint for Partition as
required under Sec. 1, Rue 69.
The doctrine must be considered well settled, that: 1) a natural child having a
right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally
acknowledged, may maintain partition (proceedings for the division of the

28

inheritance against his coheirs; 2) and the same person may intervene in
proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father,
or mother. In neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for
the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious
reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other
persons who might take by inheritance are before the court; and the
declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
Heirs of Teves v CA and Heirs of It-It GR 109963 (Oct 13, 1999)

Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves had nine children, namely

Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, Andres, Asuncion, Gorgonio, Cresenciano,
Arcadia and Maria.

After Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves died, intestate and

without debts, in 1943 and 1953, respectively, their children
executed extrajudicial settlements purporting to adjudicate unto
themselves the ownership over two parcels of land belonging to
their deceased parents and to alienate their shares thereto in favor
of their sister Asuncion Teves. The validity of these settlements
executed pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 74 is the primary issue in this
case.

Petitioners Ricardo and Arcadia Teves filed a complaint with the

RTC for the partition and reconveyance of two parcels of land
against the heirs of Asuncion Teves. They alleged that defendants,
w/o any justifiable reason, refused to partition the said parcels of
land and to convey to plaintiffs their rightful shares. The present
controversy involves only Marcelina Cimafrancas share in the
land designated as Lot 769-A.

Marcelina and Joaquins children, Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, Andres,

Asuncion, Gorgonio, Cresenciano and Arcadia executed a
document entitled Settlement of Estate and Sale adjudicating unto
themselves, in equal shares, Lot 769-A and conveying their shares,
interests, and participations over the same in favor of Asuncion for
the consideration of P425. A similar deed denominated
"Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale" was signed by Maria Teves.
Under such deed, Maria conveys her own share over Lot 769-A in
favor of Asuncion Teves for the consideration of P80.00. The two
settlements were denounced by the plaintiffs as spurious.

The other property in dispute is Lot 6409, which was registered in

the name of Joaquin Teves and his two sisters, Matea and Candida
Teves. However, Matea and Candida died without issue, causing
the entire property to pass to Joaquin Teves.

On December 14, 1971, Lot 6409 was adjudicated and divided in

equal shares in a "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement &
Sale" executed by Joaquin Teves' children Asuncion, Teotimo,
Felisia, Gorgonio, Arcadia and Maria Teves. In the same deed, the
shares of these same heirs in Lot 6409 were sold to Asuncion
Teves for P100.00. Asuncion Teves took possession of the land and
acquired title over the same. After her death in 1981, her children,
defendants-appellees It-it herein, extrajudicially settled
Asuncion Teves' property, adjudicating unto themselves Lot
6409.
On July 20, 1983 a new TCT was issued in the names of Asuncion
Teves' children, namely Elisa, Susana, Norberto, Isaac, Jaime,
Felicitas, Teresita, Corazon, and Danilo, all surnamed It-it.
On July 2, 1984, the It-its sold Lot 6409 to defendants-appellees
Lucrecio Baylosis, Sr. and Pacita Nocete-Baylosis for P20K and a
TCT was issued in the name of the Baylosis couple.
Plaintiffs claim that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement & Sale
covering Lot 6409 is also spurious. Aside from these defects which
would make said document null and void, they allege that Arcadia
Teves who is one of the living sisters of the mother of the principal
defendants although confirming the authenticity of her signature
averred that in reality no consideration was ever given to her and
that her impression of the said document was that she was only
giving her consent to sell her share of the land. Plaintiffs likewise
contend that as regards the share of Ricardo Teves, son of
Crescenciano Teves who predeceased Joaquin and Marcelina, it
was not at all affected in that extrajudicial settlement and sale since
neither Crescenciano Teves nor his son Ricardo Teves participated
in its execution.
Defendants maintained that the assailed documents were executed
with all the formalities required by law and are therefore binding and
legally effective as bases for acquiring ownership or legal title over
the lots in question. Furthermore, it is contended that plaintiffs have
slept on their rights and should now be deemed to have abandoned
such rights.
The trial court ruled in favor of defendants and rendered judgment
dismissing the complaint with costs against plaintiffs. As regards Lot
6409, the court declared that the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale
executed by the heirs of Joaquin Teves and Marcelina Cimafranca
was duly executed with all the formalities required by law, thus,

TRICIA CRUZ
DLSU LAW | JDCTR
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS | ATTY. CUSTODIO
validly conveying Lot 6409 in favor of Asuncion Teves. Moreover, it
stated that, even granting the truth of the imputed infirmities in the
deed, the right of plaintiffs to bring an action for partition and
reconveyance was already barred by prescription. An action for the
annulment of a partition must be brought within four years from the
discovery of the fraud, while an action for the reconveyance of land
based upon an implied or constructive trust prescribes after ten
years from the registration of the deed or from the issuance of the
title.
Moreover, the trial court held that the extrajudicial settlements over
both Lots 6409 and 769, having been prepared and acknowledged
before a notary public, are public documents, vested with public
interest, the sanctity of which deserves to be upheld unless
overwhelmed by clear and convincing evidence. The evidence
presented by the plaintiffs to support their charges of forgery was
considered by the court insufficient to rebut the legal presumption of
validity accorded to such documents.
CA upheld the trial court's decision affirming the validity of the
extrajudicial statements, with a slight modification.

action which Pedro and Cresenciano might have brought for the
reconveyance of their shares in the property has already prescribed. An
action for reconveyance based upon an implied trust pursuant to article 1456
of the Civil Code prescribes in ten years from the registration of the deed or
from the issuance of the title. Asuncion Teves acquired title over Lot 6409 in
1972, but the present case was only filed by plaintiffs-appellants in 1984,
which is more than 10 years from the issuance of title.

ISSUE: W/N the extrajudicial settlements in dispute were valid and legally
binding against plaintiffs/petitioners? YES

It has even been admitted by both parties that Ricardo Teves is in

possession of an undetermined portion of Lot 769-A and the It-its do not
claim ownership over his share in the land. Thus, contrary to the appellate
court's ruling, there is no basis for an action for reconveyance of Ricardo
Teves' share since, in the first place, there has been no conveyance. Ricardo
Teves is entitled to the ownership and possession of one-eighth of Lot 769A. Neither does Ricardo Teves have a right to demand partition of Lot 769-A
because the two extajudicial settlements have already effectively partitioned
such property.

SC: The extrajudicial settlements executed by the heirs of Joaquin Teves

and Marcelina Cimafranca are legally valid and binding. The extrajudicial
settlement of a decedent's estate is authorized by section 1 of Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court.
The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement & Sale covering Lot 6409 purports to
divide Joaquin Teves' estate among only six of his heirs, namely Asuncion,
Teotimo, Felisia, Gorgonio, Arcadia and Maria Teves. It does not mention nor
bear the signatures of either Pedro or Cresenciano Teves although they are
both intestate heirs of Joaquin Teves and as such, are entitled to a
proportionate share of the decedent's estate. Contrary to the ruling of the
CA, the fact that Cresenciano predeceased Joaquin Teves does not mean
that his heirs lose the right to share in the partition of the property for this is a
proper case for representation, wherein the representative is raised to the
place and degree of the person represented and acquires the rights which
the latter would have if he were living.
However, notwithstanding their non-inclusion in the settlement, the

The division of Lot 769-A, on the other hand, was embodied in two deeds.
The first extrajudicial settlement was entered into by Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro,
Gorgonio, Arcadia and Asuncion Teves in 1956, while the second deed was
executed in 1959 by Maria Teves. Cresenciano was not a signatory to either
settlement. However, in contrast to the extrajudicial settlement covering Lot
6409, the two extrajudicial settlements involving Lot 769-A do not purport to
exclude Cresenciano from his participation in Lot 769-A or to cede his share
therein in favor of Asuncion. The settlement clearly adjudicated the property
in equal shares in favor of the eight heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca.
Moreover, the deeds were intended to convey to Asuncion Teves only the
shares of those heirs who affixed their signatures in the two documents.

Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs

and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should
purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction. The extrajudicial settlements executed in 1956 and 1959
adjudicated Lot 769-A in equal shares unto the eight heirs of Marcelina
Cimafranca. Such a partition, which was legally made, confers upon
each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him.
Although Cresenciano, Ricardo's predecessor-in-interest, was not a
signatory to the extrajudicial settlements, the partition of Lot 769-A
among the heirs was made in accordance with their intestate shares
under the law.

30

An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a well-entrenched doctrine

that the law does not relieve a party from the effects of a contract, entered
into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of what he was
doing, simply because the contract turned out to be a foolish or unwise
investment. Therefore, although plaintiffs may regret having alienated their
hereditary shares in favor of their sister Asuncion, they must now be
considered bound by their own contractual acts.

Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

Valdes v CA GR 132426

Plaintiff spouses Valdez are the registered owners of a piece of

residential lot located at Carolina Executive village in Antipolo,
Rizal. In their complaint for Unlawful Detainer, they alleged that
defendant spouses Fabella, without any color of title whatsoever,
occupied the said lot by buildering their house in their lot thereby
depriving plaintiffs the rightful possession thereof.

Plaintiff spouses also alleged that theyve orally asked defendant

spouses to peacefully surrender the premises to them, but the latter
stubbornly refused to vacate the lot they unlawfully occupied; that
despite plaintiffs referral of the matter to the Barangay, defendants
still refused to heed the plea of the former to surrender the lot
peacefully.

Defendant spouses contended that the complaint failed to state that

petitioners had prior physical possession of the property or that they

were their lessors. In the alternative, defendant spouses claimed

ownership over the land OTG that they had been in open,
continuous, and adverse possession thereof for more than 30
years, as attested by an ocular inspection report from the DENR.
MTC rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff spouses/petitioners
ordering defendant spouses/respondents to vacate the property
and to the pay rent for the use and occupation of the same plus
attys fees.
Respondents appealed the MTCs decision to the RTC. RTC
affirmed the decision of the MTC.
Respondents filed a petition for review with the CA questioning the
decision of the RTC. It held that petitioners failed to make a case
for unlawful detainer because they failed to show that they had
given the private respondents the right to occupy the premises or
that they had tolerated private respondents possession of the
same, which is a requirement in unlawful detainer cases. It added
that the allegations in petitioners complaint lack jurisdictional
elements for forcible entry which requires an allegation of prior
material possession. Thus, it held that the MTC before which the
action for ejectment was filed had no jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners filed a MR which was denied.

ISSUE: W/N the allegations of the complaint clearly make out a case for
unlawful detainer? NO
SC: Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions
available to recover possession of real property: (a) accion interdictal;
(b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria.

Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely,

forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico). In
forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real
property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth
whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession
after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession
under any contract, express or implied.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of
possession which should be brought in the proper RTC when
dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary
civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the

TRICIA CRUZ
DLSU LAW | JDCTR
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS | ATTY. CUSTODIO

complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had
turned plaintiff out of possession or defendants possession had
become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or
illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana.
Accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also
brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil
proceeding.

Forcible Entry (detentacion)

Unlawful Detainer (desahuico)
-One is deprived of physical - One illegally withholds possession
possession of real property by
after
the
expiration
or
means of force, intimidation,
termination of his right to hold
strategy, threats, or stealth;
possession under any contract,
-Possession of the defendant is
express or implied;
illegal from the beginning, and - Possession of the defendant is
that the issue is which party
originally legal but became
has prior de facto possession;
illegal due to the expiration or
-Jurisdiction lies with the proper
termination of the right to
MTC or MeTC;
possess;
-Such action must be brought -Jurisdiction lies with the proper
within one (1) year from the
MTC or MeTC
date of actual entry / stealth - - Such action must be brought rom
from discovery.
the date of last demand.
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs
supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of
the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the
possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would
be an improper remedy.
Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it
is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as
brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes
provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The
complaint must show enough on its face the court jurisdiction without resort
to parol testimony.
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the
complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer,
as where it does not state how entry was affected or how and when
dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or
an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.

In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any
averment of fact that would substantiate petitioners claim that they permitted
or tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents. The complaint
contains only bare allegations that "respondents without any color of title
whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their house in the said
land thereby depriving petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing has been
said on how respondents entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the
parties. This failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts
constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy
the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the MTC
had no jurisdiction over the case.
Co v Militar 41 S 455

Petitioner Jacinto Co claims to be the owner of a parcel of land

measuring 396 sqm. covered by a TCT. The land was formerly
owned by a certain Rolando Dalida.

Dalida mortgaged the land to petitioner Co to secure payment of a

loan. After Dalidad defaulted in the payment of his obligation,
petitioner Co caused the foreclosure of the mortgage.
Subsequently, petitioner Co acquired the land at a foreclosure sale.

Petitioner Co filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the

MeTC against respondents Militar, who were in possession of the
land. Co alleged that he is the registered owner of the land; that as
owner, he declared the same for tax purposes and has been up to
date in the payment of RPT; and that respondents occupancy of
the property was by his mere tolerance but their continued stay
became unlawful after he demanded that they vacate the premises.

Respondents claimed that they are the owners of 198 square

meters each of the disputed land, having bought the same from
Burgos L. Pangilinan and Reynaldo Pangilinan who were the
owners-developers of a residential subdivision project called
"Immaculate Conception Village".

Respondent Militar further claimed that his occupancy of the

property could not be by tolerance of petitioner for the following
reasons: 1) he constructed his house way back in June 1966, long
before petitioner acquired title thereto on October 10, 1983; 2) he
bought the 1/2 portion of the property, consisting of 198 square
meters from B.L. Pangilinan & Sons, Inc. and paid for the same in
full 10 years before petitioner claimed ownership of said
property. He also assailed the jurisdiction of the MeTC, claiming

32

that it had no jurisdiction over the case as the proper action should
have been an accion reinvidicatoria filed before the RTC.
Respondent Sones also alleged similar reasons.
MeTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner Co. Respondents
appealed the decision to the RTC, which reversed and set aside the
same. Petitioner filed a MR which was denied by the CA.

ISSUE: Who between petitioner and respondents has a better right to

possess the subject property? Petitioner Co!
SC: Well-settled is the rule that the only issue for resolution in an unlawful
detainer case is physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants.
Moreover, an ejectment suit is summary in nature and is not susceptible to
circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the
property.
In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the
question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the lower courts
and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, have the undoubted competence to
provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of
determining the issue of possession.
In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the parties, it is
the petitioner who has a Torrens Title to the property. Respondents merely
showed their unregistered deeds of sale in support of their claims. The
Metropolitan Trial Court correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title in
the name of petitioner. It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is
indefeasible and binding upon the whole world unless and until it has been
nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and
decisional law, the power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title
at the first instance properly belongs to the RTC in a direct proceeding for
cancellation of title.
As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the
property, which is one of the attributes of his ownership. Respondents
argument that petitioner is not an innocent purchaser for value and was
guilty of bad faith in having the subject land registered in his name is a
collateral attack on the title of petitioner, which is not allowed. A certificate of
title cannot be subject to a collateral attack and can be altered, modified or
cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

Unida v Urban GR 155432

Respondent heirs of Ambrocio Urban, represented by Lucio

Cabaddu, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioners.
Respondent (Plaintiff) who claims to be the owner of the property
which had been subdivided into 3 lots alleged that about ten (10)
yrs ago, without the knowledge or consent of the owners,
petitioners (defendants), without any legal right whatsoever, entered
the premises of the subject land and cultivated the same as their
own, not giving any share to the owners. And that because the
location of the land was infested by the NPA at the time of the
intrusion of the defendants, the owners did nothing but to tolerate
their stay and cultivation of the subject property.

Petitioners (defendants) denied, among other things, having any

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief regarding the
authority of Lucio Cabaddu to represent the plaintiff and concluded
that he has no authority/personality to represent the alleged heirs.
They have also asserted that petitioners Crispina Unida and Nancy
Unida has possessed three (3) of the subject lots both in the
concept of owner, personally and through their predecessors, since
time immemorial.

MTC resolved the case in favor of respondent (plaintiffs) and

against petitioners (defendants).

RTC reversed the MTC Decision, it holding that although Lucio

Cabaddu was given a SPA subsequent to the filing of the complaint,
the SPA did not contain a specific authorization for him to institute
the complaint.

RTC also held that since the complaint itself asserted that
petitioners entry into the property was unlawful from the very
beginning, respondents alleged toleration thereof cannot be
considered as toleration in contemplation of law in UD cases,
hence, the action for UD was improper. Neither was FE the proper
remedy, as the entry of petitioners was not by means of FISTS. The
RTC suggested that the remedy of plaintiffs/respondents was to file
an accion publiciana or reivindicatoria before the proper RTC.

CA reversed the decision of the RTC and reinstated that of the MTC
and held that an allegation that the defendant is unlawfully
withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient for
one alleging that the withholding of possession or the refusal to

TRICIA CRUZ
DLSU LAW | JDCTR
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS | ATTY. CUSTODIO
vacate is unlawful, without necessarily employing the terminology of
the law.
ISSUE: W/N the allegations of the complaint clearly make out a case for
unlawful detainer? NO
SC:
To
justify
an
action
for
unlawful
detainer,
the permission or tolerance must have been present at the beginning of the
possession. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an
action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.
As correctly held then by the RTC, the case cannot be considered as an
unlawful detainer case, the "tolerance" claimed by respondents not being
that contemplated by law in unlawful detainer cases; neither can the case be
considered as one for forcible entry because the entry of petitioners was not
alleged to have been by means of force, intimidation, threats, stealth or
strategy.
Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid
cause for unlawful detainer or forcible entry, the MTC had no jurisdiction over
the case. It is in this light that this Court finds that the RTC correctly found
that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint.
Parenthetically, it was error for the RTC to find the complaint dismissible also
on the ground that Lucio Cabaddu was not the real party in interest. That
paragraph 1 of the complaint alleged that "plaintiff [is] of legal age, married
to Leticia Urban . . . is the Authorized representative of the heirs of Ambrocio
Urban" did not modify the name of the plaintiff appearing in the title of the
complaint. In other words, that the plaintiff appearing in the title was worded
as "Heirs of Ambrocio Urban represented by Lucio Cabaddu" complied with
Section 3 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
A final note: Since the RTC found that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the
case, it should have followed the mandate of Sec. 8, Rule 40, which
provides:
Sec. 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of
jurisdiction. If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court
dismissing the case without a trial on the merits, the Regional Trial
Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In case of
affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction

over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction
thereover, shall try the case on the merits as if the case was
originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be
remanded for further proceedings.
If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on
appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction
thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the
preceding section, without prejudice to the admission of amended
pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice.
Larano v. Sps. Calendacion GR 158231

Petitioner owns a parcel of Riceland in Laguna covered by a TCT.

Petitioner Larano and Spouses Calendacion executed a Contract to
Sell whereby the spouses agreed to buy a 50,000 sqm. portion of
petitioners Riceland for P5M, with P500K as down-payment and
the balance payable in nine (9) installments of P500K each until
Sept 2001.

Pending full payment of the purchase, possession of the riceland

was transferred to respondent spouses under the condition that
they shall account for and deliver the harvest from said riceland to
petitioner. Respondents, however, failed to pay the installments and
to account for and deliver the harvest from said riceland.

On Mar 7, 2000, petitioners sent respondent spouses a demand

letter to vacate the riceland within 10 days from receipt thereof, but
as her demand went unheeded, she filed on April 5, 2000, a
complaint against respondent spouses for unlawful detainer before
the MTC praying that respondent spouses be directed 1) to vacate
the Riceland and 2) to pay P400K per year from Sept 1998 until
they vacate, as reasonable compensation for the use of the
property, P120K as attys fees, and P50K as litigation expenses.

Respondents admit the execution of the Contract to Sell but deny

that it contains all the agreements of the parties. They allege that
petitioner has no cause of action against them because the 3-year
period has not yet lapsed AND that the MTC has no jurisdiction
over the case because the complaint failed to allege that a
demand to pay and to vacate the Riceland was made upon
them.

MTC ordered defendants (respondents) to vacate the premises and

pay petitioner the amounts prayed for.

34

Respondent spouses filed an appeal with the RTC affirming the trial
courts order with slight modifications with respect to the amount.
Respondents filed a petition for review with the CA. For failure to
file her comment despite the CA resolution which required her to do
so, petitioner was deemed to have waived her right to file comment
to the petition.
CA set aside the decision of the RTC and dismissed the complaint
for unlawful detainer. The CA nullified the proceedings before the
MTC for want of jurisdiction. It held that the issues in the case whether or not there was a violation of the Contract to Sell, whether
or not such violation gives the petitioner the right to terminate the
contract and consequently, the right to recover possession and the
value of the harvest from the riceland - extend beyond those
commonly involved in unlawful detainer suits where only the issue
of possession is involved; that the case is not a mere detainer suit
but one incapable of pecuniary estimation, placing it under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, not the MTC.
Petitioner contends that the CA should have dismissed outright the
petition for review filed before it since it contains no verification as
required by the Rules; and that the CA, in finding that the complaint
before the MTC was not one for unlawful detainer but for specific
performance, did not limit itself to the allegations in the complaint
but resorted to unrestrained references, deductions and/or
conjectures, unduly influenced by the allegations in the answer.
Respondents, on the other hand, contend that verification is just a
formal requirement; that petitioner waived her right to question the
defect when she failed to submit her comment; that the CA correctly
pointed out that the present case involves one that is incapable of
pecuniary estimation since the crux of the matter is the rights of the
parties based on the Contract to Sell.

ISSUE: W/N the complaint is one for unlawful detainer? NO

SC: Settled is the rule that jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by
the allegations pleaded in the complaint. It cannot be made to depend upon
the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant.
Neither can it be made to depend on the exclusive characterization of the
case by one of the parties. The test for determining the sufficiency of those
allegations is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a
valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the plaintiff.

In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became

unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess; hence, the
issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in
actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the
defendants right to continue in possession.
Applied to the present case, petitioner, as vendor, must comply with two
requisites for the purpose of bringing an ejectment suit: (a) there must be
failure to pay the installment due or comply with the conditions of the
Contract to Sell; and (b) there must be demand both to pay or to comply and
vacate within the periods specified in Section 2 of Rule 70, namely: 15 days
in case of land and 5 days in case of buildings. The first requisite refers to
the existence of the cause of action for unlawful detainer, while the second
refers to the jurisdiction requirement of demand in order that said cause of
action may be pursued.
Both demands to pay installment due or adhere to the terms of the
Contract to Sell and to vacate are necessary to make the vendee deforciant
in order that an ejectment suit may be filed. It is the vendor's demand for the
vendee to vacate the premises and the vendee's refusal to do so which
makes unlawful the withholding of the possession. Such refusal violates the
vendor's right of possession giving rise to an action for unlawful detainer.
However, prior to the institution of such action, a demand from the vendor
to pay the installment due or comply with the conditions of the
Contract to Sell AND to vacate the premises is required under the
aforequoted rule.
It is clear from the foregoing that the allegations in the Complaint failed to
constitute a case of unlawful detainer. What is clear is that in the Complaint,
petitioner alleged that respondents had violated the terms of the Contract to
Sell. However, the Complaint failed to state that petitioner made
demands upon respondents to comply with the conditions of the
contract the payment of the installments and the accounting and
delivery of the harvests from the subject riceland. The 10-day period
granted respondents to vacate even fell short of the 15-day period
mandated by law. When the complaint does not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirements of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the MTC does not have
jurisdiction to hear the case.

TRICIA CRUZ
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Contempt
Montenegro v Montenegro GR 156829

On June 14, 1994, respondent Ma. Teresa V. Lizares-Montenegro,

for herself and as mother and guardian of her two minor children
Antonio Amelo and Ana Maria Pia Isabel, filed with the trial court
below a complaint for support against her husband, herein
petitioner Ramon D. Montenegro.

Four years after the filing of the complaint, petitioner and

respondent Teresa executed a compromise agreement which was
submitted to the trial court for approval. The parties did not appeal
from the Decision; hence, it became final and executory.

Since petitioner failed to comply with his obligations under the

compromise agreement, respondent Teresa filed a motion for the
execution of the judgment. The trial court granted the motion and
issued a writ of execution on 15 February 1999.

A second writ of execution and a notice of garnishment was issued

by the trial court and and a notice of garnishment issued on another
date were returned unsatisfied.

In several conferences called by the trial court, petitioner admitted

his failure to comply with his obligations under the compromise

agreement but alleged that he was no longer in a position to do so

as he was already insolvent.
Respondent Teresa manifested that she would file a motion for
examination of petitioner as judgment obligor. The trial court gave
her 30 days within which to file the appropriate motion and informed
petitioner that he would have 30 days to file a comment or reply to
the motion.
On 14 March 2002, respondent Teresa filed a motion to examine
petitioner as judgment obligor under Sections 36 and 38 of Rule 39
of the RoC. She also alleged that there is an urgency for the
examination to be conducted at the earliest time since petitioner
was about to migrate to Canada.
RTC granted the motion for examination of petitioner as judgment
obligor and set his examination on 22 March 2002.
That same day, petitioner filed with the court a Manifestation
alleging that the grant of the motion for examination iwas premature
because he still would have 30 days from receipt of the motion, or
until April 14, 2002, within which to file a comment or opposition
thereto as agreed upon during the conference on 6 March 2002.
Thus, on 22 March 2002 (date set for petitioners examination),
neither petitioner nor his counsel appeared for the scheduled
hearing. The trial court issued an order re-scheduling the
hearing to 10 April 2002 and requiring the petitioner to explain
why he should not be held in contempt of court for disobeying
courts order.
On 26 March 2002, petitioner filed a Compliance with Motion to Reschedule Proceedings. He explained that he did not attend the 22
March 2002 hearing because he was under the impression that he
still had 30 days from the filing of the motion to examine him as
judgment obligor within which to respond to the motion; besides, his
counsel was not available due to previously scheduled hearings.
On 5 April 2002, petitioner filed a manifestation reiterating that he
would be unable to attend the 10 April 2002 hearing because he
was already in Canada. Counsel for petitioner likewise manifested
that he would also be unavailable on the said date because he
would be in Manila to attend to his other cases.
On 17 June 2002, the trial court issued an Order directing the
petitioner to show cause why he should not held in contempt of
court for failure to appear on the 10 April 2002 at the hearing for his
examination as judgment obligor.

36

On 28 June 2002, petitioner alleged that he was unable to attend

the 10 April 2002 hearing because he was in Canada and had no
intention to abscond from his obligation.
On 13 June 2002, the trial court issued an Order setting the case
for the hearing for examination of the petitioner on 3 July 2002. A
subpoena was issued against the petitioner and served at his
address of record. Respondent Teresa also caused the service of
the subpoena at his residence in San Antonio Village, Makati where
petitioner is allegedly residing.
The 3 July 2002 hearing did not push through as the petitioner filed
a Motion to Quash Subpoena Ad Testificandum on 28 June 2002.
In the motion, petitioner admitted that 8051 Estrella Avenue, San
Antonio Village, Makati City, is his present address but alleged that
Makati City is more than 100 kilometers away from Bacolod City;
thus, he may not be compelled by subpoena to attend the 3 July
2002 hearing in Bacolod City. In this motion, petitioner did not
allege that he was still in Canada.
The trial court denied the Motion to Quash Subpoena Ad
Testificandum, but re-scheduled the hearing to 23 October 2002.
On 22 October 2002, the day before the scheduled hearing,
petitioner filed a manifestation informing the trial court that he was
still in Canada and would not be able to attend the 23 October 2002
hearing; however, he would be in Manila on the first week of
December 2002. He moved that the hearing be re-scheduled on 9
December 2002. The manifestation, however, did not contain a
notice of hearing.
On 23 October 2002, petitioner did not appear at the scheduled
hearing, prompting the trial court to issue an order citing him in
contempt of court. The trial court declared petitioner in contempt of
court under Section 38 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and
imposed on him the penalty of imprisonment for three months and
ordered him to pay a fine of P20,000.
Montenegro then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 seeking the reversal of the RTC holding him guilty of indirect
contempt for his repeated failure to appear at the scheduled
hearings for his examination as judgment obligor.

ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in holding the petitioner guilty of indirect
contempt for willfully disobeying the orders of the trial court requiring him to

appear for purposes of examination as a judgment obligor at in the hearings

scheduled on 22 March 2002, 10 April 2002, and 23 October 2002? NO
SC: The totality of petitioners acts clearly indicated a deliberate, and
unjustified refusal to be examined as a judgment obligor at the time the
examination was scheduled for hearing by the trial court. Such acts tended
to degrade the authority and respect for court processes and impaired the
judiciarys duty to deliver and administer justice. Petitioner tried to impose his
will on the trial court.
Contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in
such a manner as to create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity
with which it is clothed. It is defined as "disobedience to the court by acting
in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. The power to punish
contempt is inherent in all courts, because it is essential to the preservation
of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders
and mandates of the courts; and, consequently, to the due administration of
justice.
The Rules of Court penalizes two types of contempt, namely, direct contempt
and indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so
near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, and
includes disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others,
or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit
or deposition when lawfully required to do so. On the other hand, Section 3
of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court enumerates particular acts which constitute
indirect contempt.
Indirect contempt may either be initiated (1) motu proprio by the court by
issuing an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt or (2) by the filing of a
verified petition, complying with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadings. In the present case, the trial court initiated the proceedings for
indirect contempt by issuing two orders directing the petitioner to show cause
why he should not be punished for indirect contempt.
In the present case, the contemptuous act was the petitioners refusal to
attend a hearing for his examination as judgment obligor, upon motion by the
respondent Teresa. It must be pointed out that the purpose of Section 36 of
Rule 39 is to provide the judgment obligee a remedy in case where the
judgment obligor continues to fail to comply with its obligation under the

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judgment. Petitioners refusal to be examined, without justifiable reason,
constituted indirect contempt which is civil in nature. Petitioners deliberate
willfulness and even malice in disobeying the orders of the trial court are
clearly shown in the pleadings he himself had filed before the trial court.
In the present case, the nature of the contemptuous acts committed are civil
in nature. Section 7 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides for indefinite
incarceration in civil contempt proceedings to compel a party to comply with
the order of the court. This may be resorted to where the attendant
circumstances are such that the non-compliance with the court order is an
utter disregard of the authority of the court which has then no other recourse
but to use its coercive power. In the present case, however, the act which
the trial court ordered the petitioner to do has already been performed, albeit
belatedly and not without delay for an unreasonable length of time. As such,
the penalty of imprisonment may no longer be imposed despite the fact that
its non-implementation was due to petitioners absence in the Philippines.
Ang v Castro GR 66371 (May 15, 1985)

Petitioner, through the Office of the Presidential Assistant on Legal

Affairs, lodged with this SC an administrative complaint against
respondent judge Casreo for ignorance of the law, gross
inexcusable negligence, incompetence, manifest partiality, grave
abuse of discretion, grave misconduct, rendering unjust decision in
a civil case and dereliction of duties in not resolving his motion for
reconsideration of the adverse decision in said civil case.

Upon learning of the administrative case filed against him by

petitioner, respondent judge ordered petitioner to appear before him
on December 29, 1983 at 8:30 in the morning, and to show cause
why he should not be punished for contempt of court, for malicious,
insolent, inexcusable disrespect and contemptuous attitude towards
the court and towards him.

On January 9, 1984, respondent judge found petitioner guilty of

contempt of court, sentenced him to suffer five (5) days
imprisonment and ordered his arrest for his failure, despite notice,
to appear on the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge against
him.

Petitioner filed his notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction

in the contempt charge but the same was denied by the respondent
judge reasoning that the pronouncement of guilt in a direct
contempt is not appealable.

Respondent judge instituted before the Office of the City Fiscal of

Quezon City a criminal complaint for libel against herein petitioner
for using malicious, insolent and contemptuous language against
him in his letter-complaint filed before the SC.
Petitioner now files a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus and asks the Court: (1) to order respondent judge
Castro to forward the records of the civil case to the IAC; (2) to
enjoin him from enforcing his order for the arrest of petitioner; (3) to
restrain respondent Assistant Fiscal Narciso Atienza of Quezon City
from conducting preliminary investigation on the libel charge filed
against him by respondent judge; and, (4) to prohibit respondent
Judge Jose P. Arro of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal from
proceeding and or conducting a hearing on the criminal complaint
for libel against petitioner.
On 20 Feb 1984, the Court issued a TRO enjoining respondent
judge from carrying out the warrant of arrest and and the
respondent fiscal from conducting the preliminary investigation for
libel lodged by respondent judge against petitioner.
On 5 Mar 1984, the Court issued another TRO enjoining
respondent Judge from proceeding and/or conducting hearing on
the criminal complaint for libel.
Respondent Judge Castro, in his comment, argues that failure of
petitioner to appear, despite notice, on the scheduled hearing of the
contempt charge for the use of derogatory language in his two
letters addressed to the Office of the Presidential Assistant on Legal
Affairs and to this Court in an administrative complaint against him,
constitutes direct contempt as the acts actually impeded,
embarrassed and obstructed him in the administration of justice.

ISSUE: W/N the alleged imputations by petitioner in his letter addressed to

the Office of the Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs and to the SC against
respondent judge constitutes direct contempt? NO
SC: The use of disrespectful or contemptuous language against a particular
judge in pleadings presented in another court or proceeding is indirect, not
direct, contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of
or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. Stated
differently, if the pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious
statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which the proceedings
are pending, it is direct contempt because it is equivalent to a misbehavior
committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the

38

administration of justice. Petitioner's conduct if at all, constitutes indirect

contempt and, if found guilty he may appeal pursuant to Section 10, Rule 71
of the Rules of Court.
As regards the ancillary action for prohibition, the Court finds the petition
meritorious considering that the basis of the libel case filed against petitioner
before the respondent RTC was a communication addressed to the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court which was coursed through the Office of the
Presidential Assistant on legal Affairs, complaining against respondent
judge's ignorance of the law, gross inexcusable negligence, incompetence,
disregard for the Supreme Court administrative order, grave misconduct,
rendering an unjust decision and dereliction of duty. Considering the
privileged character of petitioner's communication to the Chief Justice
barring a prosecution for libel, it is proper that the injunction against
respondent RTC, from proceeding with the hearing of Criminal Case No. Q31587, be made permanent pursuant to the restraining order and
established doctrine against the use of the strong arm of the law as an
instrument of arbitrary and oppressive prosecution.
People v Godoy 243 S 64 (March 29, 1995)

A complaint was filed by Judge Eustaquio Gascott of the RTC of

Palawan, as an incident arising from criminal cases under
automatic review, to cite for indirect contempt Mauricio Reynoso
Jr., a columnist, and Eva P. Ponce de Leon, publisher and chairman
of the editorial board, respectively, of the Palawan Times. Judge
Gascotts complaint is based on an article written by respondent
Reynoso, Jr. in his column, "On the Beat," and published in the July
20, 1994 issue of said newspaper which is of general circulation in
Puerto Princesa City.

The complaint avers that the article tends to impede, obstruct,

belittle, downgrade and degrade the administration of justice; that
the article contains averments which are disrespectful,
discourteous, insulting, offensive and derogatory; that it does not
only cast aspersions on the integrity and honesty of complainant as
a judge and on his ability to administer justice objectively and
impartially, but is an imputation that he is biased and he
prejudges the cases filed before him; and that the article is sub
judice because it is still pending automatic review.

Respondent Mauricio Reynoso, Jr. contends in that his article does

not intend to impede nor obstruct the administration of justice

because the same was published after complainant had

promulgated his decision in the case; that such publication will not
affect or influence the review by the Supreme Court of the criminal
case, considering that the Palawan Times is circulated only in the
City of Puerto Princess and some parts of Palawan; that the
comments made therein were made in good faith and in the
exercise of the freedom of expression and of the press; that
while the article may contain unfavorable comments about
complainant, it cannot be considered as having the tendency to
degrade or impede the administration of justice; and that the
complaint, which is for contempt of a judge of a regional trial court,
was erroneously filed with the Supreme Court contrary to Section 4,
Rule 71 of the rules of Court.
Respondent Eva P. Ponce de Leon asserts that the article is merely
in reaction to the television interview given by complainant in the
show, "Magandang Gabi Bayan," wherein the latter defended his
decision in the case of "People vs. Godoy;" that the article is no
longer sub judice as the same was published only after complainant
had rendered his decision and had already lost jurisdiction over the
case; that the article cannot be considered contemptuous and
defamatory in the absence of a clear and present danger that it will
tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, or ridicule the
administration of justice; that it constitutes a valid exercise of the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press; that a reading of
the subject article in its entirety will show that the same does not
constitute contempt but, at most, is merely a fair criticism which did
not intend to malign nor place him in disrepute in the performance
of his functions; and that respondent Ponce de Leon cannot be held
liable for contempt because she did not have either actual
knowledge of, or Personal connection with, the authorship or
publication of the allegedly contemptuous article, since she had just
returned from the United States when the same was published.

ISSUE/S:
(1) W/N the specified statements complained of are contumacious in
nature? NO
(2) W/N there can be contempt of court in case of post-litigation
statements or publications? YES
(3) Which court has jurisdiction over a contempt committed against the
trial court while the case is pending on appeal?

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(4) W/N the availability of the power to punish for contempt precludes
the prosecution for libel for the same contemptuous act? NO
(5) W/N the same contemptuous conduct of a member of the Bar can
be the subject of both a contempt proceeding and an administrative
disciplinary action? YES
SC:
(1) A reading of the subject article in its entirety will show that the same
does not constitute contempt, but at most, merely constitutes fair
criticism. The news article was merely a report of rumors regarding
the accused Danny Godoy. They are not presented as facts by
respondent Mauricio Reynoso, Jr. In fact, he even goes to the
extent of acknowledging that he himself does not know if the
rumors are true or not. The subject article only reports what Atty.
Telesforo Paredes, Jr. allegedly said. It was merely a reaction not
so much to Judge Gascott's Decision, but to the public statements
made by Complainant in the national television show "Magandang
Gabi Bayan."
Snide remarks or sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily assume
that level of contumely, which is actionable under Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court. Neither do we believe that the publication in
question was intended to influence this Court for it could not
conceivably be capable of doing so. The article has not
transcended the legal limits for editorial comment and criticism.
Besides, it has not been shown that there exists a substantive evil
which is extremely serious and that the degree of its imminence is
so exceptionally high as to warrant punishment for contempt and
sufficient to disregard the constitutional guaranties of free speech
and press.

(2) The termination of the case is not a guaranty of immunity from a

contempt charge for publications or utterances which are
defamatory or libelous, depending on the purpose and effects
thereof. In other words, one may still be cited for contempt of court
even after a case has ended, where such punitive action is
necessary to protect the court and its dignity and to vindicate it from
acts or conduct intended or calculated to degrade, ridicule or bring
the court into disfavor and thereby erode or destroy public
confidence in that court.

The liberty of the press means that anyone can publish anything he
pleases, but he is liable for the abuse of this liberty. If he does this
by scandalizing the courts of his country, he is liable to be punished
for contempt. In other words, the abuse of the privilege consists
principally in not telling the truth. There is a right to publish the truth,
but no right to publish falsehood to the injury of others with impunity.
It, therefore, does not include the right to malign the courts, to libel
and slander and utter the most flagrant and indecent calumnies
about the court and its officers, nor to invade the sanctuaries of the
temples. Such practices and such miscreants ought to be
condemned, and the courts would deserve condemnation and
abolition if they did not vigorously and fearlessly punish such
offenders. Such practices are an abuse of the liberty of the press,
and if the slander relates to the courts, it concerns the whole public
and is consequently punishable summarily as a criminal contempt.

Generally, criticism of a court's rulings or decisions is not improper,

and may not be restricted after a case has been finally disposed of
and has ceased to be pending. So long as critics confine their
criticisms to facts and base them on the decisions of the court, they
commit no contempt no matter how severe the criticism may be; but
when they pass beyond that line and charge that judicial conduct
was influenced by improper, corrupt, or selfish motives, or that such
conduct was affected by political prejudice or interest, the tendency
is to create distrust and destroy the confidence of the people in their
courts.

The Philippine rule, therefore, is that in case of a post-litigation

newspaper publication, fair criticism of the court, its
proceedings and its members, are allowed. However, there
may be a contempt of court, even though the case has been
terminated, if the publication is attended by either of these two
circumstances: (1) where it tends to bring the court into
disrespect or, in other words, to scandalize the court; or (2)

40

where there is a clear and present danger that the

administration of justice would be impeded.

offense against the dignity of a court and, at the same time, an

offense against the peace and dignity of the people of the State.

(3) The general rule that the power to punish for contempt rests with
the court contemned is that contempt proceedings are sui
generis and are triable only by the court against whose authority the
contempt are charged; the power to punish for contempt exists for
the purpose of enabling a court to compel due decorum and
respect in its presence and due obedience to its judgments, orders
and processes: and in order that a court may compel obedience to
its orders, it must have the right to inquire whether there has been
any disobedience thereof, for to submit the question of
disobedience to another tribunal would operate to deprive the
proceeding of half its efficiency.

HOWEVER, the fact that judges who are unjustly attacked also
have a remedy in an action for libel has been assailed as being
without rational basis in principle. In the first place, the outrage is
not directed to the judge as a private individual but to the judge as
such or to the court as an organ of the administration of justice. In
the second place, public interests will gravely suffer where the
judge, as such, will, from time to time, be pulled down and disrobed
of his judicial authority to face his assailant on equal grounds and
prosecute cases in his behalf as a private individual. The same
reasons of public policy which exempt a judge from civil liability in
the exercise of his judicial functions, most fundamental of which is
the policy to confine his time exclusively to the discharge of his
public duties, applies here with equal, if not superior, force.

There are, however, several jurisprudentially and statutorily

recognized exceptions to the general rule, both under Philippine
and American jurisprudence.
The rule, as now accepted and deemed applicable to the present
incident, is that where the entire case has already been
appealed, jurisdiction to punish for contempt rests with the
appellate court where the appeal completely transfers the
proceedings thereto or where there is a tendency to affect
the status quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of
the appellate court.
(4) The availability of the power to punish for contempt does not and
will not prevent a prosecution for libel, either before, during, or after
the institution of contempt proceedings. The fact that certain
contemptuous conduct likewise constitutes an indictable libel
against the judge of the court contemned does not necessarily
require him to bring a libel action, rather than relying on contempt
Proceedings. The fact that an act constituting contempt is also
criminal and punishable by indictment or other methods of criminal
prosecution does not prevent the outraged Court from punishing
the contempt. The defense of having once been in jeopardy, based
on a conviction for the criminal offense, would not lie to prevent
contempt proceedings, on the proposition that contempt may be an

(5) The basic rule here is that the power to punish for contempt and the
power to disbar are separate and distinct, and that the exercise of
one does not exclude the exercise of the other. A contempt
proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate the
authority of the court; on the other hand, the object of a disciplinary
proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the court's officer to
continue in that office, to preserve and protect the court and the
public from the official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to
hold such office.
The principal purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for
contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court and should thus
be used sparingly on a preservative and not, on the vindictive
principle. The principal purpose of the exercise of disciplinary
authority by the Supreme Court is to assure respect for orders of
such court by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible
for the orderly administration of justice. Moreover, it has been held
that the imposition a fine as a penalty in a contempt proceeding is
not considered res judicata to a subsequent charge for
unprofessional conduct. In the same manner an attorney's
conviction for contempt was not collaterally estopped by reason of a
subsequent disbarment proceeding in which the court found in his
favor on essentially the same facts leading to conviction. Contempt
of court is governed by the procedures laid down under Rule 71 of

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the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the Practice of
law are governed by file 138 and 139 thereof.

SC DOCTRINES:
As to nature
of the
offense

Criminal Contempt
Directed against the dignity
and authority of the court or a
judge acting judicially;
An
act
obstructing
the
administration
of
justice,
which tends to bring the court
into disrepute or disrespect;
An offense against organized
society;
Intent is a necessary element
in criminal contempt, and that
no one can be punished for a
criminal contempt unless the
evidence makes it clear that
he intended to commit it

As to the
purpose for
which the
power is
exercised

To preserve the courts

authority and to punish for
disobedience of its orders;
It involves no element of
personal injury. It is directed
against the power and dignity
of the court; private parties
have little, if any, interest in
the
proceedings
for
punishment.

Civil Contempt
Consists in failing to
do
something
ordered to be done
by a court in a civil
action for the benefit
of the opposing party
therein;
An offense against
the party in whose
behalf the violated
order is made;
Proceedings
to
punish
a
civil
contempt
are
remedial and for the
purpose
of
the
preservation of the
right
of
private
persons;
Intent in committing
the
contempt
is
immaterial.
To provide a remedy
for an injured suitor
and
to
coerce
compliance with an
order,
It consists in the
refusal of a person to
do an act that the court
has ordered him to do
for the benefit or
advantage of a party to
an
action
pending
before the court;
The
contemnor
is
committed until he
complies
with
the
order. The contemnor
must be in a position to
purge himself

As to the
character of
the
contempt
proceeding

Criminal
contempt
proceedings are generally
held to be in the nature of
criminal or quasi-criminal
actions;
They are punitive in nature,
and the Government, the
courts, and the people are
interested
in
their
prosecution;
They
are
not
criminal
proceedings or prosecutions,
even
though
the
contemptuous act involved is
also a crime;
The proceeding has been
characterized as sui generis,
partaking of some of the
elements of both a civil and
criminal proceeding, but really
constituting neither.
In general, criminal contempt
proceedings
should
be
conducted in accordance with
the principles and rules
applicable to criminal cases,
in so far as such procedure is
consistent with the summary
nature
of
contempt
proceedings;
Not required to take any
particular form so long as the
substantial rights of the
accused are preserved.
It is generally held that the
State is the real prosecutor;

Commitment is in the
nature of an execution
to
enforce
the
judgment of the court;
The party in whose
favor that judgment
was rendered is the
real party in interest in
the proceedings;
Generally held to be
remedial and civil in
their nature;
Proceedings for the
enforcement of some
duty, and essentially a
remedy for coercing a
person to do the thing
required;
A proceeding is one for
civil contempt if the act
charged is wholly the
disobedience, by one
party to a suit, of a
special order made in
behalf of the other
party
and
the
disobeyed order may
still be obeyed, and the
purpose
of
the
punishment is to aid in
an enforcement of
obedience;
The rules of procedure
governing
criminal
contempt proceedings,
or
criminal
prosecutions, ordinarily
are inapplicable to civil
contempt proceedings.
Instituted
by
an
aggrieved party, or his
successor, or someone
who has a pecuniary
interest in the right to
be protected.

42

Thee defendant is presumed

innocent and the burden is on
the prosecution to prove the
charges beyond reasonable
doubt;

There
is
no
presumption, although
the burden of proof is
on the complainant.
The burden of proof in
a
civil
contempt
proceeding
lies
somewhere between
the
criminal
"reasonable
doubt"

burden and the civil

"fair
preponderance"
burden.