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June 2014

A functioning housing market

a reform agenda
Klas Eklund
Housing Crisis Committee (Bokriskommittn) 2014
Original: Eiserman Design
ISSN: 1654-1758
www.bokriskommitten.se

Index
The mission and work of the
Housing Crisis Committee
4
Our message
6
1. Vision
9
2. and reality
15
3. Summary
31
Endnotes 37

4 THE HOUSING MARKET OF THE FUTURE

The mission and work of

the Housing Crisis Committee
The Housing Crisis Committee (Bokriskommittn) was appointed in
September 2013 by the Swedish Property Federation (Fastighetsgarna
Sverige) and the chambers of commerce in Stockholm, Western
Sweden and Southern Sweden. The mission of the committee is to
present concrete proposals on how not if, how the Swedish housing
market should be reformed in order to function better.
There is currently a housing shortage, mainly in the metropolitan areas.
There is substantial segregation and mobility on the housing market
is low. The housing stock is used poorly. The directive stipulates that
the committee is to primarily review the effects of the current rent
setting policy and how rent control can be reformed, and secondarily how zoning processes, regulatory systems and legislation for housing construction should be changed. The directive can be found at
www.bokriskommitten.se.
We have followed the directive and in addition taken up other important
questions, such as infrastructure, financing and tax regulations. We
have not made as concrete and thorough proposals in these areas. It is
still necessary to take up these questions too though. One key conclusion of our work is that one contributing factor to todays crisis on the
housing market is that political decisions are made in separate silos
and stacked on top of each other, without taking the whole housing
market into account. A functioning housing market therefore requires
significant, sweeping and concurrent reforms in several areas, as well
as a broad and long-term political agreement for fixed ground rules.
Some of the proposals we are presenting result in transitory and adaptation costs. But our reform package as a whole will in the long term lead
to an increase in housing construction, more rental flats, a decrease
in black markets, an increase in employment, higher economic growth
and stronger public finances without an increase in segregation.
The committee has had eight meetings, organised five seminars and
published three reports. A political hearing on the committees proposals took place in Almedalen on 2 July 2014.

THE HOUSING MARKET OF THE FUTURE

From left to right: Olle, Barbro, Bjrn, Klas, Tor, Ulrika, Sonny. Inset: Hans

Stockholm, 12 June 2014

Tor Borg, Chief Economist SBAB
Klas Eklund, Senior Economist SEB (chairman)
Ulrika Francke, CEO Tyrns
Bjrn Hasselgren, PhD and Research Fellow KTH Royal Institute of
Technology
Hans Lind, Professor of Real Estate Economics KTH Royal Institute of
Technology
Sonny Modig, Housing Investigator and Pundit
Barbro Wickman-Parak, former Deputy Governor of Sveriges Riksbank
Olle Zetterberg, CEO Stockholm Business Region
The members of the committee represent themselves; neither our clients nor our employers necessarily share the opinion of all analyses and
conclusions of this report. Nor does every member need to personally
support every detail.
This is an English translation of an excerpt of the report by the Housing
Crisis Committee; En fungerande bostadsmarknad en reformagenda presented in June 2014 and available in Swedish.

Our message:
Reform rent control, the zoning process and taxes
The crisis on the housing market is deep but it can be overcome. The
proposals we are laying out in this report result in approx. 10,000 more
new residential properties being built per year, tens of thousands of new
jobs being created and growth increasing, the housing waiting lists getting shorter, the black market getting smaller and public finances getting
stronger. Individuals will have an easier time finding housing.
The way to get there goes on two tracks: The mobility of the existing
housing stock must be increased and housing construction must pick up
in pace.
Only making proposals to increase construction is not enough. The
largest economic problems come from inefficient use of housing,
mobility being poor and chains of moves being blocked. This is why
mobility must be increased. We propose a rent control reform and
several tax changes that make it cheaper to move.
Only proposing re-regulating the rent setting policy is not enough
either. In areas with a housing shortage, the rents would risk being
driven up far too quickly and create social problems. We therefore
propose a series of simplification measures with respect to the zoning
procedure and advocate a limitation on municipalities use of their
zoning monopoly.

Therefore and this is our main message a reform agenda that

stands on two legs is required: both increasing mobility and stimulating
construction.
Re-adjustment of the rent setting process should therefore be gradual.
We are laying out a socially responsible and politically feasible proposal
for how to do that. The right of occupation of the tenants is safeguarded,
and protection from irresponsible landlords is strengthened. It is estimated that the adjustment to fairer rents will take one to two years in most
cities. In Gothenburg four to five years. Stockholm City Centre will take
the most time ten or more years. But after that, Sweden will have a rent
system that no longer creates bad lock-in effects.
A temporary housing allowance funded by a temporary wealth tax on
older properties protects households with financial problems.
The deadlocks in the housing policy create growing economic problems.
They can be dissolved via a prudent overall policy. This requires that rent
control, taxes and zoning procedures be reformed simultaneously. This
is conditioned on a broad political agreement, spanning several terms of
office.
Our proposed reforms provide a reasonable balance between safety and
efficiency. The Swedish political system has previously shown that it can
come together for important decisions when they are
really needed. Now that time has come once again!

1. Vision...

Its best to know what you are looking for before

you look for it. Winnie the Pooh
Start from the end, not the means!
The housing policy debate often starts with means and tools the zoning
monopoly, rent control, the property tax. The pundits are generally attached
to their respective positions on different tools being excellent or terrible. The
means sometimes seem to be more important than the end.
The housing policy debate is therefore far too often a debate about individual details, not about the whole; it becomes a debate where experts in narrowly
defined areas throw percentages, sections of laws and square metres at each
others heads in a way that is incomprehensible to the average citizen. The
media dramaturgy is controlled by looking for special interests that rant and
rave at every individual proposal and therefore block serious solutions.
The Housing Crisis Committee instead wants to look at housing policy as a
whole. That is why we are starting this report by stating what type of housing
market we see as the goal, what we want to achieve. That is the goal and the
contrast between this vision and todays reality which should determine what
tools we should use, and which ones we should scrap.
First therefore, this initial chapter on how we think the housing market
should work. In chapter 2, we go through how todays housing market actually looks and why it does not work. In the following chapters (only partially
translated), we draw conclusions on how we should move from todays dysfunctional housing market to the one we want.

Housing for all stages of life

On an ideal future housing market, housing and construction follow the needs
of individual people both long-term needs driven by demographics and moving patterns and more short-term needs affected by changes in income, taste,
fashion etc.

10 VISION...

On such a market, there is housing of all types for all income levels. There are
rental flats, houses and tenant-owner flats with varying standards and sizes in
different locations. There are newly built luxury apartments with all service
imaginable as well as simple rental flats that allow you to enter the market and
for people with lower needs or who are looking for housing for a shorter period
of time. The differences in the price and rent reflect this and are therefore
greater than today.
No one needs to turn down jobs or studies any more due to being unable to
find suitable housing or because you dont want to break the law. There is a
large and diverse supply of housing with different forms of tenure including
more owner-occupied flats in growing regions. Generous and simple rules
for renting out individually owned residential properties make it easy to find
temporary housing for both short and long periods of time.
The market mechanisms on the housing market function better than today,
which means that supply, demand, prices and rents are in better accord with
one another. The prices are set based on individual negotiations, flat by flat
but whether or not the rent is reasonable can be reviewed, and once contracts
are entered into, the landlord cannot raise the rent faster than inflation during
the years after the agreement without cause. Re-negotiations are held in the
event of exchanges, new construction and at certain intervals. Housing in high
demand increases the most in price when exchanges or sales occur, which
creates drivers for increased construction in these segments. Conversely, the
prices will be lower where demand is falling.

Freedom of choice and mobility

On a functioning housing market, many people buy housing, but those who
want more flexibility and dont want the responsibilities of an owner can rent.
It will usually be a little more expensive for an equivalent residential property, similarly to other markets. Today it is a common perception that a rental
flat should be cheap, but considering the service included, it is not strange if
a rental flat is more expensive than a tenant-owner flat or an owner-occupied
flat with the same standard. This type of price difference is accepted on most
markets.
Rental flats are also popular among young people and those starting a family who have not saved enough capital to buy yet and want to keep their debt
down.
People who come to Sweden temporarily to work or do research for a few
years have more options than today, since they are often reduced to buying
into a tenant-owner association (bostadsrttsfrening) as their only option, or

VISION...

11

whatever their employer can arrange. A well-functioning rental market contributes to making it easier for Sweden to attract qualified foreign labour and
investments. It contributes to better dynamics and higher economic growth.
Unemployment goes down, since it is easier to move to where the jobs are.
On this ideal housing market, the process from construction idea to ready
to move into flat is also significantly faster. At present, it takes approximately
six years in the Stockholm Region; on a well-functioning market, the goal
should be a maximum of two years. One of the reasons it goes faster is simpler
regulatory systems, both with respect to zoning and construction. That and
a looser rent setting policy makes housing financing work better. Residential
properties are quite simply considered more attractive to finance than before.
Via better regional planning and coordination of housing construction and
infrastructure initiatives, the housing market functions better.
The illegal trade in leases in the big cities has disappeared, thanks to the
well-functioning market. The housing marketplaces rarely have long waiting
lists, since the rents are better adapted to households willingness to pay, and
since the supply of available housing matches demand well. Both long housing
waiting lists and black markets have thus been eliminated.

Functioning chains on the housing market

On the housing market of the future, it is both easy and cheap to move from
one residential property to another. It is common for households to change
forms of tenure. Turnover on the housing market is higher and the housing
stock is used more efficiently. The chains connecting residences for households
as they move, which characterise a functioning housing market, are more
coherent than before, when they often were broken up due to rules for different
parts of the housing market. They are also legal, because illegal exchanges
have disappeared.
Young people, students and newly formed families have the ability to get
into the housing market and get their own place to live. For most people, their
first flat is cheap and fairly simply equipped. It is probably not in the city
centre. But it is a first step in, and as their income and savings increase and the
family grows, it becomes possible to trade up for better and more expensive
housing. Those who need short-term housing at another location, or who
simply do not want to be responsible for or cannot prioritise ownership at the
time, will thus find cheap rental properties in the housing stock under a head
lease or sublease.
Far from everyone can afford or want to seek a brand new residential
property, but many households still want to try that out. Many of them take

12 VISION...

the opportunity to trade up, even if they perhaps already have a pretty new
property. For families in a housing career it is also the case that those with
rising income will get the opportunity to get housing in a better location, if
they wish. Lots of residential properties are also sold to first-time buyers who
have saved up starting capital or receive financial assistance from parents or
relatives.
Many who live in an older property that has become too tight, too big or
perhaps is in a somewhat worse location also take the opportunity to trade up,
and thus leave behind an older but still good property. The available residential properties are taken over by families looking for better housing, but who
cannot afford or do not want to buy something brand new. They often leave
behind older and sometimes cheaper housing.
By adjusting the prices of these residential properties to consumers willingness to pay, there will be a balanced supply of both new and used residential
properties. No one needs to wait on a waiting list, if they dont have special
preferences and therefore voluntarily choose to wait.

Social protection
The housing market is in many respects a market like others where buyers and
sellers meet and the price is set so that demand matches supply. But a residential property is a commodity that is especially important perhaps the most
important of all for many people. You would be hard pressed to neglect it if
you want to live a normal life.
Even on a functioning market, the buyer or tenant tends to be the weaker
party, for precisely this reason. Even on a future ideal housing market, strong
consumer protection is therefore required when renting or buying housing.
There will also continue to be a regulatory system that provides strong security
of tenure. Contracts on the rental market will also be subject to judicial review
in the future. And for tenants that have entered into a rental agreement, the
landlord cannot raise the rent whenever he/she wants.
The housing policy enables the state and the municipalities to balance
different interests in the future as well, such as the flexibility preferences of
the builder and the landlord with the safety and predictability needs of the
residents. They provide public assistance for finding housing to the weakest
groups. The supply of residential properties for students and senior citizens
matches demand.
On a future housing market with strong social protection, the present
segregation can be reduced. The present housing policy tends to increase the
difference between areas via rigid pricing, rent control and lock-in effects. A

VISION...

13

functioning future housing market instead has more diversified residential

areas. Conscious planning combined with a better functioning housing market
leads to areas being built that are accessible to different types of households,
with different incomes and different housing preferences. The housing companies cooperate with the municipalities to provide households with social priority housing in different areas without putting together welfare-dependent
households in special areas. With more diversified residential areas, the level of
public service can also be more equal, in different areas as well.
This is the kind of housing market we want to have. This vision and how
we are going to get there has been the guiding principle of the work of the
Housing Crisis Committee.

2. and reality
The Swedish housing market is currently far from the ideal vision sketched
out in the previous chapter. Construction has been low for several years, and
a high proportion of Swedens municipalities are reporting housing shortages.
The existing housing stock is being used inefficiently. The shortage of rental
flats is particularly large, which contributes to the prices of houses and tenant-owner flats in attractive areas being pressed up. Household debt is increasing. The housing waiting lists are long. Many young people have trouble even
getting into the housing market, and Swedish companies have trouble getting
housing for foreign experts and employees only living in our country temporarily. It is expensive and a hassle to create functioning chains on the housing
market. The black market is extensive, although difficult to quantify.
All of this creates problems and difficulties for individual households but
also reduces Swedens economic dynamics. The development of growing
regions is being slowed down and the result is slower growth in incomes and
jobs. Employment is brought down. The social economic costs are substantial
and they will be even worse if the dysfunctional system continues during an
economic upswing when the pressure on the housing market increases.

Growing housing shortage

The fact that Sweden as a whole is suffering from a housing shortage is
obvious. In Figure 1, you can see a sharp falling curve of flat construction.
The bulges are the periods of subsidies and speculation. The Million
Programme in the 1960s and 70s (the extensive housing construction programme in Sweden during the 1960s and 70s focused on construction of
1 million flats, dependent on heavy government subsidies), can be seen clearly,
as well as the period following the deregulation of the credit market in the late
1980s when many took the opportunity to take out loans with subsidised terms
and the accompanying crash landing.

16 ... AND REALITY

Figure 1. Number of finished residential properties 1958-2013

120 000

In blocks of flats
In single-family homes

100 000

80 000

60 000

40 000

20 000

1958

1963

1968

1973

1978

1983

1988

1993

1998

2003

2008

2013

Source: Statistics Sweden (SCB)

Putting an exact number to the shortage is not that easy. Surveys can exaggerate the problems, while more strict financial definitions can be designed in
different ways.
The Swedish National Board of Housing, Building and Planning (Boverket)
has investigated the housing crisis in economic terms. The housing crisis is
defined as the shortage of housing in proportion to demand with purchasing
power, i.e. not how many residential properties citizens, municipalities and
companies would like to have in general. More specifically, the housing deficit
is defined as the difference between todays housing stock and what would be
required to eliminate excessive housing prices. Excessive price in turn means
price increases exceeding the price increases caused by population growth. By
this definition, the housing shortage would therefore be the shortage that is not
dependent on population increase per se. Instead, it would be the shortage due
to the housing stock not increasing in proportion to increased incomes, low
interest rates, urbanisation and changed preferences.
Calculated in this manner, the 2012 housing shortage totalled 156,000
residential properties, with just over half, approximately 86,000 in the three
metropolitan areas. There were excesses of a total of 7,000 residential properties in some of the depopulating municipalities. The important point here
is that there is a big shortage, even in narrower economic terms, and that it
is not limited to the biggest cities. In addition, the housing shortage is rising

... AND REALITY

17

fast. According to the definition of the Swedish National Board of Housing,

Building and Planning, it has emerged over the past ten years. There was a
balance as late as in 2003.1

Major regional shortages

If we instead use the municipalities own calculations as a basis, 126 municipalities reported having a housing shortage in 2013. As much as 67 percent of
Swedens population lives in municipalities reporting a housing shortage. Only
four percent live in municipalities with excess housing. The balance has tipped
toward shortage quickly. In 1994, only three percent of the municipalities
reported having a housing shortage, while nearly 70 percent of the municipalities reported that they had an excess.2
There are big differences between different cities and regions. In the late
1990s, nearly 50,000 flats were empty. Between 1998 and 2005, the municipalities received government grants to demolish over 20,000 residential
properties. Since then, the economic and demographic trend caused a sharp
increase in the demand for housing in growing regions.
Over the past years, housing construction had totalled approximately
20,000 units per year. In comparison to the population increase, that is a very
low number, see Figure 2.
Figure 2. Housing construction and population increase 1969-2013
120 000

100 000

Housing construction
Population increase

80 000

60 000

40 000

20 000

1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011

Source: Statistics Sweden

18 ... AND REALITY

The gap between population and construction is especially substantial in the

big cities. In the Stockholm County, the population has increased by approximately 35,000 per year over the past years, but the number of finished flats
has only been approximately 7,000 per year.3 The conditions are similar in the
Greater Gothenburg Region. The population has increased by approximately
10,000 per year over the past years, but the number of finished residential
properties has only been approximately 2,000 per year.4 In Malm, the population is increasing by approximately 5,000 per year. The number of finished
residential properties in 2013 was approximately 1,000.5 In all three of the
metropolitan areas, the increase in the number of finished residential properties was thus only one fifth of the population increase.

Fewer and fewer rental flats

Total construction has not kept pace with population growth. At the same
time, a dramatic change has taken place within the housing stock. The
proportion of tenant-owner flats has seen a large increase over the past 20
years, while the proportion of rental flats has fallen. Since the beginning of the
1990s, the number of tenant-owner flats has increased by approximately 50
percent, while the number of rental flats has stood still.
The gap has further expanded over the past decade. Between 1997 and
2012, the number of rental flats fell by 94,000, while the number of tenant-owner flats increased by 234,000. Approximately 110,000 rental flats were
converted into tenant-owner flats in the first decade of the 21st century in
Stockholm County alone.6 16,000 flats were converted in Skne (in the South)
and 20,000 in Vstra Gtaland (in the West) in the same period. In both cases,
this was more than the number built in the same period.7

... AND REALITY

19

Figure 3. Change in the proportion of rental flats in blocks of flats in Greater Stockholm
1990-2012, in thousands
100

50

-50

New construction

Reconstruction

Conversions

Demolitions

2012

2011

2010

2009

2007

2008

2006

2005

2004

2003

2001

2002

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1992

1993

-150

1991

-100

Accumulated change

Source: The Swedish National Board of Housing, Building and Planning, Market Report May 2014:
Lst lge p Bostadsmarknaden [Deadlock on the Housing Market]

The young and the old dominate among those living in rental flats. The rental
flat is in other words still an important path into the housing market for younger
households. Over 50 percent of people aged 25 to 34 rent, after that the proportion of renters falls rapidly as incomes rise and children enter the scene.
Upon retirement, only just over 20 percent rent their flat. However, older pensioners without live-at-home children, but with a need for service, often live in
a rental flat. For the 85+ category, the proportion of renters has risen to nearly
50 percent.
In other words, the rental flat has important characteristics that make it
attractive for different categories of residents. The rental flat is also still important in the big cities, where over one third rent their housing. In smaller cities,
the proportion of renters is only one fourth.

20 ... AND REALITY

Shortage of rental flats

Municipalities that have a balance or even a surplus of residential properties in
total report a shortage of rental flats.8 The number of municipalities reporting a shortage is also increasing; in 2013, 246 municipalities, or 85 percent,
reported a shortage of rental flats. The year before, the number was 242
municipalities.
There are plans to build in just about all of the municipalities with a shortage of rental flats. But a majority of them still are of the opinion that they need
to build more than planned, in consideration of the high demand. The flat size
mainly lacking is one and two room flats with kitchens.
Just under one third of all municipalities estimate that they have a shortage of tenant-owner flats. Just over half of the municipalities in Greater
Gothenburg and just as high a number in the smaller university municipalities
report a shortage of tenant-owner flats. In Greater Stockholm, the number of
municipalities reporting a shortage of tenant-owner flats is just over 40 percent. In particular, the municipalities report that they are lacking residential
properties with three rooms and a kitchen. The demand for small flats with
12 rooms and a kitchen has also been increasing for several years.
Only 17 percent of the municipalities report a shortage of owner-occupied
residential properties. The number of municipalities reporting a shortage of
owner-occupied flats has fallen from 93 municipalities in 2010 to 50 municipalities in 2013. Just under half of the municipalities in Greater Stockholm
report a shortage of owner-occupied flats. In Greater Malm and the smaller
university towns, approximately one fourth of the municipalities report a
shortage of owner-occupied flats.

Long housing waiting lists

On 31 December 2013, there were 431,144 people on the housing waiting list
in Stockholm. The increase was 32,000 people or eight percent last year. This
is to be compared with the fact that the Stockholm Housing Service finds flats
for only about 10,000 households per year.9
Of those on the housing waiting list, approximately 14 percent are active,
defined as people who submit five or more interest applications per year. In
spite of the fact that the housing waiting list is growing, the number of active
people is decreasing. 84 percent of those who are on the list already have some
form of housing arranged, such as their own head lease, their own tenant-owner flat or their own house, or they live with their parents. One third of the
people on the housing waiting list report themselves that the reason they are
on the list is as insurance for the future; i.e. many people get on the housing

... AND REALITY

21

waiting list to be on the safe side without actually needing housing now. But
even if you only count those who are active, the statistics show that there are
few rental flats in proportion to demand.
The average waiting time for the housing waiting list in the City of
Stockholm has increased sharply in recent years. In 2009, the average waiting
time at the Stockholm Housing Service was just under five years; in 2013 it
was over eight years. In the city centre Sdermalm, Kungsholmen and in
Vasastan the waiting time is 1617 years. The Stockholm Housing Service
finds so few flats for people on the housing waiting list in stermalm, another
attractive city centre district in Stockholm, that it does not even present any
statistics.
Waiting times have risen in the suburbs as well. In Tensta, a Stockholm
suburb from the Million Programme, the average waiting time in 2009 was
just over three years. In 2013, it had risen to nearly six years. In Vaxholm, a
small municipality north of Stockholm, the waiting time rose from under three
to nearly seven years in 2013. In central Sundbyberg, a popular municipality
close to Stockholm, the waiting time is 20 years. The average waiting time for
all of Stockholm County is 7.7 years.10
The waiting time is substantial in Gothenburg as well. Boplats Gteborg is a
marketplace where those looking for housing and those who are offering housing are to be able to find each other. The registered number of people looking
for housing is nearly 200,000. The pressure on the rental market can be illustrated by the fact that over 900 applicants went to each flat among the 8,000
listed in 2012. The average waiting time was three years in the city centre and
between one and two years in the suburbs. The waiting time for a student flat
was approximately three years.11 There are however large variations; the median registration time in the most attractive areas can be over seven years, while
the waiting time in less attractive areas can be under one year.12
In 2013, approximately 39,000 people were registered on the waiting list of
Boplats Syd, a housing service for Malm. The waiting time is an average of
two years, which is shorter than in Gothenburg and Stockholm.

Segregation getting worse

One argument for the social housing policy in general and rent control in
particular has been the wish to counteract segregation. Many fear that free
pricing would result in people with high income getting to live better than
those who have low incomes.
For houses and tenant-owner flats, this is however accepted. There is no
price control there; whoever wishes to and can pay the most can buy the res-

22 ... AND REALITY

idential property in question. With rising housing prices, low-income households and young people without wealthy parents have therefore had a tougher
and tougher time getting into the home ownership market. On the other
hand, there is price control on the rental market the negotiated use value
(bruksvrde) of the flat determines the rent, not the willingness to pay.
The idea of this price control is that everyone should be able to afford to
rent even the attractive rental flats. But if the housing supply (such as in the
city centre of a growing region) is insufficient for the entire demand, the housing must still be rationed divided up in some other way besides willingness
to pay.
One common mechanism is rental waiting lists via the housing service.
When this is insufficient, other channels become important, such as contact
with relatives and friends, or the black market. The connections are obvious:
extremely long waiting times for attractive areas lead to many trying to get
around the waiting lists via contacts or buying past them via the black trade in
leases. People who do not have contacts or are unwilling to break the law are
stuck with the waiting lists. This creates segregation although in a different
way than free pricing.
Rent control is a blunt instrument for redistribution. The controlled rent
benefits everyone who gets a hold of a flat not just low-income households.
Several studies have analysed the effects of rent control on segregation, both
with respect to income and ethnicity. The conclusion is that rent control does
not stop segregation at all. Several years ago, people living in rental flats in
the stermalm district of Stockholm made just over twice as much as those
living in rental flats in the Sdermalm district, another city centre district
in Stockholm. The study found that segregation on the basis of income was
actually higher for rental flats than for tenant-owner flats. In the same manner,
there is a clear connection between origin and an attractive housing address
among the rental housing stock, while this does not apply to tenant-owner flats
to the same extent. Ones country of birth makes a bigger difference for where
one lives when living in a rental flat than when living in a tenant-owner flat.13
Economists at Uppsala University came to the same conclusion in a study
that attempted to analyse the effects of the use value system on segregation
among the rental housing stock: In essence, the results mean that the typical resident of a rental flat in Stockholm City Centre is highly educated, is a
native of Sweden, is old and has a pretty high income, while the population in
the suburbs consists to a greater degree of households with small children and
immigrants. This pattern is not as distinct on the tenant-owner flat market...
Since the use value system generates a flat rent structure, this indirectly results
in a subsidy for those living in the city centre. This subsidy is geared toward

... AND REALITY

23

older, highly-educated households without children and without immigrant

backgrounds.14
One argument for rental control that is often raised is that we thus can avoid
social housing special houses or areas for people with subsidised housing.
Social housing exists in several countries (see next chapter), but Swedish politics has rejected this type of policy as segregating and stigmatising. Such specially designed housing areas therefore do not exist on paper in Sweden. But in
reality, the combination of rent control and a poorly functioning labour market
has resulted in certain areas in the suburbs of the big cities becoming environments with a high number of unemployed people. Reliance on government
assistance is high and social security benefits are common. Social housing has
in this sense de facto come in through the back door, as a by-product of housing
segregation and high unemployment.
The conclusion is that rent control has not achieved its goals. It has been
unable to stop segregation with respect to income while possibly aggravating
segregation with respect to origin. First and second generation immigrants are
put at a disadvantage. Rent control thus does not achieve the goal often cited
as the main argument for its existence.

Black markets
Long housing waiting lists tempt many to go via the black market instead.
There are several studies of widespread abuse in this area. Numbers involving black trade are by definition uncertain, but various estimates still make a
strong case.
The Swedish National Board of Housing, Building and Planning divides the
black housing market into three parts: unauthorised subletting, trade in leases
and fraud.15 The unauthorised subletting probably occurs often in areas where
it is difficult to get a head lease; the harder it is, the less willing those who have
such a lease are to terminate it traditionally and allow the flat to go back to the
landlord. Instead, the person in question sublets it, sometimes at an excessive
rent. The Swedish National Board of Housing, Building and Planning has not
even tried to state how extensive this part of the black market is.
With respect to trade in leases, the Swedish National Board of Housing,
Building and Planning also neglects to try to quantify the extent. There are
no official statistics in this area. However, the Swedish Property Federation
has made an attempt with owners on the private rental market in Stockholm
via a survey. In 2006, it was estimated that the black trade in Stockholm City
Centre turned over approximately SEK 660 million. For three major municipalities in the Stockholm Region; Stockholm, Sundbyberg and Solna, it was

24 ... AND REALITY

estimated that the total turnover of black leases amounted to SEK 1.2 billion.16
It should be underlined that the numbers of this study are very uncertain.
Figures from studies with the same methodology are unavailable for later
years. The Swedish Property Federations estimate is however that total turnover has increased. However, the number of leases entered into has decreased
due to low construction rates and conversion to tenant-owner flats. But the
price per lease has risen sharply.17 This data is also uncertain.
In Gothenburg, Boplats Gteborg has polled residents, with the results
indicating that the lock-in effects have increased, which results in fraudulent
exchanges and unauthorised subletting with illegal additional rent charges.18
The South Sweden Property Federation (Fastighetsgarna Syd) has conducted
a poll in Malm, which shows the same type of problem, with increasing trade
in black leases but with uncertain figures.19
In both of these parts of the black rental market unauthorised subletting
and trade in leases the parties involved, both the buyer and the seller, have
something to gain from the deal. That is why there is very rarely a report to
the rent tribunal or the police. There is also a third category in the Swedish
National Board of Housing, Building and Plannings analysis, which is pure
fraud. One example of this is when rental flats at attractive addresses put on
housing exchange forums on the Internet become an arena for fraudsters.
There are police reports and a variety of investigations here, but there is a
large number of unrecorded cases; we dont know how large a number of fraud
cases reach the surface.
In summary, there are no estimates of the extent of the black market that
are certain. However, the Swedish National Board of Housing, Building and
Planning believes that a reasonable conclusion is that it is affected by the
housing shortage and poor mobility on the housing market. The increasing
housing shortage can therefore be assumed to result in an increase in the
black market.

Growing problems on the labour market

The housing shortage in growing regions has become a major economic
problem. All sectors are having greater difficulty recruiting staff. The public
sector has recruiting problems due to the housing shortage, in sectors such as
the healthcare sector. Recruiting foreign experts is particularly problematic. In a
recent investigation, as much as 70 percent of foreign expats in Stockholm state
that it has been very difficult to find housing; another 14 percent answered
that it was difficult. The housing shortage was thus the biggest obstacle for
qualified foreign labour to overcome.20

... AND REALITY

25

For newly started and fast growing companies, the housing shortage is a
significant impediment to growth. Two thirds of start-ups in Stockholm say
in a survey that the housing shortage causes problems for them; they have
trouble attracting people to Stockholm, and also have trouble retaining staff.
Stockholms housing problem is flagged as a serious international competitive
disadvantage for startups.21 If we look at already established companies, nearly
one third of the fast growing small businesses (599 employees) have at some
point had difficulties recruiting due to the housing shortage. Every fifth growing companies has failed to recruit staff due to the housing shortage. More
than one fourth report that it takes a longer time to recruit due to the housing
shortage which delays investments.22
These are the companies where most new jobs are created. In other words,
the housing shortage directly impacts employment and skills supply and thus
also growth and competitiveness for Sweden as a whole.
Quantifying the impact on employment is however difficult. One of the
few studies that was bold enough to take on this task came to the conclusion that unemployment for the country as a whole would be 0.3 percentage
points lower if job applicants moved to counties with more open positions,
but the housing shortage impedes moving there. Employment could simultaneously increase by three percent.23 However, the study only answers the
question of what greater mobility on the labour market means in light of the
jobs currently available. It does not say anything about the more long-term
effects on growth and job creation a better functioning housing market would
have which is significantly more important. The recent Social Democratic
Research Committee for Labour Market Reforms (Socialdemokratiska
Forskningskommissionen fr arbetsmarknadsreformer) is one of several commentators who asserts that a new housing policy including a reform of rent
control would be positive for employment in Sweden.24
This is something that has been pointed out in several international studies and
comparisons of Sweden in the past years. For example, the OECD underlines
the poorly functioning housing market as a threat to dynamics and growth
in its most recent review of the Swedish economy and recommends a series
of measures market rents, simplified construction regulations, intervention
against weak competition, tax changes, etc. to deal with these growing problems.25 The same is recommended by such diverse organisations as the EU26
and the World Bank.27
The risk is obvious that the problems will get even worse in the event of
a future economic upswing. Swedens economy has grown slower than usual over the past years. The main reason is the repercussions of the financial
crisis and a weak export market. Investments have been repressed and unem-

26 ... AND REALITY

ployment is high. If problems on the housing market persist, this will delay
and obstruct the upturn expected in the coming two years according to most
economic commentators.
In the long term, the task is even more important. The demographic projections indicate continuing rapid urbanisation. Stockholm County is expected
to grow from a population of 2.1 million to 2.5 million in 10 years and 2.8
million in 2030. A population increase of 100,000 is already expected for the
City of Gothenburg by 2020, and the City of Malm is expected to grow by
approximately 40,000 in the same period.28 Accommodating this population
increase with the present poorly functioning housing market will be a difficult
challenge. This will probably require wider regional commuting and costly
infrastructure investments. In the long term, completely new construction and
transport solutions are needed.29
Continuing low construction and a shrinking number of rental flats would
have strong negative effects in this context. The gap between population and
construction would be made even wider. Matching jobs and skills would be
made difficult. Therefore, the housing shortage in general and the rental flat
shortage in particular have clear negative effects on the labour market and
skills development.30

How could things go so bad?

The conclusion is clear: The social and economic costs of the housing crisis are
already substantial now and will increase in the future. This poses the question: How did things get so bad? None of the people who made the housing
policy decisions were aiming for this situation. The crisis is a result of a long
list of political decisions and market effects, which have piled on top of each
other for years, without anyone paying attention to the big picture.
The demand for housing has increased, driven by population growth and
rapid urbanisation. The rate at which people are moving into the cities in
Sweden is faster than in almost all other European countries. One reason
for this is the growing immigration. Another is a substantial change in our
living preferences. One generation ago, people were moving to the suburbs;
few families with children wanted to live in the city centre. These days, more
households have two people who are gainfully employed and city centre living
is more attractive, even if that leaves fewer square metres per person. Increased
demand and rising willingness to pay is pressing up housing prices.
In the context of this increasing demand, there are several growing impediments on the supply side: Rent control, the bureaucratic zoning process etc.
and the fact that the state has abdicated from its past leading role.

... AND REALITY

27

Until 30 years ago, housing policy played a central part in the development
of the welfare state in Sweden. Cheap and functional housing affordable for
everybody became a cornerstone in the building of the Swedish welfare state
Housing policy was dominated by cooperative ideology for a long time, where
the joint responsibility and savings of the residents played a key role. In the
post-war period, the cooperative approach was replaced by the state and the
municipalities taking greater responsibility. Rent control, housing assistance,
municipal public housing companies, environmental programmes, capital
market regulation and interest deductions became key words in the development of housing policy from cooperative and self-determination to a state
macro policy for housing construction and financial regulation.
In the Million Programme of the 1960s and 70s, the state directed the
nations savings to housing construction via regulations. Banks and insurance
companies were forced to buy prioritised housing bonds with low return on
investment, which was a form of cheap financing for construction. This subsidy policy culminated in the beginning of the 1980s as the domestic interest
rate and credit market regulations were combined with extensive subsidies
directly to residents: first mortgage loans at guaranteed interest rates and state
subsidised second mortgage loans. People who were lucky enough to participate in these support programmes literally got paid to live in their housing.
Property prices rose, driven by all the subsidies, while inflation and the right to
deduct interest impaired loans and loan instalments. And due to the extensive
subsidies, the market became less sensitive to poor construction quality and
unjustified construction price increases.
The system eventually became unsustainable. This created high economic
and budgetary costs, and distortions of resource-allocation, while it contributed to debt and counteracted savings. A grey, unregulated credit market
emerged alongside the credit market regulations.
A system shift therefore was pushed through in the second half of the
1980s. It occurred gradually, by governments with different political persuasions. First, domestic de-regulation of the credit market came in the mid
1980s, which pulled the rug out from under the state plan economy on the
credit market with a special position for the prioritised loans for housing
construction. In 1989, the currency regulations were abolished, which was a
pre-condition for control of the domestic credit market. Then the major 1990
tax reforms came along, as the value of the interest deductions fell radically.
Reduced subsidies for household loans followed. The public housing sector was
given tighter frameworks, given that it was forced to build up its own investment capital. EU membership additionally resulted in Sweden committing to
not re-regulate the credit market.

28 ... AND REALITY

The financial risk of housing construction was thus privatised with the major
parties in agreement. It was moved from the state to the companies (housing
and construction companies) and households, as it is on most other markets
and in just about every country. It is now up to private companies to provide
consumers with the goods and services desired, without the state going in and
taking special financial responsibility for providing the service in question.
While this was happening, the macroeconomic conditions changed. Sweden
went from high to low inflation, which meant that high inflation no longer ate
up the real value of mortgages. This type of indirect subsidising of housing
thus also disappeared, with visible subsidies disappearing at the same time.

Rigidity is blocking the housing market

The state has thus relinquished control of financing and risk on the housing
market. But the policy has not drawn the full conclusions of the system shift it
itself initiated. While the financial risks have been privatised, central parts of
the regulatory system have been preserved as they were during the previous,
state-dominated period. In some cases, the policy, e.g. in terms of taxes, has
made it even harder for the markets signals to get through. The price signals
coming from the increased demand which should have led to increased construction are being blocked:
Rent control prevents the price signals from getting through to the supply of
flats. It blocks chains of moves and slows down mobility. The recent attempt
to loosen up regulations with rents better adapted to market conditions in
newly built properties has not been very successful (see next chapter).
Rent control is also the main reason for the large number of conversions
from rental flat to tenant-owner flat. A property will be worth much more if
its flats become tenant-owner flats than if they remain rental flats, because
the controlled rent keeps revenues down. It is therefore more profitable for
the property owner to convert them and sell them as tenant-owner flats.
The zoning process for construction is long, bureaucratic and larded with
appeals. The municipal zoning monopoly delays the market getting through.
Special municipal requirements and conflicts with formal national interests according to the planning legislation sometimes with an unclear
value make construction more expensive.
The infrastructure is insufficient and is often planned on a different level
than the level where housing is planned.

... AND REALITY

29

The combination of moving taxes, interest deductions and abolished property tax has perpetuated inefficient and uneven taxation of different forms of
housing, while mobility on the market has been limited.
The total demand for housing has risen via population growth and rising
incomes. But at the same time, the reduction in subsidies combined with rising
prices for tenant-owner flats and a lower number of rental flats has made it
increasingly difficult for low income households to find housing. The result is
a housing market that is characterised by both lacking mobility and too low
construction.
We are deeply critical of the lack of an overall perspective. Sweden no
longer has a coherent housing policy instead there is a muddle of inconsistent
measures, which are short-term, mutually contradictory and often driven by
special interests.

What should be done?

The gap between vision and reality leads to clear conclusions about what
should be done. Two main tasks need to be tackled:
Mobility on the housing market must be increased. Rent control
should be reformed so that rents better reflect supply and demand. This is
necessary to reduce the lock-in effects of the existing housing stock. This
adjustment should be followed by social protection measures to reduce
the transition costs for low-income households. The tax system should be
reformed simultaneously. Todays combination of low current housing property taxation and high capital gains tax creates lock-ins for tenant-owner
flats and houses. Therefore, the capital gains tax should be lowered and a
low, simple property tax should be reintroduced. In chapter 3 (summarised
in the next section), we present our proposals for how this is to be done.
Housing construction must be increased. Regulatory changes
simpler zoning and construction regulations, a reduction in the rights for
municipalities to limit and block construction with special regulations are
necessary to be able to speed up construction processes. Pressure on the
construction sector to raise productivity should be tightened and competition
should increase. Infrastructure and housing construction should be planned
jointly in a more constructive manner. Financing and tax issues should be
overhauled to ensure that those living in rental flats are not put at a disadvantage. Our proposals in these areas can be found in chapter 4 (summarised in the next section).

30 ... AND REALITY

This is a broader approach than what is usually taken in the domestic housing
policy debate. However, external analysis from organisations such as the
EU, OECD and IMF have the same type of overall approach. It is striking
how international analyses of the Swedish housing market emphasise rental control, distorted taxes and complicated zoning provisions31 while the
domestic debate prefers to avoid tackling the very special Swedish version of
rent control.
We would like to underline that these various reforms are conditioned upon
one another:
If rents are adapted to market conditions without regulatory simplifications
and increased construction, there is a risk that the supply of housing will
respond too slowly; in that case, rents may be driven up quickly in much of
the market. Increased construction in growing regions in turn cannot take
place without expanded infrastructure and better functioning public transport. Property tax and capital taxation affect the relative prices between
different types of housing and have clear effects on household demand, as
well as the financing of construction. The tax system must therefore also be
overhauled as the regulatory systems are rearranged.
But it is not enough to only increase construction. The greatest economic
costs of the poorly functioning housing market comprise inefficient use of
the existing housing stock.32 Rent control creates lock-in effects in the rental
housing stock and high capital gains taxes do the same for owner-occupied
properties and tenant-owner flats. The chains are being blocked. Since
the housing stock includes over 100 times more residential properties than
what is built per year, it would take far too long to fix the problems just by
building new properties. It is also considerably more expensive to build new
properties than to implement measures to counteract the poorly functioning
housing market. Inefficient use of the housing stock therefore must also be
tackled. The bottled up chains must be opened.
This is our main conclusion of the analysis of the gap between reality and
vision. Different political areas must cooperate to together contribute to make
it possible for the vision of a well-functioning housing market to be achieved.
It is therefore not enough to just build more or just reform rent control. The
following chapters lay out our proposals (summarised in the next section) .

Summary
1. Vision
The Housing Crisis Committee strives for a housing market with housing of all
types and for all stages of life. Where there is mobility and where zoning processes go quickly. Where housing with different forms of tenure are available
for different wallets.
We want to see a housing market where residents have great freedom of choice
in terms of prices, locations and forms of tenure. We want to see functioning
chains of moves and more extensive housing construction. A market where
housing waiting lists and black markets have disappeared.
We want to see a housing market where housing is attractive to invest in and
where financing of construction functions well. Where the process from construction plans to move-in is fast and non-bureaucratic.
We want to see a market where residents have strong security of tenure. Where
leases on the rental market can be tried in court.
We want to see a housing market where segregation is lower than it is now.
Where municipalities and property owners cooperate to distribute social
priorities in a way that does not lead to heavy concentration in specific areas.
Where newly built areas are planned in such a way that they are available to
different types of households, with different incomes and preferences.

2. and reality
The Swedish housing market is currently far from the ideal image. The housing shortage is widespread, housing waiting lists are long and the rental market
is in crisis.
The shortage of rental flats for young people and low-income households is acute.
Housing is segregated. Young people have trouble beginning to climb the housing
ladder, and chains of moves are blocked. Black markets are far too common.

32 SUMMARY

These problems are not only due to low housing construction, but also to an
even greater extent to inefficient use of the existing housing stock.
The housing crisis is aggravated as the population increases and more people
move in to the cities, while bottlenecks on the housing market block employment, dynamics and growth, and harm all of Swedens economy. Without
reforms, the housing crisis will get even deeper.
One reason for todays problems is that public measures affecting the housing
market are not coherent. The state has abdicated its previous roll as planner
and financier. The financial risk has been shifted to construction companies,
property owners and residents. But the policy shift is inconsistent. While the
supply for housing rises, mobility is impeded by obstacles and distortions on
the supply side.
Rent control creates lock-in effects and shuts the door on those who do not
have contacts. High and perpetual capital gains taxes inhibit mobility on the
market for tenant-owner flats and houses. A complex and drawn-out zoning
process is costly and weakens competition. Joint planning between housing
construction and infrastructure is insufficient.
There is therefore no longer a coherent housing policy. The policy is pursued
in silos, and mutual connections are not sufficiently taken into account.
An overall policy is required to solve these problems. Such a policy tackles
two main areas simultaneously: Mobility on the housing market and housing
construction must be increased.
Both of these tasks are necessary. It is not enough to only build more. The
biggest socio-economic costs comprise inefficient use of the existing housing
stock. This is why mobility must be increased. It is likewise not enough to
only adjust rents to market conditions. That would drive up rents far too
quickly for many households. This is why construction must be increased.
Our conclusion is that simultaneous and coordinated reforms of rent control, zoning processes and infrastructure must be made, as well as of taxes and financing.

3. Recipe for increased mobility

One reason for the low mobility is that the Swedish rent setting system is
obsolete and stale. It creates lock-in effects and blocks chains of moves. The

SUMMARY

33

housing stock is used poorly, which has negative effects on the labour market
and growth.
Rent control scares off investments in rental properties and instead creates
strong driving forces to convert rental flats into tenant-owner flats. This control
that was intended to protect the tenant in reality risks depleting rental flats.
Rent control does not reduce segregation either. The spread of income among
residents of rental flats is just as large as for residents of tenant-owner flats.
Rental flats are actually more segregated with respect to origin probably
because contacts are required to move forward on the rental market.
Switching to completely free rent setting, without any control at all, is inappropriate. The right of tenure of the tenant must be protected. We propose a
gradual reform of the rent setting system, in two steps.
1. The Rent Negotiation Act (Hyresfrhandlingslagen) is to be amended so
that no party can be forced to sign collective rent negotiation agreements.
No party should be obliged to charge negotiation compensation on behalf of
the counterparty either.
A free right to negotiate is to be immediately applicable for newly built flats.
In older flats, the rent may be changed by a maximum of five percent per
year during an adjustment period until rents have been adapted to market
conditions. It is estimated that it will take approximately ten years or more
in Stockholm City Centre, and significantly less in Gothenburg and Malm.
In most medium and small cities, the adaptation will just take a year or so.
2. When adaptation of the rent level is complete, rents are set freely during
exchanges or new construction. Large rent hikes should be avoided between
the time a tenant moves in and moves out; changes should be gradual. In
old leases, rents in five-year phases may be changed at the pace of inflation;
greater increases are allowed in the event of renovation or reconstruction.
Tenants will continue to have strong security of tenure and unreasonable
rents will be able to be tried in court. Protection from irresponsible landlords should be increased.
When empowered by them, the Swedish Union of Tenants (Hyresgstfreningen)
can also represent a group of tenants in the future in negotiations under the
present model, if both parties have agreed to such a collective negotiation
agreement.

34 SUMMARY

The social consequences of the transition should be alleviated via targeted

temporary housing assistance, financed by a temporary welfare tax on older
properties.
We say no to social housing, i.e. that special housing areas are set aside for
socially weaker households. Instead, we recommend increased cooperation
between municipalities and housing companies. The companies must reserve a
certain number of residential properties for municipal housing services randomly distributed in different areas.
Increased mobility also means that it will be easier to change forms of tenure.
Therefore, tax differences between forms of tenure must be reduced and lockin effects for tenant-owner flats and owner-occupied properties must also be
reduced.
The tax system restricts mobility for tenant-owner flats and owner-occupied
properties due to high capital gains taxes. Therefore, reintroduce a low property lax, reduce the capital gains tax and the tax on deferrals. Reduce the land
registration fee and the mortgage tax.
The tax system is not neutral. It benefits owning over renting. We advocate an
enquiry to investigate tax neutrality between owning and renting.

4. Recipe for increased housing construction

The zoning monopoly of the municipalities is an anachronism in a time where
several municipalities cooperate on major infrastructure projects and zoning
must take place in coordination with private builders. The process is also
far too long and complicated. We want to see a simpler and faster process,
with less power for the municipalities and more power for regions and county
councils.
Let the layout plan have more control, simplify local planning and use simple
zoning procedures as far as possible. Special area regulations should be able to
serve as the basis for a planning permission right away.
Reduce the ability for municipalities to have special requirements. Make housing supply a general interest with the same status as other national interests
already formalised in the planning regulation. Reduce the ability to appeal
construction and zoning cases, limit the group of people entitled to appeal.

SUMMARY

35

Limit the municipal zoning monopoly. Private builders should to a greater

degree be able to take the initiative in the zoning process.
Jointly plan housing construction and infrastructure. More creative financing
solutions for infrastructure are needed. Put greater emphasis on the regional
level.
Sweden should not go back to the old subsidy system, but support should be
given to housing savings for young people. The state credit guarantee system
should be overhauled and to a greater degree geared toward projects that
benefit low-income households. Individual repayment plans for households are
to be preferred over statutory general requirements.
Investigate the entire capital taxation system and the ability to reduce the
value of interest deductions.
Construction regulations should be harmonised not just between Swedens
municipalities, but also in the Nordic region and in the long term in the EU.
The conversion pressure should be increased on the construction sector and
the parties of the labour market must eliminate the guild mind-set in the construction sector.

5. What will the consequences be?

The effects of our proposals should not be compared with the situation today,
but how the situation will develop without reforms. Within five to ten years,
our proposals will result in:
- Increased construction approximately 10,000 more flats per year.
- A lower housing shortage.
- More rental flats.
- Less extensive black market.
- Increased mobility on the labour market.
- Increased employment: 20,000 new jobs directly in the construction sector
and many more tens of thousands in the economy as whole if the indirect effects of increased mobility are included.
- Unchanged economic segregation and reduced segregation on the basis of
origin,
- Lower household debt.
- Stronger public finances.

36 SUMMARY

6. A long-term overall policy

The housing issue is so important and spans such large fields that it should be
treated as a single policy area not divided up into different silos.
A broad political agreement for at least two terms of office is a pre-condition
for a broad strategy to be credible and hold up over a long period of time. All
parties need to give and take in such an agreement.
Swedens political culture has previously shown itself to be capable of coming
together and taking long-term and difficult decisions when needed. Now that
time has come once again!

Endnotes
1

Boverket, Report 2012:18, Bostadsbristen ur ett marknadsperspektiv

Dagens Nyheter, Januari 21, 2014

Stockholms Handelskammare, Report 2014:1: Bostadsbrist farlig flaskhals fr jobben

Vstsvenska Handelskammaren, Report 2014:1: Bostadsbristens pris

Malm stadsbyggnadskontor: Tertialrapport 3, 2013

SOU 2012:88: Att hyra frn en rtt fr alla till en mjlighet fr allt fler

www.hittabrf.se

Data in this and the next section taken from Boverket 2013: Bostadsmarknaden 2013-14

Stockholms Bostadsfrmedling

10

Dagens Nyheter, February 3, 2014

11 www.boplats.se
12

Boplats Gteborg, Marknadsanalys 2014-02: Kontraktsanalys 2013

13

Hanna Fridell and Cecilia Brogren: Lyckas hyresregleringen motverka segregation i Stockholm?, Ekonomisk Debatt,
6/2007

14

Mats Wilhelmsson, Bo Sderberg and Cecilia Enstrm: Household allocation and spatial distribution in a market under
soft rent control, Uppsala Universitet. Citations from a debate article by the same authors in Bofast 9 September
2011.

15

Boverket, Report 2011:30: Dligt fungerande bostadsmarknader

16

Fastighetsgarna Stockholm: Missbruket av bytesrtten en rapport om svarthandeln med hyreslgenheter I

Stockholm, 2006

17

Dagens Industri, February 21, 2014

18

Boplats Gteborg 2009: Slutsatser av Boplats underskningar om svarta lgenheter 2001-2003, 2006 och 2009

19

Kvllsposten, May 2, 2007

20

Oxford research 2014: Analys av utlndsk arbetskraft i Stockholms ln

21

Fastighetsgarna Stockholm 2014: Stockholm som startupstad

22

Stockholms Handelskammare 2014:1, a.a

23

Georg Marthin 2012, Measuring mismatch in the Swedish labour market, Finanspolitiska rdet

24

Bertil Holmlund m.fl: Arbetsmarknadsreformer fr jobb och vlfrd, Socialdemokraterna 2014

25

OECD: Sweden 2012

26

European Commission, Occasional Papers 186, March 2014; Macroeconomic Imbalances, Sweden 2014,
se srskilt avsnitt 3.3

27

World Bank 2014: Swedens Business Climate. Opportunities for Entrepreneurs through Improved Regulations

28

Stockholm Business region

29

A long term projection of the development in the Stockholm Region the coming 50 years is presented in SWECO:
www.stockholm2070.se

30

Se e.g. Nima Sanandaji: Hyresrttens betydelse fr en dynamisk arbetsmarknad, Hyresgstfreningen 2013

31

A good example is given by the European Commission in its latest analysis of the Swedish Economy: European
Commission, a.a

32

See e.g. Boverkets marknadsrapport, May 2014: Lst lge p bostadsmarknaden, och Boverkets marknadsrapport,
november 2013: Bostadsbristen och hyressttningssystemet ett kunskapsunderlag

The Housing Crisis Comittee has had the mission to consider

how - not if - the Swedish housing market can be brought to
function better.
We are deeply critical of the lack of an overall perspective.
Sweden has no longer a coherent housing policy - instead
there is a muddle of inconsistent measures, which are shortterm, mutually contradictory and often driven by special
interests.
The dead-lock in the housing policies create growing economic problems. They can be dissolved via a prudent overall policy. This requires that rent control, taxes and zoning
procedures be reformed simultaneously. This is conditioned
on a broad political agreement, spanning several terms of
office. Our proposed reforms provide a reasonable balance
between safety and efficiency. The Swedish political system
has previously shown that it can come together for important
decisions when they are really needed. Now that time has
come once again!

B okriskommittn

an initiative by

Bokriskommittn, Box 16050, 103 21 Stockholm. www.bokriskommitten.se