ESTRADA V.

ESCRITOR
AM No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
Petitioner: Alejandro Estrada
Respondent: Soledad Escritor
Facts: Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in RTC Las Pinas.
Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding
judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of
rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her
husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritors husband, who had lived with
another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other
hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not related to
either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite.
According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain
employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the
Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with
Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living
together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness
which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio,
Salazar, a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding
minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures for
executing the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor and
Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in
Watch Tower Central Office.
Issue: W/N respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of
gross and immoral conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal
arrangement.
Held: No.
Ratio: A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality
should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and

secular morality. The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent
neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as
required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.
The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by
maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. There is
nothing in the OCAs memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest
is so compelling that it should override respondents plea of religious freedom.
Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence
on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be
discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the
Solicitor General.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be
given an opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold
in opposing the respondents position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral
and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise protection. The Court
could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects
it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious
freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at respondents
claim of religious freedom but must also apply the compelling state interest test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court
Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it
will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of
respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the
state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and practice;
and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least
restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded
thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this
Decision.