Professional Documents
Culture Documents
COMPILATION OF
LEGAL MAXIMS
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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THE ACT ITSELF DOES NOT MAKE A MAN GUILTY UNLESS HIS INTENTIONS WERE SO
LILY SY VS. HON. MERCEDITAS GUTIERREZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. 171579 November 14, 2012
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RELATIVE WORDS REFER TO THE NEAREST ANTECEDENTS, UNLESS THE CONTEXT OTHERWISE REQUIRES.
MAPA VS. HON. JOKER ARROYO AND LABRADOR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 78585 (July 5, 1989)
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ARGUMENTUM A CONTRARIO
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A PERSON, OBJECT OR THING OMITTED FROM AN ENUMERATION MUST BE HELD TO HAVE BEEN OMITTED INTENTIONALLY
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GUILLERMO MANANTAN
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G.R. No. 14129, July 31, 1962
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CESSANTE RATIONE LEGIS, CESSAT IPSA LEX
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WHEN THE REASON OF THE LAW CEASES, THE LAW ITSELF CEASES.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALMUETE
G.R. No. L-26551, February 27, 1976
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EJUSDEM GENERIS
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A THING NOT BEING EXCEPTED MUST BE REGARDED AS COMING WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE GENERAL RULE
ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC VS. THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY
G.R. No. L-24322; July 21, 1967
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THE EXPRESS MENTION OF ONE PERSON, THING OR CONSEQUENCE IMPLIES THE EXCLUSION OF ALL OTHERS
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COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION, INC. VS. HON. RUBEN TORRES, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 132527; July 29, 2005
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EX NECESSITATE LEGIS
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FALSE DESCRIPTION DOES NOT PRECLUDE CONSTRUCTION NOR VITIATE THE MEANING OF THE STATURE
DELONG VS. STARKEY
120 Ind. App. 288; May 9, 1950
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PENAL LAWS WHICH ARE FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED ARE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT
PEOPLE VS. QUIACHON
G.R. No. 170236; August 31, 2006
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HOC QUIDEM PERQUAM DURUM EST SED ITA LEX SCRIPTA EST
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PUBLIC INTEREST REQUIRES THAT BY THE VERY NATURE OF THINGS THERE MUST BE AN END TO A LEGAL CONTROVERSY 28
FELICISIMA DE LA CRUZ VS HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS
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G.R. No. 164785, Mar 15, 2010
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INTERPRETARE ET CONCORDARE LEGIBUS EST OPTIMUS INTERPRETANDI MODUS
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EVERY STATUTE MUST BE SO CONSTRUED AND HARMONIZED WITH OTHER STATUTES AS TO FORM A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF
JURISPRUDENCE
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DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. VS CLEOFE S. JANIOLA
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THE INTERPRETATION PLACED UPON THE WRITTEN LAW BY A COMPETENT COURT HAS THE FORCE OF LAW)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PEOPLE VS JABINAL
GR NO. 162059; Jan 22, 2008
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A LATER STATUTE WHICH IS REPUGNANT TO AN EARLIER STATUTE IS DEEMED TO HAVE ABROGATED THE EARLIER ONE ON
THE SAME SUBJECT MATTER
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CARABAO, INC. VS. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION
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G.R. No. L-29304; Jul 3, 2014
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LEX DE FUTURO, JUDEX DE PRATERITO
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THE LAW PROVIDES FOR THE FUTURE, THE JUDGE FOR THE PAST.
DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION VS. STOCKHOLDERS OFINTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK
G.R. No. 181556 ; December 14, 2009
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NOSCITUR A SOCIIS
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THERE CAN BE NO LEGAL RIGHT AS AGAINST THE AUTHORITY THAT MAKES THE LAW ON WHICH THE RIGHT DEPENDS.
REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR
G.R. No. L-30671; November 28, 1973
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PARI MATERIA
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PRIVILEGES ARE TO BE INTERPRETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WILL OF HIM WHO GRANTS THEM
BARRETTO VS. TUASON
G.R. Nos. L-36872;March 31, 1934
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RATIO LEGIS
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REFERRING EACH TO EACH; REFERRING EACH PHRASE OR EXPRESSION TO ITS APPROPRIATE OBJECT; OR LET EACH BE PUT IN
ITS PROPER PLACE
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FOLLOW PAST PRECEDENTS AND DO NOT DISTURB WHAT HAS BEEN SETTLED.
J.R.A. PHILIPPINES, INC. V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 177127 October 11, 2010
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THE CONSTRUCTION IS TO BE SOUGHT WHICH GIVES EFFECT TO THE WHOLE OF THE STATUTE ITS VERY WORD
PEOPLE VS. MANTALABA
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WORDS OUGHT TO BE MORE SUBSERVIENT TO THE INTENT AND NOT THE INTENT TO THE WORDS.
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LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINE REPRESENTATIVE BY LCP NATIONAL PRESIDENT JERRY P. TRENAS, ET
AL.
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GR. No. 176951 GR. No. 177499 GR. No. 178056
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VERBA LEGIS
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PLAIN-MEANING RULE.
REPUBLIC V. LACAP
G.R. No. 158253; March 2, 2007
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THE LAWS AID THE VIGILANT, NOT THOSE WHO SLUMBER ON THEIR RIGHTS.
ALONSO VS. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC.,
G.R. No. 130876; December 5, 2003
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detention in the presence of Ex-Judge Talavera. It was noted that the accused was handcuffed through all this time
up on orders of the fiscal and based on the authorities' belief that the accused might attempt to escape otherwise.
Issue:
(1)
(2)
Ruling:
(1) YES. It was established that the accused was not apprised of his rights to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel in the course of the investigation. The Court held that the accused should
always be apprised of his Miranda rights from the moment he is arrested by the authorities as this is deemed
the start of custodial investigation. In fact, the Court included invitations by police officers in the
scope of custodial investigations. It is evident in this case that when the police invited the accusedappellant to the station, he was already considered as the suspect in the case. Therefore, the questions asked
of him were no longer general inquiries into an unsolved crime, but were intended to elicit information about his
participation in the crime. However, the
Miranda rights may be waived, provided that the waiver is voluntary, express, in writing and made in the presence
of counsel. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to establish that the accused made such a waiver.
(2) NO. There are certain situations when authorities may conduct a lawful warrantless arrest: (a) when the accused
is caught in flagrante delicto; (b) when the arrest is made immediately after the crime was
committed; and when the one to be arrested is an escaped convict. The arrest of the accused in this c a s e d i d n o t
fall in any of these exceptions. The arrest was not conducted immediately after the
consummation of the crime; rather, it was done a day after. The authorities also did not have personal knowledge
of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense because they were not there when
the crime was committed. They merely relied on the account of one eyewitness. Unfortunately, although the
warrantless arrest was not lawful, this did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court in this case because the accused
still submitted to arraignment despite the illegality of his arrest. In effect, he waived his right to contest the legality
of the warrantless arrest.
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Issue:
Whether the respondent being a co-owner with the petitioner of the subject property can be charged of robbery?
Ruling:
NO. Indeed, on second look, we note that what is involved here is a dispute between and among members of a family corporation, the
Fortune Wealth Mansion Corporation. Petitioner Lily Sy and respondents Merry, Jennifer, and Glenn, all surnamed Sy, are the ownersincorporators of said corporation, which owns and manages the Fortune Wealth Mansion where petitioner allegedly resided and where the
crime of robbery was allegedly committed. As part-owners of the entire building and of the articles allegedly stolen from the 10th floor of said
building the very same properties that are involved between the same parties in a pending estate proceeding, the respondents cannot, as
co-owners, be therefore charged with robbery. The fact of co-ownership negates any intention to gain, as they cannot steal properties which
they claim to own.
Argumentum a contrario
Negative-opposite doctrine; what is expressed puts an end to what is implied
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provides that all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contracts, express or implied, whether the
same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice;
otherwise they are barred forever.
Issue:
Does the statute of non-claims of the Rules of Court bar the claim of the government for unpaid taxes?
Ruling:
No. The reason for the more liberal treatment of claims for taxes against a decedent's estate in the form of exception
from the application of the statute of non-claims, is not hard to find. Taxes are the lifeblood of the Government and
their prompt and certain availability are imperious need. (CIR vs. Pineda, 21 SCRA 105). Upon taxation depends the
Government ability to serve the people for whose benefit taxes are collected. To safeguard such interest, neglect or
omission of government officials entrusted with the collection of taxes should not be allowed to bring harm or
detriment to the people, in the same manner as private persons may be made to suffer individually on account of
his own negligence, the presumption being that they take good care of their personal affairs. This should not hold
true to government officials with respect to matters not of their own personal concern. This is the philosophy behind
the government's exception, as a general rule, from the operation of the principle of estoppel.
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of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband, arrived at the bakeshop. Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came
and so she got into the car. After the car turned right in a corner, it stopped and then a young man, accused Enrique
Amurao, and boarded the car beside the driver. Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front
seat and went onto where Ma. Socorro was seated at the rear. He poked a gun at her and Isabelo, who earlier told
her that Enrique is his nephew announced, "ma'm, you know, I want to get money from you." She said she has
money inside her bag and they may get it just so they will let her go. The bag contained P7, 000.00. The two accused
told her they wanted P100, 000.00more. Socorro agreed to give them that but would they drop her at her gas station
in Kamagong St., Makati where the money is located. Beloy asked Socorro to issue a check for P100, 000.00.Socorro
complied. She drafted 3 checks in denominations of two for P30 thousand and one forP40 thousand. Being able to
escape by jumping out of the vehicle, Socorro upon reaching Balintawak, reported the matter to CAPCOM.
Issue:
Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under PD No.532 (Anti-Piracy and AntiHighway Robbery Law of 1974)
Ruling:
No. PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against
any person or persons on Philippine highways and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or
particular victim. The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car which was casually operating on a
highway does not make PD No 532applicable to the case.
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Ejusdem generis
Of the same kind or specie
ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC vs. THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY
G.R. No. L-24322; July 21, 1967
Facts:
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The Municipal Board of Ormoc City enacted and approved an ordinance providing the regulation of the City Tax. Its
validity was assailed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, and the lower court sustained its validity in its
decision, hence this appeal.
Issue:
WON the Municipal Ordinance assailed in this case is valid?
Ruling:
YES. Section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act enlarged the sphere of autonomy granted to chartered cities in terms of
enactment of taxing measures. It covers everything excepting those which are mentioned therein. The coverage of
the Ordinance does ot come under any of the specific exceptions listed in Section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act. Not
being excepted, it must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule as the maxim goes, Exceptio
firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis.
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COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. HON. RUBEN TORRES, et. al.
G.R. No. 132527; July 29, 2005
Facts:
This is a Petition to enjoin and prohibit the public respondent Ruben Torres in his capacity as Executive Secretary
from allowing other private respondents to continue with the operation of tax and duty-free shops located at the
Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). The petitioner seeks to declare RA
7227 as unconstitutional on the ground that it allowed only tax-free (and duty-free) importation of raw materials,
capital and equipment. Petitioners contend that the wording of RA 7227 clearly limits the grant of tax incentives to
the importation of raw materials, capital and equipment only thereby violating the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. He also assailed the constitutionality of EO 97-A for being violative of their right to equal protection.
They asserted that private respondents operating inside the SSEZ are not different from the retail establishments
located outside. The respondent moves to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of legal standing and
unreasonable delay in filing of the petition
Issue:
WON there is a violation of equal protection clause?
Ruling:
NO. The phrase tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment was merely cited as an
example of incentives that may be given to entities operating within the zone. Public respondent SBMA correctly
argued that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius", on which petitioners impliedly rely to support their
restrictive interpretation, does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example.
The petition with respect to declaration of unconstitutionality of EO 97-A cannot be, likewise, sustained. The
guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based which was based on reasonable
classification. A classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinction, (2) be germane to the purpose of
the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. Applying
the foregoing test to the present case, the Court finds no violation of the right to equal protection of the laws. There
is a substantial distinctions lying between the establishments inside and outside the zone.
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Ruling:
The SEF was created by virtue of RA 5447 which defined the activities of DECS that may exclusively be funded, and
which it took effect on 1 January 1969. With the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991, the petitioners
contend that RA 5447 was repealed. Evidently, in the repealing clause of the Code, it expressly repealed only Section
3 of RA 5447. Hence, the provisions allocating funds for the salaries of teachers under Section 1, of R.A. No. 5447,
which are not inconsistent with Sections 272 and 100 (c) of the Local Government Code, remain in force and effect.
Ex necessitate legis
By necessary implication of law
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Ruling:
The construction the trial court placed upon the deed in question is correct by virtue of the legal maxim, falsa
demonstration non nocet, cum de corpore constat. Therefore, the Court ruled that by her deed, Mary Starkey
conveyed to the appellees the fee simple title to the land involved in the case at bar and therefore the appellant
DeLong inherited no part of it at her mothers death.
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Issue:
WON the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in including airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations in the term
firearm in Section 2(b) of RA 8714?
Ruling:
NO. A word of general significance in a stature is to be taken in its ordinary sense and comprehensive sense, unless
it is shown that the word is intended to be given a different or restricted meaning; what is generally spoken shall be
generally understood and general words shall be understood in a general sense.
The term firearm in Resolution No. 8714 was intended for purposes of the gun ban during the election period. The
inclusion of airsoft guns in the term firearm and their resultant coverage by the election gun ban is to avoid the
possible use of recreational guns in sowing fear, intimidation or terror during the election period. An ordinary citizen
may not be able to distinguish between a real gun and an airsoft gun. It is fear subverting the will of a voter, whether
brought about by the use of a real gun or a recreational gun which is sought to be averted.
hoc quidem perquam durum est sed ita lex scripta est
The law may be exceedingly hard, but so the law is written
Facts:
On August 25, 1990, petitioner bought various kinds of jewelry worth P300, 000.00 from Maria Antonia Seguan. She
wrote out a check with the same amount, dated August 25, 1990, payable to cash drawn on Metrobank and gave
the check to Seguan.
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The next day, petitioner again went to Seguans store and purchased jewelry valued at P241,668.00. Petitioner issued
another check payable to cash dated August 16, 1990 drawn on Metrobank in the amount of P241,668.007 and
sent the check to Seguan through a certain Aurelia Nadera.
Seguan deposited the two checks with her bank. The checks were returned with a notice of dishonor. Petitioners
account in the bank from which the checks were drawn was closed.
Upon demand, petitioner promised to pay Seguan the amounts of the two dishonored checks, but she never did.
On June 5, 1991, an Assistant City Prosecutor of Cebu filed with the RTC, Cebu City, Branch 23, two informations
against petitioner for violations of BP No. 22.
After due trial, on December 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision in the two cases convicting petitioner.
Petitioner appealed to the CA, but the same was dismissed by the CA in its October 15, 1996 Decision wherein it
affirmed in toto the RTCs Decision.
Issue:
WON Lim violated B.P. No. 22.
Ruling:
The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are:
(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for
the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
The gravamen of B.P. No. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its
presentment for payment. And the accused failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its
payment within 5 banking days from notice of dishonor. The act is malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to
public welfare. Laws are created to achieve a goal intended and to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief.
Why and to whom the check was issued, and the terms & conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks, are
irrelevant in determining culpability.
Under BP No. 22, one need not prove that the check was issued in payment of an obligation, or that there was
damage.
It was ruled in United States v. Go Chico, that in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated?
When dealing with acts mala prohibita it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with criminal intent.
In many crimes, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial
This case is a perfect example of an act mala prohibita. The first and last elements of the offense are admittedly
present. B.P. No. 22, Section 2 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when
the first and third elements of the offense are present. If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction. To escape
liability, she must prove that the second element was absent. Petitioner failed to rebut this presumption and she
failed to pay the amount of the checks or make arrangement for its payment within 5 banking days from receipt of
notice of dishonor. B.P. No. 22 was clearly violated. Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ita lex scripta est. The law
may be exceedingly hard but so the law is written.
However, the penalty imposed on petitioner must be modified. In Vaca v. Court of Appeals [298 SCRA 658 (1998)],
it was held that in determining the penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. No. 22, the philosophy underlying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law applies. The philosophy is to redeem valuable human material, and to prevent
unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social
order. The prison sentence imposed on petitioners is deleted, and imposed on them only a fine double the amount
of the check issued.
Consequently, the prison sentences imposed on petitioner are deleted. The two fines imposed for each violation,
each amounting to P200,000.00 are appropriate and sufficient. The award of moral damages and order to pay
attorneys fees are deleted for lack of sufficient basis.
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AKBAYAN-YOUTH vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 147066. March 26, 2001
Facts:
On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other youth movements sought the extension of the
registration of voters for the May 2001 elections. The voters registration has already ended on December 27, 2000.
AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons aged 18-21 be allowed a special 2-day registration. The Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) denied the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth the sued COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion for denying
the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth alleged that there are about 4 million youth who were not able to register and are now
disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked Section 8 of Republic Act 8189 which provides that no registration shall be
conducted 120 days before the regular election. AKBAYAN-Youth however counters that under Section 28 of
Republic Act 8436, the COMELEC in the exercise of its residual and stand-by powers, can reset the periods of preelection acts including voters registration if the original period is not observed.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion when it denied the extension of the voters
registration.
Ruling:
No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of Section 8, RA 8189 which
provides that no voters registration shall be conducted within 120 days before the regular election. The right of
suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by measures like voters registration which is not a mere statutory
requirement. Beyond this, it is likewise well-settled that the law does not require that the impossible be done. The
law obliges no one to perform an impossibility, expressed in the maxim, nemo tenetur ad impossible. In other words,
there is no obligation to do an impossible thing. Impossibilium nulla obligatio est. Hence, a statute may not be so
construed as to require compliance with what it prescribes cannot, at the time, be legally, coincidentally, it must be
presumed that the legislature did not at all intend an interpretation or application of a law which is far removed
from the realm of the possible. The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to
safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and
peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed
by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one which is not indifferent and so far removed
from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times. RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in
that RA 8189s provision is explicit as to the prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act that cannot be
reset.
Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration, COMELEC has shown in its pleadings that if it is
allowed, it will substantially create a setback in the other pre-election matters because the additional voters from
the special two day registration will have to be screened, entered into the book of voters, have to be inspected again,
verified, sealed, then entered into the computerized voters list; and then they will have to reprint the voters
information sheet for the update and distribute it by that time, the May 14, 2001 elections would have been
overshot because of the lengthy processes after the special registration. In short, it will cost more inconvenience
than good. Further still, the allegation that youth voters are disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYANYouths pleading was attached any actual complaint from an individual youth voter about any inconvenience arising
from the fact that the voters registration has ended on December 27, 2001. Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in
their pleading that they are asking an extension because they failed to register on time for some reasons, which is
not appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.
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YOLANDA SIGNEY vs SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, EDITHA ESPINOSA-CASTILLO, and GINA SERVANO, represen
tative of GINALYN and RODELYN SIGNEY,
G.R. No. 173582, January 28, 2008
Facts:
Rodolfo Signey, Sr., a member of the SSS, died on 21 May 2001. In his members records, he had designated Yolanda
Signey (petitioner) as primary beneficiary and his four children with her as secondary beneficiaries. On 6 July 2001,
petitioner filed a claim for death benefits with the public respondent SSS.She revealed in her SSS claim that the
deceased had a common-law wife, Gina Servano (Gina), with whom he had two minor children namey, Ginalyn
Servano (Ginalyn), born on 13 April 1996, and Rodelyn Signey (Rodelyn), born on 20 April 2000.
Petitioners declaration was confirmed when Gina herself filed a claim for the same death benefits on 13 July 2001
in which she also declared that both she and petitioner were common-law wives of the deceased and that Editha
Espinosa (Editha) was the legal wife.
In addition, in October 2001, Editha also filed an application for death benefits with the SSS stating that she was the
legal wife of the deceased.
The SSS, through a letter dated 4 December 2001, denied the death benefit claim of petitioner. However, it
recognized Ginalyn and Rodelyn, the minor children of the deceased with Gina, as the primary beneficiaries under
the SSS Law. The SSS also found that the 20 March 1992 marriage between petitioner and the deceased was null and
void because of a prior subsisting marriage contracted on 29 October 1967 between the deceased and Editha, as
confirmed with the Local Civil Registry of Cebu City.
Issue:
Whether petitioner has a superior legal right over the SSS benefits as against the illegitimate minor children of the
deceased.
Ruling:
As to the issue of who has the better right over the SSS death benefits, Section 8(e) and (k) of R. A. No. 8282 is very
clear.
Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282 provides:
SEC. 8. Terms Defined.For the purposes of this Act, the following terms shall, unless the context
indicates otherwise, have the following meanings:
(e) Dependents The dependent shall be the following:
(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;
2) The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not
gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21)
years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and
incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and
3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member.
(k) Beneficiaries The dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent legitimate,
legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries of
the member: Provided, That the dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to fifty percent
(50%) of the share of the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children: Provided, further, That
in the absence of the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children of the member,
his/her dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of the
benefits. In their absence, the dependent parents who shall be the secondary beneficiaries of the
member. In the absence of all of the foregoing, any other person designated by the member as
his/her secondary beneficiary.
SEC. 13. Death Benefits. Upon the death of a member who has paid at least thirty-six (36)
monthly contributions prior to the semester of death, his primary beneficiaries shall be entitled
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to the monthly pension: Provided, That if he has no primary beneficiaries, his secondary
beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to thirty-six (36) times the monthly
pension. If he has not paid the required thirty-six (36) monthly contributions, his primary or
secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to the monthly pension
times the number of monthly contributions paid to the SSS or twelve (12) times the monthly
pension, whichever is higher. (Emphasis supplied).
Hence, we need only apply the law. Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain
meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention), rests
on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent by the
use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or, from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.
27
First, a general grant of power is a grant of every particular and specific power necessary for the exercise of such
general power. Other than powers expressly conferred by law on them, administrative agencies may lawfully
exercise powers that can be reasonably inferred in the wordings of the enabling law.
Second, the grant of a greater power necessarily includes the lesser power. In eo quod plus sit, semper inest et
minus.
The MTRCB has the power to cancel permits for the exhibition or television broadcast of programs determined by
the said body to be objectionable for being "immoral, indecent, contrary to law or good customs x x x." This power
is a power to impose sanctions.
First, a general grant of power is a grant of every particular and specific power necessary for the exercise of such
general power. Other than powers expressly conferred by law on them, administrative agencies may lawfully
exercise powers that can be reasonably inferred in the wordings of the enabling law.
28
29
30
Chapter II, Section 2(Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling
under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction.
Ruling:
Whether or the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27
and she paid her tuition fees; the offense charged was not committed in relation to her office; the funds in question
personally came from President Estrada, not from the government.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa. Relyingon Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those crime scognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that
in hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the
succeeding paragraphs of the said provision. The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should
receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Interpretatio talis inambiguis semper
fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid
inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted.
31
possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved.
Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.
32
Issue:
Whether or not Section 12 of RA 9302 should be applied retroactively in order to entitle Intercity Bank creditors to
surplus dividends.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Statutes are prospective and not retroactive in their operation, they being the
formulation of rules for the future, not the past. Hence, the legal maxim lex de futuro, judex de praeterito the law
provides for the future, the judge for the past, which is articulated in Article 4 of the Civil Code: Laws shall have
no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
The reason for the rule is the tendency of retroactive legislation to be unjust and oppressive on account of its liability
to unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior transactions. Further, a perusal of RA 9302 shows that
nothing indeed therein authorizes its retroactive application. In fact, its effectivity clause indicates a clear legislative
intent to the contrary, Section 28. Effectivity Clause. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following the
completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
33
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. JUDGE PALMA AND ROMULO INTIA Y MORADA
G.R. No. L-44113; March 31, 1977
Facts:
Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was charged with vagrancy. Respondent Judge dismissed the case on
the ground that her court has no jurisdiction to take further cognizance of this case without prejudice to the re-filing
thereof in the Juvenile Court, because he believed that jurisdiction over 16 years olds up to under 21 was transferred
to the Juvenile Court by the issuance of PD 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which defines youthful
offenders as those over 9years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of PD 603 transferred the case of the accused from the regular courts to the Juvenile
Court.
Ruling:
The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court expressly confers upon it a special and limited jurisdiction over criminal
cases wherein the accused is under 16 years of age at the time of the filing of the case. The subsequent issuance of
PD 603 known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code and defines a youth offender as one who is over 9 years of age
but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense did not by such definition transfer jurisdiction over
criminal cases involving accused who are 16 and under 21 years of age from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court.
Maledicta est exposito quae corrumpit textum it is dangerous construction which is against the text.
Noscitur a sociis
Word construed with reference to accompanying or associated words.
34
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word Congress used in Article VIII,
Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. That the framers of the constitution only intended for
one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the legislative. The motion was denied.
35
36
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was granted by COMELEC En Banc in its Resolution dated January
30, 2004. Private Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration for the aforementioned resolution which was
granted by the COMELEC on October 11, 2005. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the October 11, 2005
Resolution but was denied by COMELEC.
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to reverse and set 1) Resolution promulgated on October 11,
2005 and 2) Resolution promulgated on January 5, 2007.
Issue:
Whether or not Public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or without or in excess of jurisdiction in
disregarding the time-honored doctrine of nullum crimen [sine poena], nulla poena sine lege.
Ruling:
Under Section 261 (s) of the Omnibus Election Code, the punishable act is the bearing of arms outside the immediate
vicinity of ones place of work during the election period and not the failure of the head or responsible officer of the
security agency to obtain prior written COMELEC approval.
In any event, there is likewise nothing in R.A. 7166 that expressly penalizes the mere failure to secure written
authority from the COMELEC as required in Section 32 thereof. Such failure to secure an authorization must still be
accompanied by other operative acts, such as the bearing, carrying or transporting of firearms in public places during
the election period. All told, petitioner should be absolved of any criminal liability, consistent with the doctrine of
nullum crimen [sine peona], nulla poena sine lege - there is no crime when there is no law punishing it. Thus, the
Court finds that respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned Resolutions.
WHEREFORE, The Resolutions of the COMELEC En Banc issued on October 11, 2005 and January 5, 2007 in Election
Case No. 01-130 are hereby reversed and set aside.
37
Whether or not the Writ of Execution rendered by respondent Judge Villasor is valid.
Ruling:
No. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. It is a fundamental
concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from the suit unless it gives consent
because there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends
nullum tempus occurit regi. The State may not be sued without its consent. A corollary, both dictated by logic and
sound sense from such a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even
if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. Disbursements of public
funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law.
LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS HOMEOWNERS (SOUTH) ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 117188; August 7, 1997
Facts:
Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc. (LGVHAI) was organized as the association of homeowners
and residents of the Loyola Grand Villas. It was organized by the developer of the subdivision and its first president
was Victorio V. Soliven, himself the owner of the developer. For unknown reasons, however, LGVHAI did not file its
corporate by-laws. The officers of the LGVHAI tried to register its by-laws. They failed to do so. To the officers
consternation, they discovered that there were two other organizations within the subdivision the North
Association and the South Association. When one of the officers inquired about the status of LGVHAI, the head of
the legal department of the HIGC, informed him that LGVHAI had been automatically dissolved for two reasons. First,
it did not submit its by-laws within the period required by the Corporation Code and, second, there was non-user of
corporate charter because HIGC had not received any report on the associations activities.
Issue:
Whether or not the LGVHAIs failure to file its by-laws within the period prescribed by Section 46 of the Corporation
Code had the effect of automatically dissolving the said corporation?
Ruling:
No. Taken as a whole and under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself (optima statuli
interpretatix est ipsum statutum), Section 46 reveals the legislative intent to attach a directory, and not mandatory,
meaning for the word must in the first sentence thereof.
Note should be taken of the second paragraph of the law which allows the filing of the by-laws even prior to
incorporation. This provision in the same section of the Code rules out mandatory compliance with the requirement
of filing the by-laws within one (1) month after receipt of official notice of the issuance of its certificate of
incorporation by the Securities and Exchange Commission. It necessarily follows that failure to file the by-laws
within that period does not imply the demise of the corporation. By-laws may be necessary for the government
of the corporation but these are subordinate to the articles of incorporation as well as to the Corporation Code and
related statutes.
There can be no automatic corporate dissolution simply because the incorporators failed to abide by the required
filing of by-laws embodied in Section 46 of the Corporation Code. There is no outright demise of corporate
existence. Proper notice and hearing are cardinal components of due process in any democratic institution, agency
or society. In other words, the incorporators must be given the chance to explain their neglect or omission and
38
remedy the same. Non-filing of the by-laws will not result in automatic dissolution of the corporation. In fact, under
the rules and regulations of the SEC, failure to file the by-laws on time may be penalized merely with the imposition
of an administrative fine without affecting the corporate existence of the erring firm.
Pari Materia
Relating to the same matter
39
The respondent judge interpreted the word "penalties" in phrase "subject to the same penalties", as administrative
fines, not penalties imposed for a criminal offense, by a court of justice after proper criminal proceedings. In this
sense, "penalties" would have reference to fines to be imposed in cases of improper or incorrect collection of the
tax with respect to the amount and to the time of payment thereof, not as penalties imposed on acts considered as
criminal offenses under the law.
Issue:
Is the word "penalties" found in Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 5448 refers to "administrative" penalties?
Ruling:
No, the word "penalties" found in Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 5448 refers to "administrative" penalties.
The penalties mentioned in the phrase "subject to the same penalties" would then refer to Sec. 240 of the NIRC,
which are for specific offenses enumerated therein, thereby investing Republic Act 5448 with the character of
completeness, not that of incompleteness which would be against all reasonable presumptions as to how the
legislative body performs its functions.
With the certainty in the mind of the Court that the legislative body, in enacting Republic Act 5448 and relating it to
the documentary stamp tax provisions of the NIRC in the manner it did, intended to make the later law as effective
and fool-proof as the earlier statute, considering their kindred aims and objectives, and therefore are in pari materia
with each other, We have no hesitation in adopting the construction of Sec. 4 of Republic Act 5448 as providing
penalties for the same acts as those enumerated in Sec. 240 of the NIRC 4 Which clearly include those charged in
the information filed against private respondents. It may even be more accurate to say that more than just statutes
in pari materia with each other, Republic Act 5448 is an amplification of the NIRC, as may be gleaned from the
provisions of Sec. 4 of Republic Act 5448 which states that "in addition to the documentary stamp taxes imposed
under Sections 211 to 235 of Commonwealth Act No. 466, as amended, otherwise known as the National Internal
Revenue Code, there are hereby imposed science stamp taxes, etc." The second paragraph of the same Section 4
which provides that "that tax imposed herein shall be ... subject to the same penalties as the documentary stamp
imposed under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended," should, accordingly, be interpreted as referring
to the penalties imposed for the prohibited acts specified in Sec. 240 of the NIRC, designed to protect the integrity
of both kind of stamp taxes, for the full attainment of the purpose and aim of both statutes as revenue measures,
and prevent any form of subversion thereof.
40
41
The Court declared spouses Legaspi as the true and rightful owners of the property in litigation.
As the Court held in Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals "it is essential that the buyer of realty must act in good faith in
registering his deed of sale to merit the protection of the second paragraph of Article 1544." As the writer stressed
in his concurring opinion therein, "The governing principle here is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger
in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except only as
provided by the Civil Code and that is where the second buyer first registers in good faith the second sale ahead of
the first. Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar her from availing of her rights under the law, among them,
to register first her purchase as against the second buyer. But in converso knowledge gained by the second buyer of
the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior
registration with bad faith. This is the price exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second buyer being able
to displace the first buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain priority over the first, he must show that he
acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyer's rights) from the time of
acquisition until the title is transferred to him by registration or failing registration, by delivery of possession. The
second buyer must show continuing good faith and innocence or lack of knowledge of the first sale until his contract
ripens into full ownership through prior registration as provided by law."
42
The respondent as an entity is exempt from internal revenue laws and regulations. This exemption covers both direct
and indirect taxes, stemming from the very nature of the VAT as a tax on consumption, for which the direct liability
is imposed on one person but the indirect burden is passed on to another. Respondent, as an exempt entity, can
neither be directly charged for the VAT on its sales nor indirectly made to bear, as added cost to such sales, the
equivalent VAT on its purchases. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. Where the law does not
distinguish, we ought not to distinguish.
Republic Act No. 7916 (RA 7916) states that "no taxes, local and national, shall be imposed on business
establishments operating within the ecozone." Since this law does not exclude the VAT from the prohibition, it is
deemed included. Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis. An exception confirms the rule in cases not
excepted; that is, a thing not being excepted must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule.
Moreover, even though the VAT is not imposed on the entity but on the transaction, it may still be passed on and,
therefore, indirectly imposed on the same entity -- a patent circumvention of the law. That no VAT shall be imposed
directly upon business establishments operating within the ecozone under RA 7916 also means that no VAT may be
passed on and imposed indirectly. Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo prohibetur et per obliquum. When anything
is prohibited directly, it is also prohibited indirectly.
To summarize, special laws expressly grant preferential tax treatment to business establishments registered and
operating within an ecozone, which by law is considered as a separate customs territory. As such, respondent is
exempt from all internal revenue taxes, including the VAT, and regulations pertaining thereto. It has opted for the
income tax holiday regime, instead of the 5 percent preferential tax regime. As a matter of law and procedure, its
registration status entitling it to such tax holiday can no longer be questioned. Its sales transactions intended for
export may not be exempt, but like its purchase transactions, they are zero-rated. No prior application for the
effective zero rating of its transactions is necessary. Being VAT-registered and having satisfactorily complied with all
the requisites for claiming a tax refund of or credit for the input VAT paid on capital goods purchased, respondent is
entitled to such VAT refund or credit.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK
G.R. No. 5876
September 1, 1911
Facts:
On about July 27, 1901, the defendant, The Standard Oil Company of New York, imported into the Philippine Islands
30,000 cases of refined petroleum which contained approximately 300,000 gallons. That same day, the defendant
company presented to the Bureau of Customs of this city an affidavit setting forth that the said 30,000 cases of
refined petroleum had been sold by the former to the commissary department of the United States Army in Manila,
and that the said company retained no interest therein.
From August 7 to October 28, 1901, the defendant company removed from its warehouse the 30,000 cases there
deposited, which it did with the authorization of the customs authorities of the port of Manila, upon the express
representation of the duly authorized agents of the defendant that the withdrawal of the said cases was for their
delivery to the commissary department of the United States Army and for the exclusive use of the said Army, in
conformity with the terms of the privilege of free entry granted thereto.
But, of the 30,000 cases, only 10,679 were actually delivered to the commissary department of the United States
Army, and the remaining 19,321 cases, which contained 193,210 gallons of refined petroleum, equivalent to
608,321.685 kilograms, were, free of customs duties, sold to private parties; the Government of the Philippine
43
Islands, as alleged by the plaintiff, being, by these deceitful and fraudulent means, defrauded of the tax or duty
which the defendant company should have paid upon the said cases.
As prescribed by Section 30 of the Provisional Customs Tariff, then in force in the Philippine Islands, the duty
chargeable was 6.318 pesos Mexican currency for each 100 kilograms; so that, for the 608,321.685 kilograms, the
defendant company was indebted in the sum of 38,433.76 pesos Mexican currency which, at the exchange of one
dollar for each 2 pesos in Mexican currency, make exactly 38,433.76 pesos in Philippine currency.
The Government of the Philippine Islands demands of The Standard Oil Company of New York the payment of Php
38,433.76, together with the interest thereon due from October 28, 1901, and the costs and expenses occasioned
by this suit, by reason of the customs duties payable by the defendant company,
Issue:
Is the defendant company liable to pay the obligation?
Ruling:
Yes, the defendant company is liable to pay the obligation.
The intention and will of the legislator being so clear, so explicit, to approve, confirm, and ratify as by an act of his
own prior to April 11, 1899, and even also to July 12, 1898 (the date of the order of the President), the acts of the
latter and of the officials of the Government of these Islands, with respect to "the collection of all the said duties
prior to March 8, 1902," and also with regard to "the import and export duties levied by the authorities of the United
States or of the provisional military government of the same in the Philippine Islands prior to March 8, 1902"two
subjects that are the purpose of the said Act, it being an axiom of law, that the ratification is equivalent to a mandate
(ratihabitio aequiparatur mandato), the conclusion cannot be avoided that, by the legislators will, the tariff duties
demandable during the period mentioned in the complaint, are so, not by a null and void order of the President, but
by an Act of Congress. Such, and no other, is for the courts the status of the established law in this matter, be
whatever it may, in abstract law, the legality of the legislative act concerned, for there is no question pending before
us with respect to its constitutionality. We do not treat of the question in this brief, says the appellant, as we do not
consider it necessary to do so."
Ratio Legis
Interpretation according to the spirit
44
Ruling:
No, Grand Christmas Bonus Award does not constitute a lottery or a gift enterprise.
There is no statutory definition of the terms "lottery" and "gift enterprise". This Court, in the case of "El Debate" Inc.
vs. Topacio, supra, referring to lottery, said:
... while countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the authoritative one for this jurisdiction is that of the
United States Supreme Court, in analogous cases having to do with the power of the United States Postmaster
General, viz: The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing,
gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a
lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance (Horner vs. United States [1902] 147 U.S. 449; Public
Clearing House vs. Coyne [1903] 194 U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart and Singson [1915] 30 Phil. 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker
[1917] 36 Phil. 395; U.S. Vs. Baguio [1919] 39 Phil. 962: Valhalla Hotel Construction Company vs. Carmona, p. 233,
ante.)
Thus, for lottery to exist, three elements must concur, namely: consideration, prize, and chance.
In the instant case, as stated by the lower court, the prizes offered by Uy were to be taken from his share in the
agent's prize, which was 10% of the amount of the prize won by each ticket sold. Therefore, since none of the prizes
(awards and bonuses) offered in Uy's plan were to come directly from the aggregate price of the sweepstakes tickets
sold by Uy, as a part thereof, no consideration exists for the chance to win said prizes, there being no "contribution
in kind to the fund or property to be distributed."
Even in the light of the mischief or evil sought to be redressed by the Postal Law, or the ratio legis, Uy's scheme
cannot be condemned as a lottery. It is merely a scheme set up to promote the sale of tickets for the Grand Christmas
Sweepstakes Draw held on December 15, 1963. Should any question be raised it would be: whether or not
sweepstakes draws cultivate or stimulate the gambling spirit among the people. It should be so, because it cannot
be doubted that sweepstakes tickets purchasers are induced to buy said tickets because of the desire to win any of
the substantial prizes offered by the PCSO. This question, however, is at once rendered moot and academic because
sweepstakes draws are authorized by law.
45
To enforce her right as prevailing party, Villasi filed a Motion for Execution of the November 20, 2000 Court of
Appeals Decision, which was favorably acted upon by the RTC. A Writ of Execution was issued on April 28, 2004,
commanding the Sheriff to execute and make effective the November 20, 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals.
To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied on a building located at No. 140 Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, covered
by Tax Declaration No. D-021-01458, and built in the lots registered under Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 379193
and 379194. While the building was declared for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI, the lots in which it was
erected were registered in the names of the Spouses Filomeno Garcia and Ermelinda Halili-Garcia (Spouses Garcia).
After the mandatory posting and publication of notice of sale on execution of real property were complied with, a
public auction was scheduled on January 25, 2006.
To forestall the sale on execution, the Spouses Garcia filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim and a Motion to Set Aside
Notice of Sale on Execution, claiming that they are the lawful owners of the property which was erroneously levied
upon by the sheriff.
Issue:
Are the Spouses Garcia the lawful owners of the property?
Ruling:
Yes, the Spouses Garcia are the lawful owners of the property.
Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless,
they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder
has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests
not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the
State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such
an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
It likewise failed to escape our attention that FGCI is in actual possession of the building and as the payment of taxes
coupled with actual possession of the land covered by tax declaration strongly supports a claim of ownership. Quite
significantly, all the court processes in an earlier collection suit between FGCI and Villasi were served, thru the
formers representative Filomeno Garcia, at No. 140 Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, where the subject property is
located. This circumstance is consistent with the tax declaration in the name of FGCI.
The explanation proffered by the Spouses Garcia, that the City Assessor merely committed an error when it declared
the property for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI, appears to be suspect in the absence of any prompt and
serious effort on their part to have it rectified before the onset of the instant controversy. The correction of entry
belatedly sought by the Spouses Garcia is indicative of its intention to put the property beyond the reach of the
judgment creditor. Every prevailing party to a suit enjoys the corollary right to the fruits of the judgment and, thus,
court rules provide a procedure to ensure that every favorable judgment is fully satisfied. It is almost trite to say that
execution is the fruit and end of the suit. Hailing it as the "life of the law," ratio legis est anima, this Court has
zealously guarded against any attempt to thwart the rigid rule and deny the prevailing litigant his right to savour the
fruit of his victory. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty triumph for the prevailing party.
The rule on accession is not an iron-clad dictum. On instances where this Court was confronted with cases requiring
judicial determination of the ownership of the building separate from the lot, it never hesitated to disregard such
rule. The case at bar is of similar import. When there are factual and evidentiary evidence to prove that the building
and the lot on which it stands are owned by different persons, they shall be treated separately. As such, the building
or the lot, as the case may be, can be made liable to answer for the obligation of its respective owner.
46
47
Facts:
Executive Order No. 626-A (E. O. 626-A) prohibits the inter-provincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering
of carabaos. Any carabao or carabeef transported in violation of E.O. 626-A shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the governmentt, to be distributed to charitable institutions as Chairman of National Meat Inspection
may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the
case of carabao.
On January 13, 1984, Restituto Ynot transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same
was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A.
Issue:
Is Executive Order No. 626-A constitutional?
Ruling:
No, Executive Order No. 626-A is not constitutional.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed
with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our
judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty
to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by
the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two
hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be
secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process
clause into a worn and empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted
exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such
presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact
ultimately presumed therefrom. There are instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of
these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed
on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials,
contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of
a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has
fled. Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect
the public morals. In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in
view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear
and present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is
restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty
and property for the promotion of the general welfare. By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public
needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent
powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed
in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead from the
womb to beyond the tomb in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous
48
and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public
welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the
venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the
subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.
The Court finds that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed
to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense
and is immediately condemned and punished.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them
whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is
embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and
fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not
afraid to assert them.
The Court declared Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
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Mere surplusage does not amount to duplicity, and where a count charges one offense, and defectively charges
another, the latter charge may be rejected as surplusage. . . . (Ruling Case Law, volume 14, par. 40 page 196, and the
cases therein cited.)
It cannot therefore be held, that in the complaint in question two crimes are charged and that the phrase used in
the said complaint, "by means of deceit and promise of marriage," which can be considered as superfluous because
in the complaint Julian Santiago is accused of the crime of qualified seduction, has vitiated the complaint with a
nullity, and that the lower court has committed an error in overruling the second ground of the demurrer interposed
to the said complaint by the counsel for the defense.
The acts proven at the trial constitute the crime of qualified seduction prescribed and punished by Article 443, par.
1 of the Penal Code. The guilt of the accused as the author of the said crime having been proven without the
concurrence of any modifying circumstance, the penalty imposed upon said accused in its medium degree, such as
has been imposed upon him by the trial court in the judgment appealed from, is property, although the accused
should also be condemned to recognize and maintain the offspring which his illicit relations with the said girl would
produce.
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resumed on January 24, 1966 at 10:00 AM. The petitioner therefore concludes that Congress has been in continuous
session without interruption since January 17.
Issue:
1. Whether or not, the petitioners contention regarding the next adjournment of Congress specifically provides for
regular session only.
2. Whether or not, the petitioners contention that Congress is still in continuous session?
Ruling:
1. NO. The phrase until the next adjournment of Congress does not make any reference to specific session of
Congress, whether regular or special. But a well-know Latin maxim is statutory construction stated that when the
law does not distinguish we should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. It is safe to
conclude that the authors of the 1935 Constitution used the word adjournment had in mind either regular or
special and not simply the regular one as the petitioner contended.
2. NO. The mere fact that the Senate adjourned sine die at midnight of January 22, 1966, the House of the
Representative is only a part of the Congress and not the Congress itself. So logically, the adjournment of one of its
Houses is considered adjournment of the Congress as a whole. And the petitioners ad interim appointment must
have been lapsed on January 22, 1966 upon adjournment of the Senate.
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R (ON THE APPLICATION OF ST (ERITREA)) (FC) vs. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Facts:
The appellant is of Eritrean nationality. But she has never lived in Eritrea. She was born on 2 July 1981 and was
formerly resident in Ethiopia. She came to the United Kingdom on 3 July 1998. Immediately on her arrival in this
country she claimed protection as a refugee. Her reason was that she feared persecution in both Eritrea and Ethiopia.
Her claim was registered, and she was granted temporary admission into the United Kingdom under paragraph 21
of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971.
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The appellants status has not changed since the date of her arrival more than 13 years ago. Her temporary
admission has been extended from time to time, and she remains liable to detention. The latest notification of
temporary admission was issued to her on 17 October 2011. She was told that she must reside at the address given
on the notification form and she was to report to an immigration official on 22 December 2011 and then on the
fourth Thursday every two months. She was also told that she was not allowed to work or engage in any business
unless she had been explicitly granted permission to do so.
Issue:
Whether the appellant is entitled to the protection of article 32 of the Convention, which precludes the contracting
states from expelling a refugee who is lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national security or public
order.
Ruling:
For these reasons, I am not persuaded that there are sound grounds for departing from my provisional view that the
word lawfully in article 32(1) must be taken to refer to what is to be treated as lawful according to the domestic
laws of the contracting state. I think, in agreement with the Court of Appeal and with Lord Dyson, that this is what
the framers of the Convention intended by the use of this word in this context. I would dismiss the appeal.
Mr Drabble did not seek to rely on Lord Browns observations in Szoma v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions
[2006] 1 AC 564, para 24, that in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Bugdacay [1987] AC 514 Lord
Bridge has decided the case of In re Musisi rightly but for the wrong reasons, and that the term refugee in article
32(1) of the Refugee Convention must be taken to mean someone who has been determined to have satisfied the
article 1 definition of that term. I think that he was right not to do so. The ancient maxim verba accipienda sunt
secundum subjectam materiam (words are to be understood according to the subject-matter with which they deal)
provides the best guide to the meaning that should be given to what Lord Brown said in this paragraph.
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINE REPRESENTATIVE BY LCP NATIONAL PRESIDENT JERRY P. TRENAS, ET
AL.
GR. No. 176951 GR. No. 177499 GR. No. 178056
Facts:
These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the
Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Trenas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen laws, each
converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city and seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from
conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws. The supreme court en banc, by a majority vote, struck down the
subject 16 Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause.
On 31 March 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, again by a majority vote, denied the respondents first motion for
reconsideration. On 28 April 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a split vote, denied the respondents second
motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether the subject 16 Cityhood Laws is a violation of the Constitution.
Ruling:
Yes! Its final. The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities
covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also
complied with the requirements of the [Local Government Code] LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No.
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9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this
Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly
recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress, the SC said. The Court stressed that Congress clearly
intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of RA 9009,
which imposes a higher income requirement of PhP100 million for the creation of cities. The Court reiterated that
while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of
several municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that RA 9009 took effect on June
30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent to exempt the municipalities
covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress
before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on the said Joint
Resolution. Even so, the House readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress,
and forwarded the same for approval to the Senate, which again failed to prove it. Eventually, the conversion bills
of respondents were individually filed in the Lower House and fellesters.blogspot.com were all unanimously and
favorably voted upon. When forwarded to the Senate, the bills were also unanimously approved. The acts of both
Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the
express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage
of RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and, by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the
express exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses. The Court held that the imposition of the income
requirement of P100 million from local sources under RA 9009 was arbitrary. While the Constitution mandates that
the creation of local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to
insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such amendment imminently
producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside
development, and the concomitant national growth. In fact, any interpretation that runs counter with the legislative
intent is unacceptable and invalid. Verba intentioni, non e contra debent inservire. Words ought to be more
subservient to the intent than intent to the words.
Verba legis
Plain-meaning rule.
REPUBLIC v. LACAP
G.R. No. 158253; March 2, 2007
Facts:
Case is a petition for certoriari, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed,with modifications,
ruling by the RTC granting the complaint for Specific Performance anddamages filed by Lacap against RP
Dist. Eng. Of Pampanga issued an invitation to bid dated Jan 27, 1992 where Lacap and twoother contractors were
pre-qualified
Being the lowest bidder, Lacap won the bid for concreting of a certain baranggay, andthereafter undertook the
works and purchased materials and labor in connection with
On Oct 29, 1992, Office of the Dist. Eng conducted final investigation of end product and fountit 100% completed
according to specs. Lacap thereafter sought the payment of the DPWH
DPWH withheld payment on the grounds that the CoA disapproved final release of funds dueto Lacaps license as
contractor having expired
Dist. Eng sought the opinion of DPWH legal. Legal then responded to Dist. Eng that theContractors License Law (RA
4566) does not provide that a contract entered into by acontractor after expiry of license is void and that there is no
law that expressly prohibits or declares void such a contract
DPWH Legal Dept, through Dir III Cesar Mejia, issued First Indorsement on July 20 1994recommending that
payment be made to Lacap. Despite such recommendation, no paymentwas issued
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On July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damagesagainst petitioner before
the RTC.14
On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed aMotion to Dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of actionand that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
nature of the action since respondent did notappeal to the COA the decision of the District Auditor to disapprove
the claim.
Following the submission of respondents Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, the RTC issued an Order dated March
11, 1996 denying the Motion to Dismiss. The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 but it was likewise denied
by the RTC in its Order dated May 23, 1996.
On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the defenses of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
and the doctrine of non-suability of the State
Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 a decision ordering DPWH to pay Lacap for the contract of
the project, 12% interest from demand until fully paid, and the costs of the suit
CA affirmed the decision but lowered interest to 6%
Issue:
Whether or not a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects
Ruling:
A contractor with an expired license is entitled payment for completed projects, but does not exonerate him from
corresponding fines thereof. Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides:
SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts to submit a bid to
construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a supervisory capacity of a construction
work within the purview of this Act, without first securing a license to engage in the business of contracting in this
country; or who shall present or file the license certificate of another, give false evidence of any kind to the Board,
or any member thereof in obtaining a certificate or license, impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked
certificate or license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine
of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos.
The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are
clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered into by a contractor whose license had
already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus, respondent
should be paid for the projects he completed. Such payment, however, is without prejudice to the payment of the
fine prescribed under the law.
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It declared that the subject lot legally belongs to the Government of the Philippines. Wherefore, the petition for
review was denied.
Petitioners and respondent filed separate motions for reconsideration, each assailing a different aspect of the
decision.
Issue:
Petitioners, in their MR vigorously argue that:
The majority decision unduly deprives petitioners of their property without due process of law and in a manner
shocking to good conscience; in invalidating the sale to the late Tomas Alonso, the ponencia unfairly deviated from
established doctrine, using as basis factual findings either unsupported by the evidence or contradicted by the
appellate courts findings of fact; the core issues of fraud and want of jurisdiction afflicting the reconstitution of
respondent Cebu Country Clubs title were not squarely and frontally met, to the prejudice and damage of the
petitioners; and the dissenting opinion deserves a second hard look as it presents a more balanced, sober, factually
accurate, and juridically precise approach to the critical issues of this case, including prescription and
laches.Respondents, in their MR staunchly assails the decision insofar as it declared that that the subject land legally
belongs to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Moreover: The Torrens Certificate of Title of
respondent, covering subject lot cannot be collaterally attacked and nullified in this case at bar.
Ruling:
IN VIEW THEREOF, we DENY with finality the separate motions for reconsideration of the petitioners and respondent.
Tomas Alonso had caused the reconstitution of his title on a Lot which is adjacent to the disputed property, and yet
petitioners failed to show that Tomas Alonso exerted the same effort to reconstitute his alleged title to the subject
property. As successors-in-interest, petitioners merely stepped into the shoes of Tomas Alonso. They cannot claim
a right greater than that of their predecessor.
Moreover, it cannot be over-accentuated that Tomas Alonso, petitioners predecessor-in-interest, never asserted
any claim of ownership over the disputed property during his lifetime. When he was alive, Tomas Alonso did not
exert any effort to have the title of the disputed property reconstituted in his name or seek recovery thereof from
the respondent which was in possession since 1931
On the part of respondent, it failed to shed light on how its predecessor in interest, United Services Country Club,
Inc., acquired its title. Surprisingly, there is not even one evidence to show when and how its predecessor in interest,
United Services Country Club, Inc., acquired the property from anybody.
Respondent relies solely on its reconstituted title which, by itself, does not determine or resolve the ownership of
the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. The reconstitution of a title is simply the re-issuance of a lost duplicate
certificate of title in its original form and condition. It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land
covered by the lost or destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title, by itself does not vest
ownership of the land or estate covered thereby.
Furthermore, the declaration in the Courts judgment that the subject property belongs to the Government is not
an offshoot of a collateral attack on respondents title. The validity of the reconstitution of title to the land in
question was directly in dispute, and the proceedings before the trial court was in the nature of a direct attack on
the legality of respondents title.
Neither may the rewards of prescription be successfully invoked by respondent, as it is an iron-clad dictum that
prescription can never lie against the Government. Since respondent failed to present the paper trail of the
propertys conversion to private property, the lengthy possession and occupation of the disputed land by respondent
cannot be counted in its favor, as the subject property being a friar land, remained part of the patrimonial property
of the Government. Possession of patrimonial property of the Government, whether spanning decades or centuries,
cannot ipso facto ripen into ownership. Their claims can hardly evoke judicial compassion. Vigilantibus et non
dormientibus jura subveniunt. "If eternal vigilance is the price of safety, one cannot sleep on ones right for more
than a tenth of a century and expect it to be preserved in its pristine purity"
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