Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 127406

November 27, 2000

OFELIA P. TY, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July 24, 1996, of the Court of Appeals in C.A.
G.R. CV 37897, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring
the marriage contract between private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia P. Ty null
and void ab initio. It also ordered private respondent to pay P15,000.00 as monthly support for their
children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes.
As shown in the records of the case, private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a
civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 27, 1977.
However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their
marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding on August 27,
1977, was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed
Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court
of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160,
praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had no marriage
license when they got married. He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was still
married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his
marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was
rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim that their
marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted their Marriage License No.
5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A. He did not question this
document when it was submitted in evidence. Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which declared null and void his
civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his church marriage
to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents were submitted as evidence during trial
and, according to petitioner, are therefore deemed sufficient proof of the facts therein. The fact that
the civil marriage of private respondent and petitioner took place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment
declaring his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed. It also appears indisputable that private
respondent and petitioner had a church wedding ceremony on April 4, 1982.1

The Pasig RTC sustained private respondents civil suit and declared his marriage to herein petitioner
null and void ab initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both parties appealed to respondent
Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision. It ruled that
a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a
subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. Said the appellate court:
We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by defendants counsel that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. It does not say, however, that a second
marriage may proceed even without a judicial decree. While it is true that if a marriage is null and void,
ab initio, there is in fact no subsisting marriage, we are unwilling to rule that the matter of whether a
marriage is valid or not is for each married spouse to determine for himself for this would be the
consequence of allowing a spouse to proceed to a second marriage even before a competent court
issues a judicial decree of nullity of his first marriage. The results would be disquieting, to say the least,
and could not have been the intendment of even the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code on
marriage.
xxx
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We modify the appealed Decision in this wise:
1. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein private respondent] Eduardo
M. Reyes and defendant-appellant [herein petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared null and
void ab initio;
2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give monthly support in the
amount of P15,000.00 to his children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes from
November 4, 1991; and
3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this instant petition asserting that the Court
of Appeals erred:
I.
BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION, IN REQUIRING FOR THE
VALIDITY OF PETITIONERS MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT, A JUDICIAL DECREE
NOT REQUIRED BY LAW.
II
IN THE RESOLUTION, IN APPLYING THE RULING IN DOMINGO VS. COURT OF
APPEALS.
III
IN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT CONSIDERING THE CIVIL
EFFECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS RATIFICATION WHICH USED THE SAME
MARRIAGE LICENSE.

IV
IN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO THE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before
a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly? To resolve this question, we shall go over
applicable laws and pertinent cases to shed light on the assigned errors, particularly the first and the
second which we shall discuss jointly.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared the marriage of petitioner to private
respondent null and void for lack of a prior judicial decree of nullity of the marriage between private
respondent and Villanueva. The appellate court rejected petitioners claim that People v. Mendoza3
and People v. Aragon4 are applicable in this case. For these cases held that where a marriage is void
from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity. But the appellate court
said these cases, decided before the enactment of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209 as amended by
E.O No. 227), no longer control. A binding decree is now needed and must be read into the provisions
of law previously obtaining.5
In refusing to consider petitioners appeal favorably, the appellate court also said:
Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is mandatory precedent for this case.
Although decided by the High Court in 1992, the facts situate it within the regime of the now-repealed
provisions of the Civil Code, as in the instant case.
xxx
For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. . . .6
At the outset, we must note that private respondents first and second marriages contracted in 1977
and 1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. The present case differs
significantly from the recent cases of Bobis v. Bobis7 and Mercado v. Tan,8 both involving a criminal
case for bigamy where the bigamous marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the Family
Code,9 under which a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is clearly required.
Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive,
or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and before any person believed to be so by the spouse present at
the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of
the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.

As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains
no express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however, appears to be conflicting.
Originally, in People v. Mendoza,10 and People v. Aragon,11 this Court held that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved the same factual milieu.
Accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. After the death of
his first wife, accused contracted a third marriage during the subsistence of the second marriage. The
second wife initiated a complaint for bigamy. The Court acquitted accused on the ground that the
second marriage is void, having been contracted during the existence of the first marriage. There is
no need for a judicial declaration that said second marriage is void. Since the second marriage is void,
and the first one terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two subsisting valid marriages.
Hence, there can be no bigamy. Justice Alex Reyes dissented in both cases, saying that it is not for
the spouses but the court to judge whether a marriage is void or not.
In Gomez v. Lipana,12 and Consuegra v. Consuegra,13 however, we recognized the right of the second
wife who entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in their acquired estate and in proceeds of
the retirement insurance of the husband. The Court observed that although the second marriage can
be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still
there was a need for judicial declaration of such nullity (of the second marriage). And since the death
of the husband supervened before such declaration, we upheld the right of the second wife to share
in the estate they acquired, on grounds of justice and equity.14
But in Odayat v. Amante (1977),15 the Court adverted to Aragon and Mendoza as precedents. We
exonerated a clerk of court of the charge of immorality on the ground that his marriage to Filomena
Abella in October of 1948 was void, since she was already previously married to one Eliseo Portales
in February of the same year. The Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of void marriages. This ruling was affirmed in Tolentino v. Paras.16
Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986),17 the Court held that there is a need for a judicial declaration
of nullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In 1978, she married another
man, Wiegel. Wiegel filed a petition with the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to declare his marriage
to Lilia as void on the ground of her previous valid marriage. The Court, expressly relying on
Consuegra, concluded that:18
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband
at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this
Court a judicial declaration (citing Consuegra) of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she
would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent
Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID
under the law. (Emphasis supplied).
In Yap v. Court of Appeals,19 however, the Court found the second marriage void without need of
judicial declaration, thus reverting to the Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon rulings.
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. Our rulings in
Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code.20 Article
40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

In Terre v. Terre (1992)21 the Court, applying Gomez, Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that
a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary. Thus, we disbarred a lawyer for
contracting a bigamous marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. He claimed that his first
marriage in 1977 was void since his first wife was already married in 1968. We held that Atty. Terre
should have known that the prevailing case law is that "for purposes of determining whether a person
is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and
void ab initio is essential."
The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals (1993),22 the Court
held:
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law
for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. (Family Code, Art. 40; See also arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148).23
However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the case. In
Apiag v. Cantero, (1997)24 the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into
a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced into
marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied
Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second marriage took place and all the children
thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there
is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence
at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979,
before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first
marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for
judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we
conclude that private respondents second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present
case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison
v. Court of Appeals,25 the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested
rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent.
Additionally, we are not quite prepared to give assent to the appellate courts finding that despite
private respondents "deceit and perfidy" in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from
her silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein
petitioner married private respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in the civil
ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as
untruthful private respondents allegation that he wed petitioner but they lacked a marriage license.
Indeed we find there was a marriage license, though it was the same license issued on April 3, 1979
and used in both the civil and the church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of
their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it refused to recognize the
validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed
to raise this matter as affirmative defense during trial. She argues that such failure does not prevent
the appellate court from giving her defense due consideration and weight. She adds that the interest
of the State in protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution, outweighs such
technicality. In our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the essential and
formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the first of the two

ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract
from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for we
hold that the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first. The appellate court might
have its reasons for brushing aside this possible defense of the defendant below which undoubtedly
could have tendered a valid issue, but which was not timely interposed by her before the trial court.
But we are now persuaded we cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of letting the wrongdoer
profit from what the CA calls "his own deceit and perfidy."
On the matter of petitioners counterclaim for damages and attorneys fees. Although the appellate
court admitted that they found private respondent acted "duplicitously and craftily" in marrying
petitioner, it did not award moral damages because the latter did not adduce evidence to support her
claim.26
1wphi1

Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no damages should be awarded in the present case,
but for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting.
She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from
her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental
anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Should
we grant her prayer, we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from
conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not
common sense, militates against such incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an action
for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation.27 There are
other remedies.28
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July
24, 1996 and its Resolution dated November 7, 1996, are reversed partially, so that the marriage of
petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is hereby DECLARED VALID AND
SUBSISTING; and the award of the amount of P15,000.00 is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly
support to their two children, Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes, for as long as they are of
minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
See also Tison vs. CA, 276 SCRA 582, 593 (1997); Quebral vs. CA, 252 SCRA 353,
365 (1996); Son vs. Son, 251 SCRA 556, 564 (1995); re proof of facts cited.
1

Rollo, pp. 48-52.

45 Phil 739 (1954).

100 SCRA 1033 (1957).

Rollo, p. 47.

Rollo, p. 49.

G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000.

G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000. In his dissenting and concurring opinion, Justice
Vitug opined that the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage for
the purpose of remarriage should be held to refer merely to cases where it can be said
that a marriage, at least ostensibly, had taken place. No such judicial declaration of
nullity, in his view, should still be deemed essential when the "marriage," for instance,
is between persons of the same sex or when either or both parties had not at all given
consent to the marriage. Indeed, it is likely that Article 40 of the Family Code has been
meant and intended to refer only to marriages declared void under the provisions of
Articles 35, 36, 37, 38 and 53 thereof.
8

E.O. No. 209, which took effect on August 3, 1988.

10

45 Phil 739 (1954).

11

100 SCRA 1033 (1957).

12

33 SCRA 614 (1970).

13

37 SCRA 315 (1971).

14

See also Lao v. Dee, 45 Phil 739 (1924) and Pisalbon v. Bejec, 74 Phil 88 (1943).

15

77 SCRA 338 (1977).

16

22 SCRA 525 (1983).

17

143 SCRA 499 (1986).

18

Id. at 501.

19

145 SCRA 229 (1986).

20

The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.

21

211 SCRA 7 (1992).

22

226 SCRA 572 (1993).

23

Id. at 579.

24

268 SCRA 47 (1997)

25

286 SCRA 495, 530 (1998).

26

Rollo, p. 51.

Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol.1, Manila: 1990, p. 223.
27

28

Among them legal separation, or prosecution for adultery and concubinage.

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