CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I CASE DIGESTS

FOR AUGUST 26
Lambino v. COMELEC (2006) Carpio, J.
Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, together with
6,327,952 registered voters (petitioners) vs. COMELEC
(respondent)
Special Civil Actions in the SC. Certiorari
Consolidated petitions on the COMELEC resolution denying
due course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987
constitution.
Facts:
(2006)
- Feb 15: Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado (Lambino
Group) gathered signatures for an initiative petition to amend
the 1987 constitution proposing changes that will shift the
present Bicameral-Presidential system to a UnicameralParliamentary form of government.
- Aug 25: Pursuant to the Initiative and Referendum Act (RA
6735),
Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite for ratification of their initiative petition. Their
initiative petition was supported by the 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least 12% of all registered voters with each
legislative district represented by at least 3%, as required by
RA 6735.
- Aug 30: Lambino Group filed an Amended petition with the
COMELEC indicating modifications in the Transitory provisions
of their initiative.
- Aug 31: COMELEC, in its Resolution, denied Lambino
Groups petition for lack of an
enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the
Constitution.
- The following petitions were filed:
Lambino Group filed for Certiorari and mandamus to set aside
the COMELEC resolution and compel the COMELEC to give
due course to their initiative petition. They argue that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion since
Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, Santiago is
binding only to the parties to that case and that their petition
deserves cognizance as an expression of the will of the
sovereign people
a. In his Comment to the petition, Solicitor
General urged the court to grant their
petition despite the Santiago ruling. He
proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and
its implementing rules as temporary devises
to implement the system of initiative
b. Various groups and individuals sought
intervention, filing pleadings supporting or
opposing the Lambino Groups petition.
2. Binay group prayed that the Court require respondent
COMELEC to show cause why they should not be cited in
1.

contempt for the COMELECs verification of signatures and for

entertaining the Lambino Groups petition despite the
permanent injunction in Santiago.
- Sep 26: Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral
arguments
Issues:
WON the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with
Sec. 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the
Constitution through a peoples initiative- NO
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago
declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative
clause on proposals to amend the Constitution- NO
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
in denying due course to the Lambino Groups petition- NO
1.

1.

Ratio:
The initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution on Direct proposal by the people
An amendment is directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition only if
the people sign on a petition that contains the full
text of the proposed amendments.
A signature requirement would be meaningless if
the person supplying the signature had not first
seen what it is he or she is signing.
Although the Constitution does not expressly
require the inclusion of the full text of the
proposed amendments, the deliberations of the
constitutional framers clearly show their intent to
adopt relevant American jurisprudence on
peoples initiative.
The proponents bear the burden of proving that
they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures.
There is logrolling when the initiative petition
incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the
same petition. Proposed Section 4(4) providing
that the interim parliament shall convene to
propose amendments/revisions of this
constitution within 45 days from ratification is a
subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from
the Bicameral-Presidential to the UnicameralParliamentary system.
1a. The initiative violates Sec. 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
disallowing Revision through initiatives
The Constitutional framers intended, and wrote, a
clear distinction between amendment and
revision of the Constitution.
o Only Congress or a constitutional
convention may propose revisions
whereas a peoples initiative may
propose only amendments.

o A revision broadly implies a change that

alters a basic principle in the constitution
and affects several provisions whereas
amendment refers to a change that
adds, reduces, or deletes without
altering the basic principle involved and
affects only the specific provision being
amended.
o In California, courts have developed a
two-part test: the quantitative test and
qualitative test. In the former, the court
examines only the number of provisions
affected and does not consider the
degree of change. In the latter, the main
inquiry is whether the change will
accomplish such far reaching changes
in the nature of our basic governmental
plan as to amount to a revision. Under
both these tests, the Lambino Groups
initiative is a revision that alters the
structure of government and separation
of powers in the constitution.
A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 M
signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the
specific modes prescribed in the Constitution
itself.
A deliberative body with recorded proceedings
like constituent assemblies or constitutional
conventions is best suited to undertake a revision
since it would affect basic principles or several
provisions of a constitution.
2. A revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is not necessary
An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not
change the outcome of the present petition.
The Court must avoid revisiting a ruling
involving the constitutionality of a statute if
the case before the Court can be resolved
on some other grounds.
RA 6735 requires that the people must sign
the petition as signatories. In the instant
case, the Lambino Group merely attached
the signature sheets to the petition and
amended petition.
Lambino Groups logrolling initiative also
violates RA 6735 stating that no petition
embracing more that one subject shall be
submitted to the electorate
3. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the Lambino Groups initiative for following the
COMELECs ruling.
Held: Petition dismissed

Dissenting Opinion of Former Chief Justice Puno in

Tolentino v. COMELEC

Province of North Cotabato v. GRP [uploaded]

Art.XIII, Sec. 1 Calalang v. Wiliams
Calalang v. Williams 70 Phil. 726
Petition for Prohibition
Maximo Calalang (own behalf) v. SolGen Ozaeta and ASG
Amparo for respondents A.D. Williams, Vicente Fragante and
Bayan.
Facts:
Maximo Calalang, private citizen and taxpayer, made
a petition for prohibition against the resolution made by the
National Traffic Commission to the Public Works Department
(Director and Secretary) that animal-drawn vehicles be
prohibited from passing certain roads at certain timeframes.
Said roads were Rosario Street (from Plaza Calderon de la
Barca to Dasmarinas Street)- 7:30 am to 12:30 pm and 1:30
pm to 5:30 pm and Rizal Avenue (Railroad Crossing at
Antipolo Street to Echague Street)- 7:00 am to 11:00 pm. The
recommendations were to be effective for one year upon the
date of opening of Colgante Bridge. These recommendations
were made in line with the mandate of the Director of Public
Works as given by Commonwealth Act No. 548. The
Petitioner argues that said Act is unconstitutional for it
constitutes (a) undue delegation of legislative powers and (b)
unlawful interference with legitimate business and abridges the
right to personal liberty and freedom of movement.
Issues:
1. Is CA No. 548 unconstitutional due to delegation upon
executive branch legislative powers?
2. Does CA No. 548 infringe upon the liberties of petitioner and
commit social unjustice?
Ratio:
1. Contention is untenable. Said provisions do not confer
legislative powers but rather executes the public policy
demands instituted by the National Assembly.
2. Persons and property may be subjected to restrains in order
to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the
state. The question of social justice is not about mistaken
sympathy towards a given group but rather the humanization
of laws and equalization of social and economic forces by the
state. It strives to bring out the greatest good to the greatest
number.
Ruling: Petition denied
Art. II, Sec. 2; Art. XIII Secs.4-8 Association of Small
Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform (1989) Cruz J.
GR 78742, 79310, 79744, 79777

Petitions to review the decisions of the Secretary of Agrarian

Reform
So many petitioners and respondents, too little time and space,
and sorry guys andami talaga.
Summary of Proceedings:
Straight to the SC because it is assailing the constitutionality of
RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1987)
Facts:
Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State
undertake an agrarian reform program. Prior to this
constitutional provision, RA 3844 and PD 27 were enacted,
with PD 27 superseding RA 3844, as it provides for the
compulsory acquisition of land for private distribution, and
maximum land retention limits for landowners.
After the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, EO 228,
Presidential Proclamation 27, and EO 229 provided crucial
guidelines to the implementation of Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the
Constitution.
When the Congress was finally reconvened, they enacted RA
6657. which gives suppletory effects to all of the previous
legislation without being inconsistent with their provisions.
Issues:
1. WON PD 27, EO 228-229, Proc. 131, and RA 6657 violate
the separation of powers - No
2. WON PD 27, EO 228-229, Proc. 131, and RA 6657 violate
equal protection - No
3. WON RA 6657 properly exercised the powers of eminent
domain
(a) Should the State first distribute public lands instead of
immediately disturbing the property rights of private land
owners? - Political question
(b) WON RA 6657 violated the principles of just
compensation - No, and Yes, but things
Ratio:
1. PD 27 considered valid under Gonzales v. Estrada.
President Aquino had legislative powers when she enacted the
EOs and the Proc. They did not lose their effect, just because
she lost her legislative powers. Also, Proc. 131 is not an
appropriation measure, because appropriation is not its
primary purpose. And since these laws were enacted before
Congress was reconvened, they are exempt from certain
constitutional provisions that refer to the power of the
Congress.
2. No evidence has been submitted that the requisites of a
valid qualification were violated.
3. (a) It was Congress that decided to redistribute private
agricultural lands as well as public lands. The Court sees no

justification in questioning such discretion, in addition to the

fact that no such matter was mentioned in the petitions.
(b) Petitioners allege that the fixing of just compensation was
unduly entrusted to administrative authorities, which is a
violation of judicial prerogatives. This is correctly a function of
the Court. But the assignation of value by DAR is only
preliminary - it is not final and conclusive. Landowners may
submit evidence on the real value of the property if they are
not satisfied with the value assessed by DAR.
Petitioners also say that Section 18 of RA 6657, by using
Landbank bonds or GOCC shares, does not follow the
traditional method for payment of just compensation which is
though money. However, RA 6657 is not a traditional exercise
of eminent domain. Since the costs will be tremendous, there
can be no doubt that the legislators of the law, as well as the
formulators of the Sec. 4, Art XIII of the Constitution, knew that
there would not be enough cash to pay for the lands. In view of
this, we can assume that other manners of payment were
intended to be utilized. Since this manner is not violative of the
Constitution, it may be allowed. Also, since this law is for ou
posterity and for the advancement of our nation, and the
improvement of the plight of our farmers, the Court will not be
the one to strike it down. At least not today.
The last challenge is that the landowner is divested of his
property before the actual payment of just compensation. This
is not to happen. Until the payment of just compensation, the
title of the land will remain with the landowner, and no outright
change in ownership is contemplated.
Held:
1. RA 6657, PD 27, Proc. 131, EOs 228-9 are constitutional
2. Expropriate properties shall be transferred to the State only
upon full payment of just compensation
3. All rights acquired by tenant farmers under PD 27 are
retained and recognized
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of
retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights
granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein
prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings, all the petitions are
DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
Arts. XIV, Sec. 1; Art.XIV Secs. 2 and 5, Art.XIV Secs.3-4
DECS v. San Diego (1989) Cruz, J.
G.R. No. 89572
Petition for Review on RTC Ruling Which Granted Petition for
Mandamus
FACTS:
The respondent had flunked the National Medical Admission
Test (NMAT) 3 times before being told he could not take the
test anymore as per the rule contained in MECS Order No. 12,
Series of 1972, which states that after three successive
failures on the NMAT, a student will not be allowed to take the

test a 4th time. In the respondents petition for Mandamus, the

RTC judge held that the respondent had been deprived of his
right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary
exercise of the police power.
ISSUE:
1. WON the 3 strike rule regarding the NMAT is
unconstitutional, based on the right to education guaranteed in
the constitution, as well as due process and equal protection.
NO
RATIO:
Regarding the police power of the state, it is said to be
properly exercised when a) the interests of the public generally
are in need of State interference, and b) the means employed
in the attainment of that objective are reasonable and not
unduly oppressive. Regarding the case at hand, the State has
a responsibility to ensure that the Medical profession and its
members adhere to a certain standard, especially since the
health and well-being of the public is in the balance. Thus the
right to education is not absolute, as the Constitution provides
that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or
course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable
admission and academic requirements. The equal protection
clause is not violated by the rule as well, because what it
guarantees is equality among equals, such as entrance in
medical school to all those who passed the NMAT and no
arbitrary denial to passers. As of the time of the SC decision,
the respondent had failed the NMAT a grand total of 5 times,
and this shows lack of preparation and perhaps aptitude on the
part of the respondent, who cannot be allowed to sue his way
to a medical degree.
HELD:
RTC decision reversed.
Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee
Epicharis Garcia petitioner ; Fr. Antonio Lambino
(representing the faculty admission committee of Loyola
School of Theology) respondent
Petition for mandamus
FACTS:
In 1975, petitioner Garcia was admitted for studies leading to
an M.A. in Theology by the faculty admission committee of the
Loyola School of Theology. However, when petitioner wanted
to enroll for the same course for the first semester, respondent
informed her of the letter containing the facultys decision to
bar her from re-admission in their school; it was said that the
petitioners frequent questions and difficulties were not always
pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the progress of
the class. Fr. Pedro Sevilla, the schools Director, said that
their decision was final, and it would be better for her to seek
for admission at the UST Graduate School.
ISSUE:
WON respondent has the duty to admit the petitioner
RATIO:

Article XIV, Section 5(2): Academic freedom shall be enjoyed

in all institutions of higher learning.
HELD:
NO. "Petitioner cannot compel by mandamus, the respondent
to admit her into further studies in the Loyola School of
Theology. For respondent has no clear duty to admit the
petitioner. The Loyola School of Theology is a seminary for the
priesthood. Petitioner is admittedly and obviously not studying
for the priesthood, she being a lay person and a woman. And
even assuming for arguments sake that she is qualified to
study for the priesthood, there is still no duty on the part of
respondent to admit her to said studies, since the school has
clearly the discretion to turn down even qualified applicants
due to certain factors. Moreover, the Court stressed the value
and distinction between academic freedom of the university
and that of the individual, proposing that the respondent has
discretion as to whom to admit or reject based on non-arbitrary
grounds/reasons, something that the school was able to
provide.
PETITION IS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT

Non v. Danes II
Non vs Danes II - The case is a petition for certiorari with
prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction.
Facts:
The petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini
Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to
re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for
leading or participating in student mass actions against the
school in the preceding semester. Petitioners filed a petition in
the court a quo seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to
the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition in an order
dated August 8, 1988. A motion for reconsideration was filed,
but this was denied by the trial court on February 24, 1989.
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari with
prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction.
Issue:
WON the ruling in the Alcuaz vs. PSBA gives the right to
Mabini College to deny re-enrollment of students. NO
WON Mabini College is free to admit or not admit the
petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic freedom
enjoyed by the school in accordance with the Supreme Court
rulings in the cases of Garcia vs. Faculty [Admission
Committee] (G.R. No. 40779, November 28, 1975) and
Tangonon vs. Pano, et al. (L-45157, June 27, 1985) NO
WON the students were given due process. NO
WON the academic deficiencies of the students warrant their
non-readmission. NO

Ratio:
Students should not be denied their constitutional and statutory
right to education, and there is such denial when students are
expelled or barred from enrollment for the exercise of their
right to free speech and peaceable assembly and/or subjected
to disciplinary action without abiding with the requirements of
due process.

1. Whether the petitioners have legal standing?

This is a class suit of common and general interest to all
citizens of the Philippines. Under the concept of
intergenerational responsibility, petitioners can represent not
only their own generation but future unborn generations right to
a balanced and healthful ecology. (Article II, Section 16)

Held:
SUBSTANTIVE
The petition is GRANTED. The orders of respondent judge
dated August 8, 1988 and February 24, 1989 are hereby
ANNULLED. Respondent Mabini College is ORDERED to
readmit and to allow the re- enrollment of petitioners, if they
are still so minded, without prejudice to its taking the
appropriate action as to petitioners Ariel Non, Joselito Villalon,
George (Jorge) Dayaon and Daniel Torres, if it is shown by
their records (Form 137) that they have failed to satisfy the
school's prescribed academic standards.
Oposa v. Factoran (1993)
Special Civil Action for Certiorari of the dismissal order of
the RTC.

1. Whether the petitioners have a specific legal right

violated?
Yes, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with
it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
DENR has the duty - under its mandate - to protect and
advance said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the
correlative duty to protect the same gives rise to a cause of
action.
2. Whether this is a political question as the Solicitor
General argues, or a justiciable question as the petioners
assert?

FACTS:
Petitioners Oposa et al. are minors represented and joined by
their respective parents as well as the Philippine Ecological
Network, Inc (PENI), a non-profit organization, who filed in the
Regional Trial Court a taxpayers class suit praying that a
judgement be rendered ordering the original respondent,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary
Factoran, and people acting on his behalf to:
1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing, or approving new timber license agreements.
Factoran filed an order of Motion to dismiss based on 1)
plaintiffs having no cause of action and 2) the issue raised is a
political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of government. The Regional Trial Court
(RTC) granted said motion.
The plaintiffs are now filing this complaint with the Supreme
Court on the ground that the RTC judge gravely abused his
discretion with the dismissing the original action.
Factoran would be replaced by new DENR secretary Angel C.
Alcala.

Article VIII, Section 1 provides that the courts have the duty to
determine when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part
of other branches of government (judicial review) so the
Supreme Court is not only limited to political questions.
However, even in this case, this situation is about the
enforcement of a legal right already formulated and expressed
in legislation.
3. Whether the rescinding of Timber License Agreements
(TLA) would violate the non-impairment of contracts
clause of the 1987 constitution?
A license is not a contract but a privilege which can be revoked
when the public interest dictates. It is pointed out in Section 20
of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) Provided , that
when the national interest so requires, the President may
amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession,
permit, licenses, or any other form of privilege granted herein.
Even assuming that license was a contract, it is understood
that the freedom of contract is not absolute and must yield to
the police power of the State which may be used for the
purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology.
HELD:

ISSUES:
PROCEDURAL

PETITION IS GRANTED. CHALLENGED ORDER OF RTC IS

SET ASIDE

b) Whether or not the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a

ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.
MMDA v. Concerned Citizens of Manila Bay
Facts:
On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of
Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies,
for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila
Bay.
The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay
had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law,
specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the
Philippine Environment Code.
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that
the continued neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of
the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:
(1) Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a
balanced ecology;

Held:
Regional Trial Courts Order to Clean Up and Rehabilitate
Manila Bay
On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor
of respondents. Finding merit in the complaint, the Court
ordered defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily,
to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters
to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and
other forms of contact recreation.
To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as
the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from
receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by
devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of
action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.
Imbong v. Ochoa [uploaded]

(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);

(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
(8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No.
6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
(12) International Law
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that
petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to
the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.
Issues:
a) Whether or not pertinent provisions of the Environment
Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution
incidents and do not cover cleaning in general.

Tanada v. Angara [uploaded]

Espina v. Zamora (2010) Abad, J.
FACTS
Estrada signed into law the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of
2000 (RA8762). It expressly repealed RA1180, which
absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in the
retail trade business. RA8762 allows:
(1) foreigners to engage in the retail trade business under four
categories, depending on the amount of capital invested
(2) natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship
and now reside in the Philippines, to engage in the retail trade
business with the same rights as Filipino citizens.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioner lawmakers have locus standi
2. WON RA8762 is unconstitutional insofar as:
a) It contravenes Art. II, Secs. 9, 19 and 20 and Art.
XII, Sec. 10, 12 and 13 of the Constitution (see notes)
b) Its implementation would lead to alien control of
the retail trade, taken together with alien dominance
of other businesses, and result in the loss of effective
Filipino control of the economy.
c) Foreign retailers would crush Filipino retailers and
sari-sari store vendors, destroy self-employment, and
bring about more unemployment.
d) World Bank-International Monetary Fund
improperly imposed the passage of RA8762 as a
condition for the release of certain loans.

e) There is a clear and present danger that the law

would promote monopolies or combinations in
restraint of trade.
RATIO
1. YES
Even without a clear showing that the implementation of
RA8762 prejudices petitioners as taxpayers or legislators, they
have legal standing when as in this case the public interest so
requires or the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overarching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.
2. NO
- As in Tanada v. Angara, provisions in Article II are not selfexecutory. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot
give rise to a cause of action in court. While Art. II, 19
requires the State to develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos, it does not
impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic
environment.
- The Constitution recognizes the need for international
business exchange and limits protection of Filipino enterprises
only against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
- In Art. XII, 10, Congress has the discretion to reserve to
Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the
recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest
requires. In the instant case, NEDA has not opposed the policy
to open certain areas of retail trade to foreign investments.
- RA8762, in lessening the restraint on the foreigners right to
property or to engage in an ordinary lawful business, does not
deny Filipinos right to engage in the kinds of retail business.
- Court cannot inquire into the wisdom of the law unless it
blatantly violates the constitution. In this case, petitioners fail to
show that it would eventually lead to alien control and
prejudice local enterprises. The law itself provides strict
safeguards on foreign participation
RULING Petition dismissed for lack of merit
NOTES
Art. II, 9
The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that
will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and
free the people from poverty through policies that provide
adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising
standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
Art. II, 19
The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Art. II, 20
The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private
sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives
to needed investments.
Art. XII, 10
The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic
and planning agency, when the national interest dictates,

reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or

associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as
Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The
Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly
owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over
foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in
accordance with its national goals and priorities.
Art. XII, 12
The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt
measures that help make them competitive.
Art. XII, 13
The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general
welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange
on the basis of equality and reciprocity.
BFAR v. COA (2008) Puno, CJ
GR 169815
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resourced Employees
Union, Regional Office No. VII, Cebu v. Commission of
Audit
Appeal from the decision of COA
Summary of Proceedings:
COA-Legal and Adjudication Office (COA-LAO), Regional
Office VII, Cebu City - moved for reconsideration of Notice of
Disallowance, denied
COA-LAO National, Quezon City - denied
Motion for Reconsideration - denied
Supreme Court - denied
Facts:
On Oct. 18, 1999, BFAR Region VII requested BFAR Central
Office for a Food Basket Allowance, and justified its request
through high cost of living and the Employee Suggestions and
Incentive Awards System (ESIAS). Regional Directed Corazon
Corrales indorsed the Resolution, and BFAR Director Malcolm
Sarmiento, Jr. recommended its approval. Usec Cesar Drilon,
Jr. approved the request, which granted Php10 000 to each of
the 130 employees of BFA Region VII. Regional Director
Corrales released the allowance.
On post audit at September 19, 2003, COA-LAO Region VII
issued a Notice of Disallowance. It ruled that the Food Basket
Allowance had no legal basis, and it violated:
a. Sec. 15(d) of the General Appropriations Act of 1999
prohibiting the payment of honoraria, allowances, or other
forms of compensation to any government official or employee,
except those specifically authorized by law;

b. par. 4.5 of Budget Circular no. 16, dated Nov. 28, 1998
(see below)
c. Sec. 12 of RA 6758, Salary Standardization Law, which
includes all allowances in the standardized salary rates,
subject to certain exceptions.
Issues:
1. WON disallowance is unconstitutional as per Secs. 9-10,
Art. II of the Constitution - NO
2. WON BFAR Usec had authority to approve the allowance NO
3. WON the allowance is in conformity with RA 6758 - NO
4. WON the petitioner exhausted all administrative remedies NO
Ratio:
1. Secs. 9-10, Art II of the Constitution are not self-executory
and are merely statement of principles and policies. Legislative
enactment is required for them to take effect.
2. Sec. 4.5 of Budget Circular 16 states:
All agencies are hereby prohibited from granting any food, rice,
gift checks, or any other form of incentives/allowances except
those authorized via Administrative Order by the Office of the
President.
Since no Admin. Order was issued by the Office of the
President, the Food Basket allowance is not valid.

allowance/fee/pay except those authorized under the General

Appropriations Act and Section 33 of P.D. No. 807.'
5. Petitioners aver that the allowance is an incentive to
employees to encourage them to be more productive. The
Court states that there is no law authorizing the grant of the
subject Food Basket Allowance. Also, the allowance was
granted to all BFAR Region VII employees without distinction;
it was not granted due to exemplary
contributions/accomplishments by any employee.
6. Petitioners failed to appeal to the COA proper. Also, Sec. 51
of PD 1445, or the Government Auditing Code states that:
Section 51. Finality of decisions of the Commission or any
auditor. A decision of the Commission or of any auditor upon
any matter within its or his jurisdiction, if not appealed as
herein provided, shall be final and executory.
Held:
Petition is denied. COA-LAO decisions affirmed
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS [uploaded]
La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association v. Ramos [uploaded]
SEPTEMBER 11 2014
Tatad v. Garcia (1995) Quiason , J.

3. Petitioners contend that the Food Basket Allowance can be

claimed as a benefit, as stated in 7th exception1: 'such other
additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may
be determined by the DBM.' The Court states that the benefits
excluded in the salary are the ones which are granted to
reimburse expenses performed in the performance of their
official functions. The allowance is not that.
4. Petitioners contend that the allowance is not integrated in
their salary, because it is nowhere to be found in the National
Compensation Circular 59 dated September 30, 1989 list. The
Court states that the Food Basket Allowance falls under the
14th category (huhu ang aba print niyo na lang to), 'Incentive
1

Exceptions to allowances integrated in the

standardized salary:
1. representation and transportation allowance
(RATA);
2. clothing and laundry allowance;
3. subsistence allowance of marine officers and
crew on board government vessels;
4. subsistence allowance of hospital personnel;
5. hazard pay;
6. allowances of foreign service personnel
stationed abroad; and
7. such other additional compensation not
otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the
DBM.

Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court under Rule 65

Facts:
This case has to do with the EDSA LRT III, or the Light
Railway Transit III system project agreement. In 1991 there
was a prequalification requirement that was imposed on
potential bidders for the project. Only one bidder passed this
prequalification, the EDSA LRT Consortium, which was
composed of ten foreign and domestic corporations. As they
were the sole complying bidder, the DOTC recommended
awarding them the project and proceeded to negotiate with the
said firm. Though then Executive Secretary Drilon said that the
president could not grant the proposal on several grounds,
President Ramos later on approved a re-negotiated
agreement. The approved proposal was for a BLT project, or a
Build-Lease-Transfer, wherein the contractor would build or
accomplish the project in question, and would then lease it to
the government in order for the contractor to earn on its
investment, and after a period of time it would sell the project
to the government. RA 7718 was passed by President Ramos
after the agreement was signed, and it is this Act which
expressly recognizes the BLT scheme. The petitioners argue
on several grounds that the agreement in question should no
longer be continued.
Issue:

1. WON the LRT III project is constitutional with regard to the

Filipino ownership requirement for public utilities. YES
2. WON the LRT III project complied with the proper procedure
for government contracts, such as public bidding. YES
3. WON the BLT agreement is contemplated in the original
BOT Law regarding BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) and BT
(Build-Transfer) projects. YES
4. WON RA 7718 is curative. YES
5. WON the agreements are grossly disadvantageous to
government. NO
Ratio:
1. The project does not violate the requirement on Filipino
ownership of public utilities because there is a difference
between the owning of the materials or the facilities used in
public utilities, and the actual franchise. Thus the franchisee
and the owner of the facilities can be two separate entities. In
law there is a clear distinction between the operation of a
public utility and the ownership of the facilities and equipment
used to serve the public.
2. Yes it did, because Section 5 of the BOT Law in relation to
Presidential Decree no. 1594 allows the negotiated award of
government infrastructure projects, and it says that this can
apply in case of a lack of qualified bidders or contractors. Thus
the lack of public bidding does not invalidate the agreement.
And even assuming arguendo that public bidding is required by
the BOT law, the passage of RA 7718 which provides for direct
negotiation will prevail.
3. Yes, because the law must not be read in a way as to rule
out or unduly restrict any variation within the context of the two
schemes. There is no mention in the BOT law that would bar
any other arrangement for the payment of the project cost.
4. A curative statute is one that makes valid that which before
enactment of the statute was invalid. As this RA expressly
recognizes the BLT scheme, there is no longer any grounds to
contest the BLT scheme used in the agreement.
5. There is presumption of good faith on the part of
government officials in the discharge of their duties. The DOTC
is equipped with the skills and entrusted with the task of
determining whether the project will benefit the people.
Ruling:
Petition dismissed.
Gamboa v. Teves
Gamboa v Teves (2011) Carpio, J.
Wilson Gamboa petitioner ; Finance Secretary margarita
Teves et al. respondents
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition,
Injunction, Declaratory Relief and Declaration of Nullity of Sale
of Shares of Stock *treated as petition for mandamus since
the issue has far-reaching implications in national economy
FACTS:

1969 American company General Telephone and Electronics

Corporation (GTE) sold 26% of the outstanding common
shares of PLDT to PTIC
1977 Prime Holdings Inc. (PHI) became the owner of 111,
415 shares of stock of PTIC by virtue of three Deeds of
Assignment
1986 The 111, 415 shares of stock (around 46% of the
outstanding capital stock) of PTIC held by PHI were
sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good
Governance (PCGG)
1999 First Pacific, a Hong Kong-based investment firm,
acquired the remaining 54% of the outstanding capital stock of
PTIC.
2006 Inter-Agency Privatization Council (IPC) of Philippine
Government announced public bidding of PTIC shares of stock
2007 First Pacific through its subsidiary, purchased the
111,415 PTIC shares of stock (46%)
>Given these sales, First Pacifics common shareholdings in
PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, increasing
the common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about
81.47 percent
ISSUES:
1.
WON the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to shares of stock;
-YES.
Section 11: No franchise, certificate, or any other form
of authorization for the operation of a public utility
shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines
or to corporations or association organized under the
laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall
such franchise, certificate, or authorization be
exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty
years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be
granted except under the condition that it shall be
subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the
Congress when the common good so requires. The
State shall encourage equity participation in public
utilities by the general public. The participation of
foreign investors in the governing body of any public
utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate
share in its capital, and all the executive and
managing officers of such corporation or association
must be citizens of the Philippines
The Court ruled that the term capital in Section 11, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution refers only to common shares, NOT
the total outstanding capital stock (common and non-voting
preferred shares). Only common shareholders have the right to
vote in the election of directors, and thus, exercise and
participate in the control or management of the corporation.
(Preferred shareholders are often excluded from any control
and deprived of the right to vote). Since the intent of the
framers of the Constitution regarding the provision is for
Filipino nationals to be always in effective control of the
corporation, the term capital should be defined as such.

2.
WON the 111,415 PTIC shares to First Pacific violates
the constitutional limit on foreign ownership of a public utility;
-YES. Since the 40% foreign equity limit was exceeded, the
voting interests of foreigners would be substantial enough.
Moreover, Filipinos hold less than 60 percent of the voting
stock and earn less than 60 percent of the dividends of PLDT.
By virtue of the intent of the provision, there is a violation of
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.
3.
WON petitioner has locus standi
-YES. Petitioner Wilson Gamboa, a stockholder of PLDT, has
the right to question the subject sale, which he claims to violate
the nationality requirement prescribed in Section 11, Article XII
of the Constitution. (Dissenting J. Velasco, Jr.: petitioner has
no locus standi because he is neither a shareholder of PTIC
nor of First Pacific)
HELD:
SC PARTLY GRANTED the petition. Respondent Chairperson
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is
DIRECTED to apply the definition of the term capital in
determining the extent of allowable foreign ownership in
respondent PLDT, and if there is a violation, to impose the
appropriate sanctions under the law.
Heirs of Wilson P. Gamboa v. Teves Resolution
Case:
This resolves the motions for reconsideration of the 28 June
2011 Decision filed by (1) the Philippine Stock Exchange's
(PSE) President, (2) Manuel V. Pangilinan
(3) Napoleon L. Nazareno and ( 4) the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC)
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) initially filed a motion
for reconsideration on behalf of the SEC, assailing the 28 June
2011 Decision. However, it subsequently filed a Consolidated
Comment on behalf of the State,declaring expressly that it
agrees with the Court's definition of the term "capital" in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. During the Oral
Arguments on 26 June 2012, the OSG reiterated its position
consistent with the Court's 28 June 2011 Decision.1
Facts:
In 1928, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT) was granted a franchise to engage in the business of
telecommunications. Telecommunications is a nationalized
area of activity where a corporation engaged therein must
have 60% of its capital be owned by Filipinos as provided for
by Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of
the 1987 Constitution:
Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations
or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens

In 1999, First Pacific, a foreign corporation, acquired 37% of

PLDT common shares. Wilson Gamboa opposed said
acquisition because at that time, 44.47% of PLDT common
shares already belong to various other foreign corporations.
Hence, if First Pacifics share is added, foreign shares will
amount to 81.47% or more than the 40% threshold prescribed
by the Constitution.
Margarito Teves, as Secretary of Finance, and the other
respondents argued that this is okay because in totality, most
of the capital stocks of PLDT is Filipino owned. It was
explained that all PLDT subscribers, pursuant to a law passed
by Marcos, are considered shareholders (they hold serial
preferred shares). Broken down, preferred shares consist of
77.85% while common shares consist of 22.15%.
Gamboa argued that the term capital should only pertain to
the common shares because that is the share which is entitled
to vote and thus have effective control over the corporation.
ISSUE: What does the term capital pertain to? Does the term
capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refer to
common shares or to the total outstanding capital stock
(combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares)?
HELD:
Gamboa is correct. Capital only pertains to common shares. It
will be absurd for capital to pertain as inclusive of non-voting
shares. This is because a corporation consisting of 1,000,000
capital stocks, 100 of which are common shares which are
foreign owned and the rest (999,900 shares) are preferred
shares which are non-voting shares and are Filipino owned,
would seem compliant to the constitutional requirement here
99.999% is Filipino owned. But if scrutinized, the controlling
stock the voting stock or that miniscule .001% is foreign
owned. That is absurd.
In this case, it is true that at least 77.85% of the capital is
owned by Filipinos (the PLDT subscribers). But these
subscribers, who hold non-voting preferred shares, have no
control over the corporation. Hence, capital should only pertain
to common shares.
Thus, to be compliant with the constitution, 60% of the
common shares of PLDT should be Filipino owned. That is not
so in this case as it appears that 81.47% of the common
shares are already foreign owned (split between First Pacific
(37%) and a Japanese corporation).
Decision:
Petition Denied, motions for reconsideration with finality. No
further pleadings shall be entertainbed.
Notes:
Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of
the 1987 Constitution:
Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations
or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens

Agan v. PIATCO
An instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court seeking to prohibit the Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA) and the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC) and its Secretary from
implementing the following agreements executed by the
Philippine Government through the DOTC and the MIAA and
the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO)
Facts:
DOTC asked for the services of ADP to study the possible
developments for the planned new terminal of NAIA on August
1989. On 1993, six we'll-known businessmen formed the
AEDC and met with FVR to discuss the possibility of investing
in the construction and operation of a NAIA 3. On October
1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the
government under a build-operate and transfer arrangement
pursuant to RA 6957 and RA 7718 (BOT Law). On June 7, 14,
and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two daily
newspapers of an invitation for competitive or comparative
proposals on AEDCs unsolicited proposal, in accordance with
Sec. 4-A of RA 6957. June 20, 1996, PBAC Bulletin No. 1 was
issued, postponing the availment of the Bid Documents and
the submission of the comparative bid proposals. August 16,
1996, the PBAC issued PBAC Bulletin No. 3 amending the Bid
Documents. September 24, 1996, the PBAC prequalified the
Paircargo Consortium. September 26, 1996, AEDC informed
the PBAC in writing of its reservations as regards the
Paircargo Consortium, which include:
a. The lack of corporate approvals and financial capability of
PAIRCARGO;
b. The lack of corporate approvals and financial capability of
PAGS;
c. The prohibition imposed by RA 337, as amended (the
General Banking Act) on the amount that Security Bank could
legally invest in the project.
d. The inclusion of Siemens as a contractor of the
PAIRCARGO Joint Venture, for prequalification purposes; and
e. The appointment of Lufthansa as the facility operator, in
view of the Philippine requirement in the operation of a public
utility.
October 2, 1996, informing AEDC that it had considered the
issues raised by the latter, and that based on the documents
submitted by Paircargo and the established pre-qualification
criteria, the PBAC had found that the challenger, Paircargo,
had pre-qualified to undertake the project. October 16, 1996,
Both proponents offered to build the NAIA Passenger Terminal
III for at least $350 million at no cost to the government and to

pay the government: 5% share in gross revenues for the first

five years of operation, 7.5% share in gross revenues for the
next ten years of operation, and 10% share in gross revenues
for the last ten years of operation, in accordance with the Bid
Documents. However, in addition to the foregoing, AEDC
offered to pay the government a total of P135 million as
guaranteed payment for 27 years while Paircargo Consortium
offered to pay the government a total of P17.75 billion for the
same period. PBAC formally informed AEDC that it had
accepted the price proposal submitted by the Paircargo
Consortium, and gave AEDC 30 working days or until
November 28, 1996 within which to match the said bid. AEDC
failed to match the proposal within the 30-day period. February
27, 1997, Paircargo Consortium incorporated into Philippine
International Airport Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO). AEDC
subsequently protested the alleged undue preference given to
PIATCO and reiterated its objections as regards the
prequalification of PIATCO. April 16, 1997, AEDC filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of the Proceedings, Mandamus and Injunction against
the Secretary of the DOTC, the Chairman of the PBAC, the
voting members of the PBAC and Pantaleon D. Alvarez, in his
capacity as Chairman of the PBAC Technical Committee. April
17, 1997, the NEDA-ICC conducted an ad referendum to
facilitate the approval, on a no-objection basis, of the BOT
agreement between the DOTC and PIATCO. As the ad
referendum gathered only four (4) of the required six
(6)signatures, the NEDA merely noted the agreement. July 12,
1997, the Government, through then DOTC Secretary Arturo
T. Enrile, and PIATCO, through its President, Henry T. Go,
signed the Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-andTransfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
Passenger Terminal III (1997 Concession Agreement).
November 26, 1998, the Government and PIATCO signed an
Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA).
Subsequently, the Government and PIATCO signed three
Supplements to the ARCA. The First Supplement was signed
on August 27, 1999; the Second Supplement on September 4,
2000; and the Third Supplement on June 22, 2001.First
Supplement to the ARCA amended Sec. 1.36 of the ARCA
defining Revenues or Gross Revenues. Second
Supplement to the ARCA contained provisions concerning the
clearing, removal, demolition or disposal of subterranean
structures uncovered or discovered at the site of the
construction of the terminal by the Concessionaire. Third
Supplement provided for the obligations of the Concessionaire
as regards the construction of the surface road connecting
Terminals II and III. September 17, 2002, the workers of the
international airline service providers, claiming that they stand
to lose their employment upon the implementation of the
questioned agreements, filed before this Court a petition for
prohibition to enjoin the enforcement of said agreements.
October 15, 2002, the service providers, joining the cause of
the petitioning workers, filed a motion for intervention and a
petition-in-intervention. October 24, 2002, Congressmen
Salacnib Baterina, Clavel Martinez and Constantino Jaraula
filed a similar petition with this Court. November 6, 2002,

several employees of the MIAA likewise filed a petition

assailing the legality of the various agreements. December 11,
2002, a group of congressmen filed their Comment-InIntervention defending the validity of the assailed agreements
and praying for the dismissal of the petitions. Office of the
Solicitor General and the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel prayed that the present petitions be given due course
and that judgment be rendered declaring the 1997 Concession
Agreement, the ARCA and the Supplements thereto void for
being contrary to the Constitution, the BOT Law and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations.
Issue:
WON the employees of NAIA 1 and 2 are denied a right YES
They stand to lose their source of livelihood, a property right
which is zealously protected by the Constitution.
WON the SC has jurisdiction YES
The facts necessary to resolve these legal questions are well
established
and, hence, need not be determined by a trial court.
WON PIATCO is a qualified bidder NO
The total net worth therefore of the Paircargo Consortium, after
considering the maximum amounts that may be validly
invested by each of its members is P558,384,871.55 or only
6.08% of the project cost. PBAC has determined that any
prospective bidder for the construction, operation and
maintenance of the NAIA IPT III project should prove that it
has the ability to provide equity in the minimum amount of 30%
of the project cost, in accordance with the 70:30 debt-to-equity
ratio prescribed in the Bid Documents. The maximum amounts
which the Paircargo Consortium may invest in the project fell
short of the minimum amounts prescribed by the PBAC.
(Equity of Security Bank)
WON the 1997 Concession Agreement is valid NO
It's true that it is just a draft and subject to amendments but the
amendments converted the 1997 Concession Agreement to an
entirely different agreement from the contract bidded out or the
draft Concession Agreement.
WON the government can exercise direct government
guarantee NO
The BOT Law clearly and strictly prohibits direct government
guarantee, subsidy and equity in unsolicited proposals that the
mere inclusion of a provision to that effect is fatal and is
sufficient to deny the proposal.
WON Article V, Section 5.10 of the 1997 Concession
Agreement is unconstitutional YES
PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation, contravene
the Constitutional provision on temporary government takeover
and obligate the government to pay reasonable cost for the
use of the Terminal and/or Terminal Complex. Article XII,
Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides: Section 17. In
times of national emergency, when the public interest so

requires, the State may, during the emergency and under

reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.
WON the government can still regulate monopolies under the
1997 Concession Agreement and ARCA YES
Article XII, Section 19 of the 1987 Constitution states: Sec. 19.
The state shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public
interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or
unfair competition shall be allowed. The provisions of the 1997
Concession Agreement and the ARCA did not strip
government, thru the MIAA, of its right to supervise the
operation of the whole NAIA complex, including NAIA IPT III.
Held:
The 1997 Concession Agreement, the Amended and Restated
Concession Agreement and the Supplements thereto are set
aside for being null and void.
Agan v. PIATCO Resolution (2004) Puno, J.
Motions for Reconsideration
Facts:
- Asias Emerging Dragon Corp (AEDC) submitted an
unsolicited proposal for the construction and development of
the NAIA International Passenger Terminal III (IPT III) under a
Build-Operate-and-Transfer arrangement
- Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
and Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) opened
public bidding, which was won by Paircargo Consortium which
later organized into respondent PIATCO
- DOTC Secretary and PIATCO President signed the
Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer
Arrangement of the NAIA IPT III (1997 Concession
Agreement)
- The 1997 Concession Agreement was superseded by the
Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA)
- Government and PIATCO also entered into 3 supplemental
agreements
- In may 2003, Court nullified the 1997 concession agreement,
ARCA and the Supplements (PIATCO Contracts)
Issue:
Procedural:
1. WON the Court has jurisdiction over the case YES
- WON the cases at bar be referred to arbitration
pursuant to the ARCA provisions NO
- WON the petitions should be dismissed and
remanded to the trial courts for trial on the merits NO
2. WON petitioners have legal standing YES
Substantive:
1. WON the 2003 decision should be reversed and the petition
be dismissed NO

2. WON the Court should not strike down the PIATCO

contracts in its entirety in light of their separability clause NO
Ratio:
Procedural:
1. The Court has primary jurisdiction over the cases at bar, for
they (a) involve legal questions--the construction of the
Constitution, the interpretation of the BOT law and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations on undisputed
contractual provisions and government actions, and (b)
concern public interest.
2. Petitioners have legal standing, that is, a direct and personal
interest in the controversy and whether such party has
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a
result of the act complained of. The implementation of the
PIATCO contracts could deprive petitioners of sources of
livelihood or legitimate business investments.
Substantive:
1. The Court upholds its ruling that:
a. PIATCO is not a qualified bidder
- Paircargo Consortium failed to prove its ability to provide 30%
of the estimated project cost under the debt-to-equity
restriction in the Bid documents. According to which, a bidder
may only seek financing of the NAIA IPT III Project up to 70%
of the project cost. 30% must come in the form of equity or
investment by the bidder itself...to ensure that the bidder is an
investor with a substantial interest in its success.
b. The 1997 Concession Agreement is not valid
- The ENTIRE contract is invalid for violating law and public
policy. They were substantially amended after their award to
PIATCO to the governments disadvantage.
First, the agreement did not contain the provision
allowing MIAA to reserve the right to regulate the
adjustments of these new fees and charges
(groundhandling fees, airline office rentals, porterage
fees) . Whereas under the draft agreement, such fees
can be adjusted only once every two years with the
approval of the MIAA.
Second, the agreement provides that the government
will assume PIATCOs attendant liabilities in case of
PIATCOs default. It counters the spirit and policy of
the BOT law which was crafted to prevent
government from incurring financial risk.
c. The government cannot exercise direct government
guarantee
- Read together with Sec. 1.06 Art I which defines attendant
liabilities, Sec. 4.04(c) Art IV of the ARCA provides that the
Government would pay the sum total of all debts, including all
interest, fees and charges, that PIATCO incurred in pursuance
of the NAIA IPT III project.
- A direct government guarantee, subsidy or equity provision
disqualifies a proposal from being accepted, for it fails to
satisfy the three essential requisites under the BOT law
and its implementing rules.
d. Sec. 5.10(c) Art V of the ARCA is unconstitutional

- The provision obligates the government in the exercise of its

police power to compensate respondent PIATCO, contrary to
Sec 17 Art XII of the Constitution.
e. The government can regulate monopolies under the 1997
Concession Agreement
- Sec 19 Art XII of the Constitution mandates that the State
prohibit or regulate monopolies when public interest so
requires. Though PIATCO had been granted the exclusive
right to operate NAIA IPT III, those who have subsisting
contracts beyond the In-Service date cannot be arbitrarily or
unreasonably treated.
Held: Motions for Reconsideration denied.
Notes:
Sec. 1.06 Art I Attendant liabilities refer to all amounts
recorded and from time to time outstanding in the books of
Concessionaire as owing to Unpaid Creditors who have
provided, loaned or advanced funds actually used for the
Project, including all interests, penalties, associated fees,
charges, surcharges, indemnities, reimbursements and other
related expenses, and further including amounts owed by
Concessionaire to its suppliers, contractors and
subcontractors.
3 essential requisites for the acceptance of an unsolicited
proposal
1. The project involves a new technology and/or is not part of
the list of priority projects
2. No direct government guarantee, subsidy or equity is
required
3. The government agency or local government unity has
invited by publication other interested parties to a public
bidding and conducted the same
Sec. 5.10(c) Art V of the ARCA (respondent PIATCO) shall
be entitled to reasonable compensation for the duration of the
temporary takeover by GRP, which compensation shall take
into account the reasonale cost for the use of the Terminal
and/or Terminal complex
Police Power Police power is the state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare.
Two elements of police power:
1. Imposition of restraint upon liberty or property
2. Power is exercised for the benefit of the common good
Sec 17 Art XII of the Constitution In times of national
emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State
may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms
prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest.
Sec 19 Art XII of the Constitution The State shall regulate or
prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No
combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be
allowed
PPA v. Mendoza

PPA v Mendoza (September 11, 1985)

GR No. L-48304 Petition for Certiorari
PPA (petitioner) v Rafael Mendoza and Pernito Arrastre
Services Inc., et al. (Petitioner)
Facts:
On November 1972, an Ad Hoc committee was established in
order to study the problems and inefficiencies of ports in
regards to stevedoring and arrastre. This committee was
composed of reps of DoL, BoC, companies (shipping,
stevedoring, and arrastre), labor groups and port users under
the chairmanship of Deputy Commissioner of Customs. On
April 23, 1973, the committee submitted its report which
consisted of recommendation that the arrastre and stevedoring
services should be consolidated into one entity. This was to be
done in two steps wherein the first being all companies
assimilated into ten companies and secondly, all ten to be
assimilated into one operator per port. The Bureau of Customs
approved the recommendations and issued Memorandum
Order No. 28-75 on May 8, 1975. By then, there were around
50 companies operating either as arrastre, stevedoring or both
in Cebu City. Accordingly, ten corporations were formed:
1)Masayon Arrastre & Forwarding Corp., (2) Vismin
Stevedores & Forwarders, Inc., (3) Cebu Materials Handling
Corp. (4) Solid Arrastre & Forwarding Co., Inc., (5) Sto. Nino
Stevedoring & Arrastre Corp. (6) Integrated Port Services
(Cebu), Inc., (7) Panama Arrastre & Stevedoring Co., Inc., (8)
Cebu Allied Maritime Services, Inc., (9) Cebu Integrated
Arrastre, Inc., and (10) Cenvis Arrastre Services, Inc. with
Bisaya Land Trasportation Co Inc. joining later on. The
respondents refused to be assimilated to the eleven
companies and were not issued permits to operate their
services. The Philippine Ports Authority was formed due to
Presidential Decree No. 505 with the function of developing,
planning and financing port operations within the country. The
PPA issued Memorandum Order 21 which compelled the
companies mentioned to merge.

3. Whether or not the questioned orders restored the status

quo before the present controversy.
4. Whether or not the questioned orders constitute a judicial
interference in purely administrative functions.
5. Whether or not the respondent judge commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he issued the
injunction.
Ratio:
1. PPA has the power to regulate and require integration of
arrastre and stevedoring services. Presidential Decree 857
provides the framework for its powers and functions. Past
jurisprudence (Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation vs. Lazaro, G.R.
No. 54966, September 2, 1983) also reinforces that effective
utilization of port facilities is to the advantage of the
government. Standards are set and the court respects the
wisdom of PPAs choice.
2. Private monopolies are no prohibited but should be
regulated. The paramount concern is state interest and PPAs
policy is not violative of the Constitution.
3. Respondents did not question legality and validity of PPA
policy. The real issue of respondents is with the managerial
policies of the USDI and not of the PPA. The status quo that
Pernitos group is assailing is the time when their group had no
permit to operate in the port of Cebu. The questioned orders
would not return the status quo but return the burdensome
situation where various operators performed services rather
than streamlined.
Issuance of preliminary injunctions is under the sound
discretion of the court. However, judicial discretion is not
licensed to
SC Ruling: Petition is granted
DCCCO v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
[2010]
Petition for Review on Certiorari

Pernito Arrastre Services Inc., et al. (total of 18 peeps)

petitioned for declaratory relief and mandamus with injunction
and damages against PPA and United South Dockhandlers Inc
(the 11 companies that merged). Rafael Mendoza, Court of
First Instance judge, issued an injunction order that prohibited
PPA from implementing policy of integration and granting
Pernito Arrastre Services, et al. to operate without permits in
the Cebu port. This injunction was further extended to Aquino
Arrastre Services and Watergate Arrastre Services without
notice or hearing by said judge. In response, the PPA filed a
petition for certiorari at the SC.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Petitioner PPA has the power to require
integration of arrastre-stevedoring services in Philippine ports.
2. Whether PPAs policy of compulsory merger is
unconstitutional in terms of Section 2 Article 14 of 1973
Constitution and Section 20, Act 3518 that regulate private
monopolies and restraint of trade.

Summary of Proceedings:
Court of Tax Appeals - Petition for Review Partially Granted.
Assessment for deficiency withholding taxes on the
honorarium and per diems of petitioners Board of Directors,
security and janitorial services, commissions and legal and
professional fees are hereby CANCELLED . However the
assessments for deficiency withholding taxes on interests are
hereby affirmed. Petitioner is ordered to pay 1,280,145.89 and
1,357,881.14.
Facts:
Petitioner Dumaguete Cathedral Credit Cooperative (DCCCO)
is a credit cooperative duly registered with and regulated by
the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA). On November
2001, Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued Letters of
Authority authorizing BIR officers to examine petititioners

books and other accounting records for taxable years 1999

and 2000.
On June 26, 2002, petitioner received two Pre-Assessment
notices for deficiency withholding taxable years 1999 and 2000
which were protested by petitioner on July 23, 2002.
Thereafter, on October 16, 2002, petitioner received two other
Pre-Assessment Notices for deficiency withholding taxes also
for taxable years 1999 and 2000. The deficiency withholding
taxes cover the payments of the honorarium of the board of
Directors, security and janitorial services, legal and
professional fees, and interest on savings and time deposits of
its member.
Petitioner refused to pay the interest and penalties portion of
the tax. Petitioner paid on November 29, 2002 the amounts of
P105, 574.62 and P143,867.24 corresponding to the
withholding taxes on the payments. On April 2003, petitioner
received from BIR orders to pay the deficiency withholding
taxes in the amounts of 1,489,065.30 and P1,462,644.90.
Petitioner protested with the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. However the latter failed to act within the prescribed
180 day period. Hence on December 3, 2003, petitioner filed a
petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)
docketed as CTA Case No. 6827.
Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioner moved for partial
reconsideration but it was denied by the first devision in its
resolution. On July 3, 2007, it filed a petition for review with the
CTA En Banc but it was denied.
Issue:
Whether petitioner is liable to pay the deficiency withholding
taxes on interest from savings and time deposits of its
members for the taxable years 1999 and 2000, as well as the
deliquency interest of 20% per annum.
Petitioner argues that Section 24 of the National Internal
Revenue Code(NIRC) applies only to banks and not to
cooperatives since the phrase similar arrangements is
preceded by terms referring to banking transactions that have
deposit peculiarities.
Respondent counters that where the law does not distinguish,
the courts should not distinguish. Respondent maintains that
Section 24 of the NIRC applies to cooperatives as the phrase
similar arrangements is not limited to banks but includes
cooperatives that are depositories of their members. Petitioner
also invokes rules that tax exemptions are highly disfavored
and construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor
of the taxing power.
Ratio:
Petition has merit. BIR rulings No. 551-88 and DA-591-2006
declared that cooperatives are not required to withhold taxes
on interest from savings and time deposits of their members. It

bears stressing that interpretations of administrative agencies

in charge of enforcing a law are entitled to great respect and
consideration by the courts.
One must also look at the spirit or intent of the law. Articles 61
and 62 of RA 6938 express the legislative intent to give
cooperatives a preferential treatment. Pertinent provisions
were reenacted in RA 9520. Our constitution itself guarantees
the protection of cooperatives. Article XII, Section 15 considres
cooperatives as instruments for social justice and economic
development
HELD:
Petition is granted and CTA resolution is set aside.
Assessments for deficiency on withholding taxes from savings
and time deposits as well as delinquency interest are hereby
set aside.

FOR TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 23

Chavez v. Gonzales Puno, CJ
February 15, 2008
Petitioner: Francisco Chavez
Respondents: Raul Gonzales as DOJ Secretary, and National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and
Prohibition
Facts:
The case is centered on the events concerning the release of
the Hello Garci tapes, which are allegedly wiretapped
conversations between a woman, supposedly President
Macapagal-Arroyo, and a man, supposedly COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, discussing the 'rigging' of the
2004 Presidential Elections. On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary
Ignacio Bunye told reporters of the possible release of the said
tapes as a measure by the opposition to destabilize the
government. Bunye presented two tapes, one 'real' and the
other 'doctored.' He then admitted that it was Pres. Arroyo's
voice heard in the tapes, but he made a retraction soon after.
On June 7, Atty. Alan Paguia, former counsel of former Pres.
Estrada, released the allegedly authetic recording of the
wiretap. On June 8, Sec. Gonzales warned the press that
those who had copies of the tapes that they could be held
liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act, and that they could be
arrested.
On June 11, NTC issued a 'fair warning to radio and television
owners/operators to observe anti-wiretapping law.' In this press
release, the NTC warned radio and television network
operators that their authorizations and licenses explicitly
provides that they will not use their stations for the
broadcasting of false information or willful representation, and

that doing so is just cause for their suspension, revocation

and/or cancellation of their authorizations and licenses.

d. With these reasons, there is doubt whether the antiwiretapping act was actually violated.

On June 17, NTC held a dialogue with the Board of Directors

of the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) and
thereafter, issued a joint press statement which states that the
NTC was merely asking that the tapes be 'treated with
sensitivity and handled responsibly' and that they should let
due process be undertaken in ascertaining the authenticity of
the tapes. The press statement also said that the NTC is
asking that 'the exercise of press freedom be done
responsibly.'

In addition, since freedom of speech and of the press is

granted preferred right status, not every violation of a law will
justify its restriction.

Subsequently, petitioner Chavez filed his umm-(?), petition

under Rule 65, to 'prevent the unlawful, unconstitutional and
oppressive exercise of authority by the respondents.' Chavez
alleges that the acts of the respondents are violations of the
freedom of expression and of the press, and the right to
infomation by the people on matters of public concern. Chavez
is an ordinery citizen, and was not joined by members of the
broadcast media, nor did they intervene for his petition.
Respondents, in reply, question the petitioner's standing to file
the suit, allege that broadcast media holds less constitutional
guarantees as compared to print media, and that the warning
was in accordance to NTC's mandate to regulate the
telecommunications industry. Respondents also state that the
radio and television networks are still airing the tape anyway.
Issues:
1. WON petitioner has standing to file the suit - YES
2. WON acts of respondents violate the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press - YES
Ratio:
1. Petitioner raised a constitutional issue of transcendental
importance. Technicalities must be set aside and the petition
should be given way.
2. Since the restriction is content-based, it should be given the
strictest scrutiny, and presumed invalid and unconstitutional.
The government is given the burden of proof to prove its
restriction constitutional through the clear and present danger
test.
It appears that the 'clear and present danger' that the
government wants to repvent is the airing of the tape, which
violates the anti-wiretapping act, which endangers the national
security of the State. This falls short in being a clear and
present danger because:
a. The identity of the voices are obfuscated/unknown
b. There are many versions of the tape, which puts its integrity
in question
c. There is not enough evidence regarding the identity of the
wiretappers, how they were able to wiretap the conversation
and such, which are relevant proofs in this case.

The press statements of Sec. Gonzales and the NTC are also
examples of prior retraint, which has to be justified under the
clear and present danger test as well. As demonstrated, the
government failed the clear and present danger test.
Held:
Petition is granted. Official statements made by respondents
warning the media against airing the Garci tapes are nullified
because they constitute unconsitutional prior restraint on the
exercise of freedom of speech and the press.
Notes:
Freedom of speech and of the press is accorded preferred
status because it the basis upon which all other freedoms can
be exercised. It is necessary in a constitutional democracy
such as ours, because only when people have access to
information can they make enlightened judgments. Its scope is
given the broadest scope and widest latitude. It is not confined
to any particular field of human interest, or the expression of
ideas of the majority.
It is, however, not absolute. There are three tests to
determine the validity of restraints to the freedom of
speech and of the press (individually or in combination):
a. Dangerous tendency doctrine - permits limitation when a
rational connection between speech restrained and danger
contemplated is established.
b. Balancing of interests - balance of social values and
individual interests must be attained
c. Clear and present danger - speech may be restrained is
there is a substantial danger that the government has a right to
prevent. These dangers must be 1) substantive; 2) extremely
serious; 3) the degree of their imminence must be high.
The SC has generally adhered to the clear and present danger
test.
There are four aspects of freedom of the press:
a. Freedom from prior restraint - Prior restraint refers to official
governmental
restriction in advance
of publication or
dissemination. It is the
freedom from
government
censorship, whatever
the form of censorship.

To be free from prior

restraint is to be free
from any required
government approval
to publish things. Any
act that constitutes
prior restriction is
presumed invalid.
b. Freedom from punishment subsequent to publication opinions cannot be
punished after they are
published just because
they are controversial.
But this does not mean
that the press can
publish
false/obscene/libelous
matter. Freedom of the
press embraces the
freedom to discuss
truthfully and publicly
matters of public
concern.
c. Freedom of access of information - Official papers, reports,
and documents not
kept confidential and
secret are public
records. Also includes
protection of sources,
unless Congress
deems the revelation of
a source vital to the
security of the State.
d. Freedom of circulation - Distribution of newspapers and
other media to the general
public must be unhampered.
Prior restraint is distinguished according to the following:
a. Content-neutral regulation - regulation that is concerned
only with incidentals (time,
place, manner, etc.). Only
a substantial government
interest is required for this
regulation to be valid.
- not subject to intense
judicial scrutiny, but to an
intermediate approach,
which requires that the
restriction is narrowlytailored to promote a
governmental interest that
is not related to the
suppression of expression.
b. Content-based regulation - restriction that is based on the
content of the expression.
This is subject to the clear

and present danger rule, in

which the government
must show the harm that
the speech/expression will
bring about. Such harm
cannot be based on
hypothetical fears, and the
words used must be
shown to bring about a
substantive evils that
Congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of
proximity and degree.
- must also show a
substantial government
interest, which is unrelated
to the suppression of
expression.
- restriction must also not
be overbroad or vague.
Two types of content-based regulation:
a. Total government ban of the speech
b. Government restricts a certain type to certain times/places
so that it would not affect its environment
Broadcast media also enjoys less rights as compared to
print media because:
a. the scarcity of the frequencies that broadcast media
operates necessitates a stricter standard than print media
b. broadcast media is pervasive, in the sense that it is
available everywhere, even in the privacy of one's own home
c. broadcast media is uniquely accessible to children, even
those too young to read.
The additional restrictions on broadcast media are narrowly
confined to unprotected speech, and is based on compelling
State interest. The clear and present danger test also applies
to content-based regulations in broadcast media
Notes:
Sec. 4 and Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution
Freedom of expression and press, and the right to information
Gonzales v. COMELEC
- No prior restraint until there be a clear and present danger of
substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent
- Freedom of expression is not absolute
- Court has always ruled in favor of freedom of expression, and
any restriction is treated an exemption
Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans All
forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the
broad protection of the clause on freedom of speech and of

expression. The test for limitations on freedom of expression

continues to be the clear and present danger rule.

executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the

Constitution.

Cruz v. DENR (with Punos opinion)

Ratio:
***To be found in the separate opinions***

Cruz vs. DENR (2000) Per Curiam

Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus
Facts/Issue:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa assail the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997, and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The
Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly
unconstitutional in that it grants ownership over natural
resources to indigenous people.

Ruling:
The voting resulted in a deadlock of 7-7, with 7 voting to
dismiss and 7 voting to grant the petition. Upon redeliberation,
the voting remained the same. Pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition was Dismissed.
Justice Puno: Separate Opinion (For Dismissal)
Issue:
1. WON the questioned sections of the IPRA are
unconstitutional. NO (except for a certain portion that is)
Facts/Ratio:

Petitioners assail the constitutionality on the grounds that they

amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership
over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other
natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. They
question the following:
- Section 3 (a): Defines the extent and coverage of Ancestral
Domains
- Section 3 (b): Defines the extent and coverage of Ancestral
Lands
- Section 5: Ancestral Domains are private but community
property of the indigenous people
- Section 6: defines the composition of AD and AL
- Section 7: recognizes and enumerates the rights of IP over
the AD
- Section 8: recognizes and enumerates the rights of IP over
AL
- Section 57: Priority rights of the IP in the exploitation of
minerals and natural resources within the AD
- Section 58: gives the IP the responsibility to maintain,
develop, protect, and conserve the AD
They feel that sections 3(a) and 3(b) may violate the rights of
private landowners if the definition of ancestral domains and
ancestral lands include private lands within the said areas.
They also contest the applicability of customary law in the
settlement of disputes involving ancestral domain and lands as
this is said to violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.
Petitioners also question the validity of Rule VII, Part II,
Section 1 of the NCIP (National Commission of Indigenous
Peoples) that characterizes the relationship of the NCIP to the
Office of the President as a lateral but autonomous one, as it is
said to infringe on the Presidents power of control over

- The Regalian Doctrine, or jura regalia, is a Western legal

concept introduced by the Spaniards through the Laws of the
Indies and the Royal Cedulas. It states essentially that when
the Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of discovery, all
lands became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the
Spanish Crown, and private land had to be acquired from the
government and/or the Crown.
- Public Land Act (No. 926) operated on the assumption that
title to public lands in the PI remained in the government
- Act 496, or the Land Registration Law of 1903, placed all
public and private lands in the Philippines under the Torrens
system, which requires the government to issue an official
certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is
the owner of the property described therein
- Regalian Doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution
despite the framers doubt whether it was continued and
applied by the Americans
- IPRA grants IPs their ADs or ALs based on the indigenous
concept of ownership under customary law which traces its
origin to native title
- Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICC) or Indigenous
Peoples (IP) are defined as groups of people who have
actually occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under
claim of ownership since time immemorial.
- The concept that the Spanish King was the owner of
everything of value in the Indies or colonies meant that the
natives were stripped of their ancestral rights to land.
- Marcos set up the Presidential Adviser on National Minorities
(PANAMIN) which, though adopting the integration policy,
recognized the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of
life.
- The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy
of integration to one of preservation.
- The State, by recognizing the right of tribal Filipinos to their
ancestral lands and domains, has effectively upheld their right
to live in a culture distinctly their own.

- Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples economic

and social system. The concept of individual land ownership is
alien to them, as they subscribe to a communal property
system.
- The NCIP issues a certificate of Ancestral Domain Title
(CADT) in the name of the community concerned, as well as a
Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT)
- The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands and domains
held by native title as never to have been public land, and are
indisputably presumed to have been held that way since
before the Spanish Conquest
- like a Torrens title, a CADT is evidence of the private
ownership of land by native title
- The concept of native title was first upheld in Carino vs.
Insular Government, and as it is enshrined in the IPRA grants
ownership, albeit in a limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs.
- The indigenous concept of ownership governs the AD and AL
and holds that they are private but community property. The
AD is owned in common and not by one particular person,
however it is not synonymous with the co-ownership rights
under the Civil Code.
- The indigenous concept of ownership under customary law is
specifically acknowledged and recognized, and coexists with
the civil law concept and the laws on land titling and land
registration.
- There is nothing in the IPRA that grants ownership over the
natural resources within their AD
- The right of ownership as expressly defined and limited in
section 7(a) does not cover waters, minerals, coal, petroleum
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all other natural
resources enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution as belonging to the State.
- However, the inclusion of natural resources in Section 1,
Part II, Rule III of the IR goes beyond the parameters of
Section 7(b) of the law and is contrary to Section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution
- The right to negotiate the terms and conditions over the
natural resources covers only their exploration which must be
for the purpose of ensuring ecological and environmental
protection of, and conservation measures in the AD, and does
not extend to the exploitation and development of natural
resources
- The ICC or IPs rights over the natural resources take the
form of management or stewardship
- Small-scale utilization of natural resources is expressly
allowed in the third paragraph of section of Section 2, Art XII of
the Constitution, which states in recognition of the plight of
forest dwellers, gold panners, marginal fishermen and other
similarly situated who exploit our natural resources for their
daily sustenance and survival, and this view must necessarily
reject utilization in a large-scale.
- Though the IPs are given priority in large-scale development
and exploitation, Section 57 does not mandate the State to
automatically give priority to them, and the State never loses
control and ownership of the resources even in their
exploitation.

- Sections 7(b) and 57 of the law simply give due respect to the
IPs who, as actual occupants of the land wherein the natural
resources lie, have traditionally utilized these resources for
their subsistence and survival.
Ruling:
Sustained all challenged provisions of the IPRA with the
exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing
Rules for going beyond the parameters of Section 7(b) and
contravening Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

Chavez v. Public Estates Authority

Chavez v Public Estates Authority (2002)
Carpio, J.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the SC. MANDAMUS
ANTECEDENT FACTS:
-1973: Commissioner of Public Highways signed a contract
with the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim foreshore and offshore areas of
Manila Bay
-President Marcos issued PD 1084 creating Public Estates
Authority (PEA).
- Memorandum of Agreement between PEA and CDCP stating
that CDCP shall give up all development rights and transfer it
to PEA.
- President Aquino issued Special patent no. 3517 transferring
to PEA the lands reclaimed in the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road
and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP); as a result, Register of
Deeds of Paranaque transferred the three reclaimed islands
(Freedom Islands) to PEA.
FACTS:
-PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with
AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands.
-PEA and AMARI did the negotiation without public bidding.
-President Ramos, through his Exec Secretary Ruben Torres,
approved the JVA
-Petitioner Frank Chavez, as tax payer, filed the instant
Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary injunction and Temporary Restraining Order,
praying that:
>PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation
of JVA
>the sale to AMARI of the lands of public domain be
declared void
ISSUES:
1.
WON Amended JVA should be declared null and void
for violating:
a.
Sec. 2 &3, Article XII regarding alienable lands of public
domain
- YES.

Sec. 2: All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,

petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception
of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not
be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization
of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.
Sec. 3: Lands of the public domain are classified into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.
Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further
classified, by law according to the uses which they may be
devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be
limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding
twenty five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and not to exceed on thousand hectares in area.
Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than 25
hectares or acquire not more than 12 hectares thereof by
purchase, homestead, or grant.
Sec. 6. CA no. 141: The President, upon the recommendation
of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time
classify the lands
of the public domain into:(a) Alienable or disposable, (b)
Timber, and (c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands
from one class
to another, for the purposes of their administration and
disposition.
> Given these, AMARI, a private corporation, could not hold
alienable lands of public domain as ascribed in the amended
JVA. Moreover, the mere reclamation of the areas by PEA
does not convert these inalienable natural resources into
alienable or disposable lands of public domain. There must be
a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to
disposition or concession.
b. Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code
-YES. Section 79 states that the disposition of government
lands to private parties require public bidding. The Amended
JVA was the result of a negotiated contract, not of a public
bidding.
2.
WON the right to information includes information on
on-going negotiation before a final agreement
-YES.
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution : The right of the
people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy

development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such

limitations as may be provided by law.
Sec. 28, Article II: Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed
by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
>Given these provisions, PEA must, before the consummation
of the contract, disclose the matters relating to the disposition
of its property; However, once the committee makes its official
recommendation, there arises a definite proposition on the
part of the government, thereby making the right to information
operative. HOWEVER, this does not mean that a
consummated contract is a requirement for invoking the
exercise of the right to information.
Moreover, the right to information only allows access and
opportunity to access records, documents and papers. Said
right does NOT compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like regarding the renegotiation of JVA.
Therefore, the constitutional right to information includes
official information on on-going negotiations before a final
contract. The information, however, must constitute
definite propositions by the government and should not
cover recognized exceptions like privileged information,
military and diplomatic secrets affecting national security
and public order.
3. WON petitioner has locus standi
-YES. Petitioner is a taxpayer who has constitutional rights that
the PEA may violate: (1)the right of citizens to information on
matters of public concern; (2)equitable distribution of alienable
lands of public domain among Filipino citizens
4.
WON petition is mood and academic
-NO. Just because the Amended JVA had already been signed
by PEA and AMARI does not mean that it can operate to moot
the petition. PEA and AMARI have still to implement the
Amended JVA.
5.
WON petitioner neglected the principle of hierarchy of
courts
-NO. The principle of hierarchy of courts generally applies to
cases involving factual questions. The case at hand raises
constitutional questions of transcendental importance to the
public.
The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but
one which seeks to transfer title and ownership to 367.5
hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila
Bay to a single private constitution.
SC RULING:
PETITION GRANTED. Amended Joint Venture Agreement
declared NULL AND VOID
NOTES:

Sec. 2 & 3, Article XII The constitutional ban strengthens the

constitutional limitation on individuals from acquiring more than
the allowed area of alienable lands of public domain. If private
corporations were allowed, then individuals can use this to
circumvent the limitation/cap.
Revised Administrative Code of 1987, Section 4
*entails the DENR is vested with the power to authorize
the reclamation of areas under water, while PEA is vested
with the power to undertake physical reclamation of areas
whether directly or through private
contractors(15)Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the
management and disposition of all lands of the public domain
and serve as the sole agency responsible for classification,
sub-classification, surveying, and titling of lands in consultation
with appropriate agencies
Article 5 Spanish Law of Waters of 1866
*must be readwith CA no. 141 (refer to issue 1(a)) Lands
reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed
by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons,
with proper permission, shall become the property of the party
constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the
terms of the grant of authority.
The original JVA, anegotiated contract enlarged the
reclamation area to 750 hectares
BOT law and Section 302 of the Local Government Code
(In case of land reclamation or construction of industrial
estates, the repayment plan may consist of the grant of a
portion or percentage of the reclaimed land or the
industrial estate constructed) Under either the BOT Law or
the Local Government Code, the contractor or developer, if a
corporate entity, can only be paid with leaseholds on portions
of the reclaimed land. If the contractor is an individual, portions
of the reclaimed land, not exceeding 12 hectares of nonagricultural lands, may be conveyed to him in ownership in
view of the legislative authority allowing such conveyance.
Registration is not a mode of ownership; it is merely an
evidence of ownership
Sec. 60 CA no. 141
*does not automatically convert alienable lands of public
domain into private or patrimonial lands. Sec. 60. Any tract
of land comprised under this title may be leased or
sold, as the case may be, to any person, corporation, or
association
authorized to purchase or lease public lands for agricultural
purposes. The
area of the land so leased or sold shall be such as shall, in the
judgment of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, be
reasonably necessary
for the purposes for which such sale or lease is requested, and
shall in no
case exceed one hundred forty-four hectares; Provided,
however, That this
limitation shall not apply to grants, donations, or transfers
made to a province,
municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government for
the purposes

deemed by said entities conducive to the public interest; but

the land so
granted, donated, or transferred to a province, municipality or
branch or
subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated,
encumbered, or
otherwise disposed of in a manner effecting its title, except
when authorized
by Congress; Provided, further, That any person, corporation,
association, or
partnership disqualified from purchasing public land for
agricultural purposes
under the provisions of this Act, may lease land included under
this title
suitable for industrial or residential purposes, but the lease
granted shall only
be valid while such land is used for the purposes referred to.
(As amended by
Rep. Act 4107, approved June 19, 1964.)
IDEALS v. PSALM
Villarama, Jr., J.
It is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to
permanently enjoin the sale of the Angat Hydro-Electric Power
Plant (AHEPP) to Korea Water Resources Corporation (KWater).
Facts:
On August 2005, PSALM started with the privatization of
AHEPP in accordance with RA 9136 (EPIRA). On December
2009, the bidding procedure of AHEPP were approved. On
January 2010, the invitations for bidding were published in 3
major national newspapers. On May 5, 2010, K-Water was
confirmed the issuance of a Notice of Award. On May 19,
2010, IDEALS issued petition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
On May 24, 2010, this Court issued a Status QuoAnte Order
directing the respondents to maintain the status quo prevailing
before the filing of the petition and to file their respective
Comments on the petition. Petitioners contend that PSALM
gravely abused its discretion when, in the conduct of the
bidding it disregarded and violated the peoples right to
information guaranteed under the Constitution. Petitioners also
say that PSALM cannot sell the AHEPP without the consent of
co-owners MWSS and NIA. Petitioners contend that PSALM
clearly violated the constitutional provisions on the
appropriation and utilization of water as a natural resource, as
implemented by the Water Code of the Philippines limiting
water rights to Filipino citizens and corporations which are at
least 60% Filipino-owned and that the contract should be null
and void. PSALM prayed for the dismissal of the petition
because a petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy, the
petition is moot, the court has no jurisdiction, and petitioners
lack legal standing. They also refuted the contentions of the

petitioners that they violated the right of the petitioners to

information, the implication of co-ownership of AHEPP, the
violation of the right to water. MWSS asserts that they have
control over AHEPP because of the MWSS Charter, which
prevails over EPIRA. They also contend that PSALM failed to
provide a safeguard prescribed in Sec. 47 of the EPIRA when
it proceeded with the privatization of the AHEPP. They also
cite the interpretation of paragraph 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution in the case Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS
that the AHEPP is in danger of being wholly owned by a
Korean company. FGNEC agrees with the comment of PSALM
but disagrees with allowing K-Water to participate in the
bidding. K-Water says that their participation in the bidding was
guided and in accordance with the constitution. The petitioners
refute the reply of PSALM. PSALM responds to MWSS and
asserts their control over AHEPP and the constitutionality of KWater's participation.
Issues:
WON petitioners have legal standing. YES
The proceeding involves the assertion of a public right. The
mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest. The petition is anchored on
the peoples right to information on matters of public concern,
any citizen can be the real party in interest.
WON the petition is moot NO
The petition was filed not only as a means of enforcing the
States obligation to protect the citizens right to water that is
recognized under international law and legally enforceable
under our Constitution, but also to bar a foreign corporation
from exploiting our water resources in violation of Sec. 2, Art.
XII of the 1987 Constitution.
WON the right to information was violated YES
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution is intertwined with
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution. EPIRA was enacted to
provide for an orderly and transparent privatization of NPCs
assets and liabilities. Specifically, said law mandated that all
assets of NPC shall be sold in an open and transparent
manner through public bidding. The court found that PSALM's
evasive response did not comply with the constitutional
requirement and inconsistent with EPIRA.
WON there is co-ownership of the AHEPP NO
NEDA concluded that there appears to be no basis to exclude
AHEPP from the list of NPC generation assets to be privatized
and no compelling reason to transfer its management,
operations and control to MWSS. NEDA also pointed out that
ownership and operation of a hydropower plant, however, goes
beyond the mandate of MWSS. MWSS does not have the
capability to operate the plant and would end up getting private
companies to help in the operation of the plant, thus entailing
additional costs. With the advent of EPIRA in 2001, PSALM
came into existence for the principal purpose of managing the
orderly sale, privatization and disposition of generation assets,

real estate and other disposable assets of the NPC including

IPP Contracts.
WON there is violation of Sec. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution
YES
According to Sec. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution, the
exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. Art. 3 of P.D. No. 1067 is suppletory
to the provision in the constitution. The Court rules that while
the sale of AHEPP to a foreign
corporation pursuant to the privatization mandated by the
EPIRA did not violate Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
which limits the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources under the full
supervision and control of the State or the States undertaking
the same through joint
venture, co-production or production sharing agreements with
Filipino corporations 60% of the capital of which is owned by
Filipino citizens, the stipulation in the Asset Purchase
Agreement and Operations and Maintenance Agreement
whereby NPC consents to the transfer of water rights to the
foreign buyer, K-Water, contravenes the aforesaid
constitutional provision and the Water Code
WON there is violation of the Water Code provisions on the
grant of water rights YES
Stipulation in the Asset Purchase Agreement states that NPC
must transfer the water permit to the buyer but the buyer must
comply with citizenship requirement by the Water Code. Since
only the power plant is to be sold and privatized, the operation
of the non-power components such as the dam and reservoir,
including the maintenance of the surrounding watershed,
should remain under the jurisdiction and control of NPC which
continue to be a
government corporation. There is therefore no necessity for
NPC to transfer its permit over the water rights to K-Water.
Section 6 (a) of the IRR of R.A. No. 9136 insofar as it directs
the transfer of water rights in the privatization of multi-purpose
hydropower facilities, is merely directory.
WON PSALM failed to comply with Sec. 47 (e) of EPIRA NO
It is the position of PSALM that as the new owner only of the
hydroelectric power plant, K-Water will be a mere operator of
the Angat Dam. The construction, rehabilitation and
development of hydropower plants are among those
infrastructure projects which even wholly-owned foreign
corporations are allowed to undertake under the Amended
Build-Operate-Transfer (Amended BOT) Law (R.A. No. 7718).
Held:
The petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
injunctive relief/s is PARTLY GRANTED.

s Charter has been unequivocally withdrawn by Secs. 193

and 234 of the LGC. Any claim to the contrary can only be
justified by the exemptions provided in Sec. 234 which
qualifies Sec. 133.
The terms Republic of the Philippines used in Sec. 234 and
National Government used in Sec.133 are not
interchangeable. The former is broader and synonymous with
Government of the Republic of the Philippines whereas the
latter refers to the entire machinery of the central government,
as distinguished from the different forms of local government.
Sec. 234 does not cover real property owned by other
instrumentalities or agencies of the government including
government-owned and controlled corporations, otherwise it
would have been expressly stated.
Moreover, petitioner does not fall under the exemption in Sec.
234 since:
1.
The parcels of land in question do not belong to the
Republic of the Philippines.
Sec. 15 of the Charter involves

FOR TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30

II. ATTRIBUTES OF STATE
A. Inherent Powers of the State
1.
Police Power
Basco v. PAGCOR
Basco, et al. v PAGCOR (1991) Paras, J.
Petitioner: Humberto Basco, Edilberto Balce, Socrates
Maranan and Lorenzo Sanchez
Respondents: Philippine Amusements and Gaming
Corporation
Instant Petition for Review
Summary of Proceedings:
SC- filed for review
Facts:
1. Petitioners filed the instant petition seeking to annul the
PAGCOR Charter (PD 1869). Petitioners gave several reasons
as to why they seek to annul:
PAGCOR is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy
and order
PD constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial against a
third party with a right recognized by law (PD waived
the right of Manila Citys LGU to impose taxes and
license fees). It also contradicts the constitutionality
principle of local autonomy
PD violates equal protection clause because it
legalizes conducted gambling via PAGCOR
compared to prostitution, drug trafficking etc.

PD violates administration policy of C. Aquinos

government of veering away from monopoly and
cronism
PD violates selected provisions in the Constitution

2. PAGCOR was created in January 1, 1977 due to PD 1067-A

and granted a franchise via PD 1067-B. Its was established to
operate and maintain gambling casino on land or water within
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. It was supplemented by
PD 1869 to enable the government to regulate and centralize
all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or
permitted by law.
Issue:
1. Procedural issue: Do petitioners have legal standing for
filing the petition? Yes
2. Substantive issues:
PD 1869 constitutes a waiver of right of City of Manila
to collect legal fees and impose taxes, it violates
principle of local autonomy. NO
PD 1869 violates equal protection via legalizing
gambling. No and obscure
PD 1869 is against avowed trend of Cory government
against monopolies and cronism. No
PD 1869 violates Sections 11(Personal Dignity),
12(Family), 13 (Role of Youth) of Article 2, Section 13
(Social Justice) of Article 13 and Section
2(Educational Values) of Article 14. No
Ratio:
1. Legal Standing: importance to public of the case allows the
Court to brush aside technicalities in procedure.
2. Gambling is not allowed by law however the government
may regulate it in the exercise of its police power. Police
power is not a constitutional grant but rather an inborn
aspect (similar with taxing power and eminent domain) by
the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. Public welfare is
the reason behind the enactment of PD 1869. PD 1869
regulates gambling which gives revenue to the government to
be spent upon social impact projects.
3. Waiver of rights of Manila City LGU and principle of local
autonomy: PD 1869 exempts PAGCOR from paying any taxes
or fees attached to the income of the corporation aside from
5% gross revenue. Manila, as a municipal corporation, has
no inherent right to tax. Its power to tax is derived from
legislative act. Power to impose license fees on gambling by
LGU has been revoked by PD 771. City cannot tax PAGCOR
due to it being an operation of constitutional laws. This is
based on doctrine of supremacy of National Government over
local government.
4. Equal protection clause: petitioners posture ignores wellaccepted meaning of the clause. No valid ground to sustain the
contention. Mere fact that some gambling activities like
cockfighting (PD 449) horse racing (RA 306 amended by RA
983), sweepstakes and lotteries (STL) and races (RA 1169
amended by BP 42) are legalized while other gambling
activities are illegal does not render PD 1869 unconstitutional.

5. Claim that PD 1869 is against avowed trend of Cory

Government: If true, then executive dept should be the one to
recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment. Constitution
does not prohibit monopolies (Sec 19 Art 12)
6. PD 1869 violates said sections of Constitution: Said sections
are merely statements of principles and policies thus are not
self-executing. All laws have presumption of constitutionality.
There is a need to show clear and beyond reasonable doubt of
breach of constitution before law can be declared null.
SC Ruling: Petition Dismissed for lack of merit
Opinions: Padilla, J.
Concur but desires to put onto record that personal opinion on
gambling is bad and reprehensible. Recommends that
legislative dept should outlaw all forms of gambling as
fundamental state policy. (Melencio-Herrera, J. concurs)
Notes: (Paraphrased)
PD 1869: PAGCOR Charter
Sec.1- Declaration of Policy
A. to centralize all operations to one corporate entity
controlled, supervise and administered by Gov.
B. To establish and operate clubs and casinos to generate
additional revenue to fund socio-civic projects and
infrastructures, improve and expand nations tourism and
minimize malpractices in gambling
Sec. 2 Income and other taxes
A. Franchise Holder- no taxes except 5% of gross annual
revenue to national government
Sec. 9 Regulatory power: PAGCOR maintains registry and
exercise of all powers of all affiliated entities
PD 1067-A: create PAGCOR
PD1067-B: granted franchise to PAGCOR
PD1399: amends PD1067 to create floating casino Philippine
Tourist to expand PAGCOR operations outside Metro Manila
PD 771: Revocation of powers of LGUs to grant permits and
franchises to gambling

United States Vs. Pompeya (Aug 6, 1915)

Summary of Proceedings:
Court of First Instance- Fiscal charges Silvestre Pompeya with
violation of the municipal ordinance of Iloilo, on the subject of
patrol duty, executive order no. 1 of municipal code.
Sentenced by the justice of peace of Iloilo to a fine of 2
PESOS and payment of costs of trial
Supreme Court: Affirmed judgment

render service on patrol duty, required under said municipal

ordinance.
Upon arraignment, Pompeya presented a demurrer, stating
that the acts charged in the complaint do not constitute a crime
and that the municipal ordinance is unconstitutional for being
repugnant to the Organic Act of the Philippines, which
guarantees the liberty of the citizens.
The trial judge sustained said demurrer and ordered the
dismissal of the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not said law is in violation of the provisions of the
Philippine Bill in depriving citizens of their rights therein
guaranteed-NO
HELD:
The municipal ordinance was enacted pursuant to the
provisions of Act No. 1309, the specific purpose of which is to
require each able-bodied male resident of the municipality,
between the ages of 18 and 55, as well as each householder
when so required by the president, to assist in the
maintenance of peace and good order in the community, by
apprehending ladrones, etc., as well as by giving information of
the existence of such persons in the locality. The amendment
contains a punishment for those who may be called upon for
such service, and who refuse to render the same.
The Supreme Court cited the tribal relations of the primitive
man, the feudal system, the days of the "hundreds" -- all of
which support the idea of an ancient obligation of the individual
to assist in the protection of the peace and good order of his
community and his fellowmen.
It was held that the power exercised under the provisions of
Act No. 1309 falls within the police power of the state and that
the state was fully authorized and justified in conferring the
same upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that,
therefore, the provisions of the said Act are constitutional and
not in violation nor in derogation of the rights of the persons
affected thereby.
Decision:
The judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs.
So ordered

FACTS:

Notes:

This case is regarding the complaint filed by the prosecuting

attorney of the Province of Iloilo, charging Silvestre Pompeya
with violation of the municipal ordinance of Iloilo for willfully,
illegally, and criminally and without justifiable motive failing to

Source
Provision/Doctrine
Sec. 40 Act. No. 82 (municipal code)-The power of municipal
councils
Act No. 1309 Amends said section above- 1. To authorize the
municipal president to require able-bodied male residents of

the municipality, between the ages of eighteen and fifty years,

to assist, for a period not exceeding five days in any one
month, in apprehending ladrones, robbers, and other
lawbreakers and suspicious characters, and to act as patrols
for the protection of the municipality, not exceeding one day in
each week. The failure, refusal, or neglect of any such ablebodied man to render promptly the service thus required shall
be punishable by a fine not exceeding one hundred pesos or
by imprisonment for not more than three months, or by both
such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court
Organic act 1902- The Philippine Organic Act was a basic law
for the Insular Government that was enacted by the United
States Congress on July 1, 1902. It is also known as the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Cooper Act, after its author
Henry A. Cooper. The approval of the act coincided with the
official end of the PhilippineAmerican War.
The Philippine Organic Act provided for the creation of an
elected Philippine Assembly after the following conditions were
met:
1. the cessation of the existing insurrection in the
Philippine Islands;
2. completion and publication of a census; and
3. two years of continued peace and recognition of the
authority of the United States of America after the
publication of the census.
Binay v. Domingo
Paras, J.
September 11, 1991

Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal

corporations. Before they can exercise such power, there must
be a valid delegation of such power by the legislation which is
the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid
delegation may arise from express delegation, or be inferred
from the mere fact of the creation of municipal corporation, and
as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police
powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation
which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers
express granted. Municipal governments exercise this power
under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are
clothed with authority to enact such ordinances and issue
such regulations as may be necessary to carry out, and
discharge the responsibilities conferred to it by law.
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and
general welfare of the people. Though police power is NOT
capable of an exact definition.
The care for the power is generally recognized as a public
duty. The drift towards social welfare legislation geared
towards state policies to provide adequate social services
(Section 9, Art. 2, Constitution), the promotion of the general
welfare (Section 5, ibid) social justice (Section 10) as well as
human dignity and respect for human rights (Section 11).
Resolution no. 60 re-enacted under Resolution No. 243 is a
paragon of the continuing program of our government towards
social justice.
Held:

Petitioner: Honorable Jejomar Binay

Respondent: Honorable Eufemio Domingo and the
Commision on Audit
Special Civil Action for Certiorari
Facts:
In 1988, petitioner Municipality passed Resolution no.60 which
provided for burial assistance to the amount of P500 to
bereaved families whose incomes do not exceed P2000 a
month. Resolution was eventually referred to COA which
disallowed funds to be released for it. In its Decision No. 1159,
Binays two letters for consideration were shot down. It is
prayed in this petition that said COA decision be declared null
and void.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under
Resolution no. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid
exercise of police power under the general welfare clause YES
Ratio:

Petition GRANTED. CA Decision No. 1159 SET ASIDE.

Agustin v. Edu
Fernando, J.
February 2, 1972
Petitioner: Leovillo C. Agustin
Respondents: Hon. Romeo Edu as Land Transportation
Commissioner, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile as Minister of National
Defense, Hon Alfredo L. Juinio as Minister of Public Works,
Hon. Baltazar Aquino as Minister of Public Highways
Original Action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition
Facts:
On December 2, 1974, President Marcos enacted Letter of
Instruction No. 229, later amended by Letter of Instruction
no. 479, providing that all owners, users, or drivers of motor
vehicles shall have one pair of early warning device2 on their
vehicle at all times3. Such device should be put four meters
away to the front and rear of the motor vehicle stalled, or
2

triangular, collapsible, reflectorized plates is red and

yellow; at least 15 cm at the base and 40 cm at the sides
3
As per our ratification of the 1968 Vienna Convention
on Road Signs and Signals

parked for more than 30 minutes. The acquisition of an early

warning device was also added as a requirement in the
registration of every motor vehicle owner. Land
Transportation Commission Administrative Order no. 1,
the implementing rules, was issued by Respondent Edu on
January 25, 1977. They were suspended for six months, to
give motorists time to comply to the new registration
requirements. On June 30, 1978, LOI no. 716 ordered the
lifting of the suspension, prompting Respondent Edu to issue
Memorandum Circular no. 32 on August 28, 1978, which
directed the implementation of LOIs 229 and 479.
Petitioner filed the suit, and prayed that LOIs and
Memorandum Circular no. 32 be declared void and
unconstitutional and that a restraining order should be
enforced against the aforementioned in the meantime.
Petitioner states that he owns a Volkswagen Beetle with
blinking light fore and aft, which can be used as an early
warning device. He also avers that the LOIs 'clearly violates
the provisions and delegation of police power' and are really,
really, really bad4.
Court issued a TRO on October 19, 1978, and required
respondents to file an answer and not to move to dismiss the
petition.
Respondents, through Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza,
answered that the allegations by petitioner are without legal
and factual basis, the LOIs were a valid exercise of police
power, and the implementing rules and regulations were not
unlawful delegations of legislative power.
Issues:
1. WON the LOIs were a valid exercise of police power - Yes
2. WON the delegation of legislative power was unlawful - No
Ratio:
1. Police power is the power of the State to 'enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote general welfare', and 'the most essential, insistent,
and at least illimitable power to all the great public needs,' and
its exercise carries a presumption of validity and
constitutionality. Thus, it is up to the petitioner to prove that the
exercise of such is unconstitutional and unreasonable.
Petitioner failed to do so by not laying the necessary factual
foundations to rebut the sai presumption of validity.
The Solicitor General further justified the enactment of the
LOIs by stating that the President had statistical information
and data backing up the LOIs, proving that a careful study was
done before its enactment.
4

'oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, and

contrary to the precepts of the compassionate New
Society;' are 'infected with arbitrariness because it is
harsh, cruel, and unconscionable to the motoring public;
one-sided, patently illegal and immoral

The requirement is also not an 'expensive redundancy'

because an early warning device is a sign known to all
signatories of the 1968 Vienna Conventions; any motorist who
sees the early warning device will conclude, without thinking,
that there is a stalled vehicle ahead, and he/she must exercise
caution passing such. Also, motorists are free to make their
own early warning devices; the State is not compelling them to
buy their own.
2. A standard5, which defines legislative policy, marks its limits,
maps out its boundaries, and specifies the public agency to
apply it is necessary to prove a valid delegation of legislative
power. It may be express, or implied. The petitioner did not
show that there was a lack of such when he alleged that the
delegation of legislative power was unlawful.
It also evident that the petitioner does not trust the wisdom of
the said LOIs and Memorandum Circulars. The Court cannot
grant the petition based on this because it is not its duty to
override legitimate policy and inquire into the wisdom of the
law. The judiciary cannot substitute its own wisdom and
decision making for a matter left to the discretion of a co-equal
branch of government.
Held:
Petition is dismissed; restraining order is lifted.
Notes:
LOI 229 - early warning device LOI
LOI 479 - amended par. 3 of LOI 229 to the effect that motor
vehicle owners could present an early warning device upon the
registration of their vehicles, and the device could be procured
from any source.
1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals recommended the enactment of local legislation for the
installation of road safety signs.
PD 207 - PD that ratified Philippine participation in 1968
Vienna Convention
LTC Admin. Order 1 - implementing rules and regulations of
LOI 229
LOI 716 - lifted the 6-month suspension of LTC Admin order 1
Memorandum Circular 32 - issued after LOI 716, provided that
LTC Admin Order 1 be implemented, in addition, early warning
device can come from any source, but should follow the specs,
and that stickers would be issued to said devices.
2.
Power of Taxation
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) v.
Marcos (1996)
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
MCIAA (petitioner)Hon. Ferdinand J. Marcos as RTC
presiding judge (respondents)
5

implies that the legislature determines matters of

principle and lays down fundamental policy

Summary of Proceedings:
RTC- dismissed petition for declaratory relief and ordered the
denial of motion for reconsideration
SC- petitioner filed for review of the RTC decision
Facts:
Mr. Eustaquio Cesa (officer-in-charge, office of the
treasurer of Cebu City) demanded payment for realty
taxes on lands belonging to petitioner MCIAA.
Petitioner was compelled to pay its tax account
under protest and thereafter filed a petition for
Declaratory Relief with the RTC, invoking:
o Sec. 14 of RA6958 or its Charter which exempts
it from payment of realty taxes
o Sec. 133 of RA7160 or Local Government Code
(LGC) which provides that the taxing powers of
local government units do not extend to the taxes
or fees of any kind on an agency or instrumentality
of the national government.
- Petitioner insisted that while it is indeed a
government-controlled corporation, it stands on the
same footing as an agency or instrumentality of the
national government by the nature of its powers and
functions under RA6958, specifically:
To efficiently operate and
manage the Mactan-Cebu
International Airport
To carry out the government
policies of promoting and
developing the Central Visayas
and Mindanao regions as
centers of international trade
and tourism, and accelerating
the development of the means
of transportation and
communication in the country
As an attached agency of the
Department of Transportation
and Communication
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent citys
refusal to cancel petitioners realty tax account on the
ground that MCIAA is a government-controlled corporation
performing proprietary functions whose tax exemption
privilege has been withdrawn by virtue of Sec. 193 and
Sec. 234 of the LGC withdrawing tax exemptions granted
to all natural or juridical persons including governmentowned or controlled corporations.
Issue: WON The respondent judge erred in (a) failing to rule
that the petitioner is vested with government powers and
functions which place it in the same category as an
instrumentality or agency of the governmnet thereby (a) ruling
that petitioner is liable to pay real property taxes to the city of
Cebu NO

Ratio:
Notwithstanding Sec. 133 of the LGC, Sec. 232 therein
provides that cities may impose real property tax subject to
exemptions stipulated in Sec. 234 such as real property owned
by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been
granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person.
Petitioners exemption from tax granted in Sec. 14 of ita
transfer of the lands, among other things, to the petitioner and
not just the transfer of the beneficial use thereof. The transfer
is an absolute conveyance of the ownership thereof because
the petitioners authorized capital stock consists of, inter alia,
the value of such real estate owned and/or administered by the
airports.
2.
The petitioner is a taxable person.
It was only exempted from the payment of real
property taxes. The grant of the privilege only in
respect to realty tax is conclusive proof of the
legislative intent to make it a taxable person
subject to all taxes, except real property tax.
Held: Petition denied. Judgment and order affirmed.
Notes:
1. Since taxation is a destructive power which interferes
with the personal and property rights of the people and
takes from them a portion of their property for the support
of the government, tax statutes must be construed strictly
against the government and liberally in favor of the
taxpayer.
2. But since taxes are what we pay for civilized society,
or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against
exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax
exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris (of the
strictest right or law) against the taxpayer and liberally in
favor of the taxing authority. Therefore the exemption
may be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority,
the only exception being where the exemption was
granted to private parties based on material consideration
of a material nature, which then becomes contractual and
thus covered by the non-impairment clause of the
constitution.
3. The power to tax is primarily vested in the Congress
but in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local
legislative bodies, no longer merely by virtue of a valid
delegation but pursuant to direct authority conferred by the
Constitution.
4. Sec. 28(1) Art VI The rule of taxation shall be
uniform and equitable and Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation
5. Sec. 14 of RA6958 or its Charter Tax Exemptions.
The authority shall be exempt from realty taxes
imposed by the National Government or any of its political
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities . . .
6. Sec. 133 of RA7160 or Local Government Code
(LGC) Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local

Government Units. Unless otherwise provided herein,

the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangay shall not extend to the levy of
the following:
a) . . .
o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National
Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, and local government units.
(Emphasis supplied)
7. Sec. 193 Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges.
Unless otherwise provided in this code, tax exemptions or
incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by all persons,
whether natural or juridical, including government-owned,
or controlled corporations, except local water districts,
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. 6938, non stock
and non profit hospitals and educational constitutions, are
hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.
8. Sec. 232 Power to Levy Real Property Tax. A
province or city or a municipality within the Metropolitan
Manila Area may levy on an annual ad valorem tax on real
property such as land, building, machinery and other
improvements not hereafter specifically exempted.
9. Sec. 234. Exemptions from Real Property taxes. . .
.
(a)...
xxx xxx xxx
(c)... Except as provided herein, any exemption from
payment of real property tax previously granted to, or
presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or
juridical, including government-owned or controlled
corporations are hereby withdrawn upon the
effectivity of this Code.

PBCOM v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1999)

Quisumbing, J.
Petition for Review of Court of Appeals decision which affirmed
Court of Tax Appeals decision, which denied petitioners claim
for tax refund and tax credit
Facts:
- Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) is a
commercial banking corporation duly organized under
Philippine laws
- It filed its quarterly income tax returns for the first and
second quarters of 1985, and showed profits, so it
paid a total income tax of 5,016,954 pesos
- Subsequently, however, PBCom suffered losses so
they reported a net loss of 25,317,228 pesos in their
Annual Income Tax Returns, and thus declared no tax
payable for the year of 1985
- The following year, with a loss of 14,129,602 pesos,
they likewise declared no income tax liability for the
year of 1986
- During those two years though, PBCom earned rental
income from its leased properties, which were

withheld by the lessees and remitted directly to the

BIR, for the amount of 282,795.50 pesos in 1985, and
234,077 pesos in 1986
PBCom in 1987, filed for a tax credit of 5,016,954
pesos, which represents its 1985 overpayment of
taxes
After this, in 1988, they filed a claim for refund of
creditable taxes withheld by their lessees for the
aforementioned amounts
Pending the investigation by the BIR, petitioner filed
for a Petition for Review with the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) in November of 1988
The CTA in 1993 denied the request for a tax refund
or credit in the sum amount of 5,299,749.50 (the 5m
income tax plus the 282k withheld lease for 1985) on
the ground that it was filed beyond the two-year
reglementary period provided for by law
- denied the claim for refund for 1986 on the
assumption that it was automatically credited
against its tax payment in the succeeding
year
CA denied the appeal of the CTAs decision
Petitioners case is based on the Revenue
Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 7-85, issued on
April 1, 1985, which extended the prescriptive period
for credit/refund of overpaid income taxes from 2
years to 10 years
- Petitioner argues that estoppel lies against
the government and it cannot assert a
position contrary to this
- it would also violate the petitioners vested
rights and be prejudicial to taxpayers and,
- additionally, petitioner claims that if
the declaration of its nullity is
applied retroactively, would
contravene Sec. 246 of the
National Internal Revenue Code
on the non-retroactivity of rulings
Petitioner however is mistaken

Issue:
1.
WON the CA erred in denying the plea for tax refund
or tax credits on the ground of prescription, despite
petitioners reliance on RMC No. 7-85, changing the
prescriptive period of two years to ten years
1.1.
It did NOT
Ratio:
-

The Court held that the RMC created an

inconsistency with the law
- Section 230 of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1977, which is
now Section 229 of the NIRC of 1997,
clearly states the 2 year prescriptive period

a law takes precedence over an

administrative ruling
The relaxation of the revenue regulations is not
warranted, and cannot be countenanced
- although adminstrative rulings are to be
treated with great respect, they are not
conclusive and may be ignored if found to be
erroneous
- must be in harmony with the law sought to
be implemented, or else will be struck down
- cannot go beyond the terms and
provisions of the law itself
- ultra vires
As to estoppel
- fundamental rule that Government cannot be
put in estoppel by mistakes or errors of its
officials or agents
No vested rights granted by an erroneous
construction of law
- non-retroactivity rule does not apply either
because it was the CA, not the
commissioner of the BIR, who declared the
nullity of RMC No.7-85
- thus does not fall under the scope
of administrative rulings barred from
retroactivity

Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Commissioner v. Court of Appeals
Commissioner v. CA
Summary of Proceedings:
CA: Respondent commissioner of internal revenue is
enjoined from collecting the deficiency tax assessment
made and issued petitioner in relation to the
implementation of RMC NO. 37-93
Supreme Court: Judgment affirmed
Facts:
1.RA 7654 was enacted by Congress on June 10, 1993 and
took effect July 3, 1993.It amended partly Sec. 142 (c) of the
NIRC
2.Fortune Tobacco manufactured the following cigarettes
brands:Hope, More and Champion. Prior to RA 7654, these 3
brands were considered local brands subjected to an ad
valorem tax of 20 to 45%. Applying the amendment and
nothing else, (seefootnote below) the 3 brands should fall
under Sec 142 (c) (2)NIRC and be taxed at 20 to 45%.
3.However, on July 1, 1993, petitioner Commissioner of
InternalRevenue issued
Revenue Memorandum Circular37-93 which reclassified the 3
brands as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign
brand subject to the 55% ad valorem
tax. There classification was before RA 7654 took effect.

4.In effect, the memo circular subjected the 3 brands to the

provisions of Sec 142 (c) (1) NIRC imposing upon these
brands a rate of 55% instead of just 20 to 45% under Sec 142
(c) (2)NIRC.
5.There was no notice and hearing. CIR argued that the memo
circular was merely an interpretative ruling of the BIR which did
not require notice and hearing.
Issue:
WON RMC 37-93 was valid and enforceable No; lack of
notice and hearing violated due process required for
promulgated rules. Moreover, it infringed on uniformity of
taxation / equal protection since other local cigarettes bearing
foreign brands had not been included within the scope of the
memo circular.
Ratio:
1. Contrary to petitioners contention, the memo was not a
mere interpretative rule but a legislative rule in the nature of
subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary
legislation by providing the details thereof. Promulgated
legislative rules must be published
2. On the other hand, interpretative rules only provide
guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in
charge of enforcing.
3. BIR, in reclassifying the 3 brands and raising their applicable
tax rate, did not simply interpret RA 7654 but legislated under
its quasi-legislative authority.
Decision:
Decision of court of appeals, sustaining that of the court of tax
appeals is affirmed
Notes:
RA No. 7654- amended section 142(c)(1) of the National
Internal Revenue Code:
Sec. 142 cigars and Cigarettes
(c) cigarettes packed by machine-there shall be levied
accessed and collected on cigarettes packed by machine a tax
rate at the prescribed below based on the constructive
manufacturers wholesale price
(1) Only locally manufactured cigs which are currently
classified and taxed at 55% or the exportation of which is not
authorized by contract or otherwise 55% provided thas the
minimum tax shall not be less than 5 pesos per pack
Revenue Memorandum Circulsr No. 37-93(RMC 37-93):
-Concluded that brands of cigarettes, Hope, More, and
Champion being manufactured in the Fortune Tobacco Corp.
and hereby considered locally manufactured cigarettes bearing
a foreign brand subject to 55% ad valorem tax on cigs
Art. VI, section 28 par. 1 of 1987 constitution:
(1)
The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable.
The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation
Gerochi v. Department of Energy
Gerochi v Department of Energy (2007)

ORIGINAL ACTION in the SC

administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to

the principle of what has been delegated cannot be
delegated.
To discern this, the Court used the Completeness
Test and Sufficient Standard Test. Sec. 34 is
complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and
contains sufficient standards (i.e. (1)to ensure total
electrification of the country and the quality, reliability,
security, and affordability of the supply of electric
power;(2) watershed rehabilitation requirement)
Section 43(b)(ii) and Sec. 51 (d) and (e) of EPIRA
provides for such sufficient standards.

FACTS:
-Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of RA
9136, known as EPIRA (Electric Power Industry Reform Act of
2001), imposing the Universal Charge, and Rule 18 of
EPIRAs IRR which seeks to implement said imposition.
- Petitioners prayed that the consumers be refunded of
the said Universal Charge
- TRO be issued directing Department of Energy (and
the other respondents) to refrain from implementing,
charging, and collecting the Universal Charge
- Petitioners contend that:
the universal charge provided for has the
characteristics of a tax, which is strictly a legislative
function; to delegate it to the executive/administrative
agency like ERC is unconstitutional
ERC is empowered to approve where the funds
collected should be used
the imposition of the Universal Charge on all endusers is oppressive, confiscatory, and amounts to
taxation without representation
-Respondents contend that:
there is no undue delegation of legislative power to
ERC since it merely exercised its discretion as to the
execution and implementation of the provisions of
EPIRA
the Universal Charge is not a tax because it is levied
for a specific regulatory purpose, which is to ensure
the viability of the countrys electric power industry
Universal Charge is not oppressive because it is
within the States police power.
* Congress enacted EPIRA on June 8, 2001; it took effect on
June 26, 2001
ISSUES
1. WON the Universal Charge imposed under Sec 34 of EPIRA
is a tax -NO.
2. WON there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax
on the part of the ERC -NO
3. (procedural) WON petitioners violated the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts - YES
RATIO:
1.
The Universal Charge is deemed as an exercise of
police power. Regulation is the primary purpose, as
seen in Section 2 of EPIRA; generation of revenue is
not the primary purpose. Moreover, it is a wellestablished doctrine that taxing power may be used
as an implement of police power (Valmonte v Energy
Regulatory Board and Gaston v Republic Planters
Bank)
2.
In the face of increasing complexity of modern life,
delegation of legislative power to various specialized

3.

Although petitioners have locus standi, they filed the

complaint directly to the SC when it can be obtained
with the other appropriate courts. However, since the
constitutional issue will most likely resurface in the
near future, the Court let the procedural infirmity pass.

HELD
DISMISSED for lack of merit
Notes
-Power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in
its range. it is based on the principle that taxes are the
lifeblood of the government. Power of tax emanates from
necessity because government cannot fulfill its mandate
without taxes
Tax- If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and
regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax
- Sec. 34. Universal Charge - Within one year from the
effectivity of this Act, a universal charge to be determined,
fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all
electricity end-users for the following purposes:
(a) Payment for the stranded debts in excess of the
amount assumed by the National Government and
stranded contract costs of NPC as well as qualified
stranded contract costs of distribution utilities
resulting from the restructuring of the industry;
(b) Missionary electrification;
(c) The equalization of the taxes and royalties applied to
indigenous or renewable sources of energy vis-a-vis
imported energy fuels;
(d) An environmental charge equivalent to one fourth of
one centavo per kilowatt-hour (P0.0025/kWh), which
shall accrue to an environmental fund to be used
solely for watershed rehabilitation and management.
Said fund shall be managed by NPC under existing
arrangements
(e) A charge to account for all forms of cross-subsidies
for a period not exceeding 3 years
-Section 2 (EPIRA) Declaration of Policy (***excerpts***)
(a) To ensure and accelerate the total electrification of
the country
(b) To ensure the quality, reliability, security, and
affordability of the supply of electric power

(c) To ensure transparent and reasonable prices of

electricity
(f) To protect the public interest as it is affected by the rates
and services of electric utilities and other providers of electric
power
- Completeness Test the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that
when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do
is to enforce it
Sufficient Standard Test adequate guidelines or limitations
in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegates
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
- SECTION 43. Functions of the ERC. The ERC shall
promote competition, encourage market development, ensure
customer choice and penalize abuse of market power in the
restructured electricity industry. In appropriate cases, the ERC
is authorized to issue cease and desist order after due notice
and hearing. Towards this end, it shall be responsible for the
following key functions in the restructured industry:
(b) Within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act,
promulgate and enforce, in accordance with law, a National
Grid Code and a Distribution Code which shall include, but not
limited to the following:
(ii)
Financial capability standards for the generating
companies, the TRANSCO, distribution utilities and suppliers:
Provided, That in the formulation of the financial capability
standards, the nature and function of the entity shall be
considered: Provided, further, That such standards are set to
ensure that the electric power industry participants meet the
minimum financial standards to protect the public interest.
Determine, fix, and approve, after due notice and public
hearings the universal charge, to be imposed on all electricity
end-users pursuant to Section 34 hereof;
-SECTION 51. Powers. The PSALM Corp. shall, in the
performance of its functions and for the attainment of its
objective, have the following powers:
(d) To calculate the amount of the stranded debts
and stranded contract costs of NPC which shall form
the basis for ERC in the determination of the
universal charge;
(e) To liquidate the NPC stranded contract costs,
utilizing the proceeds from sales and other property
contributed to it, including the proceeds from the
universal charge.
-Valmonte v Energy Regulatory Board ; Gaston v Republic
Planters Bank - Court held that Oil Price Stabilization Fund
(OPSF) and Sugar Stabilization Fund (SSF) were exactions
made in the exercise of police power
- NPC-SPUG = National power Corporation-Strategic Power
Utilities Group
- ERC = Energy Regulatory Commission
-PSALM = Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management
Group

3.
Eminent Domain
Eslaban, Jr. v. De Onorio
Eslaban, Jr. vs Vda. De Onorio
Mendoza, J.
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 26, Surallah, South Cotabato, ordering the
National Irrigation Administration (NIA for brevity) to pay
respondent the amount of P107,517.60 as just compensation
for the taking of the latters property.
Facts:
Respondent Clarita Vda. de Enorio is the owner of a lot in
Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nio, South Cotabato with an area of
39,512 square meters. On October 6, 1981, Santiago Eslaban,
Jr., Project Manager of the NIA, approved the construction of
the main irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot, affecting a
24,660 square meter portion thereof. Respondents husband
agreed to the construction of the NIA canal provided that they
be paid by the government for the area taken after the
processing of documents by the Commission on Audit. In
1983, a Right-of-Way agreement was executed between
respondent and the NIA. The NIA then paid respondent the
amount of P4,180.00 as Right-of-Way damages. Respondent
subsequently executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and
Fees whereby she waived any compensation for damages to
crops and improvements which she suffered as a result of the
construction of a right-of-way on her property. The same year,
petitioner offered respondent the sum of P35,000.00 by way of
amicable settlement pursuant to Executive Order No. 1035,
18. The respondent demanded payment for the taking of the
property but the petitioner refused. The respondent filed a
complaint before the RTC. RTC ordered the petitioner to pay.
CA affirmed the RTC decision. Hence the petition.
Issue:
WON THE PETITION IS DISMISSIBLE FOR FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5, RULE 7
OF THE REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. YES
The petition for review was filed by Santiago Eslaban, Jr., in
his capacity as Project Manager of the NIA. However, the
verification and certification against forum-shopping were
signed by Cesar E. Gonzales, the administrator of the agency.
The real party-in-interest is the NIA, which is a body corporate.
Without being duly authorized by resolution of the board of the
corporation, neither Santiago Eslaban, Jr. nor Cesar E.
Gonzales could sign the certificate against forum-shopping
accompanying the petition for review. Hence, on this ground
alone, the petition should be dismissed.
WON LAND GRANTED BY VIRTUE OF A HOMESTEAD
PATENT AND SUBSEQUENTLY REGISTERED UNDER
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1529 CEASES TO BE PART OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. NO
Whenever public lands are alienated, granted or conveyed to
applicants thereof, and the deed grant or instrument of

conveyance [sales patent] registered with the Register of

Deeds and the corresponding certificate and owners duplicate
of title issued, such lands are deemed registered lands under
the Torrens System and the certificate of title thus issued is as
conclusive and indefeasible as any other certificate of title
issued to private lands in ordinary or cadastral registration
proceedings. The rule is that where private property is needed
for conversion to some public use, the first thing obviously that
the government should do is to offer to buy it. If the owner is
willing to sell and the parties can agree on the price and the
other conditions of the sale, a voluntary transaction can then
be concluded and the transfer effected without the necessity of
a judicial action. Otherwise, the government will use its power
of eminent domain, subject to the payment of just
compensation, to acquire private property in order to devote it
to public use.
WON THE VALUE OF JUST COMPENSATION SHALL BE
DETERMINED FROM THE TIME OF THE TAKING. YES
The value of the property must be determined either as of the
date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,
"whichever came first."
WON THE AFFIDAVIT OF WAIVER OF RIGHTS AND FEES
EXECUTED BY RESPONDENT EXEMPTS PETITIONER
FROM MAKING PAYMENT TO THE FORMER. NO
If NIA intended to bind the appellee to said affidavit, it would
not even have bothered to give her any amount for damages
caused on the improvements/crops within the appellees
property. This, apparently was not the case, as can be gleaned
from the disbursement voucher in the amount of P4,180.00
issued on September 17, 1983 in favor of the appellee, and the
letter from the Office of the Solicitor General recommending
the giving of "financial assistance in the amount of P35,000.00"
to the appellee.
Held:
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the extent that the just
compensation for the contested property be paid to respondent
in the amount of P16,047.61 per hectare, with interest at the
legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of
taking until full payment is made. Costs against petitioner.
Iron and Steel Authority v. Court of Appeals
Iron and Steel Authority (petitioner) v CA and Maria Cristina
Fertilizer Corp. (respondents)
Petition for Review GR. No. 102976 October 25, 1995
Feliciano, J.
Facts:
1. Petioner ISA was created by Presidential Decree No. 272
dated August 9, 1973 to develop and promote the iron and
steel industry of the country. Under the said degree, ISA was
created for a term of five years and was extended for another
10 years by E.O. 555 on August 31, 1979

2. National Steel Corporation (NSC), a wholly owned

subsidiary of the government-owned National Development
Corporation (NDC), embarked on an expansion program that
included the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan
City. Proclamation No. 2239 was then issued by the
President on November 16, 1982 which withdrew from sale
around 30.25 hectares of land in Iligan City for the use of NSC.
3. Certain portions of the designated land was occupied by a
non-operational chemical fertilizer plant and related facilities by
respondent MCFC. Letter of Instruction No. 1277 was issued
directing NSC to negotiate with owners of MCFM, in behalf of
the govt, for the compensation of occupancy rights of MCFC.
It was also stated that should both parties fail to reach an
agreement within 60 days, ISA would exercise its power of
eminent domain under PD 272 and start expropriation
proceedings.
4. Negotiations failed so ISA initiated eminent domain
proceedings against MCFC in RTC Branch 1 of Iligan City on
August 18, 1983. ISAs petition stated that it may be allowed to
possess the property invoked upon depositing in court 10% of
the declared market value (P1,760,789.69) of the property.
PNB was also impleaded as party-defendant due to it being
mortgagee of the plant facilities and improvements in the
proceeding.
5. The trial court then issued a writ of possession in favor of
ISA who then placed the property under NSC. Case then
proceeded to trial but the statutory existence of ISA expired
during its duration. MCFC then filed a motion to dismiss citing
no valid judgment could be rendered against ISA which had by
then ceased to be a juridical person. ISA then filed its
opposition to the motion. Court granted the MCFCs motion to
dismiss and based the decision on the Rules of the Court
stating that only natural or juridical persons or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil case. It also
referred to non-compliance of ISA with Section 16, Rule 3 of
the Rules of the Court.
6. ISA contended that, despite the expiration of its term, it
continues to exist until the winding down of its affairs are done.
It also submitted another petition that urged the RP, being the
real party-in-interest, should be allowed to substitute ISA in the
case. ISA wrote a letter to the Office of the President which
then directed the SolGen to continue the expropriation case.
7. RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and deemed that
the property was not for public use or benefit but rather for the
use of a GOCC (NSC) which was then selling some of its stock
to the public. Petitioner then appealed to the CA who affirmed
the order of dismissal of the RTC. It held that ISA was a
government regulatory agency exercising sovereign functions
which did not have the same rights as an ordinary corporation
so it was not entitle to a period for winding up its affairs after
expiration of legally mandated term. However, the CA also
held that it was premature for the RTC to have ruled that the
expropriation suit was not for public purpose because the
parties had not yet rested their cases.
8. SolGen argues that ISA initiated and prosecuted the action
as agent for RP so RP, as the principal of ISA, is entitle to be
substituted and made party-plaintiff once ISAs term expired.

MCFC argues that the failure of Congress to enact a law

further extending ISAs term means a clear legislative intent to
terminate the juridical existence of ISA and that order from the
Office of President to SolGen for continued prosecution of suit
could not prevail over negative intent. MCFC also contends
that the power of eminent domain that would be exercised by
ISA would not be on behalf of the Govt but rather of the NSC.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the RP is entitle to be substituted for ISA in
view of the expiration of ISAs term.
Ratio:
1. Juridical Person: Rule 3 Section 1 of the Rules of Court
classify ISA (based on PD 272) as entities authorized by
law to institute actions. Said PD also contains express
authorization to ISA to commence expropriation proceedings
for and in behalf of the government under Section 4 of the PD
272. However, the PD does not give ISA a distinct and
separate juridical personality from that of the government.
When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires,
its powers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities revert back
and are reassumed by the government in absence of any
provision of law.
2. Procedural implication: general rules that an action must be
prosecuted in the name of the real party of interest. In this
case, ISA instituted the proceedings in its capacity as
representative of RP and not of NSC despite it being possibly
the ultimate user of the properties involved.
3. Power of eminent domain: Despite being a principle
vested primarily in the legislative, no new legislative act is
necessary should the government decide, upon substitution, to
continue the proceedings. The legislative enacted a continuing
delegation of authority to the President to exercise the power
of eminent domain in behalf of the state. 1917 Revised
Administrative Code, which was in effect during the
proceedings, provide that the president is allowed to
exercise the right of eminent domain under Section 64 (h)
which has also been reproduced under the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 Section 12.
SC Ruling: Case remanded to lower court and allow for
the substitution of RP for ISA
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines (TELEBAP) v. COMELEC
March 12, 1987; MENDOZA, J.
Petitioner: Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of
the Philippines (organization of lawyers of radio and television
broadcasting companies), and GMA Network
Respondents: COMELEC
FACTS:

This is a case considering the validity of Section 92 of B.P Blg.

No. 881.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioners have legal standing
TELEBAP has no legal standing. GMA Network has.
TELEBAP cannot sue as citizen since it has not shown harm
as a resolution of section 92, it cannot sue as voters as this
does not concern their to suffrage, and they do not have
interest as taxpayers as this is not the exercise of powers by
Congress of its taxing and spending power.
GMA Network has because it alleges that it has lost millions of
pesos because of the provision of free airtime to COMELEC
for candidates use and will lose even more in the next
elections.

2.

Whether it takes property without due process of the

law and without just compensation?

Since a franchise is a mere privilege, as radio and television

companies do not own the airwaves they operate, they may be
reasonably burdened with the grantee of some public service.
Such regulation of the use and ownership of
telecommunication systems is in the exercise of the plenary
police power of the State for the promotion of the general
welfare. This power is recognized in Article II, section 6 of the
Constitution.
Sec. 6. The use of property bears a social function, and all
economic agents shall contribute to the common good.
Individuals and private groups, including corporations,
cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall have
the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises,
subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice
and to intervene when the common good so demands (Article
XII).
Petitioners argue that they should be adequately compensated
under Section 5 of RA 7252 which granted GMA a franchise
for the operation of radio and television statements.
Section 5. A special right is hereby reserved to the President of
the Philippines, in times of rebellion, public peril, calamity,
emergency, disaster or disturbance of peace and order, to
temporarily take over and operate the stations of the grantee,
to temporarily suspend the operation of any station in the
interest of public safety, security and public welfare, or to
authorize the temporary use and operation thereof by any
agency of the Government, upon due compensation to the
grantee, for the use of said stations during the period when
they shall be so operated.

However, there is the provision of free time in the said law.

SEC. 4. Responsibility to the Public. - The grantee shall
provide adequate public service time to enable the
Government, through the said broadcasting stations, to reach
the population on important public issues; provide at all times
sound and balanced programming; promote public
participation such as in community programming; assist in the
functions of public information and education; conform to the
ethics of honest enterprise; and not use its station for the
broadcasting of obscene and indecent language, speech, act
or scene, or for the dissemination of deliberately false
information or willful misrepresentation, or to the detriment of
the public interest, or to incite, encourage, or assist in
subversive or treasonable acts.
Petitioners argued that COMELEC Resolution 2983-A provides
for the grant of COMELEC time upon payment of just
compensation but it is recognized that an administrative
agency, cannot in the exercise of lawmaking, amend a statute
of Congress.
3.

Whether it denies broadcast and television

companies the equal protection of the laws?

Broadcast media are NOT entitled to the same treatment as

print media under free speech guarantee. Because of the
unique and pervasive influence of broadcast media,
necessarily the freedom of tv and radio broadcasting is
somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to
newspaper and print media. The government spends public
funds for the allocation and regulation of the broadcast
industry. Requiring them to give free airtime to COMELEC is a
fair exchange for what the industry gets.
4.

Whether it is in excess of the power given to

COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of
media of information during the period of election?

Finally, it is argued that the power to supervise or regulate

given to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, 4 of the Constitution
does not include the power to prohibit. In the first place, what
the COMELEC is authorized to supervise or regulate by Art.
IX-C, 4 of the Constitution,[31] among other things, is the use
by media of information of their franchises or permits, while
what Congress (not the COMELEC) prohibits is the sale or
donation of print space or air time for political ads. In other
words, the object of supervision or regulation is different from
the object of the prohibition. It is another fallacy for petitioners
to contend that the power to regulate does not include the
power to prohibit.
With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates
themselves, the COMELEC Time and COMELEC Space are
about the only means through which candidates can advertise
their qualifications and programs of government. More than

merely depriving candidates of time for their ads, the failure of

broadcast stations to provide air time unless paid by the
government would clearly deprive the people of their right to
know. Art. III, 7 of the Constitution provides that the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized, while Art. XII, 6 states that the use of property
bears a social function [and] the right to own, establish, and
operate economic enterprises [is] subject to the duty of the
State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the
common good so demands.
HELD:
Petition dismissed.
B. State Immunity from Suit
1.
When is a suit against the State
Republic v. Feliciano
Republic Vs, Feliciano (March 12, 1987); YAP, J.
Petitioner- REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondent- PABLO FELICIANO and INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT
Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court dated April 30, 1985
Summary Of Proceedings:
Court of First Instance- dismissed complaint of respondent
Pablo Feliciano
Supreme Court- judgment is hereby rendered reversing and
setting aside the appealed decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court
FACTS
Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate
AppellateCourt dated April 30, 1985 reversing the order of the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VI, dated
August 21, 1980, which dismissed the complaint of respondent
Pablo Feliciano for recovery of ownership and possession of a
parcel of land on the ground of non-suability of the State. On
January 22, 1970, Feliciano filed a complaint with the then
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against the RP,
represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land, consisting of
four (4) lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177hectares,
situated in the Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of
Tinambac,Camarines Sur.
Feliciano alleged that he bought the property in question from
Victor Gardiola by virtue of a Contract of Sale dated May 31,
1952,followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30,
1954; that Gardiola had acquired the property by purchase
from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado whose title to the said
property was evidenced by an informacion posesoria that upon
his purchase of the property, he took actual possession of the
same, introduced various improvements therein and caused it
to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was approved by

the Director of Lands on October 24, 1954.On November 1,

1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No.
90 reserving for settlement purposes, under the administration
of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration
(NARRA), a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of
Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which the NARRA
and its successor agency, the Land Authority,started subdividing and distributing the land to the settlers; that the
property in question, while located within the reservation
established under Proclamation No. 90, was the private
property of Feliciano and should therefore be excluded
therefrom. Feliciano prayed that he be declared the rightful and
true owner of the property in question consisting of 1,364.4177
hectares; that his title of ownership based on informacion
posesoria of his predecessor-in-interest be declared legal valid
and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to cancel and
nullify all awards to the settlers.

spain to US, to record a claimants actual possession of a

piece of land
Republic v. Sandoval (1993) Campos, Jr. J.
CONSOLIDATED PETITIONS for certiorari to review the RTC
orders

ISSUE:
WON the State can be sued for recovery and possession of a
parcel of land-NO

RATIO:
A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not
permitted,except upon a showing that the State has consented
to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use
of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. It may be
invoked by the courts sua sponte(describes an act of authority
taken without formal prompting from another party) at any
stage of the proceedings. Waiver of immunity, being a
derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly, but must
be construed in strictissimi juris (of strictest right).Moreover,
the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the
State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority.
Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the
legislative body.

Decision: Judgment is hereby rendered reversing and setting

aside the appealed decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court
Notes:
Doctrine Of Non-suability of State- A suit for recovery of
property is not an action in rem but an action in personam
Action in personam- suit directed against a specific party or
parties and any judgment therein binds only such party or
parties
(1) a judgment in rem is binding upon the whole world, such as a
judgment in a land registration case or probate of a will; and
(2) a judgment in personam is binding upon the parties and
their successors-in-interest but not upon strangers.
Informacion Possesoria: The inscription in the property
registry of an informacion possesoria under the Spanish
mortgage law as a means provided by the law then in force
in the Philippines prior to the transfer of sovereignty from

Antecedent Facts:
January 15 1987: Dialogue between the members of the
militant Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KMP) and the
Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) officials began. The
farmers demanded, among others, giving free lands to
farmers, zero retention of lands by landlords and stop
amortizations of land payments.
January 20 1987: KMPs National President Jaime Tadeo met
with MAR Minister Heherson Alvarez and demanded that the
minimum comprehensive land reform be granted immediately.
January 21 1987: Tadeo and his leaders vehemently
countered the ministers advice to wait for the ratification of the
1987 Constitution and just allow the government to implement
its comprehensive land reform program.
January 22 1987 (Mendiola Massacre): Tadeos group instead
decided to March to Malacanang to air their demands. At
around 4:30pm, a clash occurred between the marchers and
the anti-riot squad which left, among the marchers, 12 dead
and dozens injured.
Facts:
Immediately after the incident, President Aquino issued
Administrative Order No. 11 which created the Citizens
Mendiola Commission. The Commission was created precisely
for the purpose of conducting an investigation of the disorder,
deaths and casualties that took place on January 22.
On February 27, the Commission recommended that:
o The NBI undertake investigations regarding
the identities of those who actually fired their
guns that resulted in the death/injury of the
victims.
o All commissioned officers who were armed
during the incident be prosecuted for
violation of par 4(g) of Sec 13 BP Blg 880
(Public Assembly Act of 1985)
o The prosecution of the marchers for carrying
deadly or offensive weapons
o Jaime Tadeo be prosecuted both for violation
of par (a) Sec 13 BP Blg 880 for holding the
rally without a permit, and Art 142 of RPC for
inciting to sedition
o Specific officers be administratively liable
o The deceased and wounded victims be
compensated by the government.
After the non-delivery of their compensation, petitioners (heirs
of the deceased and those injured) instituted an action for
damages against the Republic of the Philippines, together with
the military officers, and personnel involved in the Mendiola
incident.

Petitioner filed action for damages in the RTC. Petition against

defendant Republic of the Philippines dismissed. As against
the rest of the defendants, the impleaded Military Officers,
motion to dismiss is denied. Motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners denied.
(a) Petitioners (Caylao Group) filed the
instant petition
(b) Republic of the Philippines, together with
the military officers and personnel impleaded
as defendants in the court below, filed a
petition for certiorari
Issue:
1. WON the State has waived its immunity from suit NO
2. [Sub-issues] WON (a) the Commissions recommendation
that the government indemnify the heirs and victims of the
Mendiola incident and (b) by the public addresses made by
then Pres. Aquino in the aftermath of the killings, the State has
consented to be sued

Ratio:
1. Art XVI Sec 3 expressly provides for the principle of
immunity of the government from suit. It is based on:
a. The very essence of sovereignty
b. The ground that there can be no legal right
as against the authority that makes the law
on which the right depends
c. Public policypublic service would be
hindered, and the public endangered, if the
sovereign authority could be subjected to
law suits at the instance of every citizen
The case does not qualify as a suit against the State. A suit
against the State is proper when:
a. The republic is sued by name
In this case, the ultimate liability does
not pertain to the government. The
functions of the military officers/personnel
ceased to be official the moment they
exceeded their authority (commission of
prohibited acts).
b. The suit is against an unincorporated
government agency
c. The suit is on its face against a government
officer but the case is such that ultimate
liability will belong not to the officer but to the
government.
State immunity cannot be invoked by (a)
the military officers to release them from
liability and (b) the heirs and victims to
demand indemnification from the
government
Liability should fall on the named
defendants in the lower court, herein
public officials

2. AO 11 expressly states that the purpose of creating the

Commission was to have a body that will conduct an
investigation of the disorder, deaths, and casualties that
took placecharges arising therefrom may be filed
directly with the proper court. The recommendation, not
having become final and executor, does not attach liability to
the state.
Whatever acts or utterances the President made are not
tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from suit.
The Presidents act of joining the marchers, days after the
incident, does not mean that there was an admission of
liability.
Held: Petitions dismissed.
Phil. Agila Satellite v. Lichauco Carpio-Morales, J
July 27, 2006
GR 134887
Petitioner: Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. represented by
Michael C. U. De Guzman
Respondents: Sec. Josefina Trinidad Lichauco and the
Ombudsman
Petition for review on certiorari of an order of the
Ombudsman
Summary of Proceedings:
Civil case:
RTC - motion to dismiss by respondent denied
CA - RTC decision reversed, motion to dismiss by respondent
upheld
SC - RTC decision reinstated, case remanded to trial court
Criminal case:
Ombudsman - dismissed because there is a prejudicial
question
SC - hence, this case
Facts:
Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. (PASI) is a corporation formed by
private telecommunication carriers for the launching,
ownership, operation, and management of a Philippine
satellite, in accordance with Article IV of a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) entered by PASI with the Department
of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
On June 28, 1996, the PASI wrote DOTC Sec. Lagdameo for
the confirmation of the assignment of orbital slots 161 E and
153 E to PASI. Sec. Lagdameo confirmed, and PASI
undertook preparations, including the application for loans.
PASI wrote Landbank of the Philippines to request their
participation in a club loan of US$11M. Landbank sent a copy
of the letter to DOTC Undersecretary Lichauco. Lichauco said
that:

a. 'There is no basis' in the claim of PASI that the two orbital

slots were assigned to them;
b. Since PASI is still interested, DOTC supports them but will
only be getting one orbital slot; and
c. 'Agila' is not a registered corporate alias/trademark.
Lichauco afterwards, bid out several orbital slots including 153
E, and an unknown bidder won the award for the said slot.
PASI stated that they were not informed, and filed a civil case
(see summary of proceedings). They also filed a criminal case
against Lichauco for gross violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) (see summary of
proceedings again).
Issues:
1. WON there is a prejudicial question - YES
2. WON the Ombudsman's dismissal on the account of a
prejudicial question is in order - NO
Ratio:
1. A prejudicial question has two elements (Sec. 7, Rule 111,
Rules of Court):
a. previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the subsequent criminal action; and
b. the resolution of the issue determines whether the criminal
action may proceed.
PASI concedes that the first element exists, so it does. The
second element also exists because the civil case has three
causes of action:
a. to enjoin the award of orbital slot 153 E;
b. for the declaration of the nullity of the award of slot 153 E
to the unknown bidder; and
c. damages arising from Lichauco's questioned acts.

The SC also states that allowing the dismissal of the criminal

case will sanction the extinguishment of criminal liability (if ever
there is) through prescription (Art. 89 vis-a-vis Arts. 90-91,
RPC). Prescription is like, the deadline for the filing of charges
for certain crimes. Like, you need to charge a person with
murder within 20 years of the commission of the murder,
otherwise criminal liability is extinguished.
Held:
Ombudsman ordered to reinstate to its docket the criminal
case.
Notes:
Article IV of the MOU - corporate entity shall be created (PASI,
in this case)
Sec. 3(e), RA 3019 - Causing undue injury to any party,
including the gov't in discharge of official fcns through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.
Sec. 7, Rule 111, Rules of Court - Elts of a prejudicial question
Sec. 6, Rule 111, Rules of Court - If there is a prejudicial
question in a civil action, a petition of suspension may be filed
in the office conducting the preliminary investigation.
Yap v. Paras - Sec. 6, Rule 111 directs that criminal
proceedings, if a prejudicial question is found, may only be
suspended, not dismissed.
Sec. 2, Rule II, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman - actions that an investigating officer may take
when given a case.
Art. 89, RPC - Criminal liability may be extinguished through
prescription
Arts 90-91 - Prescription things
Department of Health v. Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. (2007)
Carpio-Morales, J.

If the award of the bidded slot is considered valid, there would

be no basis for the filing of criminal charges against Lichauco
because her acts would also be considered valid. Thus, the
resolution of this issue determines whether the criminal action
filed with the Ombudsman will proceed.

Petition for Review of CA decision which affirmed RTC order

denying petitioners motion to dismiss the pending Civil Case,
as well as CA resolution which denied the petitioners motion
for reconsideration

So is there a prejudicial question? YES.

Facts:

2. But, according to Sec. 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, if

there is a prejudicial question, a petition of suspension may be
filed in the office conducting the preliminary investigation. This
should be applied suppletorily in this case; thus, a prejudicial
question warrants only the suspension of the criminal
proceedings, not their dismissal (Yap v. Paras).
Ombudsman reasons that it is the discretion of the
investigating officer to dismiss a case, as per Sec. 2, Rule II,
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. The
SC states that dismissal is only for petitions that have no basis
at all, and investigating officer should not abuse his/her
discretion.

Phil. Pharmahealth Inc. is a domestic corporation

engaged in the business of manufacturing and
supplying pharmaceutical products to government
hospitals
the DOH through then Sec. of Health Alberto G.
Romualdez, Jr. issued Administrative Order (AO)
No. 27, Series of 1998, which outlines the guidelines
and procedures on the accreditation of government
suppliers
this was later amended by AO No. 10, Series of
2000, which aimed at ensuring that only qualified
bidders can transact business with the DOH

Only products accredited wby the

Committee shall be allowed to be procured
by the DOH
In May of 2000, respondent submitted to the DOH a
request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of
accredited drug products
- this includes the antiobiotic Penicillin G
Benzathine
The processing and release of the result were due to
be out in September of that year
Sometime in Sept of that same year, DOH issued an
Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million
units of vials of Penicillin G Benzathine
- herein referred to as the Penicillin G
Benzathine contract
Despite the lack of response regarding their pending
accreditation, respondent submitted a bid for the
above contract
Respondent submitted the lower bid among the two
companies that participated
- Bid of 82.24 pesos per unit vs. Cathay/YSS
Laboratoriess bid of 95.00 pesos
But in light of the non-accreditation of respondent,
however, the contract was awarded to YSS
Respondent then filed a complaint for injunction,
mandamus, and damages, and sought to nullify the
award of the contract and have them, the plaintiff,
declared as the lowest complying responsible bidder
for the Benzathine contract
The Petitioners, the DOH as well as individual
petitioners who are the Secretaries (different ones)
and Undersecretaries of the same, filed for a
dismissal of the case on lack of merit
- based on the doctrine of state immunity,
maintaining that the suit is against the State
Motion for dismissal denied by both the RTC and the
CA, hence the present petition

Issue:
1.
WON the CA erred in upholding the denial of
petitioners motion to dismiss.
1.1.
No, it did NOT
Ratio:
- The judicial review of alleged grave abuse of
discretion in their official capacity on the part of
government officials amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction of authority is guaranteed in the
constitution
- it is proper that they are impleaded as
defendant or respondent in an appropriate
suit
- As to the DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will
not avail
- Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court
state that preliminary injunction may be

directed against a party or a court, agency,

or a person
- moreover, the defense of state
immunity does not apply in causes
of action which do not seek to
impose a charge or financial lability
against the State
Section 2, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution
embodies the rule that a state may not be sued
without its consent
- it is one of the generally accepted principles
of international law, and has been adopted
as part of the law of the land
- The rule covers complaints against officials
of the state for acts allegedly in the disharge
of their duties, for this will be regarded as
one against the state, when:
- the satisfaction of the judgment
against the officials will require the
state itself to perform a positive act,
such as the appropriation of the
amount necessary to pay damages
awarded against them
- However, there are limitations to this as
articulated in Sharif vs. Court of Appeals
- Inasmuch as the State authorizes
only legal acts by its officers,
unauthorized acts of government
officials or officers are not acts of
the State
- thus the rule does not apply where
the public official is charged in his
official capacity for acts that are
unauthorized or unlawful and
injurious to the rights of others
- also does not apply as well
when official is being sued
in his personal capacity
For the alleged act of illegally abusing their offical
postions in the Benzathine contract done in bad
faith, the present case is permissible
- Note, however, that this is not a ruling on the
actual alleged acts
- merely about the motion for
dismissal, and why it must fail

Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Farolan v. Court of Tax Appeals
Farolan v Court of Tax Appeals (1993)
(Farolan (Commissioner of Customs) petitioner ; Bagong
Buhay Trading and CTA- respondent)
Petition for Review on Certiorari
FACTS
The vessel Pacific Hawk arrived at the port of Manila carrying,
among others, 80 bales of screen net that was consigned to
Bagong Buhay Trading.

Upon examination, customs examiner saw that the importation

was declared as 80 bales of screen net of 500 rolls with a
gross weight of 12,777 kg under Tariff Heading no. 39.06-B
(should be 39.02) at 35% ad valorem.
However, upon re-examination, it was found that the bales of
screen net totaled 1,600 rolls, valued at $10.15/yard, not
$.075/yard as previously declared.
Moreover, the Collector of Customs said that the shipment
should be classified under Tariff Heading no. 51.04-B at
100% ad valorem.
Upon trial before the Court of Tax Appeals, it was decided that
it should be classified as polyethlyene plastic at the rate of
35% ad valorem instead of synthetic woven fabric at the rate
of 100% ad valorem. Bagong Buhay then filed a petition for the
release of the questioned goods. However, of the 143, 454
yards released, only 116,950 were in good condition (26,504
were in bad condition). Bagong Buhay ordered Customs to pay
for damages.
RULINGS:
Commissioner of Customs affirmed the Collector of Customs
; motion for reconsideration denied
Court of Tax Appeals reversed decision of Customs, ruling
that fraud is not established upon Bagong Buhay and that the
classification should be polyethylene plastic at the rate of
35% ad valorem and not the synthetic woven fabric at 100%
ad valorem.
ISSUES
1.
WON shipment in question is subject to forfeiture
under Section 2530-Msubparagraphs (3), (4) and (5)
of the Tariff and Customs Code - NO
2.
WON the shipment falls under Tariff Heading no.
39.02B of the Tariff and Customs Code subject to ad
valorem duty of 35% instead of Tariff Heading no.
51.04B with ad valorem of 100% - YES
3.
WON Collector of Customs may be held liable for the
damages - NO
RATIO
1.
Although there may be misdeclaration (i.e. 1,600
rolls instead of 500), it does not warrant forfeiture
because the act was not committed directly by owner,
importer, exporter or consignee set forth in Section
2530, paragraph m, subparagraph (3), and (4). Its the
fault of the supplier. Bagong Buhay cannot be
charged with the wrongful making because such entry
or declaration merely restated faithfully the data found
in the corresponding certificate of origin, certificate of
manager of the shipper, the packing lists and the bill
of lading which were all prepared by its suppliers
abroad.
Moreover, applying subparagraph (5), Commissioner
of Customs failed to show that fraud had been
committed by the private respondent. The fraud
contemplated must be actual and not constructive. In
the case at bar, Bagong Buhay Trading acted in good
faith.
2.
Relying on the laboratory findings of Bureau of
Customs and Adamson University, they classified the

3.

questioned shipment as polyethylene plastic taxable

under Tariff Heading no. 39.02 instead of synthetic
polyethylene woven fabric under Tariff Heading 51.04
As an unincorporated government agency without
any separate juridical personality of its own, the
Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity from suit.
Otherwise, it would violate the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.The political doctrine the state may not be
sued without its consent applies.
-Customs has the inherent sovereignty, namely,

taxation.
HELD:
Court of Tax Appeals AFFIRMED
Notes:
Sec. 2530.
Property Subject to Forfeiture Under Tariff
and Customs Law. Any vehicle, vessel or aircraft, cargo,
article and other objects shall, under the following conditions
be subjected to forfeiture:
m.
Any article sought to be imported or exported.
(3)
On the strength of a false declaration or affidavit or
affidavit executed by the owner, importer, exporter or
consignee concerning the importation of such article;
(4)
On the strength of a false invoice or other document
executed by the owner, importer, exporter or consignee
concerning the importation or exportation of such article; and.
(5)
Through any other practice or device contrary
to law by means of which such articles was entered through a
custom-house to the prejudice of government.
Lansang v. Court of Appeals
Lansang vs CA
Quisumbing, J.
This is petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals,
which set aside the ruling of the Regional Trial Court, Manila,
Branch 8, and ordered petitioner Amado J. Lansang to pay
private respondent Jose Iglesias P50,000.00 in moral
damages, P10,000.00 in exemplary damages and P5,000.00
in attorney's fees.
Facts:
Private respondents were allegedly given office and library
space as well as kiosks area selling food and drinks. With the
change of government after the EDSA Revolution, the new
Chairman of the NPDC, herein petitioner, sought to clean up
Rizal Park. In a written notice dated February 23, 1988 and
received by private respondents on February 29, 1988,
petitioner terminated the so-called verbal agreement with GABI
and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the
kiosks it ran privately within the public park. In another notice
dated March 5, 1988, respondents were given until March 8,
1988 to vacate. Iglesias, the GABI president, signed the notice
but claims that he was deceived into signing it. On the day of
the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and
injunction in the Regional Trial Court against petitioner. RTC
issued a TRO. The TRO expired and GABI was evicted. RTC
dismissed GABI's action for damages so the latter appealed.
CA found petitioner liable for damages.
Issue:

WON RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING

THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' COMPLAINT AGAINST
PETITIONER, AS CHAIRMAN OF NPDC, AND HIS CODEFENDANTS, IS IN EFFECT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE
WHICH CANNOT BE SUED WITHOUT ITS CONSENT. NO
The petitioner is being sued not in his capacity as NPDC
chairman but in his personal capacity. The complaint filed by
private respondents in the RTC merely identified petitioner as
chairman of the NPDC, but did not categorically state that he is
being sued in that capacity. Also, it is evident from the said
complaint that petitioner was sued allegedly for having
personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal.
WON RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT PETITIONER'S ACT OF TERMINATING
RESPONDENT GABI'S CONCESSION IS VALID AND DONE
IN THE LAWFUL PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY. YES
There is no evidence of such abuse of authority on record. As
earlier stated, Rizal Park is beyond the commerce of man and,
thus, could not be the subject of a lease contract. Admittedly,
there was no written contract. That private respondents were
allowed to occupy office and kiosk spaces in the park was only
a matter of accommodation by the previous administrator. This
being so, also admittedly, petitioner may validly discontinue the
accommodation extended to private respondents, who may be
ejected from the park when necessary. Private respondents
cannot and does not claim a vested right to continue to occupy
Rizal Park.
Held:The instant petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE, and the DISMISSAL of
the complaint for damages by the trial court for want of merit is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
2.
Express Consent
Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc. v. UP
Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency INC. (petitioner) v
University of the Philippines (respondent)
GR. No. 185918 April 18, 2012 Villarama, JR., J.
Petition for review on certiorari
Facts:
1. Lockheed entered into a contract for security services with
UP. In 1998, several security guards assigned to UP filed
separate complaints against both parties for payment of
underpaid wages, 25% overtime pay, premium pay for rest
days and special holidays, holiday pay, service incentive leave
pay, night shift differentials, 13th month pay, refund of cash
bond, refund of deductions for Mutual Benefits Aids System
(MBAS), unpaid wages from Dec. 16-31, 1998 and attorneys
fees.
2. Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on February 16, 2000
stating that both Lockheed and UP as job contractor and
principal were solidarily liable to complaints that were found
meritorious. They were ordered to pay a total amount of
P13,066,794.14 while claims such as night shift differential and
13th month pay were dismissed. Unpaid wages from Dec. 1631 were paid in the course of the proceedings amounting to
P40,140.44.
3. Both UP and Lockheed appealed the LAs decision so it was
modified by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

which further dismissed other claims such as pay for work on

rest day and special holiday and 5 days service incentive leave
pay. It also reaffirmed the Labor Arbiters decision that UP was
still solidarily responsible with Lockheed in payment for the rest
of the claims. UP moved to reconsider the NLRC resolution
however NLRC upheld its resolution but with modification that
the funds that will be taken from UP would not be those
identified as public funds for the satisfaction of judgment.
4. A Notice of Garnishment was issued to PNB UP Diliman
branch for the satisfaction of the award of P12,142,522.69.
PNB then informed UP that it had received an order of release
dated August 8, 2oo5 that was issued by the Labor Arbiter
which would force PNB to release the funds to the NLRC
Cashier thru NLRC Sheriff Max Lago in 10 working days if they
do not receive a notice regarding a court order or writ of
injunction. UP then filed an Urgent Motion to Quash
Garnishment which contends that said funds in Account No.
275-529999-8 under the name UP System Trust Receipts
were government/public funds. UP argued that public funds
may not be disbursed except by an appropriation required
by law. This motion was dismissed by the LA.
5. On September 2, 2005, the amount needed was withdrawn
by the sheriff from UPs PNB account. Ten days later, UP filed
a petition for certiorari before CA stating that NLRC and Arbiter
acted without jurisdiction or gravely abused their discretion by
authorizing sheriff to garnish UPs public funds, dismissed the
Motion to Quash Notice of Garnishment and disregarded an
official certification that the funds garnished are
public/government funds.
6. The CA dismissed UPs petition for certiorari by citing
Republic vs COCOFED. Jurisprudence defined public
funds as money belonging to the State or any political
subdivision specifically taxes, customs, duties and
moneys raised by operation of law for the support of
government or discharge of obligations. The CA felt that
funds sought to be garnished (Account that was earmarked for
Student Guaranty Deposit, Scholarship Fund, Student Fund,
Publications, Research Grants, and Misc. Trust Account) did
not fall within stated definition. On reconsideration, the CA
amended its decision in light of the ruling on the case of
National Electrification Administration vs Morales wherein it
mandates all money claims against the government to be filed
with the COA first. Lockheed then moved to reconsider the
amended decision but was denied by the CA by citing
MIAA vs CA which held that UP was also considered as a
government instrumentality exercising corporate powers
but not organized as a stock or nonstock corporation.
While said corporations are government instrumentalities,
they are still called government corporate entities but not
GOCCs. Lockheed then filed for this petition.
Issue:
1. UP is a government entity with separate and distinct
personality from national government and has its own charter
that grants it right to sue and be sued. It cannot then avail of
immunity from suit of government so it can be held liable.
2. If court lends its assent to invocation of doctrine of state
immunity, this will result in grave injustice

3. Protestations of UP are too late as execution of proceedings

have been terminated (fait accompli).
Ratio:
1. Juridical Person: CA correctly applied NEA case. UP is a
juridical personality separate and distinct from government and
has the capacity to be sued and to sue. There is a distinction
that suability does not necessitate liability. UP cannot avoid
execution and its funds may be subject to garnishment.
However, there is a need to file a claim of payment of
judgment award at the COA first. Under Commonwealth Act
No. 327 (amended by PD No. 1445 Section 26), it is the
COA which has primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and
settle all debts and claims due from the government or
any of its political subdivisions.
2. Claim of State Immunity: Lockheed claims that UP cannot
invoke state immunity to justify from allowing it to disregard its
contractual obligations. Court finds this stupid since UP did not
invoke doctrine of state immunity in the case.
3. Fait Accompli: Since garnishment was wrongly executed,
UP is entitled to reimbursement of funds with interest of 6%
per annum to be computed from time of judicial demand to
time UP filed a petition before CA.
SC Ruling: Petitioned denied for lack of merit. Lockheed
ordered to reimburse UP amount of P12,062,398.71 plus
interest of 6% per annum from September 12, 2005 to finality
of decision and 12% interest of entire amount from finality of
decision until fully paid.
FOR OCTOBER 7
a.

Money claims arising from contract

d. Petition for injunction dismissed for the lack of merit,

temporary stay of execution issued (see a.)
SC - This case
Facts:
On April 1, 1989 and May 1, 1990, petitioner DA entered into a
contract with Sultan Security Agency. As these things go,
Sultan Security filed a complaint for 'underpayment of wages;
non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night
shift differential, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for
damages' on September 13, 1990 with the Labor Arbiter (see
Summary of Proceedings).
A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer
for preliminary writ of injunction was filed by DA with the NLRC
alleging that:
a. writ of execution ordered by Labor Arbiter is null and void,
because the Labor Arbiter has not acquired jurisdiction over
them (DA); and
b. the seizure of the vehicles will hamper and jeopardize DA's
functions, to the prejudice of the public good. (For ruling, see
Summary of Proceedings again)
In the instant case, DA charges/faults NLRC with/for:
a. Grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of
execution issued by the Labor Arbiter;
b. assuming jurisdiction over a money claim, when such
jurisdiction belongs to COA; and
c. disregarding the non-suability of the State.

Department of Agriculture v. NLRC Vitug, J

November 11, 1993
GR 104296
Petitioner: Department of Agriculture
Respondents: The National Labor Relations Commission, et.
al
Petition for certiorari to nullify a resolution of the National
Labor Relations Commission

NLRC, on the other hand argues that DA has impliedly waived

its immunity from suit by entering into a service contract with
Sultan Security.

Summary of Proceedings:
Regional Labor Arbitration Branch of Cagayan de Oro:
a. DA jointly and severally liable with Sultan Security Agency
for the payment of money claims; and since there was no
appeal, the judgment became final and executory; therefore,
Labor Arbiter:
b. Issued writ of execution commanding the City Sheriff to
practically seize vehicles belonging to DA

Ratio:
1. The State may give its consent to be sued expressly or
impliedly. In this case, both were given:

NLRC Cagayan de Oro:

a. Enforcement and execution of judgment temporarily for two
months, more or less, but not extending beyond the last
quarter of the calendar year of 1991;
b. Petitioner is ordered to source for funds to pay Sultan
Security with;
c. Petitioner is ordered to post surety and supersedeas bond,
equivalent to 50% of total monetary award; and

Implied consent - given when DA entered into a contract with

Sultan Security, because when the State enters into a contract,
it is deemed to have descended into the level of an individual;
thus, it can be sued.

Issues:
1. WON DA impliedly waived its immunity from suit - YES BUT
THINGS
2. WON writ of execution should be quashed - YES

Express consent - made through a general or special law. In

this case, the general law is Art. 3083, which are the
conditions under which the gov't may be sued. (See Notes
for relevant provisions)

However, since the claims of Sultan Security clearly constitute

money claims, the claim should have been brought first to
the Commission on Audit, pursuant to Commonwealth Act

327, which details the procedures for cases involving

money claims against the government, as amended by
Presidential Decree 1445, which is the State Audit Code of
the Philippines. (See Notes for relevant provisions)
Since there are no inconsistencies between CA 327 and the
Labor Code re: money claims against the State, CA 327, as
amended by PD 1445, shall be applicable.
2. Pursuant to Section 7 of Art. 3083, writs of execution
cannot be issued against the State because the 'functions
and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to
be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from
their legitimate of specific objects, as appropriated by law.'
Reminder: law referred to is the GAA.
Held:
Petition is granted. Resolution of NLRC is reversed and set
aside. Writ of execution nullified.
Notes:
Art. 3083
Section 1. Subject to the provisions of this Act, the
Government of the Philippine Islands hereby consents and
submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability
arising from contract, expressed or implied, which could serve
as a basis of civil action between private parties.
Section 7. No execution shall issue upon any judgment
rendered by any court against the Government of the
Philippine Islands under the provisions of this Act xxx
CA 327
Section 1. In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or
claims, other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor
General shall act and decide the same xxx
PD 1445
Section 35. Collection of indebtedness due the government.
The Commission shall,
through proper channels, assist in the collection and
enforcement of all debts and claims... found to be due the
Government xxx
b. Torts committed by special agents
c. Incorporated government agencies
3. Implied Consent
a. Government submits itself to the courts jurisdiction
Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc. v. UP
Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency INC. (petitioner) v
University of the Philippines (respondent)
GR. No. 185918 April 18, 2012 Villarama, JR., J.
Petition for review on certiorari
Facts:
1. Lockheed entered into a contract for security services with
UP. In 1998, several security guards assigned to UP filed
separate complaints against both parties for payment of

underpaid wages, 25% overtime pay, premium pay for rest

days and special holidays, holiday pay, service incentive leave
pay, night shift differentials, 13th month pay, refund of cash
bond, refund of deductions for Mutual Benefits Aids System
(MBAS), unpaid wages from Dec. 16-31, 1998 and attorneys
fees.
2. Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on February 16, 2000
stating that both Lockheed and UP as job contractor and
principal were solidarily liable to complaints that were found
meritorious. They were ordered to pay a total amount of
P13,066,794.14 while claims such as night shift differential and
13th month pay were dismissed. Unpaid wages from Dec. 1631 were paid in the course of the proceedings amounting to
P40,140.44.
3. Both UP and Lockheed appealed the LAs decision so it was
modified by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
which further dismissed other claims such as pay for work on
rest day and special holiday and 5 days service incentive leave
pay. It also reaffirmed the Labor Arbiters decision that UP was
still solidarily responsible with Lockheed in payment for the rest
of the claims. UP moved to reconsider the NLRC resolution
however NLRC upheld its resolution but with modification that
the funds that will be taken from UP would not be those
identified as public funds for the satisfaction of judgment.
4. A Notice of Garnishment was issued to PNB UP Diliman
branch for the satisfaction of the award of P12,142,522.69.
PNB then informed UP that it had received an order of release
dated August 8, 2oo5 that was issued by the Labor Arbiter
which would force PNB to release the funds to the NLRC
Cashier thru NLRC Sheriff Max Lago in 10 working days if they
do not receive a notice regarding a court order or writ of
injunction. UP then filed an Urgent Motion to Quash
Garnishment which contends that said funds in Account No.
275-529999-8 under the name UP System Trust Receipts
were government/public funds. UP argued that public funds
may not be disbursed except by an appropriation required
by law. This motion was dismissed by the LA.
5. On September 2, 2005, the amount needed was withdrawn
by the sheriff from UPs PNB account. Ten days later, UP filed
a petition for certiorari before CA stating that NLRC and Arbiter
acted without jurisdiction or gravely abused their discretion by
authorizing sheriff to garnish UPs public funds, dismissed the
Motion to Quash Notice of Garnishment and disregarded an
official certification that the funds garnished are
public/government funds.
6. The CA dismissed UPs petition for certiorari by citing
Republic vs COCOFED. Jurisprudence defined public
funds as money belonging to the State or any political
subdivision specifically taxes, customs, duties and
moneys raised by operation of law for the support of
government or discharge of obligations. The CA felt that
funds sought to be garnished (Account that was earmarked for
Student Guaranty Deposit, Scholarship Fund, Student Fund,
Publications, Research Grants, and Misc. Trust Account) did
not fall within stated definition. On reconsideration, the CA
amended its decision in light of the ruling on the case of
National Electrification Administration vs Morales wherein it

mandates all money claims against the government to be filed

with the COA first. Lockheed then moved to reconsider the
amended decision but was denied by the CA by citing
MIAA vs CA which held that UP was also considered as a
government instrumentality exercising corporate powers
but not organized as a stock or nonstock corporation.
While said corporations are government instrumentalities,
they are still called government corporate entities but not
GOCCs. Lockheed then filed for this petition.
Issue:
1. UP is a government entity with separate and distinct
personality from national government and has its own charter
that grants it right to sue and be sued. It cannot then avail of
immunity from suit of government so it can be held liable.
2. If court lends its assent to invocation of doctrine of state
immunity, this will result in grave injustice
3. Protestations of UP are too late as execution of proceedings
have been terminated (fait accompli).
Ratio:
1. Juridical Person: CA correctly applied NEA case. UP is a
juridical personality separate and distinct from government and
has the capacity to be sued and to sue. There is a distinction
that suability does not necessitate liability. UP cannot avoid
execution and its funds may be subject to garnishment.
However, there is a need to file a claim of payment of
judgment award at the COA first. Under Commonwealth Act
No. 327 (amended by PD No. 1445 Section 26), it is the
COA which has primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and
settle all debts and claims due from the government or
any of its political subdivisions.
2. Claim of State Immunity: Lockheed claims that UP cannot
invoke state immunity to justify from allowing it to disregard its
contractual obligations. Court finds this stupid since UP did not
invoke doctrine of state immunity in the case.
3. Fait Accompli: Since garnishment was wrongly executed,
UP is entitled to reimbursement of funds with interest of 6%
per annum to be computed from time of judicial demand to
time UP filed a petition before CA.
SC Ruling: Petitioned denied for lack of merit. Lockheed
ordered to reimburse UP amount of P12,062,398.71 plus
interest of 6% per annum from September 12, 2005 to finality
of decision and 12% interest of entire amount from finality of
decision until fully paid.

b. The State itself files a complaint

Republic v. Sandiganbayan (2006) Garcia, J.

Petition for certiorari to nullify and set aside Sandiganbayan
decision ordering the PCGG to pay Roberto S. Benedicto or
his corporations the value of 227 shares of stock of the Negros
Occidental Golf and Country Club, Inc. (NOGCCI) at P
150,000 per share
FACTS:

A complaint was filed by the GRP against Roberto S.

Benedicto, for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
reconstitution and damages
one of several cases involving ill-gotten or
unexplained wealth that Republic, through
the Presidential Commission on Good
Governance (PCGG), filed with the
Sandiganbayan, pursuant to Executive
Order (EO) No. 14, Series of 1986
Issued by President Corazon
Aquino investing the
Sandiganbayan exclusive and
original jurisdiction over cases
involving the ill-gotten wealth of
former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, members of his immediate
family, close relatives, subordinates
the PCGG issued writs sequestration all business
enterprises, entities, and other properties owned or
registered in the name of Benedicto, or corporations
in which he had a majority or controlling interest
among these properties were the 227 shares
of stock in NOGCCI
After sequestration, the PCGG representatives/fiscal
agents sat on the board of Directors of NOGCCI
this board passed a corporate policy change,
which assessed a montlhy membership due
of P150 for each share
prior to this only the 1st share of a
member had dues, subsequent
shares were exempt
another resolution was passed which
increased the monthly dues to P250
As sequestrator, PCGG failed to pay the
corresponding monthly dues which totaled
P2,959,471
thus the 227 sequestered shares were
declared delinquent, and were to be
disposed of in an auction sale
PCGG then filed a complaint for injunction with the
RTC of Bacolod
complaint was dismissed, however
and so an auction sale was
conducted
Petitioner and private respondent Benedicto then
entered into a Compromise Agreement
This contained a general release clause
Republic agreed and bound itself to
lift the sequestration order on the
227 NOGCCI shares, among other
properties, and acknowlege that it
was within Benedictos capacity to
acquire the same shares
implied herein is that the
shares of stock could not
have been ill-gotten

Sandiganbayan approved the Compromise

Agreement
Benedicto filed for the release of the NOGCCI shares
of stock to him as part of the Compromise Agreement
the Sandiganbayan then issued the first assailed
Resolution, which required the PCGG to:
deliver to the Clerk of Court the 227
sequestered shares
or in default thereof, to pay their value at
P150,000 per share
After the PCGG failed to comply, Benedicto filed a
motion for compliance
the PCGG then moved for reconsideration,
while Benedicto moved for enforcement of
judgment
Resolving the two aforementioned issues, the second
assailed Resolution came out, denying PCGG and
granting Benedictos motion
Hence the present petition

ISSUE:
1. WON the Sandiganbayan, Second Division, gravely
abused its discretion in holding that the PCGG is at
fault for not paying the membership dues on the 227
sequestered NOGCCI shares of stock, which led to
the foreclosure thereof.
a.
No, it did NOT
2. WON the PCGG can invoke the doctrine of State
Immunity from Suit.
.
No, it can NOT
RATIO:
1. No grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan
a.
One of the PCGGs functions as receiver of the
sequestered shares of stock is to pay outstanding debts
b.
this is acknowledged by the PCGG
i.
it contends however that membership dues for a golf
should not be considered as outstanding debt
ii.
also claims to have exercised due diligence to
prevent the loss of the shares through delinquency sale
1. as seen by its filing of an
injunctive suit to enjoin the
foreclosure sale
a.
the Court finds however that it is a case of too little,
too late
c.
PCGG should have acted as a responsible father in
preserving the value of the shares of stock
.
as such, it was duty-bound to adopt timely measures
to obviate the loss of those shares, which form part of such
duty and due diligence
d.
Also, since the PCGGs fiscal agents sat on the board
that approved the policy changes, they in fact had a direct
hand in the loss of the shares through delinquency

e.
Court held that the Sandiganbayan resolutions did no
more than direct PCGG to comply with its part of the bargain
under the Compromise Agreement, which it freely entered into
.
thus, no grave abuse of discretion of the
Sandiganbayan
2. PCGG cannot invoke state immunity from suit
.
one of the exceptions to the state immunity principle
is when the government itself is the suitor
.
when the state itself is no less than the plaintiff in the
main case, immunity from suit cannot be effectively invoked
i.
when the State, through its duly authorized officers,
takes the initiative in a suit against a private party, it thereby
descends to the level of a private individual and thus opens
itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the latter may
have against it
a.
In fact, by entering the Compromise Agreement,
Republic thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and
placed itself on the same level of its adversary
.
the State may be sued even without its express
consent, precisely because by entering into a contract the
sovereign descends to the level of the citizen
i.
Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of
entering into such agreement, breach of which on its part gives
the corresponding right to the other party to the agreement
RULING:
The instant petition is DISMISSED.
Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co. (1954) Paras, C.J.
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila
FACTS:

Plaintiff-appellee, Fernando A. Froilan, filed a

complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan
Oriental Shipping Co.
alleged that he purchased from the Shipping
Commission the vessel FS-197 for P200,000, paying
P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the balance in
installments
that to secure the payment of the balance, he
executed a chattel mortgage of said vessel in favor of
the Shipping Commission
that for various reasons, among them the nonpayment of the installments, the Shipping
Commission took possession of said vessel and
considered the contract of sale cancelled
Shipping Commission (Ship Co.) chartered and
delivered said vessel to Pan Oriental Shipping Co.,
subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines
he appealed the action of the Shipping Commission
to the President of the Philippines
the Cabinet restored to him all his rights under his
original contract

he repeatedly demanded from Pan Oriental the

possession of the vessel but the latter refused
prayed that upon the approval of the bond, a writ of
replevin be issued for the seizure of said vessel and
he be given rightful possession thereof
lower court issued the writ of replevin and Pan
Oriental was divested of its possession
Pan Oriental filed an answer, and held that Froilan
had not complied with the conditions precedent
imposed by the Cabinet, and that it had incurred
necessary and useful expenses on the vessel
amounting to P127,057.31 and claimed the right to
retain said vessel until reimbursed
GRP filed a complaint in intervention alleging that
Froilan had failed to pay the balance due as well as
the interest thereon and its advances, thus intervenor
was entitled to the possession of the vessel, or in
order that it may cause the extrajudicial sale thereof
under the Chattel Mortgage Law
It prayed that Froilan be declared to be
without any rights on said vessel
Pan Oriental alleged that GRP was obligated to
deliver the vessel to it by virtue of a contract of
bareboat charter
Froilan tendered to the Board of Liquidators a check
for P162,576.96 for payment of his obligation on the
vessel
lower court held that the payment constituted a
discharge of Froilans obligation to GRP and ordered
the dismissal of the latters complaint in intervention
lower court made it clear however that said order did
not pre-judge the question involved between Froilan
and Oriental Shipping
GRP filed a motion to dimiss the counterclaim of Pan
Oriental, as said counterclaim was to compel GRP to
deliver the vessel to it, but since Froilan already paid
his obligation, the counterclaim is no longer feasible
and is barred by prior judgment and has no cause of
action
GRP also alleged that it is not subject to the
jurisdiction of the court (state immunity)
Thus Pan Orientals present appeal, premised on the
counterclaim which states that
intervenor RP is bound under the contract of
charter with option to purchase that it
entered into with the defendant to deliver
that possession to the defendant
RP has not to date complied with the stated
obligation

ISSUE:
a.
.

1. WON lower court erred in dismissing the counterclaim

YES, it did
2. WON GRP can invoke state immunity from suit
No, it can NOT

RATIO:
1. The counterclaim is not barred by prior judgment
a.
As stated earlier, the courts dismissal of the
complaint in intervention did not pre-judge the question
involved between the plaintiff and the defendant in that case
b.
Also, said order preserved its right as against the
intervenor
i.
seen in Rule 30, Section 2, of the Rules of Court
1. if a counterclaim has
been pleaded by a
defendant prior to the
service upon him of the
plaintiffs motion to
dismiss, the action shall
not be dismissed against
the defendants objection
unless the counterclaim
can remain pending for
independent adjudication
by the court
2. GRP cannot invoke state immunity from suit
.
Untenable, because by filing its complaint in
intervention the Government in effect waived its right of
nonsuability
.
The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive
it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state
as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open
to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action
against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged
position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The
latter automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to
set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have
against the state.
RULING:
Order reversed, and case remanded
c.

Government entering into business contracts;

unincorporated agencies exercising proprietary
Air Transportation Office v. David
Air Transportation Office v Ramos (2011)
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of CA
FACTS
Air Transportation Office (ATO) failed to pay spouses David
and Elisea Ramos the amount of P778,150 for the affected
portion of the respondents land that was used as part of the
runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport operated
by ATO.
ATO contended that the deed of sale had been entered into in
performance of a governmental function, pursuant to
Proclamation no. 1358 of President Marcos reserving
certain parcels of land for use of the Loakan Airport.

LOWER COURT RULINGS

RTC ordered ATO to pay David and Elisea
CA affirmed RTC decision
ISSUE
WON ATO could not be sued without the States consent - NO
RATIO
ATO is an agency of the government NOT performing a purely
governmental or sovereign function. Instead, it is involved in
the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport,
which is not part of the sovereign capacity of the State.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be invoked to
defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking
without just compensation and without proper expropriation
proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs property
*The issue has been declared moot because of the passage of
RA no. 9497, known as the Civil Aviation Authority Act of
2008, abolishing ATO and creating the Civil Aviation Authority
of the Philippines (CAAP).
HELD
CA AFFIRMED
NOTES
DOCTRINE OF NON SUABILITY OF STATE Art XVI
Sec 3 of 1987 Constitution: The State may not be sued
without its consent
Immunity of suit has been upheld in favor of an
unincorporated government agency performing governmental
function. If the government agencys function is proprietary in
nature (essentially a business), state immunity could not be
upheld
Practical consideration/explanation for state immunity:
government service may be severely obstructed and public
safety endangered because of the number of suits that the
State has to defend against
Pacific Products, Inc. V. Ong
Pacific Products, Inc. v Ong (1990)
PETITION for certiorari to review decision of CA
FACTS
Pacific Products, Inc. filed an action for sum of money against
Hilarion Labrador, who was said to be doing business under
the name and style of BML Trading and Supply.
An order was issued by the CFI of Manila ordering Sheriff to
attach the properties of Labrador
Meanwhile, BML Trading and Supply won in a bid to supply the
Bureau of Telecomm with 15,000 lbs. of bluestone copper
sulfate worth P10,500. The Sheriff of Manila garnished
P9,111.70 of P10,500 before the Bureau could release
payment to BML.
Labrador, as agent of BML Trading, assigned its rights over
the P10,500 to Vicente Ong who advanced the necessary
funds to purchase the copper sulfate, and further agreed that
the profits will be shared on a 40-60 percent basis (BML
Ong).

Pacific learned about the assignment when a copy of the third

party claim was filed by Ong in the office of the Sheriff.
Pacific sought to strike out the third party claim of Vicente Ong
LOWER COURT
RTC Labrador ordered to pay PacificP9,111.70
CA reversed decision, ordering Pacific products and First QC
Insurance Co to pay the sum of P10,293.35) to plaintiffappellant
ISSUES:
1.
WON immunity from suit was waived when the Bureau
of Telecommunication entered into a business transaction with
BML NO
2.
WON the Bureau, since it is authorized to enter into a
contract, can be sued and may be subjected to court
processes just like any other person, as was held in NASSCO
v CIR - NO
3.
WON garnishment of P10,500 payable to BML Trading
while it was still in the possession of Bureau of Telecomm is
illegal, therefore null and void - NO
RATIO
1.
Suability would only follow if the contract entered into by
government is in the exercise of a proprietary, NOT in the
exercise of a governmental function.
Bureau of Telecomm is a service bureau and not engaged in
business.
2.
NASSCO is a government owned and controlled
corporation; therefore, it has a personality of its own that is
separate and distinct from that of the government. Thats why it
can be sued. In the case at bar, the Bureau of Telecomm is a
government agency that has no charter and no distinct
personality of its own , thats why the doctrine of state
immunity from suit applies to it
3.
By the process of garnishment, the plaintiff virtually sues
the garnishee for a debt due to the defendant; money in the
hands of public officers, although it may be due government
employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in
the process of garnishment
HELD
Petition DISMISSED; CA AFFIRMED
d. When inequitable for government to claim immunity
Vigilar v. Aquino
Gregorio Vigilar (DPWH Secretary) et al. - petitioners
Arnulfo Aquiono- respondent
GR. No. 180388 January 18, 2011 Sereno, J.
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Summary of Proceedings:
RTC of Guagua- respondent filed complaint and DPWH
ordered to pay
Court of Appeals- upheld decision of RTC
SC- petitioners want a reversal and dismissal of case
Facts:
Angelito Twano, OIC District Engineer of DPWH 2nd
Engineering Division of Pampanga sent Aquino, owner of A.D.
Aquino Construction and Supplies, an Invitation to Bid for the
construction of a dike by bulldozing a part of Porac River. The
project was awarded to respondent and a contract of

agreement was executed on the amount of P1,873,790.69 to

cover project cost. The project was duly completed by
respondent who then issued a certificate of project
completion which was signed by Twano, Romeo Yumul
(project engineer) and Romeo Supan (chief of construction
section). Respondent then claimed that P1,262,696.20 was still
owed to him but the petitioners refused to pay the said amount.
He then filed a complaint for collection of sum of money with
damages before the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga. Petitioners
used the defense of complaint as a suit against the state,
failure to exhaust administrative means and the contract of
agreement was void due to violation of PD No. 1445, absent
the proper appropriation and the certificate of availability of
funds. RTC ruled in favor of respondent and ordered DPWH to
pay the whole amount (P1,873,790.69) instead of remaining
balance, P50,000.00 for attorney fees and cost of suit.
Petitioners then raised the suit to the CA which then reversed
the decision. The decision of the CA was contract agreement
declared as null and void ab initio plus COA being ordered to
allow payment to respondent based on quantum meruit basis (
payment based on merit). Petitioners, being dissatisfied with
the ruling, appealed to the SC for dismissal of case.
Issues:
1. Did the CA err in holding that doctrine of non-suability of
state has no application in case at bar
2. Did CA err in not dismissing the complaint for failure of
respondent to exist all administrative means 3. Did CA err in
ordering COA to allow payment to respondent on quantum
meruit basis despite failure to comply with PD 1445
Ratio:
1. Failure of exhausting administrative means- Doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative means and doctrine of primary
jurisdiction are not ironclad rules as reiterated in RP vs Lacap.
SC ruled that case was exempted due to it being a pure legal
concern (validity and enforcement of contract agreement) and
there was unreasonable delay that prejudiced the complaint
due to it lasting almost 20 years.
2. Payment based on quantum meruit basis- CA upheld
correct decision based on stare decisis. SC has held that
contracts were void for failing to meet the requirements
mandated by law; public interest and equity, however, dictate
that the contractor should be compensated for services
rendered and work done. There should be no unjust
enrichment of the State.
3. State immunity from suit- doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. Doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit yields to certain settled exceptions due to it
not saying that the state may not be sued under any
circumstance. Justice trumps States immunity from suit.
SC Ruling: Petition denied and CA ruling upheld
Notes:
1. RP vs Lacap- exception to doctrine of exhaustion of admin
means and primary jurisdiction ((a) where there is estoppels on
the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to
lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or

official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant;

(d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make
the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question
involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided
by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent;
(g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and
irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate
due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k)
where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto
proceedings
Republic v. Villasor
J. Fernando (1973)
Petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging Court of
Instance of Cebus order declaring their July 3 1961 decision
final and executory.
Facts:
July 3, 1961, decision was rendered in Special Proceedings
Case in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co et al. and against
petitioner Republic of the Philippines herein, confirming the
arbitration award of P1,712,396.40. On June 24, 1969,
respondent Judge Villasor declared the aforementioned
decision final and executory. Writs of garnishment were
forwarded to several banks requiring payment. Hence this
prayer.
Issue:
Whether the State can be sued in this scenario -NO
Ratio:
The State cannot be sued without its consent. It is a
fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the
juristic concept of sovereignty. A sovereign is exempt from
suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory,
but on the logical and practical cloud but on the logical and
particular legal and practical ground that there can be no legal
right as against the authority that makes the law on which a the
right depends.
Held:
Writs of certiorari and prohibition are GRANTED, nullifying and
setting aside both the order of June 24, 1969 declaring
executory the decision of July 3, 1961 as well as the alias writ
of execution issued thereunder. The preliminary injunction
issued by this Court on July 12, 1969 is hereby made
permanent.
4. Execution
Republic v. NLRC
Republic of Philippines (under Asset Privatization Trust [ATP])
- petitioner

National Labor Relations Commission, Hon. Eduardo J. Carpio

and Pantranco Association of Concerned Employees Union respondents
GR. No. 120385 October 17, 1996 Vitug,J.
Instant Petition for Temporary Restraining Order (?)
Summary of Proceedings:
Labor Arbiter: PNEI and ATP liable to pay
SC: petition for review and TRO
Facts:
Ownership of Pantranco North Express Inc. (PNEI) was
transferred to National Investment Development Corporation
(NIDC) , a subsidiary of Philippine National Bank (PNB), upon
the foreclosure of its assets. PNEI was one of the companies
placed under sequestration by the PCGG after EDSA
Revolution. The sequestration order was lifted so as to have
PNEI sold off by ATP which had managed the company by
then. Financial deterioration continued which forced ATP to file
a petition to the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission)
to suspend payments and try to make PNEI a source of profit
for the government. Cost saving measures were initiated which
led to retrenchment of 500 employees who then filed various
labor complaints at the Arbitration Branch of NLRC-NCR. PNEI
participated through the Office of Government Corporate
Council while ATP, not formally entering their appearance,
submitted a paper with a motion to dismiss. Labor Arbiter
Eduardo Carpio then ruled that PNEI and ATP were jointly and
solidarily liable for payment of claims (13th month pay and P1,
000.00 cash gift for the year 1992; medicine allowance from
1991 to September 1993 when the company ceased its
operations; uniform allowance pursuant to Art. XIII of the CBA;
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of
service, a fraction of six (6) months to be considered as one
(1) whole year; and 10% of the total award as attorney's fees).
A writ of execution was released which the sheriff served to the
Land Bank of the Philippines by way of notice of garnishment.
LBP replied that the funds of ATP were considered as public
funds thus could not be subject to garnishment. Foreseeing
that other sheriffs of the other cases may follow suit, ATP then
filed an instant petition upon the SC.
Issues:
1. Can ATP be held liable for the obligations of PNEI
Ratio:
1. Immunity of State to be sued- The State may not be sued
without its consent. This consent may be implied or expressed.
Express consent may be made by way of general or special
law. In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of
the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the
Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon
any money claim involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action
between private parties." Implied consent is given when the
State partakes in litigation. ATP, created by virtue of
Proclamation 50, can be called to court. However, suability
does not equate to liability.
2. Liability- ATP, as an institution, has no liability in the case.
ATP became the conservator of assets of PNEI. ATPs liability
should be co-extensive with the amount of assets taken from

PNEI. PNEIs assets that shall be auctioned should be the

source of financial claims of PACEU.
SC Ruling: Petition granted, Notice of garnishment to ATP is
nullified and TRO is made permanent.
Relevant Stuff:
Act No. 3083- the Philippine government "consents and
submits to be sued upon any money claim involving liability
arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as
a basis of civil action between private parties."
Proclamation 50- creation of ATP
National Electrification Admission v. Morales
National Electrification Administration v. Morales; AustriaMartinez J. (June 22, 2007)
Facts:
Daniilo Morales and 105 other employee from NEA filed with
the QC RTC Branch 88 a class suit against their employer for
payment of rice allowance, meal allowance,
medical/dental/optical allowance, childrens allowance, and
longevity pay purportedly authorized under RA 6758
(Compensation and Classification Act of 1989, eff. July 1,
1989).
The RTC in its December 16, 1999 decision ordered NEA to
settle the claims of the petitioners and other employees
similarly situated and extend to them the benefits and
allowances to which they are entitled but which until now they
have been deprived of as enumerated under Section 5 of DBM
CCC No. 10 and their inclusion in the Provident Funds
Membership, retroactive from the date of their appointments up
to the present or until their separation from the service.
(Emphasis supplied, part of the dispositive of the Decision)
The RTC decision then effectuated a Writ of Execution, which
mandates NEA to settle the claims of the petitioner and other
employees similarly situated.
Thereafter, a Notice of Garnishment was issued against the
funds of NEA with the DBP to the extent of P16,581,429.00.
NEA then filed a Motion to Quash Writs of
Execution/Garnishment, claiming that the garnished public
funds are exempt from execution under Sec. 4, PD No. 1445
(Ordaining and Instituting a Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines, app. June 11, 1978). In its May 17, 2000 RTC
denied the Motion to Quash but, at the same time, held in
abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Execution to
formally inform the Court and petitioners of the prospect of
obtaining funds from FBM within 30 days from receipt and
every 30 days thereafter, until the 90-day period has lapsed.
Morales et al filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration but the
RTC denied it.
In a letter dated June 28, 2000, former DBM Sec. Benhamin E.
Diokno informed NEA Administrator Conrado M. Estrella III of
the denial of the NEA request for supplemental budget on the
ground that the claims under RA No. 6758 which the RTC had
orderd to be sttled cannot be paid because Morales, et al are
not incumbents of positions as of July 1, 1989 who are
actually receiving and enjoying such benefits
Moreover, in an endorsement dated March 23, 2000, the COA
advised NEA against making further payments in settlement of

the claims of Morales, et al. COA had already passed upon

claims similar to those of Morales, et al. in its earlier
Decision No. 95-074 dated January 25, 1995, portions of
the endorsement read as follows:
This Office concurs with the above view. The court may have
exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the petition for the
entitlement of the after-hired employees which had already
been passed upon by this Commission in COA Decision No.
95-074 dated January 25, 1995. There it was held that: the
adverse action of this Commission sustaining the disallowance
made by the Auditor, NEA, on the payment of fringe benefits
granted to NEA employees hired from July 1, 1989 to October
31, 1989 is hereby reconsidered. Accordingly, subject to
disallowance is lifted.
Thus, employees hired after the extended date of October 31,
1989, pursuant to the above COA decision cannot defy that
decision by filing a petition for mandamus in the lower court.
PD No. 1445 and the 1987 Constitution prescribe that the only
mode for appeal from decisions of this Commission is on
certiorari to the Supreme Court in the manner provided by law
and the Rules of Court. Clearly, the lower court had no
jurisdiction when it entertained the subject case of mandamus.
And void decisions of the lower court can never attain finality,
much less be executed. Moreover, COA was not made a party
thereto, hence, it cannot be compelled to allow the payment of
claims on the basis of the questioned decision.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the auditor of NEA should postaudit the disbursement vouchers on the bases of this
Commissions decision particularly the above-cited COA
Decision No. 94-0741 [sic] and existing rules and regulations,
as if there is no decision of the court in the subject special civil
action for mandamus. At the same time, management should
be informed of the intention of this Office to question the
validity of the court decision before the Supreme Court through
the Office of the Solicitor General.
Parenthetically, records do not indicate when Morales, et al.
were appointed. Even the December 16, 1999 RTC Decision is
vague for it merely states that they were appointed after June
30, 1989, which could mean that they were appointed either
before the cut-off date of of October 31, 1989 or after. Thus,
there is not enough basis for this Court to determine that the
goregoing COA Decision No. 95-074 adversely affects
Morales, et al.
Morales, et al then filed for a Motion for an Order to Implement
Writ of Execution, pointing out that the reason cited in the May
17, 2000 RTC Order no longer exists since DBM already
denied NEAs request for funding. Also, they filed a Petition to
Cite NEA Board of Administrators Mario Tiaoqui, Victoria
Batungbcal2, Federico Puno, and Remedios Macalingcag in
Contempt of Court for allegedly withholding appropriations to
cover their claims.
RTC then issued a Resolution dated December 11, 2000
which says that: from the comments of the respondents, it
appears they did or are doing their best to secure the needed
funds to satisfy the judgment sought to be enforced eventually
denying Morales, et al.s contempt charges.
The following events took place after:

Jan 8, 2001 RTC denied the Motion for an Order to

Implement Writ of Execution, citing the same SC
Administrative Circular No. 10-2000
July 4, 2002 Morales, et al. filed for a Petition for Certiorari.
The CA held that NEA can no longer take shelter under the
provisions of PD No. 1445 and SC Administrative Circular No.
10-2000 because it is a government-owned or controlled
corporation (GOCC) created under PD No. 269, eff. August 6,
1973. It held that NEA, being a GOCC, may be subject to court
processes just like any other corporation; specifically, its
properties may be proceeded against by way of garnishment
or levy.
Issues/Held/Ratio:
1. WON Morales, et al. can proceed against the funds of NEA
NO
The December 16, 1999 RTC Decision sought to be satisfied
is not a judgment for a specific sum of money susceptible of
execution by garnishment; it is a special judgment requiring
petitioners to settle the claims of respondents in accordance
with existing regulations of COA.
It merely directs petitioners to settle claims of Morales, et al.
and other employees similarly situated It does not require
petitioners to pay a certain sum of money to respondents
which is governed by Sec. 11, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, garnishment cannot be employed to implement
such form of judgment, this is governed by Sec. 9, Rule 39. It
is only proper when the judgment to be enforced is one for
payment of a sum of money.
The RTC exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction when it
directed petitioners to extend the benefits and allowances to
which they are entitled to. Also, it countenanced the issuance
of a notice of garnishment against the funds of petitioners with
DBP.
2. WON NEA is a GOCC and can execute orders from courts
independently from COA - NO
NEA is a GOCC a juridical personality separate and distinct
from the government, with capacity to sue and be sued. As
such, NEA cannot evade execution; its funds may be
garnished or levied upon in satisfaction of a judgment rendered
against it.
However, before execution may proceed against it, a claim for
payment of the judgment award must first be filed with the
COA.
Under CA No. 327, as amended by Sec. 26, PD 1445, it is the
COA which has primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and
settle all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing the
government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities, including GOCCs and their subsidiaries
Claims from RA No. 6758 is for COA to decide, subject only to
the remedy of appeal by petition for certiorari to the SC.
Decision:
RTC decision (Jan. 8, 2001) reinstated. CA decision reversed
and set aside. Petition granted.
Notes:
SC Administrative Circular No. 10-2000.
In order to prevent possible circumvention of the rules and
procedures of the COA, judges are hereby enjoined to observe

utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in the issuance of

writs of execution to satisfy money judgments against
government agencies and local government units.
Judges should bear in mind that in Commissioner of Public
Highways v. San Diego, The universal rule that where the
State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit claimants action only up to
the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution and the power of the court ends when the judgment
is rendered, since government funds and properties may not
be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy
such judgment, is based on obvious considerations of public
policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions
and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to
be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from
their legitimate and specific objects as appropriated by law.
PD 1445 - Sec 4. Fundamental Principles. Financial
transactions and operations of any government agency shall
be governed by the fundamental principles set forth here
under, to wit:
1. No money shall be paid out of any public treasury or
depository except in pursuance of an appropriation law or
other spevific statutory authority;
2. Government funds or property shall be spent or used solely
for public purposes;
3. Trust funds shall be available and may be spent only for the
specific purpose for which the trust was created or the funds
received;
4. Fiscal responsibility shall, to the greatest extent, be shared
by all those exercising authority over the financial affairs,
transactions, and operations of the government agency;
5. Disbursements or dispositions of government funds or
property shall invariably bear the approval of the proper
officials;
6. Claims against government funds shall be supported with
complete documentation;
7. All laws and regulations applicable to financial transactions
shall be faithfully adhered to;
8. Generally accepted principles and practices of accounting
as well as of sound management and fiscal administration
shall be observed, provided that they do not contravene
existing laws and regulations.
ROC Sec. 11, Rule 39. Execution of special judgments.
When a judgment requires the performance of any act other
than those mentioned in the two preceding sections, a certified
copy of the judgment shall be attached to the writ of execution
and shall be served by the officer upon the party against whom
the same is rendered, or upon any other person required
thereby, or by law, to obey the same, and such party or person
may be punished for contempt if he disobeys such judgment.
ROC - Sec 9, Rule 39. Execution of judgments for money, how
enforced.
(c) Garnishment of debts and credits. The officer may levy on
debts due the judgment obligor and other credits, including
bank deposits, financial interests, royalties, commissions and
other personal property not capable of manual delivery in the

possession or control of third parties. Levy shall be made by

serving notice upon the person owing such debts or having in
his possession or control such credits to which the judgment
obligor is entitled. The garnishment shall cover only such
amount as will satisfy the judgment and all lawful fees
Gumaru v. Quirino State College
Gumaru v. Quirino State College; Puno, C.J., June 22,
2007
Summary of Proceedings:
RTC: denied the motion to quash the writ of execution
issued in Civil Case No. Q-97-32470
Supreme Court: the petition is DENIED. This case is
REMANDED to the trial court for trial anew, with the Office of
the Solicitor General appearing as counsel for respondent
Quirino State College
Facts:
On June 25, 1985, C.T. Gumaru Construction and Quirino
State College (an educational institution organized and existing
under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 440) entered into an
Agreement for the construction of the state colleges building
through its president, Julian A. Alvarez. Construction was done
in stages and was covered by supplemental agreements,
because funding depended on the state colleges annual
budget allocation and fund releases from the government.
On October 17, 1997, Constantino T. Gumaru, the owner and
proprietor of C.T. Gumaru Construction, filed a complaint for
damages before the RTC of Quezon City against the state
college and Julian A. Alvarez, asking for:
(1)P368,493.35, the expected profits which he would have
realized from the construction of an unfinished portion of the
project which was allegedly awarded by the defendants to
another contractor in violation of his preferential right to finish
the project;
(2) P592,136.51, the escalation costs of construction materials
and supplies; (3) P50,000.00, the value of plaintiffs bodega
allegedly demolished by the defendants; and
(4), P200,000.00 for moral and exemplary damages, attorneys
fees and costs of litigation.
On January 11, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
entered its appearance for the first time as counsel for the
defendants. It filed a "Motion to Quash Writ of Execution" on
the following grounds:
(a) defendants were not duly represented in court, since the
OSG was not notified of the proceedings; and
(b) writs of execution may not be issued against government
funds and properties to satisfy court judgments.
In an "Urgent Motion" dated March 13, 2002, the OSG asked
the court to take judicial notice of Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 10-2000, as well as Commission on
Audit (COA) Resolution No. 2000-366 dated December 19,
2000, which finally adjudged plaintiff liable to the state college
for P4,681,670.00 in overpayments, and liquidated damages
for delay in the construction of the college building.
Issues/Held:
WON respondent state college was properly represented
before the trial court NO

Ratio:
The OSG is mandated to act as the law office of the
government, its agencies, instrumentalities, officials and
agents in any litigation or proceeding requiring the services of
a lawyer in accordance to Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III,
Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292). With
respect to government-owned or controlled corporations
(GOCCs), the OSG shall act as counsel only when authorized
by the President or by the head of the office concerned.
In the case at bar, respondent state college is classified under
the Code as a chartered institution, not a GOCC. Therefore,
the proper statutory counsel of respondent state college is the
OSG, not a private lawyer.
The Solicitor General cannot refuse to represent the
government, its agencies, instrumentalities, officials and
agents without a just and valid reason. Unlike a practicing
lawyer who has the right to decline employment, a fiscal or
prosecutor, or the Solicitor General in the case at bar, cannot
refuse to perform his functions without violating his oath of
office. Actions filed in the name of the Republic that are not
initiated by the OSG will be summarily dismissed.
**The intent of the lawmaker was to give the designated
official, the Solicitor General, the unequivocal mandate to
appear for the government in legal proceedings. Spread out in
the laws creating the office is the discernible intent which may
be gathered from the term shall, which is invariably
employed, from Executive Order No. 292 (1987).
Decision:
-the petition is DENIED. This case is REMANDED to the trial
court for trial anew, with the Office of the Solicitor General
appearing as counsel for respondent Quirino State College
NOTES:
1.
Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, provides:
The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
lawyers. When authorized by the President or head of the
office concerned, it shall also represent government owned or
controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General
shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such,
shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers.
2.) Chartered institution- refers to any agency organized or
operating under a special charter, and vested by law with
functions relating to specific constitutional policies or
objectives. This term includes the state universities and
colleges and the monetary authority of the State.
3.) A government-owned or controlled corporation - refers
to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation,
vested with functions relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the
Government directly or through its instrumentalities either
wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock
corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of
its capital stock: Provided, That government-owned or

controlled corporations may be further categorized by the

Department of the Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and
the Commission on Audit for purposes of the exercise and
discharge of their respective powers, functions and
responsibilities with respect to such corporations.
III. STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT
In Re Saturnino Bermudez (1986) Per Curiam
Saturnino V. Bermudez (petitioner) - no respondents
Petition for DECLARATORY RELIEF
Facts:

Sec 5 of Art XVIII of the proposed 1986

Constitution provides that The six-year term of
the incumbent President and Vice President
elected in the February 7 1986 election is, for
purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby
extended to noon of June 30 1992
Impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer
asks the Court who among the present incumbent
President Corazon Aquino and VP Salvador Laurel,
and the Elected President Ferdinand Marcos and VP
Arturo Tolentino are being referred to in the said
provision.

Issues: WON the petition should be dismissed for:

1. lack of jurisdiction - YES
2. lack of cause of action - YES (he also lacks
personality to sue)
Ratio:
1. The SC has no jurisdiction over petitions for
declaratory relief (rather it is with the RTC). Moreover,
the petition amounts to a suit against the incumbent
President Corazon Aquino. Incumbent Presidents are
immune from suit during their incumbency and tenure.
2. It is a matter of public record and common public
knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers
therein to incumbent President Corazon Aquino and
VP Salvador Laurel. The legitimacy of the Aquino
government is not a justiciable matter, for the people
have accepted the Aquino government which is in
effective control of the entire country. It is not merely
a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure
government. The members of the SC have sworn to
uphold the Philippine Constitution under her
government.
Held: Petition dismissed.
Notes:
Previous cases questioning the legitimacy of the Aquino
government on the ground that it was not established pursuant
to the 1973 constitution had been dismissed by this Court for
lack of cause of action.

SSS Employees Association v. Soriano

SSS Employees Association (PAFLU) vs. Soriano (April 30,
1963) Bautista Angelo, J.
Facts:
PAFLU sent a list of demands to the SSC on October 20,
1960. On December 14, 1960, SSC filed a petition for
declaratory relief in the CFI of Manila wherein it asked that the
Social Security System be declared as a governmental agency
performing governmental functions so that its employees may
be prohibited from joining labor unions and from compelling
petitioners to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with
them as well as from declaring strikes detrimental to the
System. PAFLU answered with a counter-prayer that SSS be
declared as a government agency exercising propriety
functions. PAFLU filed before the Court of Industrial Relations
a change for unfair labor practice against said Commission
pursuant to Section 14, paragraph (b), of Republic Act 875.
Two days later, or on February 16, 1961, PAFLU went on
strike and picketed the premises of the SSC. SSC filed a
petition with preliminary injunction praying that PAFLU
members be ordered to go back to work and desist from
picketing the premises of the SSC. The court, presided over by
Judge E. Soriano, issued on the same date an ex parte
preliminary injunction ordering PAFLU members not only to
desist from picketing the above premises but also to refrain
from doing any act of violence. PAFLU filed a petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction to restrain the said judge
from enforcing his writ of preliminary injunction on the grounds
of having no jurisdiction. It was granted and so respondents
issued a petition to dissolve the injunction but was denied.
Issue:
WON SSS is a government agency exercising governmental
functions. -NO
"Government of the Republic of the Philippines' ... refers only
to that government entity through which the functions of the
government are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and
in these are included those arms through which political
authority is made effective whether they be provincial,
municipal or other form of local government. These are what
we call municipal corporations. They do not include
government entities which are given corporate personality
separate and distinct from the government and which are
governed by the Corporation Law. Their powers, duties and
liabilities have to be determined in the light of that law and of
their corporate charters."
WON SSS exercises propriety functions. -YES
The fact is that the main bulk of the questions of the SSS is
proprietary in nature judging from its main functions of
investment and insurance, which were essentially proprietary,
without which its main objective cannot be carried out. The
funds of the SSS are treated as special funds in the same
manner as those of the GSIS. They are distinct and separate

from those of the government such that the government cannot

dispose of them in any manner.
Held:
The petition is granted. The writ of preliminary injunction
issued ex parte by respondent judge is hereby set aside. The
writ issued by this Court is made permanent. No costs.
Notes:
For first issue
President Wilson enumerated the constituent functions as
follows:
(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of
persons and property from violence and robbery.
(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and
between parents and children.
(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and
interchange of property, and the determination of its liabilities
for debt or crime.
(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.
(5) The definition and punishment of crimes.
(6) The administration of justice in civil cases.
(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and
relations of citizens.
(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers; the preservation
of the state from external danger or encroachment and the
advancement of its international interests. (Malcolm, The
Government of the Philippine Islands p. 19) (Bacani v. National
Coconut Corporation, supra).
These functions are not exercised by SSS because its main
aim is to provide social security to a large group of employees
who are not in the government service because as a rule
private capital cannot undertake it while the government by its
very nature is better equipped to do so than any individual or
group of individual.
For second issue
The SSS is required to invest its funds (1) in interest-bearing
bonds and securities of the Government of the Philippines or
bonds or securities for the payment of the interest and principal
of which the faith and credit of the Republic of the Philippines
is pledged; (2) in interest-bearing deposits in any domestic
bank doing business in the Philippines provided that said bank
shall have been designated as a depository for this purpose by
the President; (3) in loans or advances to the national
government for the construction of permanent toll bridges in
accordance with law; (4) in housing loans to members up to a
maximum of 60% of the appraised value of the properties; (5)

in loans to members, and (6) in other projects and investments

subject to approval by the Insurance Commissioner.
ACCFA v. CUGCO
ACCFA vs CUGCO (November 29, 1969) Makalintal, J.
Petition for certiorari.
Facts:
On September 4, 1961 a collective bargaining agreement,
which was to be effective for a period of one year from July 1,
1961, was entered into by and between the Unions and the
ACCFA. A few months later, the Unions started protesting
against alleged violations and non-implementation of said
agreement. On October 25, 1962 the Unions declared a strike.
On October 30, 1962 the Unions, together with its mother
union, the Confederation of Unions in Government
Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint with the
Court of Industrial Relations against the ACCFA for having
allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practice, namely:
violation of the collective bargaining agreement in order to
discourage the members of the Unions in the exercise of their
right to self-organization, discrimination against said members
in the matter of promotions, and refusal to bargain. The strike
ended when the strikers voluntarily returned to work on
November 26, 1962. The ACCFA denied the charges and
interposed as affirmative and special defenses lack of
jurisdiction of the CIR over the case, illegality of the bargaining
contract, expiration of said contract and lack of approval by the
office of the President of the fringe benefits provided for
therein. On March 25, 1963, the CIR ordered ACCFA: 1) to
cease and desist from committing further acts tending to
discourage the members of complainant unions in the exercise
of their right to self-organization; 2) to comply with and
implement the provision of the collective bargaining contract
executed on September 4, 1961, including the payment of
P30.00 a month living allowance; 3) to bargain in good faith
and expeditiously with the herein complainants. ACCFA moved
to reconsider but was denied.
Issues:
WON the respondent court has jurisdiction over this case,
which in turn depends on whether or not ACCFA exercised
governmental or proprietary functions. -NO
The implementation of the land reform program of the
government according to Republic Act No. 3844 is most
certainly a governmental, not a proprietary, function; and for
that purpose Executive Order No. 75 has placed the ACA
under the Land Reform Project Administration together with
the other member agencies, the personnel complement of all
of which are placed in one single pool and made available for
assignment from one agency to another, subject only to Civil
Service laws, rules and regulations, position classification and
wage structures.

WON the collective bargaining agreement between the

petitioner and the respondent union is valid; if valid, whether or
not it has already lapsed; and if not, whether or not its (sic)
fringe benefits are already enforceable. YES, NO, YES
Under Section 3, Article XIV, of the agreement, the same "shall
not become effective unless and until the same is duly ratified
by the Board of Governors of the Administration." Such
approval was given even before the formal execution of the
agreement, by virtue of "Resolution No. 67, Regular Meeting
No. 7, FY 1960-61, held on August 17, 1961," but with the
proviso that "the fringe benefits contained therein shall take
effect only if approved by the office of the President." The
condition is, therefore, deemed to be incorporated into the
agreement by reference. On October 23, 1962 the Office of the
President, in a letter signed by the Executive Secretary,
expressed its approval of the bargaining contract "provided the
salaries and benefits therein fixed are not in conflict with
applicable laws and regulations, are believed to be reasonable
considering the exigencies of the service and the welfare of the
employees, and are well within the financial ability of the
particular corporation to bear."
WON there is a legal and/or factual basis for the finding of the
respondent court that the petitioner had committed acts of
unfair labor practice.
The court held that the respondent Unions are not entitled to
the certification election sought in the Court below. Such
certification is admittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf
of the employees with respect to terms and conditions of
employment, including the right to strike as a coercive
economic weapon, as in fact the said unions did strike in 1962
against the ACCFA. This is contrary to Section 11 of Republic
Act No. 875. With the reorganization of the ACCFA and its
conversion into the ACA under the Land Reform Code and in
view of our ruling as to the governmental character of the
functions of the ACA, the decision of the respondent Court
dated March 25, 1963, and the resolution en banc affirming it,
in the unfair labor practice case filed by the ACCFA, which
decision is the subject of the present review, has become moot
and academic, particularly insofar as the order to bargain
collectively with the respondent Unions is concerned.
WON it is within the competence of the court to enforce the
collective bargaining agreement between the petitioner and the
respondent unions, the same having already expired.
Held:
The decisions and orders appealed from are set aside and/or
modified in accordance with the foregoing pronouncements.
No costs.
Spouses Badillo v. Tayag
Spouses Badillo vs Tayag (April 3, 2003) Panganiban, J.

Two (2) consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court, seeking to set aside two rulings of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The first one is the July
19, 2000 Order issued by Branch 79, annulling both the May
23, 2000 Order and the May 30, 2000 Writ of Execution issued
by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan.
Facts:
In June 1994, the NHA offered for bidding the development of
certain portions of the BSRP. It eventually contracted with the
Triad Construction and Development Corporation (Triad) for
the development of parts of the site. These were then
developed and subdivided into smaller lots that were allocated,
awarded and distributed by the NHA to qualified beneficiaries.
The petitioner's contend that a part of the land awarded to
Triad is theirs. On February 1, 2000, the MTC ordered the
NHA to vacate the disputed land; to return possession thereof
to petitioners; to pay rental for its use and occupation at the
rate of P10 per square meter per month; and to shoulder the
attorneys fees, the litigation expenses and the costs of suit.
Upon receipt of the February 1, 2000 Decision of the MTC, the
NHA filed a Notice of Appeal with the same court on February
24, 2000. The NHA, however, did not pay the appellate docket
fees within the reglementary period. Consequently, petitioners
filed with that court a Motion for the immediate issuance of a
writ of execution and demolition. They contended that because
of the NHAs failure to pay the appellate docket fees within the
prescribed period, the MTC Decision became final.
Issues:
Is the failure of the NHA to pay the appellate docket fee within
the fifteen-day reglementary period a ground to dismiss its
appeal? -NO
In Martinez vs Court of Appeals, it is held that the failure to
pay the appellate docket fees does not automatically result in
the dismissal of the appeal, the dismissal being discretionary
on the part of the appellate court. While that case was
governed by Sections 20 and 23 of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines issued by the Court on January 11, 1983 to
implement the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981, the
present Rules lead to a similar conclusion. Under the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, parties perfect an appeal from the
judgment of the MTC to the RTC by filing a notice of appeal
within the fifteen day reglementary period, as provided under
Section 4 of Rule 40 and Section 9 of Rule 41.
Is the NHA exempt from filing the supersedeas bond in order
to stay the execution of the MTC judgment? -YES
A supersedeas bond is required to assure the payment of
damages to the winning party in case the appeal is found
frivolous. In the present cases, the posting of a supersedeas
bond is not necessary to stay the execution of the MTC Order.
When a case involves provable rents or damages incurred by
a government-owned or controlled corporation, the real party in
interest is the Republic of the Philippines. When the State
litigates, it is not required to put up a bond for damages or

even an appeal bond -- either directly or indirectly through its

authorized officers -- because it is presumed to be always
solvent.
Was it proper for RTC Branch 11 to delete the rentals awarded
by the MTC? -YES
A court may fix the reasonable amount of rent, but it must still
base its action on the evidence adduced by the parties. In the
instant cases, the RTC has already declared that there is no
evidence on record to support the MTCs award of rent. We
find no cogent reason to disturb this pronouncement. The
belated prayer of the NHA for the dismissal of the forcible entry
case cannot be granted, because it appealed the RTC
Decision to the CA, not to this Court. As a mere respondent in
these appealed cases, the NHA is not entitled to any
affirmative relief. Besides, we would not want to preempt the
CAs action on the said appeal.
Held:
The Petitions are hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioners.
A. CONGRESS
1. Composition, Qualifications and Term of Office
a. Senate
b. House of Representatives
Dimaporo v. Mitra Davide Jr., J
October 15, 1991
Petitioner: Moammad Ali Dimaporo
Respondents: Hon. Ramon V. Mitra (Speaker, House of
Respresentatives), and Hon. Camilo L. Sabio (Secretary,
House of Representatives)
Petition to review the decision of the Speaker and
Secretary of the House of Representatives
Facts:
Petitioner Dimaporo seeks to regain his seat in the House of
Representatives after running and losing for ARMM Regional
Governor. On January 15, 1990, Dimaporo filed his Certificate
of Candidacy for the position of ARMM Regional Governor.
The Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives,
upon being informed by COMELEC of the aforementioned
development, excluded Dimaporo's name from the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives, pursuant to Sec.
67, Art IX, Batas Pambansa 881 (Omnibus Election Code)
which states:
Any elective official whether national or local running for
any office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity except for President and Vice
President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Dimaporo sent a letter, dated June 28, 1990, to respondents,
expressing his intention to resume his duties and functions as
elected Member of Congress. There are no records on what
the Speaker and the Secretary did, but it is apparent that

Dimaporo failed to regain his seat, because look, here, it is a

case.
Petitioner Dimaporo alleges that:
a. He was barred from exercising his rights and privileges as a
duly elected representative;
b. Sec. 67, Art IX, BP 881 is not operative under the 1987
Constitution because:
I. Grounds for the shortening of a representative's term
provided for the in Constitution (Sec 13, Sec 16(3), Sec 17,
Sec 7 par. 2, all under Art VI, see notes) do not include the
filing of the Certificate of Candidacy for another public position;
thus, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the express
mention of one thing excludes all others) applies.
II. Moreover, the framers of the Constitution deliberately
omitted the grounds stated in the assailed section of BP 881;
they only reaffirmed the grounds found in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions.
c. His filing of a Certificate of Candidacy cannot be construed
by respondents as 'voluntary renunciation of office' (Sec 7
par. 2, Art VI, 1987 Consti) because only Courts can interpret
laws.
Respondents, replying to the allegations, say that:
a. The non-inclusion of Sec. 67, Art IX, BP 881 in the
Constitution does affect its validity, as the grounds mentioned
by the petitioner are not exclusive (i.e. death is not stated in
any of the grounds, but it is also a method of shortening a
representative's term). In fact, Sec. 67 can be categorized
under Sec. 7 par. 2, Art VI of the Constitution, as 'voluntary
renunciation of office.'
b. Petitioner is presumed to be aware of the laws that affect
his resignation.
c. Their dropping of petitioner Dimaporo from the rolls is a
mere ministerial act; they did not interpret any laws.
Issues:
1. WON Sec. 67, Art IX, BP 881 is valid under the present
Constitution - YES
2. WON Sec. 67, Art IV, BP 881 can be considered under
'voluntary resignation' as per Sec. 7 par. 2 of the Constitution YES
3. WON the Speaker and Secretary of the House committed
grave abuse of discretion when they dropped petitioner
Dimaporo from the rolls - NO
Ratio:
1. Sec. 67 was legislated because legislators used to run for
local office while active as representatives, but when they win,
they do not assume the office. With Sec. 67, Art IX, BP 881,
these officials do not have a 'fall back'; therefore, they are
forced to honor the latest mandate given to them by the
people. This way, there is more accountability from our
legislators.
This is in consonant with Sec. 1, Art. XI of the 1987, which
demands accountability from all public officers, viz:

Public office is a public trust. Public officers and

employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.
The presumption of constitutionality of Sec. 67 is also upheld,
as there was no clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution.
2. As per the discussion of Constitutional Commissioners
Davide and Maambong, voluntary resignation of Sec. 7 par. 2,
Art VI of the Constitution pertains to a broad range of acts that
constitute voluntary abandonment of office. Under this
definition, Sec. 67, Art IX, BP 881 can be considered.
Juxtaposed with the discussion of Assemblymen Tolentino and
Rono, the filing of a certificate of candidacy is an overt
manifestation of the intention to abandon a representative's
current office; therefore, the voluntariness of such action is
also manifest.
3. Both the Speaker and the Secretary of the House of
Representatives simply executed a ministerial act of dropping
petitioner Dimaporo from the rolls. They cannot refuse to do
such duty on the ground of the alleged invalidity of Sec.
67. This is because the transaction of public business will be
hindered through the questioning of the constitutionality of
every statute and ordinance which imposes a duty upon the
Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives.
Also, petitioner Dimaporo cannot complain of any restriction
that public policy may dictate upon his office because public
office is a public trust.
Held:
Petition dismissed for lack of merit.
Notes:
Grounds mentioned by petitioner Dimaporo:
Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any
other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government owned or controlled
corporations or subsidiaries;
Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly
behavior;
Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the
Electoral Tribunal in an election
contest; and,
Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.
i. Apportionment and Reapportionment
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC
J. Brion (2008)

Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer

for issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction
Facts:
RA 9371, An Act Apportioning the Lone Legislative District of
the City of Cagayan De Oro COMELEC issued Resolution
7837 to implement such resolution. Petitioner Rogelio
Bagabuyo filed this petition requesting for nullification of RA
9371 and Resolution 7837 on constitutional grounds. He
argues that COMELEC cannot implement RA 9371 without
providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the
conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensible for the division or
creation of a local government unit. Court did not grant
petitioners prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction so the May 14 Elections proceeded
without issue.

Historically and by its intrinsic nature, a legislative

apportionment does not mean, and does not even imply, a
division of a local government unit where the apportionment
takes place. Thus, the plebiscite requirement that applies to
the division of a province, city, municipality or barangay under
the Local Government Code should NOT apply to and be a
requisite for the validity of a legislative apportionment or
reapportionment which is the current case.
3) Does R.A. No. 9371 violate the equality of representation
doctrine? - NO
The petitioner argues that the distribution of the legislative
districts is unequal. District 1 has only 93,719 registered voters
while District 2 has 127,071. District 1 is composed mostly of
rural barangays while District 2 is composed mostly of urban
barangays.43 Thus, R.A. No. 9371 violates the principle of
equality of representation.

Issues:
1) Did the petitioner violate the hierarchy of courts rule; if so,
should the instant petition be dismissed on this ground? - NO
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus. It was pursuant to this original jurisdiction that the
petitioner filed the present petition. The present petition is of
this nature; its subject matter and the nature of the issues
raised - among them, whether legislative reapportionment
involves a division of Cagayan de Oro City as a local
government unit - are reasons enough for considering it an
exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts.
2) Does R.A. No. 9371 involve the division and conversion of
a local government unit which has a plebiscite requirement? NO
Legislative apportionment is defined by Black's Law Dictionary
as the determination of the number of representatives which a
State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative
body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in
proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines
so as to equalize population and voting power among the
districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the
realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by
changes in population and mandated by the constitutional
requirement of equality of representation.
The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly
require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit
such as provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. In
contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the
apportionment or reapportionment provision which applies to
legislative districts.

A clarification must be made. The law clearly provides that the

basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a
city or a province, not the number of registered voters therein.
The petitioner, unfortunately, did not provide information about
the actual population of Cagayan de Oro City. However, we
take judicial notice of the August 2007 census of the National
Statistics Office which shows thatbarangays comprising
Cagayan de Oro's first district have a total population of
254,644, while the second district has 299,322 residents.
Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population
sizes of the districts. The Constitution, however, does not
require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard
in gauging equality of representation. We cannot question the
division on the basis of the difference in the barangays' levels
of development or developmental focus as these are not part
of the constitutional standards for legislative apportionment or
reapportionment
HELD:
Petition DENIED for lack of merit.
Aquino III v. COMELEC (2010) Perez, J.
Senator Benigno Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo
(petitioners)-Commission on Elections (respondents)
Special Civil Action in the SC
Petition for CERTIORARI and PROHIBITION
Facts:
- Petitioners, as public officers, taxpayers, and citizens pray
that RA9716 be declared unconstitutional and that
Respondent COMELEC be restrained from making any
issuances and taking any steps relative to its
implementation.
o Aquino III was one of the two senators who voted
against the approval of the Bill by the
Senate. Robredo is the mayor of Naga City,
which was part of the former second district from
which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor

were taken for inclusion in the new second

district.
- RA9716 reconfigured the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur to create an additional legislative
district for the province. The proposed first district
will end up with a population of 176,383.
o Prior to RA9716, the Province of Camarines Sur
had an estimated population of 1, 698, 321
distributed among four legislative districts.
o Some first district municipalities (Libmanan,
Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao and San
Fernando) were combined with 2 second district
municipalities (Milaor and Gainza) to form a new
second legislative district.
- Petitioners argue that the reapportionment goes against:
a.
The population requirement for the creation of a
legislative district in Art VI Sec 5 Par (1) and (3) and Sec (3)
of the Ordinance appended thereto. From Par (3) which
reads, each city with a population of at least 250,000, or
each province, shall have at least one representative,
they theorize that a minimum population of 250,000 is required
for the creation of a legislative district except in the case of a
newly created province.
b.
The principle of proportional representation in Art
VI Sec 5 Par (1) (3) and (4). In fixing the original number of
district seats in the House of Representatives to 200, the
Constitutional Commission took into account the projected
national population of 55 million hence, a ratio of 1
representative per 250,000 people.
Respondents contend that the petition should be
dismissed on procedural grounds, particularly:
o The instant petition does not allege that the
respondents acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
o Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed
against a tribunal, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial functions. Respondent was neither
acting as a judicial or quasi-judicial body nor
performing ministerial functions in implementing
RA9716
o Petitioners could have availed themselves of
another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the course of law. The declaration of
constitutionality could have been ventilated
through a petition for declaratory relief over which
the SC has only appellate, not original
jurisdiction.
o Petitioners failed to show that they had sustained
or is in danger of sustaining any substantial injury
as a result of the implementation of RA9716, and
thereby lack legal standing.
Issues:
Procedural

1. WON Certiorari and Prohibition are the proper

remedies in assailing the constitutionality of RA9716YES
2. WON Petitioners have locus standi- YES
Substantive WON the population of at least 250,000 is
required by the Constitution for the creation of a new
congressional district- NO
Ratio:
Procedural
1. In Del Mar v. PAGCOR and Jaworski v. PAGCOR,
the SC sanctioned momentary deviation from the
hierarchy of courts and took original cognizance of
cases raising issues of paramount public importance.
2. In Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Tatad v. Executive
Secretary, Chavez v. PEA, and Bagong Alyansa
Makabayan v. Zamora , the absence of direct injury
on the part of the party seeking judicial review may be
excused in issues of transcendental importance.
Substantive
Before a law may be declared unconstitutional, there
must be a clear showing that a specific provision of
the Constitution has been violated or transgressed. In
the case at bar, there is no specific provision that
fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must
compose a legislative district.
Art VI Sec 5(3) draws a clear distinction
between the entitlement of a city to a district
on one hand, and the entitlement of a
province to a district on the other as seen in
the use by the subject provision of a comma
to separate the phrase each city with a
population of at least 250,000 from the
phrase or each province.
In the Mariano case, Sec 5(3) requires a city to have
a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a
representative, it does not have to increase its
population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an
additional district. The same can be applied to a
province considering that it is entitled to an initial seat
by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its
population.
In Sec 461 of the Local Government Code,
the requirement of population is not an
indispensable requirement for the creation of
a province, but is merely an alternative
addition to the indispensable income
requirement.
Based on the records of the Constitutional
Commission (ConCom) in creating the Ordinance
Apportioning the Seats of the House of
Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines to
the Different Legislative Districts in Provinces and
Cities and the Metropolitan Manila Area upon
framing Sec 5 Art VI , population was not the sole

determinant in the determination of the precise district

within the province to which so many districts have
been proportioned.
The 250,000 population benchmark was
used for the 1986 nationwide apportionment
of legislative districts among provinces. cities
and Metro Manila. The ConCom originally
divided the entire country into 200 districts
which corresponded to the original number
of district representatives. First, 1 seat each
was given to the 73 provinces and the 10
cities with a population of at least 250,000.
The remaining seats were then redistributed
among the provinces, cities and the
Metropolitan area in accordance with the
number of their inhabitants on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio.
The districting of Palawan, Baguio, Cavite,
Maguindanao and Cebu, for example, was
not determined solely on the basis of
population. (See Notes)
Even Petitioner Aquino concedes that Camarines Sur,
with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is
entitled to 2 districts in addition to the 4 it was given in
the 1986 apportionment based on the ratio of 1
representative per 250,000 people. Art VI Sec 5
therefore allows an additional district for the province
of Camarines Sur.
The reapportionment is valid based on considerations
other than population, such as those presented during
the deliberations of House Bill 4264 (turned RA9617)
namely:
dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities
size of the original groupings compared to
that of the regrouped municipalities
natural division separating the municipality
subject of the discussion from the
reconfigured District One
balancing of the areas of 3 districts resulting
from the redistricting of Districts One and
Two
In Sum, population is not the only factor, just one
of several other factors in the composition of the
additional district.

Held: Petition dismissed. RA9716 is a valid law.

Notes:
RA9716 is entitled An Act Reapportioning the
Composition of the First and Second Legislative Districts
in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a
New Legislative District from Such Reapportionment
Art VI, Sec 5, Par (1) (3) and (4)
(1) The HoR shall be composed of not more than 250
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall
be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan

manila area in accordance with the number of their

respective inhabitants, on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least
250,000, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
(4) Within 3 years following the return of every census,
the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided
in this section
Sec 461 of the Local Government Code

Requisites for Creation.(a) A province may be created if it

has an average annual income, as certified by the Department
of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of
the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000)
square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics
Office.
The districting of the following provinces were based
on:
Palawan: importance of the towns and the
city that eventually composed the districts
Cavite: based on the distribution of its three
cities, with each district having a city
Maguindanao: political stability and the
common interest among the people in the
area and the possibility of chaos and unity
considering the accepted regional,
traditional, political and sectoral leaders
Laguna: it was mentioned that municipalities
in the highland should not be grouped with
the towns in the lowland
Cebu: balance of the area and the
population
ii. Party-list Representatives
Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC
Atong Paglaum Inc. v. COMELEC Carpio, J
April 2, 2013
Petitioners: 54 disqualified party lists
Respondents: Commission on Elections
Special Civil Actions in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and
Prohibition.
Summary of Proceedings:

COMELEC en banc - disqualified everyone lol

Facts:
COMELEC disqualified 54 party-lists, mostly on the basis that:
a. Their sector is not marginalized or underrepresented;
and/or
b. Their nominees do not belong to the sector which they
claim to represent.
This ruling is based on the qualifications of a party-list laid
down by the SC in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC, which are:
a. Potential party-list must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups stated in RA 7941. It must show
through records and other such evidence that it represents and
seeks to uplift the marginalized and underrepresented. Majority
of the members should also belong to the group being
represented.
b. Major political parties must show that they represent the
interests of the marginalized and underrepresented in order to
qualify as party-lists.
c. Religious sector may not be represented.
d. Potential party-lists should not be disqualified as per Sec. 6
of RA 7941
e. Entity must not be funded or assisted by the government.
f. Party-list nominees must also comply with the requirements
of the law.
g. Nominees must be part of the sector they are representing.
h. Potential party-list must have a well-defined constituency.
Another SC ruling, BANAT v. COMELEC, expressly prohibited
major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections.
Issues:
1. WON the criteria laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT should be applied in the 2013 elections - NO
2. WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion - NO
Ratio:
1. Sec. 5(1), Art VI of the Constitution states that:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area
in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants,
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
According to this, party-lists may be either be
a. national parties or organizations;
b. regional parties or organizations; and
c. sectoral parties or organizations.

Sec. 3 of Republic Act 7941 (Party-list Law), echoes the same

statement:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a
mechanism of proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national,
regional and sectoral parties xxx
Even the enumeration of RA 7941 of sectors that can seek
seats under the party-list elections is not limited to the
marginalized and underrespresented (i.e. professionals and
women). Nor does RA 7941 require national and regional
parties or organizations to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors.
The Court also avers that RA 7941 does not require national
and regional party-lists to represent the marginzalied and
underrepresented, and requiring them to would exclude
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties in the party-list
system. The basis used by the court is Sec. 6 of RA 7941,
which are the grounds of refusal and/or cancellation of
registration of party-lists. In the enumeration, national or
regional parties or organizations that do not represent
marginalized and underrepresented sectors are NOT denied
participation in the party-list elections.
Therefore, through the express wording of the relevant laws,
the party-list system is not limited to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors.
As per the intent of the framers of the Constitution, the partylist system seeks to 'open the system' to parties and
organizations with enough constituents to warrant them a seat
in the House of Representatives. These parties and
organizations are not limited to economically marginalized and
underrepresented sectors - they alo include those that lack
well-defined constituencies, such as cause-oriented groups.
Regarding Ang Bagong Bayani, its definition of a political party
is contradictory to the requirement that it should represent
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. This is because
political parties are formed through the concurrence in political
ideologies and concepts in governance.
Given these, the criteria laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani is
abandoned.
With regard to political parties, it is expressly stated in of RA
7941, through Secs. 3(b) and 5 that political parties maybe
allowed to participate in the party-list elections, viz:
Sec. 3 (b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral
party or a coalition of parties.
Section 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may
register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the
party-list system xxx

The framers also make it clear that political parties may join,
expecially minor political parties (Comm. Tadeo in response to
Comm. Monsod), and that major political parties can
participate through their sectoral wings (Comms. Tadeo and
Villacorta, in response to Comm. Monsod).
The Court, though, qualifies this participation, by limiting it to
political parties that do not field candidates for legislative
district elections, or, if they have candidates for the legislative
district elections, only their sectoral wings may participate in
the party-list elections.
Thus, the prohibition is BANAT is partially abandoned.
The new parameters laid down by the Court are as follows:
a. The groups that may participate in the party-list system are:
i. National parties or organizations;
ii. Regional parties or organiations; and
iii. Sectoral parties or organizations.
b. National and regional parties or organizations do not have
to organize along sectoral lines, or represent the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors.
c. Political parties can participate in the party-list elections as
long as they do not participate in the legislative district
elections, or, in the event that they do, through their sectoral
wings.
d. Sectoral parties/organizations may either be economically
marginalized or underrepreented, or lacking in well-defined
political constituencies.
e. A majority of the members of sectoral parties that represent
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors must also
belong to such sectors. Their nominees, meanwhile, may be
those that:
i. belong to the marginalized or underrepresented sector;
and/or
ii. have a track record of the advocacy for the sector
f. Qualified party-lists may not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that at least one of their
nominees is qualified.
2. The COMELEC merely followed the previous rulings of the
Court. They dud not commit grave abuse of discretion.
Held:
All 54 petitions remanded to COMELEC to determine if they
qualify under the new guidelines.
BANAT v. COMELECJR
BANAT vs COMELEC Carpio, J.
Petition for certiorari and mandamus
Facts:
On 27 June 2002, Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed a Petition to

Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives

Provided by the Constitution, before the National Board of
Canvassers (NBC). BANAT filed its petition because the
Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently
been quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty
bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is,
would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list
seats. There were no intervenors in BANATs petition before
the NBC. On May 14, 2007 elections included the elections for
the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted
15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List
System. On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC,
promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No.
07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the partylist elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY),
Bayan Muna, Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC),
Gabrielas Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine
Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens
Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party
(BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO),
Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono.
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing
the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. On 9 July 2007, Bayan
Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as
NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as
stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans
formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No.
7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC
denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the
NBC. Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations
proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed three
other party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one
guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural
Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP), Anak
Mindanao (AMIN), and An Waray.
Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely
a ceiling?
It is a ceiling. The combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total
membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list.
Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional? -YES
Each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that
is, one qualifying and two additional seats. The additional
seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed
in proportion to their total number of votes." The three-seat
cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified
party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory
device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list
elections.

Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA

7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional? -NO
Only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the
total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to
have a seat in the House of Representatives. In computing the
additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent
threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in
the second clause of Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is
unconstitutional because the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of
available party list seats when the number of available party
list seats exceeds 50.
Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major
political parties be barred from participating in the party-list
elections? -NO BUT
The framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major
political parties to participate in party-list elections through their
sectoral wings. But by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to
continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political
parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or
indirectly.

Sections 11 and 12 of RA 7941:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the
following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least
two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List
Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for
the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis,
rank them according to the number of votes received and
allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to
the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization,
or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the
party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)

Held:
The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. We SET
ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007
in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July
2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two
percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list
seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List
System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in
Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed
from participating in party-list elections. This Decision is
immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

The Veterans Formula:

Number of seats available to legislative districts x .20 =
Number of seats available to party-list
.80

Notes:
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated
to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law,
by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector.

The House of Representatives seeks to clarify certain parts of

the guidelines laid down by the Court in the April decision of
BANAT, viz:
a. Since there are only 219 seats, and not 220, there must be
only 54 party-list seats, not 55. The Court declared 55 winners,
who will be 'left out'?
b. Is it okay to exceed the 250-member limit provided for in the
Constitution?
c. Does 'additional seats' mean 2nd or 3rd seats of parties that
have guaranteed seats (more than 2% of total votes), or all
remaining available seats?
d. Is there no more minimum vote requirement to qualify as a
party-list representative?
e. Is the filing up of all party-list seats now mandatory?

BANAT v. COMELEC Resolution

BANAT v. COMELEC Reso Carpio, J
July 8, 2009
Motion for Clarification in ntervention in the SUpreme Court
Facts:

Also, Armi Jane Roa-Borje, the third nominee of CIBAC, filed a

reconsideration-in-tervention avers that the Court has deprived
parties who obtained more than 2% of the votes, of
representation, as the Court gave these seats to party-lists that
did not even meet the 2% minimum vote requirement.

Issues:
1. How many party-list representatives should there be for the
2007 elections? - 54 SINCE THE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
WERE REDUCED TO 219
2. Is it okay to exceed the 250-member limit provided for in the
Constitution? - YES, NUNG 1995 PA
3. Does 'additional seats' mean 2nd or 3rd seats of parties that
have guaranteed seats (more than 2% of total votes), or all
remaining available seats? - THE REMAINING SEATS AFTER
THE ALLOCATION OF GUARANTEED SEATS
4. Is there no more minimum vote requirement to qualify as a
party-list representative? - NONE, THE 2% THRESHOLD HAS
BEEN DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
5. Is the filing up of all party-list seats now mandatory? - IT
DEPENDS ON HOW MANY PARTY-LISTS PARTICIPATE IN
THE ELECTIONS
6. Does this new formula violate the absolute proportionality
required by the 1987 Constitution? - NO, THAT IS FOR
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS ONLY

seats of any party. The distribution will be done from the

largest percentage of votes to the lowest percentage
To get the number of additional seats of a party-list, the
formula is as follows:
(% of votes garnered by party-list*100)*(Total number of
available seats-guaranteed seats), then remove the decimals
and retain the whole number.
If the number is less than 1, round it UP to one. Allocate 1 seat
until there are none left.
The 2% threshold (only parties that get 2% or more of the total
votes will be given seats) has been declared unconstitutional
because of the mathematical impossiblity of filling up all of the
available party-list seats.
In addition, there are no minimum number of votes needed to
have a party-list seat, or any elective seat - you just have to
have more votes than your opponent.

Ratio:
1+2. Section 5(b) allows the House of Representatives to
exceed the 250-limit through legislation. They can do this
through piecemeal legislation, or through a general law
increasing the number of representatives in the House. Since
the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, Congress has created
addition legislative districts which elect representatives of their
own; thereby, increasing the number of representatives.

5. It would still depend on the number of participating partylists, because too few participating party-lists may make the
filing up of seats mathematically impossible because of the
three-seat cap.
6. Sec. 5(1), Art VI states that

The formula laid down in the April decision is as follows:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be

composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts xxx on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(# of district representatives/0.8)*0.2 = # of party-list seats

As obvious in this formula, an increase in the number of district
representatives would also lead to an increase in the number
of party-list representatives, so as to maintain the 20%
Constitutional proportional requirement. And since this is
stated in the Constitution, there is no need for legislation to
increase the number of party-list seats, as the adjustment is
automatic. In fact, on account of this formula, the number of
representatives in the House had exceeded the 250-member
limit as early as 1995.

Thus, as is clear in the wording, the uniform and progressive

ratio only applies to legislative district elections.
Held:
April decision is clarified

Therefore, since the creation of Shariff Kabunsuan was

declared unconstitutional the legislative districts were reduced
to 219, and it follows that the party-list seats are reduced to 54.
3+4. The process is that:
a. All party-lists which have garnered more than two percent of
the votes shall be given ONE guaranteed seat, as per Sec.
11(b) of RA 7941.
b.After the guaranteed seats have been distributed, the
additional seats, which means the REMAINING AVAILABLE
SEATS will be distributed, and this includes the 2nd or 3rd

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELEC (2010) Del Castillo,

J.
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party represented by Danton Remoto
(petitioners)COMELEC (respondents)
Special Civil Action for CERTIORARI in the SC
Facts:
[First Assailed ResolutionNovember 2009] COMELEC
refused to accredit Ang Ladlad, an organization composed of
Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and Trans-gendered individuals
(LGBTs) based on moral grounds.
o Ang Ladlad tolerates immorality which offends
religious beliefs set forth in the Bible and the
Koran.

o Ang Ladlad advocates immoral doctrines in

violation of Arts. 695 and 1302 of the Civil
Code and Art. 201 of the Revised Penal
Code
[Second Assailed Resolution] On reconsideration, the majority
(4 out of 7) upheld the above resolution on the grounds that:
o It cannot be said that Ladlads expressed
sexual orientations per se would benefit the
nation as a whole. Sec. 2 of the Party List
law (RA7941) states that the party list
system serves to enable citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of
Representatives. Thereby the party-list
system is a tool for the realization of
aspirations of marginalized individuals
whose interests are also the nations.
o US courts do not recognize LGBTs as a
special class of individuals nor consider
homosexuality as a constitutionally protected
fundamental right. Ang Ladlads
constituencies will remain either male or
female protected by the same Bill of Rights
that applies to all citizens alike.
o Moral precepts espoused by the dominant
Catholic and Islam faith have seeped into
what are generally accepted as public
morals.
o Homosexual relations are considered unlawful
pursuant to the aforementioned provisions in
the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code.
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) later filed a comment in
support of petitioners application. The Commission on Human
Rights and Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed their respective
Motion to Intervene which the SC granted.
Meanwhile, the SC issued a TRO directing the COMELEC to
cease and desist from implementing the two assailed
resolutions.
In the instant case, COMELEC additionally raises that the
LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and the Party List Law, and that petitioner made
untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs
field personnel.
Issue:
1. WON the COMELEC resolution should be upheld because:
a. The LGBT sector is not among the sectors
enumerated by the Constitution and the
Party List Law. NO
b. Petitioner made untruthful statements in its
petition when it alleged its national existence

2.
3.
4.

1.

2.

3.

contrary to actual verification reports by

COMELECs field personnel. NO
WON the denial of accreditation, insofar as it used religious
dogma to justify the exclusion, violated constitutional
guarantees against the establishment of religion. YES
WON the petitioner lacks a concrete and genuine national
political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was
validly dismissed on moral grounds. NO
WON the assailed resolutions violated their rights, namely:
a. Equal protection of law YES
i.
WON LGBTs have their
own special interests and concerns
which should have been recognized
by the COMELEC as a separate
classification. NO
b. Freedom of speech and assembly YES
c. Non-discrimination based on sexual
orientation in accordance with Philippines
international obligations. YES
Ratio:
Contrary to COMELECs position, Ang Ladlad sufficiently
complied with the legal requirements for accreditation.
a. In Bagong Bayani, COMELEC ruled that the
enumeration of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors is not
exclusive. A sector must comply with the
requirements of the Constitution and
RA7941.
b. The denial of petitioners accreditation on
the ground that it made untruthful statements
regarding its national existence was neither
stated nor alluded to in the assailed
resolutions. Nonetheless, there has been
has no misrepresentation since Ang Ladlad
has various affiliates around the Philippines
which the COMELEC had overlooked.
There was a grave violation of the non-establishment clause
stipulated in Art III, Sec 5 of the Constitution: no law shall
be made respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof when the COMELEC
utilized the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad
o In Estrada v. Escritor, the Constitutions
religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a
benevolent neutrality.
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that
the government must pursue its
secular goals and interests while
striving to uphold religious liberty
within the limits of the Constitution.
It allows for accommodation of
morality based on religion provided
that it does not offend compelling
state interests.
Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify the exclusion of homosexuals
from participation in the party-list system.

o Considering that the Philippines has not seen

fit to criminalize homosexual conduct, the
same cannot be deemed to be contrary to
generally accepted public morals.
o Assailed resolutions have not identified any
specific overt immoral act performed by Ang
Ladlad.
A persons mere attraction to another
does not translate to immoral acts.
COMELEC failed to explain what
societal ills are sought to be
prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth.
4. The assailed resolutions violated their rights, namely:
a. Art. III, Sec. 1, nor shall any person be
denied equal protection of laws. The equal
protection clause guarantees that no person
or class of persons shall be deprived of
the same protection of laws which is
enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place in in like
circumstances. Laws of general
application should apply with equal force to
LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in
the party-list system on the same basis as
other marginalized and under-represented
sectors.
The Philippine electorate
has not expressed that
homosexual conduct is
immoral and unacceptable
otherwise there would be
laws criminalizing it.
Granting that there is a
moral disapproval of
homosexuality, the same
is not a legitimate state
interest that is sufficient to
justify the classification of
homosexuals.
i.
In the instant case, the
Court disagrees that homosexuals
are a class in themselves meriting
special or differentiated treatment.
b. Art. III, Sec. 4 on the freedom of
expression and association. COMELECs
action precluded petitioner from publicly
expressing its views as a political party and
participating on an equal basis in the political
process with other equally-qualified party-list
candidates.
OSG contends that the COMELEC
simply exercised its authority to
review petitioners qualifications
without any restriction on their
freedom of expression or
association (i.e. no utterance

restricted, no publication censored

or any assembly denied). BUT
although the holding of a public
office a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law, the
moral objection offered by the
COMELEC was not a limitation
imposed by law.
c. Arts. 25 and 26 of International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) on the principle of nondiscrimination, in relation to Art. 21 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) on the right to electoral
representation. Granting the instant petition
is fully in accord with our international
obligations to protect and promote human
rights.
Petitioners invocation of the
Yogyakarta Principles (the
Application of International Human
Rights Law In Relation to Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity)
cannot stand since the norms
contained therein cannot be
considered obligatory on the
Philippines. (See footnote 52 in p.
78 of Case for example)
The Yogyakarta principles
are at best de lege ferenda
(a law to be passed; a
proposed principle that
might be applied to a given
situation instead or in the
absence of a legal
principle that is in force)
Held: Petition granted
2.
a.
b.

Election
Regular Election
Special Election

3.
a.
b.

Salaries. Privileges and Disqualification

Salaries
Freedom from Arrest

Martinez v. Morfe (1972) Fernando, J.

NATURE: Two cases, both Original Actions in the Supreme
Court for Certiorari, but one additionally for habeas corpus and
the other for prohibition
FACTS:

Petitioners Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista,

Sr. are delegates of the present Constitutional
Convention (1972)
Wish to invoke parliamentary immunity granted by
Art VI, Sec 15 of the 1935 Constitution
Extended to Constitutional Convention
Delegates by the Constitutional
Convention Act
Both petitioners are facing criminal prosecutions
Manuel Martinez for falsification of a public
document
basis was his stating under oath in
his certificate of candidacy for the
Con Con that he was born on June
20, 1945, when he was actually
born on June 20, 1946
Fernando Bautista Sr. for two criminal
complaints alleging violation of the Revised
Penal Code
violated Section 51 of the RPC by
giving away free food, drinks, and
cigarettes at two public meetings
case was file by Moises
Maspil, a defeated
delegate-aspirant
Both were arrested despite attempts to invoke
parliamentary immunity
seek to have their respective warrants of
arrest quashed on the same basis
which when taken with Art 145 of
the RPC, is said to render them
immune from arrest
both possible penalties are
prision mayor or lower,
and arrest for crimes with
such penalties will see the
arresting officers punished
themselves according to
Art. 145 RPC

ISSUE:
Can the petitioners validly invoke parliamentary immunity to
quash the warrants of arrest? NO
RATIO:

Immunity from arrest does not cover any prosecution

for treason, felony, and breach of the peace
this is obvious from the explicit language of
the Constitution
its history likewise precludes any
other interpretation, which shows it
was never intended to exempt
members of the National Assembly
from criminal arrest
the grant of certain privileges to any set of
persons means the abrogation of the

principle of equality before the eyes of the

law
freedom from arrest would amount
to the creation of a privileged class
without justification in reason
likely to be no dissent that a
legislator or delegate can perform
his functions efficiently without the
need for transgression of criminal
law
the privilege applies only to prosecutions of
a civil nature
protects the right to free speech, for
one, as a right central to the
fulfillment of legislative duties
Regarding Art 145 of the RPC, It is to be remembered
that the RPC came into effect on January 1, 1932,
before the enforcement of the 1935 Constitution
Constitution states that:
such laws (already existing) shall
remain operative unless
inconsistent with the Constitution
Court declared that Art
145 of the RPC is
inoperative for being
inconsistent with the
Constitution

RULING:
Petitions DENIED
NOTES:
Art VI, Sec. 15 of the 1935 Constitution
The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the
peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the
session of the Congress, and in going to and returning from
the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not
be questioned in any other place.
Art 145 of the Revised Penal Code
Violation of parliamentary immunity. The penalty of prision
mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall use force,
intimidation, threats, or fraud to prevent any member of the
National Assembly (Congress of the Philippines) from
attending the meetings of the Assembly (Congress) or of any
of its committees or subcommittees, constitutional
commissions or committees or divisions thereof, from
expressing his opinions or casting his vote; and the penalty of
prision correccional shall be imposed upon any public officer or
employee who shall, while the Assembly (Congress) is in
regular or special session, arrest or search any member
thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime
punishable under this Code by a penalty higher than prision
mayor.

People v. Jalosjos (2000) Ynares-Santiago, J.

Nature: Motion to be allowed to discharge duties as
Congressman
FACTS:

accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos, is a member

of Congress
confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape on two counts
and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is
pending appeal
filed this motion that he be allowed to fully discharge
the duties of a Congressman
including attendance at legislative sessions
and committee meetings
despite having been convicted in
the first instance of a non-bailable
offense
Primary argument of the movant is the mandate of
the sovereign will
has a duty to perform the functions of a
Congressman

ISSUE:

RULING:
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused
from statutes and rules which apply to validly
incarcerated persons in general? NO

RATIO:

A person charged with a crime is taken into custody

for purposes of the administration of justice
it is the injury to the public that State action
in criminal law seeks to redress
Allowing accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee
meetings for five (5) days or more in a week
will virtually make him a free man
would make a mockery of the purposes of
the correction system
Question of constitutional equal protection
the performance of legitimate and even
essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in
prison
Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from
those others who are validly restrained by
law
Court cannot validate badges of
inequality
Functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from
the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement

Court holds that the privileges and rights arising from

having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by
law
all top officials of Government - executive,
legislative, and judicial are subject to the
majesty of law
Privilege has to be granted by law, not
inferred from the duties of a position
history of the immunity from arrest or detention of
Senators and Congressmen shows it has always
been granted in a restrictive sense, and the provision
cannot be expended beyond the ordinary meaning of
its terms
seen in Art VI Sec 11
petitioner invokes Art VI Sec 16 Par 2 which states
that members of Congress may be compelled to
attend sessions
however excused if there is a legitimate
excuse, and confinement for a criminal
charge is not merely authorized by law, but
has constitutional foundations

Petition DENIED
NOTES:
Art VI Sec 11 1987 Constitution
Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while
the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned
nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate
in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
Art VI Sec 16 (2)
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day
and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such
manner, and under such penalties, as such House may
provide.
Trillanes, IV v. Pimentel, Sr.
Trillanes IV v Pimentel Sr. (2008)
Antonio Trillanes petitioner ; Hon. Oscar Pimentel, Sr., in his
capacity as presiding judge rtc Makati, et al. - respondents
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in SC. Certiorari, Prohibition,
Mandamus
FACTS:

This case is about the events that transpired after the

Oakwood incident, where Antonio Trillanes IV was charged,
along with his comrades, with coup dtat (Article 134-A of
RPC).
Trillanes, who has remained in detention, won a seat in the
Senate commencing at noon on June 30,2007.
He filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed
to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests; among
these requests were:
1.
To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official
functions of the Senate
2.
To be allowed to give interviews and to air his
comments/opinions to the press or the media
3.
To be allowed to receive reporters and other members
of the media who wish to interview him during Tuesdays and
Fridays
LOWER COURT RULINGS
RTC denied all requests; motion for reconsideration denied
Hence the petition for certiorari
ISSUES
1.
WON the Jalosjos case is different from the case at bar
on the grounds that: - NO
a.
He isnt convicted so presumption of innocence applies NO
b. Crime committed is a political offense, not a crime
involving moral turpitude - no
2.
WON the fact that the people, in their sovereign
capacity, elected him is a justification to allow him to work and
serve his mandate as senator NO
3.
WON there should be liberal treatment of detention
prisoners who are held without bail NO
RATIO
1.
In the case of Jalosjos, election to Congress is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the
functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. This is no different from the case at bar.
a.
The presumption of innocence does not carry with it the
full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
As held in People v Hon Maceda: all prisoners whether
under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot
practice their profession nor engage in any business or
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in
detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and
detention.
b.
Art. III, Sec. 13 applies equally to rape and coup
dtat cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua.
There is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of
or moral turpitude in the crime charged.
2.
The contention of Trillanes is hinged on the doctrine
of administrative law, which provides that a public official
cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed
during a prior term, since his reelection to office operates as a
condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent
of cutting off the right to remove him therefore

The case is not administrative in nature so it cannot apply. The

doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases.
Election or reelection to office does not obliterate a criminal
charge.
Moreover, it was held that the mandate of the people yields to
the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to
govern all under the rull of law
3.
Petitioner harps on an alleged violation of the equal
protection clause. However, emergency or compelling
temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all
prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court
orders. That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner
failed to establish.
HELD
Appeal DENIED
NOTES
On bail
Article III, sec. 13 All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.
> Evidence of guilt is strong so petitioners application for bail
was denied. If denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is
only on the theory that the proof being strong, the defendant
would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the
verdict of the jury

c. Speech and Debate Clause

Jimenez v. Cabangbang (1966)
Concepcion, C.J.
Facts:
Defendant Bartolome Cabangbang, then a member of the
House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on
National defense, caused an open letter to be published in
several newspapers of general circulation.
The communication alleged that the petitioners Nicanor
Jimenez, Jose Lukban and Carlos Albert and other AFP
officers are under the control of those planning attacks against
the administration in furtherance of an insidious campaign for
the then Secretary of National Defense Jose Vargas.
Defendant noted that it is, of course, possible that (the said
AFP officers) are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may
have absolutely no knowledge.
Petitioners sought libel damages in the Court of First Instance
which was denied on the ground that the letter is not libelous
and that it is a privileged communication. Hence, this appeal.
Issues:
1. WON the publication in question is a privileged
communication- NO
2. WON it is libelous NO

Ratio:
1. Art VI, Sec 15 of the 1935 Constitution states that members
of Congress shall not be questioned in any other place than
Congress for any speech or debate therein. Speech or
debate therein refers to:
a. Utterances made by Congressmen in the
performance of their official functions,
such as (i) speeches delivered,
statements made, or votes cast in the
halls of Congress while the same is in
session and (ii) bills introduced in
Congress whether or not in session
b. Other acts performed by Congressmen
(either in Congress or outside the premises
housing its offices) in the official discharge
of their duties as members of Congress
or as officer of any committee thereof
(duly authorized to perform such functions
as such at the time of the performance of the
acts in question)
The publication in this case does not belong to this category
because Congress was not in session at the time of the
publication. In causing it to be published, he was not
performing his official duty either as a member of Congress or
as an officer of any committee thereof.
2. The letter in question explicitly indicates that the petitioners
might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans,
and that they might be merely unwitting tools of the planners.
Such statement is not derogatory to the plaintiffs insofar as
entitling them to damages, given that they are in fact
subordinates of the alleged planners who are high-ranking
officers of the AFP (i.e. Secretary of National Defense and the
Chief of Staff). Logically, when they alleged that such
statement was false, .they cannot mean that they were aware
of or knowingly involved in the plan.
Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago
Pobre vs Defensor-Santiago Velasco, Jr. J.
Facts:
On December 22, 2006, Anter J. Pobre filed a letter of
complaint on Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago regarding an
excerpt of her speech in the Senate. In her comment on the
complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through
counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted statements.
She, however, explained that those statements were covered
by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity,
being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her
duty as member of Congress or its committee.
Issue:
WON Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago is liable for her
actions.-NO
Under Art VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, "a Senator or
Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No

member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any

other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any committee thereof. (Pero gusto pang pagalitan ng
Korte Suprema si Miriam) But, the court also says that no
lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to
the courts should be allowed to erode the peoples faith in the
judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon
8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist
on similar conduct by others.
She also violated the Rules of the Senate containing a
provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins
a Senator from using, under any circumstance, offensive or
improper language against another Senator or against any
public institution.
Held:
The letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty.
Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of
the Constitution, DISMISSED.
Notes:
The excerpt from the speech:
"I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am
homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded.
And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my
middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit
on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the
position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I
would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme
Court of idiots"
d. Disqualifications and other prohibitions
Flores v. Drilon
Flores v Drilon (1993)
*Franklin Drilon and Richard Gordon as respondents
SPECIAL ACTION in the SC. Prohibition
FACTS
The case is about the unconstitutionality of Sec. 13 par (d) of
RA 7227, also known as the Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992, under which respondent Mayor
Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of Subic Bay metropolitan Authority (SBMA).
It is said that the said proviso infringes on the following
constitutional provisions:
1.
Sec. 7 1st par., Art. IX-B of the Constitution
-Mayor Gordon of Olongapo City (back in 1993) is an elective
official and the subject posts are public offices
2.
Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution

-it was the Congress, not the President who appointed the
mayor to the subject posts
3.
Sec. 261, par (g) of the omnibus Election Code
-the appointment of Gordon was within the prohibited 45-day
period prior to the 1992 elections
ISSUE
WON proviso in Sec. 13 par 9d) of RA 7227 violates the
constitutional proscription against appointment or designation
of elective officials to other government posts - YES
RATIO
1) Section 7 1st par. Art. IX-B, 1987 Consti: No elective official
shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity
to any public office or position during his tenure.
- it is obvious that the proviso contravenes this part of the 1987
Constitution as the section clearly expresses the policy against
the concentration of several public positions in one person, so
that the public officer may serve full time with dedication and
thus be efficient in the delivery of public services
-intent of framers: difference between appointive and elective
officials. First paragraph of Section 7 talks about an elective
official, where the provision is more stringent in not providing
any exception to the rule against appointment or designation.
The second paragraph talks about appointive officials who may
be authorized in holding multiple offices when allowed by law
or by the primary functions of his position. Given this, the
Congress intended the posts to be appointive, thus nibbling in
the bud the argument that they are ex officio
2) Sec. 16, Art. VII Consti: The President shall appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint
- Use of the word shall shows intent to make SBMA appointive
and not adjunct to the post of mayor
3) It is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to
prescribe qualifications where only one (Mayor of Olongapo
City), and no other, can qualify. Consequently, as long as he is
an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for
appointment to another public office.
HELD
INVALID; NULL AND VOID
NOTES
-Sec 94 of LGC cannot prevail over the fundamental law of the
land
-appointment is the designation of a person, by the person or
persons having authority therefor, to discharge the duties of
some office or trust
Liban v. Gordon
Petitioners: Dante Liban, Reynaldo Bernardo and Salvador
Viari
Respondent: Richard DICK Gordon
Intervenor: Philippine National Red Cross
G.R. No. 175352 January 18, 2011

Nature of petition:
Motion for clarification and/or for reconsideration of a decision
of the Supreme Court (Gordon)
Motion for partial reconsideration of a decision of the Supreme
Court (PNRC)
Ponente: Justice Leonardo-Decastro
Facts:
1. SC formerly decided on July 15, 2009 that Gordon did not
forfeit his Senate seat with his acceptance of the chairmanship
of the PNRC board of governors. It was ruled by the Court that
the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or
an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for
purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution but it also ruled that the PNRC Charter was void
and that should it desire, to register under the SEC as a private
corporation.
Dicks issues:
1. The issue of constitutionality of RA 95 (PNRC creation and
charter) was not raised by the parties; the Court went beyond
the case in deciding such issue
2. Since the court decided that petitioners did not have
standing in their petition, its pronouncement on the validity of
RA 95 is obiter due to it being a non-issue
PNRCs issues:
1. Decision made by SC (striking down PNRC charter)
deprived PNRC its right to due process since RA 95 was a
non-issue in the case and that PNRC was not a party in the
case
2. Current charter of PNRC is not RA 95 but rather PD 1264
which is not an act passed by Congress
3. PNRCs structure is sui generis (unique and one of a kind).
Its different because it is a neutral entity that performs
humanitarian functions that is an auxiliary to the government
despite being independent from it.
Ratio:
1. Constitutionality of RA 95- It was not the lis mota of the
case so it should not have been touched. However, it is seen
by the various instances in history that PNRC charter has been
amended numerous times and this is considered as
recognition that PNRC is not a private corporation that falls
under the constitutional ban (PNRC Charter was amended
several times, particularly on June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971,
December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A.
No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No.1643,
respectively).
2. SUI GENERIS- Argument has merit due to PNRC being
made in adherence to the Geneva Convention. The provisions
of R.A. No. 95, as amended by R.A. Nos. 855 and 6373, and
further amended by P.D. Nos. 1264 and 1643, show the
historical background and legal basis of the creation of the
PNRC by legislative fiat, as a voluntary organization impressed
with public interest. The PNRC has worked closely with ICRC
in humanitarian missions since 1982. National Societies such
as the PNRC act as auxiliaries to the public authorities of their
own countries in the humanitarian field and provide a range of
services including disaster relief and health and social
programs. PNRC is then a national society as stated by the

1949 Geneva Convention and its successors. National

societies are therefore organizations that are directly
regulated by international humanitarian law, in contrast to
other ordinary private entities, including NGOs.
SC Ruling: Motions are granted. Dispositive portion of
previous decision is to be modified. PNRC is sui generis
and the office of its chairman is not a government
position.
SJS v. Dangerous Drugs Board
Petitioner: Social Justice Society (1st case)
Atty. Manuel Laserna (2nd case)
Aquilino Pimentel Jr. (3rd case)
Respondent: Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (1st and 2nd ) and Commission on
Elections (3rd)
Gr. No. 157870, 158633, 161658 November 3, 2008
Ponente: Justice Velasco Jr.
Case filed: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (special civil
case)
Facts:
1. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 36 of RA
9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) which
requires mandatory drug testing for candidates for public
office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged
before the prosecutors office with certain offenses.
2. On December 23, 2003, the Comelec issued Resolution No.
6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with
the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections.
Pimentels issue:
1. Section 36 of RA 9165 and Comelec Resolution 6468 are
unconstitutional because they impose a qualification for
candidates in addition to those provided in the 1987
Constitution (Sec 3 Article 6)
2. Enjoin the implementation of said Comelec Resolution
Social Justice Societys issues:
1. Paragraphs c, d, f, g of Sec 36 of Ra 9165 are
unconstitutional for various reasons:

undue delegation of legislative power in allowing schools

and employers to determine manner of testing

violates equal protection clause as it can be used as a

tool of harassment on an undesirable employee or student

constitutional right against unreasonable searches is

violated
Lasernas issues:
1. Paragraphs c, d, f, g of Sec 36 of Ra 9165 are
unconstitutional for various infringing on several rights:

right to privacy

right against unreasonable searches and seizures

right against self-incrimination

right to equal protection

right to due process

Real/Consolidated Issues:
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for
senator? Corollary, can Congress enact a law prescribing

qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid

down by the Constitution?
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165
unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the
right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and
seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute
undue delegation of legislative power?
Ratio:
1. Justiciability of Locus Standi- Pimentel, as a senator and a
candidate for May 2004 elections, has locus standi. SJS and
Laserna do not but the Court shall relax the rule due to its
paramount public interest and transcendental importance.
2. Illegally impose added qualification (Sec 36 paragraph g) The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify
the qualification standards of a senator, as it cannot
disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional
mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution. The
Constitution is the basic law which all other laws shall conform
to. The power of Congress to legislate has certain
limitations which are subject to substantive and
constitutional limitations which circumscribe the exercise
of power and legislative subjects. If Congress may not be
allowed to institute added qualifications, Comelec, all the more,
is not allowed even if it is under the guise of enforcing election
laws. The right of the citizen to democratic elections may
not be infringed by unwarranted imposition of
requirements unspecified in the Constitution. The
unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its
having infringed the constitutional provision defining the
qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run
for and serve as senator.
3. Violation of right to privacy and guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure- Drug test to be
implemented is mandatory but random. Its objective is to
stamp out drug use and to ensure the protection of the
citizens, specially the youth. The primary legislative intent is
not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug
use as a result of this random testing are not necessarily
treated as criminals. Based on past US SC jurisprudence, it
was determined that schools stand in loco parentis over their
students which gives them the duty to safeguard the health
and well being of the students and may adopt measures to
discharge said duty. It was also determined that minor
students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are
subject to the custody and supervision of their parents,
guardians, and schools. RA 9165 was enacted as a measure
to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect the
wellbeing of the citizens, especially the youth, from the
deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to
achieve this through the medium, among others, of promoting
and resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the
workplace via a mandatory random drug test. To the Court, the
need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is
substantial enough to override the individuals privacy interest
under the premises. Enough safeguards were set to ensure
that protection of dignity and privacy would still apply (2 types
of testing to ensure accuracy of results and testing to be done

by DOH monitored laboratories). In the case of students, the

constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing for students emanates
primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to
privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their
voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental
authority of school authorities. In the case of private and
public employees, the constitutional soundness of the
mandatory, random, and suspicion less drug testing
proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy
and requirement.
4. Mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes- The
operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are
suspicionless and randomness. These concepts are absent
once an accused is mandatorily given a drug test. To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal
prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165.
It would violate an individuals right to privacy and right to selfincrimination
SC Ruling: Section 36 paragraphs C and D are
constitutional while F and G are not
Notes:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.Authorized drug testing
shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or by
any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored
by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x
The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing
methods, the screening test which will determine the positive
result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory
test which will confirm a positive screening test. The following
shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
(c) of secondary and tertiary schools: students of secondary
and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and
regulations as contained in the schools student handbook and
with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices:
officers and employees of public and private offices, whether
domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random
drug test as contained in the companys work rules and
regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the
workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of
dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which
shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the
provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent
provisions of the Civil Service Law;
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutors office with a
criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment
of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a
mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected
both in the national or local government shall undergo a
mandatory drug test.

4.

e. Duty to disclose
Internal Government of Congress

a.
Election of Officers
Santiago v.Guingona
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago and Senator Francisco S.
Tatad, petitioners vs. Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. and
Senator Marcelo B. Fernan, respondents.
Special civil action in the Supreme Court. QUO WARRANTO.
Facts:
After the 1998 elections, the largest party Laban ng Masang
Pilipino (LAMP) was who had 10 seats, Lakas-National Union
of Christian Democrats-United Muslim Democrats of the
Philippines (LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP) who had 7 seats, and four
smaller parties who had 1 seat for a total of 23 senators as
Senator GMA was elected Vice President. There was an
election of officers in the Senate and two people vied for
Senate Presidency: Marcelo Fernan and petitioner Francisco
Tatad. By a vote of 20-2, Senator Fernan won the Senate
presidency.
Senator Tatad then manifested, that with the agreement of
Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the
minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader as he
explain those who voted for Fernan comprised the majority and
those who voted for him the losing nominee belonged to the
minority. However senators belonging to Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
numbering 7 and thus also a minority had chosen
respondent Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No
consensus on the matter was arrived at. The Senate President
confirmed Senator Guingona as minority leader after receiving
a letter from Lakas stating that they had elected Senator
Guingona.
Senators Santiago and Tatad instituted an original petition for
quo warranto under rule 66 section 5 rules of court seeking
ouster of senator Teofisto Guingona Jr. as a minority leader of
the senate and declarion of Senator Tatad as rightful minority
leader. Court asked for comments from respondents and
Solicitor General.
Issues:
Does the Court have Jurisdiction over the petition? YES
Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco 11 in arguing
that this Court has jurisdiction to settle the issue of who is the
lawful Senate minority leader. They submit that the definitions
of "majority" and "minority" involve an interpretation of the
Constitution, specifically Section 16 (1), Article VI thereof,
stating that "[t]he Senate shall elect its President and the
House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all
its respective Members."
Respondents and the solicitor general, in their separate
Comments, contend in common that the issue of who is the
lawful Senate minority leader is an internal matter pertaining
exclusively to the domain of the legislature, over which the
Court cannot exercise jurisdiction without transgressing the

principle of separation of powers. Allegedly, no constitutional

issue is involved, as the fundamental law does not provide for
the office of a minority leader in the Senate. The legislature
alone has the full discretion to provide for such office and, in
that event, to determine the procedure of selecting its
occupant.
Respondents also maintain that Avelino cannot apply, because
there exists no question involving an interpretation or
application of the Constitution, the laws or even the Rules of
the Senate; neither are there "peculiar circumstances"
impelling the Court to assume jurisdiction over the petition. The
solicitor general adds that there is not even any legislative
practice to support the petitioners' theory that a senator who
votes for the winning Senate President is precluded from
becoming the minority leader.
Petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the
constitution, has not been observed in the selection of the
Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Court's
"expanded" judicial power "to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction" on the part of respondents.

leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated

candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and
prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem. And it
is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to
prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative.
This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude
into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional
principles that it is bound to protect and uphold the very
duty that justifies the Court's being. Constitutional respect and
a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch
prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the
Senate.
While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules
and even the practice of the Senate was violated, and while
the judiciary is without power to decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been lodged in the legislative
department, this Court may still inquire whether an act of
Congress or its officials has been made with grave abuse of
discretion. This paradigm shall be used for the next two issues.

Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over the

subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff or
petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the
aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it is clear that this Court
has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate
or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or
gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions
and prerogatives.

3.
Was Respondent Guingona usurping unlawfully
holding and exercising the position of Senate minority Leader?
- NO

Was there an actual violation of the Constitution? NO

In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the

person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the
contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office
allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent.
In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear
and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority
leader.

Petitioners contend that the constitutional provision requiring

the election of the Senate President "by majority vote of all
members" carries with it a judicial duty to determine the
concepts of "majority" and "minority," as well as who may elect
a minority leader. They argue that "majority" in the aforequoted
constitutional provision refers to that group of senators who (1)
voted for the winning Senate President and (2) accepted
committee chairmanships. Accordingly, those who voted for
the losing nominee and accepted no such chairmanships
comprise the minority.
The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number of
times. When referring to a certain number out of a total or
aggregate, it simply "means the number greater than half or
more than half of any total."
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of
the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more
than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide
that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto
constitute the "minority," who could thereby elect the minority

Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary

assumption and exercise of power by one without color of title
or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto
proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or
title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from
its enjoyment.

4.
Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of
discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority
leader? - NO
The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government" is
restricted only by the definition and confines of the term "grave
abuse of discretion."
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in

contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an

arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.

Petitioner Avelino then instituted this action for quo warranto

asking that the Court oust respondent and declare him as the
rightful Senate President.

By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did

not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader.
Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the
rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been
violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion
cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their
competence and authority.

ISSUES:

HELD:
Petition DISMISSED.
b. Quorum
Avelino v. Cuenco
Petitioner Jose Avelino vs. Mariano J. Cuenco
Petition for QUO WARRANTO.

a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter? NO

The answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of
powers, the political nature of the controversy, and the
Constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
president. We should abstain in this case because the
selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators
themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their
officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition
must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want
petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session
Hall not in the Supreme Court.
b. If it is has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
- YES

FACTS:
Senator Lorenzo Tanadare request to speak at the next
Senate Session to formulate charges against then Senate
President and now petitioner Jose Avelino. Before the opening
of said session, Senator Tanada and Senator Sanidad filed a
resolution with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution
(Resolution No. 67) enumerating said charges against then
Senate President and ordering the investigation thereof.
During said session, petitioner Avelino showed up late (11:35
am) though quorum was achieved at appointed time (10:00
am). Numerous delaying tactics concerning roll call and
reading of minutes were used to delay Senator Tanadas
privilege speech. At this point, disorderly conduct occurred in
the gallery and Senator David moved to adjourn the session
(allegedly as part of a preconcerted plan) which was
vehemently opposed by other Senators. After this point when a
vote whether to adjourn session was motioned, Jose Avelino
and 7 other Senators walked out of the session.
The remaining Senators then moved for Cuenco to preside
over the Session. Tanada would then deliver his privilege
speech.
Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled
"Resolution declaring vacant the position of the President of
the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus
Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the said
resolution was unanimously approved.
Senator Cuenco took the oath.The next day the President of
the Philippines recognized the respondent as acting president
of the Philippines Senate.

There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator

Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a
minority of ten senators may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent
the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met
with their unanimous endorsement.
If the rump session was NOT a continuation of the morning
session, was it validly constituted? In other words, was there
the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of
the business of the Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and
Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minute say so,
secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were
at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and
Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the
country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute
a majority of the Senate of twelve three senators. When the
Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall
constitute aquorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the
members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the
House"?
c. Should the petition be granted - NO
Even the four justices who dissented agree that the Court
being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty
three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations
in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will
support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with
Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the
latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being
essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the
majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of
the President of that body being amenable at any time by that
majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or
more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from

the divergence of opinion here aboutquorum and for the

benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved
the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and
thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.
c. Rules of proceedings
Arroyo v. De Venecia
Mendoza, J. 1997
Facts:
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which
amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue
Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of
Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of
the House which petitioners claim are constitutionallymandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of
the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The
Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral
conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The
bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During
the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and
moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the
Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation
then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the
sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano
moved for the approval and ratification of the conference
committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the
motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none,
approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep.
Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair
and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although
Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders
motion, the approval of the conference committee report had
by then already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and
certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of
Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President
Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was
passed in violation of the rules of the House
Ratio:
To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to
disregard the respect due the other two departments of our
government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the
prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set
aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the
House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow
those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the
judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that
department itself. The Court has not been invested with a
roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined,
of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its
power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion
were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead
appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the

enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A.

No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court
must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the
good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and
deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that
body
Decision: Court finds no ground for holding that Congress
committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No.
8240 This case istherefore dismissed.
Garcillano v. House of Representatives
December 23, 2008; Nachura, J.
Facts:
Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation
purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a
high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes, notoriously referred to as
the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the Presidents
instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to
manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential
elections. These recordings were to become the subject of
heated legislative hearings conducted separately by
committees of both Houses of Congress.
In one of the Senates plenary session, a lengthy debate
ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on
the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 if
the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter.
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege
speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution
absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication
of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she
recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the
Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine
National Police or other government entities in the alleged
illegal wiretapping of public officials.
Petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired
justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a
Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the
Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They
argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates
R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the publication of the Rules of
Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form
available at the Senate, is sufficient compliance of the
publication requirement prior to the effectivity of laws and other
issuances.
Ruling:
The Court held that the Senate cannot be allowed to continue
with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without
duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the
constitutional requirement.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly

provides that "the Senate or the House of Representatives, or
any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure."
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the
Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not
sufficient under the Taada v. Tuvera ruling which requires
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that
the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in
two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any
other form of publication. Publication in accordance with
Taada is mandatory to comply with the due process
requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a persons
liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure
could be arrested and detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A.
No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the
internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the
functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary
purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the
admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of
electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does
not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and
regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees,
therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its
unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these
consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have
caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only
"in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
Decision:
The Supreme Court (hereafter Court) dismissed the petition in
G.R. No. 170338 but granted the petition in G.R. No. 179275.
A writ of prohibition was issued enjoining the Senate of the
Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its committees from
conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the
"Hello Garci" tapes.
d. Power over members and right to sit
e.
Discipline of members
f.
Sessions
g.
Journal and Congressional Records
5.

Powers of Congress

a.
General plenary powers
Arnault v. Nazareno
Arnault v Nazareno
July 18, 1950
Ozaeta, J.:
Facts:
1. The controversy arose out of the Governments purchase of
2 estates. Petitioner was the attorney in-fact of Ernest H. Burt

in the negotiations for the purchase of the Buenavista and

Tambobong Estates by the Government of the Philippines. The
purchase was effected and the price paid for both estates was
P5,000,000. The Senate adopted Resolution No. 8 creating a
Special Committee to determine the validity of the purchase
and whether the price paid was fair and just. During the said
Senate investigation, petitioner was asked to whom a part of
the purchase price, or P440,000, was delivered. Petitioner
refused to answer this question, hence the Committee cited
him in contempt for contumacious acts and ordered his
commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the
Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison he
reveals to the Senate or to the Special Committee the name of
the person who received the P440,000 and to answer
questions pertinent thereto.
2. It turned out that the Government did not have to pay a
single centavo for the Tambobong Estate as it was already
practically owned by virtue of a deed of sale from the
Philippine Trust Company and by virtue of the recession of the
contract through which Ernest H. Burt had an interest in the
estate. An intriguing question which the committee sought to
resolve was that involved in the apparent irregularity of the
Government's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for
his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which
he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October,
1949. The committee sought to determine who were
responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the
expense of the Government.
3. Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating
P1,500,000 were delivered to him; and that on the same
occasion he draw on said account two checks; one for
P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the
Associated Agencies, Inc., with PNB, and another for
P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.
4. Hence, this petition on following grounds:
a) Petitioner contends that the Senate has no power to punish
him for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person
to whom he gave the P440,000, because such information is
immaterial to, and will not serve, any intended or purported
legislation and his refusal to answer the question has not
embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process.
b) Petitioner contended that the Senate lacks authority to
commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of
legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950.
c)Also contended that he would incriminate himself if he should
reveal the name of the person
ISSUES:
1. WON the Senate has no power to punish Arnault for
contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to
whom he gave the P440,000
2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit Arnault for
contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session,
which ended on May 18, 1950
3. WON the privilege against self incrimination protects the
petitioner from being questioned
RATIO:

1.

Yes. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be

within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make,
the investigating committee has the power to require
a witness to answer any question pertinent to that
inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the
jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be
material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it
vested by the Constitution, and every question which
the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to
answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of
the inquiry or investigation. The power of the Court is
limited to determining whether the legislative body
has jurisdiction to institute the inquiry or investigation.
This Court cannot control the exercise of that
jurisdiction; and it is insinuated, that the ruling of the
Senate on the materiality of the question propounded
to the witness is not subject to review by this Court
under the principle of the separation of power.
2. NO. The Senate of the Philippines is a continuing
body. Theres no reason to limit the power of the
legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of
every session and not to the end of the last session
terminating the existence of that body. The very
reason for the exercise of the power to punish for
contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform
its constitutional function without impediment or
obstruction. To deny to such committees the power of
inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat
the very purpose for which that the power is
recognized in the legislative body as an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. The
Senate, which is a continuing body, does not cease to
exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress
or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit
as to time to the Senates power to punish for
contempt in cases where that power may
constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
3. NO. The Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness
to the important question, which is the name of that person to
whom witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His
insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should
reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily
implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable
that he gave P440,000 to a person to him unknown.
Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to
a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming
that a refusal to testify would be so punishable. Since
according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and
that he gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt in
compliance with the latters verbal instruction, Court found no
basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name
of that person might incriminate him.
Decision: Petition denied
i.

b. Legislative power
substantive imitations

1. Express substantive limitations

2. Implied Substantive Limitations
3. Prohibition against delegation of legislative
powers
a.
Criterion of valid delegation
ABAKADA Guro Partylist v. Executive Secretary
ABAKADA GURO Party-list vs Executive Secretary
(September 1, 2005) Austria-Martinez, J.
Facts:
On May 24, 2005, R.A. 9337 was signed by the President. July
1, 2005 was the effectivity date of R.A. No. 9337. On May 27,
2005, ABAKADA GURO Party List filed a petition of
prohibition. They questioned the constitutionality of Sections 4,
5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and
108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods
and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on
importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT
on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These
questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing
the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1,
2006, after any of the following conditions have been satisfied,
to wit:
. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise
the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after
any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two
and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of
the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1
%).
Petitioners argued that the law was unconstitutional, as it
constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive
authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2)
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. On July 1, 2005, the Court
issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and
continuing until further orders, enjoining respondents from
enforcing and implementing the law.
Issues:
WON Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending
Sections 106, 107 and 108 of the NIRC, violate the the
Constitution. -NO
The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative
power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon
which enforcement and administration of the increase rate
under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the
operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent

upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation

or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside
of the control of the executive.
No discretion would be exercised by the President.
Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word
shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the word shall
connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an
imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of
discretion. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be
taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice
but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately
impose the 12% rate upon the existence of any of the
conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty which cannot
be evaded by the President. Inasmuch as the law specifically
uses the word shall, the exercise of discretion by the President
does not come into play. It is a clear directive to impose the
12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present. The
time of taking into effect of the 12% VAT rate is based on the
happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon the
ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person or
body other than the legislature itself.
In the present case, in making his recommendation to the
President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the
Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the
President or even her subordinate. In such instance, he is not
subject to the power of control and direction of the President.
He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to
determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will
is to take effect.The Secretary of Finance becomes the means
or tool by which legislative policy is determined and
implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to
gather data and information and has a much broader
perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather
and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and
verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is
present. His personality in such instance is in reality but a
projection of that of Congress. Thus, being the agent of
Congress and not of the President, the President cannot alter
or modify or nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretary of
Finance and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter.
Congress simply granted the Secretary of Finance the
authority to ascertain the existence of a fact, namely, whether
by December 31, 2005, the value-added tax collection as a
percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous
year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (24/5%) or the national
government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous
year exceeds one and one-half percent (1%). If either of
these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by
legislative mandate, must submit such information to the
President. Then the 12% VAT rate must be imposed by the
President effective January 1, 2006. There is no undue

delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to

the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible.57
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate
power when it describes what job must be done, who must do
it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex
economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative
process can go forward.58
Held:
R.A. 9337 is not unconstitutional and petitions are
DISMISSED. TRO issued on July 1, 2005 is LIFTED.
Notes;
SEC. 4. Sec. 106 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 106. Value-Added Tax on Sale of Goods or Properties.
(A) Rate and Base of Tax. There shall be levied, assessed
and collected on every sale, barter or exchange of goods or
properties, a value-added tax equivalent to ten percent (10%)
of the gross selling price or gross value in money of the goods
or properties sold, bartered or exchanged, such tax to be paid
by the seller or transferor: provided, that the President, upon
the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall,
effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to
twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has
been satisfied.
(i) value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and
four-fifth percent (2 4/5%) or
(ii) national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the
previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 %).
SEC. 5. Section 107 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 107. Value-Added Tax on Importation of Goods.
(A) In General. There shall be levied, assessed and collected
on every importation of goods a value-added tax equivalent to
ten percent (10%) based on the total value used by the Bureau
of Customs in determining tariff and customs duties, plus
customs duties, excise taxes, if any, and other charges, such
tax to be paid by the importer prior to the release of such
goods from customs custody: Provided, That where the
customs duties are determined on the basis of the quantity or
volume of the goods, the value-added tax shall be based on
the landed cost plus excise taxes, if any: provided, further, that
the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of
value-added tax to twelve percent (12%) after any of the
following conditions has been satisfied.
(i) value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and
four-fifth percent (2 4/5%) or

(ii) national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the

previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 %).
SEC. 6. Section 108 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 108. Value-added Tax on Sale of Services and Use or
Lease of Properties
(A) Rate and Base of Tax. There shall be levied, assessed
and collected, a value-added tax equivalent to ten percent
(10%) of gross receipts derived from the sale or exchange of
services: provided, that the President, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective
January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve
percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been
satisfied.
(i) value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and
four-fifth percent (2 4/5%) or
(ii) national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the
previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 %).
(Emphasis supplied)
The general rule barring delegation of legislative powers is
subject to the following recognized limitations or exceptions:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section
28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under
Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
b. Undue delegation of legislative power
Pelaez v. Auditor General
Pelaez v Auditor General (1965)
Emmanuel Pelaez, as VP of the Philippines and as taxpayer
petitioner ; Auditor General - respondent
ORIGINAL ACTION in the SC. Prohibition with preliminary
injunction
FACTS
The case is about the constitutionality of Executive Orders
nos. 93-121, 124, and 126-129, issued by the President
pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Said Executive Orders created 33 municipalities.

Emmanuel Pelaez instituted the action to restrain the Auditor

General from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds
in implementation of said Eos and/or any disbursement by said
municipalities.
According to petitioner:
1.
Said EOs are null and void because Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code has been impliedly repealed by
RA 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power;
a.
If the President, under RA 2370 cannot even create a
barrio, then it follows that he cannot create a municipality
which is composed of several barrios
Respondent contends that:
1.
A new municipality can be created by the President
without creating new barrios by placing old barrios under the
jurisdiction of the new municipality
2.
The power of the President to create municipalities does
not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power,
pursuant to the case of Municipality of Cardona v Municipality
of Binangonan
ISSUES
1.
WON the President can create municipalities NO
2.
WON Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code is
repealed by RA 2370 and the Constitution YES
2.1 WON the nature of powers dealt in Sec. 68 is in
accordance with the doctrine in Calalang v Williams and
People v Rosenthal - NO
3.
WON the Executive Orders are null and void - YES
RATIO
1.
The statutory denial of the presidential authority to
create a new barrio, pursuant to RA 2370 (see notes for the
relevant portions in bold), implies a negation of the bigger
power to create municipalities. The authority to create
municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. The
Cardona case that respondent invoked involved a mere
transfer of territory from an existing municipality to another,
likewise, existing at the time of and prior to said transfer, NOT
the creation of a new municipality.
If the president could create a municipality, he could, in effect,
compel the local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby
exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the
Constitution (connect with ratio no. 2)
2.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code is
repealed by the Constitution itself, pursuant to Section 10(a)
of Article X of the Constitution, where the power of control of
the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices
does NOT imply authority to either abolish or create an
executive department or bureau. Likewise, the president
cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same
or its officers act within the scope of their authority.
Moreover, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code
does not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid

delegation of the power. Although Congress may delegate to

another branch (such as the executive) the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a
law, the said law must be 1) complete in itself and must b) fix a
standard, meaning that the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable.
2.1 Although in said cases, the Court upheld that public
welfare and public interest are sufficient standards for a valid
delegation of authority to execute the law, the doctrine DOES
NOT APPLY to the case at bar because said cases involved
questions of fact. The case at bar involves legislative
questions. So, the cases do not constitute as precedents and
have no binding effect, in so far as this case is concerned.
3.
The fact that said EOs were issued after the legislative
bills for the creation of the said municipalities had failed to
pass Congress, is the best proof that their issuance entails the
exercise of purely legislative functions.
HELD
EOs null and void ab initio; respondent permanently restrained
from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
impelementation of said EOs or any disbursement by the
municipalities concerned
NOTES
*Sec 3 of RA 2370: The creation of new barrios. - All barrios
existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under
the provisions hereof.
Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a
new barrio may be created or the name of an existing one may
be changed by the provincial board of the province, upon
recommendation of the council of the municipality or
municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated.
The recommendation of the municipal council shall be
embodied in a resolution approved by at least two-thirds of the
entire membership of the said council: Provided, however,
That no new barrio may be created if its population is less than
five hundred persons.
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered
nor their names changed except under the provisions of
this Act or by Act of Congress.
*Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code: in general,
it grants to the President the power to create municipalities
under certain conditions
c. Proper delegation
i.
By express authority of the Constitution
Garcia v. Executive Secretary
Garcia v. Executive Secretary (1992) Feliciano, J.
Congressman Enrique Garcia (petitioner)The Executive
Secretary, The Commissioner of Customs, The National
Economic and Development Authority, The Tariff Commission,
The Secretary of Finance and The Energy Regulatory Board
(respondents)
Petition for CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION and MANDAMUS

Facts:
President issued EO 438, which levied an additional duty of
5% ad valorem on all imported articles. This was subsequently
increased to 9% by EO 443.
EO 475 reduced the rate to 5%, except in the cases of
crude oil and other oil products, which continued to be
subject to the additional duty of 9% ad valorem.
A week after receiving the Tariff Commissions Report on
Special Duty on Crude Oil and Oil Products, the President
issued EO 478, which levied an additional special duty of
P0.95 per liter of crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported
oil products.
In the case at bar, petitioner assails the validity of EOs 475
and 478 because they are violative of:
a. Section 24, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution:
all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
b. Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code
which authorizes the President to increase,
reduce or remove tariff duties or to impose
additional duties only when necessary to protect
local industries or products but not for the
purpose of raising additional revenue for the
government.
Issues:
1. WON the President may assume the authority of Congress to
enact revenue bills by issuing EOs 475 and 478. YES
2. WON the President is authorized to act under the Tariff and
Customs Code only to protect local industries or products for
the sake of the national economy, general welfare and/or
national security. NO
Ratio:
1. The President may increase tariff rates when authorized by
Congress.
Section 28(2), Article VI of Constitution
expressly permits Congress to authorize the
President, subject to such limitations and
restrictions as Congress may impose, to fix
within specific limits tariff rates and other
duties or imposts.
In promulgating the assailed Executive Orders,
the President invoked Sections 104 and
401 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines.
o Sec 104: The rates of duty herein
provided or subsequently
fixedmay be revised by the
President upon recommendation of
the National Economic and
Development Authority
o Sec 401(a): In the interest of
national economy, general welfare
and/or national securitythe
-

Presidentis hereby empowered to

(1) increase, reduce or remove
existing protective rates of import
duty; and (3) to impose an
additional duty on all imports not
exceeding 10 percent ad valorem
whenever necessary
2. President may increase tariff rates as authorized by law even
for revenue purposes only.
There is nothing in the language of either
Sec104 or 401 that suggest that the
President is authorized to act under the
Tariff and Customs Code only to protect
local industries or products for the sake of
the national economy, general welfare
and/or national security. The words
protective and protection in Section
401(a) are not enough to support petitioners
contention.
Petitioners theory collides with the fact that
the Bureau of Customs is a principal
traditional generator of governmental
revenue.
Customs duties are taxes on the importation
and exportation of commodities. Most
commonly, customs duties serve the
purpose of generation of revenue and/or the
regulation of economic or social activity and
it is difficult to say which is the dominant or
principal objective.
o In the instant case, the increase in
the price of imported crude oil and
oil products may be seen to have
some protective impact upon
indigenous oil production. Also, it
cannot be said that the imposition
of such increased tariff rates/special
duty raises substantial government
revenues.
The protection of local industries is not the
only permissible objective of the Presidents
delegated authority. Customs duties are
levied and imposed entirely apart from
whether or not there are any competing local
industries to protect.
o The protection of consumers is also
important in promoting the interest
of the national economy, general
welfare and/or national security.
And so, customs duties may be
reduced or even removed precisely
for the purpose of protecting
consumers from high prices,
shoddy quality and inefficient
service that local manufacturers
may otherwise impose.

o Tariff rates and customs duties are

levied on goods which are neither
found or produced in the Philippines
(ex. ivory, castoreum, truffles,
dates, figs, caviar, aircraft) And so,
customs duties may be imposed
either for revenue purposes only or
to discourage importation of such
goods.
Held: Petition dismissed for lack of merit.
Notes:
Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution Congress may,
by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage, and wharfage
dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government.
ii.
Delegation to the President
Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission
Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission (2010)
Justice Mendoza
Special Civil Action for Certiorari and Prohibition
Facts:
Upon the assent of President Aquino after the 2010 elections,
he signed Executive Order No. 1 which is an Act Creating the
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010. Two petitions were then
filed, one by Louis Biraogo in his capacity as citizen and
taxpayer, and another by Edcel Lagman, as legislators.
ISSUES:
Whether petitioners have legal standing? - YES
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act
must have the standing to question the validity of the subject
act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case
Congressmen have standing. Their petition primarily invokes
usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which
they belong as members. Indeed, legislators have a legal
standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate.

Biraogo has no standing. As correctly pointed out by the OSG,

Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of
sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the
implementation of Executive Order No. 1. However given the
transcendental importance of the case, the requirement can be
relaxed.

President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully

executed. Section 17 reads:

Whether President has power to create Truth Commission? YES

One of the recognized powers of the President granted

pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to
create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to
ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully
executed. Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano,54 the
authority of the President to issue Administrative Order No.
298, creating an investigative committee to look into the
administrative charges filed against the employees of the
Department of Health for the anomalous purchase of
medicines was upheld.

Petitioner Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a

public office and not merely an adjunct body of the Office of
the President. Petitioners-legislators argue that the creation of
a public office lies within the province of Congress and not with
the executive branch of government. They maintain that the
delegated authority of the President to reorganize under
Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code: 1) does not
permit the President to create a public office, much less a truth
commission; 2) is limited to the reorganization of the
administrative structure of the Office of the President; 3) is
limited to the restructuring of the internal organs of the Office
of the President Proper, transfer of functions and transfer of
agencies; and 4) only to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency. Such continuing authority of the President to
reorganize his office is limited, and by issuing Executive Order
No. 1, the President overstepped the limits of this delegated
authority.
The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative
about the creation by the President of a fact-finding body such
as a truth commission. Pointing to numerous offices created by
past presidents, it argues that the authority of the President to
create public offices within the Office of the President Proper
has long been recognized. The OSG also cites the recent case
of Banda v. Ermita, where it was held that the President has
the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the
executive department in line with his constitutionally granted
power of control and by virtue of a valid delegation of the
legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing
statutes. Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control
necessarily includes the power to create offices.
Court rules that the creation of the PTC is not justified by the
Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the power to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the
power of control is entirely different from the power to create
public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while
the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from
Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
It also does not find basis in the Section 31 of the Revised
Administrative Code as the power to reorganize does not
mention the creation of any office.
However the creation of the PTC finds justification under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the

executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.

Whether it transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate

funds? - NO
Suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an
allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated
as it will be sourced from the Office of the President.
Whether it falls within the investigative power of the President?
- YES
The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that
laws are faithfully executed is well recognized. It flows from the
faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII,
Section 17 thereof. Invoking this authority, the President
constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and
corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As
previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested
in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who
come before it. It is merely a fact finding body and will not
supplant the Ombudsman or DOJ or erode their respective
powers. The recommendation to prosecute is but a
consequence of the overall task of the commission to conduct
a fact-finding investigation."The actual prosecution of
suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of
the charges against them, is certainly not a function given to
the commission.
Whether it violates equal protection clause? YES
Article 3, Section 1 (Bill of Rights) refers to the equal protection
clause. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the
concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends
the requirements of justice and fair play. "According to a long
line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." This
things similarly situated would comprise a class and for a class

to be valid, it has to pass the reasonableness test. Said test

has four requisites:

Motion for Leave to Intervene and for Reconsideration of a

Division of the Supreme Court

The test has four requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions
(2) It is germane to the purpose of the law
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

Facts:
Petitioners, in a petition for mandamus, sought to compel
Manila Mayor Atienza to implement Ordinance 8027, which
reclassifies the area of the Pandacan oil depots from Industrial
II to Commercial I. This means that the oil depots and
terminals have to cease and desist from their operations, and
relocate somewhere else.

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1

should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission
is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported
cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration" only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.
The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1
chooses to limit the scope of the intended investigation to the
previous administration only. The OSG ventures to opine that
"to include other past administrations, at this point, may
unnecessarily overburden the commission and lead it to lose
its effectiveness."89 The reason given is specious. It is without
doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble objective of the
PTC to stamp out or "end corruption and the evil it breeds."
The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth,
must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC
must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past
administrations. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it
should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being
unconstitutional.
It must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but
just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness
which the equal protection clause cannot sanction.
Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth
commission as nobly envisioned by the present administration.
Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance so as to include
the earlier past administrations would allow it to pass the test
of reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution.
HELD:
Petiton Granted. EO No. 1 declared unconstitutional.
iii.
Delegation to local governments
Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr. Corona, J.
February 13, 2008
Petitioners: Social Justice Society, Vladimir Alarique T.
Cabugao and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon
Respondent: Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as Mayor of the City of
Manila
Movants-Intervenors: Chevron, Shell, Petron, (oil companies)
and the Department of Energy

The rationale for Ordinance 8027 is that the Pandacan oil

depots, being 1) open and unguarded; 2) situated near
densely-populated residential areas; and 3) only 2km from
Malacanang Palace, is susceptible to terrorist attacks,
especially since the nature of their product is extremely
flammable, violently explosive, and capable of 'frightening
conflagration.' Thus, for reasons of public safety and national
security, the oil depots and terminals were ordered to relocate
to another place.
The petition for mandamus was granted on March 7, 2007.
The basis of such is that the Local Government code imposes
upon Mayor Atienza the ministerial duty to 'enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the governance of the city.
Apparently, before the decision was rendered, other things
were happening. Note: the Court does not know that these
things were happening during the course of the case.
In 2003, the oil companies sought to nullify Ordinance 8027,
with Chevron and Shell successfully acquiring writs of
prohibitory and mandatory injunction from Manila RTC Branch
39. Petron, on the other hand, obtained a status quo ante
order.
In 2006, the City of Manila, through its Sangguniang
Panlungsod, enacted Ordinance 8119, or the Manila
Comprehensive Land Use and Zoning Ordinance of 2006.
Ordinance 8119 reclassifies the Pandacan oil depot area to
High Density Residential/Mixed Commercial Use.
The oil companies sought once more to nullify Ordinance
8119, this time from Manila RTC Branch 20. Petron was able
to acquire a TRO. In 2007, the oil companies' joint motion to
withdraw their complaint against Ordinance 8027 was granted.
They filed the motion to review because, Mayor Atienza
allegedly said, in his answer to the complaint against
Ordinance 8119, that Ordinance 8119 was intended to replace
Ordinance 8027.
The moving-intervening oil companies, asked to intervene in
reconsideration, on the grounds that they have a right to their
property, and that they have invested billions of pesos on the
construction of their facilities. They raise the following issues:

a. Mayor Atienza did not implement Ordinance 8027 because

of neglect, but because he was legally impeded by the writs of
injunction and the status quo ante order
b. Ordinance 8027 was repealed by Ordinance 8119 through
its repealing clause
c. Ordinance 8027 is unfair and oppressive, as it prevents
them from conducting business in Manila, despite the fact that
they have invested billions of pesos in the construction of their
oil depots
d. Ordinance 8027 is partial and unjust because of the many
commercial and residential building in the Pandacan area, they
were singled out and prohibited from doing business
e. Ordinance 8027 violates Sec. 5(c), RA 7638 (DOE Charter)
and Sec. 7 of RA 8479 (Downstreaming Oil Industry
Deregulation Law) (see notes for full provisions)
f. Ordinance 8027 failed to comply with Sec. 3 of EO 7924
(MMDA Charter) and Sec. 15 of its IRR, and Sec. 1, pars. (c),
(e), (f), and (g), EO 72 (Guidelines for CLUPs of Local
Governments under the LGC) (see notes for full provisions)
The Department of Energy, on the other hand, avers that
Ordinance 8027 intrudes into their control and of the energy
industry. Also, they are intervening for the general public,
whose welfare will be adversely affected by the relocation of
the Pandacan oil depots.
Issues+Ratio:
Before we discuss the issues and their explanation, let's just
make it clear that the Court is not happy that the oil companies
and the DOE intervened just now, even if they knew the
existence of the case, bringing up all these issues that have
never been brought up before.
1. WON the oil companies and the DOE should be allowed to
intervene - YES
For parties to be allowed to intervene, four requisites must be
met:
a. Legal intent
i. in the matter in controversy; or
ii. in the success of either party; or
iii. against both parties; or
iv. person will be adversely affected by a distribution or
disposition of property
b. Intervention must not prejudice the adjudication of the rights
of the parties involved
c. Intervenor's rights may not be fully protected in a separate
proceeding
d. Intervention must be done before the promulgation of the
ruling of the trial court.
The oil companies and DOE did not meet the (d), but
transcendental importance and substantial justice things, so go
lang, intervene lang.
2. WON the writs of injunction are legal impediments to the
implementation of Ordinance 8027 - NO

Firstly, the writs of injunction of Chevron+Shell and the status

quo ante order of Petron on Ordinance 8027 are not anymore
valid, as they are deemed terminated when their joint motion
for withdrawal of their complaints against Ordinance 8027 was
granted.
The TRO was mentioned in the answer of respondent Mayor
Atienza, but the Court assumed that it had lapsed, since an
RTC-issued TRO lasts for only 20 days.
Nevertheless, the Court deems is necessary to rule whether
the injunctions were legal impediments to the implementation
of Ordinance 8027.
In order for an injunction against a legislative act to be valid,
two criteria must be met:
a. there must a prima facie right that was prima facie violated,
and
b. the must be clear and convincing proof of the
unconstitutionality of the act.
RTC Judge Ros, in his decision to grant the injunctions,
mentions grounds that only meet the first criterion. He does not
say anything about the unconstitutionality of 8027, nor the
proofs of so. The second criterion is important, as the acts of
any legislative body are presumed to be valid and
constitutional, and there just be clear and convincing proof to
overcome such presumption. Thus, since the second criterion
was not met, the prohibitory and mandatory injunctions are
deemed invalid.
3. WON Ordinance 8027 was superseded/replaced by
Ordinance 8119 - NO
Petitioners claim that Mayor Atienza is estopped from denying
that 8027 superseded/replaced 8027, as he admitted in his
answer against the case against 8119 that 8119 was intended
to replace 8017. Petitioners claim that this should be covered
by Rule on Judicial Admissions (Rule 129, Section 4, Rules of
Court) which states:
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course
of he proceedings in the same case, does not require proof.
xxx
But the rule only applies for the same case. The SC states that
the case at bar is not the same case as the complaint against
8119.
3.1. WON Ordinance 8027 was impliedly repealed by
Ordinance 8119 - NO
There are two kind of implied repeal:
a. When a legislation is in complete contradiction to another
law. In this case, the more current law impliedly repeals the
older law.
b. When a legislation is clearly intended as a substitute to
another law. As implied repeals are not favored, the intent of
the legislators to repeal the former law must be manifest

In the case at bar, there is no contradiction between 8027 and

8119, as they are not inconsistent with each other.

8119The lawful method, is the enaction of a zoning ordinance that

is wellthin the power of the city of Manila to enact

8027
Reclassifies Pandacan oil
depot area from Industrial
II to Commercial I
Compels oil companies
to vacate the area in 6
months

Sanggunian has the power to protect and ensure the safety of

of their constituents. There can be no doubt that protection
from a terrorist attack a legitimate cause to protect the
residents near the Pandacan oil depot area.

Reclassified Pandacan oil depot area to High-Density Residential/Mixed Use Zone

Thus,
8027 is
valid exercise
of police power.
(R-3/MXD), which means that it shall be used
primarily
forahigh-rise
housing/dwelling
purposes and limited complementary/supplementary trade, services, and business
b. WON Ordinance 8027 is unfair and oppressive - NO
activities
Petitioners are not prevented from conducting operations in
Manila,
as claimed by respondents; rather, they are prevented
Phase out of non-conforming land use in seven
years
from conducting operations only in tha Pandacan area.
Also, since there is a valid exercise of police power, the
condemnation of property
that is awhich
danger to public safety is
Designates the area as a Planned Unit Development/Overlay
Zone (O-PUD),
compensable. Besides, the poerpeties still belong to the oil
means that there is flexibility in planning andnot
design
companies - they just cannot operate them.

There was also express intent on the part of the framers of the
law to keep both 8027 and 8119 in effect, as shown by the
following statement from Member Garcia, taken from the
minutes of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, during the first
reading of 8119:
xxx So wala po kaming binago na taliwas o nailagay na taliwas
doon sa ordinansang ipinasa ninyo (referring to 8119), ni-lift
lang po [yung definitions] from Ordinance 8027
In addition, 8027 is a special law, reclassifying the Pandacan
oil depot area specifically, while 8119 is a general law that
states the land use plan for all of Manila. Generalia specialibus
non derogant - a general law does not nullify a specific/special
law.
Thus, 8027 was NOT impliedly repealed by 8119.
4. WON Ordinance 8027 is constitutional and valid - YES
For an ordinance to be valid, it must conform to the following
substantive requirements:
a. it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
b. it must not be unfair or oppressive;
c. it must not be partial or discriminatory;
d. it must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
e. must be general and consistent with public policy; and
f. must not be unreasonable
a, e, f. WON Ordinance 8027 is a valid exercise of police
power - YES
For an exercise of police power to be valid, there must be a
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
The lawful subject here is the protection of the areas around
the Pandancan oil depots from possible terrorist attacks, taking
into account 9/11 and the vulnerability of the position of the oil
depots. Under the general welfare clause of the LGC, the

c. WON Ordinance 8027 is partial and discriminatory - NO

There are four requisites for a valid classification:
a. A classification must rest on substantial distinctions
b. It must be germane to the purpose of the law
c. It must not be limited to existing conditions only
d. It must apply equally to all members of the same class
For a: The Pandacan oil depots are a potential terrorist target
that may bring catastrophic devastation. The surrounding
areas are not
For b: Stopping operations will remove the threat they pose.
For c: This applies to future conditions as well.
For d: 8027 is applicable to all the businesses and industries
in the area delineated.
Thus, 8027 provides a reasonable classification.
a, WON Ordinance 8027 violates Sec. 5(c), RA 7638
(Department of Energy Charter) and Sec. 7 of RA 8479
(Downstreaming Oil Industry Deregulation Law) - NO
Sec. 5(c), RA 7638
a.
a. WON Ordinance 8027 failed to comply with Sec. 3 of EO
7924 (MMDA Charter) and Sec. 15 of its IRR, and Sec. 1,
pars. (c), (e), (f), and (g), EO 72 (Guidelines for CLUPs of
Local Governments under the LGC) - NO
All cited provisions govern comprehensive land use plans
(CLUPs). 8027 is not a CLUP. 8119 is a CLUP, but movantsintervenors have not presented evidence that 8119 did not
follow the procedures mandated in the aforementioned
provisions.
Held:

Motions to intervene granted. Motions for reconsideration

denied. RTC of Manila ordered to dismiss complaints against
Ordinance 8119. Mayor Atienza still ordered to enforce
Ordinance 8027. Oil companies given 90 days to present a
comprehensive plan and relocation schedule of their facilities.
Notes:
Delegation of power to carry out defined policy according
to prescribed standards
Osmena v. Orbos (1993) Narvasa, CJ.
Original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in the Supreme
Court
FACTS:

1984, President Marcos issued PD 1956 creating a

Special Account in the General Fund, designated as
the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF)
designed to reimburse oil companies for cost
increases resulting in crude oil and imported
petroleum products resulting from exchange
rate adjustments and from increases in the
world market prices of crude oil
subsequently, OPSF was reclassified, by EO 1024,
into a trust liability account
EO 137 by President Aquino expanded the grounds
for reimbursement to possible cost underrecovery
incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic
prices of petroleum products
Petition alleges that in 1991, Terminal Fund Balance
deficit was at P12.877 billion, and to abate the
worsening deficit, Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)
approved the increase in pump prices, and that
respondents are poised to accept, process and pay
claims not authorized under PD 1956
Petitioner claims that there is a violation of Sec 29(3),
Article VI of the Constitution
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for
a special purpose shall be treated as a
special fund and paid out for such purpose
only. If the purpose for which a special fund
was created has been fulfilled or abandoned,
the balance, if any, shall be transferred to
the general funds of the Government.
Petitioner claims that there is violation of Sec 28(2),
Article VI of the Constitution
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the
President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as
it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework

of the national development program of the

Government.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the OPSF is acting in a pure exercise of
taxing power.
a.
NO
2. Whether the OPSF is acting with valid delegation of
legislative authority.
.
YES (for the most part)
3. Whether OPSF is reimbursing only the proper
charges set out in its enacted purpose.
.
NO
RATIO:
1. OPSF is using the exercise of police power more than
taxing power
a.
has been said before that tax can be an instrument of
police power if purpose is for regulation
i.
From Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank: The tax
collected is not a pure exercise of the taxing power. It is levied
with a regulatory purpose, to provide a means for the
stabilization of the sugar industry. The levy is primarily in the
exercise of the police power of the State
b.
As far as the special fund contention
.
that the OPSF is a special fund is implied from the
special treatment given it by EO 137
1. It is segregated from the
general fund, and while it
is placed in a trust liability
account the fund
nonetheless remains
subject to the scrutiny and
review of the COA
c.
OPSF acts as a buffer mechanism through which the
domestic consumer prices of oil and petroleum products are
stabilized
2. OPSF is acting with valid delegation of power
.
The provision conferring the authority upon the ERB
to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides
a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised
a.
For a valid delegation of power, must be:
.
Complete in itself
1. must set forth the policy to
be executed by the
delegate
i.
Must fix a standard
1. limits of which are
sufficiently determinable or
determinate, to which the
delegate must conform
b.
Purpose of OPSF is to protect the general public and
the petroleum industry from the adverse consequences of
pump rate fluctuations

3. OPSF has been reimbursing some charges not

contemplated in its purpose
.
Principle of ejusdem generis
.
The rule states that where words follow an
enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and
specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed
in their widest extent, but are held to be as applying only to
persons or things of the same kind or class as those
specifically mentioned
a.
explicitly allows the cost underrecovery only if such
were incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of
petroleum products
.
Thus, the reimbursement of financing charges is not
authorized by paragraph 2 of Sec 8 of PD 1956, for the reason
that they were not incurred as a result of the reduction of
domestic prices of petroleum products
RULING:
WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED insofar as it prays for
the nullification of the reimbursement of financing charges,
paid pursuant to EO 137, and DISMISSED in all other
respects.
NOTES:

Sec 29(3), Article VI of the Constitution

(3) All money collected on any tax levied for
a special purpose shall be treated as a
special fund and paid out for such purpose
only. If the purpose for which a special fund
was created has been fulfilled or abandoned,
the balance, if any, shall be transferred to
the general funds of the Government.
Sec 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the
President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as
it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework
of the national development program of the
Government.

Legislative Investigations
Arnault v. Nazareno 87 Phil 29
July 18, 1950
Ozaeta, J.:
Facts:
1. The controversy arose out of the Governments purchase of
2 estates. Petitioner was the attorney in-fact of Ernest H. Burt
in the negotiations for the purchase of the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estates by the Government of the Philippines. The
purchase was effected and the price paid for both estates was

P5,000,000. The Senate adopted Resolution No. 8 creating a

Special Committee to determine the validity of the purchase
and whether the price paid was fair and just. During the said
Senate investigation, petitioner was asked to whom a part of
the purchase price, or P440,000, was delivered. Petitioner
refused to answer this question, hence the Committee cited
him in contempt for contumacious acts and ordered his
commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the
Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison he
reveals to the Senate or to the Special Committee the name of
the person who received the P440,000 and to answer
questions pertinent thereto.
2. It turned out that the Government did not have to pay a
single centavo for the Tambobong Estate as it was already
practically owned by virtue of a deed of sale from the
Philippine Trust Company and by virtue of the recession of the
contract through which Ernest H. Burt had an interest in the
estate. An intriguing question which the committee sought to
resolve was that involved in the apparent irregularity of the
Government's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for
his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which
he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October,
1949. The committee sought to determine who were
responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the
expense of the Government.
3. Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating
P1,500,000 were delivered to him; and that on the same
occasion he draw on said account two checks; one for
P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the
Associated Agencies, Inc., with PNB, and another for
P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.
4. Hence, this petition on following grounds:
a) Petitioner contends that the Senate has no power to punish
him for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person
to whom he gave the P440,000, because such information is
immaterial to, and will not serve, any intended or purported
legislation and his refusal to answer the question has not
embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process.
b) Petitioner contended that the Senate lacks authority to
commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of
legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950.
c)Also contended that he would incriminate himself if he should
reveal the name of the person
ISSUES:
1. WON the Senate has no power to punish Arnault for
contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to
whom he gave the P440,000
2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit Arnault for
contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session,
which ended on May 18, 1950
3. WON the privilege against self incrimination protects the
petitioner from being questioned
RATIO:
1. Yes. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be
within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make,
the investigating committee has the power to require
a witness to answer any question pertinent to that

inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right

against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the
jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be
material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it
vested by the Constitution, and every question which
the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to
answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of
the inquiry or investigation. The power of the Court is
limited to determining whether the legislative body
has jurisdiction to institute the inquiry or investigation.
This Court cannot control the exercise of that
jurisdiction; and it is insinuated, that the ruling of the
Senate on the materiality of the question propounded
to the witness is not subject to review by this Court
under the principle of the separation of power.
2. NO. The Senate of the Philippines is a continuing
body. Theres no reason to limit the power of the
legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of
every session and not to the end of the last session
terminating the existence of that body. The very
reason for the exercise of the power to punish for
contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform
its constitutional function without impediment or
obstruction. To deny to such committees the power of
inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat
the very purpose for which that the power is
recognized in the legislative body as an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. The
Senate, which is a continuing body, does not cease to
exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress
or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit
as to time to the Senates power to punish for
contempt in cases where that power may
constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
3. NO. The Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness
to the important question, which is the name of that person to
whom witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His
insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should
reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily
implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable
that he gave P440,000 to a person to him unknown.
Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to
a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming
that a refusal to testify would be so punishable. Since
according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and
that he gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt in
compliance with the latters verbal instruction, Court found no
basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name
Arnault v. Balagtas Labrador, J
July 30, 1955
Petitioner and appellee: Jean L. Arnault (siya yung nanalo sa
RTC)
Respondents and appellants: Eustaquio Balagtas, Director
of Prisons
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Pasay City

Summary of Proceedings:
RTC - Detention and confinement of Arnault by Senate illegal
Facts:
- May 15, 1950 - Arnault imprisoned for contempt by
Resolution 17 because he did not want to divulge the identity
of the person to whom he gave Php440 000, which was
payment for the sale of Buenavista and Tambobong Estate
(BTE).
Flashback:
- Arnault was the attorney in fact of Ernest Burt, owner of BTE.
- BTE sold to govt, Senate wants to know if the deal was
'honest, valid, and proper,' and if the price was 'fair and just.'
- Arnault asked to whom he gave the Php440 000
- Arnault did not want to talk so he was imprisoned.
Moving on:
- December 1951 - Arnault executes an affidavit, saying that
he gave the money to Jess D. Santos
- Senate calls Arnault back to ask him about Jess D. Santos
- November 6, 1952 - Senate issues Resolution 114, which
basically states that they did not believe Arnault, and that he
should remain in prison because of his 'insolent and
contumacious defiance of the legitimate authority of the
Senate,' which renders him 'unworthy of mercy.' Thus, he has
not purged himself of the contempt.
- Arnault was not happy, he filed a habeas corpus case in the
RTC and WON
Arnault's arguments:
- the maximum penalty for contempt of 6 mos. arresto mayor
has been servedl therefore, he must be released.
- He has purged himself of the charges by disclosing that he
gave the money to Jess D. Santos
- Senate is not justified in saying that he lied
- the legislative purpose has been accomplished; thus, Arnault
must be released
Issues:
1. WON the Senate believed Arnault - NO
2. WON the Senate's disbelief justifies the continued detention
of Arnault - YES
3. WON maximum penalty for arresto mayor has been
exceeded - NO
Ratio:
1. It is clear that the Senate did not believe Arnault and the
RTC committed the error of assuming that it has the power to
reveiw the findings of the Senate.
The legislature is given a wide discretion in exercising the
prerogatives of legislation, and the judiciary cannot interfere in
the said process, as such would be tantamount to the violation
of separation of powers.

The only thing that the Court can guarantee Arnault is that due
process be accorded to him. In this case, it was, so the duty of
the Court is done.
2. The Senate has the power to detain a witness for contempt
if he refuses to answer a question ertinent to legislative inquiry
by reason of its coercive power. The requirement is that such
act obstructs the legislature from the performance of its duties.
As long as the act done is committed in the course of the
legislative process, the legislature's authority and its course of
action should be supreme.
Petitioner Arnault was found by the Senate to have withheld
the identity of the receiver of the Php440 000 arrogantly and
contumaciously. The Court cannot question such finding. Thus,
he cannot be released on account of a false statement as this
is a repetition of the contempt that he committed when he was
first imprisoned. He cannot purge himself from contempt by
committing contempt again.
3. Res. 114 was passed on November 6, 1952. Arnault's
petition was submitted on March 3, 1953. That's 5 months, not
6 months. So penalty has not yet been exceeded.
Held:
RTC decision reversed. Order to allow petitioner to give bail
null and void. Petitioner re-committed to custody of respondent
Director of Prisons
Notes:
Res. 114 if considered coercive; thus, it is improper for the
courts to declare the continued imprisonment of Arnault as
abuse of legislative power,
Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (1991) Padilla,
J.
Petition for prohibtion to review the decision of the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee
FACTS:

Petition to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon

Committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and
present evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of
the equity of Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez to the
Lopa Group in 36 or 39 corporations
On July 30, 1987, RP, represented by the PCGG,
assisted by the Sol Gen, filed with the Sandiganbayan
Civil Case No. 0035 entitled Republic of the
Philippines vs. Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez, et al.
for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution
and damages
NB: many different issues in this separate
case, however, not really relevant to this
case at hand

On Sept 13, 1988, Senate Minority Floor Leader,

Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech on a matter of
personal privelege
The matter was referred by the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, which started its investigation and
subpoenaed the petitioners and Ricardo Lopa to
appear before it and testify on what they know
regarding the sale of 36 corporations belonging to
Benjamin Romualdez

ISSUE:

Whether the Blue Ribbon Investigation is permissible.

NO

RATIO:

No, the Blue Ribbon Investigation cannot be allowed

The Court is thus of the considered view that
it has jurisdiction over the present
controversy for the purpose of determining
the scope and extent of the power of the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct
inquiries into private affirs in purported aid of
legislation.
The power of both houses of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation is not, therefore,
absolute or unlimited.
As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon
Nazareno, et al., 16 the inquiry, to
be within the jurisdiction of the
legislative body making it, must be
material or necessary to the
exervise of a power in it vested by
the Constitution, such as to
legislate or to expel a member.
A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile
reveals that he (Senator Enrile) made a
statement which was published in various
newspapers on 2 September 1988 accusing
Mr. Ricardo "Baby" Lopa of "having taken
over the FMMC Group of Companies." As a
consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote a letter
to Senator Enrile on 4 September 1988
categorically denying that he had "taken over
" the FMMC Group of Companiesrepeated
allegations of a "takeover" on his (Lopa's)
part of FMMC are baseless as they are
malicious.
The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile,
during the session of the Senate on 13

September 1988, to avail of the privilege

hour, where he said that:
management officials assured him
that relatives of the President of the
Philippines were personally
discussing and representing
SOLOIL so that the order of
sequestration would be lifted and
that the new owner was Mr. Ricardo
A. Lopa.
and that the new owner is now Mr.
Ricardo Lopa who according to
them, is the brother-in-law of the
President. They even went further
by telling us that even Peping
Cojuangco who we know is the
brother of her excellency is also
interested in the ownership and
management of SOLOIL.
Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile
contained no suggestion of contemplated
legislation; he merely called upon the Senate
to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of
RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act."
There appears to be, therefore, no
intended legislation involved
The Court is also not impressed with the
respondent Committee's argument that the
questioned inquiry is to be conducted
pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212
introduced by Senator Jose D. Lina, the
purpose of which is to look into the charges
against the PCGG
It cannot, however, be said that the
contemplated inquiry on the subject
of the privilege speech of Senator
Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged
sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to
be conducted pursuant to Senate
Resolution No. 212 because, firstly,
Senator Enrile did not indict the
PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr.
Ricardo Lopa nor the herein
petitioners are connected with the
government but are private citizens.
the contemplated inquiry by respondent
Committee is not really "in aid of legislation"
because it is not related to a purpose within
the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of
the investigation is to find out whether or not
the ralatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo
Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019,
the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a
matter that appears more within the province

of the courts rather than of the legislature.

Besides, the Court may take judicial notice
that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the
pendency of this case.
In John T. Watkins vs. United States, 20 it
was held held:
But broad asis this power of inquiry, it is not
unlimited. There is no general authority to
expose the private affairs ofindividuals
without justification in terms of the functions
of congress. No inquiry is an end in itself; it
must be related to and in furtherance of a
legitimate task of Congress. Investigations
conducted
soly
for
the
personal
aggrandizement of the investigators or to
"punish" those investigated are indefensible.
the issue sought to be investigated by the
respondent Commitee is one over which
jurisdiction had been acquired by the
Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue had been
pre-empted by that court.
We cannot simply assume, that every
congressional investigation is justified by a
public need that over-balances any private
rights affected.
One of the basic rights guaranteed
by the Constitution to an individual
is the right against selfincrimination. 24 as the right to
remain completely silent may be
availed of by the accused in a
criminal case; but kit may be
invoked by other witnesses only as
questions are asked of them.
Moreover, this right of the accused is
extended to respondents in administrative
investigations but only if they partake of the
nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous
to a criminal proceeding
NB: since the inquiry is not a
crinimal proceeding or like it, being
without punishment, cannot be
completely silent, but this was of no
moment because of the dispositive
However, the Court decided the issue solely
on the basis of the inquiry being not in aid of
legislation, and therefore not allowable under
the legislative inquiry

RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED
NOTES:

Senate v. Executive Secretary

Senate v Executive Secretary (2006)
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari
and Prohibition.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN
M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate President, JUAN M.
FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore,
FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader,
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority
Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, COMPAERA
PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA
LOI EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.
LIM, M.A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMEA III, RALPH G.
RECTO, and MAR ROXAS - petitioners
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary
and alter ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and
anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of the
Philippines, respondents.
*among other consolidated petitions
FACTS
-Reports and scandals on the overpricing of the North Rail
Project and the Garci tape prompted the Senate to conduct a
public hearing and invited department heads and military
officials to speak before the investigating Senate committee.
However, Ermita and AFP Chief of Staff Senga and the
department heads said that they cannot attend due to pressing
matters of immediate attention
- On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464,
ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENCE TO THE RULE
ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE
RIGHTS
OF
PUBLIC
OFFICIALS
APPEARING
INLEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Purusant to Section 6 thereof, it took effect immediately
-EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it
infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct
investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight
functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE
WON EO 464 is constitutional CONSTITUTIONAL IN PART
RATIO
1.
Right to Information - A transparent government is
one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state; History has
been a witness to the fact that the power to withhold
information lends itself to abuse, hence, the necessity to guard
it zealously. A distinguished delegate to the U.S. Constitutional
Convention said: Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will
generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much
more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater
number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these
qualities will be diminished.
2.
Judicial Review - the power of judicial review is subject
to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or

controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the

person challenging the act must have standing to challenge
the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
3.
Locus Standi - The Senate, including its individual
members, has a substantial and direct interest over the
outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to assail
the constitutionality of E.O. 464; Indeed, legislators have
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are
allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action
which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.
Party-list representatives (like Bayan Muna, Anakpawis, and
Gabriela) likewise are allowed to sue to question the
constitutionality of E.O. 464, it being sufficient that a claim is
made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and
duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid
of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the
implementation of laws.
4.
EO 464 on Political Parties - The allegation that E.O.
464 hampers a political partys legislative agenda is vague
and uncertain, and at best is only generalized interest which
it shares with the rest of the political parties; Concrete injury,
whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of
a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally
capable of judicial resolution.
5.
Case or Controversy Requirement - E.O. 464 does not
require either deliberate withholding of consent or an
express prohibition issuing from the President in order to
bar officials from appearing before Congress. It would be a
sheer abandonment of duty if the Supreme Court would refrain
from passing on the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
6.
Authority to Inquire by the Congress - Congress has
authority to inquire into the operations of the executive
branch, and its power of inquiry extends to executive
officials who are the most familiar with and informed on
executive operations. As discussed in Arnault, the power of
inquiry, with process to enforce it, is grounded on the
necessity of information in the legislative process. If the
information possessed by executive officials on the operation
of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject,
by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that
information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.
7.
Executive Privilege - Even where the inquiry is in aid of
legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the
power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of
executive privilege.
Executive privilege has been defined as the power of the
Government to withhold information from the public, the
courts, and the Congress as well as the right of the
President and high-level executive branch officers to
withhold information from Congress, the courts, and
ultimately the public. On whether executive privilege may be

invoked - Executive privilege, whether asserted against

Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in
relation to certain types of information of a sensitive
character. While executive privilege is a constitutional
concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the
ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made.
Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are
exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact
of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary
character of the exemptions indicates that the
presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy
and in favor of disclosure.
8.
Question Hour - it is a period of confrontation initiated
by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other
ministers accountable for their acts and the operation of the
government, corresponding to what is known in Britain as the
question period.
In the 1973 Constitution, the appearance of ministers in a
question hour is mandatory. An essential feature of the
parliamentary system of government is the immediate
accountability of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to the
National Assembly. They shall be responsible to the National
Assembly for the program of government and shall determine
the guidelines of national policy. Unlike in the presidential
system where the tenure of office of all elected officials cannot
be terminated before their term expired, the Prime Minister and
the Cabinet remain in office only as long as they enjoy the
confidence of the National Assembly. The moment this
confidence is lost the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be
changed.
9.
On Mandatory nature of appearance by department
heads during question hour - The framers of the 1987
Constitution removed the mandatory nature of appearance
by department heads during the question hour in the present
Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of
separation of powers, but the need to enforce Congress
right to executive information in the performance of its
legislative function becomes more imperative.
10. EO. 464 in relation to Section 22 Article VI - Sections 21
and 22 of article VI should not be considered as pertaining to
the same power of Congress. Section 21 specifically relates to
the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim
of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation,
while Section 22 to the power to conduct a question hour,
the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress oversight function. Therefore, Congress right to
such information is not as imperative as that of the
President when Congress merely seeks to be informed on
how department heads are implementing the statutes
which it has issued, whereas for the President, as Chief
Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section
22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that
Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless,
when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance
is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is
mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault. In fine,

the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by

compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in
pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent
discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.
11. Section 1 of E.O. 464, in view of its specific reference to
Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of
any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be
construed as limited in its application to appearances of
department heads in the question hour contemplated in
said Section 22, but could not be applied to appearances of
department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation; The
requirement to secure presidential consent under Section
1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour,
is valid on its face.
12. Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials
enumerated in Section 2(b)to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
The enumeration is broad. It covers all senior officials of
executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP,
and all senior national security officials who, in the judgment of
the heads of offices designated in the same section (i.e.
department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP,
and the National Security Adviser), are covered by the
executive privilege The enumeration also includes such other
officers as may be determined by the President. Given the title
of Section 2 Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive
Privilege, it is evident that under the rule of ejusdem
generis, the determination by the President under this
provision is intended to be based on a similar finding of
coverage under executive privilege. En passant, the Court
notes that Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 virtually states that
executive privilege actually covers persons. Such is a
misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege, as discussed
above, is properly invoked in relation to specific
categories of information and not to categories of
persons. In light, however, of Sec. 2(a) of E.O. 464 which
deals with the nature, scope and coverage of executive
privilege, the reference to persons being covered by the
executive privilege may be read as an abbreviated way of
saying that the person is in possession of information which is,
in the judgment of the head of office concerned, privileged as
defined in Section 2(a). The Court shall thus proceed on the
assumption that this is the intention of the challenged order.
13. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, it is gathered
that certain information in the possession of the executive
may validly be claimed as privileged even against
Congress,
such
as
Presidential
conversations,
correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet
meetings, as it is rooted in the separation of powers
14. The implied claim authorized by Section 3 of E.O. 464 is
not accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis thereof
(e.g., whether the information demanded involves military or
diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.). While
Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are
covered by the privilege under the challenged order, Congress
is left to speculate as to which among them is being referred to

by the executive. The enumeration is not even intended to be

comprehensive, but a mere statement of what is included in
the phrase confidential or classified information between the
President and the public officers covered by this executive
order. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the
executive considers the requested information privileged.
15. The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in
relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not
asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and
certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464,
coupled with an announcement that the President has not
given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to
determine whether the withholding of information is justified
under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates
the power of inquiry of Congress. In fine, Section 3 and
Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.
16. No infirmity can be imputed to Section 2(a) of E.O. 464
as it merely provides guidelines, binding only on the heads
of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by
executive privilege.
17. Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides
that, once the head of office determines that a certain
information is privileged, such determination is presumed
to bear the Presidents authority and has the effect of
prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress,
subject only to the express pronouncement of the
President that it is allowing the appearance of such
official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize
claims of privilege by mere silence. Such presumptive
authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature
of the privilege. Executive privilege, as already discussed, is
recognized with respect to information the confidential nature
of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and
responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those instances
where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge
of highly important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of
executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain
informations must, as a matter of necessity, be kept
confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being,
by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose
information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of
such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in
enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
18. Delegation of Powers - In light of the highly exceptional
nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to
the President the power to invoke the privilege, though she
may authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege
on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must
state that the authority is By order of the President, which
means that he personally consulted with her.
19. one of the expressed purposes for requiring officials to
secure the consent of the President under Section 3 of E.O.
464 is to ensure respect for the rights of public officials
appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. That such rights
must indeed be respected by Congress is an echo from Article
VI Section 21 of the Constitution mandating that [t]he rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be

respected. In light of the above discussion of Section 3, it is

clear that it is essentially an authorization for implied
claims of executive privilege, for which reason it must be
invalidated. That such authorization is partly motivated by the
need to ensure respect for such officials does not change the
infirm nature of the authorization itself.
20. Right of people to information distinguished from
right to information - the demand of a citizen for the
production of documents pursuant to his right to information
does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces
tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to
information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from
government officials. These powers belong only to Congress
and not to an individual citizen. Thus, while Congress is
composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not
follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise
of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to
information.
21. Republicanism and Right to Information - What republican
theory did accomplish was to reverse the old presumption in
favor of secrecy, based on the divine right of kings and nobles,
and replace it with a presumption in favor of publicity, based on
the doctrine of popular sovereignty.
HELD
Sections 2(b) and 3 of EO 464 VOID; Sections 1 and 2(a)
VALID
NOTES
EO 464
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before
Congress. In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the
Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on
the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the
government, all heads of departments of the Executive
Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either House of
Congress. When the security of the State or the public interest
so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive
Privilege.
(a) Nature and Scope. The rule of confidentiality based on
executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of
government and rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May
1995, 244 SCRA 286). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall
not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially
known to them by reason of their office and not made available
to the public to prejudice the public interest. Executive privilege
covers all confidential or classified information between the
President and the public officers covered by this executive
order, including:
i. Conversations and correspondence between the President
and the public official covered by this executive order (Almonte
vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public

Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002, 384 SCRA

152);
ii. Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which
in the interest of national security should not be divulged
(Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez
v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No.
130716, 9 December 1998, 299 SCRA 744).
iii. Information between inter-government agencies prior to the
conclusion of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No.
130716, 9 December 1998, 299 SCRA 744);
iv. Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No.
130716, 9 December 1998, 299 SCRA 744);
v. Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez
v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002, 299
SCRA 744).
(b) Who are covered. The following are covered by this
executive order:
i. Senior officials of executive departments who in the
judgment of the department heads are covered by the
executive privilege;
ii. Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the
Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
iii. Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;
iv. Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the
National Security Adviser are covered by the executive
privilege; and
v. Such other officers as may be determined by the President.
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before
Congress.All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b)
hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to
appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the
observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence
to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of
public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Romero v. Estrada
Romero vs Estrada (April 2009) Velasco, Jr., J.
This is a petition for prohibition with application for
temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary
injunction.
Facts:
On August 15, 2006, petitioner Reghis Romero II, as owner of
R-II Builders, Inc., received from the Committee an invitation
signed by the Legislative Committee Secretary regarding the
liability of former president Ramos for plunder for the illegal
investment of Overseas Workers Welfare Administration
(OWWA) funds. The inquiry/investigation is intended to aid the

Senate in the review and possible amendments to the

pertinent provisions of R.A. 8042, the Migrant Workers Act".
The Congress is vested with the power to perform such under
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. On August 18,
2006, petitioner Romero II requested to be excused from
appearing and testifying before the Committee at its scheduled
hearings. On August 28, 2006, the Committee sent petitioner
Romero II a letter informing him that his request, being
unmeritorious, was denied. On August 30, 2006, petitioners
filed the instant petition seeking to bar the Committee from
continuing with its inquiry and to enjoin it from compelling
petitioners to appear before it pursuant to the invitations thus
issued. Petitioner failed to acquire a TRO so Romero II
appeared at the September 4, 2006 Committee investigation.
Two days after, petitioner Romero II filed a Manifestation with
Urgent Plea for a TRO. The manifestation was followed by the
filing on September 19, 2006 of another urgent motion for a
TRO in which petitioners imputed to the Committee the
intention to harass them. Petitioners in gist claim that: (1) the
subject matter of the investigation is sub judice owing to the
pendency of the Chavez petition; (2) since the investigation
has been intended to ascertain petitioners criminal liability for
plunder, it is not in aid of legislation; (3) the inquiry compelled
them to appear and testify in violation of their rights against
self-incrimination; and (4) unless the Court immediately issues
a TRO, some or all of petitioners would be in danger of being
arrested, detained, and forced to give testimony against their
will. The respondents likewise raised the following main
arguments: (1) the proposed resolutions were a proper subject
of legislative inquiry; and (2) petitioners right against selfincrimination was well-protected and could be invoked when
incriminating questions were propounded.
Issues:
WON the subject matter is sub judice -NO
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue,
influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of
justice. It is a traditional conviction of civilized society
everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of
fact and law should be immune from every extraneous
influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence
produced
in court; and that the determination of such facts should be
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.
WON Senate can require petitioners to attend hearings for
inquiry/investigation -YES
So long as the constitutional rights of witnesses will be
respected by respondent Senate Committees, it is their duty to
cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the facts needed
for intelligent legislative action.
WON the inquiry violates their right against selfincrimination -NO
This may be invoked only when the incriminating question is
being asked, since they have no way of knowing in advance

the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of them.

Therefore, it is not a ground to deny the Senate inquiry.
Held:
The petition is DENIED.
Notes:
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected.
Concur in Treaties

1.

2.
3.

1.

Sombilon v. Romulo (aka Nicolas v. Romulo)

Nicolas v. Romulo (2009) Azcuna, J.
Petition for CERTIORARI of the CA decision
Facts:
US Soldier Daniel Smith was charged with the rape of
petitioner Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon.
o Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA), the US, upon request, was granted
custody of Smith pending the proceedings.
o During the trial, US complied with its
agreement to bring Smith to the trial court
every time his presence was required.
In finding Smith guilty of the crime charged, the Court held
that pursuant to the VFA, he shall serve his sentence in the
facilities that shall be agreed upon by appropriate Philippine
and US authorities. Smith is hereby temporarily committed to
the Makati City Jail, pending agreement on such facilities.
Weeks later, Smith was transferred to a facility for detention
in the US embassy (under the control of the US government),
as provided for under the Romulo-Kenny Agreement entered
into by the Philippines and the US.
The matter was brought before the CA, which dismissed the
petition for having become moot.
Issues:
WON the presence of US Armed Forces in Philippine territory
pursuant to the VFA is allowed under a treaty (a) duly
concurred in by the Senate and (b) recognized as a treaty by
the other contracting state, by virtue of Art XVIII Sec. 25. YES
WON the transfer of custody of Smith, pursuant to the
Romulo-Kennedy Agreements, is allowed under the VFA. NO
WON the VFA is enforceable in the US as domestic law, either
because (a) it is self-executory or because (b) there exists
legislation, in view of Medellin v. Texas
In Medellin v. Texas, the US SC held that treaties
entered into by the US are not automatically part
of their domestic law unless these treaties are
self-executing or there is an implementing
legislation to make them enforceable
Ratio:
As held in Bayan v. Zamora, the VFA was (a) duly concurred
in by the Senate and (b) has been recognized as a treaty by

the US as attested and certified by the duly authorized

representative of the US government.
In US law, agreements that are policymaking in
nature are submitted to the senate for its advice
and consent. Those that carry out or further
implement these policymaking agreements are
merely submitted to Congress under the
provisions of the Case-Zablocki Act within 60
from ratification.
The VFA (which provides for joint RP-US military
exercises) is merely an implementing agreement
of the earlier RP-US Mutual Defense treaty
concurred in by the Philippine and US Senate.
Therefore, it was not necessary to submit the
VFA to the US senate, but merely to the US
Congress under the Case-Zablocki Act within 60
days of its ratification.
o It was not the framers intent do require
the other contracting state to convert
their system to achieve alignment and
parity with ours. It was simply required
that the treaty be recognized as a treaty
by the other contracting state.
2. The Romulo-Kennedy Agreements are not in accord with the
VFA itself. Art V Sec 10 of the VFA provides that the detention
(different from custody during trial) should be (a) by Philippine
authorities and (b) carried out in facilities agreed on by
authorities of both parties.
3. The VFA is enforceable in the US because:
(a) it is a self-executing agreement because the parties intend
its provisions to be enforceable. The VFA has been
implemented and executed, with the US complying with its
obligation to produce Smith during trial.
(b) the VFA is covered by implementing legislation, namely the
Case-Zablocki Act. Executive agreements registered under
which are immediately implemented.
(c) moreover, the RP-US mutual defense treaty was advised
and consented to by the US senate.
Held: Petitions partly granted and CA decision modified. VFA
is unconstitutional but Romulo-Kennedy Agreements are
declared not in accordance with the VFA.
Notes:
Art XVIII, Sec. 25 After the expiration in 1991 of the
Agreement between the Phil and the US concerning Military
bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate and when the Congress so
requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people
in a national referendum held for that purpose, and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state
Background of Art XVIII, Sec. 25
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, US ceded to the
Philippines all the territory acquired from Spain except naval
ports and/or military bases and facilities, which the US retained
for itself. The PH had no jurisdiction therein except to the
extent allowed by the US.

RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947 was never

advised for ratification by the US Senate, a disparity in
treatment, because the Philippines regarded it as a treaty and
had it concurred in by out Senate
When the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the
territory covered by theses bases were finally ceded to the
Philippines.
Art XVIII Sec 25 is designed to ensure that any agreement
allowing the presence of foreign military bases, troops or
facilities in Philippine territory shall be equally binding on the
Philippines and the foreign sovereign State involved.
Requirements as to bills
i. as to title
Review BANAT Partylist v. COMELEC
BANAT vs COMELEC Carpio, J.
Petition for certiorari and mandamus
Facts:
On 27 June 2002, Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed a Petition to
Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution, before the National Board of
Canvassers (NBC). BANAT filed its petition because the
Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently
been quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty
bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is,
would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list
seats. There were no intervenors in BANATs petition before
the NBC. On May 14, 2007 elections included the elections for
the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted
15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List
System. On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC,
promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No.
07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the partylist elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY),
Bayan Muna, Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC),
Gabrielas Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine
Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens
Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party
(BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO),
Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono.
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing
the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. On 9 July 2007, Bayan
Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as
NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as
stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans
formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No.
7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC
denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the
NBC. Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations
proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed three
other party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one
guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural
Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP), Anak
Mindanao (AMIN), and An Waray.
Issue:

Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in

Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely
a ceiling?
It is a ceiling. The combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total
membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list.
Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional? -YES
Each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that
is, one qualifying and two additional seats. The additional
seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed
in proportion to their total number of votes." The three-seat
cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified
party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory
device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list
elections.
Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA
7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional? -NO
Only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the
total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to
have a seat in the House of Representatives. In computing the
additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent
threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in
the second clause of Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is
unconstitutional because the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of
available party list seats when the number of available party
list seats exceeds 50.
Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major
political parties be barred from participating in the party-list
elections? -NO BUT
The framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major
political parties to participate in party-list elections through their
sectoral wings. But by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to
continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political
parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or
indirectly.
Held:
The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. We SET
ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007
in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July
2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two
percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list
seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List
System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in
Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed
from participating in party-list elections. This Decision is
immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
Notes:
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,

and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the

number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated
to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law,
by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector.
Sections 11 and 12 of RA 7941:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the
following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least
two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List
Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for
the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis,
rank them according to the number of votes received and
allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to
the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization,
or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the
party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)
The Veterans Formula:
Number of seats available to legislative districts x .20 =
Number of seats available to party-list
.80

Legislative Investigations
Arnault v. Nazareno 87 Phil 29
July 18, 1950
Ozaeta, J.
Facts:
1. The controversy arose out of the Governments purchase of
2 estates. Petitioner was the attorney in-fact of Ernest H. Burt
in the negotiations for the purchase of the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estates by the Government of the Philippines. The
purchase was effected and the price paid for both estates was
P5,000,000. The Senate adopted Resolution No. 8 creating a
Special Committee to determine the validity of the purchase
and whether the price paid was fair and just. During the said

Senate investigation, petitioner was asked to whom a part of

the purchase price, or P440,000, was delivered. Petitioner
refused to answer this question, hence the Committee cited
him in contempt for contumacious acts and ordered his
commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the
Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison he
reveals to the Senate or to the Special Committee the name of
the person who received the P440,000 and to answer
questions pertinent thereto.
2. It turned out that the Government did not have to pay a
single centavo for the Tambobong Estate as it was already
practically owned by virtue of a deed of sale from the
Philippine Trust Company and by virtue of the recession of the
contract through which Ernest H. Burt had an interest in the
estate. An intriguing question which the committee sought to
resolve was that involved in the apparent irregularity of the
Government's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for
his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which
he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October,
1949. The committee sought to determine who were
responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the
expense of the Government.
3. Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating
P1,500,000 were delivered to him; and that on the same
occasion he draw on said account two checks; one for
P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the
Associated Agencies, Inc., with PNB, and another for
P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.
4. Hence, this petition on following grounds:
a) Petitioner contends that the Senate has no power to punish
him for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person
to whom he gave the P440,000, because such information is
immaterial to, and will not serve, any intended or purported
legislation and his refusal to answer the question has not
embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process.
b) Petitioner contended that the Senate lacks authority to
commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of
legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950.
c)Also contended that he would incriminate himself if he should
reveal the name of the person
ISSUES:
1. WON the Senate has no power to punish Arnault for
contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to
whom he gave the P440,000
2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit Arnault for
contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session,
which ended on May 18, 1950
3. WON the privilege against self incrimination protects the
petitioner from being questioned
RATIO:
1. Yes. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be
within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make,
the investigating committee has the power to require
a witness to answer any question pertinent to that
inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the
jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be

material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it

vested by the Constitution, and every question which
the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to
answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of
the inquiry or investigation. The power of the Court is
limited to determining whether the legislative body
has jurisdiction to institute the inquiry or investigation.
This Court cannot control the exercise of that
jurisdiction; and it is insinuated, that the ruling of the
Senate on the materiality of the question propounded
to the witness is not subject to review by this Court
under the principle of the separation of power.
2. NO. The Senate of the Philippines is a continuing
body. Theres no reason to limit the power of the
legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of
every session and not to the end of the last session
terminating the existence of that body. The very
reason for the exercise of the power to punish for
contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform
its constitutional function without impediment or
obstruction. To deny to such committees the power of
inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat
the very purpose for which that the power is
recognized in the legislative body as an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. The
Senate, which is a continuing body, does not cease to
exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress
or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit
as to time to the Senates power to punish for
contempt in cases where that power may
constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
3. NO. The Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness
to the important question, which is the name of that person to
whom witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His
insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should
reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily
implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable
that he gave P440,000 to a person to him unknown.
Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to
a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming
that a refusal to testify would be so punishable. Since
according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and
that he gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt in
compliance with the latters verbal instruction, Court found no
basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name
Arnault v. Balagtas Labrador, J
July 30, 1955
Petitioner and appellee: Jean L. Arnault (siya yung nanalo sa
RTC)
Respondents and appellants: Eustaquio Balagtas, Director
of Prisons
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Pasay City
Summary of Proceedings:
RTC - Detention and confinement of Arnault by Senate illegal

Facts:
- May 15, 1950 - Arnault imprisoned for contempt by
Resolution 17 because he did not want to divulge the identity
of the person to whom he gave Php440 000, which was
payment for the sale of Buenavista and Tambobong Estate
(BTE).
Flashback:
- Arnault was the attorney in fact of Ernest Burt, owner of BTE.
- BTE sold to govt, Senate wants to know if the deal was
'honest, valid, and proper,' and if the price was 'fair and just.'
- Arnault asked to whom he gave the Php440 000
- Arnault did not want to talk so he was imprisoned.
Moving on:
- December 1951 - Arnault executes an affidavit, saying that
he gave the money to Jess D. Santos
- Senate calls Arnault back to ask him about Jess D. Santos
- November 6, 1952 - Senate issues Resolution 114, which
basically states that they did not believe Arnault, and that he
should remain in prison because of his 'insolent and
contumacious defiance of the legitimate authority of the
Senate,' which renders him 'unworthy of mercy.' Thus, he has
not purged himself of the contempt.
- Arnault was not happy, he filed a habeas corpus case in the
RTC and WON
Arnault's arguments:
- the maximum penalty for contempt of 6 mos. arresto mayor
has been servedl therefore, he must be released.
- He has purged himself of the charges by disclosing that he
gave the money to Jess D. Santos
- Senate is not justified in saying that he lied
- the legislative purpose has been accomplished; thus, Arnault
must be released
Issues:
1. WON the Senate believed Arnault - NO
2. WON the Senate's disbelief justifies the continued detention
of Arnault - YES
3. WON maximum penalty for arresto mayor has been
exceeded - NO
Ratio:
1. It is clear that the Senate did not believe Arnault and the
RTC committed the error of assuming that it has the power to
reveiw the findings of the Senate.
The legislature is given a wide discretion in exercising the
prerogatives of legislation, and the judiciary cannot interfere in
the said process, as such would be tantamount to the violation
of separation of powers.
The only thing that the Court can guarantee Arnault is that due
process be accorded to him. In this case, it was, so the duty of
the Court is done.

2. The Senate has the power to detain a witness for contempt

if he refuses to answer a question ertinent to legislative inquiry
by reason of its coercive power. The requirement is that such
act obstructs the legislature from the performance of its duties.
As long as the act done is committed in the course of the
legislative process, the legislature's authority and its course of
action should be supreme.
Petitioner Arnault was found by the Senate to have withheld
the identity of the receiver of the Php440 000 arrogantly and
contumaciously. The Court cannot question such finding. Thus,
he cannot be released on account of a false statement as this
is a repetition of the contempt that he committed when he was
first imprisoned. He cannot purge himself from contempt by
committing contempt again.
3. Res. 114 was passed on November 6, 1952. Arnault's
petition was submitted on March 3, 1953. That's 5 months, not
6 months. So penalty has not yet been exceeded.
Held:
RTC decision reversed. Order to allow petitioner to give bail
null and void. Petitioner re-committed to custody of respondent
Director of Prisons
Notes:
Res. 114 if considered coercive; thus, it is improper for the
courts to declare the continued imprisonment of Arnault as
abuse of legislative power,
Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (1991) Padilla,
J.
Petition for prohibtion to review the decision of the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee
FACTS:

Petition to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon

Committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and
present evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of
the equity of Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez to the
Lopa Group in 36 or 39 corporations
On July 30, 1987, RP, represented by the PCGG,
assisted by the Sol Gen, filed with the Sandiganbayan
Civil Case No. 0035 entitled Republic of the
Philippines vs. Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez, et al.
for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution
and damages
NB: many different issues in this separate
case, however, not really relevant to this
case at hand
On Sept 13, 1988, Senate Minority Floor Leader,
Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech on a matter of
personal privelege

The matter was referred by the Senate Blue Ribbon

Committee, which started its investigation and
subpoenaed the petitioners and Ricardo Lopa to
appear before it and testify on what they know
regarding the sale of 36 corporations belonging to
Benjamin Romualdez

ISSUE:

Whether the Blue Ribbon Investigation is permissible.

NO

RATIO:

No, the Blue Ribbon Investigation cannot be allowed

The Court is thus of the considered view that
it has jurisdiction over the present
controversy for the purpose of determining
the scope and extent of the power of the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct
inquiries into private affirs in purported aid of
legislation.
The power of both houses of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation is not, therefore,
absolute or unlimited.
As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon
Nazareno, et al., 16 the inquiry, to
be within the jurisdiction of the
legislative body making it, must be
material or necessary to the
exervise of a power in it vested by
the Constitution, such as to
legislate or to expel a member.
A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile
reveals that he (Senator Enrile) made a
statement which was published in various
newspapers on 2 September 1988 accusing
Mr. Ricardo "Baby" Lopa of "having taken
over the FMMC Group of Companies." As a
consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote a letter
to Senator Enrile on 4 September 1988
categorically denying that he had "taken over
" the FMMC Group of Companiesrepeated
allegations of a "takeover" on his (Lopa's)
part of FMMC are baseless as they are
malicious.
The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile,
during the session of the Senate on 13
September 1988, to avail of the privilege
hour, where he said that:
management officials assured him
that relatives of the President of the
Philippines were personally
discussing and representing
SOLOIL so that the order of
sequestration would be lifted and

that the new owner was Mr. Ricardo

A. Lopa.
and that the new owner is now Mr.
Ricardo Lopa who according to
them, is the brother-in-law of the
President. They even went further
by telling us that even Peping
Cojuangco who we know is the
brother of her excellency is also
interested in the ownership and
management of SOLOIL.
Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile
contained no suggestion of contemplated
legislation; he merely called upon the Senate
to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of
RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act."
There appears to be, therefore, no
intended legislation involved
The Court is also not impressed with the
respondent Committee's argument that the
questioned inquiry is to be conducted
pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212
introduced by Senator Jose D. Lina, the
purpose of which is to look into the charges
against the PCGG
It cannot, however, be said that the
contemplated inquiry on the subject
of the privilege speech of Senator
Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged
sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to
be conducted pursuant to Senate
Resolution No. 212 because, firstly,
Senator Enrile did not indict the
PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr.
Ricardo Lopa nor the herein
petitioners are connected with the
government but are private citizens.
the contemplated inquiry by respondent
Committee is not really "in aid of legislation"
because it is not related to a purpose within
the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of
the investigation is to find out whether or not
the ralatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo
Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019,
the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a
matter that appears more within the province
of the courts rather than of the legislature.
Besides, the Court may take judicial notice
that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the
pendency of this case.
In John T. Watkins vs. United States, 20 it
was held held:
But broad asis this power of inquiry, it is not
unlimited. There is no general authority to

expose the private affairs ofindividuals

without justification in terms of the functions
of congress. No inquiry is an end in itself; it
must be related to and in furtherance of a
legitimate task of Congress. Investigations
conducted
soly
for
the
personal
aggrandizement of the investigators or to
"punish" those investigated are indefensible.
the issue sought to be investigated by the
respondent Commitee is one over which
jurisdiction had been acquired by the
Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue had been
pre-empted by that court.
We cannot simply assume, that every
congressional investigation is justified by a
public need that over-balances any private
rights affected.
One of the basic rights guaranteed
by the Constitution to an individual
is the right against selfincrimination. 24 as the right to
remain completely silent may be
availed of by the accused in a
criminal case; but kit may be
invoked by other witnesses only as
questions are asked of them.
Moreover, this right of the accused is
extended to respondents in administrative
investigations but only if they partake of the
nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous
to a criminal proceeding
NB: since the inquiry is not a
crinimal proceeding or like it, being
without punishment, cannot be
completely silent, but this was of no
moment because of the dispositive
However, the Court decided the issue solely
on the basis of the inquiry being not in aid of
legislation, and therefore not allowable under
the legislative inquiry

RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED
Senate v. Executive Secretary
Senate v Executive Secretary (2006)
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari
and Prohibition.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN
M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate President, JUAN M.
FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore,
FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader,
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority
Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, COMPAERA
PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA

LOI EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE,

RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.
LIM, M.A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMEA III, RALPH G.
RECTO, and MAR ROXAS - petitioners
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary
and alter ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and
anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of the
Philippines, respondents.
*among other consolidated petitions
FACTS
-Reports and scandals on the overpricing of the North Rail
Project and the Garci tape prompted the Senate to conduct a
public hearing and invited department heads and military
officials to speak before the investigating Senate committee.
However, Ermita and AFP Chief of Staff Senga and the
department heads said that they cannot attend due to pressing
matters of immediate attention
- On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464,
ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENCE TO THE RULE
ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE
RIGHTS
OF
PUBLIC
OFFICIALS
APPEARING
INLEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Purusant to Section 6 thereof, it took effect immediately
-EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it
infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct
investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight
functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE
WON EO 464 is constitutional CONSTITUTIONAL IN PART
RATIO
1.
Right to Information - A transparent government is
one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state; History has
been a witness to the fact that the power to withhold
information lends itself to abuse, hence, the necessity to guard
it zealously. A distinguished delegate to the U.S. Constitutional
Convention said: Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will
generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much
more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater
number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these
qualities will be diminished.
2.
Judicial Review - the power of judicial review is subject
to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have standing to challenge
the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
3.
Locus Standi - The Senate, including its individual
members, has a substantial and direct interest over the
outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to assail

the constitutionality of E.O. 464; Indeed, legislators have

standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are
allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action
which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.
Party-list representatives (like Bayan Muna, Anakpawis, and
Gabriela) likewise are allowed to sue to question the
constitutionality of E.O. 464, it being sufficient that a claim is
made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and
duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid
of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the
implementation of laws.
4.
EO 464 on Political Parties - The allegation that E.O.
464 hampers a political partys legislative agenda is vague
and uncertain, and at best is only generalized interest which
it shares with the rest of the political parties; Concrete injury,
whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of
a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally
capable of judicial resolution.
5.
Case or Controversy Requirement - E.O. 464 does not
require either deliberate withholding of consent or an
express prohibition issuing from the President in order to
bar officials from appearing before Congress. It would be a
sheer abandonment of duty if the Supreme Court would refrain
from passing on the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
6.
Authority to Inquire by the Congress - Congress has
authority to inquire into the operations of the executive
branch, and its power of inquiry extends to executive
officials who are the most familiar with and informed on
executive operations. As discussed in Arnault, the power of
inquiry, with process to enforce it, is grounded on the
necessity of information in the legislative process. If the
information possessed by executive officials on the operation
of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject,
by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that
information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.
7.
Executive Privilege - Even where the inquiry is in aid of
legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the
power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of
executive privilege.
Executive privilege has been defined as the power of the
Government to withhold information from the public, the
courts, and the Congress as well as the right of the
President and high-level executive branch officers to
withhold information from Congress, the courts, and
ultimately the public. On whether executive privilege may be
invoked - Executive privilege, whether asserted against
Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in
relation to certain types of information of a sensitive
character. While executive privilege is a constitutional
concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the
ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made.
Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are
exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact
of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary
character of the exemptions indicates that the

presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy

and in favor of disclosure.
8.
Question Hour - it is a period of confrontation initiated
by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other
ministers accountable for their acts and the operation of the
government, corresponding to what is known in Britain as the
question period.
In the 1973 Constitution, the appearance of ministers in a
question hour is mandatory. An essential feature of the
parliamentary system of government is the immediate
accountability of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to the
National Assembly. They shall be responsible to the National
Assembly for the program of government and shall determine
the guidelines of national policy. Unlike in the presidential
system where the tenure of office of all elected officials cannot
be terminated before their term expired, the Prime Minister and
the Cabinet remain in office only as long as they enjoy the
confidence of the National Assembly. The moment this
confidence is lost the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be
changed.
9.
On Mandatory nature of appearance by department
heads during question hour - The framers of the 1987
Constitution removed the mandatory nature of appearance
by department heads during the question hour in the present
Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of
separation of powers, but the need to enforce Congress
right to executive information in the performance of its
legislative function becomes more imperative.
10. EO. 464 in relation to Section 22 Article VI - Sections 21
and 22 of article VI should not be considered as pertaining to
the same power of Congress. Section 21 specifically relates to
the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim
of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation,
while Section 22 to the power to conduct a question hour,
the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress oversight function. Therefore, Congress right to
such information is not as imperative as that of the
President when Congress merely seeks to be informed on
how department heads are implementing the statutes
which it has issued, whereas for the President, as Chief
Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section
22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that
Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless,
when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance
is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is
mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault. In fine,
the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by
compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in
pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent
discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.
11. Section 1 of E.O. 464, in view of its specific reference to
Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of
any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be
construed as limited in its application to appearances of
department heads in the question hour contemplated in

said Section 22, but could not be applied to appearances of

department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation; The
requirement to secure presidential consent under Section
1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour,
is valid on its face.
12. Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials
enumerated in Section 2(b)to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
The enumeration is broad. It covers all senior officials of
executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP,
and all senior national security officials who, in the judgment of
the heads of offices designated in the same section (i.e.
department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP,
and the National Security Adviser), are covered by the
executive privilege The enumeration also includes such other
officers as may be determined by the President. Given the title
of Section 2 Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive
Privilege, it is evident that under the rule of ejusdem
generis, the determination by the President under this
provision is intended to be based on a similar finding of
coverage under executive privilege. En passant, the Court
notes that Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 virtually states that
executive privilege actually covers persons. Such is a
misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege, as discussed
above, is properly invoked in relation to specific
categories of information and not to categories of
persons. In light, however, of Sec. 2(a) of E.O. 464 which
deals with the nature, scope and coverage of executive
privilege, the reference to persons being covered by the
executive privilege may be read as an abbreviated way of
saying that the person is in possession of information which is,
in the judgment of the head of office concerned, privileged as
defined in Section 2(a). The Court shall thus proceed on the
assumption that this is the intention of the challenged order.
13. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, it is gathered
that certain information in the possession of the executive
may validly be claimed as privileged even against
Congress,
such
as
Presidential
conversations,
correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet
meetings, as it is rooted in the separation of powers
14. The implied claim authorized by Section 3 of E.O. 464 is
not accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis thereof
(e.g., whether the information demanded involves military or
diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.). While
Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are
covered by the privilege under the challenged order, Congress
is left to speculate as to which among them is being referred to
by the executive. The enumeration is not even intended to be
comprehensive, but a mere statement of what is included in
the phrase confidential or classified information between the
President and the public officers covered by this executive
order. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the
executive considers the requested information privileged.
15. The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in
relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not
asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and
certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464,

coupled with an announcement that the President has not

given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to
determine whether the withholding of information is justified
under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates
the power of inquiry of Congress. In fine, Section 3 and
Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.
16. No infirmity can be imputed to Section 2(a) of E.O. 464
as it merely provides guidelines, binding only on the heads
of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by
executive privilege.
17. Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides
that, once the head of office determines that a certain
information is privileged, such determination is presumed
to bear the Presidents authority and has the effect of
prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress,
subject only to the express pronouncement of the
President that it is allowing the appearance of such
official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize
claims of privilege by mere silence. Such presumptive
authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature
of the privilege. Executive privilege, as already discussed, is
recognized with respect to information the confidential nature
of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and
responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those instances
where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge
of highly important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of
executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain
informations must, as a matter of necessity, be kept
confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being,
by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose
information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of
such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in
enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
18. Delegation of Powers - In light of the highly exceptional
nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to
the President the power to invoke the privilege, though she
may authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege
on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must
state that the authority is By order of the President, which
means that he personally consulted with her.
19. one of the expressed purposes for requiring officials to
secure the consent of the President under Section 3 of E.O.
464 is to ensure respect for the rights of public officials
appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. That such rights
must indeed be respected by Congress is an echo from Article
VI Section 21 of the Constitution mandating that [t]he rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected. In light of the above discussion of Section 3, it is
clear that it is essentially an authorization for implied
claims of executive privilege, for which reason it must be
invalidated. That such authorization is partly motivated by the
need to ensure respect for such officials does not change the
infirm nature of the authorization itself.
20. Right of people to information distinguished from
right to information - the demand of a citizen for the
production of documents pursuant to his right to information
does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces

tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to

information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from
government officials. These powers belong only to Congress
and not to an individual citizen. Thus, while Congress is
composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not
follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise
of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to
information.
21. Republicanism and Right to Information - What republican
theory did accomplish was to reverse the old presumption in
favor of secrecy, based on the divine right of kings and nobles,
and replace it with a presumption in favor of publicity, based on
the doctrine of popular sovereignty.
HELD
Sections 2(b) and 3 of EO 464 VOID; Sections 1 and 2(a)
VALID
NOTES
EO 464
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before
Congress. In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the
Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on
the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the
government, all heads of departments of the Executive
Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either House of
Congress. When the security of the State or the public interest
so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive
Privilege.
(a) Nature and Scope. The rule of confidentiality based on
executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of
government and rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May
1995, 244 SCRA 286). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall
not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially
known to them by reason of their office and not made available
to the public to prejudice the public interest. Executive privilege
covers all confidential or classified information between the
President and the public officers covered by this executive
order, including:
i. Conversations and correspondence between the President
and the public official covered by this executive order (Almonte
vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002, 384 SCRA
152);
ii. Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which
in the interest of national security should not be divulged
(Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez
v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No.
130716, 9 December 1998, 299 SCRA 744).
iii. Information between inter-government agencies prior to the
conclusion of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No.
130716, 9 December 1998, 299 SCRA 744);

iv. Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v.

Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No.
130716, 9 December 1998, 299 SCRA 744);
v. Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez
v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002, 299
SCRA 744).
(b) Who are covered. The following are covered by this
executive order:
i. Senior officials of executive departments who in the
judgment of the department heads are covered by the
executive privilege;
ii. Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the
Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
iii. Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;
iv. Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the
National Security Adviser are covered by the executive
privilege; and
v. Such other officers as may be determined by the President.
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before
Congress.All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b)
hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to
appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the
observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence
to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of
public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Romero v. Estrada
Romero vs Estrada (April 2009) Velasco, Jr., J.
This is a petition for prohibition with application for
temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary
injunction.
Facts:
On August 15, 2006, petitioner Reghis Romero II, as owner of
R-II Builders, Inc., received from the Committee an invitation
signed by the Legislative Committee Secretary regarding the
liability of former president Ramos for plunder for the illegal
investment of Overseas Workers Welfare Administration
(OWWA) funds. The inquiry/investigation is intended to aid the
Senate in the review and possible amendments to the
pertinent provisions of R.A. 8042, the Migrant Workers Act".
The Congress is vested with the power to perform such under
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. On August 18,
2006, petitioner Romero II requested to be excused from
appearing and testifying before the Committee at its scheduled
hearings. On August 28, 2006, the Committee sent petitioner
Romero II a letter informing him that his request, being
unmeritorious, was denied. On August 30, 2006, petitioners
filed the instant petition seeking to bar the Committee from
continuing with its inquiry and to enjoin it from compelling
petitioners to appear before it pursuant to the invitations thus

issued. Petitioner failed to acquire a TRO so Romero II

appeared at the September 4, 2006 Committee investigation.
Two days after, petitioner Romero II filed a Manifestation with
Urgent Plea for a TRO. The manifestation was followed by the
filing on September 19, 2006 of another urgent motion for a
TRO in which petitioners imputed to the Committee the
intention to harass them. Petitioners in gist claim that: (1) the
subject matter of the investigation is sub judice owing to the
pendency of the Chavez petition; (2) since the investigation
has been intended to ascertain petitioners criminal liability for
plunder, it is not in aid of legislation; (3) the inquiry compelled
them to appear and testify in violation of their rights against
self-incrimination; and (4) unless the Court immediately issues
a TRO, some or all of petitioners would be in danger of being
arrested, detained, and forced to give testimony against their
will. The respondents likewise raised the following main
arguments: (1) the proposed resolutions were a proper subject
of legislative inquiry; and (2) petitioners right against selfincrimination was well-protected and could be invoked when
incriminating questions were propounded.
Issues:
WON the subject matter is sub judice -NO
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue,
influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of
justice. It is a traditional conviction of civilized society
everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of
fact and law should be immune from every extraneous
influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence
produced
in court; and that the determination of such facts should be
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.
WON Senate can require petitioners to attend hearings for
inquiry/investigation -YES
So long as the constitutional rights of witnesses will be
respected by respondent Senate Committees, it is their duty to
cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the facts needed
for intelligent legislative action.
WON the inquiry violates their right against selfincrimination -NO
This may be invoked only when the incriminating question is
being asked, since they have no way of knowing in advance
the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of them.
Therefore, it is not a ground to deny the Senate inquiry.
Held:
The petition is DENIED.
Notes:
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of

procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected

by such inquiries shall be respected.
Concur in Treaties

1.

2.
3.

1.

Sombilon v. Romulo (aka Nicolas v. Romulo)

Nicolas v. Romulo (2009) Azcuna, J.
Petition for CERTIORARI of the CA decision
Facts:
US Soldier Daniel Smith was charged with the rape of
petitioner Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon.
o Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA), the US, upon request, was granted
custody of Smith pending the proceedings.
o During the trial, US complied with its
agreement to bring Smith to the trial court
every time his presence was required.
In finding Smith guilty of the crime charged, the Court held
that pursuant to the VFA, he shall serve his sentence in the
facilities that shall be agreed upon by appropriate Philippine
and US authorities. Smith is hereby temporarily committed to
the Makati City Jail, pending agreement on such facilities.
Weeks later, Smith was transferred to a facility for detention
in the US embassy (under the control of the US government),
as provided for under the Romulo-Kenny Agreement entered
into by the Philippines and the US.
The matter was brought before the CA, which dismissed the
petition for having become moot.
Issues:
WON the presence of US Armed Forces in Philippine territory
pursuant to the VFA is allowed under a treaty (a) duly
concurred in by the Senate and (b) recognized as a treaty by
the other contracting state, by virtue of Art XVIII Sec. 25. YES
WON the transfer of custody of Smith, pursuant to the
Romulo-Kennedy Agreements, is allowed under the VFA. NO
WON the VFA is enforceable in the US as domestic law, either
because (a) it is self-executory or because (b) there exists
legislation, in view of Medellin v. Texas
In Medellin v. Texas, the US SC held that treaties
entered into by the US are not automatically part
of their domestic law unless these treaties are
self-executing or there is an implementing
legislation to make them enforceable
Ratio:
As held in Bayan v. Zamora, the VFA was (a) duly concurred
in by the Senate and (b) has been recognized as a treaty by
the US as attested and certified by the duly authorized
representative of the US government.
In US law, agreements that are policymaking in
nature are submitted to the senate for its advice
and consent. Those that carry out or further
implement these policymaking agreements are
merely submitted to Congress under the
provisions of the Case-Zablocki Act within 60
from ratification.
The VFA (which provides for joint RP-US military
exercises) is merely an implementing agreement

of the earlier RP-US Mutual Defense treaty

concurred in by the Philippine and US Senate.
Therefore, it was not necessary to submit the
VFA to the US senate, but merely to the US
Congress under the Case-Zablocki Act within 60
days of its ratification.
o It was not the framers intent do require
the other contracting state to convert
their system to achieve alignment and
parity with ours. It was simply required
that the treaty be recognized as a treaty
by the other contracting state.
2. The Romulo-Kennedy Agreements are not in accord with the
VFA itself. Art V Sec 10 of the VFA provides that the detention
(different from custody during trial) should be (a) by Philippine
authorities and (b) carried out in facilities agreed on by
authorities of both parties.
3. The VFA is enforceable in the US because:
(a) it is a self-executing agreement because the parties intend
its provisions to be enforceable. The VFA has been
implemented and executed, with the US complying with its
obligation to produce Smith during trial.
(b) the VFA is covered by implementing legislation, namely the
Case-Zablocki Act. Executive agreements registered under
which are immediately implemented.
(c) moreover, the RP-US mutual defense treaty was advised
and consented to by the US senate.
Held: Petitions partly granted and CA decision modified. VFA
is unconstitutional but Romulo-Kennedy Agreements are
declared not in accordance with the VFA.
Notes:
Art XVIII, Sec. 25 After the expiration in 1991 of the
Agreement between the Phil and the US concerning Military
bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate and when the Congress so
requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people
in a national referendum held for that purpose, and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state
Background of Art XVIII, Sec. 25
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, US ceded to the
Philippines all the territory acquired from Spain except naval
ports and/or military bases and facilities, which the US retained
for itself. The PH had no jurisdiction therein except to the
extent allowed by the US.
RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947 was never
advised for ratification by the US Senate, a disparity in
treatment, because the Philippines regarded it as a treaty and
had it concurred in by out Senate
When the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the
territory covered by theses bases were finally ceded to the
Philippines.
Art XVIII Sec 25 is designed to ensure that any agreement
allowing the presence of foreign military bases, troops or
facilities in Philippine territory shall be equally binding on the
Philippines and the foreign sovereign State involved.
Requirements as to bills

i. as to title
Review BANAT Partylist v. COMELEC
BANAT vs COMELEC Carpio, J.
Petition for certiorari and mandamus
Facts:
On 27 June 2002, Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed a Petition to
Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution, before the National Board of
Canvassers (NBC). BANAT filed its petition because the
Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently
been quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty
bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is,
would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list
seats. There were no intervenors in BANATs petition before
the NBC. On May 14, 2007 elections included the elections for
the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted
15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List
System. On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC,
promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No.
07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the partylist elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY),
Bayan Muna, Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC),
Gabrielas Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine
Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens
Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party
(BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO),
Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono.
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing
the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. On 9 July 2007, Bayan
Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as
NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as
stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans
formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No.
7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC
denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the
NBC. Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations
proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed three
other party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one
guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural
Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP), Anak
Mindanao (AMIN), and An Waray.
Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely
a ceiling?
It is a ceiling. The combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total
membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list.
Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional? -YES
Each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that
is, one qualifying and two additional seats. The additional
seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed
in proportion to their total number of votes." The three-seat

cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified

party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory
device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list
elections.
Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA
7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional? -NO
Only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the
total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to
have a seat in the House of Representatives. In computing the
additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent
threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in
the second clause of Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is
unconstitutional because the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of
available party list seats when the number of available party
list seats exceeds 50.
Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major
political parties be barred from participating in the party-list
elections? -NO BUT
The framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major
political parties to participate in party-list elections through their
sectoral wings. But by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to
continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political
parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or
indirectly.
Held:
The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. We SET
ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007
in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July
2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two
percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list
seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List
System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in
Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed
from participating in party-list elections. This Decision is
immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
Notes:
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated
to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law,
by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector.

Sections 11 and 12 of RA 7941:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the
following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least
two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List
Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for
the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis,
rank them according to the number of votes received and
allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to
the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization,
or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the
party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)
The Veterans Formula:
Number of seats available to legislative districts x .20 =
Number of seats available to party-list
.80
Lidasan v. COMELEC
Petitioner: Bara Lidasan
Respondent: COMELEC
Ponente: J. Sanchez 1967
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
Facts:
1. On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law
House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790 (An Act Creating
the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur).
It was found out that 12 barrios (municipality of Buldon,
Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Katbo,
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of Parang and
municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios of Togaig
and Madalum situated in the municipality of Buldon, Cotabato)
indicated in the bill were not from the province of Lanao but
rather from Cotabato. However, the Comelec was prompted by
the nearing elections which resulted in it adopting a resolution
which enforced the bill. This brought a change in the
boundaries of the 2 provinces.
2. The Office of the President then recommended to the
Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until
clarified by correcting legislation. The Comelec maintained its
position and said that unless declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the bill violates the constitutional
requirement that no bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in
the title of the bill

Ratio:
1. Constitutional provision- contains dual limitations upon
legislative power. First is that Congress is to refrain from
conglomeration of heterogeneous subjects. Second is that the
title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify
the legislators and the public and those concerned of the
import of the single subject.
2. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the
title" of the bill- Constitution does not require the Congress to
read the entire text of the bill during its reading. However, this
constitutional requirement breathes the spirit of command and
is imperative for Congress to follow. It suffices if the title should
serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform
the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill,
and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. The substance shall be
prioritized over the form of the title.
3. Title of the bill- The title is misleading because it does not
inform the members of the Congress the gravity of the bill. In
enacting the bill, the creation of Dianaton would dismember 2
municipalities in Cotabato by taking away some of their
barrios. It did not inform the members of the Congress, the
public and the residents of the changes that would be made.
The Court then rules that due to this RA 4790 is null and
void.
4. Principle of a portion of the statue being deemed as
unconstitutional, the remainder is understood as
constitutional and still upheld- This is the general rule
however it is imperative that the remainder must be
separable from the unconstitutional portion. It should be
fair to presume that the Legislative would still enact the bill
without the unconstitutional provisions. That 9 out of the 21
barrios would have remained and the seat of the municipality
would then be reconsidered for it was located in a barrio of
Cotabato shows that the bill would not have stood without the
unconstitutional provision. It is then considered as indivisible
thus null and void in totality.
SC Ruling: RA 4790 is null and void in totality
ii. Requirements as to certain laws
1. appropriation laws
Guingona v. Carague
Facts:
Petitioner Senators Teofisto Guingona and Aquino Pimentel
question the automatic appropriation for debt service in the
1990 budget.
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic
appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3
Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise
known as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5
Billion, while the appropriations for the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized

by P.D. No. 81, entitled "Amending Certain Provisions of
Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty,
as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177,
entitled "Revising the Budget Process in Order to
Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,"
and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act Strenghthening the
Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the
Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent
and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The
Purpose.
The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of
P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The
petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt
service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.
Procedural

General Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 6831), is the highest

budgetary allocation among all department budgets. This is a
clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate
according highest priority to education.
Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not
without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to
provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our
enormous debt, the greater portion of which was inherited from
the previous administration. It is not only a matter of honor and
to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially,
the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the
process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service
bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds
and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby
assailed as unconstitutional.
Whether automatic appropriations decrees (PD 81, 1177 and
PD 1967) of President Marcos are still operative? - YES

Whether petitioners have standing? - YES

There can be no question that petitioners as Senators of the
Republic of the Philippines may bring this suit where a
constitutional issue is raised.3 Indeed, even a taxpayer has
personality to restrain unlawful expenditure of public funds.
Substantive
According to Sec. 5, Art. XIV of the Constitution:
(5)
The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority
to education and ensure that teaching will attract and retain its
rightful share of the best available talents through adequate
remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and
fulfillment.
Petitioners argue as against this constitutional intention, P86
Billion is appropriated for debt service while only P27 Billion is
appropriated for the Department of Education in the 1990
budget. It plain, therefore, that the said appropriation for debt
services is inconsistent with the Constitution, hence, void.
Supreme Court holds otherwise. While it is true that under
Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is
mandated to "assign the highest budgetary priority to
education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract and
retain its rightful share of the best available talents through
adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction
and fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of
Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to
respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the
attainment of other state policies or objectives.
As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for
education has tripled to upgrade and improve the facility of the
public school system. The compensation of teachers has been
doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.00 set aside for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the

Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under

the aforesaid decrees of then President Marcos became
functus oficio when he was ousted in February, 1986; that
upon the expiration of the one-man legislature in the person of
President Marcos, the legislative power was restored to
Congress on February 2, 1987 when the Constitution was
ratified by the people; that there is a need for a new legislation
by Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but
Congress, up to the present, has not approved any such law;
and thus the said P86.8 Billion automatic appropriation in the
1990 budget is an administrative act that rests on no law, and
thus, it CANNOT be enforced.
Whether the decrees if still operative are violative of the
Constitution? - NO
Since they came from President Marcos, petitioners argued
that the said decrees are inconsistent with Section 24, Article
VI of the Constitution, i.e.,
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application,
and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments
AND
Sec. 29(l).
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Supreme Court disagrees. Section 3, Article XVIII of the
Constitution recognizes that "All existing laws, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and
other executive issuances not inconsistent with the
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or
revoked.".

Certainly, the framers of the Constitution did not contemplate

that existing laws in the statute books including existing
presidential decrees appropriating public money are reduced
to mere "bills" that must again go through the legislative million
The only reasonable interpretation of said provisions of the
Constitution which refer to "bills" is that they mean
appropriation measures still to be passed by Congress. If the
intention of the framers thereof were otherwise they should
have expressed their decision in a more direct or express
manner.
Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication
is frowned upon. Equally fundamental is the principle that
construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied
prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly
stated.
Whether there is undue delegation of legislative power - NO
Petitioners assert that there must be definiteness, certainty
and exactness in an appropriation, otherwise it is an undue
delegation of legislative power to the President who
determines in advance the amount appropriated for the debt
service.
The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are
complete in all their essential terms and conditions and
sufficient standards are indicated therein.
The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended,
Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is that the
amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to
enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal,
interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans,
credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they
shall become due without the need to enact a separate law
appropriating funds therefor as the need arises. The purpose
of these laws is to enable the government to make prompt
payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain
the credit standing of the country.
Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific
amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very nature of the
problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made
certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees.
The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts
to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only
the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges
on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds,
debentures or security or other evidences of indebtedness sold
in international markets incurred by virtue of the law, as and
when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in
executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts
as shown by the books of the Treasury.

HELD:
Petition DISMISSED.
Belgica v. Ochoa ( one in aleitheia reviewer can help)
Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa (2013)
l
Subject:
Justiciable Controversy, Ripeness for Adjudication,
Political Question, Locus Standi, Res Judicata, Stare
Decisis, Pork Barrel, Congressional Pork Barrel,
Presidential Pork Barrel, Mandamus, Right to
Information, SARO, Operative Fact Doctrine
Facts:
Before the Court are consolidated petitions, taken under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Pork Barrel
refers to an appropriation of government spending meant
for localized projects and secured
solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's
district. In the Philippines, the pork barrel has been
commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of
Members of the Legislature, although, its usage would
evolve in reference to certain funds of the President such
as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
The Malampaya Funds was a special fund created under
PD 910 issued by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos for the development of indigenous energy
resources vital to economic growth.
The Presidential Social Fund is sourced from the share of
the government in the aggregate gross earnings of
PAGCOR through which the President provides direct
assistance to priority programs and projects not funded
under the regular budget.
In 1996, an anonymous source later identified as Former
Marikina City Romeo Candazo revealed that huge sums of
government money went into the pockets of legislators as
kickbacks. in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the
nullification of the PDAF for being unconstitutional.
Unfortunately, for lack of any pertinent evidentiary
support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks has become a common exercise of
unscrupulous Members of Congress, the petition was
dismissed.
In July 2013, NBI began its probe into allegations that the
government has been defrauded of some P10Billion over
the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the
pork barrel of lawmakers and various government
agencies for scores of ghost projects. The investigation
was spawned by sworn affidavits of six whistle-blowers
who declared that JLN Corporation (stands for Janet Lim
Napoles) had facilitated the swindling of billions of pesos
from the public coffers for ghost projects using no
fewer than 20 dummy
In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released report
revealing substantial irregularities in the disbursement
and utilization of PDAF by the Congressmen during the
Arroyo administration.

As for the 'Presidential Pork Barrel', whistle-blowers

alleged that "at least P900 Million from royalties in the
operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan
province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has
gone into a dummy NGO. Spurred in large part by the
findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles
controversy, several petitions were lodged before the
Court similarly seeking that the Pork Barrel System be
declared unconstitutional
I. Procedural issues/held
Justiciable Controversy
-By virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, judicial power operates only when there is
an actual case or controversy.
- Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or
controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible
of judicial resolution as
-The Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases. The requirement of contrariety
of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic
positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the Pork
Barrel System. Also, the challenged funds and the
provisions allowing for their utilization such as the 2013
GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and
PD 1869 for the Presidential Social Fund are currently
existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate
or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the
unconstitutional use of these public funds.
Ripeness for Adjudication
- Related to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of ripeness, meaning that
the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already
ripe for adjudication. A question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite
that something had then been accomplished or performed
by either branch before a court may come into the picture,
and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the
challenged action
- The cases at present have not become moot. A case
becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy
between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in
passing upon the merits.
- The Court observes that respondents proposed line-item
budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy
since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and
not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject
matter, remains legally effective and existing.
- Neither will the Presidents declaration that he had
already abolished the PDAF render the issues on PDAF
moot precisely because the Executive branch of
government has no constitutional authority to nullify or
annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the
annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by

Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by

the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality
- Moreover, the Court will decide cases, otherwise moot,
if: (a) there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; (b) the exceptional character of the situation
and the paramount public interest is involved; (c) when
the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review. All the four exceptions are applicable in this case.
Political Question
-The issues raised before the Court do not present
political but legal questions which are within its province
to resolve. A political question refers to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.
-The intrinsic constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System
is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom
of the political branches of government but rather a legal
one which the Constitution itself has
commanded the Court to act upon. More importantly, the
present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the
right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a
duty to proceed therewith under the expanded concept of
judicial power under Section1, Article 8 of the 1987
Constitution
Locus Standi
- Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his
constitutional rights by the operation of statute
orordinance, he has no standing.
- Petitioners, as taxpayers, possess the requisite standing
to question the validity of the existing Pork Barrel System
under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to
be utilized. They are bound to suffer from the
unconstitutional usage of public funds.
- Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled
the standing requirement given that the issues they have
raised may be classified as matters of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest
Res Judicata (does not apply)
-Res judicata means a matter adjudged. The focal point
of res judicata is the judgment.The res judicata principle
states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind
a subsequent case if, between the first and second
actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action.
15. The res judicata principle cannot apply in this case.
The required identity is not present since Philconsa and
LAMP, respectively, involved constitutional challenges
against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article,
whereas the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional

scrutiny of the entire Pork Barrel System. Also, the ruling

in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural
technicality and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits .
Stare Decisis (does not apply)
- Stare decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare
decisis) means follow past precedents and do not disturb
what has been settled. The focal point of stare decisis is
the doctrine created. The stare decisis principle,
entrenched under Article 8 of the Civil Code, evokes the
general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion
reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to those
that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even
though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the
first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be
decided alike.
- The Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a
separation of powers problem, specifically on the
propriety of conferring post-enactment identification
authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the
present cases call for a more holistic examination of the
entire Pork Barrel System. The complexity of the issues
and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be,
therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason
against a wholesale application of the stare decisis
principle.
- In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling
was actually riddled with inherent
Constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail
against a full resort to stare decisis.
- As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was
dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has
not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current
application to the substantive issues in these cases.
Substantive issues/held:
Pork Barrel System
-The Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the
collective body of rules and practices that govern the
manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily
intended for local projects, are utilized through the
respective participations of the Legislative and Executive
branches of government, including its members.
- The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lumpsum discretionary funds:
(a) Congressional Pork Barrel-- a kind of lump-sum,
discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually
or collectively organized into committees, are able to
effectively control certain aspects of the funds utilization
through various post-enactment measures and/or
practices.
(b) Presidential Pork Barrel-- a kind of lump-sum,
discretionary fund which allows the President to
determine the manner of its utilization.
Constitutionality of the Congressional Pork Barrel
- The Supreme Court declared that the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and its

predecessor, the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF)

are unconstitutional.
- The Supreme Court declared the Pork Barrel System as
unconstitutional on the following grounds:
(a) Separation of Powers. Under the 2013 PDAF Article,
legislators have been authorized to participate in the
various operational aspects of budgeting, including the
evaluation of work and financial plans for individual
activities and the regulation and release of funds, in
violation of the separation of powers principle. From the
moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law
that empowers Congress or any of its members to play
any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law
violates the principle
of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
(b) Non-delegability of legislative power. The power to
appropriate is lodged in Congress and must be exercised
only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution. Insofar as the 2013 PDAF
Article has conferred unto legislators the power of
appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary
funds from which they are able to fund specific projects
which they themselves determine, it has violated the
principle of non-delegability of legislative power;
(c) Checks and balances. Even without its post-enactment
legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article
would remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum
amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere
funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending.
This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the
actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for
further determination and, therefore, does not readily
indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the
Presidents power of item veto.
Insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein
items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has
flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in
the process, denied the President the power to veto items
(d) Public Accountability. To a certain extent, the conduct
of oversight would be tainted as said
legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority,
would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they
themselves participate. Also, this very same concept of
post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Allowing legislators to
intervene in the various phases of project implementation
renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of
their own office.
(e) Political dynasty. Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution is considered as not self-executing due to the
qualifying phrase as may be defined by law. In this
respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide
a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifies a guideline for legislative
or executive action.
(f) Local autonomy. The gauge of PDAF and CDF
allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office,

without taking into account the specific interests and

peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. As a
result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized
metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be
relatively underdeveloped compared to the former. This
concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and
PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local
Development Councils (LDCs). Insofar as it has authorized
legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in
affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of
capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted
genuine local autonomy.
Constitutionality of the Presidential Pork Barrel
- While the designation of a determinate or determinable
amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for a
legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must
contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law
delegates rule-making authority to the Executive either for
the purpose of (a)filling up the details of the law for its
enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or
(b)ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation,
referred to as contingent rule-making.
-The phrase and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President under
Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of
the Presidents authority with respect tothe purpose for
which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the
said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the
Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct
and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public
funds beyond the purview of the law.
- Hence, insofar as it has conferred to the President the
power to appropriate funds intended by law for energyrelated purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit
as well as other public funds under the broad
classification of priority infrastructure development
projects, it has transgressed the principle of nondelegability.
Operative Fact Doctrine
-the Courts pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality
of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b)
all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar
thereto, and (c) the phrases (1)"and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
under Section 8 of PD 910,and (2) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as
prospective in effect
- The operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that
until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the
invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act
is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience
and respect and should be properly enforced and
complied with.

Lawyers against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v.

Secretary of Budget and Management (2012) Mendoza, J.
Petition for CERTIORARI
Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality and legality
of the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) as provided in General Appropriations Act
(GAA) of 2004 (RA9206). They also seek to enjoin:
o Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) from making and thereafter
releasing budgetary allocations to
individual Congress members as pork
barrel funds out of PDAF
o the National Treasurer and Commission
on Audit from enforcing the questioned
provision
The PDAF (amounting to 8.3B) shall be used to
fund priority programs and projects or to fund the
required counter part for foreign-assisted
programs, provided that:
o the amount shall be released directly to
the implementing agency or LGU
concerned
o allocations authorized may be realigned
to any expense class if deemed
necessary
o maximum of 10% of authorized
allocations by district may be used for
procurement of rice and other basic
commodities which shall be purchased
from the National Food Authority
Petitioners arguments:
o The omission of the PDAF provision to
specify sums as allocations to individual
members of Congress signifies
Congress intentional omission to do
away with the pork barrel system
o As to the implementation of the
provision:
the DMB illegally made and
directly released budgetary
allocations out of PDAF in favor
of individual members of
Congress
Individual Congress members do
not possess the power to
propose, select and identify
which projects are to be actually
funded by PDAF
o Congress members cannot directly spend
the funds, the appropriation for which
was made by them. This constitutes a
violation of separation of powers
the authority to propose and
select projects does not pertain
to legislation
Respondents arguments:

petition should be dismissed because

there is no concrete proof that PDAF is a
source of dirty money
o In PhilConsa v. Enriquez, Court upheld
the authority of individual members of
Congress to propose and identify
projects because this was merely
recommendatory in nature. Also,
Congress members were more
knowledgeable about their constituents
needs.
Issues: WON in allowing the direct allocation and release
of PDAF funds to Congress Members based on their own
list of proposed projects, the implementation of the PDAF
under the GAA of 2004 is unconstitutional or illegal. NO
Ratio:
1. There is no violation of separation of powers
since there is no showing of a direct participation
of legislators in the actual spending of the
budget.
newspaper or electronic reports showing the
appalling effects of PDAF cannot be appreciated
by the Court since facts must be established in
accordance with the rules of evidence
2.
The governmment budgeting and appropriating
process during the enactment and implementation of the
GAA of 2004 is lawful
The executive controls the regulation of fund
released, the implementation of payment
schedules and up to the actual spending of the
funds. The executive function of executing
appropriation laws is as follows:
o DBM lays down the guidelines for the
disbursement of the fund
o Members of Congress are requested by
the President to recommend projects and
programs which may be funded from the
PDAF
o Speaker of the House of Representatives
endorses the list submitted by Congress
members to the DBM
o DBM reviews and determines whether
such list of projects submitted are
consistent with the guidelines and the
priorities the Executive had set
The authority granted to Members of Congress to
propose and select projects was already upheld
in PhilConsa which remains as valid case law.
Held: Petition dismissed
2.
power of taxation and requirement as to tax laws
3.
jurisdiction of the SC
1. Procedure for the passage of bills
c.
The presidents veto power
Bolinao Electronics Corp v. Valencia Barrera, J
June 30, 1964
o

Petitioners: Bolinao Electronics Corporation, Chronicle

Broadcasting Network, Inc., and Montserrat Broadcasting
System, Inc.
Respondents: Brigido Valencia, as Department of Public
Works and Communications Secretary, and Robert San
Andres, Acting Chief of the Radio Control Division
Intervenor: Republic of the Philippines, as operator of the
Philippine Broadcasting Service (PBS)
Original Petition for prohibition, mandatory injunction with
preliminary injunction
Facts:
Petitioners are owners and operators of radio and
television stations. Petitioners were sent notices of
hearing for the renewal of their licenses to operate their
respective radio and TV stations.
According to the notice, petitioners filed their applications
a few months after their licenses have expired, which is a
violation of Secs. 12 and 14 of Department Order No. 11,
which prohibit radio transmitters or stations to operate
without a license, and that an application for renewal of
the said licenses should be submitted two months before
the expiration date of the license, respectively.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the
hearing/investigation, but were denied on the ground that
such hearing is an 'indispensable step in the processing
of application of licenses,' as per Sec. 3 of Act 3846
(Powers and Duties of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications), which states:
SEC. 3. (1) [Sec. of Public Works and Communications]
may approve or disapprove any application for renewal of
station or operator license; Provided, however, That no
application for renewal shall be disapproved without
giving the licensee a hearing.
On July 24, 1962, however, a circular was released, which
acknowledges the late submission of applications for new
and renewal licenses of a 'great number of radio station
operators.' The circular admonished all radio station
operators, and requested them to 'take remedial measures
as soon as possible but not later than August 10, 1962.'
Petitioners construed this as a condonation or pardon for
the late filing of their application for renewal of licenses.
Respondents also claim that Chronicle Broadcasting
Network (CBN) renounced its right to operate channel 9 by
virtue of the statement 'Channel 10 assigned in lieu of
Channel 9,' which appeared in the construction permit to
transfer TV station DZXL-TV from QC to Baguio.
This renunciation is also manifest, according to
respondents, by the remarks in construction permit 798,
which say: 'construction of [CBN Baguio station] shall be
begun after DZXL-TV (Channel 9) Manila of Chronicle
broadcasting Network's permit to transfer is approved.'
Respondents aver that since the permit was approved,
CBN has effectively renounced their right to operate
channel 9.
Finally, in the General Fund appropriated to the Philippine
Broadcasting Service (PBS), the President vetoed the
following provisions, for the reason that they will render

inoperative the TV stations being operated by PBS from

September 1961:
PART ONE CURRENT GENERAL EXPENSES
IV. SPECIAL PURPOSES
1. For contribution to the operation of the Philippine
Broadcasting Service, including promotion, programming,
operations and general administration; Provided, That no
portion of this appropriation shall be used for the
operation of television stations in Luzon or any part of the
Philippines where there are television stations. x x x
P300,000.00.
VI. Special Provisions.
5. No amount appropriated for televisions under Special
Fund and General Fund shall be used for the operation of
television stations in Luzon or any part of the Philippines
where there are
television stations." (Italics supplied).
Issues:
1. WON investigation being conducted by respondents
has any basis - NONE
2. WON there was abandonment or renunciation by CBN
of channel 9 in favor of PBS - NONE
3. WON PBS can legally operate channel 9 and is entitled
to damages, for CBN's refusal to give up operations of the
aforementioned channel. - NO
Ratio:
1. Petitioners are correct in their claim that the July 24
circular is condonation or pardon of their late filing of
application, which is the only basis stated in the notice of
hearing sent to petitioners. With the only basis pardoned,
there is no more reason for the investigation to continue.
2. The statement 'Channel 10 assigned in lieu of Channel
9,' means that the assignment of Channel 10 will only be
effective upon the completion of DZXL-TV's transfer to
Baguio. Since the transfer was abandoned, this does not
mean that CBN has also abandoned its right to operate on
Channel 9, just because the transfer was approved. The
fact that CBN was allowed to continue operating on
Channel 9 after the approval of the said transfer is proof
that it did not abandon the said Channel. Furthermore,
respondents failed to produce proof that CBN really
waived or renounced its right to operate on Channel 9
3. The planned operation of Channel 9 by PBS is illegal
due to the funds appropriated for the said purpose being
illegally appropriated. The above-quoted vetoed
provisions clearly show CONDITIONS for the operation of
PBS, which are given by the whole of (5) of VI. Special
Provisions, and the following excerpt from (1) of IV.
Special Purposes:
Provided, That no portion of this appropriation shall be
used for the operation of television stations in Luzon or
any part of the Philippines where there are television
stations.
As per the case of State v. Holder, the President does not
have the power to veto conditions and restrictions. Thus,
the Presidents veto is unconstitutional, and the provision
prohibiting the use of funds for TV station in Luzon

remains. It follows then, that the expenditures to be used

for the operation of Channel 9 are null and void, and PBS
cannot claim the damages on illegal expenditures.
Held:
Writ of preliminary injunction granted and made
permanent:
Notes:
Sec. 20, Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution:
The President has the power to veto any particular item or
Items of an appropriation bill.
However, when a provision of an appropriation bill affects
one or more Items of the same the President cannot veto
the provision without at the same time vetoing the
particular item or items to which it relates.
Sec. 27 (2), Art. VI, 1987 Constitution:
The President shall have the power to veto any particular
item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but
the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does
not objec
Gonzales v. Macaraig (1990) Melencio-Herrera, J.
FACTS::
December 16, 1988 Congress passed House Bill No.
19186 (GAB of Fiscal Year 1989) which eliminated or
decreased certain items included in the proposed budget
submitted by the president
December 29, 1988 the President signed bill into law (RA
6688) but vetoed 7 special provisions and Sec 55, a
general provision.
February 2, 1989 Senate passed Res. No. 381, where
Senate as an institution decided to contest the
constitutionality of the veto of the president of SEC 55
only.
April 11, 1989 this petition was filed
January 19, 1990 filed motion for leave to file and to
admit supplemental petition with same issues but
included SEC 16 of House Bill 26934 (Gab for FY 1990 or
RA 6831)
SEC. 55 disallows the president and heads of several
department to augment any item in the GAB thereby a
violation CONSTI ART VI SEC 25 (5) (page 459)
SEC 16 of the GAB of 1990 provides for the same and
the reason for veto remains the same with the additional
legal basis of violation of PD 1177 SEC 44 and 45 as
amended by RA 6670 that authorizes the president and the
heads of depts. To use saving to augment any item of
appropriations in the exec branch of government (page
460)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto by the President of SEC 55 of
GAB for FY 1989 and SEC 16 of GAB for FY 1990 is
unconstitutional.
HELD:
The veto is CONSTITUTIONAL. Although the petitioners
contend that the veto exceeded the mandate of the lineveto power of the president because SEC 55 and SEC 16
are provisions, the court held that inappropriate
provisions can be treated as items (Henry v. Edwards) and

therefore can be vetoed validly by the president.

Furthermore inappropriate provisions must be struck
down because they contravene the constitution because it
limits the power of the executive to augment
appropriations (ART VI SEC 25 PAR 5.)
The provisions are inappropriate because
o
They do not relate to particular or distinctive
appropriations
o
Disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be
found on the face of the bill
o
It is more of an expression of policy than an
appropriation
Court also said that to make the GAB veto-proof would
be logrolling on the part of the legislative and that the
subject matter of the provisions should be dealt with in
separate and complete legislation but because they are
aware that it would be NOT passed in that manner they
attempt hide it in the GAB
If the legislature really believes that the exercise of veto
is really invalid then congress SHOULD resort to their
constitutionally vested power to override the veto. (ART VI
SEC 21 PAR 1)
DECISION:
Veto UPHELD. Petition DISMISSED.
Bengzon v. Drilon
Bengzon v Drilon (1992)
Cesar Bengzon et al. petitioners; Franklin Drilon as
Executive Secretary et al. respondents
REQUEST OF RETIRED JUSTICES MANUEL P.
BARCELONA, JUAN P. ENRIQUEZ, JUAN O. REYES, JR.
and GUARDSON R. LOOD FOR READJUSTMENT OF
THEIR MONTHLY PENSION
FACTS
Congress approved in 1990 a bill for the reenactment of
the repealed provisions of Republic Act No. 1797 and
Republic Act No. 3595 during the time of Marcos.
Congress approved House Bill No. 16297 and Senate Bill
No. 740 to reenact Republic Act Nos. 1797 and 3595 to
restore said retirement pensions and privileges of the
retired Justices and members of the Constitutional
Commissions, in order to assure those serving in the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Constitutional
Commissions adequate old age pensions even during the
time when the purchasing power of the peso has been
diminished substantially by worldwide recession or
inflation. This is underscored by the fact that the
petitioner retired Chief Justice, a retired Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court and the retired Presiding Justice are
presently receiving monthly pensions of P3,333.33,
P2,666.66 and P2,333.33 respectively.
However, President Aquino vetoed House Bill No. 16297
on the grounds that:
1.
it would erode the very foundation of the
Government's collective effort to adhere faithfully to and
enforce strictly the policy on standardization of
compensation as articulated in Republic Act No. 6758

known as Compensation and Position Classification Act

of 1989.
2.
the Government should not grant distinct privileges
to select group of officials whose retirement benefits
under existing laws already enjoy preferential treatment
over those of the vast majority of our civil service
servants.
On the other hand, the retired justices wanted to readjust
their monthly pensions. They argued that RA 1797 was
never repealed by P.D. No. 644 due to non-publication.
Since the Court ruled on the positive on the request,
Congress included in the General Appropriations Bill for
Fiscal Year 1992 certain appropriations for the Judiciary
intended for the payment of the adjusted pension rates
due the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court
of Appeals.
However, the President vetoed the underlined portions of
Section 1 and the entire Section 4 the Special Provisions
for the Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower
Courts and the underlined portions of Section 1 and the
entire Section 2, of the Special Provisions for the Court of
Appeals and the underlined portions of Section 1.3 of
Article XLV of the Special Provisions of the General Fund
Adjustments, because the foregoing appropriations will
effectively nullify the veto of the President on House Bill
No. 16297.
Supplementary fact: Budget allocated for the 22,769
Justices, Judges, and court personnel all over the country
is less than one percent (1%) of the national budget
annually
ISSUE:
WON the presidents veto power in the given case is
constitutional NO
RATIO:
1. Principle of Separation of Powers - Under the
principle of separation of powers, neither
Congress, the President, nor the Judiciary may
encroach on fields allocated to the other
branches of government. Moreover, in Angara v
Electoral Commission, it was stated that the
Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational
way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries it does not assert any
superiority over the other department, it does not
in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish
for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to
them.
2. Veto power is not absolute Article VI, Section
27(2) of the 1987 Constitution states that, The
President shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation,

revenue or tariff bill but the veto shall not affect

the item or items to which he does not object.
The Constitution provides that only a particular item or
items may be vetoed. The power to disapprove any item or
items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to
veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining
portion of the same item.
3.
Item and Provision distinguished An item in a
bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and
severable parts of the bill, an indivisible sum of money
dedicated to a stated purpose. An examination of the
entire sections and the underlined portions of the law
which were vetoed will readily show that portions of the
item have been chopped up into vetoed and unvetoed
parts. Less than all of an item has been vetoed. Moreover,
the vetoed portions are not items. They are provisions.
4.
On Presidents Executive power - The President
cannot set aside or reverse a final and executory
judgment of this Court through the exercise of the veto
power because the Executive has no authority to set aside
and overrule a decision of the Supreme Court. Neither
may the veto power of the President be exercised as a
means of repealing RA 1797. This is arrogating unto the
Presidency legislative powers which are beyond its
authority.
From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen
that when the President vetoed certain provisions
of the 1992 General Appropriations Act, she was
actually vetoing Republic Act No. 1797 which, of
course, is beyond her power to accomplish.
5.
Vested Right of Retired Justices - Retired
Justices have a vested right to the accrued pensions due
them pursuant to RA 1797. Such attempt to use the veto
power in this case trenched upon the constitutional grant
of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary, pursuant to Art VIII,
Sec. 3 of the Constitution. The right to a public pension is
of statutory origin and statutes dealing with pensions
have been enacted by practically all the states in the
United States (State ex rel. Murray v. Riley, 44 Del. 505, 62
A2d 236), and presumably in most countries of the world.
6.
Fiscal Autonomy Defined - Fiscal autonomy
means freedom from outside control. It is a guarantee on
full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with
the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It
recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and
collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the
highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay
plans of the government and allocate and disburse such
sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in
the course of the discharge of their functions.
7.
Veto impaired the power of CJ to augment items
in the Judiciarys appropriation - Sec. 25. (5) states that
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer
of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional

Commissions may, by law, be authorized to

augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.
HELD
Petition GRANTED; questioned veto SET ASIDE as illegal
and unconstitutional
NOTES:
Article VIII, Sec. 3 Constitution: The Judiciary shall enjoy
fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not
be reduced by the legislature below the amount
appropriated for the previous year and, after approval,
shall be automatically and regularly released.
PHILCONSA v. Enriquez
PHILCONSA vs Enriquez (August 19, 1994) Quiason, J.
Facts:
General Appropriation Bill of 1994 was passed and
approved by Congress on December 17, 1993. On
December 30, 1993, the President signed it into law and
was known as Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "AN ACT
APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY
ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED
AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (GAA
of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his
Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of
the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain
conditions. The House of Congress didn't override the
vetoes. In G.R. No. 113105, the petitioners prayed for a
writ of prohibition to declare as unconstitutional and void:
(a) Article XLI on the Countrywide Development Fund, the
special provision in Article I entitled Realignment of
Allocation for Operational Expenses, and Article XLVIII on
the Appropriation for Debt Service or the amount
appropriated under said Article XLVIII in excess of the
P37.9 Billion allocated for the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports; and (b) the veto of the President of the
Special Provision of Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994. In
G.R. No. 113174, petitioners sought the issuance of the
writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the
Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management, and the National Treasurer.
They questioned: (1) the constitutionality of the conditions
imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994:
(a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit
(COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights
(CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units
(CAFGU'S) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC's);
and (2) the constitutionality of the veto of the special
provision in the appropriation for debt service. In G.R. No.
113766, sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition
and mandamus against the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management,
the National Treasurer, and the COA. They challenged the
constitutionality of the Presidential veto of the special
provision in the appropriations for debt service and the

automatic appropriation of funds. In G.R. No. 11388,

petitioners sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition
and mandamus against the same respondents in G.R. No.
113766. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of: (1) the
veto on four special provision added to items in the GAA
of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and
the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH);
and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the
implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU's,
the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).
Issues:
WON petitioners have locus standi. -YES
A member of the Senate, and of the House of
Representatives for that matter, has the legal standing to
question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition
imposed on an item in an appropriation bill.
WON Article XLI on the Countrywide Development Fund is
unconstitutional. -NO
Petitioners claim that the power given to the members of
Congress to propose and identify the projects and
activities to be funded by the Countrywide Development
Fund is an encroachment by the legislature on executive
power, since said power in an appropriation act in
implementation of a law. The authority given to the
members of Congress is only to propose and identify
projects to be implemented by the President. Under Article
XLI of the GAA of 1994, the President must examine
whether the proposals submitted by the members of
Congress fall within the specific items of expenditures for
which the Fund was set up, and if qualified, he next
determines whether they are in line with other projects
planned for the locality. In short, the proposals and
identifications made by the members of Congress are
merely recommendatory.
Petitioners also assail the special provision allowing a
member of Congress to realign his allocation for
operational expenses to any other expense category,
claiming that it is against Section 25(5) of Article VI of the
Constitution. Under the Special Provisions applicable to
the Congress of the Philippines, the members of Congress
only determine the necessity of the realignment of the
savings in the allotments for their operating expenses.
WON Article XLVIII on the Appropriation for Debt Service
is unconstitutional. -NO
While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the
Constitution, Congress is mandated to "assign the highest
budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that
teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best
available talents through adequate remuneration and
other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment," it does
not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so
hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the
imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment
of other state policies or objectives.

WON the veto power of the President on the special

provision in Article XLVIII is unconstitutional. -YES IN
SOME
The President vetoed the entire paragraph one of the
Special Provision of the item on debt service, including
the provisions that the appropriation authorized in said
item "shall be used for payment of the principal and
interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" and that
"in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities
of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators. The said
provisos, being appropriate provisions, cannot be vetoed
separately. Hence the item veto of said provisions is void.
The second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 brings to
fore the divergence in policy of Congress and the
President. While Congress expressly laid down the
condition that only 30% of the total appropriation for road
maintenance should be contracted
out, the President, on the basis of a comprehensive study,
believed that contracting out road maintenance projects at
an option of 70% would be more efficient, economical and
practical. The Special Provision in question is not an
inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a
veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road
maintenance, and on the other hand, it specified how the
said item shall be expended 70% by administrative and
30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows the
addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to
items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed
separately from the items to which they relate so long as
they are "appropriate" in the budgetary sense. According
to the President, while it is desirable to subject the
purchase of medicines to a standard formulary, "it is
believed more prudent to provide for a transition period
for its adoption and smooth implementation in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines". The Special Provision which
requires that all purchases of
medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with the
formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the
Department of Health is an "appropriate" provision. it is a
mere advertence by Congress to the fact that there is an
existing law, the Generics Act of 1988, that requires "the
extensive use of drugs with generic names through a
rational system of procurement and
distribution."
Held:
The petitions are DISMISSED, except with respect to (1)
G.R. Nos. 113105 and 113766 only insofar as they pray for
the annulment of the veto of the special provision on debt
service specifying that the fund therein appropriated
"shall be used for payment of the principal and interest of
foreign and domestic indebtedness" prohibiting the use of
the said funds "to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank
Board of Liquidators",and (2) G.R. No. 113888 only insofar
as it prays for the annulment of the veto of: (a) the second
paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item of

appropriation for the Department of Public Works and

Highways (GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786); and (b) Special
Provision No. 12 on the purchase of medicines by the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (GAA of 1994, p. 748),
which is GRANTEDF
Notes:
It is a rehash of the Gonzales vs Macaraig case wherein
petitioners' cause is anchored on the following grounds:
(1) the President's line-veto power as regards
appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover
provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when
she vetoed Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90)
which are provisions; (2) when the President objects to a
provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the
item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the
item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike
out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation,
in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and
(4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5]
of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law
and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the
prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that
power. Under the President's general veto power, he has
to veto the entire bill, not merely parts thereof (1987
Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]). The exception to the
general veto power is the power given to the President to
veto any particular item or items in a general
appropriations bill (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[2]).
FOR OCT 28 TUESDAY
1. Legislative veto
Macalintal v. COMELEC
Petitioner: Romulo Macalintal
Respondent: COMELEC
Ponente: J. Austria-Martinez
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
Facts:
1. Romulo Macalintal , member of Philippine Bar and tax
payer, seeks a declaration that certain provisions in RA 9189
(An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting
by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating
Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes ). He claims that he
has actual and material legal interest in seeing to it that the
public funds would be lawfully and rightfully appropriated and
used. The SC upholds his right as petitioner
Issue:
1. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the
registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent
residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an
affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines,
violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of
the Constitution?
2. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the
COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national
offices and party list representatives including the President
and the Vice-President violate the constitutional mandate
under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning

candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be

proclaimed as winners by Congress?
3. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189,
exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on
Elections shall promulgate without violating the independence
of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the
Constitution?
Ratio:
1. Qualified citizens abroad- The essence of Ra 9189 is to
enfranchise overseas qualified Filipinos. R.A. No. 9189 was
enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the first paragraph of
Section 2, Article V of the Constitution that Congress shall
provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It
must be stressed that Section 2 does not provide for the
parameters of the exercise of legislative authority in enacting
said law. Hence, in the absence of restrictions, Congress is
presumed to have duly exercised its function as defined in
Article VI of the Constitution.
2. Residency and Domicile concerning the affidavit- under
election laws, both are used synonymously with each other.
The requirement of an execution of an affidavit is not an
enabling or enfranchising act. It serves as an explicit
expression that the citizen is not abandoning his domicile of
origin. This expression is based on the promise that they would
resume residency in the Philippines not later than 3 years.
Failure to do so would mean perpetual disenfranchisement of
the citizen.
3. Proclamation of winning candidates the phrase is far too
sweeping. Only Congress has the power to proclaim the
winner of the Presidential and Vice Presidential Race. Sec. 18
of RA 9189 states that Comelec may proclaim the winning
candidates however paragraph 4 of Section 4 of Article 7 of
Constitution states that Congress has the duty to canvass the
votes for presidential and vice presidential position which
means it also has the duty to proclaim the winners.
4. Approval of Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
Under paragraph 1 section 2 of Article 9 of Constitution,
Comelec alone has power to formulate rules and regulations is
implicit in its power to implement regulations under the said
statute. Sec 17 states that voting by mail shall be authorized
by the Comelec in not more than 3 countries subject to the
approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee . It is
only the Supreme Court may review Comelec rules and only in
cases of grave abuse of discretion. By vesting itself with the
powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went
beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress
trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of
the COMELEC. (this one ata legislative veto)
SC Decision: the petition is partly GRANTED.
1. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID
for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of
Section 17.1, to wit: subject to the approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight

Committee;
b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit:
only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional
Oversight
Committee;
c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to
wit: The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be
submitted to the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of
this Act for prior approval; and
d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section
25, to wit: It shall review, revise, amend and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission of the same law; for being repugnant to Section
1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the independence
of constitutional commission, such as COMELEC.
2. The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is
UPHELD with respect only to the authority given to the
COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the
Senators and party-list representatives but not as to the power
to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for
President and Vice-President which is lodged with Congress
under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
3. Constitutionality of Section 5 (D) is upheld.
Puno

Creation of and powers given to Joint Congressional

Oversight Committee
o The power of Congress does not end with
the finished task of legislation. Concomitant
with its principal power to legislate is the
auxiliary power to ensure that the laws it
enacts are faithfully executed
o Concept of oversight:
power of oversight embraces all
activities undertaken by Congress
to enhance its understanding of and
influence over the implementation
of legislation it has enacted
concerns post-enactment
measures undertaken by Congress:
to monitor bureaucratic
compliance with program
objectives
to determine whether
agencies are properly
administered,
to eliminate executive
waste and dishonesty
to prevent executive
usurpation of legislative
authority
to assess executive
conformity with the
congressional perception
of public interest.

intrinsic in the grant of legislative

power itself and integral to the
checks and balances inherent in a
democratic system of government
Categories of congressional oversight
functions
Scrutiny
Purpose: determine
economy and efficiency of
the operation of
government activities
Passive process of looking
at facts provided
Based on power of
appropriation of the
congress
Best seen in budget
hearings for GAA and
confirmation of
appointments
Can also be used under
Section 22 Article VI of
Consti (question hour)
Congressional investigation
Intense digging of facts
(Section 21 Article VI of
Consti)
Once an inquiry is
established, investigating
committee has power to
require witnesses to
answer any question
pertinent to the inquiry but
subject to right of against
self-incrimination
Limitations:
o must be in aid of
its legislative
functions
o must be
conducted in
accordance with
duly published
rules of
procedure
o persons
appearing therein
are afforded their
constitutional
rights.
Powers:
o issue subpoena
and subpoena
duces tecum to a
witness in any
part of the

country, signed
by the
chairperson or
acting
chairperson and
the Speaker or
acting Speaker
o thirds (2/3) of all
its members
constituting a
quorum, punish
for contempt any
person who:
o refuses, after
being duly
summoned, to
obey such
summons without
legal excuse
o refuses to be
sworn or placed
under affirmation
o refuses to answer
any relevant
inquiry
o refuses to
produce any
books, papers,
documents or
records that are
relevant to the
inquiry and are in
his/her
possession;
o acts in a
disrespectful
manner towards
any member of
the Committee or
commits
misbehavior in
the presence of
the committee
o unduly interferes
in the conduct of
proceedings
during meetings
Legislative supervision
allows Congress to
scrutinize the exercise of
delegated law-making
authority, and permits
Congress to retain part of
that delegated authority
the two previous powers
look into past executive

actions while supervision

is for the present
Congress exercises
supervision over the
executive agencies
through its veto power. It
typically utilizes veto
provisions when granting
the President or an
executive agency the
power to promulgate
regulations with the force
of law. These provisions
require the President or an
agency to present the
proposed regulations to
Congress, which retains a
right to approve or
disapprove any regulation
before it takes effect.
Legislative veto has 2
sides: necessary to
maintain the balance of
power between the
legislative and the
executive branches of
government or undue
encroachment upon the
executive prerogatives

Mabanag v. Lopez Vito on the enrolled bill doctrine

Petition for Prohibition
Facts:
Three of the plaintiff senators and eight of the plaintiff
representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the
Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and
representatives in the elections held on April 23, 1946. The
three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the
opening of the first session of Congress following the elections,
on account of alleged irregularities in their election. The eight
representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit
in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the
Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been
formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had
been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that
resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House
when the present petition was filed.
As a consequence these three senators and eight
representatives did not take part in the passage of the
questioned resolution, nor was their membership reckoned
within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote
which is required in proposing an amendment to the
Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted,

the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment

would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in
either branch of Congress.
This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a
congressional resolution designated "Resolution of both
houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto."
The defendants are members of the Commission on Elections,
the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General, and the
Director of the Bureau of Printing are made, and the petitioners
are eight senators, seventeen representatives, and the
presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and
the Philippine Youth Party. The validity of the above-mentioned
resolution is attacked as contrary to the Constitution
ISSUE:
Whether Court has Jurisdiction? - NO
The respondents deny that this Court has jurisdiction, relying
on the conclusiveness on the courts of an enrolled bill or
resolution. There is some merit in the petitioners' contention
that this is confusing jurisdiction, which is a matter of
substantive law, with conclusiveness of an enactment or
resolution, which is a matter of evidence and practice
The enrolled bill doctrine is too well established to need
citation of authorities, that political questions are not within the
province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to
deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts
by express constitutional or statutory provision. (16 C.J.S.,
431.) This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the
separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require
elucidation or citation of authorities.
If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a
proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political
question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme
intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the
amendatory process as provided in section 1 of Article XV of
the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct parts:
proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching political
character to one and withholding that character from the other.
Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function
performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity
and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself.
Supreme court agrees with the ruling in the case of Coleman
vs Miller, the US Court ruled efficacy of ratification by state
legislature of a proposed amendment to the Federal
Constitution is a political question and hence not justiciable.
The reasons adduced in support of enrollment doctrine as
contrasted with those which opposed it are, in our opinion,
almost decisive. Some of these reasons are summarized in 50
American Jurisprudence, section 150 as follows:
SEC. 150. Reasons for Conclusiveness. It has been
declared that the rule against going behind the enrolled bill is
required by the respect due to a coequal and independent
department of the government, and it would be an inquisition
into the conduct of the members of the legislature, a very
delicate power, the frequent exercise of which must lead to

endless confusion in the administration of the law. The rule is

also one of convenience, because courts could not rely on the
published session laws, but would be required to look beyond
these to the journals of the legislature and often to any printed
bills and amendments which might be found after the
adjournment of the legislature. Otherwise, after relying on the
prima facie evidence of the enrolled bills, authenticated as
exacted by the Constitution, for years, it might be ascertained
from the journals that an act theretofore enforced had never
become a law. In this respect, it has been declared that these
is quite enough uncertainty as to what the law is without saying
that no one may be certain that an act of the legislature has
become such until the issue has been determined by some
court whose decision might not be regarded as conclusive in
an action between the parties.
Pressure Wigmore on Rules of Evidence(Support for Current
Enrolled Bill Doctrine:):
I think the rule thus adopted accords with public policy. Indeed,
in my estimation, few things would be more mischievous than
the introduction of the opposite rule. . . . The rule contended for
is that the Court should look at the journals of the Legislature
to ascertain whether the copy of the act attested and filed with
the Secretary of State conforms in its contents with the
statements of such journals. This proposition means, if it has
any legal value whatever, that, in the event of a material
discrepancy between the journal and the enrolled copy, the
former is to be taken as the standard of veracity and the act is
to be rejected. This is the test which is to be applied not only to
the statutes now before the Court, but to all statutes; not only
to laws which have been recently passed, but to laws the most
ancient. To my mind, nothing can be more certain than that the
acceptance of this doctrine by the Court would unsettle the
entire statute law of the State.
Supreme Court found in the journals no signs of irregularity in
the passage of the law and did not bother itself with
considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had
been introduced.
HELD:
Petition DISMISSED.

dissenting of J. Puno in Arroyo v. de Venecia .

Arroyo v. De Venecia
Mendoza, J. 1997
Facts:
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240,
which amends certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the
House of Representatives, charged that there is violation
of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are
constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The
Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral
conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions

of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to

the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made
an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum.
But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a
quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep.
Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee
report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and
ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair
called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair
declared: There being none, approved. At the same time
the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What
is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were
talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo
subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion,
the approval of the conference committee report had by
then already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President of the Senate
and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses
of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by
President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it
was passed in violation of the rules of the House
Ratio:
To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would
be to disregard the respect due the other two departments
of our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of
the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court
either to set aside a legislative action as void because the
Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of
procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena
to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners
can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court
has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire
into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power
and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion
were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may
instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek
the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of
R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary,
the Court must assume that Congress or any House
thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was
permitted by its rules, and deference rather than
disrespect is due the judgment of that body
Decision: Court finds no ground for holding that Congress
committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A.
No. 8240 This case istherefore dismissed.
Dissenting opinion of J. Puno
Concurs with the result, but finds the need to express
views on the alleged non-justiciablity of the issue posed
by the petitioner as well as the applicability of the archaic
enrolled bill doctrine
ISSUES:
1. YES.Whether or not the issues posed by petitioner are
non-justiciable?NO
US v. Ballin

The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that

each house may determine the rules of its
proceedings. It appears that in pursuance of this
authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as
one of its rules:
Rule XV
3.
On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion
of the Speaker, the names of member, or at the suggestion
of the Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make
a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall
be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and
reported to the Speaker with the names of the members
voting, and be counted and announced in determining the
presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal,
230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule.
Validity of this rule:
The Constitution empowers each house to determine its
rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and
there should be a reasonable relation between the mode
or method of proceedings established by the rule and the
result which is sought to be
Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to
satisfy the test:
(1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2)
it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its
method has a reasonable relationship with the result
sought to be attained.
By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its
jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the
principle of separation of powers.
2. YES. Whether or not the enrolled bill doctrine may be
used to justify the dismissal of the case at bar--NO
Enrolled bill- one which has been duly introduced, finally
enacted by both Houses, signed by the proper officers of
each House and approved by the President
Modified entry or affirmative contradiction rule- the
presumption in favor of the enrolled bill is not
conclusive. The rule concedes validity to the enrolled bill
unless there affirmatively appears in the journals of the
legislature a statement that there has not been compliance
with one or more of the constitutional requirements
Why the enrolled bill should not be upheld in this case:
Even in the land of its source, the so-called conclusive
presumption of validity originally attributed to that
doctrine has long been revisited and qualified, if not
altogether rejected. On the competency of judicial inquiry,
it has been held that (u)nder the enrolled bill rule by
which an enrolled bill is sole expository of its contents
and conclusive evidence of its existence and valid
enactment, it is nevertheless competent for courts to
inquire as to what prerequisites are fixed by the
Constitution of which journals of respective houses of
Legislature are required to furnish the evidence.
Separation of powers

Section 26 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that any

law contrary to the constitution is void. The proper
exercise of judicial authority requires us to recognize any
law which is unconstitutional and to declare it
void. Without elaborating the point, we believe that under
section 228 of the Kentucky Constitution it is our
obligation to support the Constitution of the
commonwealth. We are sworn to see that violations of
the constitution by any person, corporation, state
agency or branch or government are brought to light
and corrected. To countenance an artificial rule of law
that silences our voices when confronted
Decision:
In sum, I respectfully submit that the Court has
jurisdiction over the petition at bar and the issues posed
by petitioner are justiciable. Nonetheless, I do not find
any grave abuse of discretion committed by the public
respondents to justify granting said petition.
Notes:
Essence or enrolled bill doctrine
-separation of powers
-rule of convenience
-prevent the filing of too many cases which will cast a
cloud of uncertainty on laws passed by the legislature.
-The conclusiveness of the enrolled bill is also justified on
the ground that journals and other extrinsic evidence are
conducive to mistake, if not fraud.
There are four historical bases for the doctrine.
(1) An enrolled bill was a record and, as such was not
subject to attack at common law. (2) Since the legislature
is one of the three branches of government, the courts,
being coequal, must indulge in every presumption that
legislative acts are valid. (3) When the rule was originally
formulated, record-keeping of the legislatures was so
inadequate that a balancing of equities required that the
final act, enrolled bill, be given efficacy. (4) There were
theories of convenience as expressed by the Kentucky
court in Lafferty.
Casco Chemical Co. v. Gimenez
REVIEW OF THE DECISION OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Facts:
Central Bank promulgated Resolution 1529, a
memorandum establishing the procedure for
applications for exemption from the payment of
margin fees on foreign exchange transactions
pursuant to RA2609, Foreign Exchange Margin Fee
Law.
In accordance therewith, Casco Philippine Chemical
Co. Inc. sought a refund of the sums (about 40k total)
paid as margin fee for when it bought foreign
exchange for the importation of urea and
formaldehyde, which are main raw materials in the
production of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding
lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood
producers.

Auditor General affirmed the Auditor Banks decision

denying the said vouchers on the ground that the
separate importations of urea and formaldehyde do
not fall under the exemptions in Sec. 2 of RA2609.
o Sec. 2: margin shall not imposed upon the
sale of foreign exchange for the importation
of, inter alia, urea formaldehyde for the
manufacture of plywood and hardboard
when imported by and for the exclusive use
of end-users.

Issues: WON urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law

from payment of the margin fee. NO
Ratio:

Urea formaldehyde is a finished product (see notes

for full description) which is patently distinct and
different from urea and formaldehyde as separate
articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin
known as urea formaldehyde
That the bill approved in congress contained the
injunction and and from the statements made on the
floor of the Senate indicating the intent to exempt
urea and formaldehyde separately do not
necessarily reflect the view of the Senate, much less
that of the House of Representatives.
The enrolled billwhich uses the term urea
formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts. If
there has been any misprint of the bill before it was
certified by Congress and approved by the President,
the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation,
not by judicial decree.

Held: Petition denied. Decision of the Auditor General

affirmed.
Notes:
Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the
synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from definite
proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions
relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This
produce when applied in water solution and extended with
inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use
in the manufacture of plywood.
B. Executive department
1. The president
a.
Singular Executive
Villena v. Secretary of the Interior Laurel, J
April 21, 1939
Petitioner: Jose D. Villena
Respondent: Secretary of the Interior
Original Action in the Supreme Court, Prohibition
Facts:
- Petitioner Villena is the mayor of Makati, Rizal

- Respondent Secretary requested an inquiry into the conduct

of petitioner
- Petitioner was found to have committed bribery, extortion,
malicious abuse of authority, and unauthorized practice of the
law profession
- February 8, 1939 - Respondent Secretary recommended to
the President the suspension of the petitioner
- Recommendation was verbally granted by the President,
according to the Solicitor General
- Februrary 9, 1939 - Respondent suspended the petitioner
from office
- March 28, 1939 - Formal investigation by a special
investigator appointed by respondent Secretary set at this date

- Petition does not have enough proof to warrant the granting

of the writ of the preliminary injunction
- Courts of equity have no power to restrain public officers by
injunction from performing any official acts which they are
required by law to perform, or acts which are not in excess of
the authority and discretion reposed in them

Petitioner's contentions
- Respondent has no jurisdiction or authority to suspend, or
charge petitioner, at the same time, decide for himself the
merits of the charges
- Because the power to suspend, try and punish municipal
officials is lodged in some other agency of the government
- Acts of respondent are null and void because:
- in suspending petitioner, respondent exercised control over
local government. That power was taken away from the
President by the Constitution.
- power of supervision by respondent must be exercised in
accordance with the provisions of law.
- Respondent is exercising an arbitrary power by being a
complainant and at the same time judge of the charges against
petitioner
- Action of respondent is not based in any sworn statement of
any private person.

Ratio:
1. Section 79(c) of the Administrative Code provides:

Petitioner wants the Court to:

- issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondent,
preventing him from proceeding against petitioner until the
case is resolved
- declare the respondent without authority to suspend the
petitioner
- declare the respondent without authority to prefer charges
against the petitioner
Sol Gen's contentions:
- Sec. 19(c), in relation with Sec. 86 of the Revised
Administrative Code empowers respondent Secretary to
conduct investigation of any act or conduct of any person in
the service of his bureau
- Sec 2188 of the Administrative Code, must be read in
accordance with Sec. 37 of Act 4007 (Reorganization Law of
1932)
- Petitioner did not question the power of jurisdiction of the
Department of the Interior to investigate the administrative
charges against him at the commencement of the
investigation.
- Since respondent has authority to investigate petitioner, he
should also be vested with authority to accomplish the purpose
of the investigation (i.e. the suspension of the petitioner)

Issues:
1. WON the respondent Secretary has legal authority to order
an investigation, by a special investigator appointed by himself
- YES
2. WON respondent Secretary has legal authority to suspend
petitioner - YES

The Department Head shall have direct control, direction, and

supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction
xxx
The Department Head may order the investigation of any act
or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office
under his department and in connection therewith may appoint
a committee or designate an official or person who shall
conduct such investigations, and such committee, official, or
person may summon, witness by subpoena and subpoena,
duces tecum, administer oath and take testimony relevant to
the investigation.
This section should be interpreted in relation to Section 86 of
the Administrative Code, which grants 'executive supervision
over the administration of provinces, municipalities, chartered
cities and other local political subdivisions' to the respondent
Secretary of the Interior
As per Planas v. Gil, 'supervision is not a meaningless thing. It
is an active power.' It 'implies authority to inquire into facts and
conditions in order to render the ower real and effective.'
Thus, respondent Secretary has power to order the
investigation of petitioner, under his powers of supervision.
2. Sec. 1, Art VII of the Constitution provides for a single,
not plural Executive. The President of the Philippines is
the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and
no other. The heads of the executive departments are but the
closest advisers of the President., and they are subject to the
direction of the President. Their personality is but a projection
of the personality of the President. They are only alter egos of
the President, in the matter of the department that they head.
As per Sec. 12(1), Art VII (Sec. 17, Art VII of the 1987
Consti), all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department; thus, the acts of the
respondent Secretary, being an assistant and agent of the

President, are presumptively acts of the President himself,

unless the President himself disapproves or reprobates it.
The President is invested with the authority to suspend
the petitioner. Thus the respondent, acting as his alter
ego, is also vested with such power, and since the
President did not disapprove or reprobate his act of
suspending petitioner Villena, such act must be
considered valid.

b. Qualifications, election, term and oath

Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal (2011)
Nachura, J.
Motion for Reconsideration of SC Decision
FACTS:

Held:
Petition dismissed. Costs against the petitioner.
Notes:
Sec 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code - empowers
the provincial governor to 'receive and investigate complaints
made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of
office',

Sec 37, Act No. 4007: the provisions of the existing law to
the contrary notwithstanding, that whenever a specific power,
authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted to a chief of
bureau, office, division or service, the same shall be
understood as also conferred upon the proper Department
Head who shall have authority to act directly in pursuance
thereof, or to review, modify or revoke any decision or action of
said chief of bureau, office, division or service
The Court dismissed the petition on the ground that
respondents acts are also the acts of the President, as the
President did not disapprove them. As regards the contentions
of the Sol Gen:
Contention 2: Sec 2188 of the Administrative Code, must be
read in accordance with Sec. 37 of Act 4007 (Reorganization
Law of 1932)

ISSUE:

WON the creation of the Presidential Electoral

Tribunal (PET) is unconstitutional.
NO, it is Constitutional

RATIO:

The Court said that upholding such contention would make the
power of the Secretary of the Interior too broad, as to encroach
upon the exclusive powers of municipal mayors. Court does
not have experience in answering the question, and the
Constitution itself recognizes the right of local self-government,
no matter how limited.
Contention 3: Since respondent has authority to investigate
petitioner, he should also be vested with authority to
accomplish the purpose of the investigation (i.e. the
suspension of the petitioner)

The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed

by petitioner of the SCs decision dismissing the
formers petition and declaring the establishment of
the respondent Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET)
as constitutional.
Petitioner, Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal, argues that
PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art
VII of the Constitution does not provide for the
creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of
the Constitution.
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution
of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant
of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge
of all election contests for the President or VicePresident under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the
Constitution.

The Court said that this is a point that it does not have to
decide.

A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7,

readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme
Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the
method by which the Supreme Court exercises this
authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of
power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme
Courts exercise thereof. The Supreme Courts
method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential
election contests, through the PET, is actually a
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred
by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the
subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme
Court to promulgate its rules for the purpose.
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court,
as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority conferred
upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
There is an explicit reference of the Members of the
Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically

declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4,

Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they
constitutionalized what was statutory.
Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the
same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine
of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction
bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vicepresidential elections contests includes the means
necessary to carry it into effect.
The traditional grant of judicial power is found in
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which
provides that the power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. The set up embodied in the
Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution
of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of
judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET,
resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election
contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial
power.
The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and
literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of
law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve
election contests which involve, in essence, an
exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit
constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2),
Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17,
Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral
Tribunals) of the Constitution
The PET is not simply an agency to which Members
of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET,
as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to
be an institution independent, but not separate, from
the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.

RULING:
Petition Denied
NOTES:
Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The
Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules
for the purpose.
Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of
the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall
not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.

Pormento v. Estrada

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Facts:
Pormento filed a petition asking whether private respondent
Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by the ban on the President
from any reelection." (Art VII, Sec 4)
Issue:
The court said that there is no actual controversy because
Erap did not win. The petition is speculative. The case is moot.
Held:
Petition dismissed
c. Privilege and Salary
d.
Prohibitions
Funa v. Ermita
Funa vs Ermita (February 11, 2010) Villarama, Jr., J.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus.
Antecedent Facts:
-On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as
Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC).
-Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime
Transport of the department on October 23, 2006.
-On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then
MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was
designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the
Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC
Undersecretary.
-On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as
taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant
petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautistas
appointment/designation.
-On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition,
Bautista was appointed Administrator of the MARINA and she
assumed her duties and responsibilities as such on February
2, 2009.
Facts of the Case:
-Petitioner argues that Bautistas concurrent positions as
DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
-It was pointed out in Civil Liberties Union that prohibition does
not apply to those positions held in ex officio capacities but the
position of MARINA Administrator is not ex officio to the post of
DOTC Undersecretary.
-Petitioner further contends that even if Bautistas appointment
or designation as OIC of MARINA was intended to be merely
temporary, still, such designation must not violate a standing
constitutional prohibition, citing the rationale in Achacoso v.
Macaraig. Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does

not enumerate temporariness as one (1) of the exceptions

thereto.
-Petitioner likewise asserts the incompatibility between the
posts of DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA Administrator.
The DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport and the OIC
of MARINA have become one (1) and the same person. There
is no more checking and counter-checking of powers and
functions, and therein lies the danger to the maritime industry.
-Petitioner contends that there is a strong possibility in this
case that the challenge herein can be rendered moot through
the expediency of simply revoking the temporary
appointment/designation. But since a similar violation can be
committed in the future, there exists a possibility of evading
review.
-Respondents argue that requisites of a judicial inquiry are not
present in this case and there is no longer an actual
controversy that needs to be resolved.
-They also raise the lack of legal standing of petitioner to bring
this suit.
-Respondents say that there was no violation of Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution because respondent
Bautista was merely designated acting head of MARINA on
September 1, 2008. She was designated MARINA OIC, not
appointed MARINA Administrator. Thus, her case falls under
the recognized exceptions to the rule against multiple offices.
-Petitioners fear that there is no longer a person above the
Administrator of MARINA who will be reviewing the acts of said
agency (the Undersecretary for Maritime Transport) is clearly
unfounded because any recommendation by the MARINA
Administrator concerning issues of policy and administration
go to the MARINA Board and not the Undersecretary for
Maritime Transport.
Issue:
WON petitioner has legal standing. -YES
Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional
prohibition against Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants holding two (2) or more positions in government, the
fact that he filed this suit as a concerned citizen sufficiently
confers him with standing to sue for redress of such illegal act
by public officials.
WON the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of
MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been
appointed, violated the constitutional proscription against dual
or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and
assistants. -YES
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary
of DOTC, she was thus covered by the stricter prohibition
under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot
invoke the exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2,
Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or
the primary functions of the position. Neither was she
designated OIC of MARINA in an ex officio capacity, which is
the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union. The
prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or

employment under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987

Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the
Executive officials specified therein, without additional
compensation in an ex officio capacity as provided by law and
as required by the primary functions of said office.
Held:
The petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma.
Elena H. Bautista as
Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime
Industry Authority, in a concurrent capacity with her position as
DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and therefore, NULL
and VOID.
e. Exceptions to prohibition from holding another
office
(VP as member of the cabinet, Secretary of Justice as
member of the Judicial and Bar Council)
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary
Petitioners: Civil Liberties Union, Anti Graft League of the
Philippines and Crispin Reyes
Respondents: Executive Secretary and PHILIP ELLA C.
JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform; CARLOS
DOMINGUEZ, as Secretary of Agriculture; LOURDES
QUISUMBING, as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports;
FULGENCIO FACTORAN, JR., as Secretary of Environment
and Natural Resources; VICENTE V. JAYME, as Secretary of
Finance; SEDFREY ORDOEZ, as Secretary of Justice;
FRANKLIN N. DRILON, as Secretary of Labor and
Employment; LUIS SANTOS, as Secretary of Local
Government; FIDEL V. RAMOS, as Secretary of National
Defense; TEODORO F. BENIGNO, as Press Secretary;
JUANITO FERRER, as Secretary of Public Works and
Highways; ANTONIO ARRIZABAL, as Secretary of Science
and Technology; JOSE CONCEPCION, as Secretary of Trade
and Industry; JOSE ANTONIO GONZALEZ, as Secretary of
Tourism; ALFREDO R.A. BENGZON, as Secretary of Health;
REINERIO D. REYES, as Secretary of Transportation and
Communication; GUILLERMO CARAGUE, as Commissioner
of the Budget; and SOLITA MONSOD, as Head of the National
Economic Development Authority, respondents.
Ponente: Chief Justice Fernan
Facts:
1. President Corazon Aquino issued EO. 284 on July 25, 1987.
This order contained provisions which according to petitioners
are unconstitutional, mainly Secs. 1-3.
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of
his position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or
assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive
Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not
more than two positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding compensation
therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc

bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which

the President is the Chairman.
Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant
secretary or other appointive official of the Executive
Department holds more positions than what is allowed in
Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the excess position
in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no
case shall any official hold more than two positions other than
his primary position.
Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government
in government-owned or controlled corporations, at least onethird (1/3) of the members of the boards of such corporation
should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant
secretary.
2. Petitioners argue that the EO issued is unconstitutional for it
goes against Section 13 of Article 7 of the Constitution.
According to them, it allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary
positions. Additionally, petitioners are contending DOJ
Opinion 073, released on July 23, 1987. Opinion 073
declared that Cabinet members, their deputies
(undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries may hold
other public office, including membership in the boards of
government corporations: (a) when directly provided for in
the Constitution as in the case of the Secretary of Justice
who is made an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council under Section 8, paragraph 1, Article VIII; or (b) if
allowed by law; or (c) if allowed by the primary functions
of their respective positions. This led to the promulgation of
the contested EO. Both EO and DOJ opinion are said to have
construed Section 13 of Article 7 and Section 7 paragraph 2 of
Article 9-B (Civil Service Commission) of the Constitution.
3. Petitioners argue that based on the phrase unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, the only exceptions
against holding any other office or employment in Government
are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The VicePresident may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under
Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of
Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council
by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Issue:
1. Does EO 284 add exceptions against the provisions in
exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided
in the Constitution.
2. Exception to the prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article IXB on the Civil Service Commission applies to officers and
employees of the Civil Service in general and that said
exceptions do not apply and cannot be extended to Section 13,
Article VII which applies specifically to the President, VicePresident, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or
assistants
Ratio:
1. Constitutional construction- When in doubt of
constitutionality, the Court shall bear in mind the object sought
to be accomplished by its adoption. Based on past
experiences in Marcos regime, the framers intended to ensure

that the previous scandalous practices of Cabinet members

holding multiple positions in the government and collecting
unconscionably excessive compensation therefrom would be
discontinued. Section 7 Article 9-B contains a blanket
prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or
employment in the government subsuming both elective
and appointive public officials. Despite this, the
commission still inserted another provision (Section 13,
Article 7) which specifically prohibits the President, VicePresident, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants from holding any other office or employment
during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution.
2. Comparison of Section 13, Article 7 to other
Constitutional provisions- Section 13, Article 7 specifically
prohibits the President, VP, Cabinet members and their
deputies from holding any office or employment during their
tenure as compared to other provisions like Section 13 Article
6 (prohibits members of Congress from holding other positions
within the Government) and Section 5 (par. 4) of Article 16 (no
officer of the armed forces in active service may be appointed
in any capacity to a civilian position in the government or
GOCC). Second sentence of Section 13, Article 7 further
prohibits the President and his official family from other
employment ("They shall not, during said tenure, directly
or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in
any business, or be financially interested in any contract
with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries."). The
prohibition against the president and his official family
covers both private and public sphere in terms of
employment.
3. Difference between Section 13, Article 7 and Section 7
Article 9-B: Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the
general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public
officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant
to be the exception applicable only to the President, the VicePresident, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants. The phrase unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution cannot refer to the broad exceptions
provided under Section 7, Article I-XB of the 1987
Constitution. To do so would make the intent of the
framers in ensuring that the President and official family
would have stricter prohibitions void.
4. Prohibition under Section 13, Article 7- The prohibition
against holding dual or multiple offices or employment
under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not
be construed as applying to posts occupied by the
Executive officials specified therein without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law
and as required by the primary functions of said officials'
office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any
other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties
and functions on said officials. (Officials only allowed to hold

other offices only if said offices are closely related to and

are required by the officials primary function without
additional
compensation.
Think
Secretary
of
Transportations and Communications as Chairman of
Light Rail Transit Authority).
5.Ex-officio- the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not
to be interpreted as covering positions held without additional
compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and
as required by the primary functions of the concerned official's
office. The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of
office." It refers to an "authority derived from official
character merely, not expressly conferred upon the
individual character, but rather annexed to the official
position." Ex-officio denotes an "act done in an official
character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other
appointment or authority than that conferred by the office." An
ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by
virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further
warrant or appointment. (This shit just means ex-officio is
good and constitutional and other appointments and stuff
is bad and unconstitutional).
SC Decision: EO 284 is unconstitutional, all sitting cabinet
members are to vacate their positions outside of their
primary function.
Note: EO 284 is unconstitutional because it allows
increased number of positions to be held by cabinet
members compared to what the Constitution allows.
Dela Cruz v. Commission on Audit
Petition for Certiorari (2001) Sandoval Gutierrez
Facts:
This petition for certiorari assails the Decision No. 98-381
dated September 22, 1998, rendered by the Commission on
Audit (COA), denying petitioners appeal from the Notice of
Disallowance No. 97-011-061 issued by the NHA Resident
Auditor on October 23, 1997. Such Notice disallowed payment
to petitioners of their representation allowances and per diems
for the period from August 19, 1991 to August 31, 1996 in the
total amount of P276,600.00.
Petitioners are directors of NHA and sit on the Board of
Directors not because of their own right but because they sit as
alternates of their principals which are the executive
department secretaries mentioned below.
Petitioners, through then Chairman Dionisio C. Dela Serna of
the NHA Board of Directors, appealed from the Notice of
Disallowance to the Commission on Audit based on the
following grounds:
1. The Decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Liberties Union
and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. was clarified in
the Resolution of the Court En Banc on August 1, 1991, in that
the constitutional ban against dual or multiple positions applies
only to the members of the Cabinet, their deputies or
assistants. It does not cover other appointive officials with

equivalent rank or those lower than the position of Assistant

Secretary; and
2. The NHA Directors are not Secretaries, Undersecretaries or
Assistant Secretaries and that they occupy positions lower
than the position of Assistant Secretary.
Issues:
Whether the alternates of the Executive Department
Secretaries have double employment? - NO
Presidential Decree No. 757 is the law "Creating the National
Housing Authority and dissolving the existing housing
agencies, defining its powers and functions, providing funds
therefor, and for other purposes." Section 7 thereof provides:
SEC. 7. Board of Directors. - The Authority shall be governed
by a Board of Directors, hereinafter referred to as the Board,
which shall be composed of the Secretary of Public Works,
Transportation and Communication, the Director-General of
the National Economic and Development Authority, the
Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of
Industry, the Executive Secretary and the General Manager of
the Authority. From among the members, the President will
appoint a chairman. The members of the Board may have
their respective alternates who shall be the officials next in
rank to them and whose acts shall be considered the acts of
their principals with the right to receive their benefit: Provided,
that in the absence of the Chairman, the Board shall elect a
temporary presiding officer. x x x (Emphasis ours)
It bears stressing that under the above provisions, the persons
mandated by law to sit as members of the NHA Board are the
following: (1) the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation
and Communications, (2) the Director-General of the National
Economic and Development Authority, (3) the Secretary of
Finance, (4) the Secretary of Labor, (5) the Secretary of
Industry, (6) the Executive Secretary, and (7) the General
Manager of the NHA. While petitioners are not among those
officers, however, they are alternates of the said officers,
whose acts shall be considered the acts of their principals.
On this point, Section 13, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution,
provides:
SEC. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
EMPLOYMENT during their tenure. They shall not, during
their tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

Court also discussed ex officio (per ruling in Civil Liberties

Union and Anti Graft League of the Philippines, Inc)
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal
contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the
official concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for his services in the said position. The reason
is that these services are already paid for and covered by the
compensation attached to his principal office. It should be
obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a
meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member
thereof, he is actually and in legal contemplation performing
the primary function of his principal office in defining policy in
monetary banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction
of his department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not
entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the
form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some
other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated,
such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution
Since the Executive Department Secretaries, as ex-oficio
members of the NHA Board, are prohibited from receiving
extra (additional) compensation, whether it be in the form of a
per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other
such euphemism," it follows that petitioners who sit as their
alternates cannot likewise be entitled to receive such
compensation. A contrary rule would give petitioners a better
right than their principals.
HELD:
Petition DISMISSED.
2.
a.

Powers and Functions of the President

Executive Power
i.
Power to execute laws
Ople v. Torres (1998)
Facts:
Senator Blas Ople assails the validity of
Administrative Order No. 308 Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System,
issued by President Fidel Ramos in 1996, on the
grounds that:
it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to
legislate
it intrudes on our citizenrys protected zone
of privacy
Sec. 4 provides for a Population Reference Number
(PRN) as a common reference number to establish a
linkage among concerned agencies through the use
of Biometrics Technology and computer application
designs.
Issues:
1. WON A.O. No. 308 is a law and hence, beyond the
power of the President to issue YES
2.
Assuming arguendo that A.O. 308 need not be the
subject of a law, it facially violates the right to privacy. YES

Ratio:
1. Legislative power is the authority to make laws, and
to alter and repeal them. Any power, deemed to be
legislative by usage and traiddition, is necessarily
possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has
lodged in elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the
Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative
power embraces all subjects and extends to matters
of general concern or common interest.
2.
The executive power, generally defined as the power to
enforce and administer the laws, is vested in the President. As
the Chief Executive, he represents the government as a
whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the
officials and employees of his department. He has the
power of control, or authority to assume directly the functions
of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere
with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of
control, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and
offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties
effectively. Administrative power is concerned with the work of
applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform
standard of administrative efficiency and check the official
conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative
orders, rules and regulations
It cannot be argued that A.O. 308 merely implements the
Administrative Code of 1987, which is a general law that
covers the internal administration of government and the
effects of the functions performed by administrative officials on
private individuals or parties outside government. An
administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President
which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation
of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should
be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying
out the legislative policy. In the case at bar, A.O. 308 redefines
parameters of basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State
and requires adjustment of various contending state policies
(national security, extent of privacy interest against dossiergathering by government, the choice of policies). Such subject
should be covered by law.
Administrative legislation must be restricted in its scope and
application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute
for the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form
of a public law. Authority to prescribe riles and regulations is
not an independent source of power to make laws.
(ratio not comprehensive since were discussing executive)
2.
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.
Right to privacy requires that the law be narrowly focused and

a compelling ineterest justify intrusions thereinto. It must be

accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards
to prevent unconstitutional invasions.
Held: Petition granted. A.O. 308 unconstitutional, therefore null
and void
ii. Control and supervision over the executive
branch of the government
Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Pao Sanchez, J
November 17, 1967
Petitioner: Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc.
Respondents: Jose Pao; Hon. Juan Pajo, as Executive
Secretary; Hon. Juan de G. Rodriguez, as Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Davao
Summary of Proceedings:
Director of Lands - Sales application of herein petitioner
corporation given due course; respondent Pao's claim
dismissed
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources - Pao's
appeal is without merit, claim dismissed
Executive Secretary - Farmers given the land upon which they
have made improvements; controverted land to be subdivided
and allocated to actual occupants
CFI - Plaintiff corporation's petition to reverse the decision of
the Executive Secretary and reinstate the decision of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dismissed.
Facts:
- Jose Magallanes was a permitee and actual occupant of a 1
103Ha pasture land
- January 9, 1953 - Magallanes ceded his rights and interests
of a portion of his land to petitioner corporation
- April 13, 1954 - portion of Magallanes's land officially
released from being pasture land and declared agricultural
land
- January 26, 1955 - Jose Pao and 19 companions applied for
the purchase of 90Ha of the released area
- March 29, 1955 - petitioner Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. also
files its application for the entire released area. This was
opposed by respondent Pao and his companions, as they are
actual occupants of the part they applied for.
- July 31, 1956 - Director of lands dismisses case (see
Summary of Proceedings for next three bullets)
- July 5, 1957 - Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
- June 25, 1958 - Executive Secretary
- Then, CFI
Petitioner's contentions
- Sec. 4 of Commonwealth Act 141 is controlling not only
upon courts, but also upon the President. Sec 4 states that the
decisions of the Director of Lands 'as to questions of facts

shall be conclusive when approved' by Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources.
- Executive Secretary's decision is an undue delegation of the
executive power of control, as such is not contained in the
Constitution
- Executive Secretary is equal in rank with the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources; therefore, he cannot
'override' the decision of an official of equal rank.
Issues:
1. WON Sec. 4, Commonwealth Act 141 is controlling upon the
President - NO
2. WON there is an undue delegation of the executive power of
control - NO
3. WON the Executive Secretary intruded into the 'zone of
action' of the Secretary of Natural Resources - NO
Ratio:
1. Sec 10(1), Art VII of the 1935 Constitution provides that
the President has the power of control of all executive
departments. Control is defined as 'the power of an officer
to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.'
Thus, the Constitution vests upon the President the power to
reverse the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
In addition, it is standard practice to allow appeals from
decisions of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to reach the Office of the President. And the right to
appeal to the President reposes upon the President's power of
control.
2. The President should perform acts by himself, or in person if
they are stated in the Constitution that he does so. Otherwise,
if the Constitution does not state that an act be done by the
President in person, the President may delegate it. This is
because the President cannot be expected to perform in
person all the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of his Office.
The Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by
authority of the President has undisputed jurisdiction to affirm,
modify, or even reverse any order that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources may issue. (Extensive
Enterprises v. Sabro Co.)
3. Executive Secretary signed 'by authority of the President.'
This means that his decision is the decision of the President.
The assumed authority of the Executive Secretary is accepted,
unless the President 'disapproves or reprobates' the Executive
Secretary. That has not happened here, so all is well.
Held:
CFI decision affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

Notes:
Sec. 10(1), Art VII, 1935 Constitution
The President shall have control of all executive departments,
bureaus or offices, exercise general provision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that
the laws be faithfully executed.

Banda v. Ermita (2010) Leonardo-De Castro, J.

Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and
Prohibition
Banda v. Ermita
FACTS:
Executive Order No. 285 created the National Printing
Office (NPO) and was issued by Pres. Corazon Aquino in 1987
o NPO was formed from the merger of the
Government Printing Office and the relevant printing
units of the Philippine Information Agency (PIA)
President GMA issued Executive Order No. 378 on 2004
amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia,
removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing
services requirements of government agencies and
instrumentalities.
o Seen in Section 1 of EO No. 378
o Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government
agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source
their printing services from the private sector through
competitive bidding, subject to the condition that the
services offered by the private supplier be of superior
quality and lower in cost compared to what was
offered by the NPO.
o Except for election paraphernalia
Still sole domain of NPO, although may be
shared with the Bangko Sentral
Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPOs appropriation
in the General Appropriations Act to its income
o Seen in Section 3 of EO No. 378
o No more additional government support
Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their
security of tenure as employees of the NPO, petitioners now
challenge its constitutionality, contending that:
o (1) it is beyond the executive powers of President
Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285
issued by former President Aquino when the latter still
exercised legislative powers; and
o (2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners
security of tenure, because it paves the way for the
gradual abolition of the NPO.
As a Procedural Issue, the petitioners filed the case as a
class action suit
o Claimed to be on behalf of all the NPO employees
o Section 12 Rule 3 of the Rules of Court give the
requisites of a class suit

1. The subject matter of controversy is

one of common or general interest to many
persons
2. The parties affected are so numerous
that it is impracticable to bring them all to
court
3. The parties bringing the class suit are
sufficiently numerous or representative of
the class and can fully protect the interests
of all concerned
o Petition failed to state the number of people
affected
It as the Sol Gen (counsel for
respondents) who supplied the number of
549 employees in the NPO
Only seemed like 20 employees effectively instituted the
present case
An important element of a class suit is
adequacy of representation
Essentially, the interests of the majority of the class must
be adequately represented by those instituting the suit
A manifestation for desistance was filed
by the president of the National Printing
Office Workers Association (NAPOWA),
opposing the filing of the petition
This pleading is a clear indication of the divergence of
opinions and views among the members of the class sought to
be represented
Since it cannot be said that petitioners
sufficiently represent the interests of the
entire class, the instant case cannot be
properly treated as a class suit
ISSUE:
Whether EO 378 is constitutional. YES, it is
RATIO:
First ground raised by petitioners is that former President
Aquinos EO 285 is a legislative enactment, as it was issued
while President Aquino still had legislative powers under the
Freedom Constitution, and thus only Congress through
legislation can validly amend EO 285
o We find this ground patently without merit
o It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that
the President has the power to reorganize the offices
and agencies in the executive department in line with
the Presidents constitutionally granted power of
control over executive offices and by virtue of
previous delegation of the legislative power to
reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.
o Executive Order No. 292 of the Administrative
Code of 1987 gives the President continuing
authority to reorganize and redefine the functions of
the Office of the President.
o Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the
said Code, is explicit: The President, subject to the
policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have

continuing authority to reorganize the administrative

structure of the Office of the President.
o It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is
part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in
various times has been an agency directly attached to
the Office of the Press Secretary or as an agency
under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of
the Office of the President.
o Concomitant to the Presidents power to abolish,
merge, or consolidate offices, implicitly has the power
to effect less radical or less substantive changes to
the functional and internal structure of the Office of
the President, including the modification of functions
of such executive agencies as the exigencies of the
service may require
In the case at bar, there was at most a
mere alteration of the main function of the
NPO
o The President also has recourse to residual
powers
Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of
the Administrative Code of 1987 entitled
residual powers
Presidents power of reorganization has
been supported by General Appropriations
Laws
Sec. 77 and 78 of the 2003 GAA,
reenacted in 2004 (the year of EO 378)
These gave the power to implement structural, functional,
and operational adjustments
o Section 17, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution
The president shall have control of all
executive departments, bureaus and offices.
o To be very clear, this delegated legislative power
to reorganize pertains only to the Office of the
President and the departments, offices and agencies
of the executive branch and does not include the
Judiciary, the Legislature or the constitutionallycreated or mandated bodies.
o Moreover, it must be stressed that the exercise by
the President of the power to reorganize the
executive department must be in accordance with the
Constitution, relevant laws and prevailing
jurisprudence.
Second Ground is that the reorganization will lead to the
eventual abolition of the NPO
o In Dario vs. Mison
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have
been regarded as valid provided they are
pursued in good faith
o Petitioners aver that the reorganization of the NPO
was done in bad faith
He who asserts a fact has the burden of
proving it
Petitioners utterly failed to do so
o No showing that it would lead to the abolition of
the position or removal from office of any employee

Additionally, the Court has observed that

there is no such thing as an absolute right to
hold office
RULING:
Petition Dismissed
NOTES:
EO 285
SECTION 6. Creation of the National Printing Office. There is
hereby created a National Printing Office out of the merger of
the Government Printing Office and the relevant printing units
of the Philippine Information Agency. The Office shall have
exclusive printing jurisdiction over the following:
a. Printing, binding and distribution of all standard and
accountable forms of national, provincial, city and municipal
governments, including government corporations;
b. Printing of officials ballots;
c. Printing of public documents such as the Official Gazette,
General Appropriations Act, Philippine Reports, and
development information materials of the Philippine
Information Agency.
EO 378
SECTION 1. The NPO shall continue to provide printing
services to government agencies and instrumentalities as
mandated by law. However, it shall no longer enjoy exclusive
jurisdiction over the printing services requirements of the
government over standard and accountable forms. It shall
have to compete with the private sector, except in the printing
of election paraphernalia which could be shared with the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, upon the discretion of the
Commission on Elections consistent with the provisions of the
Election Code of 1987.
SECTION 2. Government agencies/instrumentalities may
source printing services outside NPO provided that:
2.1 The printing services to be provided by the private sector is
superior in quality and at a lower cost than what is offered by
the NPO; and
2.2 The private printing provider is flexible in terms of meeting
the target completion time of the government agency.
SECTION 3. In the exercise of its functions, the amount to be
appropriated for the programs, projects and activities of the
NPO in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) shall be limited
to its income without additional financial support from the
government. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the
Administrative Code of 1987
Sec. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize
his Office. The President, subject to the policy in the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy
and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this
purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the
President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the
President Special Assistants/Advisers System and the

Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or

merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to
another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to
any other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions
to the Office of the President from other Departments and
Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to
any other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to
the Office of the President from other Departments or
agencies.
Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of the Admin Code
Sec. 20. Residual Powers. Unless Congress provides
otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and
functions vested in the President which are provided for under
the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or
which are not delegated by the President in accordance with
law.
2003 GAA, reenacted in 2004
Section 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided
by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no
changes in key positions or organizational units in any
department or agency shall be authorized in their respective
organizational structures and funded from appropriations
provided by this Act.
Section 78. Institutional Strengthening and Productivity
Improvement in Agency Organization and Operations and
Implementation of Organization/Reorganization Mandated by
Law. The Government shall adopt institutional strengthening
and productivity improvement measures to improve service
delivery and enhance productivity in the government, as
directed by the President of the Philippines. The heads of
departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and other entities of
the Executive Branch shall accordingly conduct a
comprehensive review of their respective mandates, missions,
objectives, functions, programs, projects, activities and
systems and procedures; identify areas where improvements
are necessary; and implement corresponding structural,
functional and operational adjustments that will result in
streamlined organization and operations and improved
performance and productivity: PROVIDED, That actual
streamlining and productivity improvements in agency
organization and operations, as authorized by the President of
the Philippines for the purpose, including the utilization of
savings generated from such activities, shall be in accordance
with the rules and regulations to be issued by the DBM, upon
consultation with the Presidential Committee on Effective
Governance: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in the
implementation of organizations/reorganizations, or specific
changes in agency structure, functions and operations as a
result of institutional strengthening or as mandated by law, the
appropriation, including the functions, projects, purposes and
activities of agencies concerned may be realigned as may be
necessary: PROVIDED, FINALLY, That any unexpended

balances or savings in appropriations may be made available

for payment of retirement gratuities and separation benefits to
affected personnel, as authorized under existing laws.
Section 17, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution
The president shall have control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices.
Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs
Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs (2012)
Prospero Pichay Petitioner
*hes the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water
Utilities Administration (LWUA)
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR
LEGAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATIVE AND ADJUDICATORY
DIVISION, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, and HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his
capacity as Secretary of Finance, and as an ex-officio member
of the Monetary Board - respondents
PETITION for Certiorari and Prohibition
FACTS
- The case is about the constitutionality of EO No. 13 which
abolished the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and
transferred its investigative, adjudicatory and recommendatory
functions to the Office Of The Deputy Executive Secretary For
Legal Affairs, Office of the President.
EO No. 13 was issued by President Noynoy Aquino.
The said EO, in effect, abolished PAGC which was
created under EO No. 12 issued by Gloria Arroyo.
- Finance Secretary Cesar Purisima filed before the
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division - Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA) a
complaint for grave misconduct against Pichay and the
incumbent members of LWUA Board of Trustees because of
purchase of 445,377 shares of stock of Express Savings Bank,
Inc.
Petitioner Pichay filed a motion to dismiss the case
since it was already pending before the Office of the
Ombudsman
- Pichay alleged the following:
I. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE
POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO CREATE A PUBLIC
OFFICE.
II. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE
POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO APPROPRIATE
FUNDS.
III. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE
POWER OF CONGRESS TO DELEGATE QUASI-JUDICIAL
POWERS TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.
IV. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR ENCROACHING
UPON THE POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN. (NO)
V. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE
GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS. (NO)
VI. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. (NO)

ISSUE
WON EO 13 is unconstitutional given the following allegations
- NO
RATIO
1.
The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize
the Executive Department under E.O. 292. Clearly, the
abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a
division specially created within the ODESLA is properly within
the prerogative of the President under his continuing
"delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own office
pursuant to E.O. 292.
2.
However, the President's power to reorganize the Office
of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should
be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the
President Proper.
Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can
reorganize the Office of the President Proper by
abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by
transferring functions from one unit to another. In
contrast
under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the
President's power to reorganize offices outside the
Office of the President Proper but still within the
Office of the President is limited to merely transferring
functions or agencies from the Office of the President
to Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.
3.
The Reorganization Did not Entail the Creation of a
New, Separate and Distinct Office. The abolition of the PAGC
did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct
office as the duties and functions that pertained to the defunct
anti-graft body were simply transferred to the ODESLA, which
is an existing office within the Office of the President Proper.
So, in other words, it is merely a reorganization, an
alteration of administrative structure, which is within the
ambit of EO 292. Besides, the reorganization was done in
good faith
4.
The IAD-ODESLA cannot try and resolve cases, its
authority being limited to the conduct of investigations,
preparation of reports and submission of recommendations.
E.O. 13 explicitly states that the IAD-ODESLA shall perform
powers, functions and duties of PAGC.
the IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and
recommendatory body to the President, not having
the power to settle controversies and adjudicate
cases. Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot
be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice,
or even a quasi-judicial agency or office.
5.
The power to issue EO 13 is in accordance with the
Presidents function as Chief Executive , where he is granted
full control over the Executive department to ensure
enforcement of laws.
Article VII, Section 17 provides: The President shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
HELD
Petition DISMISSED

NOTES
EO 292, Sec. 31 (aka Administrative Code of 1987): President
has the continuing authority to reorganize the offices
under him in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency. These include the ability to:
(1)Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the
President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the
Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the
Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating,
or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit
to another;
(2)Transfer any function under the Office of the President to
any other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions
to the Office of the President from other Departments and
Agencies; and
(3)Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to
any other Department or Agency as well as transfer agencies
to the Office of the President from other departments or
agencies.
Carolina P. Araullo v. Pres. Benigno Aquino Araullo vs
Aquino
Araullo: Chairperson Bagong Alyansa Makabayan, Aquino:
President of Philippines
Bersamin 2013
History:
On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada
delivered a privilege speech in the Senate of the Philippines to
reveal that some Senators, including himself, had been allotted
an additional P50 Million each as "incentive" for voting in favor
of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing the
constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration
Program(DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and
related issuances of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) implementing the DAP.
The DBM listed the following as the legal bases for the DAPs
use of savings, namely:
(1) Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
granted to the President the authority to augment an item for
his office in the general appropriations law;
(2) Section 49 (Authority to Use Savings for Certain Purposes)
and Section 38 (Suspension of Expenditure Appropriations),
Chapter 5, Book VI of Executive Order (EO) No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987); and
(3) the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 2011, 2012 and
2013, particularly their provisions on the (a) use of savings; (b)
meanings of savings and augmentation; and (c) priority in the
use of savings.
As for the use of unprogrammed funds under the DAP, the
DBM cited as legal bases the special provisions on

unprogrammed fund contained in the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and

2013.
Procedural:
Whether certiorari and mandamus are proper remedies? - YES
Judicial power is invested in supreme court (Article VIII,
Section 1) and they can determine when there is grave abuse
of discretion.

Considering that the issues center on the extent of the power

of the Chief Executive to disburse and allocate public funds,
whether appropriated by Congress or not, these cases pose
issues that are of transcendental importance to the entire
Nation, the petitioners included. As such, the determination of
such important issues call for the Courts exercise of its broad
and wise discretion "to waive the requirement and so remove
the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious
constitutional questions raised
Budget and DAP

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate

remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials
Following our recent dispositions concerning the congressional
pork barrel, the Court has become more alert to discharge its
constitutional duty. We will not now refrain from exercising our
expanded judicial power in order to review and determine, with
authority, the limitations on the Chief Executives spending
power.
Whether the court has complied with the requisites of judicial
review? - YES
Questionable: actual case or controversy
Since Secretary Abad has declared DAP is already
discontinued because it had already served its purpose, should
the issue be ruled upon since the actual case is done and is so
moot and academic.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that
a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
The Court cannot agree that the termination of the DAP as a
program was a supervening event that effectively mooted
these consolidated cases. Verily, the Court had in the past
exercised its power of judicial review despite the cases being
rendered moot and academic by supervening events, like: (1)
when there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) when
the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was
of paramount public interest; (3) when the constitutional issue
raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide
the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) when the case was
capable of repetition yet evading review.
Assuming that the petitioners several submissions against the
DAP were ultimately sustained by the Court here, these cases
would definitely come under all the exceptions. Hence, the
Court should not abstain from exercising its power of judicial
review.
Whether petitioners have standing? YES

4 Stages of Budget Cycle

1. Budget Preparation
2. Budget Legislation
3. Budget Execution
4. Budget Accountability
DAP Effectiveness
The March 2012 report of the World Bank,released after the
initial implementation of the DAP, revealed that the DAP was
partially successful. The disbursements under the DAP
contributed 1.3 percentage points to GDP growth by the fourth
quarter of 2011. The continued implementation of the DAP
strengthened growth by 11.8% year on year while
infrastructure spending rebounded from a 29% contraction to a
34% growth as of September 2013.
DAP History
The earliest available document relating to the genesis of the
DAP was the memorandum of October 12,2011 from Sec.
Abad seeking the approval of the President to implement the
proposed DAP. The memorandum, which contained a list of
the funding sources for P72.11 billion and of the proposed
priority projects to be funded
The memorandum of October 12, 2011 was followed by
another memorandum for the President dated December 12,
2011 requesting omnibus authority to consolidate the savings
and unutilized balances for fiscal year 2011.
Substantially identical requests for authority to pool savings
and to fund proposed projects were contained in various other
memoranda from Sec. Abad. The President apparently
approved all the requests, withholding approval only of the
proposed projects contained in the June 25, 2012
memorandum, as borne out by his marginal note therein to the
effect that the proposed projects should still be "subject to
further discussions.
In order to implement the June 25, 2012 memorandum, Sec.
Abad issued NBC No. 541 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency
Measure Withdrawal of Agencies Unobligated Allotments as
of June 30, 2012),

NBC No. 541 specified that the unobligated allotments of all

agencies and departments as of June 30, 2012 that were
charged against the continuing appropriations for fiscal year
2011 and the 2012 GAA (R.A. No. 10155) were subject to
withdrawal through the issuance of negative SAROs, but such
allotments could be either: (1) reissued for the original PAPs of
the concerned agencies from which they were withdrawn; or
(2) realigned to cover additional funding for other existing
PAPs of the concerned agencies; or (3) used to augment
existing PAPs of any agency and to fund priority PAPs not
considered in the 2012 budget but expected to be started or
implemented in 2012. Financing the other priority PAPs was
made subject to the approval of the President. Note here that
NBC No. 541 used terminologies like "realignment" and
"augmentation" in the application of the withdrawn unobligated
allotments.
Taken together, all the issuances showed how the DAP was to
be implemented and funded, that is (1) by declaring
"savings" coming from the various departments and agencies
derived from pooling unobligated allotments and withdrawing
unreleased appropriations; (2) releasing unprogrammed funds;
and (3) applying the "savings" and unprogrammed funds to
augment existing PAPs or to support other priority PAPs.
Substantive
1. Whether DAP is an appropriation measure and so is an
usurpation of the power of Congress - NO
No law was necessary for the adoption and implementation of
the DAP because of its being neither a fund nor an
appropriation, but a program or an administrative system of
prioritizing spending; and that the adoption of the DAP was by
virtue of the authority of the President as the Chief Executive
to ensure that laws were faithfully executed.
Section 25 Paragraph 5, Article VI
5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations; however, the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section
25(5), supra, must be made upon a concurrence of the
following requisites, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of
the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the
Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their
respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the
appropriations for their respective offices; and

(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the

general appropriations law for their respective offices.
Was first requisite with VALID provisions present - NO
Section 25(5), supra, not being a self-executing provision of
the Constitution, must have an implementing law for it to be
operative. That law, generally, is the GAA of a given fiscal
year. To comply with the first requisite, the GAAs should
expressly authorize the transfer of funds.
In the 2011 GAA, the provision that gave the President and the
other high officials the authority to transfer funds was Section
59, as follows:
Section 59. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines,
the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the
Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal
autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to
augment any item in this Act from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations.
In the 2012 GAA, the empowering provision was Section 53, to
wit:
Section 53. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines,
the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the
Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal
autonomy, and the Ombudsman are
A reading shows, however, that the aforequoted provisions of
the GAAs of 2011 and 2012 were textually unfaithful to the
Constitution for not carrying the phrase "for their respective
offices" contained in Section 25(5), supra. This was fixed in
2013 GAA which had such a phrase.
Definition of savings:
Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed
appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or
encumbrance which are: (i) still available after the completion
or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or
purpose for which the appropriation is authorized; (ii) from
appropriations balances arising from unpaid compensation and
related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of
absence without pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances
realized from the implementation of measures resulting in
improved systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies
to meet and deliver the required or planned targets, programs
and services approved in this Act at a lesser cost.
The DBM declares that part of the savings brought under the
DAP came from "pooling of unreleased appropriations such as
unreleased Personnel Services appropriations which will lapse
at the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of slow
moving projects and discontinued projects per Zero-Based
Budgeting findings."

The fact alone that the appropriations are unreleased or

unalloted is a mere description of the status of the items as
unalloted or unreleased. They have not yet ripened into
categories of items from which savings can be generated.
For us to consider unreleased appropriations as savings,
unless these met the statutory definition of savings, would
seriously undercut the congressional power of the purse,
because such appropriations had not even reached and been
used by the agency concerned vis--vis the PAPs for which
Congress had allocated them.
Court agrees with the petitioners who accuse the respondents
of forcing the generation of savings in order to have a larger
fund available for discretionary spending. They aver that the
respondents, by withdrawing unobligated allotments in the
middle of the fiscal year, in effect deprived funding for PAPs
with existing appropriations under the GAAs.
The withdrawal and transfer of unobligated allotments and the
pooling of unreleased appropriations were invalid for being
bereft of legal support. Nonetheless, such withdrawal of
unobligated allotments and the retention of appropriated funds
cannot be considered as impoundment.
"Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for
whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress.
It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any
type." Impoundment under the GAA is understood to mean the
retention or deduction of appropriations. The 2011 GAA
authorized impoundment only in case of unmanageable
National Government budget deficit, to wit
The withdrawal of unobligated allotments under the DAP
should not be regarded as impoundment because it entailed
only the transfer of funds, not the retention or deduction of
appropriations.
Although the OSG rightly contends that the Executive was
authorized to spend in line with its mandate to faithfully
execute the laws (which included the GAAs), such authority did
not translate to unfettered discretion that allowed the President
to substitute his own will for that of Congress.
Whether the third requisite was violated regarding cross border
transfers? - YES
The records show, indeed, that funds amounting to
P143,700,000.00 and P250,000,000.00 were transferred under
the DAP respectively to the COA and the House of
Representatives. COA project: IT Infrastructure Program and
hiring of additional litigation experts. HOR project: Completion
of the construction of the Legislative Library and Archives
Building/Congressional e-library.

OSG argues that the Constitution does not prevent the

President from transferring savings of his department to
another department upon the latters request, provided it is the
recipient department that uses such funds to augment its own
appropriation. In such a case, the President merely gives the
other department access to public funds but he cannot dictate
how they shall be applied by that department whose fiscal
autonomy is guaranteed by the Constitution.
Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-border
transfers of funds, the plain text of Section 25(5), supra,
disallowing cross border transfers was disobeyed.
Whether the sourcing of DAP from unprogrammed
fudesmeeting the original revenue targets - YES
The revenue targets stated in the BESF were intended to
address the funding requirements of the proposed
programmed appropriations. In contrast, the unprogrammed
funds, as standby appropriations, were to be released only
when there were revenues in excess of what the programmed
appropriations required. As such, the revenue targets should
be considered as a whole, not individually; otherwise, we
would be dealing with artificial revenue surpluses. The
requirement that revenue collections must exceed revenue
target should be understood to mean that the revenue
collections must exceed the total of the revenue targets stated
in the BESF. Moreover, to release the unprogrammed funds
simply because there was an excess revenue as to one source
of revenue would be an unsound fiscal management measure
because it would disregard the budget plan and foster budget
deficits, in contravention of the Governments surplus budget
policy.
Whether DAP violated equal protection clause? - NO
The allegations about Senators and Congressmen being
unaware of the existence and implementation of the DAP, and
about some of them having refused to accept such funds were
unsupported with relevant data. Also, the claim that the
Executive discriminated against some legislators on the
ground alone of their receiving less than the others could not of
itself warrant a finding of contravention of the Equal Protection
Clause. The denial of equal protection of any law should be an
issue to be raised only by parties who supposedly suffer it,
and, in these cases, such parties would be the few legislators
claimed to have been discriminated against in the releases of
funds under the DAP.
Whether operative fact doctrine is applicable - YES
The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the
law or executive act prior to the determination of its
unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced
consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or
disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act

but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general

rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect.
We find the doctrine of operative fact applicable to the
adoption and implementation of the DAP. Its application to the
DAP proceeds from equity and fair play. The consequences
resulting from the DAP and its related issuances could not be
ignored or could no longer be undone.
In that context, as Justice Brion has clarified, the doctrine of
operative fact can apply only to the PAPs that can no longer be
undone, and whose beneficiaries relied in good faith on the
validity of the DAP, but cannot apply to the authors,
proponents and implementors of the DAP, unless there are
concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the proper
tribunals determining their criminal, civil, administrative and
other liabilities
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions
for certiorari and prohibition; and DECLARES the following
acts and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration
Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and related
executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in
violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
and the doctrine of separation of powers, namely:
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the
implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn
unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as
savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and without
complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in
the General Appropriations Acts;
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive
to augment the appropriations of other offices outside the
Executive; and
(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were
not covered by any appropriation in the General Appropriations
Act.
The Court further DECLARES VOID the use of unprogrammed
funds despite the absence of a certification by the National
Treasurer that the revenue collections exceeded the revenue
targets for non-compliance with the conditions provided in the
relevant General Appropriations Acts.
Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Radstock
Securities
Strategic Alliance Development Corporation vs Radstock
Securities (December 4, 2009) Carpio, J.
Facts:
- PNCC was incorporated in 1966 for a term of fifty years
under the Corporation Code with the name Construction
Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP).
- PD 1113 granted CDCP a 30-year franchise to construct,
operate and maintain toll facilities in the North and South

Luzon Tollways.
- PD 1894, issued on 22 December 1983, amended PD 1113
to include in CDCPs franchise the Metro Manila Expressway.
- Sometime between 1978 and 1981, Basay Mining
Corporation (Basay Mining), an affiliate of CDCP, obtained
loans from Marubeni Corporation of Japan (Marubeni)
amounting to 5,460,000,000 yen and US$5 million.
- A CDCP official issued letters of guarantee for the loans,
committing CDCP to pay solidarily for the full amount of the
5,460,000,000 yen loan and to the extent of P20 million for the
US$5 million loan. However, there was no CDCP Board
Resolution authorizing the issuance of the letters of guarantee.
- In 1983, CDCP changed its corporate name to PNCC.
- Meanwhile, the Marubeni loans to CDCP Mining remained
unpaid. On 20 October 2000, during the short-lived Estrada
Administration, the PNCC Board of Directors(PNCC Board)
passed Board Resolution No. BD-092-2000 admitting PNCCs
liability to Marubeni for P10,743,103,388 as of 30 September
1999.
- 3 months after admitting liability, Marubeni assigned its entire
credit to Radstock for US$2 million or less than P100 million.
Radstock immediately sent a notice and demand letter to
PNCC.
- On 15 January 2001, Radstock filed an action for collection
and damages against PNCC before the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City.
- The trial court ordered PNCCs bank accounts garnished and
several of its real properties attached.
- PNCC filed motions to dismiss and reconsider but were
denied by RTC and CA.
- On June 19, 2001, the PNCC Board, under a new President
and Chairman, revoked Board Resolution No. BD-099-2000.
- RTC ruled in favor of Radstock and ordered PNCC to pay
P13 Billion including interest.
- PNCC appealed to the CA and it issued a TRO.
- On 17 August 2006, PNCC and Radstock entered into the
Compromise Agreement where they agreed to reduce PNCCs
liability to Radstock, supposedly from P17,040,843,968, to
P6,185,000,000.
- On 25 January 2007, the Court of Appeals approved the
Compromise Agreement.
- STRADEC moved for reconsideration of the 25 January
2007 Decision. STRADEC alleged that it has a claim against
PNCC as a bidder of the National Governments shares,
receivables, securities and interests in PNCC.
- The Court of Appeals treated STRADECs motion for
reconsideration as a motion for intervention and denied it in its
31 May 2007 Resolution. STRADEC filed a motion for review.
- On 13 January 2009, the Court held oral arguments on the
following issues:
1. Does the Compromise Agreement violate public policy?
2. Does the subject matter involve an assumption by the
government of a private entitys obligation in violation of the
law and/or the Constitution? Is the PNCC Board Resolution of
20 October 2000 defective or illegal?
3. Is the Compromise Agreement viable in the light of the nonrenewal of PNCCs franchise by Congress and its inclusion of

all or substantially all of PNCCs assets?

4. Is the Decision of the Court of Appeals annullable even if
final and executory on grounds of fraud and violation of public
policy and the Constitution?
Issue:
WON The PNCC Board Acted in Bad Faith and with Gross
Negligence in Directing the Affairs of PNCC. -YES
The members of the board of directors have a three-fold duty:
duty of obedience, duty of diligence, and duty of loyalty.
The members of the board of directors (1) shall direct the
affairs of the corporation only in accordance with the purposes
for which it was organized; (2) shall not willfully and knowingly
vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or
act in bad faith or with gross negligence in directing the affairs
of the corporation; and (3) shall not acquire any personal or
pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors or
trustees. The PNCC Board blatantly violated its duty of
diligence as it miserably failed to act in good faith in
handling the affairs of PNCC. First. For almost two decades,
the PNCC Board had consistently refused to admit liability for
the Marubeni loans because of the absence of a PNCC Board
resolution authorizing the issuance of the letters of guarantee.
Second. The PNCC Board admitted liability for the Marubeni
loans despite PNCCs total liabilities far exceeding its assets.
Third. In a debilitating self-inflicted injury, the PNCC Board
revived what appeared to have been a dead claim by
abandoning one of PNCCs strong defenses, which is the
prescription of the action to collect the Marubeni loans. Fourth.
The basis for the admission of liability for the Marubeni loans,
which was an opinion of the Feria Law Office, was not even
shown to the PNCC Board. The PNCC Board admitted
PNCCs liability for the Marubeni loans relying solely on a mere
opinion of a private law office, which opinion the PNCC Board
members never saw, except for Atty. Valdecantos and Atty.
Francisco. The PNCC Board knew that PNCC, as a
government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC),
must rely exclusively on the opinion of the OGCC in
accordance with Section 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 9
dated 27 August 1998.(see notes) The act of the PNCC
Board in issuing Board Resolution No. BD-092-2000 expressly
admitting liability for the Marubeni loans demonstrates the
PNCC Boards gross and willful disregard of the requisite care
and diligence in managing the affairs of PNCC, amounting to
bad faith and resulting in grave and irreparable injury to PNCC
and its stockholders. This reckless and treacherous move on
the part of the PNCC Board clearly constitutes a serious
breach of its fiduciary duty to PNCC and its stockholders,
rendering the members of the PNCC Board liable under
Section 31 of the Corporation Code.(see notes) In approving
PNCC Board Resolution Nos. BD-092-2000 and BD-099-2000,
the PNCC Board caused undue injury to the Government
and gave unwarranted benefits to Radstock, through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence of the PNCC Board. Such acts are declared under
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act, as corrupt practices xxx and xxx

unlawful. Being unlawful and criminal acts, these PNCC
Board Resolutions are void ab initio and cannot be
implemented or in any way given effect by the Executive
or Judicial branch of the Government.
WON the Compromise Agreement is void for being contrary to
the constitution, existing laws, and public policy. -YES
The claim that PNCC is an autonomous entity can't be
appreciated because as stated in Section 2, Article IX-D,
COA's audit jurisdiction extends not only to government
"agencies or instrumentalities," but also to "government-owned
and controlled corporations with original charters" as well as
"other government-owned or controlled corporations" without
original charters. With the expiration of PNCCs franchise, the
assets and facilities of PNCC were automatically turned over,
by operation of law, to the government at no cost. Forming part
of the General Fund, the toll fees can only be disposed of in
accordance with the fundamental principles governing financial
transactions and operations of any government agency, to wit:
(1) no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law, as expressly
mandated by Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution; and
(2) government funds or property shall be spent or used solely
for public purposes, as expressly mandated by Section 4(2) of
PD 1445 or the Government Auditing Code. Reinforcing this
Constitutional mandate, Sections 84 and 85 of PD 1445
require that before a government agency can enter into a
contract involving the expenditure of government funds, there
must be an appropriation law for such expenditure. Section 86
of PD 1445, on the other hand, requires that the proper
accounting official must certify that funds have been
appropriated for the purpose. Section 87 of PD 1445 provides
that any contract entered into contrary to the requirements of
Sections 85 and 86 shall be void. Under Article 1409 of the
Civil Code, the Compromise Agreement is inexistent and void
from the beginning, and cannot be ratified. Without an
appropriation law, the use of the toll fees to pay Radstock
would constitute malversation of public funds. Even counsel for
Radstock expressly admits that the use of the toll fees to pay
Radstock constitutes malversation of public funds.PNCC
cannot use public funds, like toll fees that indisputabl form part
of the General Fund, to pay a private debt of CDCP Mining to
Radstock. Such payment cannot qualify as expenditure for a
public purpose. The toll fees are merely held in trust by PNCC
for the National Government, which is the owner of the toll
fees. Under Section 20(1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book
V of Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of
1987, the authority to compromise a settled claim or liability
exceeding P100,000.00 involving a government agency, as in
this case where the liability amounts to P6.185 billion, is vested
not in COA but exclusively in Congress. Congress alone has
the power to compromise the P6.185 billion purported liability
of PNCC. Without congressional approval, the Compromise
Agreement between PNCC and Radstock involving P6.185
billion is void for being contrary to Section 20(1), Chapter IV,

Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Held:
We DECLARE (1) PNCC Board Resolution Nos. BD-092-2000
and BD-099-2000 admitting liability for the Marubeni loans
VOID AB INITIO for causing undue injury to the Government
and giving unwarranted benefits to a private party, constituting
a corrupt practice and unlawful act under Section 3(e) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and (2) the Compromise
Agreement between the Philippine National Construction
Corporation and Radstock Securities Limited INEXISTENT
AND VOID AB INITIO for being contrary to Section 29(1),
Article VI and Sections 3 and 7, Article XII of the Constitution;
Section 20(1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987; Sections 4(2), 79, 84(1), and 85
of the Government Auditing Code; and Articles 2241, 2242,
2243 and 2244 of the Civil Code
Notes:
Section 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 9:
SECTION 1. All legal matters pertaining to government-owned
or controlled corporations, their subsidiaries, other corporate
off-springs and government acquired asset corporations
(GOCCs) shall be exclusively referred to and handled by the
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC).
Section 31 of Corporation Code:
SEC. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. -- Directors
or trustees who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent
topatently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of
gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the
corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in
conflict with their duty as such directors or trustees shall be
liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom
suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members and
other persons.
Section 2, Article IX-D:
SECTION 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the
power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all
accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in
trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies,
commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal
autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state
colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such
non- governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly
or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are
required by law or the granting institution to submit to such

audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the

internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate,
the Commission may adopt such measures, including
temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and
appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general
accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be
provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting
papers pertaining thereto.
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to
the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods required
therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of
government funds and properties.
Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution:
Section 29(1). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Section 84. Disbursement of government funds
1. Revenue funds shall not be paid out of any public treasury
or depository except in pursuance of an appropriation law or
other specific statutory authority.
Section 85. Appropriation before entering into contract
1. No contract involving the expenditure of public funds shall
be entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor, the
unexpended balance of which, free of other obligations, is
sufficient to cover the proposed expenditure.
Section 87. Void contract and liability of officer. Any contract
entered into contrary to the requirements of the two
immediately preceding sections shall be void, and the officer or
officers entering into the contract shall be liable to the
government or other contracting party for any consequent
damage to the same extent as if the transaction had been
wholly between private parties.
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from
the beginning:
(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy;
(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.
These contracts cannot be ratified.
Section 20(1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987:
Section 20. Power to Compromise Claims. - (1) When the
interest of the Government so requires, the Commission may
compromise or release in whole or in part, any settled claim or
liability to any government agency not exceeding ten thousand

pesos arising out of any matter or case before it or within its

jurisdiction, and with the written approval of the President, it
may likewise compromise or release any similar claim or
liability not exceeding one hundred thousand pesos. In case
the claim or liability exceeds one hundred thousand pesos, the
application for relief therefrom shall be submitted, through the
Commission and the President, with their recommendations, to
the Congress.
iii. General supervision of local governments and
autonomous regions
iv. Power of Appointment
Sarmiento III v. Mison (1987) Padilla, J
No. L-79974
Ulpiano P. Sarmiento III and Juanito G. Arcilla v. Salvador
Mison (Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs) and
Guillermo Carague (Secretary of the Department of Budget
Petition for Prohibition
Facts:
Petitioners, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to have the
appointment of respondent Mison as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs, on the light of the fact that his
appointment was not confirmed by the Commission of
Appointments.
At the crux of the case is Sec. 16, Art VII of the 1987
Constitution which states: (please read this very carefully
before reading further so you will not be confused)
(1) [The President shall nominate and, with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.] (2) {He
shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,} and
[those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.] (3) {The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers
lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.}
Issues:
1. In which sentence/s do/es the phrase 'with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments' apply to? - THE 1ST
SENTENCE ONLY
1.a. WON the phrase 'in the President alone' in the 3rd
sentence means that lower ranking officers are, unless
provided by law, subject to the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments - NO
2. WON the appointment of respondent Mison as Commission
of the Bureau of Customs is in accordance to Sec. 16, Art VII
of the 1987 Constitution - YES
Ratio:
1. There are four groups of officers that the President may
appoint (in brackets and braces alternately in above provision):
a. Heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces

from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers

whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
b. All other officers of the Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law;
c. Those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint; and
d. Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress
may, by law, vest in the President alone.
Verba legis:
The first group obviously requires the consent/confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments. And since an express
enumeration of the subjects excludes others not enumerated
(expressio unius est exclusio alterius), this is the only group of
officers which require the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.
Historical background:
The 1935 Consti subjects all Presidential appointments to the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, which
caused horse-trading and bad things. The 1973 Consti (The
Dictator/Authoritarian Consti) bestowed appointing power
exclusively to the President, without the check and balance
provided by the Commission on Appointments. The 1987
Consti, therefore, created a compromise: some are subject to
the confirmation of the Commission of Appointments, and
some are not.
Framers' intent:
The proposal of Commissioner Foz to put a period after
'captain' (latter part of the 1st sentence) was given favorable
attention by Commissioner Regalado, as such amendment
makes it clear that officers mentioned after the the word
'captain' do not have to be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments.
1.a. The word 'alone' in the sentence: 'The Congress may, by
law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone xxx' is a mere 'slip in draftsmanship.' It
appears to be a redundancy, because the second sentence,
already states: 'those whom [the President] may be authorized
by law to appoint.' This redundancy cannot prevail over the
obvious intent of the framers of the Constitution to exclude all
officers after the first sentence from the confirmation of the
Commission of Appointments.
2. The Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs holds the
position of bureau director. The framers of the Constitution
deliberately excluded bureau directors from the confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments as is obvious in the
exchange of Commissioner Maambong and Foz, viz:
Commissioner Maambong: Who will then appoint the bureau
directors if not the President?
Commissioner Foz: It is still the President who will appoint
them but their appointment shall no longer be subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
The appointment power is also given by the legislature to the
President through the PD 34, which amended Sec. 601 of RA
1937 (Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines). Even if
these laws were enacted under the 1935 Constitution, they

should still be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art VII of the 1987
Constitution.
Held:
Petition dismissed. Appointment constitutional.
Cruz, dissenting:
In view of 'express enumeration of the subjects excludes
others not enumerated (expressio unius est exclusio alterius),'
the first sentence is the only necessary sentence, and the
other two are superfluous. There must be some reason why
there are two more sentences.
Cruz reading: Everyone mentioned in Sec. 16, Art VII is
subject to the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments because the next two are continuations of the
conditions mentioned in the first, except those 'officers lower in
rank' when Congress provides a law that bestows their
authority on the President alone.
Manalo v. Sistoza
GR. No. 107369 August 11, 1999
Petitioner: Jesulito Manalo
Respondent: Pedro Sistoza, etc. and Salvador Enriquez II (
Secretary of Budget and Management)
Ponente: J. Purisima
Special civil action for Prohibition
Facts:
1. President Corazon Aquino signed RA 6975 (Creation of
DILG) on December 13, 1990. Certain provision concerning
the powers, functions and term of office of the PNP chief plus
the appointment of its members and officers were noted,
specifically Sections 26 and 31. In accordance to the law, the
President, through Exec. Sec. Franklin Drilon, 15 police
officers (the respondents) and appointed them positions in the
PNP with ranks of Chief Superintendent and Director. The
appointments were made in a permanent capacity. Without
having their names submitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation, the officers took their oath of
office and assumed their post. The DBM authorized
disbursements for their salaries and emoluments.
Issue:
1. Respondent officers assumed their office despite failing to
secure the required confirmation from CoA thus are acting
without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion considering that RA 6975 is a valid law that requires
confirmation of appointments of officers of rank of senior
superintendents or higher by the CoA and that the PNP is akin
to AFP where the Constitution requires confirmation by CoA
2. Respondent Secretary, in allowing disbursements in favor of
the officers, is acting without or in excess of jurisdiction or in
grave abuse of discretion
Ratio:
1. Power of Appointment- vested in the Chief Executive
under Section 16 Art VII of the Constitution. History has
shown that presidential appointment when left unchecked
leads to abuse of power. If appointment was left to consent of
CoA, the commission became a venue for horse-trading and
malpractices. The intent of the framers is only to subject

certain high positions in the government to the power of

confirmation of the CoA and allow other positions within
the exclusive appointing power of the President. Under
Section 16 Art VII, there are 4 groups of officers in the
government that is to be appointed by the President. The
first group containing the heads of executive departments,
ambassadors, public ministers and consuls, officers of
the armed forces from rank of colonel or naval captain and
other officers whose appointments are vested in him in
the Constitution. The other officers who are not within this
category need not be confirmed by the CoA. Based on past
jurisprudence (Tarrosa v Singson), Congress cannot by law
expand the power of confirmation of the CoA and require
confirmation of gov. officials not mentioned in the first sentence
of Section 16 Art VII.
2. Unconstitutional Sections 26 and 31- These sections
empower the CoA to confirm the appointments of public
officials whose appointments are not required by the
Constitution. The two sections are unconstitutional and are
struck down but the rest of RA 6975 stands.
3. PNP and AFP difference- The PNP and AFP are separate
and distinct from each other. The Constitution already
distinguishes the AFP under Section 4 Art XVI while it
distinguishes the nature of the PNP in Section 6 Art XVI.
The PNP is further distinguished as different in RA 6975
Section 2 thus can be said to be different from the AFP. This
certifies that PNP officers do not fall under the first category of
presidential appointment that require CoA confirmation.
SC Ruling: Petition dismissed
Notes:
RA 6975 Provisions
Section 2. Declaration of policy - It is hereby declared to be
the policy of the State to promote peace and order, ensure
public safety and further strengthen local government
capability aimed towards the effective delivery of the basic
services to the citizenry through the establishment of a
highly efficient and competent police force that is national
in scope and civilian in character.
The policy force shall be organized, trained and equipped
primarily for the performance of police functions. Its national
scope and civilian character shall be paramount. No element
of the police force shall be military nor shall any position
thereof be occupied by active members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines.
Sec. 26. Powers, Functions and Term of Office of the PNP
Chief. - The command and direction of the PNP shall be
vested in the Chief of the PNP who shall have the power to
direct and control tactical as well as strategic movements,
deployment, placement, utilization of the PNP or any of its
units and personal, including its equipment, facilities and other
resources. Such command and direction of the Chief of the
PNP may be delegated to subordinate officials with respect to
the units under their respective commands, in accordance with
the rules and regulations prescribed by the Commission. The
Chief of the PNP shall also have the power to issue detailed
implementing policies and instructions regarding personnel,
funds, properties, records, correspondence and such other

matters as may be necessary to effectively carry out the

functions, powers and duties of the Bureau. The Chief of the
PNP shall be appointed by the President from among the
senior officers down to the rank of the chief
superintendent, subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments: Provided, That the Chief of
the PNP shall serve a term of office not to exceed four (4)
years: Provided, further, That in times of war or other national
emergency declared by Congress, the President may extend
such term of office.
Sec.31. Appointment of PNP Officers and Members. - The
appointment of the officers and members of the PNP shall be
effected in the following manner:
(a) Police Officer I to Senior Police Officer IV - Appointed by
the PNP regional director for regional personnel or by the Chief
of the PNP for the national headquarters personnel and
attested by the Civil Service Commission;
(b) Inspector to Superintendent - Appointed by the Chief of the
PNP, as recommended by their immediate superiors, and
attested by the Civil Service Commission;
(c) Senior Superintendent to Deputy Director General Appointed by the President upon recommendation of the
Chief of the PNP, with the proper endorsement by the
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and
(d) Director General - Appointed by the President from
among the senior officers down to the rank of chief
superintendent in the service, subject to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments; Provided, That the Chief
of the PNP shall serve a tour of duty not to exceed four (4)
years; Provided, further, That, in times of war or other national
emergency declared by Congress, the President may extend
such tour of duty.
Limitations on appointing power of President
Interim or recess appointments
Temporary designations
b. Powers over Legislation
i. Veto
ii. Delegated decree authority
Emergency Powers
Araneta v. Dinglasan
FACTS:

violation of the provisions of this Executive Order, and prays

for the issuance of the writ of prohibition to the judge and the
city fiscal.
Involved in case L-3055 is Executive Order No. 192, which
aims to control exports from the Philippines. In this case, Leon
Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the
Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner
of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes by the petitioner.
Both official refuse to issue the required export license on the
ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is
forbidden by this Executive Order.
Case No. L-3054 relates to Executive Order No. 225, which
appropriates funds for the operation of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines during the period from July 1, 1949
to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes. The petitioner
Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, an elector, and
president of the Nacionalista Party, applies for a writ of
prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from
disbursing this Executive Order.
Affected in case No. L-3056 is Executive Order No. 226, which
appropriates P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in connection
with, and incidental to, the hold lug of the national elections to
be held in November, 1949. The petitioner, Antonio Barredo,
as a citizen, tax-payer and voter, asks this Court to prevent
"the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise
disposing of that amount or any part of it."
Notwithstanding allegations in the petitions assailing the
constitutionality of Act No. 671, the petitioners do not press the
point in their oral argument and memorandum. They rest their
case chiefly on the proposition that the Emergency Powers Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 671) has ceased to have any force
and effect.
LAW (Commonwealth Act No. 671)
AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS
A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND
AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES
AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:

The petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the

President avowedly issued in virtue of Commonwealth Act No.
671.

SECTION 1. The existence of war between the United States

and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the
Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with
extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.

Involved in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756 is Executive Order

No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses and lots for
residential buildings. The petitioner, J. Antonio Araneta, is
under prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Manila for

"SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 26, of

the Constitution, the President is hereby authorized, during the
existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and
regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the
national policy declared in section 1 hereof. Accordingly, he is,
among other things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the

Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, departments,

offices, agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the
Government of the Commonwealth including the determination
of the order of precedence of the heads of the Executive
Department; (c) to create new subdivisions, branches,
departments, agencies or instrumentalities of government and
to abolish any of those already existing; (d) to continue in force
laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise
become inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or
application of those of an administrative character; (e) to
impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend or abolish
those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of
bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure of the
proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize the national, provincial, city
or municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for purposes
that he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the
collection of credits or the payment of debts; and (i) to exercise
such other powers as he may deem to enable the Government
to fulfill its responsibities and to maintain and enforce the
authority.

The opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the

Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the legislature
is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of
its powers.
He said he issued the call for a special session of the National
Assembly "when it became evident that we were completely
helpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the
Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which
was to open on January 1, 1942." (Emphasis ours.) It can
easily be discerned in this statement that the conferring of
enormous powers upon the President was decided upon with
specific view to the inability of the National Assembly to
meet. As we have indicated, the period that best comports
with constitutional requirements and limitations, with the
general context of the law and with what we believe to be the
main if not the sole raison d'etre for its enactment, was a
period coextensive with the inability of Congress to function, a
period ending with the conventing of that body.
It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that
Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when
Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that
Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued
without authority of law. There is no pretense that the
President has independent or inherent power to issue such
executive orders as those under review. Since
Commonwealth Act 671 was the one which granted such
statutory power, and which now no longer operative, executive
orders have no basis.

SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as

practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the
Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations
promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the
rules and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in force
and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall
otherwise provide.
Procedural:

HELD:
Petitions granted and will take effect 15 days after entry of
final judgement

Above all, the transcendental importance to the public of these

cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE:
Whether Emergency Powers Act Is Still In Effect ?- NO
Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:
In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may
by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject
to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules
and regulations to carry out a declared national policy.
Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of
its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for
in its nature, the object to be accomplish, the purpose to be
subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. The
consequences of the various constructions offered will also be
resorted to as additional aid to interpretation. We test a rule by
its results.
It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was
approved with the limitation in Section 26, Article VI in view.

Review concept of emergency in David v. Arroyo

David vs. Arroyo (2006) Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
There is a distinction between the Presidents authority to
declare a state of national emergency and to exercise
emergency powers.
o Article VII, Sec 18 grants the President the
power to declare a state of emergency
(calling-out power) even in the absence of a
Congressional enactment.
Under the calling-out power, the
President may summon the armed
forces to aid him in suppressing
lawless violence, invasion and
rebellion.
o Article VI, Sec 23 reads: in times of war or
other national emergency, the Congress
may, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to restrictions as it
may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy The exercise of

emergency powers, such as the taking over

of privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest (Art XII, Sec.17)
, requires delegation from Congress.
In authorizing Congress to delegate
emergency powers to the
President, Congress is the
repository of such powers.
The framers thought to allow
Congress to grant emergency
powers to the president subject to
certain conditions, namely:
There must be a war or
other emergency
Delegation must be for a
limited period only
Delegation must be
subject to such restrictions
as the Congress may
prescribe
Emergency powers must
be exercised to carry out a
national policy declared by
Congress
Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of
conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger
to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal.
o Implicit in this definitions are the elements of
intensity, variety and perception.
o In the US, emergencies are classifiable under
three principal heads: economic, natural
disaster and national security
o As contemplated in our constitution,
emergency is of the same breadth. It may
include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence
or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar
catastrophe of nationwide proportions or
effect.
iii. Integrative powers
NOVEMBER 19 WEDNESDAY
c. Special Powers
i. Powers as commander in chief
Gudani v. Senga Tinga, J
August 15, 2006
Petitioners: B/Gen. (Ret.) Francisco V. Gudani and Lt. Col.
Alexander F. Balutan
Respondents: Lt./Gen. Generoso S. Senga (Chief of Staff,
AFP), Col. Gilberto Jose. C. Roa (Pre-Trial Investigating
Officer), the Provost Martial General of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, and the General Court-Martial
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and
Prohibition.

Facts:
- September 22, 2005 - Sen. Rodolfo Biazon invited several
senior officials of the AFP to appear in a public hearing before
the Senate Committee on National Defense re: allegations of
fraud in the conduct of the 2004 elections (this is the height of
the Hello Garci scandal)
- Petitioners Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were in charge of
the peace and order in Lanao del Norte+Sur
- September 23, 2005 - Gen. Senga replied that he cannot
come, but he will be sending other officials.
- September 26, 2005 - Memo issued in behalf of Gen. Senga,
directing petitioners to attend the Senate hearing
- September 27, 2005 - Gen. Senga wrote a letter to Sen.
Biazon, requesting him to move the meeting to the 29th,
because other officers were attending 'urgent operational
matters,' even as petitioners were on their way from Baguio to
Manila
- September 27, 2005, 10:10 PM - a message was transmitted
to the PMA Superintendent (petitioners were stationed at the
PMA) from the office of Gen. Senga, viz:
PER INSTRUCTION OF HER EXCELLENCY PGMA, NO AFP
PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY
CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER
APPROVAL. INFORM BGEN FRANCISCO F GUDANI AFP
AND LTC ALEXANDER BALUTAN PA (GSC)
ACCORDINGLY. (the Order)
- September 28, 2005 - Gen. Gudani wrote to Sen. Biazon that
no AFP officer has been granted permission by the President
to appear before the Senate. Petitioners testified anyway
- On the same day, PGMA issued EO 464 (Executive privilege
things. Recall: Senate v. Ermita. Declared partly
unconstitutional)
- Also on the same day, the office of Gen. Senga issued a
statement saying that Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan shall be
subjected to General Court Martial for disobeying orders from
the Commander-in-Chief.
- September 30, 2005 - petitioners were directed to appear
before the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) for
investigation on October 3.
- October 3, 2005 - Petitioners invoke their right to remain
silent
- October 4, 2005 - Gen. Gudani is compulsorily retired from
military service
- October 6, 2005 - OPMG recommended that petitioners be
charged with Art. of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior
officer, in relation o Art. of War 97, on conduct prejudicial to the
good order and military discipline.
Petitioners seek:
- the order of PGMA preventing AFP officers to testify before
the Senate without her prior approval be declared
unconstitutional
- the charges against them be quashed
- respondents+successors-in-interest be permanently enjoined
from proceeding against them

Petitioners argue:
- there was a violation of the principle of separation of powers,
as the Order interferes with the power of the Senate to conduct
investigations in aid of legislation.
- the Order was a 'gag order;' therefore, it was a violation of the
public's constitutional right to information and transparency in
matters of public concern
- there was no law to prevent them from testifying in Senate
- Gen. Gudani is no longer subject to military jurisdiction as he
is retired, and as per the Art. 2, Title I, Arts. of War, the
persons subject to military law are those in the active service
of the AFP
Issues:
1. WON the semi-unconstitutionality of EO 464 (as per Senate
v. Ermita) affects the case at bar - NO
2. WON Gen. Gudani's violation of the Order could lead to
investigation for court-martial - YES
3. WON the Order violated the separation of powers as the
President interfered with the Senate's powers to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation - NO
4. WON Gen. Gudani is still subject to military jurisdiction YES
Ratio:
1. Petitioners were charged not with the violation of EO 464,
but with the violation of the direct order of Gen. Senga, from
PGMA, not to appear in the Senate hearing. Senate v. Ermita
is about the nature of executive privilege, while the case at bar
deals with the commander-in-chief powers of the President.
The commander-in-chief powers of the President are not
encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that of
executive privilege.
2. The ability of the President falls under her commander-inchief powers, stated in Sec. 18, Art VII of the Constitution.
As commander-in-chief of the military, she has absolute
authority over persons and actions of the members of the
armed forces, and such powers include the ability of the
President to restrict the travel, movement, and speech of
military officers. (There are limitations to this power,
though, found in Sec. 5, Art XVI)
Also, individual rights in the military can be curtailed in a
certain decree, as the effectiveness of the military depends
largely on the discipline instilled among its ranks. Soldiers and
officers are not free to ignore the lawful orders of their
superiors, just because they think these orders to be unlawful.
In addition, Kapunan, Jr. v. De Villa is an ample precedent in
holding that the freedom of military officers to speak out on
certain matters can be restricted by a superior officer. In
Kapunan, it was Kapunan who was placed in house arrest by
Pres. FVR and was prevented from giving interviews to the
press.

3. Military officers are required to obey the orders of their

superior officers. In the case at bar, the President issued
the Order in her capacity as the commander-in-chief of the
Armed Forces, and the petitioners, as members of the
Armed Forces, are required to obey the orders of the
President despite contrary orders from the Senate. Again,
the President's commander-in-chief powers are not hampered
by the limitations of executive privilege.
However, this does not preclude the institution of judicial action
by the Senate against orders of the President that interfere
with the Senate's power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. In other words, the Senate may ask the courts to
strike down orders of the President that prevent resource
persons from appearing in Senate inquiries in aid of legislation.
3. Jurisdiction was acquired over Gen. Gudani before he
retired. As per Abadilla v. Ramos, when jurisdiction is
acquired over an officer, it continues until the case is
terminated. Military jurisdiction attached to Gen. Senga before
he retired, and such will continue until the court martial
proceedings are terminated.
Held:
Petition denied. No pronouncement to costs.
Notes:
Sec. 18, Art VII
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary,
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. xxx martial law things
Sec. 5, Art XVI
(1) All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or
affirmation to uphold and defend this Constitution.
(2) The State shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist
consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights in
the performance of their duty.
(3) Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate
remuneration and benefits of its members shall be a prime
concern of the State. The armed forces shall be insulated
from partisan politics.
No member of the military shall engage directly or
indirectly in any partisan political activity, except to vote.
(4) No member of the armed forces in the active service
shall, at any time, be appointed or designated in any
capacity to a civilian position in the Government including
government-owned or controlled corporations or any of
their subsidiaries.
(5) Laws on retirement of military officers shall not allow
extension of their service.
(6) The officers and men of the regular force of the armed
forces shall be recruited proportionately from all provinces and
cities as far as practicable.
(7) The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces
shall not exceed three years. However, in times of

war or other national emergency declared by the Congress,

the President may extend such tour of duty
Lansang v. Garcia (1971) Concepcion, J. -> From 2017A
LANSANG v. GARCIA
Petitioner: Teodosio Lansang, Rodolfo Del Rosario, Bayani
Alcala Respondent: Brigadier-Gen. Eduardo Garcia, Chief, Phil
Constabulary
Ponente: Concepcion, C.J. Date of Promulgation: Dec. 11,
1971
Nature of the petition: Orig. action in the SC. Petition for
habeas corpus
Facts:
*Involved here are 9 separate petitions*PWHC privilege for
the writ of habeas corpus
Aug. 21, 1971: While the Liberal Party was holding a public
meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its
candidates for the Nov. 1971 general elections, 2 hand
grenades were thrown at the platform where the candidates
and other persons were. 8 persons were killed and many were
injured.
Aug. 23, 1971: Pres. Marcos announced the issuance
Proclamation No. 889 suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. He invoked the power vested upon him by Art.
VII 10 par. 2 of the (1935) Constitution. Suspension applied to
persons presently detained, as well as others who may be
hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or
rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed by them
in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto,
or in connection therewith.
PETITIONERS, who have been arrested without a warrant and
then detained, upon the authority of Proclamation Order 889,
filed for petitions for writs of habeas corpus, assailing the
validity of said Proclamation Order RESPONDENTS: allege,
inter alia, (1) that the petitioners had been apprehended and
detained on reasonable belief that they had participated in the
crime of insurrection and rebellion, (2) that their continued
detention is justified due to the suspension of the PWHC
pursuant to Proc. Order 889, (3) that there is a state of
insurrection or rebellion in the country and that public safety
and the security of the State required the suspension of the
PWHC, as declared in Proc. Order 889 (4) that in making the
declaration, the Pres. relied on relevant facts gathered through
the coordinated efforts of the various intelligence agents of the
government, (5) that the determination of the Pres. is final and
conclusive upon the courts and upon all other questions, and is
a political question

Aug. 30: Proc. Order 889-A, amending Proc. Oder 889,

postulating the existence of actual conspiracy and intent of the
lawless elements to rise in arms to overthrow the government.
It also asserts that the lawless elements are actually engaged
in an armed insurrection and rebellion to accomplish their
purpose.
Sept. 1: Proc. Order 889-B lifting the PWHC in certain
provinces, sub-provinces and cities Sept. 25: Proc. Oder 889C restoring the PWHC in certain provinces and cities
Oct. 4: Proc. Order 889-D further lifting the suspension of the
PWHC
THEREFORE, the PWHC remained suspended in 18
provinces, 2 sub-provinces and 18 cities.
Issues:
1. WON the Court would adhere to the view laid down in 2
precedent cases that the authority to decide whether exigency
has arisen requiring suspension of the PWHC belongs to the
President and his decision is final and conclusive upon the
courts and upon all other personsNO
2. WON Proc. Order 889 as amended complied with the
requirements of Art. III 1. Par 14, and Art. VII 10 par. 2 of the
ConstitutionYES
3. WON petitioners are covered by Proc. 889 as amended
YES
Ratio:
1. The Court has authority to, and should, inquire into the
existence of the factual bases required by the Constitution for
the suspension of the PWHC, and thus determine the
constitutional sufficiency of such bases in accordance with the
requirements of Art. III 1. Par 14, and Art. VII 10 par. 2 of
the Constitution.

Art. III 1. Par 14: The privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, in any way of which events the
same may be suspended wherever during such
period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.
Art. VII 10 par. 2: The President shall be
commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines, and, whenever it becomes necessary, he
may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion, or imminent danger thereof when the public
safety requires it, he may suspend the privileges of
the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or
any part thereof under martial law.

2. The petitioners argument that Proc. Order 889 is invalid

because it did not declare the existence of actual invasion,
insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof has been
rendered moot and academic with the issuance of Proc. 889-A,
which superseded the original proclamation.

The Pres did not act arbitrarily in issuing Proc. No. 889, as
amended, and that accordingly, the same is not
unconstitutional

According to the abovementioned provisions, there are 2

conditions that must concur for the valid exercise of the
authority to suspend the PWHC, to wit:

Grant of power to suspend the PWHC is neither absolute nor

unqualified. The authority granted by the Constitution is limited
and conditional. Art. III 1. Par 14 establishes a general rule,
and an exception thereto. What is more, it postulates the
exception in the negative, evidently to stress its importance
(the PWHC shall NOT be suspended...) It is only by way of
exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege.

There must be an invasion, insurrection, or rebellion

or imminent danger thereof
Public safety must require the suspension of the
privilege.

The President declared in Proc. Order 889 that both conditions

are present. The Supreme Court, as voted on by all its
members, can inquire in to the existence of the Presidents
bases for saying such in order to determine the
constitutionality of the P.O. Otherwise, the Consti provisions
would be meaningless. Our political system is essentially
democratic and republican and the suspension of the privilege
affects the most fundamental element of that system, namely
individual freedom. However, when individual freedom is used
to destroy social order, by means of force and violence, in
defiance of the Rule of Law, it may warrant a limited
withdrawal of the liberty guaranteed or protected by
suspending the PWHC, when public safety requires it.
The SC held that: Considering that the Pres. was in
possession of the information on the alleged July-August plan
to terrorize Manila when the Plaza Mirandan bombing took
place, the Court is not prepared to hold that the Pres. had
acted arbitrarily or gravely abused his discretion when he
concluded that public safety and national security required the
suspension of the privilege of the writ.
Results of courts findings: There is no doubt there exists a
sizable group of men (NPA) who have publicly risen in arms to
overthrow the government and still are engaged in rebellion
against the government.
President acted in good faith in choosing the limited
suspension instead of placing the entire country under it.
Hence, limited coverage and limited application to persons
detained for crimes of insurrection and rebellion.
3. The crimes for which the detained prisoners are held and
deprived of their liberty are among those for which the PWHC
has been suspended (members of CPP and its other front
organizations). Their release will not be ordered unless trial
court orders otherwise.
Rule:

Notes:

Far from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend is

thus circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by the
prescribed setting or conditions essential to its existence, but,
also, as regards the time when and the place where it may be
exercised.
In cases of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent
danger, the Pres. under the Consti, has 3 options:
1. To call out the armed forces
2. To suspend the PWHC 3. To place the Phil or any part
thereof
under martial law
Test for determining validity of presidential suspension of writ:
Acc. to Sol Gen, not that the Presidents decision is correct
and that public safety was endangered by the rebellion and
justified the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending the
writ, the President did not arbitrarily.

Burgos v. Macapagal-Arroyo
Burgos v Macapagal-Arroyo (2010)
Edita Burgos petitioner
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, GEN. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ.
GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, LT.
COL. NOEL CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO,
and DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON
respondents
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI OF THE
DECISION OF CA
FACTS
-April 28, 2007,1PM: Jonas Joseph T. Burgos a farmer
advocate and a member of Kilusang Magbubukid sa
Bulacan was forcibly taken and abducted by a group of four
(4) men and a woman from the extension portion of Hapag
Kainan Restaurant in Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth
Avenue, Quezon City. A security guard took note of the

incident and got the plate number of the vehicle used to take
Burgos away.
- Because of the incident, the petitioner (the mother of Joseph
Burgos), held a press conference and announced that her son
Jonas was missing. It was discovered that plate number TAB
194 was registered to a 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle owned by a
certain Mauro B. Mudlong, who was arrested because said
vehicle transported timber without license. However, right after
the conference, the plate number of the vehicle went missing,
and the engine and other spare parts were cannibalized.
- the petitioner testified before the CA that the police was able
to generate cartographic sketches of two (one male and one
female) of the abductors of Jonas based on its interview of
eyewitnesses; however, nothing came out of the information
given by State Prosecutor Velasco because he was pulled out
from the investigation by the DOJ Secretary, and that the
police, particularly P/Supt. Jonnel C. Estomo, failed to
investigate and act upon these leads.
- Aug. 29, 2007: the Philippine National Police-Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) presented
certain people to prove the point/theory that NPAs were
accountable for the incident
CA: Motion to declare respondents in contempt denied;
moreover, petition for habeas corpus and contempt as
against President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo must be
dropped since she enjoys the privilege of immunity from
suit. The CA ruled that the Presidents immunity from suit
is a settled doctrine citing David v. Arroyo. (the only takeoff
point from president as the commander in chief)
ISSUE
Whether the PNP-CIDG and others failed to conduct an
exhaustive investigation on the matter in due diligence of their
duties - YES
RATIO
From the records, we note that there are very significant
lapses in the handling of the investigation. no significant follow
through was also made by the PNP-CIDG in ascertaining the
identities of the cartographic sketches of two of the abductors
despite the evidentiary leads provided by State Prosecutor
Velasco of the DOJ. Notably, the PNP-CIDG, as the lead
investigating agency in the present case, did not appear to
have lifted a finger to pursue these aspects of the case. Based
on these considerations, we conclude that further investigation
and monitoring should be undertaken.
HELD
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and for the foregoing
reasons, the Court RESOLVES to:
(1) DIRECT the Commission on Human Rights to conduct
appropriate investigative proceedings, including field
investigations acting as the Courts directly commissioned
agency for purposes of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo - with
the tasks of: (a) ascertaining the identities of the cartographic
sketches of two of the abductors as well as their whereabouts;
(b) determining based on records, past and present, the
identities and locations of the persons identified by State
Prosecutor Velasco alleged to be involved in the abduction of
Jonas namely: T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army), Cpl.

Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron

Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), and an alias T.L., all reportedly
assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence
Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; further
proceedings and investigations, as may be necessary, should
be made to pursue the lead allegedly provided by State
Prosecutor Velasco on the identities of the possible abductors;
(c) inquiring into the veracity of Lipios and Manuels claims
that Jonas was abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and @KA
ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG; (d) determining
based on records, past and present, as well as further
investigation, the identities and whereabouts of @KA DANTE
and @KA ENSO; and (e) undertaking all measures, in the
investigation of the Burgos abduction, that may be necessary
to live up to the extraordinary measures we require in
addressing an enforced disappearance under the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo;
(2) REQUIRE the incumbent Chiefs of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to make
available and to provide copies, to the Commission on Human
Rights, of all documents and records in their possession and
as the Commission on Human Rights may require, relevant to
the case of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, subject to reasonable
regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws;
(3) DIRECT the PNP-CIDG and its incumbent Chief to submit
to the Commission on Human Rights the records and results of
the investigation the PNP-CIDG claimed to have forwarded to
the Department of Justice, which were not included in their
previous submissions to the Commission on Human Rights,
including such records as the Commission on Human Rights
may require, pursuant to the authority granted under this
Resolution;
(4) Further DIRECT the PNP-CIDG to provide direct
investigative assistance to the Commission on Human Rights
as it may require, pursuant to the authority granted under this
Resolution;
(5) AUTHORIZE the Commission on Human Rights to
conduct a comprehensive and exhaustive investigation that
extends to all aspects of the case (not limited to the specific
directives as outlined above), as the extraordinary measures
the case may require under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
and
(6) REQUIRE the Commission on Human Rights to submit to
this Court a Report with its recommendations, copy furnished
the petitioner, the incumbent Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP and
the PNP-CIDG, and all the respondents, within ninety (90)
days from receipt of this Resolution.
The dismissal of the petitions for Contempt and for the
Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is hereby AFFIRMED. (the only
takeaway point from president as the commander in chief)
IBP v. Zamora (see legmeth)
Lacson v. Perez
Lacson vs Perez (May 10, 2001) Melo, J.

Facts:
-On May 1, 2001, President GMA issued proclamation no. 38
declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the NCR. She
also issued general order no. 1 directing the AFP and PNP to
suppress the rebellion.
-Warrantless arrests were effected.
-4 petitions were filed before the SC.
-First was GR No. 147780. It was for prohibition, injunction,
mandamus, and habeas corpus filed by Panfilo Lacson,
Michael Ray Aquino and Cezae Mancao.
-Second was GR No. 147781. It was for mandamus and/or
review for factual basis for the suspension of writ of habeas
corpus with prayer for TRO filed by Miriam Defensor-Santiago.
-Third was GR No. 147799. It was for prohibition and injunction
and/or restraining order filed by Ronaldo Lumbao.
-Fourth was GR No. 147810. It was for certiorari and
prohibition filed by Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino.
-All of the petitions assail the declaration of state rebellion and
the Warrantless arrests.
-On May 6, 2006, President GMA lifted the declaration of state
of rebellion.
-The petitions have been rendered moot and academic.

for since its purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful

restraint.
-In the second petition, it is not shown that petitioner is in
imminent danger of being arrested without a warrant so the
relief for mandamus can't be used.
-In the third petition, it is argued that the declaration of a "state
of rebellion" is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers,
being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary which
has the constitutional prerogative to "determine or interpret"
what took place on May 1, 2001, and that the declaration of a
state of rebellion cannot be an exception to the general rule on
the allocation of the governmental powers. The Court
disagrees. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution expressly
provides that "[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief
of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion"
-In the fourth petition, the petitioner is not a real party in
interest since the petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to
itself which would justify resort to the Court. Petitioner is a
juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to
be threatened by a warrantless arrest.

Issue:
WON Petitioners' prayers are proper. -NO
-As to petitioners' claim that the proclamation of a "state of
rebellion" is being used by the authorities to justify warrantless
arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that it has missued a
particular order to arrest specific persons in connection with
the "rebellion."
-In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may
only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of
rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless
arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the
declaration of a "state of rebellion."
-In the first two petitions, their contentions that they are under
imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not
justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus
and prohibition, since a individual subjected to warrantless
arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course
of law. They may also ask for a preliminary investigation under
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Also, a person subject of a
warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial
authorities within the periods provided in Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, otherwise the arresting officer could be
held liable for delay in the delivery of detained persons.
-In the first petition, they pray that the "appropriate court before
whom the informations against petitioners are filed be directed
to desist from arraigning and proceeding with the trial of the
case, until the instant petition is finally resolved." This relief is
clearly premature considering that as of this date, no
complaints or charges have been filed against any of the
petitioners for any crime. Petitioners' allegations ex abundante
ad cautelam in support of their application for the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called

Held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby
DISMISSED. However, in G.R. No. 147780, 147781, and
147799, respondents, consistent and congruent with their
undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents,
representatives, and all persons acting for and in their behalf,
are hereby enjoined from arresting petitioners therein without
the required judicial warrant for all acts committed in relation to
or in connection with the may 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang.
Sanlakas v. Angelo Reyes
G.R. No. 159085, 159103, 159185, 159196 February 3, 2004
Petitioner:

Sanlakas (represented by Rep. Jv Bautista)

and Partido ng Maggagawa (Renato Magtubo)

Social Justice Society Officers and Members

Reps. Rolex Suplico, Carlos Padilla, Celso

Lobregat, Hussin Amin, Abraham Mitra, Emmylou
Talino-Santos, Georgilu Yumul Hermida

Aquilino Pimentel
Respondent: ExeSec. Alberto Romulo, SecDef Angelo Reyes,
SecJus Simeon Datumanong, Gen. Narciso Abaya,
Hermogenes Ebdane, Joey Lina Jr.
Ponente: Justice Tinga
Facts:
1. Around 300 junior officers and enlisted men from the AFP
took control of the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati
City during the early hours of July 27, 2003. The soldiers
demanded the resignation of the President, Sec. of Defense
and Chief of PNP.

2. In response to this, the President issued Proclamation No.

427 and General Order No. 4 which both declaring a state of
rebellion and called out the Armed Forces to suppress the
rebellion. However, the crisis was resolved during the evening
of July 27, 2003. The soldiers, after hours of negotiations,
agreed to return to their barracks. The president lifted the
declaration of a state of rebellion only on August 1, 2003
through Proclamation No. 435.
3. It was during the timeframe of July 27 to August 1 were the
petitions filed challenging the validity of Proclamation No. 427
and General Order No. 4
Issue:
1. Procedural: Do petitioners have legal standing in
challenging petition?
2. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not require
the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the Armed
Forces
3. Was there sufficient factual basis for proclamation of a state
of rebellion by the President for an indefinite period
4. Presidential issuances cannot be construed as exercise of
emergency powers as Congress had not delegated any such
powers to the President
5. Is the declaration of state of rebellion by the President an
exercise of emergency powers vested in the Congress granted
by the Constitution in Section 23(2) Article VI
Ratio:
1. Locus Standi- Petitioners Sanlakas, PM and SJS have no
locus standi. Legal standing is defined as personal and
substantial interests in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain a direct injury as a result of the
governmental act. Only members of Congress (the
congressmen and Pimentel) have legal standing as their claim
of declaration is an exercise of Congress emergency powers
and so then impairs their legislative powers as the declaration
may be a subterfuge to avoid congressional scrutiny in the
Presidents exercise of martial law powers.
2. Calling out power of the President- Section 1 of Article VII
vests unto the President executive powers while Section 18 of
the same article vests the powers of the Commander-in-Chief
upon the President also. Section 18 of Article VII grants the
president a sequence of graduated powers (calling out
power, power of suspension of writ of habeas corpus and
power to declare martial law). Section 18 does not expressly
prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion.
3. Lesson from US constitutional history on Presidents
power- Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough by
itself but even more so when taking into account the provisions
on executive power and presidential oath of office (faithful
execution clause?).
4. Presidents authority to declare state of rebellion- drawn
from her powers as chief executive and commander-in-chief.
Statutory authority for such declaration can be found in Section
4, Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Book III (Office of President)
of Revised Admin Code. It only gives notice to the nation that
such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to
prevent and suppress it. A state of rebellion or martial law
cannot suspend or violate constitutionally vested rights. It does

not suspend operation of Constitution or privilege of writ of

habeas corpus. The presidential issuance also called for
suppression of rebellion with due regard to constitutional
rights.
5. Full discretionary power of President for call out power
without Congress- Argument of declaration of state of
rebellion amounts to declaration of martial law to circumvent
the report requirement found in Sec. 18 is unfounded. There is
no indication of any form of martial law( military tribunals,
curtailment of civil/political rights, Presidential exercise of
legislative and judicial powers). The president, in declaring a
state of rebellion and using call out power, exercised a
wedding of Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief
powers in executive capacity vested by Section 1 and 18
of Article VII. Sec 23 (2) Article VI enumerates the delegated
legislative powers in context with emergency powers upon
grant of Congress so it is different.
SC Decision: Petition Dismissed
Note: Do try to read the case itself since the majority of the
case talks about the history of the provisions concerning the
powers of the president
SEC. 4. Proclamations.Acts of the President fixing a date or
declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest,
upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or
regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in
proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.
Sec. 23. (2) In times of war or other national emergencies, the
Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment
thereof.
David v. Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo
David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo (2006) Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
(7) Consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition
FACTS:
- Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Presidential
Proclamation 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency, and General Order No. 5 implementing
PP1017 issued by President Arroyo on February 24
2006.
- The operative portion of PP1017 may be divided into
three operative provisions:
(1) By virtue of the power vested upon me by Sec
18, Art VIIdo hereby command the AFP, to
maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or
rebellion (calling-out power)
(2) To enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by
me personally or upon my direction (take care

-
-

power or to ensure that the laws be faithfully

executed)
(3) As provided in Sec 17, Art XII of the Constitution
do hereby declare a state of national emergency
(power to take over)
(March 3 2006) President issued Proclamation No.
1021 lifting PP1017 after all these petitions were filed
(see notes for separate petitions)
Respondents present the following factual bases:
o Members of the Magdalo group indicted in
the Oakwood mutiny escaped their detention
cell
o Threat of the Magdalos D-Day on February
24
o Defections in the military, particularly in the
Philippine marines
o Reproving statements from communist
leaders
o Minutes of the Intelligence Report and
Security Group of the Philippine army
showing the growing alliance between the
NPA and the military
Petitioners cite the events following the proclamation:
o Office of the President announced the
cancellation of all programs and activities
related to the 20th anniversary celebration of
EDSA People Power I; and revoked the
permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the
local governments
o Presidential Chief of Staff announced that
warrantless arrests and take-over of
facilities, including media, can already be
implemented
o During the dispersal of rallyists along EDSA,
police warantlessly arrested petitioner
Randolf David, a UP professor and
newspaper columnist
o Operatives of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP raided
the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. They
confiscated news stories by reporters,
documents, picture and mock-ups of the
Saturday issue
o Members of petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno
went to Camp Crame to visit their Chairman
Crispin Beltran but were told that they could
not be admitted because of the
proclamation. Two members were arrested
and detained while the rest were dispersed
by police

ISSUES:
Procedural
1. WON the issuance of PP1021 renders the petitions
moot and academic NO
2. WON petitioners in 171485 (Escudero, et al.), 171400
(Alternative Law Groups, Inc.), 171483 (KMU, et al),

171489 (Cadiz et al) and 171424 (Legarda) have

legal standing YES
*note: the other three petitions indicate direct injury
Substantive
3. WON SC can review the factual bases of PP1017
YES
4. WON PP1017 and G.O No. 5 are unconstitutional NO
a. Facial Challenge- WON PP1017 is void on its
face because of its overbreadth NO
b. Constitutional Basis
(1) WON conditions for calling-out power are
present YES
(2) WON the clause To enforce obedience to
all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction arrogates upon the
President the power to enact laws and
decrees in violation of Art VI, Sec 1 which
vests legislative powers in Congress YES
(3) WON President Arroyos inclusion of Sec 17,
Art XII is an encroachment on the
legislatures emergency powers YES
c. As Applied Challenge- WON the illegal
implementation of a law render it unconstitutional
NO
RATIO:
1. All the exceptions for deciding cases otherwise moot and
academic are present in this case. Specifically,
a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution
petitioners assail the constitutionality of PP1017 and
G.O No. 5
b. The exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involvedissues being
raised affect the publics interest, involving as they do
the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of
assembly and of the press
c. When constitutional issue raised requires formulation
of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar,
and the publicthe Court, in the present case,
functions to educate the bench, the bar, and the
military and the police, on the extend of the protection
given by constitutional guarantees
d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review
2. All the petitioners herein have locus standi. The petitions
call for the application of the transcendental importance
doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the
petitioners in the PP1017 cases. Incidentally, it is not
proper to implead President as respondent since the
President may not be sued in any civil or criminal case
(not provided in the Constitution because to drag him into
court litigations will degrade the dignity of the high office of
the {resident, the Head of State)
3. In IBP v. Zamora, the Court held that while the
Presidents calling-out power is considered as a

discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it

does not prevent an examination of whether such
power was exercised within permissible constitutional
limits or whether it was exercised in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion. Under Art VIII,
Sec 1 judicial courts are also authorized to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government.
In Lansang v Garcia, the Court focused on the system of
checks and balances under which the President is
supreme, only if and when he acts within the sphere
allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to
determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in
the Judicial Department, which in this respect, is in
turn, constitutionally supreme The standard laid down
is whether the President acted arbitrarily, not correctly.
In IBP, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that
the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual
basis. Without sufficient proof to support his
assertion, the Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings. In the case at bar,
petitioners failed to show that Presidents Arroyo exercise
of the calling-out power, by issuing PP1017 is totally bereft
of factual basis.
4a. A facial review of PP1017 using the overbreadth doctrine
is uncalled for because:
(1) Claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only spoken words and again, that
overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws
that are sought to be applied to protected conduct
PP1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free
speech, which is manifestly subject to state
regulation.
(2) facial invalidation of laws is generally disfavored.
Traditionally, a person to whom a law on the ground
that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally
to others (i.e. in other situations not before the Court)
in overbreadth analysis, challenges are permitted to
raise the rights of third parties the Court must
therefore examine PP1017 and pinpoint its flaws and
defects on the assumption or prediction that its very
existence may cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected sppech or
expression
(3) on this ground, the challenger must establish that
there can be no instance when the assailed law may
be validpetitioners did not eve attempt to show
whether this situation exists
4b (1) In IBP v Zamora, the only criterion for the exercise of
the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary,
the President ma call the armed forces to prevent or suppress

lawless violence, invasion or rebellionPresident Arroyo

found it necessary to issue PP1017 considering the
circumstances then prevailing, Owing to her Offices vast
intelligence network, she is the best position to determine the
actual condition of the country.
4b (2) The PP1017 operative clause To enforce obedience to
all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction was lifted
from Marcos Proclamation No 1081 which granted President
Marcos legislative powerPresident Arroyos ordinance power
cannot is limited to those enumerated in Chapter 2, Book III of
EO 292 or Administrative Code of 1987 (see notes) She
cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Marcos under
PP1081. Decrees are laws which are of the same category
and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the
President in the exercise of his legislative power during Martial
Law under the 1973 constitution.
Neither can the President enforce obedience to all laws
through the military. She can only order the military, under PP
1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless
violence.
4b(3) There is a distinction between the Presidents authority
to declare a state of national emergency and to exercise
emergency powers. The first is granted under Sec 18 Art VII
whereas the latter requires delegation from Congress under
Sec 23 Art VI. Sec 17 Art XII (the taking over of privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest by
the State) is an aspect of the emergency powers clause. Sec
17 refers to Congress, not the PresidentPP1017 dpes not
authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest without authority from
Congress
4c. There is nothing in PP1017 allowing police, expressly or
impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the
citizens constitutional rights. There is nothing in G.O. No. 5
authorizing the military or police to commit acts beyond what
are necessary and appropriate to suppress and prevent
lawless violence. Othewise, such acts are considered illegal.
Here, the right against unreasonable search and seizure; the
right against warrantless arrest; and the freedom of speech, of
expression, of the press, and of assembly were violated.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court
rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the
AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the
provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws
not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees
promulgated by the President, are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017
declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of

the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration

does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest without
prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard
by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e.
whatever is necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence. Considering that acts of terrorism have not yet
been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such
portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The
warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the
dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU
members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these
petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of
standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press,
as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and
whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other
materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
NOTES:
In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al.
assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the
emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid
the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial
law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom
of the press, of speech and of assembly.
In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and
Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the CIDGs act of
raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of censorship
or prior restraint. They also claimed that the term
emergency refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and
similar occurrences, hence, there is absolutely no emergency
that warrants the issuance of PP 1017.
In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are Representative
Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty one (21) other
members of the House of Representatives, including
Representatives Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro
Casio, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador. They asserted that PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute usurpation of legislative
powers; violation of freedom of expression and a
declaration of martial law. They alleged that President Arroyo
gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed forces
without clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of
lawless violence and a showing that there is necessity to do
so.
In G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their
members averred that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate unto President
Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees; (2) their issuance
was without factual basis; and (3) they violate freedom of

expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble

to redress their grievances.
In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc.
(ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
unconstitutional because they violate (a) Section 4 of Article II,
(b) Sections 12,and 4 of Article III, (c) Section 23 of Article VI,
and (d) Section 17 of Article XII of the Constitution.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al.,
alleged that PP 1017 is an arbitrary and unlawful exercise by
the President of her Martial Law powers. And assuming that
PP 1017 is not really a declaration of Martial Law, petitioners
argued that it amounts to an exercise by the President of
emergency powers without congressional approval. In
addition, petitioners asserted that PP 1017 goes beyond the
nature and function of a proclamation as defined under the
Revised Administrative Code.
And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424, petitioner Loren B. Legarda
maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional
for being violative of the freedom of expression, including its
cognate rights such as freedom of the press and the right to
access to information on matters of public concern, all
guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987
Constitution. In this regard, she stated that these issuances
prevented her from fully prosecuting her election protest
pending before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter
2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987). She may issue any of the following:
Sec. 2. Executive Orders.Acts of the President providing for
rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or
execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be
promulgated in executive orders.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders.Acts of the President which
relate to particular aspect of governmental operations in
pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be
promulgated in administrative orders.
Sec. 4. Proclamations.Acts of the President fixing a date or
declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest,
upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or
regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in
proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.
Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders.Acts of the President on
matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary
interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the
Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders.
Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars.Acts of the President on
matters relating to internal administration, which the President

desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the

departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government,
for information or compliance, shall be embodied in
memorandum circulars.

SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by
law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment thereof.

Sec. 7. General or Special Orders.Acts and commands of

the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or
special orders.

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places
mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to
exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not
need a congressional authority to exercise the same.

Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan v. Puno

Abad, J. 2011

3.

Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions. - YES

The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the
power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides.

Facts:
On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre
of 57 men and women, including some news reporters, then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946,
placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat
and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She
directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP) to undertake such measures
as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent
and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the named
places.
Three days later or on November 27, President Arroyo also
issued Administrative Order 273 (AO 273) transferring
supervision of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) from the Office of the President to the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG). But, due to issues
raised over the terminology used in AO 273, the President
issued Administrative Order 273-A (AO 273-A) amending the
former, by delegating instead of transferring supervision of
the ARMM to the DILG.[

SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x x x
While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the
above power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. The imminence of violence
and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and she
had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned.
Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of emergency in the
subject places and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence
there have clearly no factual bases, the Court must respect the Presidents actions
HELD:
Petition dismissed for lack of merit.

ii. Executive Clemencies

iii. Diplomatic Powers
iv. Contracting and guaranteeing foreign loans
Constantino v. Cuisia

Claiming that the Presidents issuances encroached on the ARMMs autonomy, petitioners Datu
Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM officials, filed this

v. Power over foreign affairs

petition for prohibition under Rule 65. They alleged that the proclamation and the orders
empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMMs operations and seize the regional

vi. Recognition of foreign states

governments powers, in violation of the principle of local autonomy under Republic Act 9054 (also
known as the Expanded ARMM Act) and the Constitution. The President gave the DILG Secretary

vii. Conduct of foreign relations

the power to exercise, not merely administrative supervision, but control over the ARMM since the
latter could suspend ARMM officials and replace them.
1.

viii. Settlement of disputes with foreign powers

Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local

autonomy under Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, and Section 1, Article - NO

viii. Treaty-making

The DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement
agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao
massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post on
December 10, 2009
2.

Executive Agreements
Bayan v. Executive Secretary. See J. Punos dissenting
opinion

Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out

the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City; - NO

Negotiate
Province of North Cotabato v. GRP, supra (see aleitheia
reviewer)

Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully exercised emergency powers when she ordered
the deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the places mentioned in the proclamation. But such
deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:

ix. Deportation of undesirable aliens

Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Cement
Manufacturers Assn of the Phils.

d. Residual Power
Marcos v. Manglapus
Marcos vs. Manglapus (1989)
RESOLUTION of Motion for Reconsideration of SC Decision
Facts:
- (September 15 1989) SC by a vote of 8 to 7 dismissed the
petition after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or
with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of
former President Marcos and his family at the present time and
under present circumstances pose a threat to national interest
and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines
- (September 28 1989) Marcos died in Honolulu Hawaii.
Thereafter, President Aquino issued a statement barring the
return of Marcos remains and the other petitioners to the
Philippines.
- (October 2 1989) Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, arguing:
1.To bar Marcos and his familys return is to deny
them the inherent right of citizens to return to their
county of birth and the protection of the Constitution
and all of the right guaranteed to Filipinos thereunder
2. President has no power to bar a Filipino from his
own country; if she has, she had exercised it
arbitrarily
3. There is no basis for barring the return of the family
of former President Marcos
Issues:
1. WON the Court should reconsider its decision NO
Ratio:
The burden is upon the movants to show that there are
compelling reasons to reconsider the decision of the Court. In
this motion, petitioners have not established compelling
reasons to warrant a reconsideration. Marcos death has not
changed the factual scenario under which the Courts decision
was rendered. The threats to the government, to which the
Marcoses return has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect,
have not been shown to have been ceased.
The President has unstated residual powers which are
implied from the grant of executive power and which are
necessary for her to comply with her duties under the
Constitution. The powers of the president are not limited to
what are expressly enumerated in the Constitution. (See
Notes for US citations) One of the presidents duties is to
protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her
decision to bar the return of the Marcoses at the present time
and under present circumstances is in compliance with this
bounden duty.
Held: Motion for reconsideration denied for lack of merit.
Notes:
- US president also has residual powers. Alexander Hamilton
said: [t]he [article II] enumeration [in sections 2 and 3] ought
therefore to be considered, as intended merely to specify the
principal articles implied in the definition of execution power;
leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of that power,
interpreted in conformity with other parts of the Constitution . . .

- In Myers vs United States, the federal executive, unlike the

Congress, could exercise power from sources not enumerated,
so long as not forbidden by the constitutional text
- Chief Justice Taft in Myers: the constitutional concept of
inherent power is not a synonym for power without limit; rather,
the concept suggests only that not all powers granted in the
Constitution are themselves exhausted by internal
enumeration, so that, within a sphere properly regarded as one
of executive power, authority is implied unless there or
elsewhere expressly limited..
1. Immunity from suit
In Re Saturnino Bermudez (1986) Per Curiam
Saturnino V. Bermudez (petitioner) - no respondents
Petition for DECLARATORY RELIEF
Facts:
Sec 5 of Art XVIII of the proposed 1986
Constitution provides that The six-year term of
the incumbent President and Vice President
elected in the February 7 1986 election is, for
purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby
extended to noon of June 30 1992
Impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer
asks the Court who among the present incumbent
President Corazon Aquino and VP Salvador Laurel,
and the Elected President Ferdinand Marcos and VP
Arturo Tolentino are being referred to in the said
provision.
Issues: WON the petition should be dismissed for:
1. lack of jurisdiction - YES
2. lack of cause of action - YES (he also lacks
personality to sue)
Ratio:
1. The SC has no jurisdiction over petitions for
declaratory relief (rather it is with the RTC). Moreover,
the petition amounts to a suit against the incumbent
President Corazon Aquino. Incumbent Presidents are
immune from suit during their incumbency and tenure.
2. It is a matter of public record and common public
knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers
therein to incumbent President Corazon Aquino and
VP Salvador Laurel. The legitimacy of the Aquino
government is not a justiciable matter, for the people
have accepted the Aquino government which is in
effective control of the entire country. It is not merely
a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure
government. The members of the SC have sworn to
uphold the Philippine Constitution under her
government.
Held: Petition dismissed.
Notes:
Previous cases questioning the legitimacy of the Aquino
government on the ground that it was not established pursuant
to the 1973 constitution had been dismissed by this Court for
lack of cause of action.
Soliven v. Makasiar Per Curiam

November 14, 1988

Petitioners:
82585
Maximo V. Soliven, Antonio V. Roces, Frederick K. Agcaoili,
Godofredo Manzanas
82827 and 83979
Luis D. Beltran
Respondents:
82585
Ramon P. Makasiar (Presiding Judge, Manila RTC), Silvestre
Bello III (DOJ Usec.), Luis C. Victor, the City Fiscal of Manila,
and President Corazon C. Aquino
82827
Makasiar, Victor, Fiscal, People of the Philippines,
Superintendent of the Western Police District, and Members of
the Process Serving unit at the Manila RTC
83979
Catalino Macaraig (Exec. Sec.), Sedfrey Ordonez (DOJ Sec),
Bello III, Jesus Guerrero (City Fiscal of Manila), and Makasiar
Petition for certiorari and prohibition to review the
decisoin of the RTC of Manila
Facts:
- Petitioners were charged with libel by President Corazon C.
Aquino
- Petitioners are newspapermen
- Usec. of Justice Silvestre Bello III found a prima facie case of
libel against petitioners
- Judge Makasiar issued a warrant of arrest for petitioners
Petitioners aver:
- they were denied due process when the infomations for libel
were filed against them pending the review of the Sec. of
Justice of the resolution of the Usec. of Justice of a prima facie
of libel against them
- Sec. 2, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution was violated because
Judge Makasiar did not personally examine the complainant
and the witnesses in his determination of a probably cause for
the issuance of warrants of arrest for petitioners
- Presidential immunity necessitates that the President
cannot file a suit, as her filing of a suit will expose her to
being held in contempt of court or perjury.
- Privileged character of the publication renders them immune
to libel
- Libel case against them will produce a chilling effect on press
freedom
Issues:
1. WON petitioners were denied due process - MOOT, BUT
STILL, NO
2. WON petitioners' interpretation of Sec. 2, Art. III holds water
- NO
3. WON the President may issue criminal proceedings against
petitioners
4. WON petitioners are immune from libel - THIS COURT IS
NOT A TRIER OF FACTS

5. WON libel case would produce a chilling effect - NO BASIS

TO RULE ON THAT POINT YET
Ratio:
1. Sec. of Justice had already affirmed the resolution of the
Usec of Justice finding a prima facie case of libel against
petitioners. Either way, petitioner Beltran filed a Motion to
Declare Proceedings Closed instead of a counter affidavit. Due
process does not require that petitioners file their counter
affidavits; it only requires that they be given a chance to. They
were given a chance. They did not take that chance.
2. Sec. 2, Art. III states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
What the Constitution means here is that it is the exclusive and
personal authority of the issuing judge to satisfy himself with
the existence of probably cause. He should follow the
procedure, which requires him to: 1) personally evaluate the
reports and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal; 2) if
he finds the fiscal's report to be unsatisfactory, he can require
the submission of supporting affdavits.
Circular 12 of the SC contains the guidelines in issuing
warrants of arrest. The Court finds no proof that respondent
Judge violated/deviated from procedure.
3. Presidential immunity exists so as to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any
hindrance or distraction, considering that being a
President requires undivided attention. This privilege
pertains to the President by virtue of her office; thus, she
is the only person who can invoke this and raise such
defense. With that, the petitioners cannot invoke Presidential
immunity from suit as a defense in the case in which the
President herself is the complainant.
Although the President is not prevented from waiving
such right, such choice is solely her prerogative, and it
cannot be assumed by any other person.
Held:
Petitions dismissed. Status quo ante order lifted.
1. Executive Privilege
Neri v Senate Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers Investigations (2008) Leonardo-De Castro, J.
Petition for CERTIORARI assailing the show cause Letter and
contempt Order issued by respondent Senate Committees on

Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, Trade and

Commerce, and National Defense and Security against
petitioner Romulo L. Neri, former Director General of the
National Economic and Development Authority
FACTS:
(see notes for complete timeline)
four resolutions were introduced in the senate, all
directing an inquiry in aid of legislation in connection
with the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project

testifying before the respondent committees, he

disclosed thaT:
then COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos
offered him P200 million in exhange for his
approval of the NBN project.
He informed President Arroyo about the
bribery attempt and that she instructed him
not to accept the bribe
- however, when probed further on what they discussed about
the NBN project, he refused to answer, invoking executive
privilege. Particularly, he refused to answer the questions on:
whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN
project
whether or not she directed him to prioritize it
whether or not she directed him to approve after
being told about the bribe
- petitioner maintains that his conversations with President
Arroyo are candid discussions meant to explore options in
making policy decisions these discussions dwelt on the impact
of the bribery scandal involving high government officials on
the countrys diplomatic relations and economic and military
affairs and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors
and lenders in the Philippines
ISSUES:
1. WON the communications elicited by the subject three
questions are covered by executive privilege YES
a. WON there is a recognized claim of executive
privilege despite the revocation of EO 464 YES
b. WON the claim of executive privilege is properly
invoked by the president YES
2. WON the Committees contempt Order was issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction YES
RATIO:
1a. the three communications are covered by the presidential
communications privilege (see notes) since the three elements
of presidential communication privilege, based on American
jurisprudence, are present:
a. the protected communication must relate to
a quinteseential and non-delegable
presidential powerhere, i.e. the power to
enter into executive agreement with other
countries
b. communication must be authored or solicited
and received by a close advisor of the
President or the president himself. The
judicial test is that an advisor must be in
operational proximity with the president

petitioner can be considered a close advisor,

being a cabinet member
c. the presidential communications privilege
remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need,
such that the information sought likely
contains important evidence and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authoritythe
condition for overcoming the presumption is not
shown
1b. the claim is properly invoked by the president. According to
jurisprudence, for executive privilege to be properly invoked,
there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of
the department which has control over the matter. Executive
Secretary Ermitas letter (see timeline) satisfies the
requirement since it serves as the formal claim of privilege. He
expressly states that this Office is constrained to invoke the
settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v.
Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly Congress
must not require the executive to state the reasons for the
claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the
infromation which the privilege is meant to protect as a matter
of respect to a coordinate and co-equal department,
2. 5 reasons given by the court:
a. there being a legitimate claim of executive
privilege, the issuance of the contempt Order
suffers from constitutional infirmity
b. respondent Committees did not comply with the
requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita that
the invitations should contain the possible
needed statute which prompted the need for
the inquiry, along with the usual indication of
the subject of inquiry and the questions
relative to and in furtherance thereof.
c.

a reading of the transcript of respondent

Committees January 30, 2008 proceeding
reveals that only a minority of the members of
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was
present during the deliberation. the needed
vote is a majority of all the members of the
Committee. Apparently, members who did not
actually participate in the deliberation were
made to sign the contempt Order.

d. respondent Committees likewise violated Section

21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that
the inquiry be in accordance with the duly
published rules of procedure.
e. respondent Committees issuance of the
contempt Order is arbitrary and precipitate. It
must be pointed out that respondent Committees
did not first pass upon the claim of executive
privilege and inform petitioner of their ruling.

Instead, they curtly dismissed his explanation as

unsatisfactory and simultaneously issued the
Order citing him in contempt and ordering his
immediate arrest and detention.

HELD: Petition granted.

NOTES:
Timeline(credits to my ex-blockmate)
April 21, 2007: Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC) enters into a contract with Zhing Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
equipment and services for the National Broadband Network
(NBN) for a project of roughly P16 Billion Pesos. The project
was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)

Respondent Committees investigate Secretary Romulo Neri.

He is summoned to appear and testify on September 18, 20,
26 and October 25, 2007. Neri only shows up on September
26 claiming that he was out of town on those dates.

September 26, 2007: Neri testifies before respondent

Committee in an 11-hour meeting, discloses that COMELEC
Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in
exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He informed
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and she told him
not to accept. However, he invoked executive privilege and
refused to answer the following questions:

W/N President Arroyo followed up on the NBN project

W/N she directed him to prioritize the ZTE

o W/N she directed him to approve the project after being told
about the bribe

Respondent Committee issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum

to petitioner, requiring him to appear and testify on November
20, 2007.

November 15, 2007: Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita

sends a letter to the Committee asking them to dispense with
the petitioners testimony on the grounds that he had already
testified exhaustively and on executive privilege. Included in
the letter are the reasons for invoking executive privilege
(necessary for the protection of public interest in Presidental
decision-making) and a note that Sec. Neri had asked to be
informed of any further questions in advance.

November 20, 2007: Neri fails to appear before the

Committee

November 22, 2007: Respondent Committee issues a

Letter requiring him to explain why he should not be
held in contempt

November 29, 2007: Neri replies to Committee saying that it

was not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing, and that he

thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to

be covered by executive privilege. Additionally, he sends a
letter prepared by his counsel Atty. Antonio R. Bautista stating
that his non-appearance was a) upon the order of the
President and b) his conversation with the President deals with
delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic
matters. The reply also reiterates the petitioners request that
he be furnished in advanced with the questions so that he
could prepare.

December 7, 2007: Neri files a petition for certiorari assailing

the Letter dated November 22, 2007. (This case)

January 30, 2008: Committees found petitioners explanations

unsatisfactory. They issue an Order citing him in contempt and
order his arrest. On the same day, Neri moved for the
reconsideration of the above order on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion.

After some oral arguments (not listed), on March 6 2008

President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151,
revoking Executive Order 464 and Memorandum Circular
No. 108.

1.
2.
3.

4.

5.
6.

Kinds of executive privilege

1. presidential communications privilege- applies to decisionmaking of the president and to documents in their entirety,
and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as
pre-deliberative ones
2. deliberative process privilege- applies to decision-making
of executive officials
CJ Punos dissenting opinion in Neri v Senate Committee
on Accountability of Public Officers Investigations
(keypoints from ESCRA)
separation of powers between the branches is not absolute.
oversight may be undertaken through review or investigation of
executive branch action.
Legislative power of investigation includes the power of
contempt or process to enforce
Two requirements for the valid exercise of the legislative power
of investigation and contempt of witness for contumacy:
a. Existence of a legislative purposesubject
matter of inquiry is one over which the
legislature can legislate
b. Pertinency of the question propounded
Privilege is strongest when used not out of a personal desire to
avoid culpability, but based on a legitimate need to protect the
presidents constitutional mandate to execute the law, to
uphold prudential separation of powers, and above all, to
promote the public interest
A claim of executive privilege may be valid or not depending
on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is
made
In the US, presidential communications privilege covers the
performance of the Presidents responsibilities of his ofice
and made in the process of shaping policies and making
decisions

7. Presidential communications are presumptively privileged

8. To overcome the qualified presumption, there must be
sufficient showing or demonstration of specific need for the
withheld information on the branch of government seeking its
disclosure. Two standards must be met to shwo the specific
need: evidentiary and constitutional
9. The claim of executive privilege must be balanced with the
specific need for disclosure of the communications on the part
of the branch of the government
10. Court cannot assess the validity of the claim of the executive
secretary that disclosure of the withheld information may
impair our diplomatic relations with the peoples republic of
China; no absolute explanation offered on how diplomatic
secrets will be exposed at the expense of our national interest
if petitioner answers the three undisputed questions
11. The three assailed questions are pertiennt to the subect matter
of the legislative investigation being undertaken by the
respondent senate committees
12. The motive of the respondent senate committees in conducting
their investigation and propounding their questions is beyond
the purview of the Courts power of judicial review
13. It appears by tradition, custom and practice, the Senate does
not re-publish its rules especially when the same has not
undergone any material change
14. There is no basis for either petitioner or Neri to assume that
petitioners further testimony will be limited only on the three
dispited questions
(outline)
I.
General policy considerations on disclosure
and secrecy in a democracy: US and Philippine
constitution
II.
Our government operates under the Principle
of separation of powers
a. A look at the power of legislative
investigation and contempt of witness
b. A look at executive privilege
i.
definition and judicial use
of the term
executive privilege: right of
the president and high-level
executive branch officials to
withhold information from
Congress, the courts and the
public
ii.
history and use
rooted in two theories: (a)
separation of powers theory
that certain presidential
communications should be
free from compulsion by other
branches (b) structural
argument that secrecy is
important to the Presidents
constitutional duties in
conducting state and foreign
affairs

III.
IV.

nixons administration
produced significant
developments: privilege was
invoked not for the protection
of national security interests,
foreign policy decision-making
or military secrets as in the
past, but rather to keep under
wraps politically damaging
and personally embarrasing
information
iii.
scope, kinds and context
of executive privilege
at least four kinds in the US:
military and state secrets,
presidential communications,
deliberative process, and law
enforcement privileges
Presidential Communications Privilege and
Philippine Jurisprudence
Test and Procedure to Determine the Validity
of the Invocation of Exeuctive Privilege Covering
Presidential Communications in a Legislative
Inquiry
a. U.S. v. Nixon
i.
Background proceedings
ii.
Rationale of presidential
communications privilege
1. Public interest in candor or
candid opinions in
presidential decisionmaking
2. Separation of powers
iii.
Scope of the presidential
communications privilege
iv.
Qualified Presumption in
Favor of the Presidential
Communications Privilege
v.
Deomonstrable Specific
Ned for Disclosure will overcome
the qualified presumption
1. Evidentiary standard of
need
2. Demonstrable specific
need for disclosure to be
balanced with the claim of
privilege using the function
impairment test
vi.
In camera determination of
information to be disclosed
b. Resolving the case at bar with the aid of
U.S. v. Nixon and other cases
i.
Procedure to follow when
diplomatic, military and national
security secrets privilege is invoked
In US case, there must be a
formal claim of privilege

lodged by the head of the

department that has control
over the matter after his
actual personal consideration.
The court must thereafter
detemrine whether the
circumstances are
appropriate for the claim of
privilege, without forcing a
disclosure of the very thing
the privilege is designed to
protect.
In Senate v. Ermita, only the
President or the Executive
Secretary, by order of the
President, can invoke
executive privilege. Petitioner,
himself or through his
counsel, cannot expand the
grounds.
ii.
Applicability of the
presidential communications
privilege
courts task is to balance
whether the disclosure of the
disputed information impairs
the presidents ability to
perform her constitutional
duty to execute the laws more
than non-disclosure would
impair the respondent senate
committees ability to perform
their constitutional function to
enact laws (aka function
impairment test)
1. Presidential
communications enjoy a
qualified presumption in
their favor
function impairment test
begins with a recognition that
presidential communications
are presumptively privileged
2. next, the strength of the
qualified presumption must
be determiney
a primary factor in
determining the strength is to
look where the constitution
textually committed the power
in question. In the case at bar,
the subject of the
respondents inquiry is a
foreign loan agreement.
Other factors pertain to the
nature of the disclosure
sought: (1) time of disclosure,

V.

whether contemporaneous
disclosure or open
deliberation, which has a
greater chilling effect on
rendering candid opinions, as
opposed to subsequent
disclosure; (2) level of detail,
whether full texts or whole
conversations or summaries;
(3) audience, whether the
general public or a select few;
(4) certainty of disclosure,
whether the information is
made public as a matter of
course or upon request as
considered by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Nixon v.
Administrator of General
Services;(5) frequency of
disclosure as considered by
the U.S. Supreme Court in
U.S. v. Nixon and Cheney v.
U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia;
Type of information
iii.
Determining specific need
of respondent senate committees
for the withheld information to
overcome the qualifed presumption
1. Evidentiary standard of
need
2. Balancing the conflicting
constitutional functions of
the President and the
Senate using the function
impairment test
c. Presidential communications privilege and
wrongdoing
d. Negotiations and accommodations
Validity of the order of arrest

Akbayan v. Aquino will be late but before sunrise

Akbayan v. Aquino Carpio-Morales, J
July 16, 2008
Petitioners: Akbayan+Several Congresspeople
Respondents: Thomas Aquino (DTI Usec.) JPEPA negotiators
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Mandamus and
Prohibition
Facts:
- Petitioners seek to obtain the ff things about the JapanPhilippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA):
- full text
- drafts
- Philippine and Japanese offers submitted
- all pertinent attachments and annexes

- JPEPA is the first bilateral free trade agreement of the

country. It covers: trade in goods, rules of origin, customs
procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment,
intellectual property rights, government procurement,
movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition policy,
mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement,
improvement of the business environment, and general and
final provisions.
- January 25, 2005 - Reps. Lorenzo Tanada III and Mario Joyo
Aguja passed House Resolution 551, calling for an inquiry into
JPEPA
- Petitioner Congresspeople repeatedly asked respondent
Aquino and other government officials for a draft of the JPEPA,
the offers, and the annexes
- Respondent government officials repeatedly ignored the
requests, or told them that JPEPA is a work in progress and a
draft will be sent to them ASAP
- HOR almost subpoenaed respondent Usec. Aquino, but
Speaker Jose de Venecia asked petitioners to hold it in
abeyance, as they wait for consent from PGMA to release the
documents
- September 11, 2006 - full text of JPEPA released to the
public
Petitioners aver:
- the divulging of the contents of the JPEPA after the
agreement has been concluded makes the Senate a mere
rubber stamp of the Executive (the Court did not decide on this
point)
Respondents counter-argue:
- The JPEPA negotiation things is covered by executive
privilege
Issues:
1. WON petitioners have standing - YES
2. WON issue is rendered moot by release of the full text of the
JPEPA - YES AND NO
3. WON the refusal of the govt to release the JPEPA
documents violates the public's right to information on matters
of public concern and the constitutional mandate of full public
disclosure of transactions involving public interest - NO
3.a. WON the respondents' invocation of executive privilege
is valid - YES
3.a.1. WON public interest is enough to overcome the
privileged status of the JPEPA negotiation things - NO
4. WON non-disclosure of the JPEPA things undermines
petitioners' right to effective and reasonable participation in
social, political, and economic decision-making (refer to ratio
for 3.a.1) - NO
5. WON respondents failure to claim executive privilege during
the House Committee hearings can be construed as a waiver
to such privilege - NO
Ratio:
1. Petitioners have sufficient interest as citizens alone because
they bring up the public's right to information.

2. The issue is largely rendered moot by the release of the full

text of the JPEPA, but 1) the JPEPA has not yet been signed
by the Senate, and Art. 167 of the JPEPA expressly states that
it shall not take effect until it is signed; 2) petitioners also seek
that the offers and details of negotiations bet. Japan and the
Philippines be released.
3. The right to information and full public disclosure is not
absolute. There are kinds of information that are considered
privileged, viz:
a.
Informers privilege - privilege of govt not to disclose
the identity of people who give informations re: violations of
law
b.
Presidential communications privilege - privilege
accorded to presidential communications to allow the frank
exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments
c.
Deliberative process privilege - covers documents
reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and
deliberations
d.
Diplomatic negotiations privilege - accorded to
diplomatic negotiations, also to allow for the frank exchange of
ideas and assessments
Clearly, the JPEPA things fall under (d)
3.a. The validity of executive privilege depends on the
ground invoked to justify it and the context in which is it is
made. In this case, the ground invoked is diplomatic
negotiations.
With regard to diplomatic negotiations, PMPF v. Manglapus
states that the secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is
not violative if the constitutional provisions of freedom of
access to information. We must also take into account the
sensitivity of information exchanged in negotiations and the
necessary insulation of negotiators from public reaction and
influence from pressure groups.
Thus, it can be reasonably stated that information about
diplomatic negotiations is privileged.
The diplomatic negotiations privilege seeks to protect the
independence of the President in decision-making,
particularly in her capacity as the sole organ of the nation
in its external relations and its sole representative with
foreign nations.
As per Senate v. Ermita, a privilege once recognized may be
invoked under different procedural settings. Thus, the privilege
for diplomatic negotiations may be invoked not only against
citizens demand for information may ALSO be invoked against
context of legislative investigations.
3.a.1. As per Senate Select Committee. v. Nixon, the
presumption that the public interest favors confidentiality
can be defeated only by a strong showing of need by

another institution of government - a showing that the

responsibilities of that institution cannot responsibly be fulfilled
without access to records of the Presidents deliberations.
The full text of the JPEPA is already available, and there
have been numerous articles written about it and people
have been discussing it over the internet. This defeats the
petitioners argument that the participation of the public has
been compromised by the non-release of the offers and the
documents during the negotiations of the JPEPA. The public is
given ample time to review and scrutinize the treaty before it is
ratified.
Thus, petitioners have failed to present the 'sufficient need'
necessary to overcome the privileged status of the JPEPA
offers and negotiation things as diplomatic negotiations.
4. REFER TO THE RATIO ABOVE
5. Respondents received only requests for the information. The
subpoena was held in abeyance. Such requests for information
are not a compulsory process - they do not strictly call for an
assertion of executive privilege. Also, as in Senate v. Ermita,
the Court is averse to laying down new rules that restrict
executive privilege.
Held:
Petition dismissed
Notes:
The President is vested with the exclusive Constitutional
authority to enter into treaties. While the Senate (not the HOR,
or the whole Congress) is given the power to concur with the
treaties, ONLY the President is given the power to enter into
treaties and Congress may not interfere with treaty
negotiations.
I didnt put here na the part where Carpio-Morales rebuts the
dissent of Puno. Sorry guys.
4.
Succession
Constructive Resignation
Estrada v. Desierto ;
FACTS
- Nature: Writ of Preliminary Injunction against complaints
against him until his term is over
- May 11, 1998 ~ Estrada was elected President; Arroyo was
VP; some 10 million Filipinos voted for Estrada and both
Estrada and Arroyo were to serve a 6-year term.
- Oct. 4, 2000 ~ Estrada's "sharp decent from power" began;
Chavit Singson, Estrada's long time friend, publicly accused
Estrada, Estrada's family and friends of receiving millions of
pesos from jueteng lords.
- Oct. 5, 2000~ Sen. Teofisto Guingona Jr. delivered a speech
entitled "I ACCUSE" wherein he accused Estrada of receiving
220 million pesos worth of jueteng money from Gov. Singson

from November 1998 till August 200 and obtained another 70

million peson on excise tax still from Gov. Singson
- The privilege speech was referred by Sen. Drilon to the Blue
Ribbon Committee and the Committee on Justice for joint
investigation
- The House of Reps also decided to investigate the expose of
Gov. Singson.
- Reps. Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael
Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach Estrada.
- Oct. 11, 2000 ~ Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a
pastoral statement asking Estrada to step down from the
presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern
- Oct. 13, 2000~ CBCP also cried out for Estrada's resignation
- Oct. 17, 2000~ Former Pres. Aquino joined the calls for
resignation and former Pres. Ramos joined the chorus as well.
- But before that, on Oct 12, Arroyo already resigned as DSWD
Secretary and also asked for Estrada's resignation but Estrada
really held on to his office and refused to resign. (According to
J. Puno: "The heat is on.")
- November ended with a "big-bang" because on November
13, House Speaker Manuel Villar transmitted the Articles of
Impeachment (which was based on the grounds of bribery,
graft and corruption, betrayal of public trust and culpable
violation of the Constitution) signed by 115 representatives to
the Senate.
- Nov. 20, 2000~ Senate finally opened the impeachment trial.
21 senators took their oath as judges with SC Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr, presiding.
- Dec. 7, 2000~ The impeachment trial started.
- Dramatic point of the December hearings was the testimony
of Clarissa Ocampo, the SVP of Equitable-PCI
BANK. Ocampo testified that she was one foot away from
Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on
documents involving a 500 million pesos investment account
with their bank on Feb 4 2000.
- Impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas
and when January came, more bombshells were exploded.
> Sec. of Finance Atty. Espiritu testified that Estrada jointly
owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who
was facing charges of insider trading.
> Jan. 16, 2001~ with a vote of 11-10, the Senator judges
ruled against opening the 2nd envelope which allegedly
contained evidence showing that petitioner held 3.3 billion
pesos in a secret bank account under the name "Jose
Velarde."
> In short, this resulted to what we know as "EDSA II"
- January 19, 2001~ withdrawal of support from the Armed
Forces, PNP and mass resignations ensued
- Jan 20, 2001~ Estrada surrendered. At 12 nn, CJ Davide
administered the oath to Arroyo as the President of the
Philippines.
> Estrada left Malacaang and issued a press statement
saying that he now leaves Malacaang Palace for the sake
of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our
nation.

> He also wrote a letter saying that the VP shall be the

acting president and said letter was transmitted to former
Speaker Fuentebella and Sen. Pres. Pimentel.
- Jan 21, 2001~ Arroyo discharged the powers and duties of
the Presidency. The SC issued a resolution, which confirmed
the authority given by the 12 members of the Court then
present to the Chief Justice to administer the oath of office to
GMA.
- Jan. 24, 2001~ Despite the receipt of Estrada's letter, House
of Reps. passed House Resolution No. 175 experiencing full
support to GMA's administration and also HR no. 176
- Feb 7, 2001~ Despite receipt of Estrada's letter claiming
inability, Senate passed Resolution No. 82 confirming GMA's
nomination of Teofisto Guingona as VP and the Senate's
support of the new gov't. and also in the same date, Senate
passed Res. No. 83 recognizing that the impeachment court is
functus offictio.
- Feb. 8, 2001~ Senate passed Res. No. 84 certifying vacancy
in the Senate.
- Feb 15, 2001- CJ Davide and J. Panganiban inhibited
themselves from participating in this case as per Saguisag's
motion. They of course debunked his charge "that they have
compromised their weight on one side" but nonetheless
recused themselves.
ISSUES
1. WON the petitions present a justiciable controversy
2. WON the petitioner resigned as president
3. WON the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as
president
4. WON the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit (and
assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity)
5. WON the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be
enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.
HELD
1. The Court shall consider as justiciable the issue of WON the
change in the presidency was done in the manner prescribed
by the 1987 Constitution. (In this part, the ponente
differentiated EDSA I from EDSA II saying that EDSA I was a
revolution, change of presidency was done extraconstitutionally whereas EDSA II was not a revolution, the
change was done to an element of the government only and it
was done intra-constitutionally because GMA swore to uphold
or protect the 1987 Constitution. Read it if u want a better
understanding. Also, the Court is interpreting ART II sec 1,
ART VII Sec 8 and ART VII Sec 11 in this case so look at
those provisions too.J)
2. The Court held that resignation shall be determined from the
totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the
issue. (In relation to this, see Art. VII, Section 8)
3. The Court held that the question WON it may review and
revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing
GMA as the de jure President of the Philippines is a political
one. (Congress has laid Estrada's claim of inability to rest
because of its recognition of GMA as president. The issue is a
political question and the Court cannot review Congress'

decision without violating the principle of separation of

powers.)
4. The Court held (shall rule) that the President enjoys
immunity only during his tenure. (Reasoning in the In Re:
Bermudez case that the incumbent President is immune from
suit or from being brought to court during his period of his
incumbency and tenure but not beyond.)
5. The Court shall rule that to warrant a finding of prejudicial
publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges
have been unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity.
Decision The petitions of Joseph E. Estrada challenging the
respondent Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo as the de jure 14th
President of the Republic are DISMISSED.
Estrada v Desierto Resolution on Motion for
Reconsideration
Estrada v. Desierto (2001) Petitioner: JOSEPH E.
ESTRADA Respondent: Ombudsman Desierto, et al. Ponente:
Puno, J. Nature of the petition: Motion for Reconsideration of a
decision of SC
Doctrine: Immunity from suit does not include unofficial acts;
unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State.
Facts:
Estrada assails the Courts original ruling for adverting to
newspaper accounts to conclude that he has resigned as
president. As basis for the Courts decision, they used the
Totality Test:
1. Expos of Gov. Chavit Singson
2. I accuse speech of Sen. Guingona in the Senate
3. Joint investigation of the speech of Sen. Guingona by Blue
Ribbon Committee and Committee on Justice
4. Investigtion of Singson expose by House Committee on
Public Order and Security
5. Move to impeach petitioner in House of Representatives
6. Pastoral letter of Archbishop Cardinal Sin demanding
petitioners resignation; similar demands by Catholic Bishops
conference, former Presidents Cory Aquino and Fidel Ramos;
resignation of Arroyo as Sec. of DSWD and call for Estrada to
resign
7. Resignation of members of Estradas Council of Senior
Economic Advisers and of Sec. Mar Roxas III from the
Department of Trade and Industry
8. Defection of then Sen. Pres. Franklin Drilon and then
Speaker of the House
Manuel Villar and 47 representatives from petitioners Lapiang
Masang Pilipino
9. Transmission of Articles of Impeachment by Speaker Villar
to Senate
10.
Unseating of Sen. Drilon as Senate Pres. and Rep.
Villar as Speaker of the House
11.
Impeachment trial of Estrada
12.
Testimonies of Clarissa Ocampo and former
Finance Sec. Edgardo Espiritu at impeachment trial
13.11-10 vote of senator-judges denying

prosecutors motion to open 2nd envelope which allegedly

contained evidence showing that he had a Php3.3B deposit in
a secret bank account under the name of Jose Velarde
14. Prosecutors walkout and resignation
15. Indefinite postponement of impeachment proceedings to
give a chance to HOR to resolve issue of
prosecutors resignation
16. Rally at EDSA shrine
17.Withdrawal of support of then Sec. of National Defense
Mercado and then Chief of Staff Gen. Reyes, together with
chiefs of all armed forces
18.
Withdrawal of support by then Director General of
PNP, Gen. Lacson, and major service commanders
19.
Stream of resignations by Cabinet secretaries,
undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs
20.
Estradas agreement to hold snap election and
opening of controversial second envelope
Court also used the Angara Diary to decipher the intent of
Estrada to resign.
Finally, the press release of Estrada containing his final
statement was issued after the oath- taking of respondent
Arroyo as President; such issuance of press release by
Estrada and abandonment of Malacanang Palace confirmed
his resignation.
These overt acts clearly indicated that Estrada had resigned
before 12 noon, Jan 20, 2001; therefore, the claim that Arroyo
took oath of office while office was not vacant does not stand.
Estrada had several options available to him other than
resignation: snap elections; transmission to Congress of
written declaration of temporary inability; he asked Sen.
Angara prior to leaving if aalis na ba ako? implying he still
had a choice.
Therefore, while pressure was exerted for petitioner to resign,
pressure did not completely vitiate voluntariness of petitioners
resignation.
Issues:
1.
WON Angara Diary was Hearsay EvidenceNO
2. WON Congress had authority to determine Pres. as
unable to governYES
3.
WON Estrada is immune from suits for Criminal
ActsNO
Ratio:
1. Evidentiary Issue Diary was not an out of court statement; it
was part of pleadings in the case at bar. Evidence is hearsay if
it depends on the credibility of some persons other than the
witnesses who produced it. Three reasons for excluding
hearsay evidence:
1) Absence of cross examination
2) Absence of demeanor evidence
3) Absence of oath
However, not all hearsay evidence is inadmissible. Some
exceptions have been admitted by the Court due to their
relevance, trustworthiness, and necessity.
Angara Diary discloses admissions of Estrada: his proposal for
snap presidential election, statement that he only wanted the
five-day period promised by Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes,
statement that he would leave by Monday if the second

envelope would be opened by Monday, and pagod na pagod

na ako...
Doctrine of adoptive admission: a partys reaction to a
statement by another person when it is reasonable to treat the
partys reaction as an admission of something stated or implied
by the other person.
After withdrawal of support from armed forces, Estradas
silence and non-objection to the option of a dignified exit or
resignation can be taken as admission by him
Admissions by a co-partner or agent: as alter ego of Estrada,
Exec. Sec. Angara (Little Pres) was authorized by Estrada to
act for him in critical hours and days before he abandoned
Malacanang. Petitioner had made statements of full trust to
Angara (mula umpisa ng kapmanya, Ed, ikaw pinkikinggan ko.
Hanggang sa huli, ikaw pa rin) and Estrada asking Sec.
Angara if he should leave indicates FULL TRUST: thus
Estrada cannot deny Sec. Angara headed his team of
negotiators that met with team of Arroyo to discuss the
peaceful and orderly transfer of power after his relinquishment
of the powers of the presidency. The diary shows Sec. Angara
always briefed Estrada on negotiations; Sec. Angara acted on
behalf of Estrada, and thus Estrada is bound by the acts and
declarations of Sec. Angara, under the rule: what is done by
agent is done by principal.
The ban on hearsay evidence does not cover two kinds of
relevant statements:
1. Statements which are the very facts in issue
2. Statements which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in
issue:
1) Statement of person showing his statement of mind
2) Showing his physical condition
3) Statements from which an inference may be made as to his
state of mind
4) Statements which may identify the date, place, and person
in question
5) Statements showing the lack of credibility of a witness
The Angara diary contained statements of Estrada which
reflect his state of mind, and are circumstantial evidence of his
intent to resign.
2. Temporary Inability
Art. VII, Sec. 11 of the Constitution on inability: majority of the
Cabinet determines the President is unable to govern; the
President informs Congress that his inability has ceased, but is
contradicted by a majority of the members of the Cabinet.
Estrada claims his inability to govern temporarily as
communicated to Speaker of the House and Senate President
is a political question which the Court may not review.
Held: Cannot be sustained
Estrada himself submitted: Congress has the ultimate
authority under the Constitution to determine whether the
President is incapable of performing his functions in the
manner provided for in Sec. 11, Art. VII. Recognition by
Congress of Arroyo as de jure president is a political judgment,
its wisdom not to be debated in Court.
Held: Under Art. VII, Sec. 8 of the Constitution, Court ruled
Estrada had resigned from office prior to Arroyo taking oath.

Estrada faulted Congress for disregarding his temporary

inability to govern and President-on- leave argument and thus
should not be given legal significance because: 1) they are
post facto and 2) a declaration of presidential incapacity
cannot be implied.
Held: Under Art. VII, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, Court ruled
Congress has ultimate authority to determine whether
President is unable to govern.
Senate President and Speaker Funetebella had issued a Joint
Statement declaring their support to the constitutional
successor to the Presidency: an a prio recognition of Arroyo as
constitutional successor to the presidency, followed by post
facto resolutions of the Senate and House confirming this
recognition. These acts of Congress, a priori and post facto,
cannot be dismissed as merely implied recognitions of
respondent Arroyo, as the President.
The Constitution clearly sets out the structure of addressing
vacancies in office of the President:
Art. VII, Sec. 7: a) when Pres elect fails to qualify, b) if Pres
shall not have been chosen, c) if at beginning of the term of
Pres, Pres-elect shall have died or become permanently
disabled
Art. VII, Sec. 8: covers situations of death, permanent
disability, removal from office or resignation of the President
Art. VII, Sec. 11: when Pres transmits to the Senate
President and Speaker of the HoR his written declaration that
he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office In
each case, the Constitution specifies the body that will resolve
the issues that may arise from the contingency. 3.
Impeachment and Absolute Immunity Art. XI, Sec. 3(7):
Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further
than removal from office and disqualification to hold an office
under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted
should nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial,
and punishment according to law. Estrada contends since he
was not convicted at the impeachment trial (since the
prosecutors walked out), the failure to convict is equivalent to
acquittal. Further, dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute
amounts to an acquittal for purposes of applying the rule
against double jeopardy. Court disagrees. Estrada cannot
invoke double jeopardy, because he was not acquitted; at best
he can claim violation of his right to a speedy trial, which only
amounts to failure to prosecute. He should therefore ask for a
trial of the case and only if the Court fails to prove his guilt can
he be acquitted. Unjustified postponements, which prolong the
trial for an unreasonable length of time, are what violate the
right of an accused to a speedy trial (Rules of Court). Estrada
failed to show that postponement of the impeachment
proceedings were unjustified or for an unreasonable length of
time. There existed a justified suspension (HoR had to resolve
issues of resignation of the public prosecutors) but before
impeachment proceedings could proceed, or three day from
suspension, Estradas resignation supervened, rendering the
impeachment court moot and terminated. The four-day period
between suspension and resignation cannot be considered as
an unreasonable length of time violative of the right to speedy
trial.

The claim of double jeopardy cannot be grounded on the

dismissal or termination of the case without the express
consent of the accused. Estradas resignation acted as his
consent to the termination of the impeachment proceedings.
When the dismissal or termination of the case is made at the
instance of the accused, there is no double jeopardy.
Finally, Estrada cannot invoke absolute immunity from suit for
criminal committed while sitting as President if he is no longer
sitting as president.
Intent of the framers: executive immunity of President from suit
is concurrent only with his tenure, not his term.
Rule:
WHEREOF, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in G.R.
Nos. 146710-15 and his Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 146738
are DENIED for lack of merit.
5.
The Vice President
Right of succession and membership in Cabinet
6.
Removal
1. Judiciary
1. Judicial Power
All courts can exercise judicial power
o Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659
Ynot v IAC (1987)
FACTS
- The case is about the constitutionality of EO No. 626-A.
- The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat
from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac
Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of EO No. 626-A.

Petitioner contends that said EO is unconstitutional

because
1.
it is imposed without according the owner a
right to be heard before a competent and impartial
court as guaranteed by due process
2.
there is improper exercise of the legislative
power by the former President under Amendment No.
6 of the 1973 Constitution

ISSUE
1.
WON lower courts can examine constitutional questions
YES
a.
WON judicial power authorizes exercise of declaring a
provision unconstitutional - YES
2.
WON EO No. 626-A is unconstitutional YES
a.
WON said EO violates due process requirement YES
b. WON said EO is not a valid exercise of police power YES
RATIO
1.
While lower courts should observe a becoming modesty
in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not
prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted,
subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have
jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of

court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts

in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of
certain measures. This simply means that the resolution of
such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower
courts.
1a. While laws are presumed to be constitutional, that
presumption is not by any means conclusive and in fact may
be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their
invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the
time to make the hammer fall, and heavily." Judicial power
authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there
should be no shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss
of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition
unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.
2.
a. Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban
not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement,
providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported
from one province to another." The reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
The Court did not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial
transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with
no less difficulty in one province than in another.
the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had
filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to
produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The
executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner
and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out
forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the
petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus
denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
b. The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police
power because the method employed to conserve the
carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the
law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated
because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the
right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned
and punished. The conferment on the administrative
authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the
officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion
in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these
reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A
unconstitutional.
HELD
Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional.
NOTES
EO No. 626-A
WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the
interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of

carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive

Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;
WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the
violators still manage to circumvent the prohibition against
inter-provincial movement of carabaos by transporting
carabeef instead; and
WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of
Executive Order No. 626 and the prohibition against
interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to
strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the
disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the
violation;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President
of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended
such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another. The carabao or
carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as
amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and
other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef,
and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
2.
a.

Supreme Court
Jurisdiction
1. Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the
SC
1. En banc vs Division
o Manotok v. Barque, G.R. Nos. 162335 and 162605,
December 8, 2008
Manotok v Barque (2008)
FACTS
Homer L. Barque, Sr. (Barque, Sr.) represented by
Teresita Barque-Hernandez filed a petition for administrative
reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177 of the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. TCT No. 210177 was
allegedly destroyed when a fire gutted the Quezon City Hall on
11 June 1988. In support of the petition, Barque, Sr. submitted
the owners duplicate certificate of title, Real Estate Tax
Receipts and Tax Declaration.
Atty. Bustos denied the petition for administrative
reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 on the following grounds:
1. Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of
171,473 Sq. Mtrs. and 171,472, respectively, covered by TCT
No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823 Piedad Estate,
containing an area of 342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered by TCT No.
372302 registered in the name of Severino M. Manotok, et al.,
reconstituted under Adm. Reconstitution No. Q-213 dated
February 01, 1991;
2. The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document as
categorically stated by Engineer Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief,
Geodetic Surveys Division, Lands Management Bureau, in his
letter dated February 19, 1997.13

June 24 1998: Land Registration Authority gave due

course to appeal. However, the LRA ruled that TCT No.
210177 may only be reconstituted after a court of competent
jurisdiction cancelled TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the
name of the Manotoks.
CA: denied the Manotoks petition and affirmed the LRA
Resolution of 24 June 1998. However, upon motion for
reconsideration of the Barques, CA granted reconsideration
and directed Land Registration Authority to reconstitute
forthwith respondents TCT No. T-210177.
Manotoks came to SC for relief.
the First Division of this Court denied the petitions and
affirmed the Amended Decisions of the Court of Appeals. In its
19 April 2006 Resolution, the Special First Division of this
Court denied the Manotoks motion for reconsideration. No
proceeding of any kind took place before any trial court
assailing the validity of the Torrens title of the Manotoks.
Yet, as the final resolution of the Barques simple petition for
administrative reconstitution, the First Division of this Court
cancelled the Torrens title of the Manotoks and declared the
title of the Barques not only reconstituted, but also valid.
The special first division of the court referred the case
to the court en banc
ISSUE
1.
WON the ruling of First Division Court is correct NO
2.
WON decision of First Division is already final and
executory, and thus has become immutable and unalterable. NO
*WON Court en banc decision prevails over division court
ruling - YES
RATIO
1.
First, the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First
Division of this Court overturns well-entrenched doctrines
of this Court, such as the decision in Sps. Antonio and
Genoveva Balanon-Anicete, et al. v. Pedro Balanon. Second,
the LRA has no jurisdiction to reconstitute the Barques title
because of the pre-existing Torrens title of the Manotoks.
Third, a Torrens title can only be cancelled if a direct
proceeding assailing its validity is filed before the proper
Regional Trial Court. Fourth, the Barques submitted patently
forged documents in the administrative reconstitution of their
title, and even in the attachments to their Memorandum of 23
August 2007.
The Decision of the First Division overturns three doctrines
firmly established in numerous decisions of this Court, both en
banc and in division, many of them landmark rulings. The three
well-established doctrines that the Decision of the First
Division has overturned are:
1. A Torrens title can be cancelled only in a proceeding directly
attacking the titles validity before the proper regional trial
court.43 This is the bedrock principle that provides enduring
stability to Torrens titles.
2. A reconstitution of Torrens title, whether judicial or
administrative, cannot proceed once it is shown that another
Torrens title has already been issued to another person over
the same property. The reconstituting body or court has no
jurisdiction to issue another Torrens title over the same

property to the petitioner.44The existence of a prior title ipso

facto nullifies the reconstitution proceedings.45 The proper
recourse is to assail directly in a proceeding before the
regional trial court the validity of the Torrens title already
issued to the other person.
3. The reconstituting officer or court has no jurisdiction to
decide the issue of ownership over the property or the validity
of the title.46 The purpose of reconstitution is solely to replace a
certificate of title that was lost or destroyed in the same legal
status it existed at the time of the loss or destruction. The
validity of a Torrens title, reconstituted or not, is a separate
issue from the reconstitution of title.
2.
Decision of First Division never became final and
executory. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability of
decisions necessarily applies only to final and executory
decisions. If the decision never became final and executory,
the doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions has
no application. Before finality of a decision, a court has
"plenary power to alter, modify or even set aside, its own
decisions, and even order a new trial, at any time before
the decision becomes final.
First, the First Division has no jurisdiction to overturn a
doctrine laid down by the Court en banc or in division. The
Court en banc has ruled in Group Commander, Intelligence
and Security Group, Philippine Army v. Dr. Malvar that a
decision of a division is void if it overturns a doctrine
established by the en banc or another division. There, the
Court held:
Section 4, sub-paragraph (3), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, provides:
"x x x no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the
(Supreme) Court en banc or its Divisions may be modified
or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc."
A Decision rendered by a Division of this Court in
violation of the above constitutional provision would be in
excess of jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid.
A void decision vests no right, creates no obligation, grants no
title, and settles no issue. A void decision protects no one and
is subject to attack, directly or collaterally, at any time. A void
decision has no existence in law. Therefore, a void decision
cannot become final and executory against, or in favor of, any
one.
Second, the doctrine of immutability and unalterability of
decisions applies only if the trial court or hearing officer has
jurisdiction over the subject matter. A decision rendered by a
trial court or hearing officer without jurisdiction over the subject
matter is void and cannot become final and executory. Such
decision cannot even become res judicata because there can
be no conclusiveness of judgment if the trial court or hearing
officer has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.
1. Composition
o De Castro v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010 and
April 20, 2010
De Castro vs JBC (March 17, 2010) Bersamin, J.
DECISION

Facts:
-These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has
arise from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section
9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
from the occurrence thereof from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy."
-Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically
considered for the position of Chief Justice the five most
senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely:
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato
C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales;
Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two
declined their nomination through letters dated January 18,
2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
-Candidates who accepted their nominations without
conditions were Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro; Associate
Justice Arturo D. Brion; and Associate Justice Edilberto G.
Sandoval (Sandiganbayan). Candidates who accepted their
nominations with conditions were Associate Justice Antonio T.
Carpio and Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales.
-The JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing
the names of the following candidates to invite the public to file
their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not
later than February 22, 2010, to wit: Associate Justice Carpio,
Associate Justice Corona, Associate Justice Carpio Morales,
Associate Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Associate Justice
Brion, and Associate Justice Sandoval.
-Petitioners Arturo M. De Castro and John G. Peralta
respectively commenced G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No.
191149 as special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus,
praying that the JBC be compelled to submit to the incumbent
President the list of at least three nominees for the position of
the next Chief Justice.
-In G.R. No. 191032, Jaime N. Soriano, via his petition for
prohibition, proposes to prevent the JBC from conducting its
search, selection and nomination proceedings for the position
of Chief Justice.
-In G.R. No. 191057, a special civil action for mandamus, the
Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) wants the
JBC to submit its list of nominees for the position of Chief
Justice to be vacated by Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement on May 17, 2010, because the incumbent President
is not covered by the prohibition that applies only to
appointments in the Executive Department.
-In Administrative Matter No. 10-2-5-SC, petitioner Estelito M.
Mendoza, a former Solicitor General, seeks a ruling from the
Court for the guidance of the JBC on whether Section 15,
Article VII applies to appointments to the Judiciary.
-In G.R. No. 191342, which the Court consolidated on March 9,
2010 with the petitions earlier filed, petitioners Amador Z.
Tolentino, Jr. and Roland B. Inting, Integrated Bar of the

Philippines (IBP) Governors for Southern Luzon and Eastern

Visayas, respectively, want to enjoin and restrain the JBC from
submitting a list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice to
the President for appointment during the period provided for in
Section 15, Article VII.
-All the petitions now before the Court pose as the principal
legal question whether the incumbent President can appoint
the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
Issues:
G.R. No. 191002 (De Castro petition)
a. Does the JBC have the power and authority to resolve the
constitutional question of whether the incumbent President can
appoint a Chief Justice during the election ban period? -YES
b. Does the incumbent President have the power and authority
to appoint during the election ban the successor of Chief
Justice Puno when he vacates the position of Chief Justice on
his retirement on May 17, 2010? -YES
G.R. No. 191032 (Soriano petition)
a. Is the power to appoint the Chief Justice vested in the
Supreme Court en banc? -NO
G.R. No. 191057 (PHILCONSA petition)
a. Is the constitutional prohibition against appointment under
Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution applicable only to
positions in the Executive Department?-YES
b. Assuming that the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of
the Constitution also applies to members of the Judiciary, may
such appointments be excepted because they are impressed
with public interest or are demanded by the exigencies of
public service, thereby justifying these appointments during the
period of prohibition?-NO
c. Does the JBC have the authority to decide whether or not to
include and submit the names of nominees who manifested
interest to be nominated for the position of Chief Justice on the
understanding that his/her nomination will be submitted to the
next President in view of the prohibition against presidential
appointments from March 11, 2010 until June 30, 2010?-NO
A. M. No. 10-2-5-SC (former OSG Mendoza petition)
a. Does Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution apply to
appointments to positions in the Judiciary under Section 9,
Article VIII of the Constitution?-NO
b. May President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo make appointments
to the Judiciary after March 10, 2010, including that for the
position of Chief Justice after Chief Justice Puno retires on
May 17, 2010? -YES
G.R. No. 191149 (Peralta petition)
a. Does the JBC have the discretion to withhold the
submission of the short list to President Gloria MacapagalArroyo?-NO
G.R. No. 191342 (Tolentino petition)
a. Does the JBC have the authority to submit the list of

nominees to the incumbent President without committing a

grave violation of the Constitution and jurisprudence prohibiting
the incumbent President from making midnight appointments
two months immediately preceding the next presidential
elections until the end of her term?-YES
b. Is any act performed by the JBC, including the vetting of the
candidates for the position of Chief Justice, constitutionally
invalid in view of the JBCs illegal composition allowing each
member from the Senate and the House of Representatives to
have one vote each?-NO
Ruling:
Intervenor NUPL maintains that there is no actual case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for adjudication,
considering that although the selection process commenced by
the JBC is going on, there is yet no final list of nominees;
hence, there is no imminent controversy as to whether such list
must be submitted to the incumbent President, or reserved for
submission to the incoming President.
Intervenor Tan raises the lack of any actual justiciable
controversy that is ripe for judicial determination, pointing out
that petitioner De Castro has not even shown that the JBC has
already completed its selection process and is now ready to
submit the list to the incumbent President; and that petitioner
De Castro is merely presenting a hypothetical scenario that is
clearly not sufficient for the Court to exercise its power of
judicial review.
Intervenors Corvera and Lim separately opine that De Castros
petition rests on an overbroad and vague allegation of political
tension, which is insufficient basis for the Court to exercise its
power of judicial review.
Intervenor BAYAN et al. contend that the petitioners are
seeking a mere advisory opinion on what the JBC and the
President should do, and are not invoking any issues that are
justiciable in nature.
Intervenors Bello et al. submit that there exist no conflict of
legal rights and no assertion of opposite legal claims in any of
the petitions; that PHILCONSA does not allege any action
taken by the JBC, but simply avers that the conditional
manifestations of two Members of the Court, accented by the
divided opinions and interpretations of legal experts, or
associations of lawyers and law students on the issues
published in the daily newspapers are matters of paramount
and transcendental importance to the bench, bar and general
public; that PHILCONSA fails not only to cite any legal duty or
allege any failure to perform the duty, but also to indicate what
specific action should be done by the JBC; that Mendoza does
not even attempt to portray the matter as a controversy or
conflict of rights, but, instead, prays that the Court should rule
for the guidance of the JBC; that the fact that the Court
supervises the JBC does not automatically imply that the Court
can rule on the issues presented in the Mendoza petition,
because supervision involves oversight, which means that the
subordinate officer or body must first act, and if such action is
not in accordance with prescribed rules, then, and only then,
may the person exercising oversight order the action to be
redone to conform to the prescribed rules; that the Mendoza

petition does not allege that the JBC has performed a specific
act susceptible to correction for being illegal or
unconstitutional; and that the Mendoza petition asks the Court
to issue an advisory ruling, not to exercise its power of
supervision to correct a wrong act by the JBC, but to declare
the state of the law in the absence of an actual case or
controversy.
We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or
controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is
that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the
selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be
submitted to the President for consideration of which of them
will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice.
Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC
began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and
practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the
list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the
next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial
determination, because the next steps are the public interview
of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of
candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as may
be needed."
We need not await the occurrence of the vacancy by May 17,
2010 in order for the principal issue to ripe for judicial
determination by the Court. It is enough that one alleges
conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but
seemingly proscribed by the Constitution. A reasonable
certainty of the occurrence of the perceived threat to a
constitutional interest is sufficient to afford a basis for bringing
a challenge, provided the Court has sufficient facts before it to
enable it to intelligently adjudicate the issues.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department),
provides:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department),
states:
Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a
Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en
banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof.
In the consolidated petitions, the petitioners, with the exception
of Soriano, Tolentino and Inting, submit that the incumbent
President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno
upon his retirement on May 17, 2010, on the ground that the
prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15,
Article VII does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary.
The Court agrees with the submission. The records of the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the
framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and
arranging the Constitution. The arrangement was a true

recognition of the principle of separation of powers that

underlies the political structure. Had the framers intended to
extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily
and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely
in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
Based on the journal of the Constitutional Commission, it may
be pointed out that that instruction that any vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days (in the last sentence of Section 4 (1)
of Article VIII) contrasts with the prohibition in Section 15,
Article VII, which is couched in stronger negative language that a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments" Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article
VIII of the word shall an imperative, operating to impose a
duty that may be enforced should not be disregarded.
Thereby, Section 4(1) imposes on the President the
imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of
the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of
the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a
clear disobedience to the Constitution.
Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President from
appointing a Chief Justice on the premise that Section 15,
Article VII extends to appointments in the Judiciary cannot be
sustained. A misinterpretation like Valenzuela should not be
allowed to last after its false premises have been exposed. It
will not do to merely distinguish Valenzuela from these cases,
for the result to be reached herein is entirely incompatible with
what Valenzuela decreed. Consequently, Valenzuela now
deserves to be quickly sent to the dustbin of the unworthy and
forgettable. We reverse Valenzuela.
Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other
appointments in the Judiciary.
There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the
adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate
midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief
Executive in the mold of the appointments dealt with in the
leading case of Aytona v. Castillo. In fact, in Valenzuela, the
Court so observed, stating that:
xxx it appears that Section 15, Article VII is directed against
two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes
and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first
refers to those appointments made within the two months
preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those
which are declared election offenses in the Omnibus Election
Code, viz.:
xxx
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section
15, Article VII consists of the so-called midnight
appointments. Given the background and rationale for the
prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the
Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to
appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers
did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the

Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their

subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for
judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process
of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight
appointments to the Judiciary. The creation of the JBC was
precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away
with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments.
Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be
held on the second Monday of May, letting the elections fall on
May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the regular
presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of the
prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14,
the period of the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the
prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill
the vacancy in the Supreme Court but the framers never
intended for Secrion 15, Article VII to apply to appointments in
the Judiciary.
As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a
doubt on whether a JBC list is necessary at all for the
President any President to appoint a Chief Justice if the
appointee is to come from the ranks of the sitting justices of
the Supreme Court.
Sec. 9, Article VIII says:
xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.xxx
The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the
Supreme Court from the outside, that is, a non-member of the
Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of candidates for the
Supreme Court, not of those who are already members or
sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been
vetted by the JBC.
Section 8(5) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the JBC to
submit a list of at least three nominees to the President for
every vacancy in the Judiciary. The JBC has no discretion to
submit the list to the President after the vacancy occurs,
because that shortens the 90- day period allowed by the
Constitution for the President to make the appointment. For the
JBC to do so will be unconscionable on its part, considering
that it will thereby effectively and illegally deprive the President
of the ample time granted under the Constitution to reflect on
the qualifications of the nominees. It is a ministerial duty of the
JBC not discretionary.
The challenge mounted against the composition of the JBC
based on the allegedly unconstitutional allocation of a vote
each to the ex officio members from the Senate and the House
of Representatives, thereby prejudicing the chances of some
candidates for nomination by raising the minimum number of
votes required in accordance with the rules of the JBC, is not
based on the petitioners actual interest, because they have
not alleged in their petition that they were nominated to the
JBC to fill some vacancies in the Judiciary. Thus, the
petitioners lack locus standi on that issue

Decision:
WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R.
No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149, and the petition for
mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 for being premature;
2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032
and G.R. No. 191342 for lack of merit; and
3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and,accordingly,
directs the Judicial and Bar Council:
(a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates
to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement
of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010;
(b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of
ChiefJustice;
(c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of
nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or before May 17,
2010; and
(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of
candidates to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to
the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto
in accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.
De Castro vs JBC (April 20, 2010) Bersamin, J.
RESOLUTION
We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for
all the matters being thereby raised and argued, not being
new, have all been resolved by the decision of March 17,
2010.
The Court clarified the ff.
First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare
decisis is controlling, and accordingly insist that the Court has
erred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela.
The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but
is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with
a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular
decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a
rectification. The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in
a common-law setting like the United Kingdom, where judges
make law as binding as an Act of Parliament. But ours is not a
common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not
always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial pronouncement in
an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a
subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are
relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such
reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The
application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and
stability.
Second: Some intervenors are grossly misleading the public by
their insistence that the Constitutional Commission extended to

the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the

period stated in Section 15, Article VII.
There is nothing in the records of the Constitutional
Commission talking about extending the ban to the Judiciary.
Last: The movants take the majority to task for holding that
Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments in the
Judiciary. They aver that the Court either ignored or refused to
apply many principles of statutory construction.
The movants gravely err in their posture, and are themselves
apparently contravening their avowed reliance on the
principles of statutory construction. For one, the movants,
disregarding the absence from Section 15, Article VII of the
express extension of the ban on appointments to the Judiciary,
insist that the ban applied to the Judiciary under the principle
of verba legis. That is self-contradiction at its worst.
1. Judicial and Bar Council: Appointments and
Qualifications
o Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012
Mendoza, Petition for Prohibition and Injunction
The issue at hand has been in hibernation until the unexpected
departure of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012,
and the nomination of former Solicitor General Francisco I.
Chavez (petitioner), as his successor. Issue must be resolved
immediately.
Section 8, Article XIII paragraph 1 provides that (1) A Judicial and
Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the
creation
of the JBC, designated one representative to sit in the JBC to act
as one of
the ex officio members.6
Perhaps in order to give equal opportunity to both houses to sit in
the exclusive body, the House of Representatives and the
Senate would send alternate representatives to the JBC. In
other words, Congress had only one (1) representative.
In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered.
Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th)
member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC - one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having
one-half (1/2) of a vote.
Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in
2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the
Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each.
At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and

Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously

sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature.

At this juncture, it is worthy to note that the seven-member

composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to
provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting.

It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the
exercise of the power of judicial review have been met in this
case;
At any rate, due to its serious implications, not only to government
processes involved but also to the sanctity of the Constitution, the
Court
deems it more prudent to take cognizance of the petition.
(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to
perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom
are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of
the 1987 Constitution
As petitioner correctly posits, the use of the singular letter a
preceding representative of Congress is unequivocal and
leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of
what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in
mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1)
representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more
than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the
JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so
provided.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that
where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that the language employed in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed.
The raison d tre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because
it is assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions
are couched express the objective sought to be attained;35
and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a
lawyers document but essentially that of the people, in whose
consciousness it should ever be present as an important
condition for the rule of law to prevail.
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent
that the word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of
the Constitution is used in its generic sense. Since law is clear
and unambiguous, no need to use extrinsic aids.
Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into the
minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is
undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended that
the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.

Courts conclusion that Congress, in the context of JBC

representation, should be considered as one body. It is evident
that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to
its primary function in government - to legislate.
Considering that even if 8 person JBC is invalid, operative fact
doctrine applies. The Court finds the exception applicable in
this case and holds that notwithstanding its finding of
unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its
prior official actions are nonetheless valid.
HELD:
Petition GRANTED. Current numerical composition of JBC
UNCONSTITUTIONAL

o Kilosbayan v. Ermita, G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007

Petitioner: Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan
Foundation
Respondents: Exe. Sec. Eduardo Ermita, Sandiganbayan
Justice Gregory Ong (dude that got booted out recently)
GR. No. 177721 July 3, 2007
Ponente: Justice Azcuna
Special Civil Action in the SC (Certiorari)
Facts:
1. On May 16, 2007, the Executive Secretary, in representing
the Office of the President, announced the appointment of
Gregory Ong as Associate Justice of the SC to fill up post left
by AJ Romeo Callejo Sr. on April 28, 2007. The appointment
was reported the following day, May 17, by major publications.
On May 18, major publications reported that the appointment
was recalled or held in abeyance by Malacanang due tu to
questions relating to the citizenship of Ong. However, there
was no indication that the appointment was cancelled. Next
day, the major publications reported that the Ermita stated that
the appointment is still present but the validation of the issue
was still being done by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).
2. Petitioners claim that Ong is a Chinese citizen, as indicated
in his birth certificate due to fact that at the time of his birth on
May 25, 1953; both his parents were Chinese (no shit with a
surname like that, who would have thought?). Eleven years
later, his father was granted Filipino citizenship by
naturalization however petitioners argue that this does not
make him a natural-born Filipino. His appointment to the SC
would contradict Section 7(1) of Article VIII of the Consti then.

3. The 3rd argument of the petitioners is that Ongs birth

certificate speaks for itself and it states his nationality as
Chinese at birth. By invoking Article 410 and 412 of the CC,
petitioners contend that the birth certificate acts as prima facie
evidence. Petitioners argue that the birth certificate prevails
over Ongs new Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau
of Immigration dated October 16, 1996 that states that he is a
natural born Filipino and released opinion of SoJ Teofisto
Guingona that asserts his natural-born citizenship.
4. Ong traced his ancestral lines to Maria Santos of Malolos
Bulacan and obtained a certification and identification stating
his status as natural-born Filipino citizen for Bureau of
Immigration and DOJ under Article 4 Sections 1 and 2 since
his mother was a Filipino citizen when he was born.
Issue:
1. Whether or not appointment of Gregory Ong as Associate
Justice in the SC violates the Constitution and is attended with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction- Yes
2. Whether or not Ongs birth certificate is prima facie
evidence, unless corrected by a judicial order in non-summary
proceedings, based on what it states- Yes
Ratio:
1. Naturalized citizenship- based on evidence obtained
and submitted (birth certificate, petition to be admitted to
Philippine bar, naturalization papers of his father), it
appears to be that he is a naturalized citizen. The alleged
recognition of the Bureau of Immigration and DOJ cannot
amend final decision of the trial court that states that Ong
and his mother were naturalized along with his father. This
is in direct contradiction of Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of
the Constitution
2. Change in an entry in a civil register cannot be made without
a judicial order- Under law, a change of citizenship status is a
substantial change (Labayo-Rower v Republic). RA 9048
Section 2(3) provides that a summary administrative
proceeding to correct a clerical or typo errors in birth
certificates cannot apply to change in nationality. Substantial
corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded
in the civil registry should, therefore, be effected through a
petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
SC Decision: Petition granted. Ong is enjoined from accepting
or assuming the position until he shows thru necessary
appropriate adversarial proceedings in court that he is a
natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the records of birth and
citizenship.
Notes:
Ongs Ancestral line

respondent Ong traces his ancestral lines to one Maria

Santos of Malolos, Bulacan, born on November 25, 1881, who
was allegedly a Filipino citizen who married Chan Kin, a
Chinese citizen; that these two had a son, Juan Santos; that in
1906 Chan Kin died in China, as a result of which Maria
Santos reverted to her Filipino citizenship; that at that time
Juan Santos was a minor; that Juan Santos thereby also
became a Filipino citizen that respondent Ongs mother, Dy
Guiok Santos, is the daughter of the spouses Juan Santos and

Sy Siok Hian, a Chinese citizen, who were married in 1927;

that, therefore, respondents mother was a Filipino citizen at
birth; that Dy Guiok Santos later married a Chinese citizen,
Eugenio Ong Han Seng, thereby becoming a Chinese citizen;
that when respondent Ong was eleven years old his father,
Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was naturalized, and as a result he,
his brothers and sisters, and his mother were included in the
naturalization.
1. Salary
1. Security of Tenure
o De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294
Petitioner: GUALBERTO de la Lllana (presiding judge of
Branch 2 of City Court of Olongapo) etc.
Respondent: Manuel Alba (Minister of Budget) Francisco
Tantuico and Ricardo Puno
No. L-57883 March 12, 1982
Direct petition to SC for adjudication of BP Blg. 129
(Declaratory relief or prohibition)
Facts:
1. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (An Act Reorganizing the
Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes) was assailed by Gualberto de la Llana of Olongapo
City. He takes issue with the law because it supposedly
contravenes the time honored principle of independent
judiciary as protected and safeguarded in Section 11 of Article
VIII of the Constitution (Article X Section 7 in 1973 Consti). The
main contention of the petitioners is that it is only the SC that
can remove judges from their designated posts and not the
legislature (BP 129 mandates that Justices and judges of
inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit
courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the
Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts
established by such Act, would be considered separated from
the judiciary).
Issue:
1. Whether or not judges can be removed by legislation (BP
129)?- Yes
Ratio:
1. Abolition in good faith- the abolition of an office within the
competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers
from no infirmity. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of
offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. If
the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have
ceased to hold office. The rule that the abolition of an office
does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent has a
requisite principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must
be made in good faith. It is observed that the volume
containing the minutes of the proceedings for BP 129 has 590
pages devoted to its discussion. It shows that considerable
time, effort and exhaustive study was made before the act was
signed by the President. It can be surmised that good faith
may be ascertained due to the process involved.
2. Security of tenure- Removal is to be distinguished from
termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be
no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in

law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an

occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that
sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any
impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless,
for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one
of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between
removal and the abolition of the office. . In the implementation
of the assailed legislation, it would be in accordance with
accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as
incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be
consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest
consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a
failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court
does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is
involved.
SC Decision: Petition dismissed and BP 129 is constitutional
1. Removal
1. Requirements as to decisions
o Oil & Gas Nature Corporation v. CA, 315 SCRA 296, at 307308
The foreign court explicitly declared in its Order that Award Paper
No. 3/B-1 shall be part of the decree. This curt ruling of the
foreign court may be categorized in the nature of
memorandum decisions or those which adopt by reference the
findings of facts and conclusions of law of inferior tribunals. In
this jurisdiction, it has been held that memorandum decisions
do not transgress the constitutional requirement in Article VIII,
Section 14, on clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the
law on which the decision is based. Nonetheless, it would be
more prudent for a memorandum decision not to be simply
limited to the dispositive portion but to state the nature of the
case, summarize the facts with references to the record, and
contain a statement of the applicable laws and jurisprudence
and the tribunals assessments and conclusions on the
case. This practice would better enable a court to make an
appropriate consideration of whether the dispositive portion of
the judgment sought to be enforced is consistent with the
findings of facts and conclusions of law made by the tribunal
that rendered the decision. This is particularly true where the
decisions, orders, or resolutions came from a court in another
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the enforcement of the decisions would
be based on presumptions that laws in other jurisdictions are
similar to our laws, at the expense of justice based on the
merits.
Moreover, the constitutional guideline set forth in Article VIII,
Section 14 cannot prevail over the fundamental elements of
due process. Matters of procedure even if laid down in the
Constitution must be tempered by substantial justice provided
it has factual and legal basis. Considering that the case
involves significant properties, the overriding consideration of a
judgment based on the merits should prevail over the
primordial interests of strict enforcement on matters of
technicalities. Procedural lapses, absent any collusion or

intent to defraud the parties or mislead the tribunals, should

not be allowed to defeat the claim of a party who is not wellinformed in the technical aspects of the case but whose
interest is merely to enforce what he believes to be his rightful
claim.
1. Mandatory period for deciding cases
1. Presidential electoral tribunal
o Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal (2011)
Nachura, J.
Motion for Reconsideration of SC Decision
FACTS:
The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed
by petitioner of the SCs decision dismissing the
formers petition and declaring the establishment of
the respondent Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET)
as constitutional.
Petitioner, Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal, argues that
PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art
VII of the Constitution does not provide for the
creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of
the Constitution.
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution
of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant
of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge
of all election contests for the President or VicePresident under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:

WON the creation of the Presidential Electoral

Tribunal (PET) is unconstitutional.
NO, it is Constitutional

RATIO:

A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7,

readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme
Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the
method by which the Supreme Court exercises this
authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of
power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme
Courts exercise thereof. The Supreme Courts
method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential
election contests, through the PET, is actually a
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred
by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the
subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme
Court to promulgate its rules for the purpose.
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court,
as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority conferred
upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
There is an explicit reference of the Members of the
Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically

declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4,

Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they
constitutionalized what was statutory.
Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the
same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine
of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction
bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vicepresidential elections contests includes the means
necessary to carry it into effect.
The traditional grant of judicial power is found in
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which
provides that the power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. The set up embodied in the
Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution
of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of
judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET,
resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election
contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial
power.
The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and
literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of
law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve
election contests which involve, in essence, an
exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit
constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2),
Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17,
Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral
Tribunals) of the Constitution
The PET is not simply an agency to which Members
of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET,
as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to
be an institution independent, but not separate, from
the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
RULING:
Petition Denied
NOTES:
Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The
Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules
for the purpose.
Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of
the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall
not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
1. Administrative powers
i. supervision of lower courts
o Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464
BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, RTC,
Antique, petitioner,
vs.

HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND ATTY.

NAPOLEON A. ABIERA, respondents.
Justice Nocon Petition for Certiorari
Facts:
Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12
of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, seeks the review of the
following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order
dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to
refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the
Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counteraffidavit and other controverting evidences.
In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman, respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of
the Public Attorney's Office alleged that petitioner had falsified
his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by
certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have been
submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days
have been determined and decided on or before January 31,
1998," when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no
decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10)
criminal cases that have been submitted for decision.
Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly
falsified his certificates of service for the months of February,
April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months
beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of
seventeen (17) months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted
by this Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide the
aforementioned cases.
Whether Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case - NO
We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative
action taken against him by this Court with regard to his
certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in
the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts
and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue
of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and
take the proper administrative action against them if they
commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government
may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on
the powers granted to it by the Constitution, 3 for such a
justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the
Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court

over all courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines

the independence of the judiciary.

and rumoured that Judge Muro would grant motion to quash in

consideration of millions of pesos.

HELD:
Petition GRANTED. Ombudsman directed to dismiss
complaints and to refer said complaint to supreme court for
appropriate action.

July 14, 2000 - SP Formaran filed a motion for inhibition for Judge
Muro to inhibit himself from further handling the case.

o In re Demetria, A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA, March 27, 2001

In re Demetria
A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA.
Respondent: Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G.
Demetria Per Curiam, March 27, 2011
Doctrine:
No position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness than a seat in the Judiciary.
The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline
judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal... (Sec 11, Art
8)
Facts:
Prosecutions witnesses: State
Prosecutor
Formaran III, CSP Zuno, etc. Defense witnesses: respdondent
Justice Demetria, Go Teng Kok and his lawyer, Yu Yuk Lai,
etc.
Dec. 9, 1998 SP Formaran III charged Yu Yuk Lai,
together with her nephew Kenneth Monceda y Sy, before the
RTC of Manila Br. 18 for unlawfully selling and delivering to a
poseur-buyer three kilograms of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu). Both of the accused were held at the
detention cell in Camp Crame.

July 18, 2000 the motion was heard and submitted for
resolution. SP Formaran was informed that the staff of CA
Justice Demetria called and that the Justice wanted to speak
with him. Later in the afternoon, Justice Demetria, Go Teng
Kok and his lawyer Atty. Reinerio Paas (which is also a close
friend of the Justice) went to SP Formarans office at the DOJ.
Go Teng Kok pleaded with Formaran to withdraw his motion to
inhibit Judge Muro as this would delay the case and that a new
judge might convict his friend, accused Yu Yuk Lai. Justice
Demetria asked about the status of the case and asked him if
he could help Go Teng Kok.
On the same day (3pm), CSP Zuno received a call from Justice
Demetria who requested him to instruct SP Formaran to
withdraw the motion for inhibition of Judge Muro so that the
Judge could already issue an order.
Justice Demetria reasoned out that it was purely accidental that he
saw Go Teng Kok at the DOJ because his primary reason was
to visit old friends. Also, he merely requested SP Formaran to
do something to help Go Teng Kok about the case without
specifying what kind of help. And He denied the call he had
with CSP Zuno.
Issue/s:
WoN respondent Justice Demetria interceded in
behalf of suspected drug queen Yu Yuk Lai in violation of Rule
2.04, Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct8. YES
Ratio:

Nov. 10, 1999 Info spread that Yu Yuk Lai had

been seen regularly playing in the casinos. SP Formaran filed
a motion to transfer the detention of the accused to the City
Jail. Judge Laguio granted the motion.

The requested help for Go Teng Kok could not have

meant any other assistance but the withdrawal of the motion to
inhibit Judge Muro. Also, he didnt actually meet his old
friends as testified by his very own witnesses.

January 28, 2000 Judge Laguio inhibited himself.

The case was re- raffled to Br. 53 and was supposed to be
presided by Judge Angel Colet but was handled by the
Branchs Pairing Judge Manuel Muro.

The positive assertions of CSP Zuno and SP

Formaran III are consistent with natural human experience.

May 15, 2000 Judge Muro granted Yu Yuk Lais motion to be

confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital for a period of 7 days
which was contrary to the Chief of the Health Services. It was
extended to a period of 1 month until fit to be discharged.
Rumors spread that Judge Muro was partial to the accused.
July 6, 2000 unidentified concerned court employees alleged
that Yu Yuk Lai was not sick when ordered to be hospitalized

Decision:
Justice Demetrio G. Demetria is GUILTY of violating Rule 2.04 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is ordered DISMISSED from
the service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to
his appointment or reappointment to any government office,
agency, instrumentality, including any government owned or
controlled corporation or institution.
ii.

temporarily assign judges to other stations in public

interest
iii. order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid
miscarriage of justice
iv. appointment of officials and employees of the entire
judiciary
v. promuglate rules concerning the enforcement and
protection of constitutional rights
vi. promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure
vii. admission to the practice of law
viii. integration of the bar
1. no quasi-judicial and administrative work for
judges
o Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Trans Co., 57 Phil. 600
Manila Electric Company v Pasay Transportation Company, Inc. et
al. (1932)
FACTS
- The case is about the validity of Section 11 of Act no. 1446 and
the legal right of members of SC, sitting as board of arbitrators,
to act on the petition.
- Act no. 1446 : "An Act granting a franchise to Charles M. Swift to
construct, maintain, and operate an electric railway, and to
construct, maintain, and operate an electric light, heat, and
power system from a point in the City of Manila in an easterly
direction to the town of Pasig, in the Province of Rizal."
- Section 11 of Act no. 1446: "Whenever any franchise or right of
way is granted to any other person or corporation, now or
hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of
the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or
corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation
to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or
corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of
the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the
decision of a majority of whom shall be final."
- Manila Electric Company filed a petition permitting certain
companies to use the Pasig Bridge of the Manila Electric
Company and the compensation to be paid to the Manila
Electric Company by such transportation companies.
- The court required the petitioner to serve copies of the petition to
those affected by it (i.e. Attorney-General and the
transportation companies)
- The Attorney-General disclaimed any interest in the proceedings,
and opposition was entered to the petition by a number of
public utility operators.
ISSUE
1.
WON Section 11 of Act no. 1446 is valid - NO
1a. WON the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators whose majority decision shall be deemed final, is
allowed - NO
RATIO
1.
In the case at bar, either the members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercise
judicial functions, or the members of the Supreme Court, sitting
as board of arbitrators, exercise administrative or quasi judicial
functions. Either way, the functions that are asked to be
performed by the members of the Supreme Court or the

Supreme Court as an entity is not lawful because it does not

fall within the jurisdiction granted the Supreme Court.
2.
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one
of the three divisions of power in our government. It is judicial
power and judicial power only which is exercised by the
Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian
of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any
other department of the government, so should it as strictly
confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or
by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme
Court and its members should not and cannot be required to
exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any
duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of
judicial functions.
3.
The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as
heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall
hereafter be prescribed by law (sec. 26). When the Organic
Act speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme
Court, it could not only mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by
the Supreme Court acting as a court, and could hardly mean
the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators. There is an important
distinction between the Supreme Court as an entity and the
members of the Supreme Court. A board of arbitrators is not a
"court" in any proper sense of the term, and possesses none of
the jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be
exercised by the Supreme Court.
4.
Moreover, according to Chief Justice Taney:
The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it
cannot be required or authorized to exercise any other. . . . Its
jurisdiction and powers and duties being defined in the organic
law of the government, and being all strictly judicial, Congress
cannot require or authorize the court to exercise any other
jurisdiction or power, or perform any other duty. . . . The award
of execution is a part, and an essential part of every judgment
passed by a court exercising judicial power. It is no judgment,
in the legal sense of the term, without it. Without such an
award the judgment would be inoperative and nugatory,
leaving the aggrieved party without a remedy. It would be
merely an opinion, which would remain a dead letter, and
without any operation upon the rights of the parties, unless
Congress should at some future time sanction it, and pass a
law authorizing the court to carry its opinion into effect. Such is
not the judicial power confided to this court, in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction; yet it is the whole power that the court
is allowed to exercise under this act of Congress. . . . And
while it executes firmly all the judicial powers entrusted to it,
the court will carefully abstain from exercising any power that
is not strictly judicial in its character, and which is not clearly
confided to it by the Constitution. . . .
HELD
Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide
the operation of a democratic government constitutionally
established, and that it would be improper and illegal for the
members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to

act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company. As a result,

the members of the Supreme Court decline to proceed further
in the matter.
o In re Judge Rodolfo Manzano, 166 SCRA 246
In Re Judge Rodolfo Manzano (October 5, 1988) Padilla, J.
Facts:
-On July 4, 1988, Judge Manzano sent a letter to the Court
that the former was appointed by the Governor of Ilocos Norte
as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee.
-He is requesting for the issuance of the Court of a resolution
that would authorize him to accept the appointment.
Issue:
WON he can be appointed to the committee. -NO
It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice
perform administrative functions. Administrative functions are
those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct
and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the
policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the
administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court
and other courts established by law shall not be designated to
any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative
functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution). Considering that
membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial
Committee on Justice, which discharges a administrative
functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is
constrained to deny his request.
Held:
ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U.
Manzano is DENIED.
1. fiscal autonomy
1. automatic release of appropriation for the
judiciary
1. confidentiality of deliberations
o In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and
the Attendance of Court officials and employees as
witnesses under the subpoenas of February 10, 2012 and
the various letters for the Impeachment Prosecution Panel
dated January 19 and 25, 2012, Per Curiam Resolution,
February 14, 2012Facts:
1. The SC received letters from Joseph Abaya, Congressman
and Impeachment Prosecution Panel Manager, in behalf of the
House Impeachment Panel, requesting certain letters,
documents, rollos and communications of the SC in certain
cases (Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the
Philippines v Philippine Arilines , Inc., Navarro v Ermita,
Merceditas Gutierrez v House of Representatives Committee

on Justice, League of Cities v Comelec, GMA TRO petition,

Mike Arroyo TRO Petition, Official Appointment of Corona as
Associate Justice and Chief justice).
2. These requests were made during the impeachment
proceedings against CJ Corona to which the prosecution panel
manifested in a compliance dated Jan 27, 2012 that it would
present about 100 witnesses and around a thousand
documents. These would be gathered from private and public
offices. The list of proposed witnesses included Justices of the
SC, SC court officials and employees (much of those were
internal to the Court).
3. Based on the manifestation in open court in the
impeachment trial, the House Panel requested the
Impeachment Court for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum
and ad testificandum for the production of the records of cases
and attendances of the Justices, officials and employees of the
SC to testify on the requested records. However, Presiding
Senator-Judge JPE issed an order denying the Prosecution
Panels requests to Justices Villarama, Sereno, Reyes and
Velasco.
4. On February 10, 2012, Atty Vidal, Clerk of the SC, brought
to our attention the Subpoena Ad Testificandum et Duces
Tecum and Subpoena Ad Testificandum she received,
commanding her to appear before the panel with the original
and certified true copies of the documents requested. The SC
shall decide how the Court will comply with the subpoenas and
letters of the PIP.
Doctrine and Policy:
1. Principle of Separation of powers

Doctrine is an essential component of democratic and

republican system of government

Not by express provision in Constitution but as

underlying principle that constitutes the bedrock of system of
checks and balances

Each branch of government (legislative, judiciary and

executive) is separate, co-equal, coordinate and supreme
within its own sphere under the legal and political reality of one
overarching Constitution that governs one government and
nation.

Principle of comity- practice of voluntary observation on

inter-departmental courtesy in undertaking the assigned
constitutional duties of each (an aspect of principle of
separation of powers).
o Manifested when courts tread carefully and exercise
restraint by intervening only when grave abuse of discretion is
clear by other two branches
o Manifested by other 2 branches by voluntarily and
temporarily refraining from continuing acts questioned before
the courts
2. Access to Court records: general rule is policy of
transparency

Constitutional right to information (Article III, Section 7 of

Constitution)

Policy is embodied in Section 11, Rule 136 of Rules of

Court
o
Section. 11. Certified copies.The clerk shall
prepare, for any person demanding the same, a copy certified

under the seal of the court of any paper, record, order,

judgment, or entry in his office, proper to be certified, for the
fees prescribed by these rules.

Confidentiality of Court documents

o
Internal Rules of the SC prohibits the disclosure of the
ff:
Result of the raffle of cases

Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC declares that the results

of the raffle of cases shall only be available to the parties and
their counsels, unless the cases involve bar matters,
administrative cases and criminal cases involving the penalty
of life imprisonment, which are treated with strict confidentiality
and where the raffle results are not disclosed even to the
parties themselves.
Actions taken by the court on each cases included in the
agenda of the Courts session

Deliberations of the members in court sessions on cases

and matters pending before it
o
Rule 10, Section 2 of the IRSC provides that the
actions taken in each case in the Courts agenda, which are
noted by the Chief Justice or the Division Chairman, are also
to be treated with strict confidentiality. Only after the official
release of the resolution embodying the Court action may that
action be made available to the public.
o
Section 2. Confidentiality of court sessions. Court
sessions are executive in character, with only the Members of
the Court present. Court deliberations are confidential and
shall not be disclosed to outside parties, except as may be
provided herein or as authorized by the Court.
3. Privilege against disclosure of certain types of information
and communication

Known as deliberative process privilege

o
Not exclusive to judiciary ( 2 other branches can claim
this as seen in Chavez v PEA)
o
What applies to magistrates applies with equal force
to court officials and employees who are privy to these
deliberations. They may likewise claim exemption when asked
about this privileged information. (SC is taken as institution so
privilege not given to individual justices but rather the whole so
all 15 are covered and not CJ only)
o
This rule extends to documents and other
communications which are part of or are related to deliberative
process

Under Code of Conduct for Court Personnel

o
2007 Resolution on Access to Justice for the Poor
Project
Article 1 (2) Confidential information generally refers to
information not yet made a matter of public record relating to
pending cases, such as notes, drafts, research papers, internal
discussion, internal memoranda, records of internal
deliberations, and similar papers. Even after the decision,
resolution, or order is made public, such information that a
justice or judge uses in preparing a decision, resolution, or
order shall remain confidential.

Qualifications for protection under deliberative process

privilege
o
Pre-decisional

Communications are considered pre-decisional if made in

attempt to reach final conclusion
o
Deliberative
Key question in determining this is whether disclosure of the
information would discourage candid discussion within the
agency -> may undermine courts ability to perform functions

Other grounds for denying access to court records

o
Disqualification
by
reason
of
privileged
communication
o
Pendency of action or matter

Application of deliberative process privilege to court

officials and employees mutatis mutandis in respect to official
functions
Privileged documents or communications

Court actions such as raffle of cases and actions taken

by court on each case

Court deliberations in court sessions on cases and

matters pending before the Court

Court records (pre-decisional and deliberative in nature

such as notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions,
internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations and the
such)

Confidential information secured by justices, judges,

court officials and employees in course of official functions

Records of cases that are still pending for decision

Principle of inter-departmental courtesy demands that

highes officials of each dept be exempt from the compulsory
process of other departments
o
These privileges belong to SC as institution and not
any justice or judge in individual capacity
D. The Constitutional Commissions
o CLU v. Executive Secretary, supra.
Petitioners: Civil Liberties Union, Anti Graft League of the
Philippines and Crispin Reyes
Respondents: Executive Secretary and PHILIP ELLA C. JUICO,
as Secretary of Agrarian Reform; CARLOS DOMINGUEZ, as
Secretary of Agriculture; LOURDES QUISUMBING, as
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports; FULGENCIO
FACTORAN, JR., as Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources; VICENTE V. JAYME, as Secretary of Finance;
SEDFREY ORDOEZ, as Secretary of Justice; FRANKLIN N.
DRILON, as Secretary of Labor and Employment; LUIS
SANTOS, as Secretary of Local Government; FIDEL V.
RAMOS, as Secretary of National Defense; TEODORO F.
BENIGNO, as Press Secretary; JUANITO FERRER, as
Secretary of Public Works and Highways; ANTONIO
ARRIZABAL, as Secretary of Science and Technology; JOSE
CONCEPCION, as Secretary of Trade and Industry; JOSE
ANTONIO GONZALEZ, as Secretary of Tourism; ALFREDO
R.A. BENGZON, as Secretary of Health; REINERIO D.
REYES, as Secretary of Transportation and Communication;
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, as Commissioner of the Budget; and
SOLITA MONSOD, as Head of the National Economic
Development Authority, respondents.

Ponente: Chief Justice Fernan

Facts:
1. President Corazon Aquino issued EO. 284 on July 25, 1987.
This order contained provisions which according to petitioners
are unconstitutional, mainly Secs. 1-3.
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his
position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant
secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive
Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not
more than two positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding compensation
therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc
bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which
the President is the Chairman.
Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant
secretary or other appointive official of the Executive
Department holds more positions than what is allowed in
Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the excess position
in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no
case shall any official hold more than two positions other than
his primary position.
Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in
government-owned or controlled corporations, at least onethird (1/3) of the members of the boards of such corporation
should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant
secretary.
2. Petitioners argue that the EO issued is unconstitutional for it
goes against Section 13 of Article 7 of the Constitution.
According to them, it allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary
positions. Additionally, petitioners are contending DOJ
Opinion 073, released on July 23, 1987. Opinion 073
declared that Cabinet members, their deputies
(undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries may hold
other public office, including membership in the boards of
government corporations: (a) when directly provided for in
the Constitution as in the case of the Secretary of Justice
who is made an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council under Section 8, paragraph 1, Article VIII; or (b) if
allowed by law; or (c) if allowed by the primary functions
of their respective positions. This led to the promulgation of
the contested EO. Both EO and DOJ opinion are said to
have construed Section 13 of Article 7 and Section 7
paragraph 2 of Article 9-B (Civil Service Commission) of
the Constitution.
3. Petitioners argue that based on the phrase unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the only exceptions against
holding any other office or employment in Government are
those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The VicePresident may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under
Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of
Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council
by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Issue:

1. Does EO 284 add exceptions against the provisions in

exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided
in the Constitution.
2. Exception to the prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB on
the Civil Service Commission applies to officers and
employees of the Civil Service in general and that said
exceptions do not apply and cannot be extended to Section 13,
Article VII which applies specifically to the President, VicePresident, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or
assistants
Ratio:
1. Constitutional construction- When in doubt of constitutionality,
the Court shall bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption. Based on past experiences in
Marcos regime, the framers intended to ensure that the
previous scandalous practices of Cabinet members holding
multiple positions in the government and collecting
unconscionably excessive compensation therefrom would be
discontinued. Section 7 Article 9-B contains a blanket
prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or
employment in the government subsuming both elective
and appointive public officials. Despite this, the
commission still inserted another provision (Section 13,
Article 7) which specifically prohibits the President, VicePresident, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants from holding any other office or employment
during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution.
2. Comparison of Section 13, Article 7 to other Constitutional
provisions- Section 13, Article 7 specifically prohibits the
President, VP, Cabinet members and their deputies from
holding any office or employment during their tenure as
compared to other provisions like Section 13 Article 6
(prohibits members of Congress from holding other positions
within the Government) and Section 5 (par. 4) of Article 16 (no
officer of the armed forces in active service may be appointed
in any capacity to a civilian position in the government or
GOCC). Second sentence of Section 13, Article 7 further
prohibits the President and his official family from other
employment ("They shall not, during said tenure, directly
or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in
any business, or be financially interested in any contract
with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries."). The
prohibition against the president and his official family
covers both private and public sphere in terms of
employment.
3. Difference between Section 13, Article 7 and Section 7
Article 9-B: Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the
general rule applicable to all elective and appointive
public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article
VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the
President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants. The phrase unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution cannot refer to

the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IXB of the 1987 Constitution. To do so would make the
intent of the framers in ensuring that the President and
official family would have stricter prohibitions void.
4. Prohibition under Section 13, Article 7- The prohibition against
holding dual or multiple offices or employment under
Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not be
construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive
officials specified therein without additional compensation
in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of said officials' office.
The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other
office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition
but are properly an imposition of additional duties and
functions on said officials. (Officials only allowed to hold
other offices only if said offices are closely related to and
are required by the officials primary function without
additional
compensation.
Think
Secretary
of
Transportations and Communications as Chairman of
Light Rail Transit Authority).
5.Ex-officio- the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be
interpreted as covering positions held without additional
compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and
as required by the primary functions of the concerned official's
office. The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of
office." It refers to an "authority derived from official
character merely, not expressly conferred upon the
individual character, but rather annexed to the official
position." Ex-officio denotes an "act done in an official
character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other
appointment or authority than that conferred by the office." An
ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by
virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further
warrant or appointment. (This shit just means ex-officio is
good and constitutional and other appointments and stuff
is bad and unconstitutional).
SC Decision: EO 284 is unconstitutional, all sitting cabinet
members are to vacate their positions outside of their
primary function.
Note: EO 284 is unconstitutional because it allows increased
number of positions to be held by cabinet members
compared to what the Constitution allows.
Civil Service Commission members are allowed to
o Flores v. Drilon, supra.
Flores v Drilon (1993)
*Franklin Drilon and Richard Gordon as respondents
SPECIAL ACTION in the SC. Prohibition
FACTS
The case is about the unconstitutionality of Sec. 13 par (d) of RA
7227, also known as the Bases Conversion and Development
Act of 1992, under which respondent Mayor Gordon of
Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of Subic Bay metropolitan Authority (SBMA). It is said
that the said proviso infringes on the following constitutional
provisions:

1. Sec. 7 1st par., Art. IX-B of the Constitution

-Mayor Gordon of Olongapo City (back in 1993) is an elective
official and the subject posts are public offices
2. Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution
-it was the Congress, not the President who appointed the mayor to
the subject posts
3. Sec. 261, par (g) of the omnibus Election Code
-the appointment of Gordon was within the prohibited 45-day period
prior to the 1992 elections
ISSUE
WON proviso in Sec. 13 par 9d) of RA 7227 violates the
constitutional proscription against appointment or designation
of elective officials to other government posts - YES
RATIO
1) Section 7 1st par. Art. IX-B, 1987 Consti: No elective official shall
be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to
any public office or position during his tenure.
- it is obvious that the proviso contravenes this part of the 1987
Constitution, as the section clearly expresses the policy
against the concentration of several public positions in one
person, so that the public officer may serve full time with
dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public
services
-intent of framers: difference between appointive and elective
officials. First paragraph of Section 7 talks about an elective
official, where the provision is more stringent in not providing
any exception to the rule against appointment or designation.
The second paragraph talks about appointive officials who may
be authorized in holding multiple offices when allowed by law
or by the primary functions of his position. Given this, the
Congress intended the posts to be appointive, thus nibbling in
the bud the argument that they are ex officio
2) Sec. 16, Art. VII Consti: The President shall appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint
- Use of the word shall shows intent to make SBMA appointive and
not adjunct to the post of mayor
3) It is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe
qualifications where only one (Mayor of Olongapo City), and no
other, can qualify. Consequently, as long as he is an
incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for
appointment to another public office.
HELD
INVALID; NULL and VOID
NOTES
-Sec 94 of LGC is not easy act not prevailed over the fundamental
law of the land
-appointment is the designation of a person, by the person or
persons having authority therefor, to discharge the duties of
some office or trust
o Macalintal v. COMELEC, supra.

Petitioner: Romulo Macalintal

Respondent: COMELEC
Ponente: J. Austria-Martinez
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
Facts:
1. Romulo Macalintal , member of Philippine Bar and tax payer,
seeks a declaration that certain provisions in RA 9189 (An Act
Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by
Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating
Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes ). He claims that he
has actual and material legal interest in seeing to it that the
public funds would be lawfully and rightfully appropriated and
used. The SC upholds his right as petitioner
Issue:
1. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration
of voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other
countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing
their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency
requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution?
2. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC
to proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and
party list representatives including the President and the VicePresident violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for
President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as
winners by Congress?
3. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189,
exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve
the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the
Commission on Elections shall promulgate without
violating the independence of the COMELEC under
Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?
Ratio:
1. Qualified citizens abroad- The essence of Ra 9189 is to
enfranchise overseas qualified Filipinos. R.A. No. 9189 was
enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the first paragraph of
Section 2, Article V of the Constitution that Congress shall
provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It
must be stressed that Section 2 does not provide for the
parameters of the exercise of legislative authority in enacting
said law. Hence, in the absence of restrictions, Congress is
presumed to have duly exercised its function as defined in
Article VI of the Constitution.
2. Residency and Domicile concerning the affidavit- under election
laws, both are used synonymously with each other. The
requirement of an execution of an affidavit is not an enabling or
enfranchising act. It serves as an explicit expression that the
citizen is not abandoning his domicile of origin. This expression
is based on the promise that they would resume residency in
the Philippines not later than 3 years. Failure to do so would
mean perpetual disenfranchisement of the citizen.
3. Proclamation of winning candidates the phrase is far too
sweeping. Only Congress has the power to proclaim the
winner of the Presidential and Vice Presidential Race. Sec. 18
of RA 9189 states that Comelec may proclaim the winning
candidates however paragraph 4 of Section 4 of Article 7 of

Constitution states that Congress has the duty to canvass the

votes for presidential and vice presidential position which
means it also has the duty to proclaim the winners.
4. Approval of Joint Congressional Oversight Committee Under
paragraph 1 section 2 of Article 9 of Constitution, Comelec
alone has power to formulate rules and regulations is
implicit in its power to implement regulations under the
said statute. Sec 17 states that voting by mail shall be
authorized by the Comelec in not more than 3 countries
subject to the approval of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee . It is only the Supreme Court may
review Comelec rules and only in cases of grave abuse of
discretion. By vesting itself with the powers to approve,
review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the
constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC.
SC Decision: the petition is partly GRANTED.
1. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID for
being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section
17.1, to wit: subject to the approval of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee;
b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: only
upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee;
c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit:
The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted
to the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this
Act for prior approval; and
d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to
wit: It shall review, revise, amend and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission of the same law; for being repugnant to Section
1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the independence
of constitutional commission, such as COMELEC.
2. The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is UPHELD
with respect only to the authority given to the COMELEC to
proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators and party-list
representatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes
and proclaim the winning candidates for President and VicePresident which is lodged with Congress under Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution.
3. Constitutionality of Section 5 (D) is upheld.
Puno

Creation of and powers given to Joint Congressional

Oversight Committee
o The power of Congress does not end with the finished task of
legislation. Concomitant with its principal power to legislate is
the auxiliary power to ensure that the laws it enacts are
faithfully executed
o Concept of oversight:
power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by
Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over
the implementation of legislation it has enacted
concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress:

o
o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives

to determine whether agencies are properly administered,
to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty
to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority
to assess executive conformity with the congressional
perception of public interest.
intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the
checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of
government
Categories of congressional oversight functions
Scrutiny
Purpose: determine economy and efficiency of the operation
of government activities
Passive process of looking at facts provided
Based on power of appropriation of the congress
Best seen in budget hearings for GAA and confirmation of
appointments
Can also be used under Section 22 Article VI of Consti
(question hour)
Congressional investigation
Intense digging of facts (Section 21 Article VI of Consti)
Once an inquiry is established, investigating committee has
power to require witnesses to answer any question pertinent to
the inquiry but subject to right of against self-incrimination
Limitations:
must be in aid of its legislative functions
must be conducted in accordance with duly published rules of
procedure
persons appearing therein are afforded their constitutional
rights.
Powers:
issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to a witness in any
part of the country, signed by the chairperson or acting
chairperson and the Speaker or acting Speaker
thirds (2/3) of all its members constituting a quorum, punish for
contempt any person who:
refuses, after being duly summoned, to obey such summons
without legal excuse
refuses to be sworn or placed under affirmation
refuses to answer any relevant inquiry
refuses to produce any books, papers, documents or records
that are relevant to the inquiry and are in his/her possession;
acts in a disrespectful manner towards any member of the
Committee or commits misbehavior in the presence of the
committee
unduly interferes in the conduct of proceedings during meetings
Legislative supervision
allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated lawmaking authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that
delegated authority
the two previous powers look into past executive actions
while supervision is for the present
Congress exercises supervision over the executive
agencies through its veto power. It typically utilizes veto
provisions when granting the President or an executive agency
the power to promulgate regulations with the force of law.
These provisions require the President or an agency to present

the proposed regulations to Congress, which retains a right to

approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes effect.
Legislative veto has 2 sides: necessary to maintain the
balance of power between the legislative and the executive
branches of government or undue encroachment upon the
executive prerogatives

o Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210

Cayetano v Monsod (1991)
Instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
FACTS
- Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter
received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991.
- Cayetano opposed the nomination because Monsod allegedly
does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years, pursuant
to Section 1 (1) of Article IX-C.
- June 5, 1991: Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
- June 18, 1991: he took his oath of office and assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
ISSUE
Has Monsod practiced law for at least ten years - YES
RATIO
1. Section 1 (1) of Article IX-C provides:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree,
and must not have been candidates for any elective position in
the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years.
Interpreted in the light of the (1) various definitions of the term
Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law
practice, and taking into consideration the (2) liberal
construction intended by the framers of the Constitution,
(3) Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyereconomist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyerlegislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than
satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(1) Excerpts (see case for full definition)
Blacks definition: The rendition of services requiring the knowledge
and the application of legal principles and technique to serve
the interest of another with his consent.

(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken), (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co.): The practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also
considered to be in the practice of law when he in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising
clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for
that purpose.
Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava: The practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of
the legal effect of facts and conditions, constitute as practice of
law.
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.]: Practice of law
under modern conditions embraces conveyancing, the giving
of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct connection
with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation.
Barr v Cardell: One may be a practicing attorney in following any
line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys
engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he
is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute.
111 ALR 23: Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice
of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in
any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
(2) Excerpts from the record:
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding
members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or
Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification
that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the
Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law
outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long
as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their
legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within
COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment
as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the
Commission on Audit.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a
lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is
set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA,
although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will
involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed
in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in
accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our

provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the

answer is yes.
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides,
among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of
the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified
public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing
practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(3) (excerpt) After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and
having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office
of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group, Monsod
worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa
Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the
laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating
legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. He worked with
the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an
investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and has rendered services to various
companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief
executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and
National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL, Monsod's work
involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for
NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec.
In the field of advocacy, he has worked with the under privileged
sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in
initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the
agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill.
Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of
the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which
conducted numerous hearings and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission, and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers
2. Besides:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be
performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his
best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are
others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is
a political question involving considerations of wisdom
which only the appointing authority can decide.
3. 4 stages in Appointing process in a regular appointment
1st stage: nomination
2nd stage: confirmation by Commission on Appointments
3rd stage: issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon
submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent
appointment)
4th stage: acceptance ie. Oath taking, posting of bonds
4. Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution
provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment.
Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for

seven years, two Members for five years, and the last
Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment
to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say
that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or
stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the
modern concept of the practice of law, which modern
connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's
definition would require generally a habitual law practice,
perhaps practiced two or three times a week and would outlaw
say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive
years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
HELD
Petition DISMISSED
NOTES
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the
President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission,
and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the
answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
Commission has confirmed? NO
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the
U.S. Congress) decides to confirma Presidential nominee, it
would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still
reverse the U.S. Senate.
E. Local Government
Legaspi v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 159110,
December 10, 2013, Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to
authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to
immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking
restrictions and prohibitions defined in Ordinance
No. 801 (Traffic Code of Cebu City).1
o

The Jabans, Jr. and Sr., and Legaspi both brought suit
against the City regarding the ordinance. All had
been affected by it, since all had cars that were
clamped in different instances. (Refer to case,
details dont seem pertinent)
The cases were consolidated before Branch 58 of the
RTC, which, after trial, rendered on January 22,
1999 its decision declaring Ordinance No. 1664 as
null and void
On June 16, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed
decision,17overturning the RTCand declaring
Ordinance No. 1664 valid

Upon the denial of their respective motions for

reconsideration on August 4, 2003, the Jabans and
Legaspi came to the Court via separate petitions for
review
on
certiorari.
The
appeals
were
consolidated.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Ordinance No. 1664was enacted within
the ambit of the legislative powers of the City of
Cebu; and
2. Whether Ordinance No. 1664complied with the
requirements for validity and constitutionality,
particularly the limitations set by the Constitution
and the relevant statutes.
YES TO BOTH
RATIO:
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A
long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance
to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and
must be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must
not be unfair or oppressive;(3) must not be partial
or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
with no issues being hereby raised against the
formalities attendant to the enactment of Ordinance
No. 1664, we presume its full compliance with the
test in that regard. Congress enacted the LGC as
the implementing law for the delegation to the
various LGUs of the States great powers, namely:
the police power, the power of eminent domain,
and the power of taxation. The LGC was fashioned
to delineate the specific parameters and limitations
to be complied with by each LGU in the exercise of
these delegated powers with the view of making
each LGU a fully functioning subdivision of the
State subject to the constitutional and statutory
limitations.
The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities
like the City of Cebu with the legislative power to
enact traffic rules and regulations was expressly
done through Section 458 of the LGC, and also
generally by virtue of the General Welfare Clause
embodied in Section 16 of the LGC
The first substantive requirement for a valid ordinance
is the adherence to the constitutional guaranty of
due process of law.

The guaranty of due process of law is a constitutional

safeguard against any arbitrariness on the part of
the Government, whether committed by the
Legislature, the Executive, or the Judiciary. It is a
protection essential to every inhabitant of the
country
This clause has been interpreted as imposing two
separate limits on government, usually called
"procedural due process" and "substantive due
process."
Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers
to the procedures that the government must follow
before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or
property. Classic procedural due process issues
are concerned with that kind of notice and what
form of hearing the government must provide when
it takes a particular action.
Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes,
asks whether the government has an adequate
reason for taking away a persons life, liberty, or
property. In other words, substantive due process
looks to whether there is sufficient justification for
the governments action.
Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely
affected only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of public
interest or public welfare. Due process requires the
intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the
rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the
guaranty of due process of law, the contentions of
the petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under
strict scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the
substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by
its conformity with the limitations under the
Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the
requirements of fairness and reason, and its
consistency with public policy.
Considering that traffic congestions were already
retarding the growth and progress in the population
and economic centers of the country, the plain
objective of Ordinance No. 1664 was to serve the
public interest and advance the general welfare in
the City of Cebu. Its adoption was, therefore, in
order to fulfill the compelling government purpose
of immediately addressing the burgeoning traffic
congestions caused by illegally parked vehicles
obstructing the streets of the City of Cebu.
To us, the terms encroachment and obstacles used in
Section 458 of the LGC, supra, were broad enough

to include illegally parked vehicles or whatever else

obstructed the streets, alleys and sidewalks, which
were precisely the subject of Ordinance No. 1664 in
a vowedly aiming to ensure "a smooth flow of
vehicular traffic in all the streets in the City of Cebu
at all times" (Section 1). This aim was borne out by
its Whereas Clauses,
Firstly, Ordinance No. 1664 was far from oppressive
and arbitrary. Any driver or vehicle owner whose
vehicle was immobilized by clamping could protest
such action of a traffic enforcer or PNP personnel
enforcing the ordinance. Section 3 of Ordinance
No.
1664,
supra,
textually
afforded
an
administrative escape in the form of permitting the
release of the immobilized vehicle upon a protest
directly made to the Chairman of CITOM; or to the
Chairman of the Committee on Police, Fire and
Penology of the City of Cebu; or to Asst. City
Prosecutor Felipe Belciaofficials named in the
ordinance itself. The release could be ordered by
any of such officials even without the payment of
the stipulated fine. That none of the petitioners,
albeit lawyers all, resorted to such recourse did not
diminish the fairness and reasonableness of the
escape clause written in the ordinance. Secondly,
the immobilization of a vehicle by clamping
pursuant to the ordinance was not necessary if the
driver or vehicle owner was around at the time of
the apprehension for illegal parking or obstruction.
In that situation, the enforcer would simply either
require the driver to move the vehicle or issue a
traffic citation should the latter persist in his
violation. The clamping would happen only to
prevent the transgress or from using the vehicle
itself to escape the due sanctions. And, lastly, the
towing away of the immobilized vehicle was not
equivalent to a summary impounding, but designed
to prevent the immobilized vehicle from obstructing
traffic in the vicinity of the apprehension and
thereby ensure the smooth flow of traffic. The
owner of the towed vehicle would not be deprived
of his property.
Notice and hearing are the essential requirements of
procedural due process. Yet, there are many
instances under our laws in which the absence of
one or both of such requirements is not necessarily
a denial or deprivation of due process. Among the
instances are the cancellation of the passport of a
person being sought for the commission of a crime,
the preventive suspension of a civil servant facing
administrative charges, the distraint of properties to
answer for tax delinquencies, the padlocking of
restaurants found to be unsanitary or of theaters
showing obscene movies, and the abatement of

nuisance per se. Add to them the arrest of a person

in flagrante delicto.
The clamping of the petitioners vehicles pursuant to
Ordinance No. 1664 (and of the vehicles of others
similarly situated) was of the same character as the
aforecited established exceptions dispensing with
notice and hearing.
In other words, the prior intervention of a court of law
was not indispensable to ensure a compliance with
the guaranty of due process.
To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked
vehicles was a fair and reasonable way to enforce
the ordinance against its transgressors; otherwise,
the transgressors would evade liability by simply
driving away.
RULING:
Petitions Denied, CA decision Affirmed
NOTES:
Ordinance No. 1664
Section 1. POLICYIt is the policy of the government
of the City of Cebu to immobilize any motor vehicle
violating any provision of any City Ordinance on
Parking Prohibitions or Restrictions, more
particularly Ordinance No. 801,
otherwise known as the Traffic Code of Cebu City, as
amended, in order to have a smooth flow of
vehicular traffic in all the streets in the City of Cebu
at all times.
Section 2. IMMOBILIZATION OF VEHICLESAny
vehicle found violating any provision of any existing
ordinance of the City of Cebu which prohibits,
regulates or restricts the parking of vehicles shall
be immobilized by clamping any tire of the said
violating vehicle with the use of a denver boot
vehicle immobilizer or any other special gadget
designed to immobilize motor vehicles. For this
particular purpose, any traffic enforcer of the City
(regular PNP Personnel or Cebu City Traffic Law
Enforcement Personnel) is hereby authorized to
immobilize any violating vehicleas hereinabove
provided.
Section 3. PENALTIESAny motor vehicle, owner or
driver violating any ordinance on parking
prohibitions, regulations and/or restrictions, as may
be providedunder Ordinance No. 801, as amended,
or any other existing ordinance, shall be penalized
in accordance with the penalties imposed in the
ordinance so violated, provided that the vehicle
immobilizer may not be removed or released

without its owner or driver paying first to the City

Treasurer of Cebu City through the Traffic
Violations Bureau (TVB) all the accumulated
penalties for all prior traffic law violations that
remain unpaid or unsettled, plus the administrative
penalty of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) for the
immobilization of the said vehicle, and receipts of
such payments presented to the concerned
personnel of the bureau responsible for the release
of the immobilized vehicle, unless otherwise
ordered released by any of the following officers:
a) Chairman, CITOM b) Chairman, Committee on
Police, Fire and Penology c) Asst. City Fiscal Felipe
Belcia
3.1 Any person who tampers or tries to release an
immobilized or clamped motor vehicle by
destroying the denver boot vehicle immobilizer or
other such special gadgets, shall be liable for its
loss or destruction and shall be prosecuted for such
loss or destruction under pain or penalty under the
Revised Penal Code and any other existing
ordinance of the City of Cebu for the criminal act, in
addition to his/her civil liabilities under the Civil
Code of the Philippines; Provided that any such act
may not be compromised nor settled amicably
extrajudicially.
3.2 Any immobilized vehicle which is unattended and
constitute an obstruction to the free flow of traffic or
a hazard thereof shall be towed to the city
government impounding area for safekeeping and
may be released only after the provision of Section
3 hereof shall have been fully complied with.
3.3 Any person who violates any provision of this
ordinance shall, upon conviction, be penalized with
imprisonment of not less than one (1)month nor
more than six (6) months or of a fine of not less
than Two Thousand Pesos(P2,000.00)nor more
than Five Thousand Pesos(P5,000.00), or both
such imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the
court.2
WHEREAS Clauses
WHEREAS, the City of Cebu enacted the Traffic Code
(Ordinance No. 801) as amended, provided for
Parking Restrictions and Parking Prohibitions in the
streets of Cebu City;
WHEREAS, despite the restrictions and prohibitions of
parking on certain streets of Cebu City, violations
continued unabated due, among others, to the very
low penalties imposed under the Traffic Code of
Cebu City;

WHEREAS, City Ordinance 1642 was enacted in

order to address the traffic congestions caused by
illegal parkings in the streets of Cebu City;
WHEREAS, there is a need to amend City Ordinance
No.1642 in order to fully address and solve the
problem of illegal parking and other violations of the
Traffic Code of Cebu City;
F. Accountability of Public Officers
Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga
Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,
Inc., G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003 edited
the digest from s reviewer thing
.CARPIO-MORALES, J
FACTS
- This is the case re: the impeachment complaints
against CJ Hilario Davide, for the alleged misuse of
the Judiciary Development Fund. The JDF that year
was used to renovate parts of the Court. The COA
testified that there were no missing funds, but the
books of the Court were unbelievably messy and
disorganized. Wimpy Fuentebella and Gibo
Teodoro wanted CJ Davide charged with technical
malversation.
- November 2001 - 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules
of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House
Impeachment Rules) superseding the Rules
approved by 11th Congress
> Section 16. Impeachment Proceedings Deemed
Initiated. In cases where a Member of the House
files a verified complaint of impeachment or a
citizen files a verified complaint that is endorsed by
a Member of the House through a resolution of
endorsement against an impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings against such official are
deemed initiated on the day the Committee on
Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or
resolution against such official, as the case may be,
is sufficient in substance, or on the date the House
votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said
Committee that the verified complaint and/or
resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in
substance. In cases where a verified complaint or
a resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as
the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the
Members of the House, impeachment proceedings
are deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such
verified complaint or resolution of impeachment
with the Secretary General.
> Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment
Proceedings. Within a period of one (1) year from
the date impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no
impeachment proceedings, as such, can be
initiated against the same official.
o

- July 2002 House of Representatives adopted a

Resolution directing Committee on Justice to
conduct an investigation in aid of legislation on the
manner of disbursements and expenditures by the
Chief Justice of the Judiciary Development Fund
- June 2003 Pres. Estrada filed the first
impeachment complaint against Davide and 7
associate justices for culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of public trust, and other high
crimes; endorsed by Rep. Suplico, Zamora, and
Dilangalen
- House Committee on Justice dismissed the first
complaint because insufficient in substance
- October 2003 Rep. Teodoro and Fuentebella filed
second impeachment complaint founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry; resolution
of endorsement/impeachment was signed by at
least 1/3 of all the members of the House of
Representatives
Petitioners aver:
- They have standing to complain, as citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators
- Second impeachment complaint is not valid, as the
HOR is barred from initiating another impeachment
complaint, as per Sec. 3(5), Art XI, viz:
No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a
period of one year.
Respondents argue: (check notes, Ill answer these
arguments there)
- The Court should exercise judicial restraint, as this
case is not justiciable
- Case is not justiciable because impeachment is
solely a power of Congress; its part of the sphere
in which they are supreme
- Sec 3(8) gave HOR the power to promulgate the
rules on impeachment
- to initiate does not mean to file, as it is the HOR,
as a whole, that initiates an impeachment case.
Since the first complaint was not approved by the
HOR, they have not yet, as a collective, initiated it.
ISSUES
1. WON issue is justiciable - YES
2. WON Sec. 16 and 17 of the Rules of Procedure for
Impeachment Proceedings adopted by 12th
Congress is constitutional - NO
3. WON second impeachment complaint is valid - NO
Ratio
1. Note: theres a really long discussion of the
procedural things sa case, but wala naman sa
A2017 digests, so Ill keep this as is.
Justiciable. The Constitution did not intend to leave
the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of
Congress. Instead, it provided for judicially
discoverable standards for determining the validity

of the exercise of such discretion through power of

judicial review.
o Locus standi - Case is of transcendental public
importance.
o Ripe for adjudication - the second complaint had
been filed and the 2001 rules had been
promulgated and enforced.
o Lis mota - (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule
V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the
12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof,
the second impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
o Judicial Restraint not an option because the
Court is not legally disqualified; no other tribunal to
which the controversy may be referred.
Is this a political question? No, it is not TRULY
justiciable because it met the standards of judicial
review.
2. This issue involves the interpretation of the word
initiate. Initiate must be used in its ordinary
meaning, and as per Webster, it means to
perform or facilitate the first action. Initiate can
be found in two paragraphs in Sec. 3, Art XI, viz:
(1) The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a
period of one year.
As per Fr. Bernas, (1) refers to impeachment CASES
while (5) refers to impeachment proceedings which
cannot be initiated more than once within a period
of one year. The HOR is initiates a CASE by
transmitting it with the Articles of Impeachment to
the Senate. Only the HOR can do this. However,
when it is PROCEEDINGS that we are talking
about, things get a little weirder. Note that the
PROCEEDINGS is the process by which a CASE is
crafted.
There are 3 stages of the impeachment proceedings:
1) The beginning, which is the filing of the
complaint, and its referral to the Committee on
Justice; 2) the middle, which is the leading
moments up to the formulation of the Articles of
Impeachment; and 3) the transmittal of the Articles
of Impeachment to the Senate. The question is:
when are the proceedings initiated? As per the
definition of the word, the explanations of Fr.
Bernas, Ret. Justice Feliciano, and Comm.
Maambong (who framed this provision),
PROCEEDINGS
are
initiated
when
the
impeachment complaint is:
a. filed and referred to the Committee on
Justice, or

b. filed by at least 1/3 of the members of

the HR with the Secretary General of the
House
It is deemed initiated in that stage because it is the
very first event that sets in motion the impeachment
process.
With that, Sec. 3(5), Art XI becomes clear: HOR
cannot file an impeachment complaint against
CJ Davide within one year. The two complaints
were filed within 4 months of each other. That is
unconstitutional.
Initiate being clear, Secs 16 and 17 of Rule V of the
House Impeachment Rules, stating that:
Impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated
(1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution
is sufficient in substance, or
(2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the
finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in
substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement
before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a
resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the
members of the House.
Are unconstitutional as it gives the word initiate a
new meaning, effectively changing the correct
interpretation of the Constitution.
3. The second complaint is invalid because it
contravenes Sec. 3(5), Art XI, as it was initiated
only 4 months after the first complaint was initiated.
HELD
Secs 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules UNCONSTITUTIONAL; second complaint
against CJ Davide BARRED under Sec 3(5), Art XI,
1987 Consti.
NOTES
- The Court should exercise judicial restraint, as this
case is not justiciable
- Case is not justiciable because impeachment is
solely a power of Congress; its part of the sphere
in which they are supreme
- Still subject to judicial review. Sorry.
- Sec 3(8) gave HOR the power to promulgate the
rules on impeachment
Sec 3(8) states: The Congress shall
promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this
section. Part in bold qualifies the power to
promulgate rules. Rules have to carry out
the purpose of Sec. 3.
- to initiate does not mean to file, as it is the HOR,
as a whole, that initiates an impeachment case.
Since the first complaint was not approved by the
HOR, they have not yet, as a collective, initiated it.

Comm. Maambong expressly states that

HOR, as a body, only approves or
disapproves an impeachment complaint.
HOR does NOT initiate an impeachment
complaint as a body.

o Gutierrez v. House of Representatives, G.R. No.

193459, February 15, 2011
(See
http://www.gov.ph/the-corona-impeachmenttrial/) (sorry guys I fell asleep and didn't get to
finish my digest so I got one online)
Certiorari and prohibition
Date of Promulgation: February 15, 2011
Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J.
QuickGuide: Petitioner-Ombudsman challenges
House Resolutions of Sept. 1 and 7, 2010
finding two impeachment complaints against the
petitioner, simultaneously referred to the House
Committee on Justice, sufficient in form and
substance on grounds that she was denied due
process and that the said resolutions violated
the one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment
proceedings for impeachable officers. Court
dismissed the petition.
Facts:
22July2010: 4 days before the 15th
Congress opened its first session, private
respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo
Lim and spouses Pestao (Baraquel group) filed
an impeachment complaint against Gutierrez
upon endorsement of Party-List Representatives
Walden Bello and Arlene Bag-ao
27July2010: HOR Sec-Gen transmitted
the complaint to House Speaker Belmonte who
then, on August 2, directed the Committee on
Rules to include it in the Order of Business
3Aug2010:
private
respondents
Renato Reyes Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan,
Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and
James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed an
impeachment
complaint
againsta
herein
petitioner
endorsed
by
Representatives
Colmenares, Casio, Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and
De Jesus
HOR provisionally adopted the
Rules
of
Procedure
on
Impeachment
Proceedings of the 14th Congress and HOR
Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House
Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 9,
directed the Committee on Rules to include it in
the Order of Business
11Aug2010:
HOR
simultaneously
referred the two complaints to the House
Committee on Justice (HCOJ for brevity)

After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution

of September 1, 2010, found both complaints
sufficient in form
2Sept2010: The Rules of Procedure of
Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress
was published
After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution
of September 7, 2010 found the two complaints,
which both allege culpable violation of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust,
sufficient in substance
Petitioner filed petitions for certiorari and
prohibition
challenging
Resolutions
of
September 1 and 7 alleging that she was denied
due process and that these violated the oneyear bar rule on initiating impeachment
proceedings
Issue/s:
Whether the case presents a justiciable
controversy
Whether the belated publication of the Rules of
Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings of the
15th Congress denied due process to the
Petitioner
Whether the simultaneous referral of the two
complaints violated the Constitution
Ruling: Petition DISMISSED.
Ratio:
1. NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION
- Francisco Jr. vs HOR: Judicial review is not
only a power but a duty of the judiciary
- the 1987 Constitution, though vesting in the
House of Representatives the exclusive power
to initiate impeachment cases, provides for
several limitations to the exercise of such power
as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5),
Article XI thereof. These limitations include the
manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and
the one year bar on the impeachment of one and
the same official.
-the Constitution did not intend to leave the
matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of
Congress. Instead, it provided for certain welldefined limits, or in the language of Baker v.
Carr, judicially discoverable standards for
determining the validity of the exercise of such
discretion, through the power of judicial review
2. DUE PROCESS: Is there a need to publish
as a mode of promulgation the Rules of
Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings?
(P) alleges that the finding of
sufficiency in form and substance of the
impeachment complaints is tainted with bias as
the Chairman of the HCOJs, Rep. Tupas, father
has a pending case with her at the
Sandiganbayan

Presumption of regularity
The determination of sufficiency of
form and exponent of the express grant of rulemaking power in the HOR
the Impeachment Rules are clear in
echoing the constitutional requirements and
providing that there must be a verified complaint
or resolution, and that the substance
requirement is met if there is a recital of facts
constituting
the
offense
charged
and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the
committee
The Constitution itself did not
provide for a specific method of promulgating the
Rules.
impeachment is primarily for the
protection of the people as a body politic, and
not for the punishment of the offender
3. THE ONE-YEAR BAR RULE
(P): start of the one-year bar from
the filing of the first impeachment complaint
against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before
the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th
Congress. She posits that within one year from
July 22, 2010, no second impeachment
complaint may be accepted and referred to
public respondent.
INITIATIVE: Filing of impeachment
complaint coupled with Congress taking initial
action of said complaint (referral of the complaint
to the Committee on Justice)
IMPEACH: to file the case before the
Senate
Rationale of the one-year bar: that
the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: 1)to
prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and
2) to allow the legislature to do its principal task
[of] legislation,
that there should only be ONE CANDLE that
is kindled in a year, such that once the candle
starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no
longer rekindle the candle. (Gutierrez vs. HOR,
2011)
- JAGB
About these ads
Share this:
TwitterFacebook
Related
Quick Facts and Doctrines (Congress)
In "Constitutional Law"
Valeroso v People
In "Criminal Law"
SYCIP JR. v. CA
In "Criminal Law"

IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW

o Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137**
Marbury vs Madison (1803)
Facts:
-The case resulted from a petition to the Supreme
Court by William Marbury, who had been appointed
Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia by
President John Adams but whose commission was
not subsequently delivered.
-Marbury petitioned the Supreme Court to compel the
new Secretary of State James Madison to deliver
the documents.
-The Court, with John Marshall as Chief Justice, found
firstly that Madison's refusal to deliver the
commission was both illegal and remediable.
-Nonetheless, the Court stopped short of compelling
Madison (by writ of mandamus) to hand over
Marbury's commission, instead holding that the
provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that enabled
Marbury to bring his claim to the Supreme Court
was itself unconstitutional, since it purported to
extend the Court's original jurisdiction beyond that
which Article III established.
-The petition was therefore denied.
Issue:
Has the applicant a right to the commission he
demands? -YES
When a commission has been signed by the
President, the appointment is made. The
commission is completed when the seal of the US
is affixed to it by the Secretary of State. Thus, it
gave Marbury the right to hold office for five years,
independent of the executive. To withhold his
commission would be violative of a vested legal
right.
If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do
the laws of his country afford him remedy? -YES
One of the first duties of the government is to afford
that protection. The President is invested with
certain important political powers which authorizes
him to appoint certain officers, who act by his
authority and in conformity with his orders. It is
political in nature and the court has no jurisdiction
over it. But when the legislature proceeds to
impose on that officer other duties; when he is
directed peremptorily to perform certain acts; when
the rights of individuals are dependent on the
performance of those acts; he is so far the officer of
the law; is amenable to the laws for his conduct;
and cannot at his discretion sport away the vested
rights of others. Thus, Marbury has a right to the

commission; a refusal to deliver which is a plain

violation of that right, for which the laws of his
country afford him a remedy.
He is entitled to the remedy for which he applies? -NO
This depends on:
1st. The nature of the writ applied for.
2nd. The power if this court.
3rd. The nature of the writ.
These circumstances certainly concur in this case.
For the 1st: Where the head of the department is
directed by law to do a certain act affecting the
absolute rights of individuals, in the performance of
which he is not placed under the particular direction
of the President, and the performance of which, the
President cannot lawfully forbid, and therefore is
never presumed to have forbidden; as for example,
to record a commission, or a patent for land or to
give a copy of a record; it is not perceived on what
ground the courts of the country are further excuse
from the duty of giving judgement, that right be
done to an injured individual, than if the same
services were to be performed by a person not the
head of a department. This is a plain case for a
mandamus.
For the 2nd and 3rd: The Supreme Court is authorized
to issue writs of mandamus in cases warranted by
the principles and usages of law, to any courts
appointed, or persons holding office, under the
authority of the US. It was insisted that the
Supreme Court should have had appellate
jurisdiction for it to issue a mandamus. It appears
that issuing a writ of mandamus to public officers is
not warranted by the Constitution. Since the act is
repugnant to the Constitution, the former is deemed
void.
Decision:
Petition denied
o Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139**
Angara v Electoral Commission (1936)
ORIGINAL ACTION for the issuance of writ of
prohibition
FACTS
In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, Jose Angara, Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were
candidates for the position of member of the
national Assembly for the first district of the
Province of Tayabas.
On Oct. 7, the provincial board of canvassers
proclaimed Angara as the member-elect for the
said district (having garnered the highest number of
votes).
On November 15, Angara took his oath of office.
The National Assembly, on Dec. 3, passed resolution
no. 8, confirming the election of the members of the
National Assembly.

Five days thereafter (Dec. 8), Pedro Ynsua filed a

Motion of Protest before the Electoral
Commission against Angara.
On Dec. 9, the Electoral Commission adopted a
resolution, par. 6 of which states that Dec. 9 is the
last day of filing protests against the elections.
Angara then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Protest
under the grounds that by virtue of the resolution
no. 8 of National Assembly, the protest in question
was filed out of the prescribed period.
Ynsua said that there is no constitutional provision that
bars him to present a protest after NAs
confirmation.
ISSUE
1.
Does the SC have jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission? - YES
2.
Has Electoral Commission acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest? - NO
RATIO
1.
In cases of conflict, the judicial department is
the only constitutional organ which can be called
upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the
integral or constituent units thereof.
The separation of powers is a fundamental
principle in our system of government. Each
department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its sphere. BUT these three powers
are not to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system
of checks and balances to secure workings of the
departments of the government
The judiciary, as provided by the Constitution,
determines the nature, scope, and extent of such
powers. When the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert
superiority over the other departments; it merely
asserts the obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority. This is in truth all that is involved in what
is termed judicial supremacy which properly is the
power of judicial review.
Power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited
further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented.
The judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation
*(from reflections on the case as per the book)
Judicial power is not the same as the power of
judicial review.

o Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable

controversies or disputes involving rights that are
enforceable and demandable before the courts of
justice or the redress of wrongs for violation of such
rights
o Power of judicial review is the power of a court to
determine the constitutional validity of the acts of
the other departments of the government
o Thus, all courts possess the judicial power but only
those modeled after the American judicial system
exercise the power of judicial review.
2.
Sec. 4 article VI: There shall be an electoral
commission [] The Electoral Commission shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualification of the members
of the National Assembly
The grant of power to the Electoral
Commission to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of
the national Assembly, is intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature
The express lodging of that power in the
Electoral Commission makes the act within its
legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative
HELD
The petition for a writ of prohibition against Electoral
Commission is hereby DENIED.
o Miranda v. Aguirre, 314 SCRA 603
Petitioner: Jose Miranda, Alfredo Dirige Manuel Afiado
et al
Respondent: Alexander Aguirre (Executive Secretary)
Epimaco Velasco (Secretary of Local Government)
et al.
GR No. 133064 September 16, 1999
Ponente: Justice Puno
Special Civil Action (Prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction)
Facts:
1. RA 7720 converted the municipality of Santiago,
Isabela into an independent component city on May
5, 1994. The people of Santiago, Isabela then
ratified the RA in a plebiscite. On February 14,
1998, RA 8528 amended RA 7720 which changed
the status of Santiago from independent
component city to component city.
2. The petitioners then assail the validity of the
amending law due to its lack of provision for
submitting the law for ratification to the people of
Santiago. Miranda was then mayor of Santiago at
the time of filling of petition while Afiado was the
president of the Liga ng mga Baranggay of
Santiago. Respondents then assailed the standing
of the petitioners and that the petition raises a
political question which the SC has no jurisdiction
over. The SolGen filed a comment contending that

RA 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an

independent component city to a component city. A
third comment was filed contending that both the
Constitution and the LGC of 1991 do not require a
plebiscite in approving a law that merely allowed
qualified voters in city to vote in provincial elections.
Issue:
1. Whether or not RA 8528 is unconstitutional for not
having a plebiscite in its ratification- Yes
Ratio:
1. Locus Standi- It is now an ancient rule that the
constitutionality of law can be challenged by one
who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. Petitioners were officials and citizens
of Santiago during the filing of the case. The injury
they would receive was real and immediate in the
application of the law.
2. Political Question- This plea has long lost its
appeal especially in light of Section 1 of Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution which defines judicial
power as including the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. As per Tanada
v Cuenco, The term political question connotes
what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. It refers to those questions
which under the Constitution are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard
to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure. The question is then a
justiciable issue as defined by Casibang v Aquino
(justiciable issue implies a given right, legally
demandable and enforceable, an act or omission
violative of such right, and a remedy granted and
sanctioned by law, for said breach of right.)
3.Unconstitutionality- The Constitution requires a
plebiscite in converting a city from an independent
component city to a component city in Section 10
Article X (No province, city, municipality, or
barangay may be created, or divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered
except in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code and subject to approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.). The power to
create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially
alter boundaries of local government units
belongs to Congress. This power is part of the
larger power to enact laws which the Constitution

vested in Congress. The exercise of the power

must be in accord with the mandate of the
Constitution. In the case at bar, the issue is
whether the downgrading of Santiago City from an
independent component city to a mere component
city requires the approval of the people of Santiago
City in a plebiscite. The resolution of the issue
depends on whether or not the downgrading falls
within the meaning of creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of
municipalities per Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. A close analysis of the said
constitutional provision will reveal that the creation,
division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration
of boundaries of local government units involve a
common denominator which is that material change
in the political and economic rights of the local
government units directly affected as well as the
people therein. It is precisely for this reason that
the Constitution requires the approval of the people
in the political units directly affected.
SC Decision: Petition Granted. RA 8528 is
unconstitutional
Notes:
Dissent in Obiter
Justice Buena- R.A. No. 8528 justified on the ground
that Congress has the power to amend the charter
of Santiago City. This power of amendment,
however, is limited by Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. Quite clearly, when an amendment of
a law involves the creation, merger, division,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of
local government units, a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected is mandatory. He also
contends that the amendment merely caused a
transition in the status of Santiago as a
city. Allegedly, it is a transition because no new
city was created nor was a former city dissolved by
R.A. No. 8528. As discussed above, the spirit of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution calls for the
people of the local government unit directly affected
to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material
change in their rights and responsibilities. They
may call the downgrading of Santiago to a
component city as a mere transition but they cannot
blink away from the fact that the transition will
radically change its physical and political
configuration as well as the rights and
responsibilities of its people.
Justice Mendoza- posits the theory that "only if the
classification involves changes in income,
population, and land area of the local government
unit is there a need for such changes to be
approved by the people. With due respect, such an
interpretation runs against the letter and spirit of
section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which,

to repeat, states: "No province, city, municipality, or

barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered
except in accordance with the criteria established in
the Local Government Code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected." It is
clear that the Constitution imposes two conditions - - first, the creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundary of a local
government unit must meet the criteria fixed by the
Local Government Code on income, population and
land area and second, the law must be approved
by the people "by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
o David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No.
171396, May 3, 2006
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
(7) Consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition
Facts:
Petitioners
assail
the
constitutionality
of Presidential Proclamation 1017 declaring a state
of national emergency, and General Order No. 5
implementing PP1017 issued by President Arroyo
on February 24 2006.
- The operative portion of PP1017 may be divided
into three operative provisions:
(1) By virtue of the power vested upon me
by Sec 18, Art VIIdo hereby command
the AFP, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence
as well any act of insurrection or
rebellion (calling-out power)
(2) To enforce obedience to all the laws and
to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction (take care power or to
ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed)
(3) As provided in Sec 17, Art XII of the
Constitution do hereby declare a state of
national emergency (power to take over)
- (March 3 2006) President issued Proclamation No.
1021 lifting PP1017 after all these petitions were
filed (see notes for separate petitions)
- Respondents present the following factual bases:
o Members of the Magdalo group
indicted in the Oakwood mutiny
escaped their detention cell
o Threat of the Magdalos D-Day on
February 24
o Defections in the military, particularly
in the Philippine marines
o
Reproving
statements
from
communist leaders

o Minutes of the Intelligence Report and

Security Group of the Philippine
army showing the growing alliance
between the NPA and the military
Petitioners cite the events following the
proclamation:
o Office of the President announced the
cancellation of all programs and
activities related to the 20
anniversary celebration of EDSA
People Power I; and revoked the
permits to hold rallies issued earlier
by the local governments
o Presidential Chief of Staff announced
that warrantless arrests and takeover of facilities, including media,
can already be implemented
o During the dispersal of rallyists along
EDSA, police warantlessly arrested
petitioner Randolf David, a UP
professor and newspaper columnist
o
Operatives
of
the
Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG) of the PNP raided the Daily
Tribune offices in Manila. They
confiscated
news
stories
by
reporters, documents, picture and
mock-ups of the Saturday issue
o Members of petitioner Kilusang Mayo
Uno went to Camp Crame to visit
their Chairman Crispin Beltran but
were told that they could not be
admitted
because
of
the
proclamation. Two members were
arrested and detained while the rest
were dispersed by police
Issues:
Procedural
1. WON the issuance of PP1021 renders the petitions
moot and academic NO
2. WON petitioners in 171485 (Escudero, et al.),
171400 (Alternative Law Groups, Inc.), 171483
(KMU, et al), 171489 (Cadiz et al) and 171424
(Legarda) have legal standing YES
*note: the other three petitions indicate direct injury
Substantive
3. WON SC can review the factual bases of PP1017
YES
4. WON PP1017 and G.O No. 5 are unconstitutional
NO
a. Facial Challenge- WON PP1017 is void
on its face because of its overbreadth
NO
b. Constitutional Basis
(1) WON conditions for calling-out
power are present YES
th

(2) WON the clause To enforce

obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction arrogates upon
the President the power to enact
laws and decrees in violation of Art
VI, Sec 1 which vests legislative
powers in Congress YES
(3) WON President Arroyos inclusion of
Sec 17, Art XII is an encroachment
on the legislatures emergency
powers YES
c. As Applied Challenge- WON the illegal
implementation of a law render it
unconstitutional NO
RATIO:
1. All the exceptions for deciding cases otherwise
moot and academic are present in this case.
Specifically,
a. There is a grave violation of the
Constitutionpetitioners
assail
the
constitutionality of PP1017 and G.O No. 5
b. The exceptional character of the situation
and the paramount public interest is
involvedissues being raised affect the
publics interest, involving as they do the
peoples basic rights to freedom of
expression, of assembly and of the press
c. When constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the publicthe
Court, in the present case, functions to
educate the bench, the bar, and the military
and the police, on the extend of the
protection given by constitutional guarantees
d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading
review
e. Voluntary
cessation
of
the
activity
complained of.
2. All the petitioners herein have locus standi. The
petitions call for the application of the
transcendental
importance
doctrine,
a
relaxation of the standing requirements for the
petitioners in the PP1017 cases. Incidentally, it
is not proper to implead President as
respondent since the President may not be
sued in any civil or criminal case (not provided
in the Constitution because to drag him into
court litigations will degrade the dignity of the
high office of the {resident, the Head of State)
3. In IBP v. Zamora, the Court held that while the
Presidents calling-out power is considered
as a discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom, it does not prevent an examination
of whether such power was exercised within

permissible constitutional limits or whether

it was exercised in a manner constituting
grave abuse of discretion. Under Art VIII, Sec
1 judicial courts are also authorized to
determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the government.
In Lansang v Garcia, the Court focused on the
system of checks and balances under which
the President is supreme, only if and when
he acts within the sphere allotted to him by
the Basic Law, and the authority to
determine whether or not he has so acted is
vested in the Judicial Department, which in
this respect, is in turn, constitutionally
supreme The standard laid down is whether
the
President
acted
arbitrarily,
not
correctly. In IBP, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the Presidents
decision is totally bereft of factual basis.
Without sufficient proof to support his
assertion, the Court cannot undertake an
independent investigation beyond the
pleadings. In the case at bar, petitioners failed
to show that Presidents Arroyo exercise of the
calling-out power, by issuing PP1017 is totally
bereft of factual basis.
4a. A facial review of PP1017 using the overbreadth
doctrine is uncalled for because:
(1) Claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in
cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek
to regulate only spoken words and again, that
overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal
laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct PP1017 pertains to a spectrum of
conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly
subject to state regulation.
(2) facial invalidation of laws is generally disfavored.
Traditionally, a person to whom a law on the
ground that it may conceivably be applied
unconstitutionally to others (i.e. in other situations
not before the Court) in overbreadth analysis,
challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third
parties the Court must therefore examine
PP1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence
may cause others not before the court to refrain
from
constitutionally
protected
sppech
or
expression
(3) on this ground, the challenger must establish that
there can be no instance when the assailed law
may be validpetitioners did not eve attempt to
show whether this situation exists

4b (1) In IBP v Zamora, the only criterion for the

exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever
it becomes necessary, the President ma call the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellionPresident Arroyo
found it necessary to issue PP1017 considering the
circumstances then prevailing, Owing to her
Offices vast intelligence network, she is the best
position to determine the actual condition of the
country.
4b (2) The PP1017 operative clause To enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction was lifted from Marcos
Proclamation No 1081 which granted President
Marcos legislative powerPresident Arroyos
ordinance power cannot is limited to those
enumerated in Chapter 2, Book III of EO 292 or
Administrative Code of 1987 (see notes) She
cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by
Marcos under PP1081. Decrees are laws which are
of the same category and binding force as statutes
because they were issued by the President in the
exercise of his legislative power during Martial Law
under the 1973 constitution.
Neither can the President enforce obedience to all
laws through the military. She can only order the
military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent
to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
4b(3) There is a distinction between the Presidents
authority to declare a state of national emergency
and to exercise emergency powers. The first is
granted under Sec 18 Art VII whereas the latter
requires delegation from Congress under Sec 23
Art VI. Sec 17 Art XII (the taking over of privately
owned public utility or business affected with public
interest by the State) is an aspect of the emergency
powers clause. Sec 17 refers to Congress, not the
PresidentPP1017 dpes not authorize her during
the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest without
authority from Congress
4c. There is nothing in PP1017 allowing police,
expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest,
search or violate the citizens constitutional rights.
There is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the
military or police to commit acts beyond what are
necessary and appropriate to suppress and prevent
lawless violence. Othewise, such acts are
considered illegal. Here, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure; the right against
warrantless arrest; and the freedom of speech, of
expression, of the press, and of assembly were
violated.
HELD:

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules

that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a
call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to
prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the
provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws
not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated
by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In
addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national
emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is
CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize
the President to take over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by
which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e.
whatever is necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence. Considering that acts of terrorism have not yet
been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such
portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The
warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the
dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU
members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these
petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of
standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press,
as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and
whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other
materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Notes:
In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et
al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it
encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress;
(2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional
requirements for the imposition of martial law; and
(3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.
In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares
and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the
CIDGs act of raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a
clear case of censorship or prior restraint. They
also claimed that the term emergency refers only
to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar
occurrences, hence, there is absolutely no
emergency that warrants the issuance of PP 1017.
In

G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are

Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and
twenty one (21) other members of the House of
Representatives, including Representatives Satur
Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casio, Liza
Maza, and Josel Virador. They asserted that PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute usurpation of
legislative powers; violation of freedom of
expression and a declaration of martial law. They
alleged that President Arroyo gravely abused her
discretion in calling out the armed forces without
clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of
lawless violence and a showing that there is
necessity to do so.

In G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU,

and their members averred that PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5 are unconstitutional because (1) they
arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact
laws and decrees; (2) their issuance was without
factual basis; and (3) they violate freedom of
expression and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble to redress their grievances.
In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law
Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5 are unconstitutional because they violate (a)
Section 4 of Article II, (b) Sections 12,and 4 of
Article III, (c) Section 23 of Article VI, and (d)
Section 17 of Article XII of the Constitution.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I.
Cadiz, et al., alleged that PP 1017 is an arbitrary
and unlawful exercise by the President of her
Martial Law powers. And assuming that PP 1017 is
not really a declaration of Martial Law, petitioners
argued that it amounts to an exercise by the
President
of
emergency
powers
without
congressional approval. In addition, petitioners
asserted that PP 1017 goes beyond the nature
and function of a proclamation as defined under the
Revised Administrative Code.
And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424, petitioner Loren B.
Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
are unconstitutional for being violative of the
freedom of expression, including its cognate rights
such as freedom of the press and the right to
access to information on matters of public concern,
all guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of the
1987 Constitution. In this regard, she stated that
these issuances prevented her from fully
prosecuting her election protest pending before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2,
Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987). She may issue any of the following:
Sec. 2. Executive Orders.Acts of the President providing for
rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or
execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be
promulgated in executive orders.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders.Acts of the President which relate
to particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of
his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in
administrative orders.
Sec. 4. Proclamations.Acts of the President fixing a date or
declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest,
upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or
regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in
proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.

Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders.Acts of the President on matters of

administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest
which only concern a particular officer or office of the
Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders.
Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars.Acts of the President on matters
relating to internal administration, which the President desires
to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments,
agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for
information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum
circulars.
Sec. 7. General or Special Orders.Acts and commands of the
President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special
orders.

o Gonzales v. Narvasa, 337 SCRA 733

Petitioner: Ramon Gonzales
Respondent:
Andres
Narvasa
(Preparatory
Commission on Constitutional Reforms) et al.
GR. No. 140835 August 14, 2000
Ponente: Justice Gonzaga-Reyes
Special Civil Action (Prohibition and Mandamus)
Facts:
1. Ramon Gonzales, in the capacity as taxpayer and
citizen, assails constitutionality of Preparatory
Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and
of positions of presidential consultants, advisers
and assistants.
2. PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada on November
26, 1998 by E.O. No. 43. The objective is to study
and recommend proposed amendments and/or
revisions to the 1987 Constitution and manner of
implementation. The constitutionality of PCCR is
assailed under 2 grounds. One, it is a public office
which only legislature can create by law. Second,
the creation of such body by the President is
intervention in a process which the President
should be totally excluded from according to the
Constitution; the amendment of the fundamental
charter.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the creation of PCCR qualifies as a
public office (consultants, advisers and assistants)
that only the legislature can create? - NO
2. Whether or not that by creation of PCCR the
President takes an intervening role in constitutional
reform? - No
Ratio:
1. Moot and academic- An action is considered moot
when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy
because issue involved has become academic.
Under EO No. 43, the PCCR was instructed to
complete its tasks by June 30, 1999. However, the
President extended its timeframe until December
31, 1999 by EO No. 70. The PCCR accomplished
its mandate and submitted its recommendations on

December 20, 1999 and was dissolved on the

same day.
2. Inappropriate remedy- Given that the issue is stale,
it is impossible to grant the relief prayed for by the
petitioner. Prohibition is a preventive remedy and
does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait
accompli.
3. Lack of standing of petitioner- A citizen acquires
standing only if he can establish that he has
suffered actual or threatened injury as result of the
allegedly illegal action of the government. In the
case at bar, petitioner cannot claim injury, if at all, it
would be Congress who can claim due to allegation
that the President encroached upon the
legislatures power to create a public office and
propose amendments to the Constitution. A
taxpayer can claim standing in constitutional issue
when it is established that public funds have been
used in alleged contravention of the law or
Constitution. There should be exercise of Congress
of its taxing or spending power. In this case, it was
created under the Office of the President and the
amount appropriated for operational expenses is
sourced from the funds of the Office of the
President. There is then no appropriation
(appropriation defined as act of legislature setting
apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum
t be used in payment of debts or dues from the
State to creditors).
4. Presidential Consultants, advisers and assistantsThe petitioner is unclear in assailing this concept
due to lack of insufficiency of nature of allegations.
The petitioner does not assail what the act of the
President is wrong but merely attached a copy of
the Philippine Government Directory listing names
of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.
5. Mandamus- the petitioner asks the court to issue a
writ of mandamus so that Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora would answer his letter requesting
names of executive officials holding multiple
positions in government, copies of their
appointments and list of recipients of luxury
vehicles taken by Cutsoms and turned over to
Malacanang. The right to information can be found
in Section 7 of the Bill of Rights Article III. This
provision is self-executing and can be invoked by
any citizen. Zamora then has constitutional and
statutory duty, in capacity as Executive Secretary,
to answer petitioners letter dealing with public
concern and info being asked for.
SC Decision: Petition dismissed except Zamora
ordered to give info being asked for
o ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Phil. MultiMedia Inc., G.R. No. 175769, January 19, 2009,
Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS:

Philippine Multi-Media System, Inc. (PMSI), operator

of Dream Broadcsating System, delivers a digital
direct-to-home (DTH) television satellite to its
subscribers all over the Philippines, was granted a
legislative franchise under Republic Act 8630 and
was given a Provisional Authority by the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) to install,
operate and maintain a nationwide DTH satellite
service. When it commenced operations, it offered
as part of its program line-up, together with other
paid premium program channels, ABS-CBN
Channels 2 and 23, NBN, Channel 4, ABC,
Channel 5, GMA, Channel 7, RPN, Channel 9, and
IBC, Channel 13, pursuant to Memorandum
Circular 4-08-88 which mandated all cable
television system operators, operating within the
Grade A and B CONTOURS to carry out the
television signals of the authorized television
broadcast stations.
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN), a
licensed television and radio broadcasting network,
demanded PMSI to cease and desist from
rebroadcasting Channels 2 and 23. In its reply,
PMSI contended that the rebroadcasting was in
accordance with the authority granted by NTC
under its obligations under NTC MC 4-08-88.
Negotiations were ensued between the parties in an
effort to reach a settlement; however, the same
was terminated by ABS-CBN allegedly due to
PMSIs inability to ensure the prevention of illegal
retransmission and further rebroadcast of its
signals, as well as the adverse effect of the
rebroadcasts on the business operations of its
regional television stations.
ABS-CBN filed with the Intellectual Property Rights
Office (IPO) a complaint for Violation of Laws
Involving Property Rights, with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction alleging that PMSIs
unauthorized rebroadcasting of Channels 2 and 23
infringed on its broadcasting rights and copyright.
The TRO was granted by the Bureau of Legal
Affairs (BLA) of IPO. PMSI, pursuant to the TRO,
suspended the retransmission of PMSI of Channels
2 and 23 and likewise filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
granted the petition of PMSI and reversed the
decision of the BLA. ABS-CBN filed its appeal
however it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
Furthermore,
ABS-CBNs
motion
for
reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not PMSI violated the Laws on Property
Rights.

2. Whether or not the issuance MC 4-08-88 by the

NTC is a valid exercise of the police power of the
State.
HELD:
1. NO. PMSI did not violate the Laws on Property
Rights because it is not engaged in rebroadcasting
Channels 2 and 23. Rebroadcasting has been
defined as the simultaneous broadcasting by one
broadcasting organization of the broadcast of
another broadcasting organization. It is also the
transmission by wireless means for the public
reception of sounds or of images or of
representations thereof; such transmission by
satellite is also broadcasting where the means for
decrypting are provided to the public by the
broadcasting organization or with its consent.
PMSI is only engaged in the carrying of signals of
ABS-CBN coming from ABS-CBN and transmitting
signals. PMSI is not the origin nor does it claim to
be the origin of the programs broadcasted by the
ABS-CBN. PMSI did not make and transmit on its
own but merely carried the existing signals of the
ABS-CBN. When PMSI subscribers view ABSCBNs programs in Channels 2 and 23, they know
that the origin thereof was the ABS-CBN.
The nature of broadcasting is to scatter the signals in
its widest area of coverage as possible. On this
score, it may be said that making public means that
accessibility is undiscriminating as long as it is
within the range of the transmitter and equipment of
the broadcaster. That the medium through which
the PMSI carries the ABS-CBNs signal, that is via
satellite, does not diminish the fact that it operates
and functions as a cable television. It remains that
the PMSIs transmission of signals via its DTH
satellite television service cannot be considered
within the purview of broadcasting.
Furthermore, there is no rebroadcasting on the part of
the PMSI of the ABS-CBMs programs on Channels
2 and 23, as defined under the Rome Convention,
which defines rebroadcasting as the simultaneous
broadcasting by one broadcasting organization of
the
broadcast
of
another
broadcasting
organization. ABS-CBN creates and transmits its
own signals; PMSI merely carries such signals
which the viewers receive in its unaltered form.
PMSI does not produce, select, or determine the
programs to be shown in Channels 2 and 23.
Likewise, it does not pass itself off as the origin or
author of such programs. Insofar as Channels 2
and 23 are concerned, PMSI merely retransmits the
same in accordance with Memorandum Circular 0408-88. With regard to its premium channels, it buys
the channels from content providers and transmits
on an as-is basis to its viewers. Clearly, PMSI does
not perform the functions of a broadcasting

organization; thus, it cannot be said that it is

engaged in rebroadcasting Channels 2 and 23.
Therefore, the retransmission of ABS-CBNs signals
by PMSI which functions essentially as a cable
television does not constitute rebroadcasting in
violation of the formers intellectual property rights
under the IP Code.
2. YES. The law on copyright is not absolute. The
carriage of ABS-CBNs signals by virtue of the
must-carry rule in Memorandum Circular No. 04-0888 is under the direction and control of the
government though the NTC which is vested with
exclusive jurisdiction to supervise, regulate and
control
telecommunications
and
broadcast
services/facilities in the Philippines. The imposition
of the must-carry rule is within the NTCs power to
promulgate rules and regulations, as public safety
and interest may require, to encourage a larger and
more effective use of communications, radio and
television broadcasting facilities, and to maintain
effective competition among private entities in
these activities whenever the Commission finds it
reasonably feasible.
The Must-Carry Rule is in consonance with the
principles and objectives underlying Executive
Order No. 436, to wit:
The Filipino people must be given wider access to
more sources of news, information, education,
sports event and entertainment programs other
than those provided for by mass media and
afforded television programs to attain a well
informed, well-versed and culturally refined
citizenry and enhance their socio-economic growth.
Moreover, radio and television waves are mere
franchised which may be reasonably burdened with
some form of public service. It is a privilege subject,
among other things, to amendment by Congress in
accordance with the constitutional provision that
any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be
subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the
Congress when the common good so requires.
The must carry rule is a valid exercise of the police
power of the State. It favors both broadcasting
organizations and the public. It prevents cable
television companies from excluding broadcasting
organization especially in those places not reached
by signal. Also, the rule prevents cable television
companies from depriving viewers in far-flung areas
the enjoyment of programs available to city
viewers. In fact, this Office finds the rule more
burdensome on the part of the cable television
companies. The latter carries the television signals
and shoulders the costs without any recourse of
charging. On the other hand, the signals that are
carried by cable television companies are
dispersed and scattered by the television stations

and anybody with a television set is free to pick

them up.
RULING:
Petition Denied

o Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services Inc., G.R. No.

167614, March 24, 2009
Petitioner Antonio Serrano, a Filipino seafarer, the last
clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8042, to wit:
Sec. 10. MONEY Claims. - x x x In case of termination
of overseas EMPLOYMENT without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the
workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement
of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent
(12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his EMPLOYMENT contract or
for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less.
He alleges that this clause does not magnify the
contributions of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs)
to national development, but exacerbates the
hardships borne by them by unduly limiting their
entitlement in case of illegal dismissal to their lumpsum salary either for the unexpired portion of their
employment contract "or for three months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less"
(subject clause). Petitioner claims that the last
clause violates the OFWs' constitutional rights in
that it impairs the terms of their contract, deprives
them of equal protection and denies them due
process.
Issues:
Does the subject clause violate Section 10, Article III
of the Constitution on non-impairment of contracts?
- NO
As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A.
No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the execution of the
EMPLOYMENT contract between petitioner and
respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be argued
that R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause,
impaired the employment contract of the parties.
But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline,
the subject clause may not be declared
unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on
the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in
the exercise of the police power of the State to
regulate a business, profession or calling,
particularly the recruitment and deployment of
OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring
respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs
wherever they may be EMPLOYED
All private contracts must yield to the superior and
legitimate measures taken by the State to promote
public welfare.

Does the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of

the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and
Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected
sector? - YES
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the law.
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord
all members of the labor sector, without distinction
as to place of deployment, full protection of their
rights and welfare.
There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court
reviews the constitutionality of a classification
embodied in a law:
a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the
challenged classification needs only be shown to
be rationally related to serving a legitimate state
interest;
b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the
government must show that the challenged
classification serves an important state interest and
that the classification is at least substantially related
to serving that interest;
c) Strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative
classification which impermissibly interferes with
the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to
the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is
presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon
the government to prove that the classification is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest
and that it is the least restrictive means to protect
such interest
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a
valid classification, and its policies should be
accorded recognition and respect by the courts of
justice except when they run afoul of the
Constitution. The deference stops where the
classification violates a fundamental right, or
prejudices persons accorded special protection by
the Constitution.
Our present Constitution has gone further in
guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to
marginalized groups of society, including labor.
Under the policy of social justice, the law bends
over backward to accommodate the interests of the
working class on the humane justification that those
with less privilege in life should have more in law.
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise
judicial restraint in deciding questions of
constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion
given to Congress in exercising its legislative
power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the
"rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion
would be given deferential treatment.

But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the

denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of
prejudice against persons favored by the
Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny
ought to be more strict.
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains
a suspect classification in that, in the computation
of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees
who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month
cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired
portion of one year or more in their contracts, but
none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers
with fixed-term employment. The subject clause
singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens
it with a peculiar disadvantage.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears
facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However,
a closer examination reveals that the subject clause
has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious
impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with EMPLOYMENT contracts of less
than one year vis--vis OFWs with EMPLOYMENT
contracts of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with EMPLOYMENT
contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixedperiod EMPLOYMENT;
Prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8042 on July
14, 1995, illegally dismissed OFWs, no matter how
long the period of their employment contracts, were
entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired
portions of their contracts.
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No.
8042 introduced a differentiated rule of computation
of the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs
based on their EMPLOYMENT periods, in the
process singling out one category whose
contracts have an unexpired portion of one year or
more and subjecting them to the peculiar
disadvantage of having their monetary awards
limited to their salaries for 3 months or for the
unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less, but all
the while sparing the other category from such
prejudice, simply because the latter's unexpired
contracts fall short of one year.
American Jurisprudence holds that when an
employee is wrongfully discharged under a contract
of EMPLOYMENT his prima facie damage is the
amount which he would be entitled to had he
continued in such EMPLOYMENT until the
termination of the period.
However, there would be certain misgivings if one
is to approach the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of the subject clause from the
lone perspective that the clause directly violates

state policy on labor under Section 3,Article XIII of

the Constitution.
While all the provisions of the 1987 Constitution are
presumed self-executing, there are some which this
Court has declared not judicially enforceable,
Article XIII being one of them.
Ultimately, therefore, Section 3 of Article XIII
cannot, on its own, be a source of a positive
enforceable right.
Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay
should form part of the salary basis in the
computation of his monetary award, because these
are fixed benefits that have been stipulated into his
contract.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include
overtime and leave pay.
By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis
for the automatic inclusion of overtime and holiday
pay in the computation of petitioner's monetary
award, unless there is evidence that he performed
work during those periods.
HELD:
Petition GRANTED. Subject clause
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Petitioner awarded salary
for the full unexpired term of his contract.
2 December 2014 (3 hours)
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW
o IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15,
2000**
Political questions: questions, which under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative/executive branch of the government
- Two aspects:
o Matters that are to be exercised by
the people in their primary political
capacity
o Matters which have been specifically
delegated to some other department
or
particular
office
of
the
government,
with
discretionary
power to act
Court often had to wrestle with
the political question doctrine
in the area of the exercise of
the discretionary power of
the
legislative/executive
branch
- Case law on the political question doctrine:
o Barcelon v Baker (1905)

Facts:
Governor-General
suspended the privilege of
the writ, pursuant to a
resolution of the Philippine

Commission, in Cavite and

Batangas based on a finding
of open insurrection therein.
Barcelon, who was detained
by constabulary officers in
Batangas, filed a petition for
the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus alleging that
there
was
no
open
insurrection in Batangas .
Held: Judicial department may
not investigate the facts upon
which the legislative and
executive
branches
of
government
acted
in
suspending the privilege of
the writ.

Under our form of

government,
one
department has no
authority to inquire
into the acts of
another, which acts
are performed within
the discretion of the
government.
The
exercise
of
discretionary power is
conclusive upon the
courts.
Once a determination
is made by the
executive
and
legislative
departments that the
conditions justifying
the
assailed
acts
exist, it will presume
that the conditions
continue until the
same
authority
decides that they no
longer exist.
o The executive
branch
are
better situated
to
obtain
information
about peace
and order
o Alejandrino v Quezon (1924)
Facts: Alejandrino, who was
appointed Senator by the
Governor-General
was
suspended from office for

disorderly
conduct
for
assaulting another Senator.
Held: Suspension was illegal
because the Jones law does
not authorize the senate to
suspend
an
appointive
member. However, the SC
does not possess the power
of coercion to make the
Philippine Senate take any
particular action.
Philippine Legislature
or any branch thereof
cannot be directly
controlled
in
the
exercise
of
their
legislative powers by
any judicial process
o Other cases applying the political
question doctrine to the internal
affairs of the legislature:
Vera v Avelino (1946)
Mabanag v Lopez-Vito (1947)
Arnault v Balagtas (1955)
Osmena v Pendatun (1960)
o Avelino v Cuenco (1949)
Facts: Senate president Jose
Avelino, who was deposed
and replaced, questioned his
successors title claiming that
the latter had been elected
without a quorum.
Held: Petition was first
dismissed on the ground that
such was an internal matter
and not subject to judicial
review. On reconsideration,
Court held that it could
assume jurisdiction over the
controversy
in
light
of
subsequent events justifying
intervention among which
was the existence of a
quorum.
Petition
was
ultimately
dismissed
but
Court declared respondent
Cuenco as the legally elected
Senate President.
o Other cases wherein the Court
brushed aside the political question
doctrine and assumed jurisdiction
whenever it found constitutionallyimposed limits on the exercise of
powers
conferred
upon
the
legislature. The exercise of the
legislatures power is subject to

constitutional limitations which are

mandatory.
Tanada v Cuenco (1957)
Cunanan v Tan, Jr. (1962)
Gonzales v COMELEC (1967)
Tolentino v COMELEC (1971)
which abandoned Mabanag v
Lopez-Vito
Other cases applying the political
question doctrine to the exercise of
executive power:
Severino v Governor-General
(1910)
Abueva v Wood (1924)
Forbes v Chuoco Tiaco (1910)
Manalang v Quitoriano (1954)
Untal v Chief of Staff (1949); Raquiza
v Bradford (1945)
Held: As the Commander-inChief, the President has the
power to determine whether
war (legally speaking) still
continues or has ceased. It is
not
within
the
judicial
department to determine
when was is at end.
Other cases applying the political
question doctrine to the exercise by
the President of his powers as
Commander-in-Chief,
citing
Barcelon v Baker (1905).
Montenegro c Castaneda
(1952)
Lansang v Garcia (1971)
Held: the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is neither absolute
nor unqualified because the
Constitution sets limits on the
exercise
of
executive
discretion on the matter
The function of the
Court
is
not
to
supplant but merely
check the Executive;
to ascertain whether
the President has
gone beyond the
constitutional limits of
his jurisdiction, not to
exercise the power
vested in him or to
determine the wisdom
of his act.

Judicial inquiry is
confined
to
the

question of whether
the President did not
act arbitrarily
o The issue of whether the Presidents
exercise of power was justiciable
divided the Court down the middle in
the following cases

Javellana
v
Executive
Secretary (1973)
Aquino, Jr. v Enrile (1973)
Garcia-Padilla v Enrile (1983):
held that the President must
be given absolute control in
times of war or national
emergency
Morales, Jr. v Enrile (1983;
promulgated six days after
Garcia-Padilla):
reiterated
Lansang
1987 Constitution Commission recognized 2
lessons from EDSA:
o the need to grant the Court the
express power to review the
exercise
of
the
powers
as
commander-in-chief by the President
and deny it of any discretion to
decline its exercise
o the need to compel the Court to be
pro-active
by
expanding
its
jurisdiction
o Thus, Art VIII, Sec 1: judicial power
includes the duty of the courtsto
determine whether or not there has
been a gave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the government
It may be conceded that the
Presidents calling out power
may be a lesser power than
the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ and to
declare martial law but even
then, its exercise cannot be
left to the absolute discretion
of the Chief Executive.
The Court is charged with the special duty of
determining the limitations which the law places
upon all official action. The Court has the
responsibility being the ultimate interpreter of the
fundamental law.
o ITF v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 159139, January 13,
2004

Information Technology Foundation of the

Philippines v. Commission on Elections
Panganiban, J
January 13, 2004
Petitioners: Information Technology Foundation of
the Philippines, Ma. Corazon M. Akol, Miguel Uy,
Eduardo H. Hilado, Ley salcedo, and Manuel
Alcuaz, Jr.
Respondents: Commission on Elections; Benjamin
Abalos, Sr. (Chairman); Eduardo D. Mejos (Bidding
and Awards Committee [BAC] Chairman); Gideon
de Guzman, Jose F. Balbuena, Lamberto Llamas,
Bartolome Sinocruz (BAC members); Mega Pacific
eSolutions, Inc. (MPEI); and Mega Pacific
Consortium (MPC)
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari
Summary of Proceedings:
Comelec Chairman - Petitioner Akol wrote a letter on
May 29, 2003 to Chairman Abalos, protesting the
irregularities in the bid. Chairman Abalos, through
his EA, Atty. Jaime Paz, rejected the protest.
Facts:
Timeline:
- This a case involving the botched bidding of
automated counting machines (ACMs) supposedly
for use in the 2004 elections. Really bad time for
Chairman Ben Abalos and PGMA.
- June 7, 1995 - RA 8046 was passed, authorizing
Comelec to conduct a nationwide demonstration of
a computerized election system. Also allowed
Comelec to pilot test the system in the March 1996
elections for ARMM
- December 22, 1997 - RA 8436 was passed,
authorizing Comelec to use an automated election
system (AES) for the national and local elections.
Also mandated Comelec to procure automated
counting machines (ACMs)
- February 8, 1998 - Comelec Res. 2985 was
promulgated. Comelec decided against full national
implementation of the AES and limited it to ARMM.
Manual count still conducted for all of Sulu because
the AES there failed
- October 29, 2002 - Comelec Res. 02-0170 passed.
Modernization program for the 2004 elections
adopted. Biddings resolved to be conducted in 3
phases
- January 24, 2003 - EO 172 issued by PGMA,
Php2.5B allocated to fund the AES for 2004
elections. Additional Php500m released by request
of the Comelec
- January 28, 2003 - Invitation for Eligibility and to Bid
issued by Comelec

- February 17, 2003 - Request for Proposal (RFP) to

procure ACMs released
- February 18, 2003 - Pre-bid conference conducted
by Comelec Bidding and Award Committee (BAC).
Bidders given until March 10, 2003 to submit their
bids
- Only respondent Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC)
and Total Information Management Corp (TIMC)
were found to be eligible, out of 57 bidders. Both
companies referred to BAC's technical working
group (TWG) and DOST for technical evaluation
- April 15, 2003 - Comelec en banc awarded project to
respondent MPC (Comelec Res. 6074)
- April 24, 2003 - TWG and DOST report says that
both companies failed in certain items in the
technical evaluation.
- Yes, the award was given before the report was
published.
- May 16, 2003 - Res. 6074 publicized, and MPC
informed
- Contract entered into WITH MPEI, NOT MPC WHO
WAS AWARDED THE BID
- May 29, 2003 - Petitioners protested the award.
Protest rejected in a June 6, 2003 letter which
stated that the bid would 'stand up to the strictest
scrutiny.'
Bidding things we need to know
- AES has three phases: 1) Voter registration and
validation system; 2) Automated counting and
canvassing system; 3) electronic transmission
- Bidding process step 1: Invitation to apply and bid.
Contains bid qualifications, like, they can be joint
ventures, but must be 60% Filipino, and things like
that.
- Bidding process step 2: Pre-bid conference. Bidders
who have bought the bid documents get to ask
questions about the bidding things.
- Bidding process step 3: Submission of envelopes.
Two envelopes: 1) Eligibility envelope - contains
eligibility documents (legal, technical, and financial
documents). Includes joint venture agreement, or
memorandum of agreement (MOA), or consortium
agreement, if applicable; 2) Bid envelope - contains
the actual bid (the peso amount). Will not be
opened
if
eligibility
requirements
unsatisfactory/lacking.
- Bidding process step 4: Post-qualification. Bids
submitted to TWG to determine technical eligibility.
Must pass the MANDATORY reqs. In this case,
mandatory reqs are: 1) use of appropriate ballots;
2) stand-alone machine which can count votes and
an automated system which can consolidate the
results immediately; 3) with procisions for audit
trails; 4) minimum human intervention; 5) adequate
safeguards/security measures

- Bidding process step 5: Contract awarded to lowest

technically-qualified bid. If there are no qualified
bidders, failure of bidding will be declared. Rebidding should be planned.
Things we need to know about Mega Pacific
Consortium (MPC)
- Consists of five companies: 1) Mega Pacific
eSolutions, Inc. (MPEI) (lead company); 2) SK
C&C;
3)
WeSolv;
4)
Election.com
Ltd.
(subcontractor); 5) ePLDT (subcontractor)
- MPEI entered into four separate bilateral agreements
with the companies. Meaning, there is no single
MOA/JV agreement between the five companies.
- Proofs that MPC as a consortium is real: 1) Letter
signed by President Willy U. Yu of MPEI for MPC;
2) Official receipt issued to MPC, acknowledging
payment for bid documents
Issues:
Procedural:
1. WON petitioners have locus standi - YES
2. WON administrative remedies have
exhausted - YES

been

Substantive:
3. WON Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it
awarded the contract to MPC - YES, YES, A
THOUSAND TIMES YES
Grave abuse of discretion is done when 1) an act
is done contrary to the Constitution; 2) an act is
executed
whimsically,
capriciously,
or
arbitrarily out of malice, ill will, or personal bias
Ratio:
1. The subject matter is a 'matter of public concern
and imbued with public interest.' It is of 'paramount
public interest' and 'transcendental importance.'
Comelec's failed bidding and questionable award of
contract would impact directly on the success or the
failure of the electoral process. The core of the
democratic process. The will of the people should
not be impaired! The ballot should be untainted!
2. Yep. Sec. 55 of RA 9184 (Govt Procurement
Reform Law) provides that the protest should go
first to the head of the procuring entity. May 29
letter is a protest. That is enough.
3.a. Comelec failed to establish the identity, existence,
and eligibility of MPC as a bidder
- Proofs of existence presented by MPC (see things
we need to know about MPC) not enough. That
letter is self-serving and uncorroborated. The

receipt is issued by a cashier without sufficient

inquiry into the existence/identity of the supposed
payor.
There is no single agreement of joint venture, or
MOA, or something, that establishes the existence,
composition,
and
scope
of
the
organization/grouping/team. Why did Comelec not
see this? Did it not examine the eligibility
documents in envelope 1? If it did, they should
have not opened envelope 2/the bid envelope
Sec. 5.4(b), IRR, RA 6957 (BOT law), amended by
RA 7718 states: joint venture/consortium proponent
shall be evaluated based on the individual or
collective experience of the member-firms. By this
standard, MPEI alone would not have qualified.
Why did the Comelec open envelope 2?
Even Commissioner Florentino Tuason, Jr. has not
seen the agreement between MPEI and the four
other companies. He was the head of Comelec's
Legal Department. He should have seen that shit.
Grave abuse of discretion by 'arbitrarily failing to
observe its own rules, policies, and guidelines.'

3.b. ACMs failed to pass the DOST technical tests

3.c. Remedial measures and re-testings undertaken
by the Comelec and DOST after the award are
contrary to the nature of public biddings, and they
do not cure the grave abuse of discretion
committed by Comelec when it awarded the
contract to MPC
Held:
Petition granted.
Award of contract to MPC null and void.
Contract also null and void.
Comelec ordered to refrain from implementing any
other agreement re: this project.
Copy of decision furnished to Office of the
Ombudsman, to determine any criminal liabililty.
OSG to take measures to protect the govt and
vindicate public interest from the ill effects of the
illegal disbursements of the public funds.
o Jumamil v. Cafe, G.R. No. 144570, September
2005
Corona, J.
Petition for Review on Certiorari of CA decision
FACTS:
- Petitioner Jumamil filed before the RTC a petition
for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary
injunction and writ of restraining order against
public respondents Mayor Caf and members of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Panabo, Davao del
Norte.

He also challenged the constitutionality of

Resolution No. 7, which provided for an initial
appropriation of P765, 000 for the construction of
stalls around a proposed terminal, and Ordinance
No. 10, appropriating a further amount of P1.5 M
for the construction of additional stalls
- Petitioner alleges that the ordinances were passed for
the respondents private benefit because:
o
even before their issuance,
respondent Mayor Caf and private
respondents (57 awardees of the
stalls who had deposited 40,000
each ) had already entered into
lease contracts for the construction
and award of the market stalls.
o there was no publication/invitation to
the public that this contract was
available to all who were interested
to own a stall and were willing to
deposit P40,000
- Both parties agreed to await the decision in CA SP
No. 20424 which involved similar facts, issues and
parties. RTC consequently deferred the resolution
of the pending petition.
- The CA in SP No. 20424 held that petitioner had no
standing:
o
to
challenge
the
two
resolutions/ordinances because he
suffered no wrong under their terms;
the issue was not the ordinances
themselves but the award of the
market stalls to the private
respondents on the strength of the
contracts individually executed by
them with Mayor Cafe
o to file the petition for declaratory relief
and seek judicial interpretation of the
agreements.
- CA SP No. 20424 was later elevated to the SC as
UDK Case No. 9948. SC denied the petition for
being insufficient in form and substance.
- RTC adopted the ruling in CA SP No. 20424 and
ordered petitioner to pay attorneys fees in the
amount of P1000 to each of the 57 private
respondents
ISSUES:
1. WON parties were bound by the outcome in CA SP
20424 YES
2. WON petitioner had legal standing to bring the
petition for declaratory relief YES
3. WON Resolutions were unconstitutional NO
4. WON petitioner should be held liable for damages
NO
RATIO:
1. Petitioner, having expressly agreed to be bound by
the Courts decision in CA SP No. 20424/UDK

Case No. 9948, should be reined in by the

dismissal order which has now become final and
executory
2.

Petitioner brought the petition in his capacity as

taxpayer and not in his personal capacity. He was
questioning the official acts of the public
respondents in passing the ordinances and
entering the lease contracts. A taxpayer need not
be a party to the contract to challenge its
validity.
Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically
prove sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation. The
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the
State for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional
act
constitutes
a
misapplication of such funds. The resolutions
being assailed were appropriations ordinances and
were allegedly for the private benefit of
respondents.

3.

Petitioner failed to prove the subject ordinances

and agreements to be discriminatory. He should
have clearly established that such ordinances
operated unfairly against those who were not
notified and who were thus not given the
opportunity to make their deposits. Also, there is
the presumption of regularity of official duty, absent
any showing to the contrary.

4. Petitioner should not be liable for damages since

the alleged bad faith of petitioner was never
established. The award of attorneys fees are not
justified in this case.
HELD: CA decision affirmed with modification.
o Arceta v. Mangrobang, G.R. No. 152895, (June
15, 2004) Quisumbing, J.
NATURE: Special Civil Actions in the SC Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus
DOCTRINE: Seeking judicial review at the earliest
opportunity does not mean immediately elevating the
matter to the Supreme Court, but that the question of
unconstitutionality of the act in question should have
been immediately raised in the proceedings in the court
below, and not merely on appeal.
FACTS:
For resolution are two consolidated petitions assailing the
constitutionality of B.P. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law).

Arceta was charged with violating B.P. 22 for

issuing a check in the amount of P740,000 to Oscar R.
Castro on Dec. 21, 1998. When check was presented for
payment it was dishonored by drawee bank for having
insufficient funds.
During her arraignment, Arceta pleaded not
guilty. Subsequently, she filed the instant petition.
Gloria S. Dy was charged for the same
violation as Arceta by the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Caloocan.
Dy issued a check in the amount of
P2,500,000 to Anita Chua on Jan 2000. When check
was presented for payment it was dishonored by drawee
bank since account was closed.
Both petitioners allege that since the Lozano doctrine,
which upheld the validity of B.P. 22, is the prevailing
jurisprudence any move to quash the charges or dismiss
the case would be imprudent.
ISSUE:
WON the following petitions show that the constitutionality
is the very lis mota of the case NO
RATIO:
Court ruled that the filed petitions are not subject to judicial
review as they fail to meet the following requisites:
1. An actual and appropriate case and controversy exists
2. A personal and substantial interest of the party raising
the constitutional question
3. Exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity .
4. Constitutional question raised is the very lis mota of the
case
As the special civil action initiated by the petitioners was
certiorari, the petitioners had to claim that the
respondents acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion. However, the petitions
were devoid of such claims. As such, there is no
sufficient cause of action presented.
The petitioners also ignored the hierarchy of courts outlined
in Rule 65, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Seeking judicial review at the earliest
opportunity does not mean immediately elevating
the matter to this Court. The petitioners opted to raise
the issue only at the SC level and not at the first instance
in the lower courts when it was most appropriate to do
so.

Finally, the petitioners failed to prove that the constitutional

question raised is the very lis mota of the case. Every
law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, and not one that is doubtful,
speculative or argumentative.
RULING:
Petitions dismissed for utter lack of merit.

Yap v. Thenamaris Ships Management and

Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc., G.R. No.
179532, May 30, 2011, Nachura, J.

Yap v Thenamaris Ships Management

FACTS:
Yap is an electrician in the vessel by Intermare Maritime
Agencies, Inc. The contract of employment entered by
Yap was for a duration of 12 months. It started on
August 23, 2001 and on November 8, 2001 the vessel
was sold!
YAP received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra
bonus BUT NOT THE payment of his wage because
he refused to accept it for it was only a ONE-MONTH
basic wage. He insisted that it should be the
UNEXPIRED PORTION of his contract. Since he was
ILLEGALLY DISMISSED and the promise of his
employer that they would be transferring him was not
done.
Labor Arbiter rendered decision in favor of petitioner
finding the latter to have been constructively and illegally
dismissed by respondents and that they acted in bad
faith when they assured petitioner of re-embarkation but
actually he was not able to board one despite of
respondents numerous vessels hence, respondent
was ordered to pay YAP for a period of his
unexpired 9 months.
Respondents, sought RECOURSE from NLRC but
modified the payment from 9 months to 3 months by
virtue of Section 10 of RA 8042:
In case of termination of overseas employment without just,
valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract,
the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of
his placement fee with interest of 12% per annum, plus
his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for 3 months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less
then both parties reconsidered and NLRC REVERESED
ITS OWN DECISION and put it back to 3 months and
said that there can be no choice of 3 months salary for

every 1 year of unexpired term BECAUSE there is no

full year of unexpired term which this can be applied
(since the unexpired term is only 9 months)
HENCE THIS PETITION
While this case was pending before the SC, they declared
the clause or for 3 months for every year of the
unexpired term whichever is less unconstitutional in RA
8042 in the case of SERRANO v GALLANT MARITIME
SERVICES INC.
Petitioner, unaware of the ruling, claims that the said clause
gives an erring employer the option to pay an illegally
dismissed migrant worker only 3 months for every year
of the unexpired term of his contract (subject to abuse).
Respondent, aware of the ruling, aver that the SCs
pronouncement of unconstitutionality in Serrano should
not apply because it is a substantive law that deals with
the rights and obligations of the parties in case of illegal
Dismissal of a migrant worker and is not merely
procedural in character. Thus, there should be no
retroactive effect.
ISSUE/RATIO:
WON the decision in Serrano can also be applied here
YES
We have already spoken. Thus, this case should not be
different from Serrano. As a general rule, an
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.
Supported by Art. 7 CC:
Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse or custom or practice to the contrary
The Court said that this case SHOULD NOT BE PART of
the doctrine of operative fact. Because first, it was not
the fault of petitioner that he lost his job. Secondly, to
rule otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other
OFWS and would send a wrong signal that
principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies
MAY VIOLATE AN OFWs security of tenure
OTHER ISSUES:
During the pending of the case, respondents claim that the
tanker allowance should be excluded from the
definition of the term salary Court ruled that
1.) It is already late. It was no raised before the LA, NLRC,
and CA. And besides Matters not taken up below cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal

2.) In Serrano case, they also made the pronouncements

of the word salary would be inclusive of the tanker
allowance
RULING:
YAP is entitled to his salary ($1430 per month) of 9 months
unexpired term.

o Barangay Captain Beda Torrecampo v.

Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System, et al., G.R. No. 188296, May 30, 2011
Barangay Captain Beda Torrecampo v. Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (2011)
Petition for injunction with prayer for issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction
FACTS
Personnel and heavy equipment from DPWH
entered Barangay Matandang Balara to implement
the C-5 Road Extension Project.
Torrecampo, the Barangay Captain of the area,
alleged that if the MWSS and the DPWH were
allowed to continue the project
o The aqueducts in the area will be put at great risk
and can endanger water supply in the area;
o A better alternative would be RIPADA area,
consisting of Pook Ricarte, Pook Polaris and Pook
Dagohoy, located in Barangay UP Diliman
MWSS and Allado, through the OGCC, explained
that:
o Under Republic Act No. 6234 (the MWSS
Charter), the MWSS owns and has jurisdiction,
supervision and control over all waterworks and
sewerage systems within the development path of
the expanding Metro Manila area, Rizal province,
and a portion of Cavite province
o Presidential Proclamation No. 1395 (PP 1395)
reserved certain parcels of land of the RIPADA
area for:
the road realignment of C5 Road Extension project
housing facilities for deserving and bona fide
occupants, including active and retired UP
employees residing in said communities who will be
displaced by the said project
March 12 2009: MWSS issued Board Resolution
No. 2009-052 and allowed DPWH to use the 60
Meter Right-of-Way for preliminary studies in the
implementation of the C-5 Road Extension Project.
DPWH entered the said properties of the MWSS to
conduct the necessary complete study and detailed
design of the C-5 Road Extension Project, including
test pitting and geothermal profiling.
ISSUE
WON case is a justiciable matter? - NO

RATIO
Torrecampo is not entitled to an injunction.
Torrecampo seeks judicial review of a question
of Executive policy, a matter outside this
Courts jurisdiction. Torrecampo failed to show
that respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion that would warrant the exercise of this
Courts extraordinary certiorari power.
In effect, Torrecampo wants the Court to determine
whether the Tandang Sora area is a better
alternative to the RIPADA area for the C-5 Road
Extension Project.
The determination of where, as between two possible
routes, to construct a road extension is obviously
not within the province of this Court. Such
determination belongs to the Executive branch.
HELD
Petition DENIED
o Planters Products Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation,
G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008
Planters Products Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation (2008)
Review on certiorari of the decision of CA
FACTS
Planters Products Inc. (PPI) and Fertiphil Corp
are engaged in the importation and distribution of
fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural chemicals.
President Marcos issued LOI no. 1465 which
provided for the imposition of a capital recovery
component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all
grades of fertilizers in the Philippines
However, after the 1986 EDSA Revolution, the
Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA), the body to
whom Fertiphil paid the capital contribution
component (worth P10 per bag) voluntarily stopped
the imposition of the P10 levy.
o Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the
amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465, but PPI
refused to accede to the demand.
Fertiphil avers that LOI No. 1465 is
unconstitutional; FPA, through SG, countered that it
was a valid exercise of police power to ensure
stability in the fertilizer industry
RTC: ruled in favor of Fertiphil; CA affirmed
decision of RTC but deleted the award for
attorneys fees
ISSUE
1. WON Fertiphil has locus standi to question the
constitutionality of LOI no. 1465? YES
2.
WON constitutionality of said LOI may be
resolved by RTC YES
3. WON P10 levy is a valid exercise of power of
taxation / police power - NO
RATIO

1.

Fertiphil has locus standi because it

suffered direct injury; doctrine of standing is a
mere procedural technicality which may be
waived.
The doctrine requires a litigant to have a material
interest in the outcome of a case. In private suits,
locus standi requires a litigant to be a real party in
interest, which is defined as the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.
In this jurisdiction, We have adopted the direct
injury test to determine locus standi in public
suits. The direct injury test in public suits is
similar to the real party in interest rule for
private suits
However, since a strict application of the direct injury
test may hamper public interest, this Court relaxed
the requirement in cases of transcendental
importance or with far reaching implications.
2.
RTC may resolve constitutional issues; the
constitutional issue was adequately raised in
the complaint; it is the lis mota of the case.
Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
states:
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(2)
Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
(a)
All
cases
in
which
the
constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation,
order,
instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
3. Although imposition of the levy was an exercise
by the State of its taxation power. the primary
purpose of the levy is revenue generation, so it is
not an implement of police power.
Moreover, an inherent limitation of power of taxation is
public purpose. The P10 levy is unconstitutional
because it was not for a public purpose. The levy
was imposed to give undue benefit to PPI.
HELD
Decision of CA AFFIRMED
o Araullo v. Aquino, III, supra.
o Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
152 SCRA 284 (legal method case)
the concept of judicial review is sort of
malabo here :)
Petitioners: David Nitafan, Wenceslao Polo and
Maximo Savellano Jr.

Respondent: Commissioner of Internal Revenue and

Financial Officer of SC
GR. No. L-78780 July 23, 1987
Ponente: Melencio-Herrera J.
Facts:
1. Petitioners, judges presiding branches 52, 19 and
53 of RTC of NCR seek to prohibit and/or enjoin
respondents from making deductions of withholding
taxes from their salaries. Petitioners submit that
taxes withheld from compensation as judicial
officers constitute a decrease in their salaries
contrary to Section 10 Article 8 of 1987
Constitution. This was despite the Courts previous
decision in affirming the CJs directive to the Fiscal
Management and Budget Office of the SC to
continue the deduction of withholding taxes from
salaries of all members of the judiciary. The SC
also disregarded its previous decisions concerning
tax exemptions for judges in Perfecto vs Meer and
Endencia vs David.
Issue:
1. Does the constitution prohibit the deduction of taxes
from salaries of the judiciary?- Yes
Ratio:
1. Intent of framers- made deliberately clear by
framers by means of deleting the proposed
express grants of exemption from payment
of income taxes to the members of the
judiciary. This was to give substance to
equality among the 3 branches of
government.
2. Constitutional Commission deliberations- In
the records of the Commission, it is seen
that they deliberately allow for the judiciary
to be exempt from taxation. The
commission compared the constitutional
provisions being debated upon with
previous provision of the 1973 Constitution
which stated that the salaries of judges and
justices would not be decreased in
connection with another provision that
stated that all public employees and officers
would be exempt from income taxes. The
end result was that the commission agreed
that salaries of members of the judiciary are
taxable.
3. Previous Rulings- the ruling that "the
imposition of income tax upon the salary of
judges is a dimunition so it violates the
Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer, affirmed by
Endencia vs. David
must be declared
discarded. The framers of the fundamental law,
as the alter ego of the people, have expressed
in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning
and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987
Constitution that they have adopted.

SC Decision: Petition dismissed

o

Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga

Manananggol, supra.
o Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, supra. uploaded
V. CITIZENSHIP AND SUFFRAGE
o Elizabeth Lee v. Director of Lands, G.R.
No. 128195, October 3, 2001*
o Tecson v. Comelec, G.R. No. 161434,
March 3, 2004
Tecson vs COMELEC (March 3, 2004) Vitug, J
.Facts:Fornier petition (GR No. 161824):
-On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald
Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines
under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang
Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming
national elections.
-On 09 January 2004, a petition was filed by
Victorino X. Fornier before the COMELEC to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to
Cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the
thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born
Filipino citizen when in truth, according to
Fornier, his parents were foreigners.
-According the the petitioner, even if FPJ's
father, Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother.
-On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed
the petition for lack of merit. Three days
later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed
his motion for reconsideration. The motion
was denied on 06 February 2004 by the
COMELEC en banc.
-Hence his petition assailing he decision of the
COMELEC before this Court conformably
with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure and
praying for a temporary restraining order, a
writ of preliminary injunction or any other
resolution that would stay the finality and/or
execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
-Petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code in consonance with
Section 52 and in relation Article 69.Tecson
and Velez petitions (GR Nos. 161434 and
161634):
-They invoke the provisions of Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987

Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of

the COMELEC when it took cognizance of
SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme
Court to instead take on the petitions they
directly instituted before it.-It is fair to
conclude that the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, defined by Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would
not include cases directly brought before it,
questioning the qualifications of a candidate
for the presidency or vice-presidency before
the elections are held.
-Accordingly, their petitions were dismissed.
Issue:WON FPJ is a Filipino citizen.
-IT IS ASSUMEDThe term "citizens of the
Philippine Islands" appeared for the first
time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also
commonly referred to as the Philippine
Organic Act of 1902, the first
comprehensive legislation of the Congress
of the United States on the Philippines
- ".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
continuing to reside therein, who were
Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April,
1891, and then resided in said Islands, and
their children born subsequent thereto, shall
be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands and as such entitled to
the protection of the United States, except
such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty
of peace between the United States and
Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth
eighteen hundred and ninety eight."Under
the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines"
was one who was an inhabitant of the
Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the
11th day of April 1899. The term "inhabitant"
was taken to include
1) a native-born inhabitant,
2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular
Spain, and
3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers
on or before 11 April 1899.Any conclusion
on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou
could only be drawn from the presumption
that having died in 1954 at 84 years old,
Lorenzo would have been born sometime in
the year 1870, when the Philippines was
under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon
his. death in 1954, in the absence of any
other evidence, could have well been his

place of residence before death, such that

Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the
"en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine
Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby
extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution,
during which regime respondent FPJ has
seen first light, confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate.But while the totality
of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate
in his favor enough to hold that he cannot
be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in
relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given
to the parties to present their position and
evidence, and to prove whether or not there
has been material misrepresentation, which,
as so ruled in Romualdez- Marcos vs.
COMELEC, must not only be material, but
also deliberate and willful.WON FPJ is
Illegitimate. -NOSection 39, Rule 130, of the
Rules of Court provides
- "Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or
declaration of aperson deceased, or unable
to testify, in respect to the pedigree of
another person related to him by birth or
marriage, may be received in evidence
where it occurred before the controversy,
and the relationship between the two
persons is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration. The word `pedigree
includes relationship, family genealogy,
birth, marriage, death, the dates when and
the places where these facts occurred, and
the names of the relatives. It embraces also
facts of family history intimately connected
with pedigree."For the above rule to apply, it
would be necessary that (a) the declarant is
already dead or unable to testify, (b) the
pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c)
the declarant must be a relative of the
person whose pedigree is in question, (d)
declaration must be made before the
controversy has occurred, and (e) the
relationship between the declarant and the
person whose pedigree is in question must

be shown by evidence other than such act

or declaration.The duly notarized
declaration made by Ruby Kelley
Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe
submitted before the COMELEC, might be
accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe,
recognizing his own paternal relationship
with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie
Kelley and his children (including
respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one
family.Petitioner would have it that even if
Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could
not have transmitted his citizenship to
respondent FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child. According to petitioner,
prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan
F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted
marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez,
making his subsequent marriage to Bessie
Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an
illegitimate child. The veracity of the
supposed certificate of marriage between
Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be
most doubtful at best. But the documentary
evidence introduced by no less than
respondent himself, consisting of a birth
certificate of respondent and a marriage
certificate of his parents showed that FPJ
was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino
father and an American mother who were
married to each other a year later, or on 16
September 1940.
Held:The Court RESOLVED to DISMISS.
o Bengzon v. HRET, 357 SCRA 545
Bengson vs HRET (May 7, 2001) Kapunan, J.
Facts:
-The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz
is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that "no person
shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born
citizen."
-Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of
Filipino parents.
-On November 5, 1985, however, respondent
Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine
Corps and, without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the United States.
-As a consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship for under Commonwealth Act

No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may

lose his citizenship by, among others,
"rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign
country."
-On June 5, 1990, he was naturalized as a US
citizen.
-On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz
reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.
-He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections
and beat petitioner, Bengson.
-Petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad
Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
claiming that respondent Cruz was not
qualified to become a member of the House
of Representative.
-On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its
decision dismissing the petition for quo
warranto and declaring respondent Cruz the
duly elected Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan in the May 1998
elections.
-It also denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
-Hence this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
WON respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino
who became an American citizen, can still
be considered a natural-born Filipino upon
his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship
may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. Commonwealth
Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the
three modes by which Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1)
by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3)
by direct act of Congress. Repatriation
results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he
lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a naturalborn Filipino.
Held:
Petition is DISMISSED.

Notes:
-There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1)
by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These
ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to
the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born
citizen, and the naturalized citizen.
R.A. No. 2630:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his
Philippine citizenship by rendering service
to, or accepting commission in, the Armed
Forces of the United States, or after
separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil
Registry in the place where he resides or
last resided in the Philippines.
The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship. Having
thus taken the required oath of allegiance to
the Republic and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem,
Pangasinan in accordance with the afore
cited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed
to have recovered his original status as a
natural-born citizen, a status which he
acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return
to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.
o

In re Ching, Bar Matter No. 914, October

1, 1999

Applicant: Vicente Ching

Re: Application for Admission to Philippine Bar
Ponente: Justice Kapunan
Bar Matter No. 914 October 1, 1999
Facts:
1. Vicente Ching is the legitimate son of Tat Ching, a
Chinese citizen, and Prescila Dulay, a Filipino.
He was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union
on April 11, 1964. Since his birth, he has lived in
the Philippines. On July 17, 1988, Ching finished
a Bachelor of Laws course at St. Louis
University in Baguio City. He then filed an
application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations.
The Supreme Court issued a Resolution on
September 1, 1998 which granted his application
provided that he must submit to the Court proof
of his Philippine citizenship.

2. Ching submitted on November 18, 1998 the

following documents:

Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the

Board of Accountancy of the Professional
Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a
certified public accountant;

Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997,

issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in
Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a
registered voter of the the place

Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also

issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing that
Ching was elected as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during
the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.
3. The results of the Bar examinations came out on
April 5, 1999 and Ching was able to pass it. The
oath-taking was scheduled on May 5, 1999 but
due to his questionable status, he was not
allowed to take it. The SC required him to show
further proof of citizenship and ordered the OSG
to file a comment on Chings petition for
admission to the bar.
4. The OSG filed its comment and stated that Ching
was a legitimate child of a Chinese father and
Filipino mother so under the 1935 Constitution,
he was a Chinese citizen unless he elected to
Philippine citizenship upon reaching age of
majority in compliance with Commonwealth Act
625. However, the OSG concluded that Ching
had not formally elected to take Philippine
citizenship and if he were to do so, it would be
too late as it would be beyond the reasonable
time allowed by jurisprudence (Cuenco ruled that
7 years was not within reasonable time) but
given the circumstance, it recommended that the
rules be relaxed and allow Ching to take his
oath.
5. Ching filed a Manifestation attaching his affidavit of
Election of Philippine Citizenship and his oath of
allegiance both dated July 15, 1999. The
manifestation states that:

I have always considered myself as a Filipino

I was registered as a Filipino and consistently

declared myself as one in my school records and
other official documents

I am practicing a profession (Certified Public

Accountant) reserved for Filipino citizens

I participated in electoral process[es] since the

time I was eligible to vote

I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as

a member of the Sangguniang Bayan from 1992
to 1995

I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999

in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 625

My election was expressed in a statement

signed and sworn to by me before a notary
public

I accompanied my election of Philippine

citizenship with the oath of allegiance to the

Constitution and the Government of the

Philippines

I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and

my oath of allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar
of Tubao La Union

I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00)

as filing fees.
Issue:
1. Given that Ching had already elected Philippine
citizenship on July 15, 1999, the question now is
whether or not he elected Philippine citizenship
within a reasonable time- No
Ratio:
1. Governing law- When Ching was born, the
governing law was the 1935 Constitution. Under
Article 4 Section 1 (3), the citizenship of a
legitimate child followed that of the father
(regardless if alien) unless upon reaching the
age of majority, he elects to be of Philippine
citizenship. This provision was also recognized
by the 1973 Constitution and even the 1987
followed suit (those born before January 17,
1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching age of majority are
Philippine citizens).
2. Reasonable time- The 1935 Constitution and CA
No. 625 does not prescribe a time period and
states that election should be made upon
reaching age of majority only(21). Reasonable
time has been interpreted to mean that election
should be made within 3 years of reaching age
of majority. In Cuenco v Secretary of Justice, it
was held that the 3 year rule was not inflexible
however it further found that 7 years does not fall
under reasonable time. Given that Ching elected
to be of Philippine citizenship 14 years after
reaching age of majority, it is obviously beyond
reasonable time. The argument of Ching of
special circumstances of his situation
(uninterrupted stay, being a CPA, registered
voter and former elected public official) does not
vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law is
specific in the requirements for its acquisition.
No reason was also given on why he delayed in
electing Philippine citizenship.
3. Process of electing Philippine citizenship- is not
tedious. Requirement is to execute affidavit of
election of Philippine citizenship and file it at the
civil registry.
SC Ruling: Petition denied

Co v. HRET, 199 SCRA 692

Petitioner: Antonio Co and Sixto Balanquit Jr.

Respondent: Electoral Tribunal of Lower House and
Jose Ong Jr.
GR No. 9219192 and 9220203 July 30, 1991
Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.
Petition for certiorari
Facts:
1. On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for
the second district of Samar was held. Jose Ong
Jr. won the seat and the petitioners lost badly.

The two losing candidates then assailed the

citizenship and residency of Ong in election
protest. The father of Ong was a naturalized
citizen while his mother is a natural citizen. The
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
declared that Ong was a natural citizen and that
for all voting purposes, he was a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar. The two filed a motion
for reconsideration which was denied.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Ong Jr. is a natural born citizenYes
Ratio:
1. Issue of Jurisdiction: Article VI Section 17 states
that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective members.
However in the case of Robles vs HRET, the SC
decided that the judgments of the Tribunals are
beyond jurisdiction except in cases of
extraordinary jurisdiction such as grave abuse of
discretion or in denial of process of law. In the
case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use
of power, no denial of due process on the part of
the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of
the power of judicial review by the Supreme
Court.
2. Citizenship- Respondents grandfather arrive from
China during the Spanish regime. He brought his
son over from the China and raised him as a
Filipino. The father (Jose Ong Chuan) became a
naturalized citizen and took his oath when Jose
Jr. was 9 years old. Keep in mind his mom is a
Filipino citizen since under Article IV, he would
be a citizen of the Philippines due to his mothers
citizenship and electing to be of Philippine
citizenship upon reaching age of majority. His
brother, Emil Ong, was considered as a natural
citizen and became a delegate of the 1971
Constitutional Convention. In the 1987
Constitutional Commission, the intent of the
framers were considered as desiring to give
Article IV Section 1 paragraph 3 retroactive
effect. This meant that Jose Jr. would be a
natural born citizen due to the desire to ensure
that anybody who elected Philippine citizenship
based on the 1935 Constitution would be
considered as natural-born. Under the 1973
Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and
those born of Filipino mothers with an alien
father were placed on equal footing. They were
both considered as natural-born citizens. He was
already a Filipino citizen then thus no need to file
for election of Philippine citizenship.
3. HRETs view on citizenship- It observed that "when
protestee was only nine years of age, his father,
Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized Filipino.
Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act
squarely applies its benefit to him for he was
then a minor residing in this country.

Concededly, it was the law itself that had already

elected Philippine citizenship for respondent by
declaring him as such.
4. Question of citizenship for the father- SC cannot
declare Jose Ong Chuans citizenship as null
and void because of due process. Hes been
dead for a long time. The SCs function is to
question whether HRET made a grave abuse of
discretion in its ruling and not questions that
collaterally attach citizenship. It is also of note
that the grandfather falls under Filipino
citizenship under Section 4 of the Philippine Bill
of 1902. This would further aid in saying that
respondent is then a natural born Filipino citizen.
4. Residence- Jose Jr. is domiciled in Samar despite
going to Manila to practice his profession and do
business. Their family history has shown that
even after numerous fires that burned down their
home, they elected to stay and live in Samar.
SC Decision: Petition dismissed

o
o

Coquilla v. Comelec, G.R. No. 151914,

July 31, 2002*
Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630

Facts:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private
respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates
for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11,
1998 elections.
A petition for disqualification was filed against
Manzano. A certain Ernesto Mamaril alleged that
private respondent was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States. This resulted in
respondent Eduardo Manzanos proclamation as
vice mayor to be suspended.
COMELEC Second Division granted such petition
on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under
40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons
with dual citizenship are disqualified from running
for any elective position.
Section 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. No. 7160), which declares as disqualified
from running for any elective local position: . . . (d)
Those with dual citizenship.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998,
the respondent admitted that he is registered as a
foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under
Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and
alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was
born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino
mother. He was born in the United States, San
Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and
is considered an American citizen under US

Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an

American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino
citizenship.
Secnd Division of COMELEC disqualified Manzano.
COMELEC En Banc reversed and said Manzano is
qualified to run. Hence this petition for certiorari.

Whether dual citizens can seek public office - YES

Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of
the concurrent application of the different laws of
two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person
whose parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a
state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a
person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on
his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the
situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or
more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individuals
volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the
Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law.
Clearly, in including Sectin 5 in Article IV on
citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but
with naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after
their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual
citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d) and in
R.A. No. 7854 Sec 20 must be understood as
referring to dual allegiance. Consequently,
persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification.
However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when
he ran for his present post, private respondent
elected Philippine citizenship and in effect
renounced his American citizenship. When
respondent attained the age of majority, he
registered himself as a voter, and voted in the
elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively
renounced his US citizenship under American

law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S.

citizenship.

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of

candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is
not a permanent resident or immigrant of
another country; that he will defend and
support the Constitution of the Philippines and
bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that
he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this
country are concerned, effectively repudiated
his American citizenship and anything which
he may have said before as a dual citizen.
HELD:
Petition DISMISSED. Manzano can be elected into
office.
o

Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, G.R.

198742, August 10, 2012
Justice Reyes
Facts:
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen
having been born of Filipino parents on August 8,
1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a
naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage
to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
She sought in 2005 to be renaturalized. Petition
was granted and took her oath of allegiance.
Petitioner ran for public office. In 2007, she lost for
Mayor. In 2010, she won as Vice Mayor in
hometown of Caba La Union.
Private respondents filed a case against her
questioning her qualification to run. The petitions
similarly sought the petitioners disqualification from
holding her elective post on the ground that she is a
dual citizen and that she failed to execute a
"personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
Sec 5: Those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship

before any public officer authorized to administer

an oath;
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and
averred that since September 27, 2006, she
ceased to be an Australian citizen.

The fact that petitioner won the elections can not

cure the defect of her candidacy. The application of
the constitutional and statutory provisions on
disqualification is not a matter of popularity.

RTC ruled against petitioner disqualifying her.

COMELEC affirmed. Hence this petition

HELD:
Petition DISMISSED.

Issue:

3 December 2014 (2-HOUR QUIZ Judiciary and

Judicial Review)
4 December 2014 (JOINT 3-HOUR CLASS)
B. Suffrage - Article V
Material points of:
Macalintal v. COMELEC, supra.

Wheter failure to renounce foreign citizenship in

accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen
ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective public
office - YES
The language of Section 5(2) is free from any
ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC, we declared its
categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American
or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective
public position in the Philippines unless he or she
personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign
citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of
candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the
renunciation and held that to be valid, the
renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly
executed before an officer of the law who is
authorized to administer an oath stating in clear
and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all
foreign citizenship
The foreign citizenship must be formally rejected
through an affidavit duly sworn before an
officer authorized to administer oath.
Whether Australian laws mean she is no longer
Australian - NO
Petitioner contends that the Australian Citizenship
Act of 1948, under which she is already deemed to
have lost her citizenship, is entitled to judicial
notice. We disagree.
Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice.
Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proven.
If we were to read the Australian Citizen Act of
1948 into the application and operation of R.A. No.
9225, we would be applying not what our legislative
department has deemed wise to require. To do so
would be a brazen encroachment upon the
sovereign will and power of the people of this
Republic

Petitioner: Romulo Macalintal

Respondent: COMELEC
Ponente: J. Austria-Martinez
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
Facts:
1. Romulo Macalintal , member of Philippine Bar
and tax payer, seeks a declaration that certain
provisions in RA 9189 (An Act Providing for A
System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified
Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating
Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes ). He
claims that he has actual and material legal interest
in seeing to it that the public funds would be
lawfully and rightfully appropriated and used. The
SC upholds his right as petitioner
Issue:
1. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing
the registration of voters who are immigrants or
permanent residents in other countries by their
mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their
intention to return to the Philippines, violate the
residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of
the Constitution?
2. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering
the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates
for national offices and party list representatives
including the President and the Vice-President
violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution that the winning
candidates for President and the Vice-President
shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress?
3. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee created in Section 25 of Rep.
Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise,
amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations that the Commission on Elections shall
promulgate without violating the independence of
the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the
Constitution?

Ratio:
1. Qualified citizens abroad- The essence of Ra
9189 is to enfranchise overseas qualified
Filipinos. R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in
obeisance to the mandate of the first paragraph
of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution that
Congress shall provide a system for voting by
qualified Filipinos abroad. It must be stressed
that Section 2 does not provide for the
parameters of the exercise of legislative
authority in enacting said law. Hence, in the
absence of restrictions, Congress is presumed
to have duly exercised its function as defined in
Article VI of the Constitution.
2. Residency and Domicile concerning the
affidavit- under election laws, both are used
synonymously
with
each
other.
The
requirement of an execution of an affidavit is
not an enabling or enfranchising act. It serves
as an explicit expression that the citizen is not
abandoning his domicile of origin. This
expression is based on the promise that they
would resume residency in the Philippines not
later than 3 years. Failure to do so would mean
perpetual disenfranchisement of the citizen.
3. Proclamation of winning candidates the phrase
is far too sweeping. Only Congress has the power
to proclaim the winner of the Presidential and Vice
Presidential Race. Sec. 18 of RA 9189 states that
Comelec may proclaim the winning candidates
however paragraph 4 of Section 4 of Article 7 of
Constitution states that Congress has the duty to
canvass the votes for presidential and vice
presidential position which means it also has the
duty to proclaim the winners.
4. Approval of Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee Under paragraph 1 section 2 of Article
9 of Constitution, Comelec alone has power to
formulate rules and regulations is implicit in its
power to implement regulations under the said
statute. Sec 17 states that voting by mail shall be
authorized by the Comelec in not more than 3
countries subject to the approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee . It is only the
Supreme Court may review Comelec rules and only
in cases of grave abuse of discretion. By vesting
itself with the powers to approve, review, amend,
and revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the
scope of its constitutional authority. Congress
trampled upon the constitutional mandate of
independence of the COMELEC.
SC Decision: the petition is partly GRANTED.
1. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are
declared VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first

paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: subject to the
approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee;
b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1,
to wit: only upon review and approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight
Committee;
c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of
Section 19, to wit: The Implementing Rules and
Regulations shall be submitted to the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created
by virtue of this Act for prior approval; and
d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of
Section 25, to wit: It shall review, revise, amend
and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Commission of
the same law; for being repugnant to Section 1,
Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the
independence of constitutional commission, such
as COMELEC.
2. The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No.
9189 is UPHELD with respect only to the authority
given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning
candidates for the Senators and party-list
representatives but not as to the power to canvass
the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for
President and Vice-President which is lodged with
Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution.
3. Constitutionality of Section 5 (D) is upheld.
Puno

Creation of and powers given to Joint

Congressional Oversight Committee
o
The power of Congress does not end with the
finished task of legislation. Concomitant with its
principal power to legislate is the auxiliary power to
ensure that the laws it enacts are faithfully
executed
o
Concept of oversight:
power of oversight embraces all activities
undertaken by Congress to enhance its
understanding of and influence over the
implementation of legislation it has enacted
concerns post-enactment measures undertaken
by Congress:

to monitor bureaucratic compliance with

program objectives

to determine whether agencies are properly

administered,

to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty

to prevent executive usurpation of legislative

authority

to assess executive conformity with the

congressional perception of public interest.

 intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and

integral to the checks and balances inherent in a
democratic system of government
o
Categories of congressional oversight
functions
Scrutiny

Purpose: determine economy and efficiency

of the operation of government activities

Passive process of looking at facts provided

Based on power of appropriation of the

congress

Best seen in budget hearings for GAA and

confirmation of appointments

Can also be used under Section 22 Article VI

of Consti (question hour)
Congressional investigation

Intense digging of facts (Section 21 Article VI

of Consti)

Once an inquiry is established, investigating

committee has power to require witnesses to
answer any question pertinent to the inquiry but
subject to right of against self-incrimination

Limitations:
o
must be in aid of its legislative functions
o
must be conducted in accordance with duly
published rules of procedure
o
persons appearing therein are afforded their
constitutional rights.

Powers:
o
issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum
to a witness in any part of the country, signed by
the chairperson or acting chairperson and the
Speaker or acting Speaker
o
thirds (2/3) of all its members constituting a
quorum, punish for contempt any person who:
o
refuses, after being duly summoned, to obey
such summons without legal excuse
o
refuses to be sworn or placed under
affirmation
o
refuses to answer any relevant inquiry
o
refuses to produce any books, papers,
documents or records that are relevant to the
inquiry and are in his/her possession;
o
acts in a disrespectful manner towards any
member of the Committee or commits misbehavior
in the presence of the committee
o
unduly interferes in the conduct of
proceedings during meetings
Legislative supervision

allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of

delegated law-making authority, and permits
Congress to retain part of that delegated authority

the two previous powers look into past

executive actions while supervision is for the
present

Congress exercises supervision over the

executive agencies through its veto power. It
typically utilizes veto provisions when granting the
President or an executive agency the power to
promulgate regulations with the force of law. These
provisions require the President or an agency to
present the proposed regulations to Congress,
which retains a right to approve or disapprove any
regulation before it takes effect.
Legislative veto has 2 sides: necessary to maintain
the balance of power between the legislative and
the executive branches of government or undue
encroachment upon the executive prerogatives
Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC, 355 SCRA
318
Akbayan-Youth v Commission on elections
(2001)
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the SC. Certiorari
and mandamus
FACTS
- The petitioners, representing the youth sector,
and invoking their right to suffrage, sought
to direct COMELEC to conduct a special
registration before the 2011 General
Elections of new voters aged 18 to 21. They
said that around 4 million youth failed to
register on or before the deadline set by
COMELEC under Republic Act no. 8189.
- Senator Raul Roco (who was the Chairman of
the Committee on Electoral Reforms,
Suffrage, and Peoples Participation) invited
COMELEC to a public hearing to discuss
the matter.
- Commissioners Tancangco and Lantion
submitted Memorandum no. 2001-027 on
the Report on Request for a Two-day
Additional Registration of New Voters Only
- A consultation meeting among regional heads
and representatives, including a number of
senior staff, was held by Commissioner
Borra. It was the consensus of the group,
with the exception of Director Jose
Tolentino, Jr. of the ASD, to disapprove the
request for additional registration of voters
on the ground that Section 8 of RA 8189
explicitly provides that no registration shall
be conducted during the period starting 120
days before a regular election and that the
Commission has no more time left to
accomplish all pre-election activities.

Accordingly,
COMELEC
issued
Resolution no. 3584 which denied the
request to conduct a 2 day additional
registration of new voters

ISSUES
1. WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing COMELEC Resolution
no. 3584? NO
2. WON Court can compel COMELEC through
mandamus to conduct a special registration
of new voters - NO

of RA 8436 would come into play only in

cases where pre-election acts are still
capable of being reasonably performed vis-vis the remaining period before the date of
election and the conduct of other related preelection activities required under law.

RATIO
1. Right to suffrage is not absolute. It is
subject to substantive requirements, set
out in Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution,
and
procedural
requirements (i.e. process of registration),
under RA no. 8189 or the Voters
Registration Act of 1996. The act of
registration
is
one
indispensable
precondition to the right of suffrage. The
State, in the exercise of its police power,
may enact laws to safeguard and
regulate the act of voters registration for
the ultimate purpose of conducting
honest, orderly and peaceful elections.

2. The stand-by power of COMELEC under

Section 28 of RA 8436 presupposes the
possibility of its being exercised or availed
of. The law obliges no one to perform an
impossibility (nemo tenetur ad impossible).
In other words, there is no obligation to do
an impossible thing (impossibilium nulla
obligation est). It must be presumed that the
legislature intends an interpretation or
application of a law which is within the realm
of possibility, logic, common sense, reason,
and practicality. Also, the determination of
whether or not the conduct of a special
registration of voters is feasible under
prevailing circumstances involves the
exercise of discretion and thus, cannot be
controlled by mandamus.
HELD
Petition DENIED

Sec. 8 of RA 8189 is explicit in saying that no

registration shall be conducted during the
period starting 120 days before a regular
election and 90 days before a special
election.
Likewise, Sec 35 of RA 8189 says that any
registered voter or a representative of a
political party may file except 100 days prior
to a regular election
With regard to Section 29 of RA no. 6646
which adopted verbatim in Section 28 of RA
8436 saying that: if it should no longer be
possible to observe the periods and dates
prescribed by law for certain pre-election acts,
the Commission shall fix other periods and
dates in order to ensure accomplishments of
the activities so voters shall not be deprived of
their right to suffrage
In the case at bar, Section 28 of RA 8436 and
Section 8 of RA 8189, although at first glance
may seem to be at war in relation to the other,
are capable of being harmonized and
reconciled. Changes made by the legislature in
the form of amendments to a statute should be
given effect, together with other parts of the
amended act. The court ruled that Section 28

NOTES
RA no. 8189 An act providing for a general
registration of voters, adopting a system of
continuing
registration,
prescribing
procedure thereof and authorizing the
appropriation of funds therefor
Section 1, Article V Consti: Suffrage may be
exercised by all citizens of the Philippines
not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at
least eighteen years of age, and who shall
have resided in the Philippines for at least 1
year and in the place wherein they propose
to vote for at least 6 months immediately
preceding the election. No literacy, property,
or other substantive requirement shall be
imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Section 3(a) of RA 8189: Registration refers to
the act of accomplishing and filing of a
sworn application for registration by a
qualified voter before the election officer of
the city or municipality wherein he resides
and including the same in the book of
registered voters upon approval by the
Election Registration Board.
The law aids the vigilant and not those who
slumber on their rights.

Kapunan, J: The rule is that a law which treats

a subject in general terms and which does
not contradict the provision of a special
statute is not to be considered as intending
to affect the provisions of the latter
between Section 28 of RA 8436 (which is a
general law) and RA 8189 (special law), RA
8189 is controlling.
Pardo, J: Laws are to be harmonized rather
than consider one repealed in favor of the
other

VI. CONSTITUENT POWER

Del Rosario v. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 367
(1970) Makasiar, J. .
Petition for Declaratory Relief
FACTS
- Simeon del Rosario filed the instant petition against
the National Treasurer and COMELEC members
assailing the constitutionality of RA6132
o RA6132 is An Act Implementing by
Resolution
of
both
Houses
Numbered Two as Amended by
Resolution
of
Both
Houses
Numbered Four of the Congress of
the Philippines Calling for a
Constitutional Convention, Providing
for
Proportional
Representation
Therein nad Other Details Relating
to the Election of Delegates to and
the Holding of the Constittutional
Convention, Repealing for the
Purpose RA 4914 And Other
Purposes
- (see issue #2 for his arguments)
ISSUES:
1. WON petitioner has standing YES
2. WON RA6132 is unconstitutional insofar as:
a. Congress abdicated its power as a
constituent
body
to
propose
amendments in favor of the
Constitutional Convention NO
b. Amending the constitution is not
necessary NOT JUSTICIABLE
c. Secs 2, 5, 8(a) Par 1 and Secs 4,
8(a) Par 2 are unconstitutional NO
d. Its title embraces more than one
subject by failing to include to
propose
amendments
to
the
constitution of the Philippines NO
RATIO:
1. Petitioner assails the appropriation of P29 M as a
waste of public funds because there is no time limit
for the duration of the Constitutional Convention
therefore he has standing as taxpayer.

2a. Art XV of the Constitution authorizes

Congress sitting as a Constituent Assembly
either to propose amendments or to call a
convention for the purpose. Congress can
choose between either, and which choice is a
political question.
2b. Whether there is necessity for amending the
constitution is addressed to the wise judgment
of Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly.
Also, whether the Constitution is merely
amended in part or revised totally would
become immaterial when it is ratified by the
sovereign people
2c. The Court sustained the validity of said
provisions in two previous decisions
2d. To include to propose amendments to the
constitution of the Philippines is superfluous since
the said phrase is already included in the title of
Resolutions of Both Houses No. 2 and 4 which
RA6132 implements. Also, the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution is implicit in the
call for the convention itself.
HELD: Petition Dismissed

Imbong v. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28

FACTS:
Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing
separate cases and both interested in
running as candidates for delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, question the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming
that it prejudices their rights as such
candidates.
March 16, 1967 - Congress, acting as a
Constituent Assembly, passed Res. No. 2
which called for a Constitutional Convention
which shall have two delegates from each
representative district.
June 17, 1969 - Congress passed
Resolution No. 4 amending Resolution No.
2 by providing that the convention shall be
composed of 320 delegates with at least
two delegates from each representative
district.
August 24, 1970 - Congress, acting as a
legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132,
implementing Res Nos. 2 and 4 and
expressly repealing R.A 4914 which
previously implemented Res. No. 2.
Gonzales assails the validity of Sections 2,
4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a), and the entire law,

Imbong questions the constitutionality of

par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. 6132.

ISSUES:
1. Does the Congress have the right to call for
a constitutional convention and set the
parameters of such convention?
2. Are the provisions of R.A. 6132
constitutional?
RATIO:
1. The Congress has authority to call a
constitutional
convention
as
the
constituent assembly. The Congress
also has the authority to enact
implementing details, contained in Res.
Nos. 2 and 4 and R.A. 6132, since such
details are within the competence of the
Congress in exercise of its legislative
power.
Congress, when acting as a Constituent
Assembly pursuant to Article XV of the 1987
Constitution, has full and plenary authority
to propose Constitutional amendments or to
call a convention for the purpose, by a
three-fourths vote of each House in joint
session assembled, but voting separately.
2.
The provisions are constitutional. Sec. 4 of
R.A. 6132 is merely in application with Sec. 2 of
Art. XII of the Constitution and does not constitute a
denial of due process or equal protection of the law.
Sec. 2 also merely obeyed the intent of the
Congress in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 regarding the
apportionment of delegates. The challenged
disqualification of an elected delegate from running
for any public office in Sec. 5 is a valid limitation as
it is reasonable and not arbitrary. Lastly, par. 1 of
Sec. 8(a) which is both contested by the petitioners
is still valid as the restriction contained in the
section is so narrow that basic constitutional rights
remain substantially intact and inviolate thus the
limitation is a valid infringement of the constitutional
guarantees invoked by the petitioners.
HELD:
Petitions cannot be granted.

Lambino v. COMELEC, supra.

Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, together
with 6,327,952 registered voters (petitioners) vs.
COMELEC (respondent)
Special Civil Actions in the SC. Certiorari

Consolidated petitions on the COMELEC resolution

denying due course to an initiative petition to
amend the 1987 constitution.
Facts:
(2006)
- Feb 15: Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado
(Lambino Group) gathered signatures for an
initiative petition to amend the 1987 constitution
proposing changes that will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a UnicameralParliamentary form of government.
- Aug 25: Pursuant to the Initiative and
Referendum Act (RA 6735),
Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC
to hold a plebiscite for ratification of their initiative
petition. Their initiative petition was supported by
the 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least 12%
of all registered voters with each legislative district
represented by at least 3%, as required by RA
6735.
- Aug 30: Lambino Group filed an Amended petition
with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the
Transitory provisions of their initiative.
- Aug 31: COMELEC, in its Resolution, denied
Lambino Groups petition for lack of an
enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend
the Constitution.
- The following petitions were filed:
1. Lambino Group filed for Certiorari and mandamus
to set aside the COMELEC resolution and compel
the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative
petition. They argue that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion since Santiago is not a
binding precedent. Alternatively, Santiago is
binding only to the parties to that case and that
their petition deserves cognizance as an
expression of the will of the sovereign people
a. In his Comment to the petition,
Solicitor General urged the court to
grant their petition despite the
Santiago ruling. He proposed that
the Court treat RA 6735 and its
implementing rules as temporary
devises to implement the system of
initiative
b. Various groups and individuals
sought intervention, filing pleadings
supporting or opposing the Lambino
Groups petition.
2. Binay group prayed that the Court require
respondent COMELEC to show cause why they
should not be cited in contempt for the COMELECs
verification of signatures and for entertaining the
Lambino Groups petition despite the permanent
injunction in Santiago.

1.

2.

3.

1.

- Sep 26: Court heard the parties and intervenors in

oral arguments
Issues:
WON the Lambino Groups initiative petition
complies with Sec. 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution
through a peoples initiative- NO
Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in
Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution- NO
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying due course to the Lambino
Groups petition- NO
Ratio:
The initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct proposal
by the people
An amendment is directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a
petition only if the people sign on a
petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments.
A signature requirement would be
meaningless if the person supplying the
signature had not first seen what it is he
or she is signing.
Although the Constitution does not
expressly require the inclusion of the full
text of the proposed amendments, the
deliberations of the constitutional
framers clearly show their intent to
adopt relevant American jurisprudence
on peoples initiative.
The proponents bear the burden of
proving that they complied with the
constitutional requirements in gathering
the signatures.
There is logrolling when the initiative
petition incorporates an unrelated
subject matter in the same petition.
Proposed Section 4(4) providing that the
interim parliament shall convene to
propose amendments/revisions of this
constitution within 45 days from
ratification is a subject matter totally
unrelated to the shift from the
Bicameral-Presidential to the
Unicameral-Parliamentary system.
1a. The initiative violates Sec. 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution disallowing Revision through initiatives
The Constitutional framers intended,
and wrote, a clear distinction between
amendment and revision of the
Constitution.

o Only Congress or a constitutional

convention may propose
revisions whereas a peoples
initiative may propose only
amendments.
o A revision broadly implies a
change that alters a basic
principle in the constitution and
affects several provisions
whereas amendment refers to a
change that adds, reduces, or
deletes without altering the basic
principle involved and affects
only the specific provision being
amended.
o In California, courts have
developed a two-part test: the
quantitative test and qualitative
test. In the former, the court
examines only the number of
provisions affected and does not
consider the degree of change.
In the latter, the main inquiry is
whether the change will
accomplish such far reaching
changes in the nature of our
basic governmental plan as to
amount to a revision. Under
both these tests, the Lambino
Groups initiative is a revision
that alters the structure of
government and separation of
powers in the constitution.
A popular clamor, even one backed by
6.3 M signatures, cannot justify a
deviation from the specific modes
prescribed in the Constitution itself.
A deliberative body with recorded
proceedings like constituent assemblies
or constitutional conventions is best
suited to undertake a revision since it
would affect basic principles or several
provisions of a constitution.
2. A revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is not necessary
An affirmation or reversal of
Santiago will not change the
outcome of the present petition. The
Court must avoid revisiting a ruling
involving the constitutionality of a
statute if the case before the Court
can be resolved on some other
grounds.
RA 6735 requires that the people
must sign the petition as signatories.
In the instant case, the Lambino
Group merely attached the signature

sheets to the petition and amended

petition.
Lambino Groups logrolling initiative
also violates RA 6735 stating that
no petition embracing more that one
subject shall be submitted to the
electorate
3. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the Lambino Groups
initiative for following the COMELECs ruling.
Held: Petition dismissed
Santiago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325,
March 19, 1997*
o Almario v. Alba, 127 SCRA 69*
o Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1*
o Occena v. Commission, 104 SCRA 1
(1981) Fernando, CJ.
Facts:
Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A.
Gonzales, both members of the Philippine
Bar and former delegates to the 1971
Constitutional Convention that framed the
present Constitution, are
suing
as
taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of
these petitions is the assertion that the 1973
Constitution is not the fundamental law, the
Javellana
ruling
to
the
contrary
notwithstanding.
Issue:
What is the power of the Interim
Batasang
Pambansa
to
propose
amendments and how may it be exercised?
More specifically as to the latter, what is the
extent of the changes that may be
introduced, the number of votes necessary
for the validity of a proposal, and the
standard required for a proper submission?
Held:
The applicable provision in the 1976
Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as
pertinent it reads thus: The Interim
Batasang Pambansa shall have the same
powers and its Members shall have the
same functions, responsibilities, rights,
privileges, and disqualifications as the
interim National Assembly and the regular
National Assembly and the Members
thereof. One of such powers is precisely
that of proposing amendments. The 1973
Constitution in its Transitory Provisions
vested the Interim National Assembly with
the power to propose amendments upon
special call by the Prime Minister by a vote
of the majority of its members to be ratified
in accordance with the Article on

Amendments. When, therefore, the Interim

Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the
President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E.
Marcos, met as a constituent body its
authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It
could and did propose the amendments
embodied in the resolutions now being
assailed. It may be observed parenthetically
that as far as petitioner Occena is
concerned, the question of the authority of
the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose
amendments is not new. Considering that
the proposed amendment of Section 7 of
Article X of the Constitution extending the
retirement of members of the Supreme
Court and judges of inferior courts from
sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a
restoration of the age of retirement provided
in the 1935 Constitution and has been
intensively and extensively discussed at the
Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as
through the mass media, it cannot,
therefore, be said that our people are
unaware
of
the
advantages
and
disadvantages of the proposed amendment.
Issue:
Were the amendments proposed are
so extensive in character that they go far
beyond the limits of the authority conferred
on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as
Successor
of
the
Interim
National
Assembly? Was there revision rather than
amendment?
Held:
Whether
the
Constitutional
Convention will only propose amendments
to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the
present Constitution and propose an entirely
new Constitution based on an Ideology
foreign to the democratic system, is of no
moment; because the same will be
submitted to the people for ratification. Once
ratified by the sovereign people, there can
be no debate about the validity of the new
Constitution. The fact that the present
Constitution may be revised and replaced
with a new one is no argument against the
validity of the law because amendment
includes the revision or total overhaul of
the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether
the Constitution is merely amended in part
or revised or totally changed would become
immaterial the moment the same is ratified
by the sovereign people.
Issue:

What is the vote necessary to propose

amendments as well as the standard for
proper submission?
Held:
The Interim Batasang Pambansa,
sitting as a constituent body, can propose
amendments. In that capacity, only a
majority vote is needed. It would be an
indefensible proposition to assert that the
three-fourth votes required when it sits as a
legislative body applies as well when it has
been convened as the agency through
which amendments could be proposed.
That is not a requirement as far as a
constitutional convention is concerned. It is
not a requirement either when, as in this
case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa
exercises its constituent power to propose
amendments. Moreover, even on the
assumption that the requirement of threefourth votes applies, such extraordinary
majority was obtained. It is not disputed that
Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment
allowing a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines naturalized in a foreign country
to own a limited area of land for residential
purposes was approved by the vote of 122
to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the
Presidency, the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a
vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and
Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the
Article on the Commission on Elections by a
vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention. Where
then is the alleged infirmity? As to the
requisite standard for a proper submission,
the question may be viewed not only from
the standpoint of the period that must
elapse before the holding of the plebiscite
but also from the standpoint of such
amendments having been called to the
attention of the people so that it could not
plausibly be maintained that they were
properly informed as to the proposed
changes. As to the period, the Constitution
indicates the way the matter should be
resolved. There is no ambiguity to the
applicable provision: Any amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution shall be valid
when ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite which shall be held not later
than three months after the approval of such
amendment or revision. The three
resolutions were approved by the Interim
Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent
assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In

the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of

the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is
thus within the 90-day period provided by
the Constitution.

o Gonzales v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774

Gonzales v COMELEC (1967)
ORIGINAL ACTION for prohibition with
preliminary injunction
FACTS
the Senate and the House of
Representatives passed
o R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1,
proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the
Constitution of the Philippines, be amended
to increase the membership of the House of
Representatives to a maximum of 180, to be
apportioned among the several provinces
as nearly as may be according to the
number of their respective inhabitants,
although each province shall have, at least,
one (1) member;
o R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to
propose amendments to said Constitution,
the convention to be composed of two (2)
elective delegates from each representative
district, to be "elected in the general
elections to be held on the second Tuesday
of November, 1971;" and
o R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16,
Article VI, of the same Constitution, be
amended so as to authorize Senators and
members of the House of Representatives
to become delegates to the aforementioned
constitutional convention, without forfeiting
their respective seats in Congress.
ISSUE
WON resolution of Congress acting as
constituent assemply is justiciable? -YES
RATIO
*the
judicial
department
is
the
only
constitutional organ which can be called
upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments
and among the integral or constituent units
thereof.
1. The power to amend the Constitution or to
propose amendments thereto is not
included in the general grant of legislative
powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent
powers of the people as the repository of
sovereignty in a republican state, such as

ours to make, and, hence, to amend their

own Fundamental Law. Congress may
propose amendments to the Constitution
merely because the same explicitly grants
such power. Hence, when exercising the
same, it is said that Senators and Members
of the House of Representatives act, not as
members of Congress, but as component
elements of a constituent assembly. When
acting as such, the members of Congress
derive their authority from the Constitution,
unlike the people, when performing the
same function, for their authority does not
emanate from the Constitution they are
the very source of all powers of
government, including the Constitution itself.
Therefore, since it is a question involving the
constitution, it is justiciable.
* The system of checks and balances
underlying the judicial power to strike down
acts of the Executive or of Congress
transcending the confines set forth in the
fundamental laws is not in derogation of the
principle of separation of powers, pursuant
to which each department is supreme within
its own sphere.
HELD
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes
in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and
R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and
invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases
must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and
the writs therein prayed for denied, without
special pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered.
Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 (1972)
Fernando, J.
Petition for declaratory relief as taxpayers and in
behalf of the Filipino people.
FACTS:
The petitioners seeks for the court to declare that
the
deliberating
Constitutional
Convention
was"without power, under Section 1, Article XV of
the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to
consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek
to revise the present Constitution through the
adoption of a form of a government other than the
form now outlined in the present Constitution [the
Convention being] merely empowered to propose
improvements to the present Constitution without
altering the general plan laid down therein."
ISSUE:
WON the petitioners has locus standi
WON the court has jurisdiction over the case

RATIO:
1. NO.
Justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the
person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement."
Pascual v. The Secretary of Public Works:
validity of a statute may be contested only by one
who will sustain a direct injury, in consequence of
its enforcement.
Taxpayers only have standing on laws providing for
the disbursement of public funds.
Expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the
State for the purpose of administering an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of
such funds,' which may be enjoined at the request
of a taxpayer."
2.NO.
At the time the case was filed the Con-Con has not
yet finalized any resolution that would radically alter
the 1935 constitution therefore not yet ripe for
judicial review. The case becomes ripe when the
Con-Con has actually does something already.
Then the court may actually inquire into the
jurisdiction of the body.
Separation of power departments should be left
alone to do duties as they see fit. The Executive
and the Legislature are not bound to ask for advice
in carrying out their duties, judiciary may not
interfere so that it may fulfill its duties well. The
court may not interfere until the proper time comes
ripeness

Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 33

Sanidad vs COMELEC (October 12, 1976) Martin,
J
This is here as a demonstration that at some point
in our history, the President did exercise in this
function of proposing revisions/amendments to the
Constitution
But now, that power resides in our people, and for
any body to exercise it, they must locate their
authority to do so under the Constitution.

Facts:
-On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling
for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for
the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve
some issues.
-On September 22, 1976, the President issued
another related decree, Presidential Decree No.

1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree

No. 991, by declaring the provisions of presidential
Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of voting
and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens
Assemblies) applicable to the national referendumplebiscite of October 16, 1976.
-On the same date of September 22, 1976, the
President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033,
stating the questions to be submitted to the people
in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976.
-The Commission on Elections was vested with the
exclusive supervision and control of the October
1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite.
-On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and
PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son, filed for
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to
enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding
and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on
October 16; to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as
they propose amendments to the Constitution, as
well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it
directs the Commission on Elections to supervise,
control, hold, and conduct the ReferendumPlebiscite scheduled on October 16,1976.
-On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the
comment for respondent Commission on Elections.
The Solicitor General principally maintains that
petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue
raised is political in nature, beyond judicial
cognizance of this Court.
-On September 30, 1976, another action for
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was
instituted by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, a delegate to
the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that
the power to propose amendments to, or revision of
the Constitution during the transition period is
expressly conferred on the interim National
Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the
Constitution.
-Another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction was filed on October 5, 1976 by RAUL
M. GONZALES.
Issues:
WON petitioner's have legal standing. -YES
WON the issue at hand is justiciable.-YES
The amending process both as to proposal and
ratification, raises a judicial question. This is
especially true in cases where the power of the
Presidency to initiate the of normally exercised by
the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the
terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to
propose amendments o the constitution resides in
the interim National Assembly in the period of

transition (See. 15, Transitory provisions). After that

period, and the regular National Assembly in its
active session, the power to propose amendments
becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular
National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art.
XVI, 1973 constitution). Section 2 (2), Article X of
the new Constitution provides: "All cases involving
the constitutionality of a treaty, executive
agreement, or law may shall be heard and decided
by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty,
executive agreement, or law may be declared
unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least
ten Members. ..." The Supreme Court has the
last word in the construction not only of treaties
and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself.
What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom
of the act of the incumbent President in proposing
amendments to the Constitution, but his
constitutional authority to perform such act or to
assume the power of a constituent assembly.
Whether the amending process confers on the
President that power to propose amendments is
therefore a downright justiciable question.
WON the President can amend the Constitution. NO and YES
The prerogative of the President to approve or
disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of
legislation. The President has nothing to do with
proposition or adoption of amendments to the
Constitution. The amending process is laid out in
the Constitution and can be found in Sections 1 and
2 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution and
Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions.(see
notes) In times of normally, the amending process
may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular
National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of
all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional
Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the
Members of the National Assembly. In times of
transition, amendments may be proposed by a
majority vote of all the Members of the National
Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime
Minister.
In the period of transition, the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution lies in the interim
National Assembly upon special call by the
President (Sec. 15 of the Transitory Provisions).
Harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the
President decided not to call the interim National
Assembly. If the President has been legitimately
discharging the legislative functions of the interim
Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly
discharge the function of that Assembly to propose
amendments to the Constitution, which is but
adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative

power. For the President to shy away from that

actuality and decline to undertake the amending
process would leave the governmental machineries
at a stalemate or create in the powers of the State
a destructive vacuum, thereby impeding the
objective of a crisis government "to end the crisis
and restore normal times." In these parlous times,
that Presidential initiative to reduce into concrete
forms the constant voices of the people reigns
supreme. After all, constituent assemblies or
constitutional conventions, like the President now,
are mere agents of the people.
The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a
resounding call to the people to exercise their
sovereign power as constitutional legislator. The
proposed amendments, as earlier discussed,
proceed not from the thinking of a single man.
Rather, they are the collated thoughts of the
sovereign will reduced only into enabling forms by
the authority who can presently exercise the
powers of the government. In equal vein, the
submission of those proposed amendments and
the question of martial law in a referendumplebiscite expresses but the option of the people
themselves implemented only by the authority of
the President.
WON the referendum-plebiscite is inoperative
because of the participation of 15 year olds. -NO
October 16 is in parts a referendum and a
plebiscite. The question - (1) Do you want martial
law to be continued? - is a referendum question,
wherein the 15-year olds may participate. For the
succeeding
question
on
the
proposed
amendments, only those of voting age of 18 years
may participate. This is the plebiscite aspect, as
contemplated in Section 2, Article XVI of the new
Constitution. A "referendum" is merely consultative
in character. It is simply a means of assessing
public reaction to the given issues submitted to the
people foe their consideration, the calling of which
is derived from or within the totality of the executive
power of the President. A "plebiscite," on the other
hand, involves the constituent act of those "citizens
of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law,
who are eighteen years of age or over, and who
shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place wherein they propose to vote
for at least six months preceding the election.
Literacy, property or any other substantive
requirement is not imposed. It is generally
associated with the amending process of the
Constitution, more particularly, the ratification
aspect.

WON the time given for deliberation is too short. NO

The period from September 21 to October 16 or a
period of 3 weeks is not too short for free debates
or discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues.
The questions are not new. They are the issues of
the day. The people have been living with them
since the proclamation of martial law four years
ago.
Held:
The vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions
are hereby dismissed. This decision is immediately
executory.
Notes:
The questions ask, to wit:
(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?
(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be
continued, do you approve the following
amendments to the Constitution? For the purpose
of the second question, the referendum shall have
the effect of a plebiscite within the contemplation of
Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:
1.There shall be, in lieu of the interim National
Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa.
Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa which
shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise
provided by law, shall include the incumbent
President of the Philippines, representatives
elected from the different regions of the nation,
those who shall not be less than eighteen years of
age elected by their respective sectors, and those
chosen by the incumbent President from the
members of the Cabinet. Regional representatives
shall be apportioned among the regions in
accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio while the sectors shall be
determined by law. The number of representatives
from each region or sector and the, manner of their
election shall be prescribed and regulated by law.
2.The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the
same powers and its members shall have the same
functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and
disqualifications as the interim National Assembly
and the regular National Assembly and the
members thereof. However, it shall not exercise the
power provided in Article VIII, Section 14(l) of the
Constitution.
3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall,
within 30 days from the election and selection of
the members, convene the interim Batasang
Pambansa and preside over its sessions until the
Speaker shall have been elected. The incumbent

President of the Philippines shall be the Prime

Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his
powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa
is organized and ready to discharge its functions
and likewise he shall continue to exercise his
powers and prerogatives under the nineteen
hundred and thirty five. Constitution and the powers
vested in the President and the Prime Minister
under this Constitution.
4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet
shall exerciseall the powers and functions, and
discharge the responsibilities of the regular
President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet, and
shall be subject only to such disqualifications as the
President (Prime Minister) may prescribe. The
President (Prime Minister) if he so desires may
appoint a Deputy Prime Minister or as many Deputy
Prime Ministers as he may deem necessary.
5. The incumbent President shall continue to
exercise legislative powers until martial law shall
have been lifted.
6. Whenever in the judgment of the President
(Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or
a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the
interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National
Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on
any matter for any reason that in his judgment
requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet
the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders
or letters of instructions, which shall form part of the
law of the land.
7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue
as presently constituted but their functions, powers,
and composition may be altered by law.
Referenda conducted thru the barangays and
under the Supervision of the Commission on
Elections may be called at any time the government
deems it necessary to ascertain the will of the
people regarding any important matter whether of
national or local interest.
8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent
with any of these amendments shall continue in full
force and effect.
9. These amendments shall take effect after the
incumbent President shall have proclaimed that
they have been ratified by I majority of the votes
cast in the referendum-plebiscite.
Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on
Amendments ordains:
SECTION 1. (1)Any amendment to, or revision of,
this Constitution may be proposed by the National
Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The
National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of
all its Members, call a constitutional convention or,
by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the

question of calling such a convention to the

electorate in an election.
SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall
be held not later than three months after the
approval of such amendment or revision.
Transitory Provision
SECTION 15.The interim National Assembly, upon
special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a
majority vote of all its Members, propose
amendments
to
this
Constitution.
Such
amendments shall take effect when ratified in
accordance with Article Sixteen hereof.
o Tolentino v. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702
Petitioner: Arturo Tolentino
Respondent: COMELEC et al
Intervenors: Victor Ortega, Leonardo Siguion Reyna,
Raul Manglapus etc
GR No. L-34150 Oct 16, 1971
Ponente: Justice Barredo
Petition for Prohibition
Facts:
1. Congress passed 2 resolutions calling for a
constituent assembly so the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 was created. The delegates
of the assembly were then elected by virtue of
RA 6132 (Constitutional Convention Act of
1971). After the delegates were elected in 1970,
the Convention held its inaugural session on
June 1, 1971. Around 3:30 am of September 28,
1971, the Convention approved Organic
Resolution No. 1 which aimed to decrease the
voting age of citizens from 21 to 18.
2. Then President Diosdado Macapagal ordered the
Comelec to aid the Constitutional Convention in
implementing
the
resolution.
Comelecs
response was to hold a plebiscite based on
certain conditions (notes). The petition for
prohibition was then filed.
3. The Court also limited the number of intervenors
to be accepted from the ranks of the delegates
of the convention.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction?- Yes
2. Whether or not amendments proposed may be
ratified separately and piecemeal? No
* Court Question: Is there any limitation or condition in
Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which is
violated by the act of the Convention of calling for a
plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in
Organic Resolution No. 1 (lowering voter age)?

Ratio:
1. Procedural (jurisdiction) - Only the intervenors
brought this issue up. Both the Chief Accountant
and Auditor of the Convention (respondents)
concede that SC has jurisdiction since it is a
justiciable issue rather than a political question.
Since the issue is about constitutionality, the SC

has jurisdiction. The issue is not a political

question because power to amend or propose
amendments is not part of the powers of
Congress but rather powers of the people.
2. Nature of Convention- the Convention derives its
powers from the Constitution (Article XV section
1). Both the SC and Convention derive their
powers from the Constitution. it is within the
power as it is the solemn duty of the Court,
under the existing Constitution to resolve the
issues.
3. Unconstitutionality- The unconstitutionality is not
about lowering the age of voters from 21 to 18
but rather on the way on how the Convention
goes with its procedures. The Court holds that
there is, and it is the condition and limitation
that all the amendments to be proposed by
the same Convention must be submitted to
the people in a single "election" or plebiscite.
It being indisputable that the amendment
proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite is
only the first amendment the Convention
proposes and hold that the plebiscite being
called for the purpose of submitting the same
for ratification of the people on November 8,
1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article
XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the
Convention and the respondent Comelec in
that direction are null and void. This is based
on
statutory
construction
(such
amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of
the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for
their ratification) and the wisdom and
appropriateness of the said provision (has to
be taken as a whole so cannot be chopped to
bits and pieces). Also in doing the ratification of
amendments piecemeal, it does not give the
voter an idea on how the proposed amendment
would be of any significance due to it being
alone. The intervenors state that the purpose of
the ratification is to allow 18 years olds and
above voters the capacity to vote on the
Constitution that the Convention would draft in
the future.
SC Decision: Petition Granted. Immediately
executory. Organic Resolution 1 and all
implementing acts and resolutions null and void.
Notes:
1. Conditions for Comelec to hold plebiscite for ConCon

The Constitutional Convention will undertake

the printing of separate official ballots, election
returns and tally sheets for the use of said
plebiscite at its expense;

The Constitutional Convention will adopt its

own security measures for the printing and
shipment of said ballots and election forms

Said official ballots and election forms will be

delivered to the Commission in time so that they
could be distributed at the same time that the

Commission will distribute its official and sample

ballots to be used in the elections on November
8, 1971.

o Planas v. COMELEC, 49 SCRA 105*

o UNIDO vs. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 17
Facts:
Petitioner United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO)
are campaigning for people to say NO to
amendments
proposed
by
the
Batasang
Pambansa. President Marcos Kilusang Bagong
Lipunan (KBL) political party are campaigning YES.
On March 12, 1981 President Marcos campaigned
on national TV in his Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo
for YES which was broadcast by 26 TV stations
and 248 radio stations.
Respondent COMELEC had issued Resolution No.
1467, 1468, and 1469 on March 5 1981 which
provide for:
1. equal opportunity for both sides on public
discussions and debates on plebiscite
questions
2. Equal time on broadcast media for
plebiscite campaign
3. Equal space on print media for plebiscite
campaign
Pursuant to these resolutions, UNIDO wanted the
same time and opportunity to campaign for NO in
the media. COMELEC denied such motion on the
basis It is the considered view of this Commission
that when President Marcos conducted his 'pulongpulong' or consultation with the people on March
12, 1981, he did so in his capacity as President
Prime Minister of the Philippines and not as the
head of any political party The UNIDO or any of
its leaders does not have the same constitutional
prerogatives vested in the President/Prime Minister
as above discussed. As such, it has no right to
'demand' equal coverage by media accorded
President Marcos.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether there was denial of due process? - YES
Petitioner wants COMELEC to direc TV and radio
stations to give them equal airtime.
Petitioner evidently overlooks the fact that the
television and radio stations they refer to in their

petition who will be directly affected by any

injunction of the Comelec upon Our orders are not
parties to this case. It is elementary, to state the
obvious, that in the premises, We would be overreaching the bounds of our constitutional powers if
We acceded to petitioner request, absent such
indispensable parties. There is also no showing
they ASKED TV stations for such media time.
Whether election laws also apply to plebiscites YES
Section 5 of Article XII-C of the Constitution
circumscribes the relevant powers of the Comelec
this wise:
SEC. 5.
The enjoyment or utilization of all
franchises or permits for the operation of
transportation and other public utilities, media of
communication or information, all grants, special
privileges, or concessions granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any governmentowned or controlled corporation, may be
supervised or regulated by the Commission during
the election period for the purpose of ensuring free,
orderly, and honest elections.
Phrase free, orderly, and honest elections not
only refer to regular elections but the Court views
the provision as applicable also to plebiscites,
particularly
one
relative
to
constitutional
amendments.
Therefore, it is the duty of the Comelec to see to it
that the sale of air time by TV and radio stations
insures that time equal as to duration and quality is
available to all candidates for the same office or
political parties, groups or aggrupations at the
same rates or given free of charge.
BUT (Next issue is the big one. If he was
speaking as political party head, COMELEC
must give opposition political party equal time.
If as president of philippines, no such
requirement)
Whether President Marcos was speaking as head
of state or as head of his political party - Head of
State
In instances where the head of state is at the same
time the president of the political party that is in
power, it does not necessarily follow that he speaks

with two voices when he dialogues with the

governed
The President/Prime Minister of the Philippines is
the political head of all the people. His is the sacred
responsibility to protect and defend the security of
all the people, the stability of the government and
the integrity of the national territory, not only for the
tenure to which he has been elected but for all
times. When, as in the instant situation, he deems
it warranted by the circumstances to present to
them a plan of government which includes the
modification of the existing structure of
government together with its concomitant
allocation of governmental powers, it is not only his
right but his duty to take the people directly into his
confidence and impart to them to the fullest
measure of his capacity and by all available
adequate means the reasons therefor and the
corrollarily advantages thereof to their welfare
Therefore, when the head of state is afforded the
opportunity or when he feels it incumbent upon him
to communicate and dialogue with the people on
any matter affecting the plan of government or any
other matter of public interest, no office or entity
of the government is obliged to give the
opposition the same facilities by which its contrary
views may be ventilated.
HELD:
Appeal DISMISSED.

Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50

SCRA 30*
*Optional
**May be read as excerpts in V.V. Mendoza,
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS:
CASES AND MATERIALS