You are on page 1of 26

ARTICLE 136

A Project report from Secondary Data

Submitted to Professor, Nageshwar Rao


Faculty of Constitutional Law; TNNLS

Submitted by- Mithelesh DK


Roll No. BA0130038
Class 2nd Year
Semester-4

Declaration
I do hereby declare that the project research entitled Article 136 submitted to the
Tamil Nadu National Law School in fulfillment of the requirement of the internal
component is a record of the original work done by me under the supervision and
guidance of Mr. Nageshwar Rao and that the project submitted has not been
formed on the basis of any other project submitted by any other university or
college.

Mithelesh Dk
BA0130038

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the project entitled Article 136 submitted to the Tamil Nadu
National Law School in fulfillment of the internal component done by Mithelesh
Dk under the supervision of Mr. Nageshwar Rao

Place: Tiruchirappalli

Mr. Nageshwar Rao

Date: 30.4.2015

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Thanks to the Almighty who gave me the strength to accomplish the project with
sheer hard work and honesty. This research venture has been made possible due to
the generous co-operation of various persons. To list them all is not practicable,
even to repay them in words is beyond the domain of my lexicon.
May I observe the protocol to show my deep gratitude to the venerated Faculty-incharge Prof. Nageshwar Rao, for his kind gesture in allotting me such a
wonderful and elucidating research topic. Apart from that I would like to thank my
friends for their support and suggestions during the process of making this project.

Table of contents:

S.no Contents

Pag

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

e no
6
7
8
11
13
13
16
17
21
23

Introduction
Appeals by Special leave
Exercise of discretion
Scope of Article 136
Ground for SLP
Appeal in Constitutional/Civil cases
Appeal in Criminal Matters
Tribunals
Dismissal Of Appeal
Conclusion

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED:

AIR

All India Records


5

SC

Supreme Court

SCC

Supreme Court Cases

C.P.C

Civil Procedure Code

Cr.P.C

Criminal Procedure Code

Pvt

Private

Ltd

Limited

O.N.G.C

Oil Natural Gas Corporation

U.P

Uttar Pradesh

P and H

Punjab and Haryana

U.O.I

Union of India

Cr.L.J

Criminal Law Journal

M/s

Messers

Assn

Association

Supp

Supplementary

A.P

Andhra Pradesh

C.I.T

Commissioner of Income Tax

Co

Company

J&K

Jammu and Kashmir

Rly

Railway

Introduction:

Special leave means special permission to be granted by the Supreme Court to hear an appeal of
any part of the court which includes tribunals, Quasi-judicial Authority and Subordinate courts.
Article 136 of the Indian Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to grant in its discretion
6

Special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause
or matter passed or made by any court, Judicial Authority or even any Quasi-Judicial Authority
in the territory of India under it in suitable cases the Supreme Court can even disregard the
limitations contained in Article 132 to Article 134 on its applicable jurisdiction and hear appeals
which it could not otherwise hear under those provisions.
The article vests very wide powers in Supreme Court. The power given under this article is in the
nature of a special residuary power which is exercisable outside the purview of ordinary law.
Article 132 to 135 deal with ordinary appeals to the Supreme Court in cases where the needs of
justice demand interference by the highest court of this land. This article is worded in the widest
possible terms. It vests in the Supreme Court a plenary jurisdiction in the matter of entertaining
and hearing appeals by granting special leave against any kind of judgment or order made by any
court or tribunal (except a military tribunal) in any proceedings and the exercise of this power is
left entirely to the discretion of the court unfettered by any restrictions and this power cannot be
curtailed by any legislation short of amending the article itself.
Article 136 confers a special jurisdiction on the Supreme Court. It opens with a non obstante
clause viz Notwithstanding anything in this chapter this means that the power of the supreme
court under Art. 136 is unaffected by Art. 132, 133, 134 and 134A.
In Kunhayammed V. State of Orissa1 the Supreme Court Characterized its power under Art. 136
as an untrammelled reservoir of power incapable of being confined to definitional bounds; the
discretion conferred on the Supreme court being subjected to only one limitation, that is the
wisdom and good sense of justice of the Judges

Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court.


(1) Notwithstanding anything in this chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant
special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in
any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in territory of India.

1 AIR 2000 SC 2587, 2593 : 2000 6 SCC 359


7

(2) Nothing in the clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order
passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the
Armed Forces.

Appeals by Special leave:


Art 132 135 of the constitution deal with appeals of the Supreme Court which a person may
avail of as a matter of right so long as the conditions specified in those articles are satisfied.
Under Art 136, one may appeal to the court only with its permission or leave. But the power of
the court to hear the appeals in this article is much wider and general. It vests in the Supreme
Court plenary jurisdiction in the matter of entertaining and hearing appeals by granting special
leave against any judgment, decree, determination or order, in any cause or matter, passed oe
made by any court or tribunal.
Compared with provisions of the Article 132, 133 and 134, the jurisdiction conferred under Art
136 has the following distinguishing features:
1. The power to grant special leave is not confined to judgments, decrees or final orders of
the High Courts. It can be granted even against the decisions of the lower courts such as
magistrates2.
2. Appeals shall lie from orders or determinations of all courts or tribunals in the territory of
India, except those mentioned in clause (2).
3. There is no condition that the order of the court should be final order. Hence, appeals
against interlocutory orders are permissible. But normally, an appellant is expected to
exhaust the others remedies provided in law.
4. An appeal shall lie from any order or determination of a court or tribunal. The
determination need not be final.
5. The order or determination of a court may be in any cause or matter, civil criminal or
otherwise.
6. No law making any determination of any court or tribunal final can limit the jurisdiction
of the court in Art 1363

2 See e.g., Rajendrakumar jain v. State.


8

By virtue of this article we can grant Special leave in civil cases, in criminal cases, in income
tax cases, in cases which come up before different kinds of tribunals, and variety of other
cases.4 The only conditions are: 1) the determination or order sought to be appealed from must
have the character of a judicial adjudication. Purely administrative or executive direction is not
contemplated to be made the subject matter of appeal of the Supreme Court. 5 2) The authority
whose act is complained against must be a court or tribunal. Unless both the conditions are
satisfied, Art 136 clause (1) cannot be invoked.6

Exercise of Discretion.
Art 136, as shown above, is worded in the widest possible terms. It confers a wide discretion on
the Supreme Court to entertain appeals in suitable cases not otherwise provided for in the
constitution. It is in the nature of residuary or reserve power7 and , therefore, it cannot be defined
exhaustively. Decided cases, however, establish that the Supreme court will grant special leave to
appeal in exceptional cases cases where grave injustice has been done by disregard to the forms
of the legal process, or violation of the principles of natural justice, or otherwise. The
discretionary nature of the power continues until the disposal of the appeal.8
In express terms, Article 136 does not confer a right of appeal on a party as such, but it confers a
wide discretionary power on the supreme court to grant special leave to appeal in Suitable cases.
Though it is residuary power and extraordinary power in its terms, it shall be exercised by the
Supreme Court in accordance with the well-established judicial principles, or the well-known
norms of procedure which have been recognized for long as precedents. Thus, while considering
3 Pritam Singh V. State, AIR 1950 SC 169
4 See E.g., Dhakeswari cotton mills Ltd V. CIT AIR 1955 SC 65
5 Jaswant sugar mills Ltd V. Lakshmi Chand, AIR 1963 Supp (1) SCR 242
6 Engg. Mozdoor Sabha V. Hind cycles Ltd., AIR 1963 SC 874
7 Durga Shankar Mehta V.Raghuraj singh, AIR 1954 SC 520
8 Taherakhatoon V. Salambin Mohammed, 1999 2 SCC 635
9

a petition under Art 136, it is reasonable to assume that the norms of fair procedure implied in
Art 21 are adequately met and procedure followed in disposing of a petition under Article 136 is
Consistent with the procedure contemplated in Art 21.9
It is true that the strictest vigilance over abuse of the process of the court, especially at the level
of the Supreme Court, should be maintained, ordinarily a private party, other than the
complainant, should not be permitted to file an appeal.10 In criminal cases, it is all the more so
since an adverse verdict may result in irretrievable injury to life or liberty. But in the absence of
an independent prosecution authority easily accessible to every citizen, a wider connotation of
standing is necessary for Art 136. Thus, the court may entertain special leave to appeal from
private party in such cases only where it is convinced that the public interest justifies an appeal
-against the acquittal, and that the state has refrained from petitioning for special leave for
reasons which do not bear on the public interest, but are prompted by private influence, want of
bona fides and other extraneous considerations.11 A third party may also appeal if it is aggrieved
by a decision.12 The court may also invoke its jurisdiction in Art 136 suo motu. 13 In criminal
cases, it can also acquit an accused who has not filed an appeal against his conviction, if all other
accused who were convicted with him are acquitted in appeal.14
In Pritam Singh V. State, in explaining how the discretion will be exercised generally in
granting special leave to appeal, the Supreme Court observed:
The wide discretionary power with which this court is invested under it is to be exercised
sparingly and in exceptional cases only, and as far as possible a more or less uniform standard
9 P.S.R Sadhanatham V. Arunachalam, 1980 3 SCC 141
10 K.Manjusree V. State of A.P., 2008 3 SCC 512
11 P.S.R Sadhanatham V. Arunachalam, 1980 3 SCC 141
12 Gopabandhu Biswal V. Krishna Chandra Mohanty, 1998 4 SCC 447
13 Pawan kumar V. state of Haryana, 2003 11 SCC 241
14 Gurucharan
10

should be adopted in granting special leave in the wide range of matters which can come up
before it under this article. By virtue of this article, we can grant special leave in civil cases, in
criminal cases, in income tax cases, in cases which come up before different kinds of tribunals
and in a variety of other cases. The only uniform standard which in our opinion can be laid down
in the circumstances is that court should grant special leave to appeal only in those cases where
special circumstances are shown to exist.
Again in Dhakeswari cotton mills V. CIT, the SC said:
It is not possible to definethe limitations on the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested
in this court by the constitutional provision made in the Art 136. The limitations, whatever they
be, are implicit in the nature and character of the power itself. It being an exceptional and
overriding power, naturally it has to be exercised sparingly and with caution and only in special
and extraordinary situations. Beyond that it is not possible to fetter the exercise of this power by
any set formula or rule.
Thus, it is a well- settled practice of the supreme court that expect where there has been an
illegality or an irregularity of procedure or a violation of the principles of natural justice,
resulting in the absence of a fair trial or gross miscarriage of justice, the supreme court does not
permit a third review of evidence with regard to questions of fact in cases in which two courts of
fact have appreciated and assessed the evidence with regard to such questions. 15it can, however,
go into the correctness of findings of facts where the concurrent decision of two or more courts
or tribunals in manifestly unjust,16 The supreme court does not allow a point raised before the
courts below to be raised before itself for the first time. 17 Every error, even of law, does not
justify interference under Art 136. But in case of grave injustice, the court is duty bound to
interfere with the findings of fact given if they have been affirmed thrice. 18 The court ordinarily
15 Chikkarange gowda V. state of Mysore, AIR 1956 SC 731
16 Raghunath G. Panhale V. Chaganalal Sundarji & Co. 1999 8 SCC 1
17 R.J Singh Ahuluwalia V. State of Delhi, 1970 3 SCC 451
18 Indra Kaur V. Sheo lal Kapoor, 1988 2 SCC 488, 489
11

does not go into the sufficiency of evidence. 19Leave cannot be granted merely against adverse
exercise of discretionary power when no illegality has been committed, nor any unreasonable
restriction placed on any fundamental right of the appellant. 20 The court does not interfere with
the exercise of discretionary power by the High court under Art 226 and 227, merely because
two views are possible on the facts of the case. In exceptional cases, the court admits appeal
under Article 136 even though the appellant has not exhausted all other remedies such as under
article 226 and 227, if there are exceptionally sound reasons for such admission. 21 It may also
admit that an appeal against the judgment of a single Judge of the High Court against which a
division bench of that High Court declined to interfere. The court may refuse to give relief under
Art 136 to a person who does not come before it with clean hands, for example, if he has
suppressed some facts.22

Scope of Article 136:


1) The word order in Art 136(1) has not been qualified by the adjective final as in the case
in Arts. 132, 133 and 134. The Supreme Court has thus power to hear an appeal even from
an interlocutory or an intern order. In practice, however, the court does not ordinarily grant
leave to appeal from an interlocutory order, but it can do so in an exceptional case.
Ordinarily, the parties are directed to approach the High Court for the recall, stay or
modification of the interim order. At times, the Supreme Court has, while dismissing such
petitions requested the high court to dispose of the matter preferably within a time frame.
Use of imperative words such as directed and fixing a time frame within the high court

19 Narayan Govind Gavate V. State of Maharashtra, 1977 1 SCC 133


20 Khatri ahmed mushabhai V. Limdi Municipality
21 S.G Chemicals & dyes trading employees union V. S.G Chemicals & dyes trading
Ltd. 1986 2 SCC 624
22 Rasiklal Vaghajibhai Patel V. Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn,. 1985 2 SCC 35
12

shall dispose of a matter have, on occasion, led to a confrontation between the high court
and the supreme court.
2) Article 136 (1) does not define the nature of proceedings from which the supreme court may
hear appeals and therefore, it could hear appeals in any kind of proceedings whether civil,
criminal or relating to income tax, revenue or labour disputes, etc
3) Article 136(1) confers on the Supreme Court power to hear appeals from orders and
determination of any tribunal other than a military tribunal. This aspect of Art 136(1) is very
significant and is discussed in detail below.
4) Under Art. 136 (1), the supreme court may hear appeal even though the ordinary law
pertaining to the dispute makes no provision for such an appeal.
5) Being a Jurisdiction conferred by the constitution, it cannot be diluted or circumscribed by
ordinary legislative process: it can be curtailed or modified only by constitutional process.
6) The Supreme Court may hear an appeal even where the legislature declares the decision of a
court or tribunal as final. Thus in Raigarh23, the supreme court heard an appeal from an order
of the Railway Rates Tribunal, Madras, in spite of Sec 46A of the Railways Act, 1980,
laying down that the decision of the tribunal shall be final.
7) Under Art 136 (1), the supreme court plenary jurisdiction to grant leave and hear appeals
against any order of a court or tribunal. This confers on the Supreme Court power of judicial
superintendence over all courts and tribunals in India including subordinate courts of
magistrate and district judge.24
8) Notwithstanding concurrent findings of trail court and high court the lack of quality or
credibility of evidence may call for interference.25
9) After granting special leave to appeal under Art.136, the court can revoke the leave granted
by it, if the respondent brings to the notice of the court facts which would justify such
revocation. The court will do so in the interest of justice.
10) Generally speaking, under Art. 136, the Supreme Court hears an appeal from an
adjudicatory order and not from an administrative order. An adjudicatory order is an order
that adjudicates upon the rival contentions of parties and it must be passed by an authority

23 Mahendra Saree Emporium(II) V. G.V Srinivasa Murthy, 2005 1 SCC 481


24 Delhi Judicial Service Assn. V. State of Gujarat, AIR 1991 SC 2176
25 A.Subair V. State of Kerala, 2009 6 SCC 587
13

constituted by the state by law for the purpose in discharge of the state obligation to secure
justice to its people.

Grounds for SLP:


(1) SLP can be filed against any judgment or decree or order of any High Court /tribunal in
--the territory of India.
(2) SLP can be filed in both cases of Civil/Constitutional or Criminal matters.
(3) Or, SLP can be filed in case the High court refuses to grant the certificate of fitness for
appeal to Supreme Court of India.
(4) SLP can be filed by the appellant if all other alternative remedies are exhausted.

Time frame within which SLP can be filed:


(1) SLP can be filed against any judgment of High Court within 90 days from the date of
judgment.
Or SLP can be filed within 60 days against the order of the High Court refusing to grant the
certificate of fitness for appeal to Supreme Court.

Appeal in Constitutional/Civil Cases:

Under art 136, the Supreme Court can hear appeal in a case involving substantial question of
constitutional law if the high court refuses to grant the necessary certificate under Art. 132.
Similarly, the Supreme Court may entertain appeal in a civil case where substantial question of
law is involved but which is not covered by art.132 as for example, when the high court may
have refused to grant a fitness certificate.
14

Ordinarily, the Supreme Court does not entertain an appeal against an exercise of discretion by
the court below if it has been exercised along sound judicial lines. But if the discretion is
exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably, or is based on a misunderstanding of the principles that
govern its exercise, or the order has been passed without jurisdiction, or if there is a patently
erroneous interpretation of law by the high court, the Supreme Court would intervene if there has
been a resultant failure of justice 26. So also if the court below acts without jurisdiction, or in
violation of principles of natural justice27 or without a proper appreciation of material on record
or the submissions made interference under Art 136 is warranted.
Ordinarily, the Supreme Court does not appreciate evidence, or go behind the findings of fact
arrived at by the court below, much less concurrent findings, unless there is sufficient ground foe
doing so.28The court can, however appreciate evidence on record to avoid miscarriage of
justice.29 If in giving the findings the lower court ignored or misread and misconstrued certain
important pieces of evidence, and the supreme court comes to the conclusion that, on the
evidence taken as a whole, no court could properly, as a matter of legitimate inference, arrive at
the conclusion that the lower court has arrived, or where the two lower courts of appeal were
under a clear misapprehension as to the findings of the fact by the trial court, or where the lower
courts arrived at the findings not on proper consideration of the law on the subject, or were
appreciation of evidence by the courts on the face of it appears to be erroneous causing
miscarriage of justice, the court would examine the evidence itself. 30 The position however is
different if it is a mixed question of law and fact.31

26 Santosh V. Mul Singh, ntAIR 1958 SC 321


27 National organic chemical industries Ltd V. Miheer H. Mafatal, 2004 12 SCC 356
28 Ghisalal V. Dhapubai, 2011 2 SCC 298
29 Shashi Jain V. Tarsen lal
30 Heramba Brahma V. State of Assam
31 Suresh kumar jain V. Shanthi Swarup Jain. AIR 1997 SC 2291
15

Order xvi rule 4 c of the Supreme Court rules which provides the
SLPs shall be confined only to the pleadings before the court or tribunal or whose order is
challenged. However, the petitioner may, with due to the respondent, and with the leave court of
the urge additional grounds, at the hearing.
Thus a new plea put forward for the first time in the form of written submissions after the
hearing was concluded was not entertained.32
Nevertheless the Supreme court is extremely reluctant to entertain and entirely new plea, not
raised earlier if earlier before the lower courts, being raised for the first time in appeal before it,
especially when the new plea is founded on facts33. For example: The Supreme court did not
permit the plea of mala fides being raised before it for the first time as it is being esentailly a
question of fact needed to be supported by relevant material. Again whether there is a novation
of a contract is a mixed question of law and fact and cannot be raised before the Supreme court
for the first time. A document which is produced by the respondent for the first time at the stage
of arguments can be considered if it forms the basis of the petitioners claim.34
If however a point of fact plainly raises on the record or a point of law is relevant and material
and can be decided on the basis of material on record without any further evidence being taken,
or the plea was urged before the trial court and was rejected but was not repeated before the High
Court, or if a question of considerable importance likely to arise in similar suit, or if it goes to the
jurisdiction of the lower court, the Supreme court may permit the plea to be raised. If it is a pure
question of law going to the root of the case, the plea maybe allowed to be raised with the
permission of the court.35

32 State of Rajasthan V. H.V Hotels, 2007 2 SCC 468, 475


33 R.J Singh Ahluwalia V. Delhi. AIR 1971 SC 1552
34 Ramashray Singh V. New India Insurance Co Ltd 2003 10 SCC 664
35 Vimal Chandra Grover V. Bank of India, 2000 5 SCC 122, at 134
16

In one case, the Supreme Court permitted the question of constitutional validity of the relevant
statute to be raised for the first time before it. Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High
courts judgment and sent the matter back to it so that it may decide the question of constitutional
validity of the act.36
In a preventive detention case, the court allowed a new plea to be raised, viz., non-consideration
of detenus representation by the government, because the plea was important as it was fatal to
detention and it could be determined on the material available to the court.37

APPEAL IN CRIMINAL MATTERS:

The Scope of Article 134 providing for appeals to the Supreme Court in criminal matters is
limited. The residuary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under article 136 has more frequently
been invoked in criminal appeals. But the court does not interfere lightly. It has more than once
declared that it will not grant special leave to appeal under article 136(1) of the constitution,
unless it is shown those special and exceptional circumstances exist, the substantial and grave
injustice has been done, and the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant
a review of the decision appealed against. Further, in the exercise of its special leave appellate
36 M/s Noorulla Ghazanfarulla V. Municipal board of Aligarh, AIR 1981 SC 2176
37 Harish Pahwa V. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 1126
17

jurisdiction, the Supreme Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts
below unless, of course, the findings are perverse or vitiated by error of law or there is gross
miscarriage of justice.38
In granting special leave to appeal in criminal cases, the supreme court will take guidance from
the principles which have been laid down by the privy council defining the limits within the
interference with the course of criminal justice taken in the subordinate courts is warranted. 39 A
perusal of the Privy Council decisions on the point would indicate that the council had repeatedly
aaffirmed the principle that it was unwilling to act in criminal cases in the free fashion of a fully
constituted court of criminal appeal. The exercise of prerogative takes place only where it is
shown that the injustice of a serious and substantial character has occurred.40
In Reil v. R41, Lord Halsbury, delivering the opinion of the Privy Council, pointed out that leave
to appeal in criminal cases could only be granted where some clear departure from the
requirement of justice is alleged to have taken place. In Abhram Mallory Dillot re,42 it was
observed that the Privy Council reviews proceedings unless it is shown that by a disregard of the
forms of legal process or some violation of the principles of natural justice or otherwise,
substantial grave injustice has been done. In Ibrahim v Emperor, it was observed that the ground
for his majestys interference in criminal matters was the violation of principle of justice. In Ras
Behari Lal v King Emperor43 Leave to appeal was granted on the disclosure that a member of the
jury did not understand the language in which the trial was conducted. In M. Ahlikili Dhalamini

38 Mohd.Husssain Umar Kochra V. K.S Dalipsinghji. 1969 3 SCC 429


39 Pritam Singh V. State. AIR 1950 SC 169
40 Dal Singh V. King Emperor
41 (1885) 10 AC 675
42 1887 12 AC 459
43 1932-33 60 IA 354
18

v. R, the appeal was allowed because there had been failure to hold in public the whole of the
proceedings in a murder case.
The principle stated above, namely, that the Judicial committee will interfere where there had
been an infringement of the essential principles of justice,, has been further elucidated by
Viscount Simon, who after reviewing various cases pointed out the following circumstance in
which the Privy Council could interfere in a criminal appeal:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Where the accused has not been given the opportunity of being heard
Where the trial took place in the absence of accused
Where the accused is not allowed to call relevant witnesses
Where the tribunal was shown to have been corrupt or not properly constituted
Where the court fails to understand the proceedings because of the language.
Where the sentencing court had no jurisdiction to try the case.

The Same is the practice of the Supreme court as is clear from the following observations in
Pritam Singh V. State
Generally speaking, this court will not grant special leave, unless it is shown that exceptional and
special circumstances exist, than substantial and grave injustice has been done and that the case
in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed
against.

Tribunal:
As shown above, special leave to appeal under Art 136 is not limited to orders or determinations
of a court of law, but includes a tribunal also. A tribunal is a body or authority, though not a
court in the strict sense, which is invested with the judicial power to adjudicate on questions of
law or fact, affecting the rights of the citizens in a judicial manner. Appeals have been
entertained under this article, for example, against determinations of industrial tribunal, central
administrative tribunal, election commission, railway rates tribunal, central administrative
tribunal, administrative of evacuee property, authority under the payment of wages, central
government exercising powers of revision. The courts power to grant special leave is not taken
away, even when it is declared by law that the order or decision of the tribunal shall be
19

conclusive. This power has been preserved even in respect of the administrative and other
tribunals provided under Arts. 323-A and 323- B.
A body or authority for being characterized as a tribunal for the purposes of Art 136 must possess
the following features:
1) It must be a body or authority invested by law with power to determine questions or
disputes affecting the rights of citizen.
2) Such a body or authority in arriving at the decision must be under a duty to act judicially.
Whether an authority has a duty to act judicially is to be gathered from the provisions of
the act under which is constituted. Generally speaking, if the investigating is subject to
certain procedural attributes contemplating an opportunity of presenting its case to a
party, ascertainment of facts by means of evidence if a dispute be on questions of fact,
and if the dispute be on a question of law on the presentation of legal arguments, and the
decision results in the disposal of the matter on findings based upon those question the
strict sense, should be invested with the trapping of a court, such as authority to
determines of law and fact, then such a body or authority acts judicially.44
3) Such a body must be invested with the judicial power of the state. This means that the
authority required to act judicially, though not a court in the strict sense, should be
invested with the trapping of a court, such as authority to determine matters in cases
initiated by parties, sitting in public, power to compel attendance of witnesses and to
examine them on oath, duty to follow fundamental rules of evidence(though not under the
strict rules of the evidence act,1872),provision for imposing sanctions by way of
imprisonment, fine, damages or mandatory or prohibitory orders to enforce obedience to
its command. The list is illustrative; some, though not necessarily all, such trappings will
ordinarily make the authority which is under a duty to act judicially, a tribunal. 45 The
intentional of the constitution by the use of the word tribunal in the article seem to have
been to include within the scope of article 136 tribunals adorned with similar trappings as
court but strictly not coming within that definition46.

44 Jaswant Sugar mills Ltd V. Lakshmi chand, AIR 1963 SC 677


45 Jaswant Sugar mills Ltd V. Lakshmi chand, AIR 1963 SC 677
20

Bharat bank Ltd. V. employees47 is an important early decision of the supreme court, defining
the nature of tribunals against whose decisions appeals may be admitted by the supreme court
in the exercise of its jurisdiction under article 136.The issue in that case was whether the
determination by an industrial tribunal set up under the industrial disputes act, 1947 was open
to appeal to the supreme court under article 136 of the constitution. The majority of the
judges answered the question in affirmative. An industrial tribunal is a tribunal for the
purposes of article 136, because it is invested with the following trapping of a court of law:
1. The proceedings before it commence on submission of an application, which is in the
nature of a plaint.
2. It has the same powers as regards discovery, inspection, taking evidence, as are
possessed by a civil court.
3. Witnesses are examined and cross-examined as in a court of law.
4. A party may be represented by a legal practitioner.
5. The tribunal is required to decide on the basis of the evidence adduced and according
to the provisions of the statute.
6. Members of the tribunal are persons qualified to be judges.

In Jaswant Sugar Mills ltd. V. Lakshmi Chand,48 the court held that the conciliation officer,
exercising powers under clause 29 of the order of the Uttar Pradesh governor, issued under the
U.P Industrial disputes Act, 1947 is not a tribunal, because he is not required to sit in public, no
formal pleadings are contemplated to be tendered, he is not empowered to compel attendance of
witnesses, nor is he restricted in making an enquiry about evidence which the parties may bring
before him. The Conciliation officer is again not capable of giving a determinative judgment or
award affecting the rights and obligations of the parties. He is not invested with powers similar to
those of the civil court under the CPC for enforcing attendance on any person and examining him
on oath, compelling production of documents, issuing commissions for the examination of
witnesses and other matters. Likewise, an arbitrator appointed under Section 10, Industrial
46 Bharat Bank Ltd. V. Employees
47 AIR 1950 SC 188
48 AIR 1963 SC 677
21

Disputes Act, 1947,is not a tribunal because he lacks the basic, the essential, and the fundamental
requisite in that behalf because he is not invested with the states inherent judicial power. He is
appointed by the parties and the power to decide the dispute between the parties who appoint him
is derived by him from the agreement of the parties and from no other source 49. In Dev Singh
v.P&H High Court50, it was held that appeals in disciplinary matters against the decision of the
District Judge to the High court under Rule X of the High courts rules are of administrative and
not of judicial character and therefore, no appeal against the order of the high court lies under
article 136. Supreme Court has even heard appeals from several bodies. In Harinagr sugar mills
V. Shyam Sundar JhunJhunwala51 it was held that Central government acting under Sec 111(3) of
the companies Act,1956, while deciding a dispute regarding registration of shares between a
company and the person who has purchased these shares
It may however, be stated that the consideration about the presence of all or some of the
trappings of a court is really not decisive. The presence of some of the trappings may assist the
determination of the character of power exercised by the authority. But the main and basic test is
whether the adjudicating power which a particular authority is empowered to exercise has been
conferred on it by a statute can be described as a part of the states inherent power exercised in
discharging its judicial function. In Associated Cement Company Ltd. V. P.N Sharma,52 it was
held that the Punjab state government exercising its appellate jurisdiction under rule 6 of the
Punjab Welfare Officers Rules, 1952 was a tribunal within the meaning of Article 136, as the
power which the state government exercises under the rule is a part of the states judicial power
and it can be exercised in respect of disputes between the management and its welfare officers.
Article 136 of the constitution does not confer a right of appeal, but a discretionary power on the
Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal from the order of any tribunal within the territory
of India. It is implicit in the discretionary power that it cannot be exhaustively defined. The
49 Engg. Mazdoor Sabha V. Hind Cycles Ltd., AIR 1963 SC 874
50 1987 7 SCC 161
51 AIR 1961 SC 648
52 AIR 1965 SC 1595
22

grounds on which the Supreme Court would normally interfere with decisions of tribunals can be
classified under the following categories, namely
1. Where the tribunal acts in excess of the jurisdiction conferred upon it under the statute or
regulation creating it, or where it ostensibly fails to exercise a patent jurisdiction.
2. Where there ia an apparent error on the face of the decision.
3. Where awards are made in violation of principles of natural justice causing substantial
and grave injustice to parties and
4. Where the tribunal has erroneously applied well accepted principles of jurisprudence.

Dismissal of Appeal:
After the Supreme Court grants leave to appeal, the Court hears the appeal on merits. After
hearing the arguments of the parties, the Court gives its decision. The Court may dismiss the
appeal with or without giving reasons for the same, or the Court may pass on order of reversal,
modification or merely affirmation of the decision of the lower court or the tribunal. In any such
situation, the decision appealed against gets merged with the decision of the Apex Court. This
means that after the Supreme Court, the original decision appealed against cannot be challenged
through a writ petition in High Court under Art. 226 of the constitution. Nor can the lower or
tribunal review its decision against which the Supreme Court has disposed of an appeal.53
A petition for grant of leave to appeal may be rejected for several reasons, such as;
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

The petition is time barred.


Defective presentation54
Petitioner lacks locus standi to file the petition
Conduct of the petitioner disentitles him to any indulgence by the court.
The question raised in the petition is not considered fit for consideration by the Court or
does not deserve to be dealt with by the Apex Court.

Delay:

53 Kunhayammed v State of Kerela AIR 2000 SC 2587


54 State of Punjab v Ashok Singh Garcha (2009) 2 SCC 399
23

An appeal must be filed without undue delay although Art. 136 prescribes no period of limitation
for the purpose. But the Court does not like the stale claims to be raked up. The Court has power
to condone delay in approaching it to enable it to do substantial justice to the parties concerned. 55
The Court shows a liberal attitude in condoning delay when the Government is the appellant.
One reason for such an approach is that bureaucratic delay is proverbial. Secondly, the Court
feels that if the state is denied an opportunity to appeal cause of delay, it may be loss to society
as a whole.56

Restrictions or Limitations:
Article 136 imposes no restriction or limitation on the power of Supreme Court to hear appeals.
The constitutional provision confers a plenary jurisdiction on the court. Nevertheless, the Court
has sought to impose on itself some restrictions in exercising this vast appellate jurisdiction. This
has been done with the view to reduce the flow of appeals to it so that it is not faced with
backlog of cases.

55 U.O.I v Cynamide India Ltd AIR 1987 SC 1802


56 State of U.P v Harish Chandra AIR 1996 SC 2173
24

Conclusion:
I found, that this is a beautiful constitutional provision which renders justice to a common
man. Due to the presence of this provision the common man has the right to seek the justice
in highest court of authority without any hindrance. This is a basic structure of the indiaan
constitution that cannot be amended on passing of any law. By crucial analysis over this
article it enables us to understand that subjects of India have been saved from erroneous
miscarriage of justice sometimes even the state government.

25

Bibliography:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Indian Constitutional Law 7th edition M P Jain.


V.N Shuklas Constitution of India.
Constitution law of India Dr.J.N Pandey
www.wikipedia.org/articlesonslp
www.lawresources.in
www.indiankanoon.in

26

You might also like