Hernandez v NAPOCOR

Facts
1. Sometime in 1996, National Power Corporation (Napocor) began the construction of steel poles
or towers in connection with its 230 Kilovolt Sucat-Araneta-Balintawak Power Transmission
Project. Said transmission line passes through the perimeter of Fort Bonifacio and Dasmarias
Village proximate to where petitioners homes are (Forbes Park).
2. Petitioners researched and found out through internet sources that exposure to
electromagnetic fields could cause diseases ranging from cancer to leukemia. Thus, petitioners
had various meetings with Napocor about the infrastructure project but such meetings remained
unsuccessful because both parties never reached an agreement.
3. Petitioners filed a complaint for damages with prayer for the issuance of TRO and/or
preliminary injunction against Napocor. The complaint was granted by the court.
4. Napocor filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for TRO and Preliminary Injunction with the
CA, on the ground that Sec. 1 of PD 1818 provides that no court of the Philippines shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory
injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project
5. The trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against Napocor. The
trial court said that an injunction was necessary to stay Napocors activation of its power lines
due to the possible health risks posed to the petitioners. The trial court was of the view that
Presidential Decree No. 1818 and jurisprudence proscribing injunctions against infrastructure
projects do not find application in the case at bar because of the health risks involved.
6. Napocor amended its petition filed before the CA to include the prayer for the nullification and
injunction of the Order of the trial court.
7. CA reversed the trial courts order, ruling that the proscription on injunctions against
infrastructure projects of the government is clearly mandated by the Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 1818.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court may issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction to enjoin the construction and operation of the steel poles or towers by the NAPOCOR,
notwithstanding Presidential Decree No. 1818
Held: Yes, petition is granted.

Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits courts from issuing injunctions against government
infrastructure projects. However, the prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or
restraining orders against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of
discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly outside this dimension and involving
questions of law, this Court declared that courts could not be prevented from
exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.

In the case at bar, petitioners sought the issuance of a preliminary injunction on

the ground that the Napocor project impinged on their right to health as enshrined in
the Constitution and for violation of Sec. 27 of the Local Government Code for
Napocors failure to conduct prior consultation with them. (question of law)

Moreover, the issuance by the trial court of a preliminary injunction finds legal support in
Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. The rule on preliminary injunction merely requires that
unless restrained, the act complained of will probably violate his rights and tend to render the
judgment ineffectual. Here, there is adequate evidence on record to justify the conclusion that

the project of Napocor probably imperils the health and safety of the petitioners so as to justify
the issuance by the trial court of a writ of preliminary injunction.

Sabalones v CA
Facts: Samson Sabalones is a member of diplomatic service assigned to different countries. He
left to his wife (Remedios Gaviola) the administration of some of their conjugal properties for 15
years.
2. He retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines, but not to his wife and
children.
3. 4 years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot in Greenhills,
San Juan. He claimed that he was 68 years old, sick and living alone without any income, and
that his share of the proceeds of the sale to defray the prohibitive cost of his hospitalization and
medical treatment.
4. His wife opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged
that the house in Greenhills was occupied by her and their 6 kids, and that they were depending
for their support on the rentals from another conjugal property (building and lot in Forbes Park).
She also informed the court that despite her husbands retirement, he had not returned to his
legitimate family and was instead maintaining a separate residence with another woman and
their 3 kids.
5. Wife asked the court to grant legal separation and order the liquidation of their conjugal
properties, with forfeiture of her husbands share because of his adultery.
6. RTC found that petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous marriage. Court thus decreed the
legal separation and forfeiture of petitioners share in the conjugal properties, declaring as well
that he was not entitled to support from his wife.
7. Wife filed to the CA a motion for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioner
from interfering with administration of their properties. She alleged that he had harassed the
tenant in Forbes Park that his lease would not be renewed) =granted by CA
8. Sabalones now assails this decision, arguing that since the law provides for joint
administration of conjugal properties, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or the other
because no right will be violated.
ISSUE: W/N a preliminary injunction can be issued by the Court (despite joint administration of
conjugal properties)
Held: YES. SC agree with CA that pending the appointment of an administrator over the whole
mass of conjugal assets, the CA was justified in allowing the wife to continue with her
administration. It was also correct, taking into account the evidence adduced at the hearing, in
enjoining the petitioner from interfering with his wifes administration pending resolution of the
appeal.
Since no formal designation of administrator has been made, such designation was implicit in the
decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus
also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was in effect approved by the
Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the wife with the preliminary injunction.
The primary purpose of injunction is to preserve status quo. The Court notes that the
wife has been administering the subject properties for 19 years now, without complaint on the

part of petitioner. He has not alleged, much less shown, that her administration has caused
prejudice to the conjugal partnership.
The twin requirements of a valid injunction are: existence of a right and its actual or
threatened violation. Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied that as the
petitioners legitimate wife, she has a right to a share (if not the whole) of the conjugal estate.
There is also enough evidence to raise apprehension that entrusting said estate to Sabalones
may result in its disposition to the disadvantage of the wife and kids.
Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as the
administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue
administering the properties in the meantime without interference from the petitioner, pending
the express designation of the administrator.
Ulang v CA (4 cases involved)
Facts: Brigida Julian, mother of Robert Ulang, sold a residential lot located at Olongapo City, to
Valentina Salazar, mother of private respondent Nelia Salazar. The sale is evidenced by a Deed of
Sale With Mortgage to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price in the amount of
P40,000.00. Included in the sale were two (2) houses standing on the lot. One of these houses
was occupied by Roberto Ulang and the other is rented by Frank Collins.
2. Frank Collins received a letter informing him that the premises were now owned by the
spouses Ynares, Jr., by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by and between the said spouses and
Roberto Ulang as attorney-in-fact of Brigida Julian.
3. Frank Collins filed a complaint for consignation of rentals (1st case) against Valentina
Salazar and the spouses Casimiro and Nieves Ynares, Jr. It was through this complaint that the
second sale became known to Valentina Salazar.
5. CFI of Olongapo rendered a decision accepting the consignation made by Frank Collins and
upholding Valentina Salazar's title and ownership of the property in question by virtue of the sale
between Brigida Julian and Valentina Salazar. The decision in said case which was appealed to
and affirmed by the Court of Appeals and subsequently became final.
6. Consequently, Valentina Salazar filed a case in the CFI of Olongapo City, for recovery of
possession (2nd case)against Roberto Ulang who had refused to vacate the premises and to pay
rentals to Salazar. After trial, the court declared that the second sale to the Ynares couple was
null and void, but decided that the sale between Brigida Julian and Valentina Salazar was a mere
equitable mortgage. Valentina Salazar appealed the said decision of the lower court to the Court
of Appeals. CA set aside the judgment of the lower court and ordered Roberto Ulang to vacate
and deliver the promises occupied by him to appellant Valentina Salazar.
8. A motion for issuance of a writ of execution was filed by Valentina Salazar before the trial
court. The motion was granted and a writ of execution was issued. However, before the writ of
execution could be carried out, petitioner Roberto Ulang filed an "Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and for Suspension of Implementation of the Writ of Execution."
9. Due to the intervening death of Valentina Salazar, a motion for substitution by her lone heir,
Nelia Salazar, was flied. The lower court grant the substitution and deny Roberto Ulang's
motion for reconsideration and suspension of implementation of the writ of execution,
and the other allowing an Alias Writ of Execution to issue. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari to annul these two (2) orders before the Court of Appeals. The petition was dismissed
for lack of merit.
10. Ulang filed a suit for foreclosure of mortgage with preliminary injunction and
damages (3rd case) against Nelia Salazar and the Sheriff of RTC of Olongapo City. On this day,

the court issued a restraining order enjoining Nelia Salazar and the respondent sheriff from
ejecting Roberto Ulang pending the hearing of his application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
11. The court issued the Order denying Ulang's prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction on the
ground that the foreclosure proceeding was still pending and the issue as to whether petitioner is
justified to foreclose the mortgage had not yet been determined. His motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied and the sheriff succeeded in evicting Ulang from the premises.
12. Ulang filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 (4th case) before the CA with prayer for
the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction directed against the issuance by Judge
Dans on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
13. According to Ulang, his right to remain in the property by virtue of the assignment to him
made by his mother, Brigida Julian of the loan of Valentina Salazar in the amount of P40,000.00
and secured by a mortgage over the subject premises, which loan has not been paid by
respondent Nelia Salazar, compelled him to seek the ancillary remedy of a preliminary injunction
in order to prevent private respondent Salazar and the Deputy Sheriff from ejecting him from the
premises until after said loan (which actually forms part of the purchase price) shall have been
fully paid. It is for this reason, according to him, that he opted to foreclose the mortgage.
14. But according to the CA:
Injunction, whether preliminary or final, is not designed to protect
contingent or future rights. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not
in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give
rise to a cause of action. The complainant's right or title, moreover, must be
clear and unquestioned, for equity, as a rule, will not take cognizance of
suits to establish title, and will not lend its preventive aid by injunction
where the complainant's title or right is doubtful or disputed. The possibility
of irreparable damage, without proof of violation of an actual existing right,
is no ground for an injunction, being mere damnum absque injuria.
15. SC AFFIRMED and the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner.