RULE 110

TOPIC: JURISDICTION
UY v. CA
276 SCRA 374
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Rosa Uy was employed as an
accountant in Don Tim Shipping
Company owned by the husband of
one Consolacion Leong. While
helping her husband manage their
lumber
business
Rosa
and
Consolacion agreed to form a
partnership. Various sums were
claimed to have been given by
Consolacion as capital of the
lumber business of Rosa, but no
receipt was ever issued. The
friendship of the two turned sour,
thus, Consolacion demanded the
return of her money but the checks
issued by Rosa were all dishonored
for
insufficiency
of
funds.
Consolacion filed a complaint for
Estafa and for violation of BP 22.
The Manila RTC acquitted the
petitioner of Estafa but convicted
her of the charges under BP 22.
Petitioner contends that Manila
RTC never acquired jurisdiction
over offenses under BP 22 and
assuming arguendo that she raised
the matter of jurisdiction only
upon appeal, she cannot be
estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC of Manila
acquired jurisdiction over the
violation of the
Bouncing checks law.
RULING:

The crimes of Estafa and violation

of the Bouncing Checks Law are
two different offenses having
different elements and, necessarily,
for a court to acquire jurisdiction
each of the essential ingredients of
each crime has to be satisfied.
The respondent court is wrong to
conclude that inasmuch as the RTC
of Manila acquired jurisdiction
over the Estafa case then it also
acquired jurisdiction over the
violation of BP 22. No proof has
been offered that the checks were
issued, delivered, dishonored or
knowledge of
insufficiency of
funds occurred in Manila, which
are essential elements necessary
for the Manila court to acquire
jurisdiction. BP 22 on the other
hand, as a continuing offense, may
be tried in any jurisdiction where
the offense was in part committee.
Petitioner also timely questioned
the jurisdiction of the court. As
provided by jurisprudence, we can
see that even if a party fails to file
a motion to quash, he may still
question the jurisdiction of the
court later on. The general rule is
that the jurisdiction of a court over
a subject matter of the action is a
matter of law and may not be
conferred by consent or agreement
of the parties. The lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be
raised at any stage of the
proceeding, even on appeal.
WHEREFORE,
finding
the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br
32, to have no jurisdiction over
Crim. Case Nos. 84-32335 to 8432340, inclusive, the assailed

RULE 110
decision of respondent Court of
Appeals affirming the decision of
the trial court dated 24 September
1991 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, without prejudice to the
filing of appropriate charges
against petitioner with the court of
competent
jurisdiction
when
warranted.
CRUZ v. CA
388 SCRA 79
Carpio, J.;
TOPIC: JURISDICTION
FACTS:
Lutgarda Cruzexecuted before a
Notary Public the City of Manila an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of a
parcel of land stating that she was
the sole surviving heir of the
registered owner when in fact she
knew there were other surviving
heirs. After trial on the merits, the
trial court rendered its decision
acquitting petitioner on the ground
of reasonable doubt. However, on
the same decision, the trial court
rendering decision on the civil
aspect of the case, ordered the
return to the surviving heirs of the
parcel of land located in Bulacan.
A Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but was denied
for lack of merit. A second move
for a reconsideration was likewise
denied by the trial court. Petitioner
asserts that both copies of the
motion for reconsideration were
sent to the trial court and the City
Prosecutor by registered mail on
February 10, 1994. CA held that if
service is made by the registered
mail, proof shall be made by such

affidavit
and
registry-receipt
issued by the mailing office.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in
not finding that the prosecution
was duly furnished a copy of the
petitioners
motion
for
reconsideration with respect to the
decision on the civil aspect of the
case.
Whether or not the CA erred in
finding that the RTC of Manila had
jurisdiction to render judgment on
the civil aspect of the case.
RULING:
1. Petitioner asserts that both
copies
of
the
motion
for
reconsideration were sent to the
trial court and the City Prosecutor
by registered mail on Feb. 10,
1994.
SC agrees to the ruling of the CA.
An MR filed, thru a registered
mail, without proof of service is
considered a mere scrap of paper.
Hence the period continued to run
and lapsed making the trial courts
decision final and executory. Proof
of service is mandatory.
2. Being a civil liability arising
from the offense charged, the
governing law is the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, not the civil
procedure rules that pertain to
civil action arising from the
initiatory pleading that gives rise
to the suit. There are 3 important
requisites which must be present
in order that a court acquires
jurisdiction: first, jurisdiction over
the subject matter; second, over

RULE 110
the territory; third, over the
person. The trial court had
jurisdiction over the subject matter
as the law has conferred on the
court the power to hear cases
involving
Estafa
through
falsification of document. The RTC
also had jurisdiction over the
offense charged since the crime
was
committed
within
its
territorial jurisdiction. Lastly, RTC
had jurisdiction over the person of
the accused-petitioner because she
voluntarily submitted to the courts
authority.
WHEREFORE, petitioner is given
five days from receipt of this
decision within which to serve a
copy
of
her
motion
for
reconsideration on the offended
party. Let this case be remanded to
the
trial
court
for
further
proceedings.
Dela Cruz vs. Moya
160 SCRA 838
CORTES, J.:
TOPIC: JURISDICTION
FACTS:
Rodolfo Dela Cruz is a member of
the Armed Forces Intelligence and
Operations Section. Armed with a
MISSION ORDER, Dela Cruz
proceeds to Maco, Davao del Norte
to investigate reports of illegal
cockfighting being conducted. Dela
cruz and company caught in
flagrante delicto the operators of
cockfighting, but the latter refused
arrest. The operators, including
Eusebio Cabilto, followed the
soldiers on their way bak to the OC

headquarters. Fighting ensued and

in the scuffle, Dela Cruz shot
Cabilto. On Aug 2, 1979, Dela cruz
was charged with homicide in the
CFI of Davao.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil courts
have jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the criminal case.
RULING:
SC resolves the issue on the
negative.
In civil procedure, one of the
essential requisites of a valid court
proceeding is that the court
hearing must have jurisdiction
over of the subject matter of the
case. Jurisdiction is determined by
the statute at force at the time the
action was commenced. At that
time, General Order 59 was
operative giving military tribunals
exclusive jurisdiction over all
offenses committed by military
personnel
while
in
the
performance of their official duty.
Since Dela cruz was executing a
Mission Order, he his deemed
performing his official duties.
Court records contain a copy of
Mission Order, thus, certificate
from
secretary
of
DND
is
unnecessary. CFI was without
jurisdiction to try the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. The proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 4008 are
declared null and void but without
prejudice to the filing of another
action in the proper forum. Let a
copy of this decision be furnished
the
Judge
Advocate
of
the
Philippine
Constabulary,
Camp

RULE 110
Crame,
Quezon
appropriate action.

City,

for

GUEVARRA v. ALMODOVAR
169 SCRA 476
PARAS, J.:
TOPIC: JURISDITION
FACTS:
John Philipp Guevarra, then 11
years old, was playing with his
best friend, Teodoro Amine, Jr. and
other children. They were targetshooting a bottle cap with an air
rifle borrowed from a neighbor. In
the course of their game, Teodoro
was hit by a pellet on his left
collarbone
which
caused
his
unfortunate
death.
After
preliminary investigation, Fiscal
acquitted petitioner due to his age
and because the unfortunate event
appeared to be an accident. The
parents of Teodoro appealed to the
Ministry of Justice, which ordered
to file a case against petitioner
Guevarra for Homicide through
reckless imprudence.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not an 11 year old
could be charged with the crime of
homicide thru reckless imrpudence
2. Whether or not the court had
jurisdiction
over
the
case
notwithstanding the fact that it did
not pass thru the barangay lupon.
RULING:
1. Intent and discernment are two
different concepts. While they are
products of mental processes
within a person, intent refers to
the desire of ones act while

discernment refers to the moral

significance that a person ascribes
to an act. Minors 9 years to 15
years are presumed to be without
criminal
capacity,
but
this
presumption may be rebutted if it
could be proven that they were
capable of appreciating the nature
and criminality of the act, that is,
that they acted with discernment.
2. SC mentioned its ruling on a
previous case. The jurisdiction of a
court over a criminal case is
determined
by
the
penalty
imposable under the law for the
offense and not the penalty
imposed. In construing Section
2(3) of P.D. 1508, the penalty,
which the law defining the offense
attaches to the latter, shall be
considered.
Hence,
any
circumstance which may affect
criminal liability must not be
considered. As categorically stated
in Ebol v. Amin, P.D. 1508 is not
jurisdictional.
WHEREFORE,
PREMISES
CONSIDERED, this petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit
and
the
Temporary
Restraining Order effective 17
September 1986 is LIFTED. Let
the case be remanded to the lower
court for trial on the merits. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE v. MARIANO
71 SCRA 600
MUNOZ PALMA, J.:

RULE 110

TOPIC: JURISDICTION
FACTS:
Hermogenes
Mariano
is
an
appointed Liaison officer by Mayor
Constantino Nolasco of San Jose
del Monte, Bulacan. Mariano is
authorized to receive and be
receipted for US excess property
of USAID/NEC. Mariano, instead of
delivering it to the Office of the
Mayor, misappropriated, misapply
and converteed the said items for
his personal benefit. Hence, the
Office of Provinsial Fiscal of
Bulacan filed an Information
accusing
private
reponsdent
Mariano of Estafa. Mariano filed a
motion to quash thee information.
He claimed that the items which
were the subject matter of the
Information against him were the
same items for which Mayor
Nolasco was indicted before a
Military Commission under a
charge of malversation of public
property. The judge of RTC
granted the motion to quash on the
ground of lack of jurisction. It held
that
it
had
already
taken
cognizance of the malversation
case
against
Mayor
Nolasco
involving the same subject matter,
as such the court has without the
jurisdiction to pass upon anew the
same subject matter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not civil courts and
military
commissions
exercise
concurrent jurisdiction over the
offense of estafa of goods allegedly
committed by a civilian.
RULING:

Sec. 44 of Judicary Act of 1948

provides that:
xxx CFI shall have original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases in
which the penalty provided by law
is imprisonment for more than six
months xxx
The
offense
charged
against
Mariano is penalized with arresto
mayor in its minimum and prision
correccional
in
its
maximum
period. Thus, Mariano falls under
the original jurisdiction of the CFI.
In a previous case decided by SC,
it ruled that the jurisdiction of a
court is determined by the statute
in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. In
the case at bar, the law in force
vesting jurisdiction upon CFI was
the Judiciary Act of 1948.
SC also made it clear that Estafa
and Malversation are two and
separate distinct offenses.
Lastly, Military Commission is
without power or authority to hear
and determine the particular
offense
charged
against
respondent
Mariano. Estafa falls within the
sole exclusive jurisdiction of civil
courts.
PREMISES
CONSIDERED,
the
appealed Order dated March 14,
1975, is set aside and respondent
Judge is directed to proceed with
the trial of Criminal Case No. SM649 without further delay.
SO ORDERED.

RULE 110

PEOPLE vs. CHUPECO, 10

SCRA 838
TOPIC: JURISDICTION
Facts: The accused-appellant, Jose
L. Chupeco, was charged in the
City of Manila, Philippines, under
the information:
That the said accused being the
owner of, and, having previously
on the 24th day of July, 1946,
executed a Chattel Mortgage on
the properties, sawmill machinery
and equipment and transportation
units to be used sawmill building,
located at Sitio Saguing,
Dinalupihan, Bataa, in favor of the
Agricultural and Industrial Bank,
whose capital, assets, accounts,
contracts and choses in action
were subsequently transferred to
the herein complainant
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
with principal office at the City of
Manila, Philippines, to secure a
loan of P20,000.00, from said
Agricultural and Industrial Bank.
The accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
with intent to defraud the said
Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation, pledge and incumber,
or cause to be pledged and
incumbered the same personal
properties to one Mateo B. Pinile
without having fully satisfied the
mortgage and during the term
thereof and without the consent of
the mortgagee bank, knowingly
transfer and remove, or cause to
be transferred and removed the
said properties to the municipality
of Subic, Zambales, also without
the written consent of the
mortgagee bank, to the damage
and prejudice of the said

Rehabilitation Finance Corporation

in the sum of P15,935.80,
Philippine currency, representing
the unpaid balance of the aforesaid
mortgage.
The accused moved to quash the
foregoing information on the
ground that more than one offense
is charged and that the court had
no jurisdiction.
The accused attacks the
jurisdiction of the trial court on the
strength of the agreement with the
fiscal to discard the charge of
repledging or remembering the
chattels already mortgaged to the
Agricultural and Industrial Bank
thus leaving in force only the
accusation of having transferred
the encumbered property from
Bataan to Zambales without the
consent of the mortgagee. It is
argued that since the place where
the chattels were, as well as the
site to which they were moved, are
both outside of Manila, the courts
of the latter acquired no
jurisdiction to try the case,
because the offense was not
committed within the Manila
territory.
Issue: Whether or not the trial
court has a jurisdiction over
Chupecos case
Held: No. We find this stand
without merit. The original terms
of the charge averred (and it is not
disputed) the crime of repledging
already encumbered property
without the creditor's consent, and
one of the essential ingredients of
the offense (the execution of the
first mortgage) having been
alleged, to have taken place in
Manila, the court of first instance
of that city acquired jurisdiction

RULE 110
over the offense under the Rules of
Court (People vs. Mission, 48 O.G.,
1331; Rule 110, section 9). It is
well-established that once vested,
the jurisdiction is not tolled by
subsequent amendment or which
in this case amounted to no more
than an avowal by the prosecution
that it could not establish the other
elements of the offense.
Furthermore, the court actually
rejected the defense motion to
dismiss, and directed that the cue
be tried on the original charge of
repledging property already
encumbered. The accused obeyed
that directive, and by so doing it
renounced the claim that the
information had been so amended
as to discard that particular
averment.
Even if the Court of First Instance
of Manila had jurisdiction over the
case, the accused cannot be found
guilty on the evidence on record of
the crime for which he stands
indicted. FOR THE FOREGOING
REASON, the appealed decision is
hereby reversed, and another one
entered acquitting the accused
Jose L. Chupeco.
MANILA RAILROAD CO. vs
ATTY.GENERAL, 20 Phil 523
TOPIC: JURISDICTION
Facts: In the month of December,
1907, the plaintiff began an action
in the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Tarlac for the
condemnation of certain real
estate, stated by the plaintiff in his
complaint to be located in the
Province of Tarlac. It is alleged in
the complaint that the plaintiff is
authorized by law to construct a
railroad line "from Paniqui to

Tayug in the Province of Tarlac,"

and it is for the purpose of
condemning lands for the
construction of such line that this
action is brought. The complaint
states that before beginning the
action the plaintiff had caused to
be made a thorough search in the
office of the registry of property
and of the tax where the lands
sought to be condemned were
located and to whom they
belonged. As a result of such
investigations the plaintiff alleged
that the lands in question were
located in the Province of Tarlac.
On the 4th day of October the
plaintiff gave notice to the
defendants that on the 9th day of
October a motion would be made
to the court to dismiss the action
upon the ground that the court had
no jurisdiction of the subject
matter, it having just been
ascertained by the plaintiff that the
land sought to be condemned was
situated in the Province of Nueva
Ecija, instead of the Province of
Tarlac, as alleged in the complaint.
This motion was heard and, after
due consideration, the trial court
dismissed the action upon the
ground presented by the plaintiff.
This appeal is taken from said
judgment of dismissal.
Issue:
1. The question for our
consideration and decision is the
power and authority of a Court of
First Instance of Tarlac to take
cognizance of an action by a
railroad company for the
condemnation of real estate
located in another province.
2. Whether or not Sec. 377[1] of
the Code of Civil Procedure and

RULE 110
Act. No. 1258 are applicable and
therefore the CFI has no
jurisdiction.
Held:
1. Yes, CFI Tarlac has power and
authority to take cognizance of
condemnation of real estate
located in another province.
Sections 55 and 56[1] of Act No.
136 of the Philippine Commission
confer perfect and complete
jurisdiction upon the CFI of these
Islands with respect to real estate
in the Philippine Islands. Such
jurisdiction is not made to depend
upon locality. There is no
suggestion of limitation. The
jurisdiction is universal. It is
nowhere suggested, much less
provided, that a CFI of one
province, regularly sitting in said
province, may not under certain
conditions take cognizance of an
action arising in another province
or of an action relating to real
estate located outside of the
boundaries of the province to
which it may at the time be
assigned.
Furthermore, in terms of
jurisdiction over person of the
plaintiff, the procedure does not
alter or change that power or
authority; it simply directs the
manner in which it shall be fully
and justly exercised. To be sure, in
certain cases, if that power is not
exercised in conformity with the
provisions of the procedural law,
purely, the court attempting to
exercise it loses the power to
exercise it legally. This does not
mean that it loses jurisdiction of
the subject matter. It means simply
that he may thereby lose
jurisdiction of the person or that

the judgment may thereby be

rendered defective for lack of
something essential to sustain it.
There is, of course, an important
distinction between person and
subject matter are both conferred
by law. As to the subject matter,
nothing can change the
jurisdiction of the court over
diminish it or dictate when it shall
attach or when it shall be removed.
That is a matter of legislative
enactment which none but the
legislature may change. On the
other hand, the jurisdiction of the
court over the person is, in some
instances, made to defend on the
consent or objection, on the acts or
omissions of the parties or any of
them. Jurisdiction over the person,
however, may be conferred by
consent, expressly or impliedly
given, or it may, by an objection,
be prevented from attaching or
removed after it has attached.
2. No. Sec. 377 contains no
express inhibition against the
court. The prohibition provided
therein is clearly directed against
the one who begins the action and
lays the venue. The court, before
the action is commenced, has
nothing to do with it either. The
prohibition is not a limitation on
the power of the court but on the
rights of the plaintiff. It establishes
a relation not between the court
and the subject, but between the
plaintiff and the defendant. It
relates not to jurisdiction but to
trial. It simply gives to defendant
the unqualified right, if he desires
it, to have the trial take place
where his land lies and where,
probably, all of his witnesses live.

RULE 110
Its object is to secure to him a
convenient trial.
Section 377 of the Code of Civil
Procedure is not applicable to
actions by railroad corporations to
condemn lands; and that, while
with the consent of defendants
express or implied the venue may
be laid and the action tried in any
province selected by the plaintiff
nevertheless the defendants whose
lands lie in one province, or any
one of such defendants, may, by
timely application to the court,
require the venue as to their, or, if
one defendant, his, lands to be
changed to the province where
their or his lands lie. In such case
the action as to all of the
defendants not objecting would
continue in the province where
originally begun. It would be
severed as to the objecting
defendants and ordered continued
before the court of the appropriate
province or provinces. While we
are of that opinion and so hold it
can not affect the decision in the
case before us for the reason that
the defendants are not objecting to
the venue and are not asking for a
change thereof. They have not only
expressly submitted themselves to
the jurisdiction of the court but are
here asking that that jurisdiction
be maintained against the efforts
of the plaintiff to remove it.
The judgment must be REVERSED
and the case REMANDED to the
trial court with direction to
proceed with the action according
to law.
FUKUZUME vs. PEOPLE, 474
SCRA 580
TOPIC: JURISDICTION

Facts: A petition for certiorari

finding the accused-appelant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of a
crime of estafa.
In an Information, dated
November 4, 1994, filed with the
RTC of Makati, Fukuzume was
charged with estafa committed as
follows:
That sometime in the month
of July, 1991 up to September 17,
1992, in the Municipality of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines,
a place within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to
prejudice and defraud Javier Yu y
Ng, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make
false
representation
and
fraudulent manifestation that he is
the duly authorized representative
of Furukawa Electric Co. Ltd., in
the
Philippines,
and
was
authorized to sell excess aluminum
conductor materials not being
used by Napocor and Furukawa,
the accused knowing full well that
those representations were false
and were only made to induce and
convince said Javier Yu y Ng to buy
said materials, who believing said
representations to be true, gave
and delivered the total amount
of P424,000.00 but the accused
once in possession of the money,
far from complying with his
obligation to deliver said aluminum
conductor materials to herein
complainant, with intent of gain,
unfaithfulness
and
abuse
of
confidence, applied and used for

RULE 110
his own personal use and benefit
the said amount and despite
repeated demands failed and
refused and still fails and refuses
to account for, to the damage and
prejudice of Javier Yu y Ng in the
aforementioned
amount
of P424,000.00.
Upon being arraigned on
February 28, 1995, Fukuzume
pleaded not guilty.[27] Trial ensued.
In its Decision dated October 21,
1996, the trial court found
Fukuzume guilty as charged. On
March
13,
2000,
the
CA
promulgated its decision affirming
the findings and conclusions of the
trial court but modifying the
penalty imposed.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC of
Makati have jurisdiction over the
case of Fukuzume.
Held: No. With respect to the
sworn statement of Yu, which was
presented in evidence by the
prosecution, it is clear that he
alleged therein that on July 12,
1991, he gave Fukuzume the
amount
of P50,000.00
at the
Intercontinental Hotel in Makati.
However,
we
agree
with
Fukuzumes contention that Yu
testified
during
his
direct
examination that on July 12, 1991
he gave the amount of P50,000.00
to Fukuzume in the latters house.

It is not disputed that Fukuzumes

house is located in Paraaque.

More importantly, we find

nothing in the direct or crossexamination of Yu to establish that
he gave any money to Fukuzume
or transacted business with him
with respect to the subject
aluminum scrap wires inside or
within the premises
of the
Intercontinental Hotel in Makati,
or anywhere in Makati for that
matter. Venue in criminal cases is
an
essential
element
of
jurisdiction.
Citing Uy vs. Court of Appeals we
held in the fairly recent case
of Macasaet vs. People that:

It is a fundamental rule that for

jurisdiction to be acquired by
courts in criminal cases the offense
should have been committed or
any one of its essential ingredients
took place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the
territory where the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance or
to try the offense allegedly
committed therein by the accused.

RULE 110
Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction
over a person charged with an
offense
allegedly
committed
outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a
court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information. And
once it is so shown, the court may
validly take cognizance of the
case. However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial show
that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court
should dismiss the action for
want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis
supplied)

Where life or liberty is affected by

its proceedings, the court must
keep strictly within the limits of
the law authorizing it to take
jurisdiction and to try the case and
to render judgment.

In the present case, the criminal

information against Fukuzume was
filed with and tried by the RTC of
Makati. Thus, having found that
the RTC of Makati did not have
jurisdiction to try the case against
Fukuzume, we find it unnecessary

to consider the other issues raised

in the present petition.

WHEREFORE, the instant

petition
is GRANTED.
The
assailed decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals are SET
ASIDE on ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati
PEOPLE vs. MAGALLANES, 249
SCRA 212
TOPIC: JURISDICTION
Facts: In the evening of August 7,
1992, the Spouses Dumancas,
under the direction and
cooperation of P/Col. Nicolas
Torres who took advantage of his
position as station commander of
the PNP, with Police Inspector
Abetos cooperation, induced other
police officers and civilian agents
to abduct kidnap and detain Rufino
Garagar and Danilo Lumangyao,
with the use of a motor vehicle and
then shot and killed the victims
with evident premeditation,
treachery and nocturnity. The
other accuse secretly buried the
victims in a make shifts shallow
grave to conceal the crime of
murder for a fee of P500.00 each.
The cases were consolidated and
the accused pleaded not guilty and
filed motions for bail. The
prosecution presented Moises
Grandeza, the alleged one
eyewitness and co-conspirator in
the offense. After the prosecution
rested its case, the trial court
received evidence for the accused,

RULE 110
but the reception of evidence was
suspended because of the motions
for inhibition of Judge Gravilles
filed by several accused. Garvilles
voluntarily inhibited himself and
the case was re-raffled. However,
the prosecution moved for the
transmittal of the records to the
Sandiganbayan because the
offenses charged were committed
in relation to the office of the
accused PNP officers. The trial
court ruled that the
Sandiganbayan does not have
jurisdiction because the
informations do not state that the
offenses charged were committed
in relation to the office of the
accused PNP officers and denied
the Motion for the Transfer of
Records to Sandiganbayan. The
prosecution moved to reconsider
but the same was denied. The
reception of evidence was resumed
but the judge later inhibited
himself. The cases were then reraffled to Branch 49 of the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod.
The prosecution filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for a
temporary restraining order,
challenging the refusal of the
judge to transfer the cases to the
Sandiganbayan. The private
respondents were required to
comment on the petition and
issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the respondent
judge to desist from proceeding
with the trial of the case.
Issue: Whether or not the
Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction
over this case.
Held: The jurisdiction of a court
may be determined by law in force

at the time of the commencement

of the action. When the
informations in the cases were
filed, the law governing the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
was P.D.1861, which provides that
the Sandiganbayan shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over
cases involving: 1.) violations of
Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices
Act; 2.) offenses committed by
public officers in relation to their
office, where the penalty
prescribed is higher than prision
correccional for imprisonment of
six (6) years or affine of P6,000, it
shall be tried by the Regional Trial
Court, Metropolitan Court,
Municipal Trial Court or the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
Jurisdiction is also determined by
the allegations in the complaint or
information and not by the result
of the evidence after the trial. In
the present case, the
Sandiganbayan has not yet
acquired jurisdiction over the
cases. The allegations in the
complaint or information of taking
advantage of his position are not
sufficient to bring the offenses
within the definition of the
offenses committed in relation to
public office. Its considered
merely an aggravating
circumstance. Moreover, the
Sandiganbayan has partly lost its
jurisdiction over cases involving
violations of R.A. 3019, as
amended in R.A. 1379 because it
only retains jurisdiction on cases
enumerated in subsection a) when
the public officers rank is classified
as Grade 27 or higher. In the
case at bar, none of the PNP
officers involved occupy a position

RULE 110
classified as Grade 27 or higher.
Accused Torres, who is the highest
in rank among the accused only
has a rank classified Grade 18.
Lastly, the courts cannot be
divested of jurisdiction which was
already acquired before the
subsequent enactment R.A. 7975
which limited the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction to officers whose rank
is Grade 27 or higher, because
the courts retain its jurisdiction
until the end of litigation. Hence,
cases already under the
jurisdiction of the courts at the
time of the enactment of R.A.7975
are only referred to the proper
courts if trial has not yet begun at
that time. Petition is DENIED and
the challenged orders are
AFFIRMED.
BUAYA vs. POLO, 169 SCRA 471
Facts:
TOPIC: JURISDICTION
Petitioner Solemnidad Buaya was
an insurance agent of Country
Bankers Insurance Corporation
(CBIC) and was authorized to
collect premiums for and in behalf
of CBIC then make a report and
accounting of the transactions and
remit the same to the principal
office of CBIC in Manila. However,
an audit of Buayas account
showed that there was a shortage
in the amount of P358,850.7. As a
result, she was charged with estafa
before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila has no jurisdiction because
she is based in Cebu City, but the
same was denied by respondent
Judge Polo. The subsequent motion
for reconsideration was likewise

denied. Hence, the present

petition.
Issue: Whether or not the
Regional Trial Court of Manila has
jurisdiction to try the criminal case
against petitioner Buaya.
Held:
The allegation in the complaint or
information determine the
jurisdiction of the court in criminal
cases. 14(a) of Rule 110 provides
that the action in all criminal
prosecutions shall be instituted
and tried in the court of the
municipality or province where the
offense was committed or where
any of its essential elements took
place. The subject information
charges Buaya with estafa
committed during the period of
1980 to June 15, 1982 inclusive in
the City of Manila, Philippines. The
claim of Buaya that RTC Manila
has no jurisdiction because she is
based in Cebu City is without
merit.
Clearly, RTC Manila has no
jurisdiction since the respondents
principal place of business in
Manila and Buayas failure to remit
the premiums caused damage and
prejudice to respondent in Manila.
Besides, estafa is a continuing
offense which may be prosecuted
at any place where any of the
essential elements of the crime
took place. Petition is DISMISSED.
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
(PEOPLE
OF
THE PHILIPPINES), petitioner,
vs.
HON. DELFIN VIR. SUNGA, as
Presiding Judge, CFI Branch I,
Camarines
Sur,
ARISTON

RULE 110
ANADILLA, RAFAEL ANADILLA
and
JOSE
ANADILLA, respondents
Facts:
That on or about June 29,
1994 in the afternoon Rey Sunga,
Ramil Lansang, Inocencio Pascua,
Jr., and Lito Octac as principals,
and Locil Cui alias Ginalyn Cuyos
as accomplice by means of force,
violence and intimidation, to wit:
by pinning down one JOCELYN
TAN, a minor, fifteen (15) years of
age, succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of her against her will
and without her consent; that on
the occasion of said rape and to
enable them to conceal the
commission of the crime, the
herein accused in furtherance of
the conspiracy together with
LOCIL CUI, a minor, acting with
discernment and who cooperated
in the execution of the offense as
ACCOMPLICE, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
taking advantage of their superior
number and strength, with intent
to
kill,
treacherously
attack,
assault, and use personal violence
upon JOCELYN TAN by repeatedly
stabbing and smashing a stone on
her head, thereby inflicting upon
her mortal wounds and multiple
fractures on her skull which were
the direct cause of her death
shortly thereafter.
On October 18, 1994 a motion to
discharge accused Locil Cui (Locil)
to be a state witness, averring
therein that the legal requisites for
her discharge had been complied
with, and submitting her sworn

statement which detailed how her

co-accused carried out the crime.
Her version of the facts is as
follows:
"At about 2:00 p. m. of June 29,
1994, Locil boarded a tricycle
bearing the marking "Ryan-Ryan"
from the Social Security System
(SSS) Office in Puerto Princesa
City. Already on board the tricycle
was a lesbian who had a birthmark
on the right side of the face and
who invited Locil for a joy ride.13
Upon instruction of the lesbian,
the tricycle driver, whom she did
not know but whom she later
identified and who answered to the
name Rey Sunga (Sunga), repaired
to the Mendoza Park.
At the Mendoza Park, the lesbian
alighted and spoke to Jocelyn Tan,
the victim, who was dressed in a
PINS
uniform.
The
lesbian,
together with Jocelyn, then joined
Locil aboard the tricycle which
was already driven by Inocencio
Pascua (Pascua) vice Sunga who
had in the meantime left. Still
aboard the tricycle, the four of
them proceeded to and reached
Barangay Irawan, Puerto Princesa
City and on reaching a forested
area, Jocelyn was met by Sunga
who held her and by Ramil
Lansang (Lansang) who wrapped
his arm around her waist as they
dragged her to a nearby "buho"
clumps. There, Jocelyn was made
to lie down. Her skirt was raised
and her panty was taken off by
Lansang. As she lay face up with
both her hands held by Sunga and
Pascua, Lansang stripped naked,

RULE 110
placed himself on top of Jocelyn,
inserted his penis into her vagina
and "seemed to be pumping."
After Lansang, Sunga took turn to
have sexual intercourse with
Jocelyn as Lansang and one who
was not known to Locil and whom
the latter described as one who
has "chinky" or "narrow eyes,"
later identified to be Pascua, kept
Jocelyn pinned down by her hands.
Pascua too subsequently had
carnal knowledge of Jocelyn who
all along struggled against her
malefactors.
After Pascua satisfied his lust,
Sunga, with a sharp bladed
weapon, stabbed the abdomen of
the motionless Jocelyn, drawing
her to rise to a sitting position and
clutch her abdomen. Sunga then
passed on the bladed weapon to
Lansang who smashed Jocelyn's
head with an irregularly shaped
stone, causing her to fall to the
ground
lifeless.
Locil,
who
witnessed everything, was then
pulled by the lesbian and led back
into the tricycle where they
awaited Lansang, Sunga and
Pascua to ride with them. All five
thereafter headed back to Puerto
Princesa City proper, leaving
Jocelyn's body behind.
When the five reached the
Mendoza
Park
where
Locil
alighted, she heard the voice of
someone from inside the tricycle
warning her to keep mum about
the incident, otherwise something
would also happen to her. Locil

then repaired to her boarding

house. Until she was arrested
following the discovery on July 12,
1994 of Jocelyn's corpse, she did
not report the incident to anyone."
Upon the other hand,
accused proffered alibi.

all

the

Accused-appellant Sunga, who had

previously been convicted for
robbery with homicide, denied
having anything to do with the
rape and killing of Jocelyn. He
branded as false the testimony of
Locil whom he claimed is a
prostitute and a pimp and was
always seen loitering at Mendoza
Park. Through a sworn statement,
he averred that: He, Octa and Jun
returned to Irawan, took Jocelyn's
corpse and dumped it at a coffee
plantation in Jacana Road; and that
he did not take part in the rape or
killing of Jocelyn but merely joined
the group due to Lansang's
promise to give him P500.00.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC: By decision of March 7,
1996, the trial court convicted
Sunga and Lansang as principals
of the crime of Rape with
Homicide and sentenced each to
suffer the penalty of DEATH, and
Pascua as principal in the crime of
Rape. While the others are
acquitted and Locil is discharged
as state witness.
Automatic review by SC.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the discharge by the
lower court of Locil Cui as a state

RULE 110
witness is in accordance with law;
and
(2) Whether the guilt of appellants
has
been
proven
beyond
reasonable doubt
(3) Is Sunga's sworn statement
admissible as evidence?
HELD:
The accused were acquitted.
(1) NO.
Requisites: 1. the discharge must
be with the consent of the accused
sought to be a state witness; - YES
2. his testimony
necessary; - YES

is

absolutely

Based on Locil's sworn statement,

she was the only person who saw
what happened to Jocelyn. Her
testimony was thus indispensable.
3. No other direct evidence is
available
for
the
proper
prosecution
of
the
offense
committed except his testimony; YES

Locil's account for they relate --not to the crime itself but to events
THEREAFTER.
An exhaustive review of the
transcript of stenographic notes of
Locil's testimony reveals, however,
that the manner by which she
related it was punctuated with
marks of tentativeness, uncertainty
and indecisiveness which the trial
court unfortunately failed to take
note of in its decision on review.
b. To recapitulate, Locil claimed
that on June 29, 1994 she boarded
a tricycle bearing a lesbian who
invited her for a joyride, proceeded
to the Mendoza Park and picked up
Jocelyn, whom she was not
acquainted with, then brought by
the same tricycle to Irawan where
the latter was raped and brutally
murdered. In other words, she
wanted to convey that she was
deliberately brought by appellants
with them on June 29, 1994 to the
place where they were to carry
out,
which
they
did,
their
abominable acts against Jocelyn.
This
strikes
this
Court
as
improbable if not bizarre.
5. He does not appear to be the
most guilty; and. - YES

4.
His
testimony
can
be
substantially corroborated in its
material points; - NO

6. He has not at any time been

convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude. - -YES

a. As for the rest of the

prosecution evidence, it fails to
corroborate Locil's testimony. The
declarations of other witnesses can
in no way enhance the veracity of
the essential, material aspects of

But -- Who can trust one who, in

her early teens, gets pregnant,
flees home and stays in a boarding
house albeit she has no visible
means of income to pay therefor,
and carries an alias name to evade

RULE 110
being traced by her mother and
aunt?
(2) NO, see items 1 and 2.
In light of the weak evidence for
the prosecution, the defense of
alibi as well as of denial by
appellants is accorded credence,
for it is precisely when the
prosecution's case is weak that the
defense
of
alibi
assumes
importance and becomes crucial in
negating criminal liability.
In fine, regardless of the probative
weight of appellants' alibi, the
prosecution still has the onus of
proving
the
guilt
beyond
reasonable doubt of the accused
and cannot rely on the weakness of
the
defense
evidence.
The
prosecution
having
failed
to
discharge its burden, appellants'
presumed innocence remains and
must thus be acquitted.
(3) NO.
From the testimony of SPO2
Janoras, it can be gathered that
Atty. Rocamora (Sunga's counse
during custodial investigation) did
not, if at all, fully apprise Sunga of
his rights and options prior to
giving his (Sunga's) admission.
Evidently, Atty. Rocamora, without
more, merely acted to facilitate the
taking of the admission from
Sunga.
Any information or admission
given by a person while in custody
which may appear harmless or
innocuous at the time without the
competent
assistance
of
an

independent counsel must be

struck down as inadmissible. Even
if the confession contains a grain
of truth or even if it had been
voluntarily given, if it was made
without the assistance of counsel,
it is inadmissible.
The right to counsel involves more
than just the presence of a lawyer
in the courtroom or the mere
propounding of standard questions
and objections; rather it means an
efficient
and
decisive
legal
assistance and not a simple
perfunctory representation.
RATIO:
(1) The sole, uncorroborated
testimony of an accused who
turned state witness may suffice to
convict his co-accused if it is given
unhesitatingly
and
in
a
straightforward manner and is full
of details which by their nature
could not have been the result of
deliberate afterthought; otherwise,
it
needs
corroboration
the
presence or lack of which may
ultimately decide the cause of the
prosecution and the fate of the
accused.
(2) The rule in this jurisdiction is
that the testimony of a selfconfessed
accomplice
or
coconspirator imputing the blame to
or implicating his co-accused
cannot, by itself and without
corroboration, be regarded as
proof to a moral certainty that the
latter committed or participated in
the commission of the crime. The
testimony must be substantially
corroborated in its material points

RULE 110
by unimpeachable testimony and
strong circumstances and must be
to such an extent that its
trustworthiness becomes manifest.
a.
Was
Locil's
testimony
corroborated in its material points
by
the
prosecution's
other
evidence? - NO
b. If in the affirmative, was the
corroborative
evidence
unimpeachable
testimony
and
strong circumstances to such an
extent that Locil's trustworthiness
becomes manifest? - NO
In
the
appreciation
of
circumstantial
evidence,
there
must be at least two proven
circumstances which in complete
sequence lead to no other logical
conclusion than that of the guilt of
the accused. [This was not present
in this case]
NOTES:
(1) Custodial investigation is the
stage
"where
the
police
investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but
has begun to focus on a particular
suspect taken into custody by the
police who carry out a process of
interrogation that lends itself to
elicit incriminating statements.
.
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P.
DALMACIO, and ROMEO B.
OCON, Petitioners,
vs.
VIRGILIO
M.
TULIAO, Respondent.

FACTS:
Two burnt cadavers were
discovered in Ramon, Isabela
which were identified as the bodies
of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer
Tuliao. The latter is the son of
respondent SPO2 Maderal was
arrested and executed a sworn
confession
identifying
Jose
Miranda, PO3 Romeo Ocon and
SPO3
Alberto
Dalmacio
(Petitoners0 as responsible for the
death. Hence, private respondent
filed a criminal complaint for
murder
against
the
three
petitioners. A motion to quash
warrant of arrest was filed by
petitioner. Noting the absence of
petitioners,
Judge
Tumaliluan
denied the same on the ground
that jurisdiction over the person of
the accused is not yet acquired.
ISSUE:
Is the dismissal valid?
HELD:
No,
it
is
not
valid.
Adjudication of a motion to quash
a warrant of arrest requires
neither
jurisdiction
over
the
person of the accused nor custody
of the law over the body of the
accused. As a general rule, the act
of
seeking
affirmative
relief
constitutes voluntary submission
to the jurisdiction of the court. The
exemptions to this rule are those
whose pleading whose prayers is
avoidance of the jurisdiction of the
court. In criminal cases, these
pleadings include motion to quash
a complaint on lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused and
motion to quash warrant. In these
cases, custody over the body of the
accused no jurisdiction over his
person is not required.

RULE 110

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

and PHOTOKINA MARKETING
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
ALFREDO
L.
BENIPAYO, Respondent.
FACTS:
Alfredo
Benipayo,
then
Chairman
of
the
COMELEC,
delivered a speech in the Forum
on Electoral Problems: Roots and
Responses in the Philippines held
in UP Diliman. The same was
published in Manila Bulletin. In the
same speech he allegedly delivered
libelous speech against Photokina
Marketing Corporation regarding
anomalous contract contracted by
the latter. Hence, People of the
Philippines
with
Photokina
Marketing Corporation filed a
criminal complaint for libel against
Benipayo
in
RTC.
Benipayo
questioned the jurisdiction of RTC
to try the libel case alleging that
the speech was delivered in
relation to his office and hence, it
should be the Sandiganbayan that
should have jurisdiction over the
case.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
RTC
has
jurisdiction to try the case.
HELD:
Yes, RTS has jurisdiction
over the case. While the speech
was delivered in relation to his
office, Article 360of RPC is explicit
in which court has jurisdiction to
try cases of written defamation :
The criminal and civil action
for damages in cases of
written
defamations as
provided
for
in
this

chapter, shall
be
filed
simultaneously or separately
with the court of first
instance [now, the Regional
Trial Court] of the province
or city where the libelous
article is printed and first
published or where any of
the offended parties actually
resides at the time of the
commission of the offense
xxx
MAYOR
FRANCISCO
LECAROZ, Petitioner,
v.
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with
the crime of grave coercion in an
information
filed
before
the
Sandiganbayan. The complaint
alleged that the accused, a public
officer, being then the mayor of
Sta. Cruz, Marinduque, taking
advantage of his public position
and which offense was committed
in relation to his office, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take over the operation
and control of the gasoline station
owned by Pedro Par, sell the
gasoline therein to the public
issuing the invoices of said
gasoline station and some pieces of
yellow pad paper for the purpose,
and padlock dispensing pump
thereof without authority of law,
depriving Pedro Par of the
possession and exercise of a lawful
trade
or
occupation.
The
information was amended with the
insertion of the phrase "by
ordering
his
policemen
companions" between the words
"Pedro Par" and "to sell the

RULE 110
gasoline. Petitioner filed a motion
to
quash
the
information
principally on the ground that the
respondent court lacks jurisdiction
to entertain the case and that it
should have been filed with the
ordinary courts in Marinduque
where the alleged crime was
committed.
ISSUE:
Does
Sandiganbayan
has
jurisdiction to try the case?
HELD:
Yes,
Sandiganbayan
has
jurisdiction. Rspondent court has
jurisdictional competence not only
over criminal and civil cases
involving
graft
and
corrupt
practices committed by public
officers and employees but also
over other crimes committed by
them in relation to their office,
though not involving graft and
corrupt practices, as may be
determined by law. If petitioner
were not the mayor he would not
have
allegedly
directed
the
policeman and the latter would not
have followed his orders and
instructions to sell Pedro Pars
gasoline and padlocked the station.
PANFILO
M.
LACSON, petitioner vs.
THE
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY,
THE
SANDIGANBAYAN,
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR,
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
JUSTICE,
MYRNA
ABALORA, NENITA ALAPAP,
IMELDA
PANCHO
MONTERO,
and
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent
s.
ROMEO
M.
ACOP
and
FRANCISCO
G.
ZUBIA,
JR., petitioners-intervenors.
FACTS:
Eleven persons believed to
be members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang,
reportedly
an
organized crime syndicate which
had been involve in a spate of bank
robberies in Metro Manila, were
slain along Commonwealth Avenue
in Quezon City by elements of the
Anti-Bank
Robbery
and
Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG).
The ABRITG was composed of
police officers with Presidential
Anti-Crime Commission Task Force
Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by
petitioner Chief Superintendent
Panfilo M. Lacson. An information
for murder was filed against
petitioner after an allegation that
was transpired was a summary
execution (or a rub out) and not a
shoot-out between the Kuratong
Baleleng gang members and the
ABRITG. Ombudsman filed on
March
1,
1996
eleven
amended informations
before
the Sandiganbayan,
wherein
petitioner was charged only as an
accessory. Accused filed separate
motions
questioning
the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
asserting that under the amended
information, the cases fall within
the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court because RA 8249
ISSUE: Does Sandiganbayan has
jurisdicition over the case?

RULE 110
HELD:
No.
Fo acase to be within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
it must be shown that the offense
charged in the informationwas
committed in relation to the office
of the accused.
In People vs. Montejo, the
court held that an offense is said to
have been committed in relation to
the office if it is intimately
connected with the office of the
offender and perpetrated whie he
was in the performance of his
official functions. This intimacy
must be alleged in he information,
which determines the jurisdiction
of the court. The controlling factor
is the specific factual allegations in
the information that would sow the
close intimacy of the discharge of
the accused official duties and the
commission of the offense charged.
It does not even matter the phrase
committed in relation to his
office appears in the information
or not.
In the case at bar, what the
amended information contains is a
mere allegation that the offense
was committed by the accused
public officer in relation to his
office and that is not sufficient.
Such phrase is merely a conclusion
of law. Since it was not proven that
the
crime
of
murder
was
committed in the discharge of their
duties, the Sandiganbayan does
not have jurisdiction over the case

RULE 110

FUKUZUME vs. PEOPLE, G.R.

No. 143647, November 11,
2005
Topic: Venue of criminal actions
FACTS:
Private complainant Javier
Ng Yu is a businessman engaged in
buying and selling aluminum scrap
wires. Sometime in 1991, Yu,
accompanied by a friend, Mr.
Jovate, went to the house of the
accused-appellant
Yusuke
Fukuzume in Paraaque. Jovate
introduced Fukuzume to Yu telling
the latter that Fukuzume is from
Furukawa Electric Corporation
and that he has at his disposal
aluminum scrap wires. Fukuzume
then told Yu that the scrap wires
belong to Furukawa but they are
under the care of NAPOCOR.
Believing
Fukuzumes
representation to be true, Yu
agreed to buy the aluminum scrap
wires from Fukuzume. Thereafter
on 1992, Fukuzume gave Yu a
letter, authorizing Fukuzume to
dispose
of
excess
aluminum
conductor materials. Fukuzume
then agreed to accompany Yu
when the latter is going to take the

aluminum scrap wires from the

NAPOCOR compound. When Yu
arrived
at
the
NAPOCOR
compound,
Fukuzume
was
nowhere to be found. Yu proceeded
to
show
the
documents
of
authorization
to
NAPOCOR
personnel but the people from
NAPOCOR did not honor the
authorization letter. Unable to get
the aluminum scrap wires from the
NAPOCOR compound, Yu talked to
Fukuzume and asked from the
latter the refund of the money he
paid him. Failing to refund the
money, Yu then filed a criminal
complaint in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati against
Fukuzume for the crime of estafa.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC of Makati
has jurisdiction over the crime
charged
RULING:
No. The CA erred in ruling
that the RTC of Makati has
jurisdiction
over
the
offense
charged. The CA ruled on the basis
of the sworn statement of Yu filed
with the NBI and the affidavit
subscribed by Fukuzume. With
respect to the sworn statement of
Yu, it is clear that he alleged that
he gave Fukuzume the amount of
50,000 in Makati. However, Yu
testifed
during
his
direct
examination that he gave the said
amount to Fukuzume in the latters
house which is in Paraaque.
Settled is the rule that whenever
there is inconsistency between the
affidavit and the testimony of a
witness in court, the testimony

RULE 110
commands
greater
weight
considering that affidavits taken ex
parte are inferior to testimony
given in court, the former being
almost invariably incomplete and
oftentimes inaccurate. Moreover,
we find nothing in the cross
examination of Yu to establish that
he gave any money to Fukuzume
anywhere in Makati for that
matter. Venue in criminal cases is
an
essential
element
of
jurisdiction. From the foregoing, it
is evident that the prosecution
failed to prove that Fukuzume
committed the crime of estafa in
Makati or that any of the essential
ingredients of the offense took
place in the said city. Hence, the
judgment of the trial court
convicting Fukuzume of the crime
of estafa should be set aside for
lack
of
jurisdiction,
without
prejudice, however, to the filing of
appropriate charges with the court
of competent jurisdiction.
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. HON.
ASUNCION, MANIO, G.R. No.
108208, March 11, 1994
Topic: Venue of criminal actions
FACTS:
Private
respondent
Alexander Dionisio y Manio, a
member of the PNP assigned to
the
Central
Police
District
Command Station 2 in Novaliches,
Quezon City, was dispatched by his
Commanding Officer to Dumalay
Street in Novaliches to respond to
a complaint that a person was
creating trouble there. Dionisio
proceeded to that place, where he
subsequently shot to death T/Sgt.

Romeo
Sadang.
Pursuant
to
Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court, the Office of the City
Prosecutor filed with the RTC of
Quezon
City
an
Information
charging Dionisio with the crime of
homicide. The respondent Judge
dismissed the criminal complaint
"for
re-filing
with
the
Sandiganbayan" on the ground
that the Sandiganbayan, and not
the RTC, has jurisdiction over the
case for crimes committed by
public
officer
when
penalty
prescribed by law for the offense is
higher than prision correccional.
Private prosecutor moved for a
reconsideration of the dismissal,
citing the opinion of the Secretary
of Justice that "crimes committed
by
PNP
members
are
not
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan"
because "they fall within the
exclusive
jurisdiction
of
the
regular
courts"
and
"the
Sandiganbayan is not a regular
court but a special court."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over all crimes
committed by public officers with a
penalty
higher
than
prision
correccional
RULING:
No. If the crime committed
by the public officer is not related
to his public function, then the
RTC has exclusive jurisdiction of
the offense. There is no indication
at all that the trouble-maker was
the victim and that he was shot by
the private respondent in the
course of the latter's mission.

RULE 110
However, it may yet be true that
the crime of homicide charged
therein was committed by the
private respondent in the course of
his public mission, which fact,
however, was not alleged in the
information. In view of this
eventuality
and
the
special
circumstances of this case, and to
avoid further delay, we shall direct
the court a quo to conduct a
preliminary hearing in this case to
determine whether the crime
charged was committed by the
private respondent in relation to
his office. If it be determined in the
affirmative, then it shall order the
transfer of the case to the
Sandiganbayan
which
shall
forthwith docket and proceed with
the case as if the same were
originally filed with it. Otherwise,
the court a quo shall set aside the
challenged orders, proceed with
the trial of the case, and render
judgment thereon. Any officer
authorized
to
conduct
a
preliminary investigation who is
investigating an offense committed
by a public officer where the
penalty prescribed by law is higher
than prision correccional, must
determine if the crime was
committed by the respondent in
relation to his office. If it was, the
investigating officer shall forthwith
inform
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman which may either (a)
take over the investigation of the
case pursuant to Section 15(1) of
R.A. No. 6770, 59 or (b) deputize a
prosecutor to act as special
investigator or prosecutor to assist
in
the
investigation
and
prosecution of the case pursuant to
Section
31
thereof.
If
the

investigating officer determines

that the crime was not committed
by the respondent in relation to his
office, he shall then file the
information with the proper court.
PEOPLE vs. VANZUELA, G.R.
No. 178266, July 21, 2008
Topic: Venue of criminal actions
FACTS:
Veneranda is the wife of the
late Dionisio Paler, Sr. who is the
registered owner of a parcel of
irrigated riceland, situated in
Barangay Mabini (Roxas), Mainit,
Surigao del Norte. 1 hectare of
this riceland (subject property)
was cultivated by the respondents
as agricultural tenants for more
than 10 years, with an agreed
lease rental of 12 cavans of
palay, at 45 kilos per cavan, per
harvest. The respondents allegedly
failed to pay the rentals since
1997. Initially, Veneranda brought
the matter before the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Office in
Surigao del Norte, but no amicable
settlement was reached by the
parties. Thus, Veneranda filed a
criminal complaint for estafa
against the respondents. The RTC
dismissed
the
criminal
case
contending that the instant case
pertains to the non-payment of
rentals by the accused to the
private complainant, involving a
lease of an agricultural land by the
former from the latter. This being
so, the controversy in the case
involves an agrarian dispute which
falls under the primary and
exclusive original jurisdiction of
the
Department
of
Agrarian

RULE 110
Reform
(DARAB).

Adjudication

Board

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC of
Surigao City has jurisdiction over
the charge for estafa even if it
involves agricultural tenants of the
private complainant
RULING:
Yes. In the instant case, the
RTC has jurisdiction over the
subject matter because the law
confers on it the power to hear and
decide cases involving estafa.
Second.
The
RTC
also
has
jurisdiction
over
the
offense
charged since the crime was
committed within its territorial
jurisdiction.
Third. The RTC likewise acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of the
respondents
because
they
voluntarily submitted to the RTC's
authority. Where the court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter
and over the person of the
accused, and the crime was
committed within its territorial
jurisdiction, the court necessarily
exercises jurisdiction over all
issues that the law requires the
court to resolve. Thus, based on
the law and material allegations of
the information filed, the RTC
erroneously concluded that it lacks
jurisdiction over the subject matter
on the premise that the case
before it is purely an agrarian
dispute. In the instant case, the
RTC failed to consider that what is
lodged before it is a criminal case
for estafa involving an alleged
misappropriated
amount
of

P80,000.00 -- a subject matter over

which the
RTC
clearly
has
jurisdiction. Notably, while the
RTC has criminal jurisdiction
conferred on it by law, the DARAB,
on the other hand, has no authority
to try criminal cases at all. In
Bautista v. Mag-isa Vda. de Villena,
we outlined the jurisdiction of the
DARAB, to wit: For agrarian
reform cases, jurisdiction is vested
in the DAR; more specifically, in
the DARAB.
KWONG SING vs. CITY OF
MANILA, 41 Phil., 103
Topic: Cause of the accusation
FACTS:
Kwong Sing, in his own
behalf and in behalf of all others
having a common or general
interest in the subject-matter of
this action, filed a complaint for a
preliminary injunction, prohibiting
the city of Manila from enforcing
Ordinance No. 532, questioning
the ordinances validity. The said
ordinance requires receipts in
duplicate in English and Spanish
duly signed showing the kind and
number of articles delivered by
laundries and dyeing and cleaning
establishments. Appellants claim
is that the ordinance savors of
class legislation; that it unjustly
discriminates between persons in
similar circumstances; and that it
constitutes
an
arbitrary
infringement of property rights.
There are, in the city of Manila,
more than 40 Chinese laundries.
The laundrymen and employees in
Chinese laundries do not, as a rule,
speak, read, and write English or

RULE 110
Spanish. Moreover, petitioner also
contended that the ordinance is
invalid, because it is arbitrary,
unreasonable, and not justified
under the police power of the city.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the enactment of
the ordinance is a valid exercise of
police power of the City of Manila
RULING:
Yes. The ordinance invades
no fundamental right, and impairs
no
personal
privilege.
The
ordinance is neither discriminatory
nor unreasonable in its operation.
It applies to all public laundries
without distinction, whether they
belong to Americans, Filipinos,
Chinese, or any other nationality.
All, without exception, and each
everyone
of
them
without
distinction, must comply with the
ordinance. Equally and uniformly
the ordinance applies to all
engaged in the laundry business,
and, as nearly as may be, the same
burdens are cast upon them. Even
if private rights of person or
property are subjected to restraint,
and even if loss will result to
individuals from the enforcement
of the ordinance, this is not
sufficient ground for failing to
uphold the hands of the legislative
body. The very foundation of the
police power is the control of
private interests for the public
welfare. After the case was
submitted to this court, counsel for
appellants
asked
that
a
preliminary
injunction
issue,
restraining the defendant or any of
its officers from enforcing the

ordinance, pending decisions. It

was perfectly proper for the trial
and appellate courts to determine
the validity of the municipal
ordinance on a complaint for an
injunction, since it was very
apparent that irreparable injury
was impending, that a municipality
of suits was threatened, and that
complainants had no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy. But
finding that the ordinance is valid,
the general rule to the effect that
an injunction will not be granted to
restrain a criminal prosecution
should be followed.
ZALDIVIA vs. REYES, G.R. No.
102342, July 3, 1992
Topic: Designation of Offense
FACTS:
The petitioner is charged
with quarrying for commercial
purposes without a mayor's permit
in violation of an ordinance of the
Municipality of Rodriguez, in the
Province of Rizal. The offense was
allegedly committed on May 11,
1990. The referral-complaint of the
police was received by the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Rizal on May 30, 1990. The
corresponding information was
filed with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Rodriguez on October 2,
1990. The petitioner moved to
quash the information on the
ground that the crime had
prescribed, but the motion was
denied. The petitioner argues that
the charge against her was
governed by Sections 1 and 2 of
the Rule on Summary Procedure
and
Act.
No.
3326.
The
prosecution, on the other hand,

RULE 110
contends that the prescriptive
period was suspended upon the
filing of the complaint against her
with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor. Agreeing with the
respondent judge, the Solicitor
General invokes Section 1, Rule
110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which provides that for
offenses not subject to the rule on
summary procedure in special
cases, the institution of criminal
action interrupts the period of
prescription
of
the
offense
charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said offense is
governed by the Rules on Criminal
Procedure or by the Rule of
Summary Procedure.
RULING:
The offense is governed by
the Rule of Summary Procedure.
The Court held that if there be a
conflict between the Rule on
Summary Procedure and Section 1
of Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the former
should prevail as the special law.
And if there be a conflict between
Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
latter must again yield because
this Court, in the exercise of its
rule-making power, is not allowed
to "diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights" under Article
VIII,
Section
5(5)
of
the
Constitution.
Prescription
in
criminal cases is a substantive
right. Our conclusion, therefore, is
that the prescriptive period for the
crime imputed to the petitioner

commenced
from
its
alleged
commission on May 11, 1990, and
ended two months thereafter, on
July 11, 1990, in accordance with
Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was
not interrupted by the filing of the
complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor on May 30,
1990, as this was not a judicial
proceeding.
The
judicial
proceeding
that
could
have
interrupted the period was the
filing of the information with the
MTC of Rodriguez, but this was
done only on October 2, 1990,
after the crime had already
prescribed.
BENJAMIN K. GOROSPE, ET
AL., VS. MARIANO B.
PEAFLORIDA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 11583, 19 JULY 1957,
EN BANC (BAUTISTA ANGELO,
J.:)
Topic: Criminal actions, when
enjoined; Petition for Quo
Warranto
Zulueta and Peaflorida were
candidates for the position of
Provincial Governor of Iloilo.
Penaflorida was declared elected
by the Board of Canvassers.
Zulueta filed with the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo a protest
contesting
the
election
of
Peaflorida on the grounds of
errors, irregularities, frauds and
corrupt
practices.
Similarly,
Ceferino de los Santos, Jr., a
defeated candidate for board
member, filed a criminal complaint
in said court against Peaflorida
and Ladrido charging the latter

RULE 110
with a violation of Section 49 of
the Revised Election Code relative
to
corrupt
practices.
This
complaint was dismissed on the
ground that, the violation charged
being a public offense, the same
can only be prosecuted by a
government prosecutor and not by
a private individual. And taking
cue of this suggestion, Zulueta
lodged a complaint with the fiscal
involving
the
same
charged
against Peaflorida and Ladrido.
Peaflorida
and
Ladrido,
through counsel, filed a petition
for-prohibition with injunction with
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
praying that the provincial fiscal
be enjoined from proceeding with
the investigation of the criminal
case until after the election contest
shall have been finally determined,
and the court issued a preliminary
injunction after petitioner had filed
a bond in the amount of P1,000.
On the other hand, Zulueta
filed in the election protest an
amended petition seeking to strike
out from the original protest the
averment
relative
to
corrupt
practices which are involved in the
criminal
case
then
under
investigation by the fiscal, which
was
strongly
resisted
by
Peaflorida. The court admitted
the
amended
petition.
Peafloridas motion to file an
amended answer containing a
counterclaim was denied.
Peaflorida
and
Ladrido
brought the case by way of
certiorari to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals denied the

petition but enjoined forever the

fiscal from proceeding with the
investigation
of
the
criminal
complaint filed by Zulueta against
Peaflorida and Ladrido.
ISSUE:
Whether
the
Court
of
Appeals erred in enjoining the
provincial fiscal from proceeding
with the investigation of the
criminal charge filed by Zulueta
against Peaflorida and Ladrido on
the sole ground that, the charge
involving
as
it
does
a
disqualification to hold office, the
same is tantamount to a petition
for quo warranto which can only
be filed within one week from the
proclamation of the one declared
elected.
HELD:
Yes. The Court held that one
should not confuse an action of
quo warranto with the complaint
for a violation of the Election Code
even if the same may have the
effect of disqualifying a candidate
to hold the office to which he is
elected. One partakes of the
nature of a civil case wherein the
petitioner
is
the
defeated
candidate, while the other is a
criminal
action
which
is
prosecuted in the name of the
People. Both proceedings have
different
objectives
and
are
predicated on different grounds.
The purpose of quo warranto is
merely to prevent an elective
official from assuming office on the
ground of ineligibility. To be
eligible, one must have the

RULE 110
qualifications required by law with
regard to citizenship, residence,
age, loyalty, etc. On the other
hand, the principal purpose of the
criminal
action
is
the
imprisonment of the offender, be
he a candidate or not, and the
grounds of the action vary
depending
upon
the
acts
committed. Here the acts involved
are those prohibited by Section 49
of the Election Cade relative to
corrupt practices. The fact that the
present offense carries with it the
accessory
penalty
of
disqualification from holding office
does not convert it into an action
of quo warranto. Lastly, there is a
difference
as
regards
the
prescriptibility of the action. While
an action of quo warranto should
be filed within one week from
proclamation, an election offense
prescribes after two years, from
the date of its commission, and if
the discovery is made on the
occasion of an election contest, the
period shall commence on the date
the
judgment
becomes
final
(Section 188, Revised Election
Code).
Another
point
to
be
considered is that, as a general
rule, an injunction will not be
granted to restrain a criminal
prosecution (Kwong Sing vs. City
of Manila, 41 Phil., 1.03). The
reason is obvious. Public interest
requires that criminal acts be
immediately
investigated
and
prosecuted for the protection of
society. This is more so in
connection with a violation of the
Election Law. The only way to curb
fraud, terrorism and other corrupt
practices that are committed in the

elections is to demand their

immediate
investigation
and
prosecution. Only in this way can
we maintain a clean election and
secure the free expression of the
peoples will at the polls.
Appellee,
who
is
not
appellant, may assign errors in his
brief where his purpose is to
maintain the judgment on other
grounds, but he may not do so if
his purpose is to have the
judgment modified or reversed, for,
in such case, he must appeal.
JESUS GUIAO vs. ALBINO L.
FIGUEROA, in his capacity as
Provincial Fiscal of the
Province of Pampanga
G.R. No. L-6481, 17 May 1954,
EN BANC (LABRADOR, J.)
Topic: Control of Prosecution;
Mandamus
Porfirio Dizon and Emiliano
Manalo participated either as
principals or accomplices in the
kidnapping and murder of Felix
Lampa, and that the only reason
why the fiscal excluded them from
the
amended
information
is
because he thought it more
convenient, or perhaps more
expedient, to do so.
IIn view of the failure of the
provincial fiscal to include these
two
persons,
a
motion
for
contempt was filed against the
fiscal, but
this
motion
was
dismissed on the ground that if the
fiscal committed an error of
judgment, or even an abuse of
discretion, the recourse against
him was not an action for
contempt but one of mandamus.

RULE 110
Due to this order of the court, the
action for mandamus was filed by
Jesus Guiao to compel the fiscal to
include
Porfirio
Dizon
and
Emiliano Manalo as accused in his
information.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a fiscal may
be
compelled
by mandamus to
include in an information persons
who appear to be responsible for
the crime charged therein, but
whom the fiscal believes to be
indispensable witnesses for the
State.
HELD:
No. The rules of Court make
it a mandatory duty for the fiscal to
file charges against whomsoever
the evidence may show to be
responsible for an offense.
When it becomes necessary
to
exclude
from
prosecution
persons who appear responsible
for a crime in order that they may
be used as State witnesses, the
exclusion is lodged in the sound
discretion of the competent court,
not in that of the prosecuting
officer.
When the fiscal chose to
ignore his legal duty to include the
said Porfirio Dizon and Emiliano
Manalo as accused in the criminal
case, and to follow the procedure
outlined in the rules by which said
persons may be discharged in
order that they may be utilized as
witnesses for the prosecution, it
became proper and necessary for
the competent court to require him
to comply therewith.
Petitioner-appellee
Jesus
Guiao has no right to institute the
action of mandamus, because he
has no clear right to the

performance of the alleged legal

duty by the provincial fiscal
Every person accused of a
crime has a positive interest in the
inclusion of all his co-conspirators
because they are jointly and
severally liable with them for
indemnities that may be imposed
upon them for the offense they
may have committed together.
LINO BROCKA ET AL. vs. JUAN
PONCE ENRILE ET AL.
G.R. No. 69863-65, 10
December 1990, EN BANC
(MEDIALDEA, J.)
Topic: Criminal actions, when
enjoined; Preliminary/Final
Injunction
Petitioners were arrested by
the
Northern
Police
District
following the forcible and violent
dispersal of a demonstration held
in sympathy with the jeepney
strike called by the Alliance of
Concerned Transport Organization
(ACTO). Thereafter, they were
charged with Illegal Assembly.
Except for Brocka, et al. who
were charged as leaders of the
offense of Illegal Assembly and for
whom no bail was recommended,
the other petitioners were released
on bail of P3,000.00 each. Brocka,
et al.'s provisional release was
ordered only upon an urgent
petition for bail for which daily
hearings were held.
However, despite service of
the order of release, Brocka, et al.
remained
in
detention,
respondents having invoked a

RULE 110
Preventive Detention Action (PDA)
allegedly issued against them.
Neither the original, duplicate
original nor certified true copy of
the PDA was ever shown to them.
Brocka,
et
al.
were
subsequently charged with Inciting
to Sedition, without prior notice to
their
counsel.The
original
informations filed recommended
no
bail.
The
circumstances
surrounding the hasty filing of this
second offense are cited by
Brocka, et al.
Brocka, et al. contend that
respondents' manifest bad faith
and/or harassment are sufficient
bases for enjoining their criminal
prosecution, aside from the fact
that the second offense of inciting
to sedition is illegal, since it is
premised on one and the same act
of attending and participating in
the ACTO jeepney strike. They
maintain that while there may be a
complex crime from a single act
(Art. 48, RTC), the law does not
allow the splitting of a single act
into two offenses and filing two
informations therefor, further, that
they will be placed in double
jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution of
the criminal cases for Inciting to
Sedition may lawfully be enjoined.
HELD:
Yes. Indeed, the general rule
is that criminal prosecution may
not be restrained or stayed by
injunction, preliminary or final.

There are however exceptions,

among which are:
a.
To
afford
adequate
protection to the constitutional
rights of the accused;
b. When necessary for the
orderly administration of
justice or to avoid oppression
or multiplicity of actions;
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub
judice;
d. When the acts of the
officer are without or in excess of
authority;
e. Where the prosecution is
under an invalid law, ordinance or
regulation;
f. When double jeopardy is
clearly apparent;
g. Where the court has no
jurisdiction over the offense;
h. Where it is a case of
persecution
rather
than
prosecution;
i. Where the charges are
manifestly false and motivated by
the lust for vengeance; and
j. When there is clearly no
prima facie case against the
accused and a motion to
quash on that ground has
been denied.
k. Preliminary injunction has
been issued by the Supreme
Court
to
prevent
the
threatened unlawful arrest of
petitioners.
In the case at bar, Brocka, et
al. have cited the circumstances to

RULE 110
show that the criminal proceedings
had become a case of persecution,
having been undertaken by state
officials in bad faith.
Thus,
the
tenacious
invocation of a spurious and
inoperational PDA and the sham
and hasty preliminary investigation
were clear signals that the
prosecutors intended to keep
Brocka, et al. in detention until the
second offense of "Inciting to
Sedition" could be facilitated and
justified without need of issuing a
warrant of arrest anew. As a
matter of fact the corresponding
informations
for
this
second
offense were hastily filed on
February 11, 1985, or two days
after Brocka, et al.'s release from
detention was ordered by the trial
judge on February 9, 1985.
JOSELITO V. NARCISO vs. FLOR
MARIE STA. ROMANA-CRUZ
G.R. No. 134504, 17 March
2000, THIRD DIVISION
(PANGANIBAN, J.)
Topic: Control of Prosecution
Petitioner was charged with
parricide which is punishable
with reclusion perpetua. Judge
Pedro T. Santiago of the Regional
Trial court (RTC) granted his
Motion to Post Bail. However,
Court of Appeals (CA) ruled
otherwise. He argued before the
CA that he was entitled to bail
because the evidence of his guilt
was not strong. He contended that
the prosecutor's conformity to his
Motion for Bail was tantamount to
a finding that the prosecution

evidence
strong.

against

him

was

not

The Court of Appeals ruled,

however, that there was no basis
for such finding, since no hearing
had been conducted on the
application for bail -- summary or
otherwise. The appellate court
found that only ten minutes had
elapsed between the filing of the
Motion by the accused and the
Order granting bail, a lapse of time
that could not be deemed sufficient
for the trial court to receive and
evaluate any evidence.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondent

Court of Appeals has erroneously

reversed and set aside the order of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City which granted the petitioner
his constitutional right to bail,
considering the absence of strong
evidence or proof of his guilt, and
more especially when the public
prosecutors, who have direct
control of the proceedings and
after assessment of the evidence,
have themselves recommended the
grant of bail.
2. Whether

or

not the private

respondent
has
the
legal
personality to intervene in the
present criminal case
HELD:
1. No. Jurisprudence is replete
with
decisions
compelling
judges to conduct the required
hearings in bail applications, in
which the accused stands

RULE 110
charged with a capital offense.
The absence of objection from
the prosecution is never a basis
for the grant of bail in such
cases, for the judge has no
right to presume that the
prosecutor knows what he is
doing on account of familiarity
with the case. "Said reasoning
is tantamount to ceding to the
prosecutor
the
duty
of
exercising judicial discretion to
determine whether the guilt of
the accused is strong. Judicial
discretion is the domain of the
judge before whom the petition
for provisional liberty will be
decided. The mandated duty to
exercise discretion has never
been
reposed
upon
the
prosecutor.
Additionally,
the
courts
grant or refusal of bail must
contain a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution,
on the basis of which should be
formulated the judge's own
conclusion on whether such
evidence is strong enough to
indicate the guilt of the
accused. The summary thereof
is considered an aspect of
procedural due process for
both the prosecution and the
defense;
its
absence
will
invalidate the grant or the
denial of the application for
bail. Clearly, the grant of bail
by Executive Judge Santiago
was laced with grave abuse of
discretion and the Court of
Appeals
was
correct
in
reversing him.

2. In parricide, the accused

cannot be considered an
offended party just because
he was married to the
deceased. In the interest of
justice and in view of the
peculiar circumstances of
this case, the sister of the
victim may be deemed to be
an "offended party"; hence,
she has the legal personality
to challenge the void order
of the trial court.
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE. HON.
JUDGE ASAALI S. ISNANI ET
AL.
No. L-34162, 29 December
1987, SECOND DIVISION
(SARMIENTO, J.)
Topic: Control of Prosecution
Petitioner Ebarle was then
the
provincial
governor
of
Zamboanga and a candidate for reelection in 1971 local elections.
The Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines filed complaints with
the
city
fiscal
against
the
petitioner for violations of RA 3019
(Anti-Graft Law) and Articles 171,
182,183, 213, and 318 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The petitioner thereafter
went to the respondent Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga del
Sur, the Honorable Asaali Isnani
presiding, on a special civil action)
for prohibition and certiorari with
preliminary
injunction.
The
respondent
Court
issued
a
restraining order. The respondent
Anti-Graft League moved to have

RULE 110
the same lifted and the case itself
dismissed.
Thereafter,
the
Supreme
Court
issued
a
Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) ordering
the respondents to desist from
further
proceedings.
AntiGraftLeague
moved
to have
it lifted
and the
case
itself
dismissed. On the other hand, the
petitioner submits that
the
prosecutions
in
question
are
politically motivated as he being a
candidate
for
reelection
as
Governor of Zamboanga del Sur
and citing provisions of EO 264
"OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE
BY
WHICH
COMPLAINANTS
CHARGING
GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS
AND
EMPLOYEES
WITH
COMMISSION
OF
IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE
GUIDED."
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondents
City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft
League failed to comply with
the provisions of Executive
Order No. 264, "OUTLINING
THE
PROCEDURE
BY
WHICH
COMPLAINANTS
CHARGING GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS
AND
EMPLOYEES
WITH
COMMISSION
OF
IRREGULARITIES SHOULD
BE GUIDED.
2. Whether or not the AntiGraft
League
has
the
standing to commence the
series of prosecutions below
(G.R. No. 33628).

3. Whether
or
not
the
prosecutions in question are
politically
motivated,
initiated by his rivals, he
being,
as
we
said,
a
candidate for reelection as
Governor of Zamboanga del
Sur.
HELD:
1. No.
Executive Order No.
264 (October 6, 1970) has
exclusive
application
to
administrative, not criminal
complaints. The very title
speaks of "COMMISSION OF
IRREGULARITIES." There is
no mention, not even by
implication,
of
criminal
"offenses," that is to say,
"crimes."
While
"crimes"
amount to "irregularities,"
the Executive Order could
have very well referred to
the more specific term had it
intended to make itself
applicable thereto.
2. Yes. The Anti-Graft League of
the Philippines is not an
"offended party" within the
meaning of Sec. 2, Rule 110,
of the Rules of Court (now
Section 3 of the 1985 Rules
on
Criminal
Procedure).
However, A complaint for
purposes
of
preliminary
investigation by the fiscal
need not be filed by the
"offended party." The rule
has been that, unless the
offense subject thereof is one
that cannot be prosecuted de
oficio, the same may be filed,
for preliminary investigation

RULE 110
purposes, by any competent
person.
The
"complaint"
referred to in the Rule 110
contemplates one filed in
court, not with the fiscal. In
that case, the proceeding
must be started by the
aggrieved party himself.
3. It is not our business to
resolve
complaints
the
disposition of which belongs
to another agency, in this
case, the respondent Fiscal.
But more than that, and as a
general rule, injunction does
not lie to enjoin criminal
prosecutions. The rule is
subject to exceptions, to wit:
(1)
for
the
orderly
administration of justice;
(2) to prevent the use of
the strong arm of the law
in
an
oppressive
and
vindictive manner; (3) to
avoid
multiplicity
of
actions; (4)
to
afford
adequate protection to
constitutional rights; and
(5) because the statute
relied
on
is
constitutionally infirm or
otherwise void. We cannot
perceive
any
of
the
exceptions applicable here.
The petitioner cries foul, in a
manner of speaking, with
respect to the deluge of
complaints commenced by
the
private
respondent
below, but whether or not
they
were
filed
for
harassment purposes is a
question we are not in a
position to decide. The
proper venue, we believe, for

the petitioner's complaint is

precisely in the preliminary
investigations
he
wishes
blocked here.
Rodriguez v. Gadiane et al
GR No. 152903, July 17, 2006
Facts:
The Court is called upon to
resolve the question of whether a
private offended party in a
criminal proceeding may file a
special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65, assailing an
interlocutory order, without the
conformity
of
the
public
prosecutor.
Thomasita Rodriguez filed
complainant, a criminal case,
against Rolando Gadiane and
Ricardo Rafols, Jr., for violation of
Batas
Pambansa
Bilang
22.
However, respondents filed a
motion to dismiss the petition on
the ground that the petition was
filed by the private complainant,
instead
of
the
government
prosecutor representing the People
of the Philippines in criminal
cases.
Issue:
Whether or not the
aggrieved person may file a special
civil action for certiorari.
Ruling:
A special civil action for
certiorari may be filed by an
aggrieved party alleging grave
abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the trial court.[8] In a long
line of cases, this Court construed
the term aggrieved parties to

RULE 110
include the State and the private
offended party or complainant.
It is well-settled that in
criminal cases where the offended
party is the State, the interest of
the private complainant or the
private offended party is limited to
the civil liability. Thus, in the
prosecution of the offense, the
complainant's role is limited to
that of a witness for the
prosecution. If a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if
there is an acquittal, an appeal
therefrom on the criminal aspect
may be undertaken only by the
State through the Solicitor
General. Only the Solicitor General
may represent the People of the
Philippines on appeal. The private
offended party or complainant may
not take such appeal. However, the
said offended party or complainant
may appeal the civil aspect despite
the acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for
certiorari filed under Section 1,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
wherein it is alleged that the trial
court committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction
or
on
other
jurisdictional grounds, the rules
state that the petition may be filed
by the person aggrieved. In such
case, the aggrieved parties are the
State and the private offended
party
or
complainant.
The
complainant has an interest in the
civil aspect of the case so he may
file such special civil action
questioning the decision or action
of the respondent court on
jurisdictional grounds. In so doing,
complainant should not bring the
action in the name of the People of

the Philippines. The action may be

prosecuted in name of said
complainant.
Bautista v. Fiscal
GR No. 59830, July 31, 1984
Facts:
Juan Bautista and Nenita
Marquez filed with the office of the
City Fiscal a complaint against
Estrada, Banigued, and F. Bautista
for estafa thru falsification of
public document. The assistant
Fiscal dismissed the case for lack
of prima facie evidence. Bautista
did
not
move
for
the
reconsideration of the fiscal's
resolution; neither did he appeal to
the Ministry of Justice. Instead, Mr.
Bautista filed a new complaint with
the City Court of Dagupan against
the same respondents, charging
them with the same offense. The
City Court found that an offense
has been committed and the
respondents therein are probably
guilty thereof. Accordingly, a
warrant for their arrest was issued
and an order directing respondent
city fiscal to file the corresponding
information.
However,
the
respondent city fiscal, through
Assistant Fiscal Manaois, filed a
manifestation with the city court
that he will reinvestigate the case
in view of his prior resolution.
After reinvestigation, the city
Fiscal, filed a motion to dismiss the
case but was denied by the City
Court. Thereafter, the city court
again forwarded the records of the
case to respondent city fiscal for
the filing of the information. In
turn, respondent city fiscal filed a

RULE 110
manifestation informing the city
court of his inability to prosecute
the case because of his sincere and
honest belief that he has no prima
facie
case
to
warrant
the
prosecution of the accused. The
court
filed
a
petition
for
mandamus, ordering the city fiscal
to
file
the
corresponding
information for falsification of
public documents. The court of
appeals reversed the decision or
the trial court and dismissed the
petition for mandamus.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellate
court can direct the City Fiscal to
file the corresponding information
and to prosecute the case.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court did not
find any cogent reason to set aside
the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals
Section 4, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Court, specifically
provides that "all criminal action
either commenced by complaint or
by information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of
the fiscal.
Indeed,
how
can
the
prosecuting fiscal secure the
conviction of an accused on
evidence beyond reasonable doubt
when he himself is not convinced
that he has a prima facie case
against the petitioners. The better
procedure would be to appeal the
Fiscal's decision to the Ministry of
Justice and/or ask for a special
prosecutor.

Crespo v. Mogul
No. L-53373, June 30, 1987
Facts:
The Assistant Fiscal with the
approval of the Provincial Fiscal
filed information for estafa against
Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit
Criminal Court of Lucena City.
When the case was set for
arraigment the accused filed a
motion to defer arraignment on the
ground that there was a pending
petition for review filed with the
Secretary
of
Justice
of
the
resolution of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal for the filing of
the information. However, the
presiding judge, Leodegario L.
Mogul, denied the motion. So the
accused filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for a preliminary writ of
injunction in the Court of Appeals.
CA, restrained Judge Mogul from
proceeding with the arraignment.
On the other hand, Undersecretary
of Justice resolved the petition for
review by reversing the resolution
of the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal and directed the Fiscal for
Immediate
dismissal
of
the
information. However, respondent
Judge denied the motion and set
the
arraignment.
Hence,
the
accused filed a petition for
certiorari,
prohibition
and
mandamus with petition for the
issuance of preliminary writ of
prohibition
and/or
temporary
restraining order in the Court of
Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial
court acting on a motion to dismiss

RULE 110
a criminal case filed by the
Provincial Fiscal upon instructions
of the Secretary of Justice to whom
the case was elevated for review,
may refuse to grant the motion and
insist on the arraignment and trial
on the merits.
Ruling:
Petition was dismissed.
The rule therefore is that
once a complaint or information is
filed in the Court any disposition of
the case as its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound
discretion of the court.
The Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal
may be disregarded by the trial
court, the secretary of Justice, as
far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review
or appeal from the action of the
fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed
in the court
Padilla v. CA
L-39999, May 31, 1984
Facts:
The Fiscal accused the
petitioners of the crime of grave
coercion.
Confederating
and
mutually helping one another, and
acting without any authority of
law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, by
means of threats, force and
violence prevent Antonio Vergara
and his family to close their stall.
In committing the offense, the
accused took advantage of their
public positions: Roy Padilla, being

the incumbent municipal mayor,

and the rest of the accused being
policemen,
except
Ricardo
Celestino who is a civilian, all of
Jose
Panganiban,
Camarines
Norte, and that it was committed
with evident premeditation. The
trial court finds the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of grave coercion. Hence an
appeal to the Court of Appeals,
which modified the ruling of the
trial court, and decided in favor of
the petitioners. Stating that they
were acquitted on the ground of
reasonable doubt but ordered
them to pay for the actual
damages. Still not content with the
CAs decision, the petitioners filed
a motion for reconsideration
contending that the acquittal of
the defendants-appellants as to
criminal liability results in the
extinction of their civil liability.
Issue:
Whether
or
not
the
respondent court committed a
reversible error in requiring the
petitioners to pay civil indemnity
to
the
complainants
after
acquitting them from the criminal
charge
Ruling:
The
Supreme
Court
AFFIRMED the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals and
dismiss the petition for lack of
merit.
The extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it that of
the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from
which the civil might arise did not

RULE 110
exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3 (c), Rev.
Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51
OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44
OG. 1811)
Article
29
clearly
and
expressly provides is a remedy for
the plaintiff in case the defendant
has been acquitted in a criminal
prosecution on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable
doubt.
It
merely
emphasizes that a civil action for
damages is not precluded by an
acquittal for the same criminal act
or omission.
People v. Camba
L-36471, November 19, 1980
Facts:
Camba was found guilty of
murder qualified by treachery with
assault upon an agent of a person
in authority was sentenced to
death and to indemnify the heirs of
Gongora. However, upon the
observation of the court, the crime
committed is more of robbery with
homicide, for the reason that the
victim Pat. Gongora was killed
while responding to the call for
help of a victim of snatching.
Hencem the appellant claims that
his conviction for murder should
be set aside.

Ruling:
It should be born in mind in
this connection that the label or
caption in the information in
respect of the crime committed is
not controlling- what matters are
the material allegations in the
information.
The trial court found the
appellant
guilty
of
murder
qualified by treachery but without
any other modifying circumstance.
The crime was compounded,
according to the trial court, with
assault upon an agent of a person
in authority. In this light the
appropriate penalty, pursuant to
Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
is death.
If it be held as we do that the
crime committed was robbery with
homicide, the result will be the
same
for
the
aggravating
circumstances of treachery and
contempt of public authority will
have to be assigned.
The death penalty, however,
cannot
be
imposed
on
the
appellant who was only 20 years
old when he committed the crime
for lack of the necessary votes.
The judgment of the court a
quo is modified by reducing the
sentence on the appellant to
reclusion
perpetua
and
consolidating the damages in the
amount of P30,000.00.

Issue:
Whether or not the court
erred in convicting the accused of
the offense charged despite the
fact that what was proven was a
different crime.

Manangan Jaeniz
Buhat vs. CA 265 scra 701
Topic:
Amendment
Information

of

the

RULE 110
Facts:
On March 25, 1993, an
information for HOMICIDE was
filed in the RTC against petitioner
Danny Buhat, John Doe and
Richard Doe. The information
alleged that on October 16, 1992,
petitioner Danilo Buhat, armed
with a knife, unlawfully attacked
and killed one Ramon George Yu
while the said two unknown
assailants held his arms, using
superior strength, inflicting x x x
mortal wounds which were x x x
the direct x x x cause of his death.
Even before petitioner could be
arraigned, the prosecution moved
for
the
deferment
of
the
arraignment on the ground that
the private complainant in the
case, one Betty Yu, moved for the
reconsideration of the resolution of
the City Prosecutor which ordered
the filing of the aforementioned
information
for
homicide.
Petitioner however, invoking his
right to a speedy trial, opposed the
motion. Thus, petitioner was
arraigned on June 9, 1993 and,
since petitioner pleaded not guilty,
trial ensued.
On February 3, 1994, then
Secretary of Justice Franklin M.
Drilon, finding Betty Yus appeal
meritorious, ordered the City
Prosecutor of Roxas City to amend
the information by upgrading the
offense charged to MURDER and
implead therein additional accused
Herminia Altavas, Osmea Altavas
and Renato Buhat.
On March 10, 1994, the
Assistant City Prosecutor filed a

motion for leave to amend

information. The amendment as
proposed was opposed by the
petitioner.
In an order, dated June 2, 1994,
the RTC denied the motion for
leave to amend information. The
denial was premised on (1) an
invocation of the trial courts
discretion in disregarding the
opinion of the Secretary of Justice
as allegedly held in Crespo vs.
Mogul and (2) a conclusion
reached by the trial court that the
resolution
of
the
inquest
prosecutor is more persuasive than
that of the Secretary of Justice, the
former having actually conducted
the
preliminary
investigation
where he was able to observe the
demeanor of those he investigated
The Solicitor General promptly
elevated the matter to the Court
of Appeals. He filed a petition
for certiorari assailing the
aforecited order denying the
motion for leave to amend
information.
Finding
the
proposed amendment as nonprejudicial to petitioners rights,
respondent court granted the
petition for certiorari.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the additional
allegation of conspiracy is a
substantial amendment
2. Whether
or
not
the
upgrading of the crime
charged from homicide to
the more serious offense of
murder is such a substantial
amendment
that
it
is
disallowed if made after the

RULE 110
accused had pleaded "not
guilty" to the crime of
homicide
Held:
1. No. The additional allegation
of conspiracy is only a formal
amendment,
hence
petitioner's participation as
principal is not affected by
such amendment.
Petitioner undoubtedly is charged
as a principal in the killing of
Ramon George Yu
whom he is alleged to have
stabbed
while
two
unknown
persons held the victim's
arms. The addition of the phrase,
"conspiring, confederating and
helping one
another" does not change the
nature of petitioner's participation
as principal in
the killing.
Whether under the original or the
amended information, petitioner
would have to defend
himself as the People makes a case
against him and secures for public
protection the
punishment
of
petitioner
for
stabbing to death, using superior
strength, a fellow citizen in
whose health and safety society as
a whole is interested. Petitioner,
thus, has no tenable
basis to decry the amendment in
question
2. The Court ruled in the
negative. In the case of
Dimalibot
v.
Salcedo,the

Court
ruled
that
the
amendment
of
the
information so as to change
the crime charged from
homicide to murder, may be
made "even if it may result in
altering the nature of the
charge so long as it can be
done without prejudice to
the rights of the accused."
Petitioner in the case at bench
maintains that having already
pleaded "not guilty" to the
crime of homicide, the amendment
of the crime charged in the
information from homicide to
murder
is
a
substantial
amendment prejudicial to his right
to be informed of the nature of the
accusation against him. He utterly
fails to dispute, however, that the
original information did allege that
petitioner stabbed his victim
"using superior strength." This
particular allegation qualifies a
killing to murder, regardless of
how such
a killing is technically designated
in the information filed by the
public prosecutor, as provided for
in Article 248 of the RPC.
Thus, the allegation of petitioner
using superior strength constitutes
a mere formal amendment, which
is
permissible
even
after
arraignment.
Tehankee Jr. vs Madayag 207
scra 134
Topic:
Amendment
Information

of

the

RULE 110
Facts:
Petitioner was originally charged
on July 19, 1991 in an information
for the crime of frustrated murder
of one Maureen Navarro Hultman.
After the prosecution had rested
its case, petitioner was allowed to
file a motion for leave to file a
demurrer to evidence. However,
before the said motion could be
filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman
died.
Consequently, private prosecutor
Rogelio A. Vinluan filed an
omnibus motion for leave of court
to file an amended information and
to
admit
said
amended
information.
The
amended
information, filed on October 31,
1991, reads:
That on or about the 13th
day of July, 1991, in the
Municipality
of
Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the
said Claudio Teehankee, Jr.
y. Javier, armed with a
handgun, with intent to kill
and evident premeditation
and by means of treachery,
did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot
with the said handgun
Maureen Navarro Hultman
who was hit in the head,
thereby inflicting mortal
wounds
which
directly
caused the death of said
Maureen Hultman.

Petitioner filed an opposition

thereto, as well as a rejoinder to
the reply of the prosecution. The
trial court issued the questioned
order admitting the amended
information.
Petitioner avers that the additional
allegation
in
the
amended
information
constitutes
a
substantial amendment since it
involves a change in the nature of
the offense charged, that is, from
frustrated
to
consummated
murder.
Petitioner then postulates that
since the amended information for
murder
charges
an
entirely
different offense, it is essential
that
another
preliminary
investigation on the new charge be
conducted
before
the
new
information can be admitted.
At the scheduled arraignment on
November 26, 1991, petitioner
refused to be arraigned on the
amended information for lack of a
preliminary investigation thereon.
By
reason
of
such
refusal,
respondent judge ordered that a
plea of "not guilty" be entered for
petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not an amended
information involving a substantial
amendment, without preliminary
investigation, after the prosecution
has
rested
on
the
original
information, may legally and
validly be admitted
Held: In the present case, there is
an identity of offenses charged in
both the original and the amended

RULE 110
information. What is involved here
is not a variance in the nature of
different offenses charged, but
only a change in the stage of
execution of the same offense from
frustrated
to
consummated
murder. This is being the case, we
hold that an amendment of the
original information will suffice
and, consequent thereto, the filing
of the amended information for
murder is proper.
Petitioner would insist, however,
that the additional allegation on
the fact of death of the victim
Maureen
Navarro
Hultman
constitutes
a
substantial
amendment which may no longer
be allowed after a plea has been
entered.
The
proposition
is
erroneous and untenable.
Section 14 of Rule 110 provides
that an amendment, either of form
or substance, may be made at any
time before the accused enters a
plea to the charge and, thereafter,
as to all
After arraignment and during the
trial, amendments are allowed, but
only as to matters of form and
provided that no prejudice is
caused to the rights of the
accused.
Now, an objective appraisal of the
amended information for murder
filed against herein petitioner will
readily show that the nature of the
offense originally charged was not
actually changed. Instead, an
additional allegation, that is, the
supervening fact of the death of
the victim was merely supplied to

aid the trial court in determining

the proper penalty for the crime.
That the accused committed a
felonious act with intent to kill the
victim
continues
to
be
the
prosecution's theory.
It consequently follows that since
only a formal amendment was
involved and introduced in the
second information, a preliminary
investigation is unnecessary and
cannot be demanded by the
accused. The filing of the amended
information without the requisite
preliminary investigation does not
violate petitioner's right to be
secured against hasty, malicious
and oppressive prosecutions, and
to be protected from an open and
public accusation of a crime, as
well as from the trouble, expenses
and anxiety of a public trial. The
amended information could not
conceivably have come as a
surprise to petitioner for the
simple and obvious reason that it
charges essentially the same
offense as that charged under the
original information. Furthermore,
as we have heretofore held, if the
crime originally charged is related
to the amended charge such that
an inquiry into one would elicit
substantially the same facts that
an inquiry into the other would
reveal,
a
new
preliminary
investigation is not necessary. 17
WHEREFORE, it being clearly
apparent that respondent judge
did
not
commit
the
errors
speciously attributed to him, the
extraordinary writs prayed for are
hereby DENIED and the instant

RULE 110
petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

fate, this petition for prohibition

was filed.

Jalandoni vs. Andaya 55 SCRA

261

Issue: Whether or not respondent

Judges
insistence
to
try
a
prosecution for libel, instead of
having it elevated to the proper
court of first instance is correct

Topic: Jurisidction
Facts:
Petitioner instituted a criminal
complaint for libel in the Municipal
Court of the Municipality of
Batangas presided over by the
respondent Judge. The accused
named therein was Serafin D.
Cruz. There was the corresponding
preliminary examination of the
witnesses for the complainant with
respondent Judge finding that
there was reasonable ground to
believe that such offense was
committed by the person named.
After respondent Cruz posted the
corresponding bail bond for his
provisional liberty, the respondent
Judge set the case for hearing on
the merits on July 13, 1964, at 2:30
o'clock in the afternoon. When that
time came, complainant, now
petitioner,
through
counsel
manifested in open court that
under Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code, respondent Judge was
devoid of jurisdiction to do so.
There was, as noted, a negative
response. After hearing arguments
on such motion for desistance
including memoranda submitted
by both sides, respondent Judge
issued
an
order
denying
petitioner's verbal motion to have
Criminal Case No. 801 elevated to
the Court of First Instance of
Batangas. With a motion for
reconsideration meeting the same

Held: There is no need to make

mention against that it is a court of
first instance that is specifically
designated to try a libel case.
Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code so provides. Its language is
categorical; its meaning is free
from doubt. This is one of those
statutory provisions that leaves no
room for interpretation. All that is
required is application. 4 What the
law ordains must then be followed.
It is as simple as that. It did not
appear to be so to respondent
Judge. He would go ahead. He
therefore did invite a suit of this
character bent as he was on
treading
grounds
where
his
presence was, to put it at its
mildest, unwelcome. He must be
restrained.
WHEREFORE,
the
writ
of
prohibition is granted and the
preliminary injunction issued by
this Court on December 18, 1964,
is made permanent.

People vs Pineda 20 SCRA 748

Topic: Consolidation of offenses
in one InformationFacts:

RULE 110
Respondents Tomas Narbasa,
Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres
stand indicted before the Court of
First Instance of Lanao del Norte,
as principals, in five (5) separate
cases for murder.
On July 29, 1965, spouses Teofilo
Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de
Mendoza, along with their children
were
attacked
by
private
respondents.
Teofilo
and
the
children were shot dead, leaving
only Valeriana alive but wounded.
Two of the three defendants in the
five criminal cases heretofore
listed Tomas Narbasa and
Tambak Alindo moved for a
consolidation thereof "into one (1)
criminal case." Their plea is that
"said cases arose out of the same
incident and motivated by one
impulse."
Giving the nod to defendants'
claim, respondent Judge directed
the City Fiscal to unify all the five
criminal cases, and to file one
single information in Case 1246.
He also ordered that the other four
cases, Nos. 1247, 1248, 1249 and
1250 "be dropped from the
docket."
The City Fiscal balked at the
foregoing
order,
sought
reconsideration thereof, upon the
ground that "more than one gun
was used, more than one shot was
fired and more than one victim was
killed." The defense opposed.
Respondent Judge denied the
motion to reconsider. He took the
position that the acts complained

of "stemmed out of a series of

continuing acts on the part of the
accused, not by different and
separate sets of shots, moved by
one impulse and should therefore
be treated as one crime though the
series of shots killed more than
one victim;" and that only one
information for multiple murder
should be filed, to obviate the
necessity of trying five cases
instead of one."
Issue: Whether or not respondent
Judge was correct in averring that
the five cases be consolidated, and
that only one information should
be filed by the City Fiscal
Held: The Court ruled in the
negative. Deeply rooted is the
doctrine that when various victims
expire from separate shots, such
acts
constitute
separate
and
distinct crimes. In People vs.
Gatbunton, the spouses Mariano
Sebastian and Maxima Capule
who were asleep were killed by
one burst of machine gun fire; and
then, by a second burst of machine
gun fire, two of the couple's
children also asleep were
killed.
The
accused,
Tomas
Gatbunton, was found guilty by the
trial court of quadruple murder. On
appeal, this Court declared that
"appellant must be declared guilty
of four murders."
The respondent Judge reasons out
in his order of May 31, 1966 that
consolidation of the five cases into
one would have the salutary effect
of obviating the necessity of trying
five cases instead of one. To save
time,
indeed,
is
laudable.

RULE 110
Nonetheless, the statute confers
upon the trial judge the power to
try these cases jointly, such that
the fear entertained by respondent
Judge could easily be remedied.
Upon the facts and the law, the
Court holds that the City Fiscal of
Iligan City correctly presented the
five separate informations four
for murder and one for frustrated
murder.
People vs. Devaras 228 scra 482
Topic: Qualifying circumstances
shall
be
alleged
in
the
Information
Facts:
A pedicab driver and his
passenger were attacked without
provocation by two men who
hacked them to death and later
threw their bodies over the bridge
with the help of another person.
Investigation that same night
disclosed the participation of the
herein
appellants,
who
were
subsequently accused of murder in
two informations alleging that they
committed
the
offenses
in
conspiracy with each other and
with treachery and abuse of
superior strength.
The principal witness for the
prosecution was Raul Animos, who
claimed to have witnessed the
killing of the two victims. He said
that on July 10, 1990, at about 7
o'clock in the evening, the three
appellants were drinking with him
in the house of Devaras and that
thereafter they joined him on his

tour of duty as bantay-bayan. They

had been making the rounds in the
town for about four hours when,
while at the Daguitan bridge, they
saw
a
zigzagging
pedicab
approach. When the pedicab was
halfway
across
the
bridge,
Blademir
Devaras,
who
was
carrying a long bolo, suddenly
attacked
Efren
Verzosa,
the
pedicab driver. Efren fell from his
seat
but
Blademir
continued
hacking him with the bolo, hitting
him in the head and neck. At abut
the same time, Ronilo Caisek, who
also carrying a long bolo, attacked
Felix Verzosa, the passenger, who
tried to parry the blows with his
arms as he got out of the vehicle.
He fell, staggered and ran but was
overtaken
by
Ronilo,
who
continued striking the helpless old
man in the head, neck, chest and
shoulders.
Pablo Devaras did not participate
in the brutal slaying but later
helped Blademir throw Efren's
body over the bridge into the river
below. Ronilo himself was ordered
to help throw the body of Felix
and,
although
he
initially
hesitated, had to comply in the end
because he was threatened with
death if he refused to obey.
The body of Felix was found the
following morning under the
bridge. The body of Efren was
found about three hours later near
the seashore. The autopsy revealed
that Felix had sustained twenty
wounds and nine wounds had been
inflicted in Efren.

RULE 110
All
three
accused
denied
participation in the killings. After
assessing the evidence of parties,
the trial court decided in favor of
the prosecution and convicted
Blademir Devaras as principal and
Pablo Devaras as accessory in the
murder of Efren Verzosa; and
Ronilo Caisek for the murder of
Felix Verzosa.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the RTC
erred in convicting them of
murder instead of homicide
2. Whether or not the RTC
erred in convicting appellant
Pablo
Devaras
as
an
accessory
Held:
1. The first error assigned by
the appellants is untenable
because the evidence of
record clearly shows that
Blademir
and
Ronilo
suddenly
attacked
their
unarmed victims with bolos,
thereby
insuring
the
commission of the offense
without
risk
themselves
arising from the defense the
victims might make. The
killings would have been
homicide only without the
attendance
of
treachery,
which is one of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in
Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code.
We agree that there was no
conspiracy between the appellants

to justify their common conviction

for both murders. There is no
evidence that Blademir and Ronilo
had earlier come to an agreement
to kill the Verzosas; on the
contrary, it would appear that they
had
acted
on
impulse,
independently of any common
plan. The trial court was correct in
finding Blademir guilty of the
murder only of Efren Verzosa and
Ronilo guilty of the murder only of
Felix Verzosa instead of holding
them equally liable for both
murders.
2. The second assigned error must
also
be
dismissed.
The
determination of the persons to be
prosecuted on the basis of the
evidence
against
them
rests
primarily with the prosecutor, who
is
vested
with
quasi-judicial
discretion in the discharge of this
function. We have held that, as an
exception, the prosecutor can be
compelled by mandamus if he
abuses this discretion and refuses
to include a person as a co-accused
against whom there appears to be
at least prima facie. However, this
extraordinary writ is available only
if the petitioner shows that he has
first exhausted all remedies in the
ordinary course of law, such as a
motion filed with the trial court for
the indictment of the person or
persons
excluded
by
the
prosecutor. It does not appear that
such a motion was filed by the
appellants in the case at bar.
An accessory is defined as one
who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime, and
without
having
participated

RULE 110
therein, either as principal or an
accomplice, takes part subsequent
to its commission by concealing or
destroying the body of the crime,
or the effects or instruments
thereof in order to prevent its
discovery. For having assisted in
throwing Efren's dead body into
the river, Pablo Devaras was
correctly
held
guilty
as
an
accessory.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the
trial court is AFFIRMED, but with
modification.
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. NARCISO
NAZARENO, et. al.
G.R. No. 103964, August 1,
1996, Mendoza, J., Second
Division
TOPIC: Prosecution of Offenses
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati (Branch 136), finding
accused-appellants
Narciso
Nazareno and Ramil Regala guilty
of murder for the killing of Romulo
"Molet" Bunye II in Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila. Two others, accused
with them, Manuel Laureaga and
Orlando Hular, were acquitted.
On December 14, 1988, between
8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., Bunye
took a stainless tricycle, which
was
driven
by
Fernando
Hernandez. Unknown to Bunye
was that two men were waiting
outside his house and that the two
hailed another tricycle in order to

follow him. Bunye alighted at the

corner of T. Molina and Mendiola
Streets in Alabang, Muntinlupa
and crossed to the left side of the
street. Shortly after, the tricycle,
driven by Rogelio de Limos,
arrived and stopped in front of
Hernandez's tricycle. One of the
men jumped out of the tricycle and
shot Bunye at the back of the head.
When Bunye fell face down, the
assailant fired another shot at
Bunye's head. Then, the other man
approached Bunye and shot him
also in the head. The autopsy
report on the victim showed that
he died of gunshot wounds in the
head.
On December 28, 1988, Ramil
Regala,
Narciso
Nazareno,
Orlando
Hular
and
Manuel
Laureaga were arrested. Regala
and Nazareno were put in a police
line-up. They were identified and
pointed to as the assailants by the
tricycle drivers. Regala executed
affidavits, admitting participation
in the slaying of Bunye and
pointing to Nazareno and a certain
Rey Taling as his co-conspirators.
He claimed that they had been
hired by Hular to kill the victim
and told that they would be paid by
Laureaga. His affidavits were
corroborated by Hular who stated
that it was Laureaga who wanted
Bunye
killed,
apparently
in
connection with Bunye's job as
administrator of the public market
in Alabang.
However,
Regala
and
Hular
recanted. Regala claimed that he
had been tortured. On the other

RULE 110
hand, Hular claimed that, although
he was not tortured, he admitted
to the crime and signed the
affidavit because he was afraid he
would also be tortured. Nazareno
also claimed to have been tortured
to admit to the crime but refused
to sign any written statement. The
trial court ruled the confessions of
Regala
and
Hular
to
be
inadmissible. However, it held
Regala and Nazareno guilty on the
basis of their positive identification
by Hernandez and de Limos during
the police line-up and their
testimony in court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the constitutional
right to due process of the
accused-appellants was violated.
RULING:
No, there was no violation of due
process in the prosecution and
subsequent conviction of Nazareno
and Regala. Accused-appellants
claim that their arrests without
warrant were illegal and justify the
nullification of the proceedings of
the trial court. The warrantless
arrest
of
accused-appellant
Nazareno was upheld by this Court
in 1990 in a petition for habeas
corpus. It appears that, on January
9, 1989, Nazareno filed a motion
for bail. As the trial court denied
his motion, a petition for habeas
corpus was filed on his behalf with
this Court. It was alleged that
Nazareno's arrest was illegal
because it was made without
warrant fourteen days after the
killing of Bunye. This Court
dismissed the petition. He filed a

motion for reconsideration which

the Court also denied on the
ground that the warrantless arrest
was in accordance with Rule 113,
5(b) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The question
which Nazareno raises has thus
been settled long ago in a final
decision of this Court.
Furthermore,
Nazareno
and
Regala waived objections based on
the alleged irregularity of their
arrest, considering that they
pleaded not guilty to the charges
against them and participated in
the trial. Any defect in their arrest
must be deemed cured when they
voluntarily
submitted
to
the
jurisdiction of the court. For the
legality of an arrest affects only
the jurisdiction of the court over
the
person
of
the
accused. Consequently,
if
objections based on this ground
are waived, the fact that the arrest
was illegal is not a sufficient cause
for setting aside an otherwise valid
judgment rendered after a trial,
free from error. The technicality
cannot render the subsequent
proceedings void and deprive the
State of its right to convict the
guilty when all the facts on record
point to the culpability of accused.
DOCTRINE:
The legality of an arrest affects
only the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the accused.
HONORATO GALVEZ, et. al. v.
COURT OF APPEALS (17TH
DIVISION), et. al.

RULE 110
G.R. No. 114046, October 24,
1994, Regalado, J., Second
Division
TOPIC:
Prosecution
Offenses;
Amendment
Substitution
of
complaint
information

of
or
or

FACTS:
On November 12, 1993, petitioners
Honorato Galvez, the incumbent
Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan,
and one Godofredo Diego were
charged
in
three
separate
informations with homicide and
two
counts
of
frustrated
homicide. Both accused posted
their respective cash bail bonds
and were subsequently released
from detention. On November 15,
1993,
Bulacan
Provincial
Prosecutor Liberato L. Reyes filed
a Motion to Defer Arraignment and
Subsequent Proceedings to enable
him "to review the evidence on
record and determine once more
the proper crimes chargeable
against the accused," which was
granted
by
Judge
Villajuan.
Respondent Prosecutor Dennis M.
Villa-Ignacio
was
designated
Acting Provincial Prosecutor of
Bulacan and was instructed to
conduct a re-investigation of the
aforesaid criminal cases filed
against herein petitioners.
By virtue of a Manifestation
with Ex-parte Motion
filed
by
respondent
prosecutor,
the
proceedings were again ordered
suspended by Judge Villajuan until
after the prosecution's request for
change of venue shall have been
resolved by the Supreme Court,

and the preliminary investigation

being conducted by the former
shall have been terminated. It
appears that on December 2, 1993,
private complainants had filed with
the SC a Petition for Change of
Venue, purportedly to safeguard
the lives of the victims and their
witnesses, and to prevent a
miscarriage of justice.
On December 15, 1993, before
petitioners could be arraigned,
respondent prosecutor filed an Ex
parte Motion
to
Withdraw
Informations. This
motion
was
granted by Judge Villajuan and the
cases were considered withdrawn
from the docket of the court. On
the same day, Prosecutor VillaIgnacio filed four new informations
against herein petitioners for
murder, two counts of frustrated
murder,
and
violation
of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 for
illegal
possession
of
firearms which were subsequently
raffled to the sala of Judge Victoria
Pornillos of Branch 10, Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan. No
bail having been recommended for
the crime of murder, Judge
Pornillos ordered the arrest of
herein petitioners.
On December 27, 1993, the
scheduled
arraignment
before
Judge Pornillos were reset due to
the
absence
of
respondent
prosecutor.
On
even
date,
petitioners filed before Judge
Villajuan
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration of his order of
December 15, 1993 which granted
the motion to withdraw the
original informations. Thereafter, a

RULE 110
Motion
to
Quash
the
new
informations for lack of jurisdiction
was filed by petitioners before
Judge
Pornillos. At
the
court
session set for the arraignment of
petitioners, Judge Pornillos issued
an order denying the motion to
quash and, at the same time,
directed that a plea of not guilty be
entered for petitioners when the
latter refused to enter their plea.
In the meantime, and prior to the
arraignment of herein petitioners
before Judge Pornillos, an order
was issued by Judge Villajuan
granting
the
motion
for
reconsideration
filed
by
petitioners. However,
the
arraignment was suspended and,
in the meanwhile, petitioners filed
a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with
respondent
Court of Appeals, assailing the
order dated January 24, 1994
issued by Judge Pornillos which
denied petitioners' motion to
quash. Respondent court dismissed
the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the ex parte motion to
withdraw the original informations
is null and void on the ground that
(a) there was no notice and
hearing as required by Sections 4,
5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court; and (b) the appropriate
remedy which should have been
adopted by the prosecution was to
amend
the
informations
by
charging the proper offenses
pursuant to Section 14 of Rule
110.
RULING:

It is petitioners' submission that

the prosecution's failure to serve
them a copy of the motion to
withdraw the original informations
and to set said motion for hearing
constitutes a violation of their
right to be informed of the
proceedings
against
them.
Petitioners advance the theory that
respondent prosecutor should have
amended the original informations
instead of withdrawing the same
and filing new ones. They postulate
that
the
principle
of nolle
prosequi does not apply in this
case since the withdrawal or
dismissal of an information is
addressed solely to the sound and
judicious discretion of the court
which has the option to grant or
deny it and the prosecution cannot
impose its opinion on the court.
It is further stressed that in case
there is a need to change the
nature of the offense charged, that
is, from homicide to murder, by
adding the qualifying circumstance
of treachery, the only legal and
proper remedy is through the filing
of the corresponding amended
information;
and
that
the
withdrawal of an information is
allowed only where the new
information involves a different
offense which does not include or
is not included in the offense
originally charged.
In actuality, the real grievance of
herein accused is not the dismissal
of the original three informations
but the filing of four new
informations,
three
of
which
charge graver offenses and the
fourth, an additional offense. Had

RULE 110
these new informations not been
filed, there would obviously have
been no cause for the instant
petition. Petitioners' contention
that the dismissal of the original
informations and the consequent
filing of the new ones substantially
affected their right to bail is too
strained and tenuous an argument.
They would want to ignore the fact
that had the original informations
been amended so as to charge the
capital offense of murder, they still
stood to likewise be deprived of
their right to bail once it was
shown that the evidence of guilt is
strong. Petitioners could not be
better
off
with
amended
informations
than
with
the
subsequent ones. It really made no
difference considering that where
a capital offense is charged and
the evidence of guilt is strong, bail
becomes a matter of discretion
under either an amended or a new
information.
DOCTRINE:
The rule is now well settled that
once a complaint or information is
filed in court any disposition of the
case, whether as to its dismissal or
the conviction or the acquittal of
the accused, rests in the sound
discretion of the court. Although
the
prosecutor
retains
the
direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even
when the case is already in court,
he cannot impose his opinion upon
the tribunal. For while it is true
that the prosecutor has the quasijudicial discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case
should be filed in court, once the
case had already been brought

therein
any
disposition
the
prosecutor may deem proper
thereafter should be addressed to
the court for its consideration and
approval. The only qualification is
that the action of the court must
not impair the substantial rights of
the accused or the right of the
People to due process of law.
FELIX A. VELASQUEZ v. HON.
UNDERSECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, HON. ARTEMIO G.
TUQUERO, et. al
G.R. No. 88442, February 15,
1990, Grio-Aquino, J., First
Division

TOPIC: Prosecution of Offenses;

Control of Prosecution

FACTS:

Respondent Edgardo Avila was a

Cash and Business Development
Consultant
of
the
Techtrade
Management
International
Corporation, authorized to followup business transactions, including
loan applications submitted to the
company.
On September 29, 1986, Avila
informed the company that he had
a borrower (whom he did not
identify) for P200,000 with interest
of 3%/month for a 30-day term
from September 29 to October 29,
1988. This was approved by the
company which issued to him a
pay-to-cash check for P194,000

RULE 110
after deducting the 3% interest of
6,000. Instead of returning the
borrowed amount on due date or
giving a satisfactory explanation
for the supposed borrower's failure
to pay the loan despite written
demands, Avila resigned from the
company on December 17, 1986
promising that: "... I shall set aside
the P200,000 upon its subsequent
collection xxx to answer for the
P100,000
portion
of
Tony's
P700,000 loan to you; please treat
the P100,000 balance, less my
unpaid professional fee and gas
expenses from November 16 to
December
15,
1986, as
my
separation
and
compulsory
benefit".
On December 23, 1986, petitioner
Felix A. Velasquez, as Executive
Vice-President/Managing Director
of Techtrade, filed a complaint for
estafa against Avila in the Manila
City Fiscal's Office. Assistant
Fiscal Romulo Lopez dismissed the
complaint. However, upon review
by the Chief, Investigation Division
of the City Fiscal's Office, the
latter set aside Fiscal Lopez'
resolution and ordered the filing of
an information for estafa against
Avila in the RTC.
Avila
twice
sought
a
reconsideration of that resolution,
but both motions were denied by
the
City
Fiscal.
Before
arraignment, Avila filed on June
29, 1987 in the Department of
Justice a petition for review which
the petitioner opposed. Justice
Undersecretary Silvestre Bello III
denied the petition for review. A

motion for reconsideration of the

denial did not prosper.
On October 14, 1988, Avila filed a
second motion for reconsideration
which the Undersecretary of
Justice,
Honorable
Artemio
Tuquero granted on January 4,
1989. He directed the City Fiscal
to conduct a reinvestigation of
this case to afford respondent to
properly present evidence that he
was duly authorized to pay the
subject
creditors
and
for
complainant to rebut the same
with controverting evidence, and
thereafter to resolve the case anew
on the basis of all the evidence
adduced. The complainant filed a
motion for reconsideration of that
resolution but it was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of
Justice, the State Prosecutor, or
the Fiscal interfere with the
judges disposition of the case.
RULING:
No, neither the Secretary of
Justice, the State Prosecutor, nor
the Fiscal may interfere with the
judge's disposition of the case,
much less impose upon the court
their opinion regarding the guilt or
innocence of the accused, for the
court is the sole judge of that.
Once the information is filed in
court, the court acquires complete
jurisdiction over it. A motion for
reinvestigation should, after the
court had acquired jurisdiction
over the case, be addressed to the
trial judge and to him alone.

RULE 110
Although the fiscal retains the
direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even
while the case is already in Court,
he cannot impose his opinion on
the trial court. The Court is the
best and sole judge on what to do
with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within
its
exclusive jurisdiction and
competence. A motion to dismiss
the case filed by the fiscal should
be addressed to the Court who has
the option to grant or deny the
same. It does not matter if this is
done
before
or
after
the
arraignment of the accused or that
the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation
or
upon
instructions of the Secretary of
Justice who reviewed the records
of the investigation.

DOCTRINE:
Once a complaint or information is
filed in Court, any disposition of
the case as its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court.

STA. ROSA MINING COMPANY

v. ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL
FISCAL AUGUSTO ZABALA, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS OFFICER-INCHARGE OF THE PROVINCIAL
FISCAL'S OFFICE OF
CAMARINES NORTE, et. al.

G.R. No. L-44723, August 31,

1987, Bidin, J., En Banc
TOPICS: Prosecution of Offenses;
Criminal Actions, how
Control of Prosecution

instituted,

FACTS:
On March 21, 1974, petitioner filed
a complaint for attempted theft of
materials (scrap iron) forming part
of the installations on its mining
property at Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte against private
respondents Romeo Garrido and
Gil Alapan with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Camarines
Norte, then headed by Provincial
Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre. The case
was assigned to third Assistant
Fiscal Esteban P. Panotes for
preliminary
investigation
who,
after conducting said investigation,
issued a resolution dated August
26, 1974 recommending that an
information for Attempted Theft be
filed against private respondents
on a finding of prima facie case
which resolution was approved by
Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre.
Private
respondents
sought
reconsideration of the resolution
but the same was denied by Fiscal
Ilustre in a resolution.

On October 29, 1974, Fiscal Ilustre

filed with the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Norte
Information,
charging
private
respondents with the crime of
Attempted Theft. In a letter dated

RULE 110
October 22, 1974, the private
respondents
requested
the
Secretary of Justice for a review of
the Resolutions of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal. On November 6,
1974, the Chief State Prosecutor
ordered the Provincial Fiscal by
telegram to "Please elevate entire
records PFO Case 577 against
Garrido et al., review in five days
and defer all proceedings pending
review."

The letter-request for review was

opposed by petitioner in a letter to
the Secretary of Justice dated
November 23, 1974 alleging,
among other things, that an
information for Attempted Theft
had already been filed against
private respondents for which
reason the request for review has
become a moot question as the
Provincial
Fiscal
has
lost
jurisdiction to dismiss the charge
for attempted theft.
On March 6, 1975, the Secretary
of Justice, after reviewing the
records, reversed the findings
of prima
facie case
of
the
Provincial Fiscal and directed said
prosecuting officer to immediately
move for the dismissal of the
criminal case. Petitioner sought
reconsideration of the directive of
the Secretary of Justice but the
latter denied the same.

A
motion
to
dismiss
dated
September 16, 1975 was then filed
by the Provincial Fiscal but the

court denied the motion on the

ground that there was a prima
facie evidence
against
private
respondents. Private respondents
sought reconsideration of the
court's ruling but in an Order
dated February 13, 1976, the
motion filed for said purpose was
likewise denied. Thereafter, Fiscal
Ilustre was appointed a judge in
the Court of First Instance of Albay
and respondent Fiscal Zabala
became officer-in-charge of the
Provincial
Fiscal's
Office
of
Camarines Norte.

On April 19, 1976, respondent

Fiscal filed a Second Motion to
Dismiss the case. This second
motion to dismiss was denied by
the
trial
court.
Whereupon,
respondent fiscal manifested that
he would not prosecute the case
and disauthorized any private
prosecutor to appear therein.

ISSUE:
After a case has been filed in
court, whether or not a fiscal be
compelled to prosecute the same,
after his motion to dismiss it has
been denied.
RULING:
There is no question that the
institution of a criminal action is
addressed to the sound discretion
of the investigating fiscal. He may
or he may not file the information
according to whether the evidence

RULE 110
is in his opinion sufficient to
establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. And
when he decides not to file the
information, in the exercise of his
discretion,
he
may
not
be
compelled to do so. However, after
the case had already been filed in
court, "fiscals are not clothed with
power, without the consent of the
court, to dismiss criminal actions
actually instituted and pending
further proceedings. The power to
dismiss criminal actions is vested
solely in the court".

Notwithstanding
his
personal
convictions or opinions, the fiscal
must proceed with his duty of
presenting evidence to the court to
enable the court to arrive at its
own independent judgment as to
the culpability of the accused. The
fiscal should not shirk from his
responsibility much less leave the
prosecution of the case at the
hands of a private prosecutor. At
all times, the criminal action shall
be prosecuted under his direction
and control. Otherwise, the entire
proceedings will be null and void.

However, the matter of instituting

an
information
should
be
distinguished from a motion by the
fiscal for the dismissal of a case
already filed in court. The judge
may properly deny the motion
where, judging from the record of
the
preliminary
investigation,
there appears to be sufficient
evidence
to
sustain
the
prosecution. This is, as it should
be, because the case is already in
court and, therefore, within its
discretion
and
control.
The
complaint cannot be withdrawn by
the fiscal without the consent of
the court." It is discretionary on
the court where the case is
pending to grant the motion to
dismiss or deny the same.

The Court is the best and sole

judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the
case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A
motion to dismiss the case filed by
the fiscal should be addressed to
the Court who has the option to
grant or deny the same. It does not
matter if this is done before or
after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was
filed after a reinvestigation or
upon instructions of the Secretary
of Justice who reviewed the
records of the investigation.

In the case at bar, the court below

denied the fiscal's motion to
dismiss on the ground that there
was a prima facie case against
private
respondents.

DOCTRINE:
Once a complaint or information is
filed in Court any disposition of the
case as its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court. Although
the fiscal retains the direction and
control of the prosecution of

RULE 110
criminal cases even while the case
is already in Court, he cannot
impose his opinion on the trial
court.
FIDEL M. BAARES II, et. al., v.
ELIZABETH BALISING, et. al.
G.R. No. 132624, March 13,
2000, Kapunan, J., First
Division
TOPICS: Prosecution of
Offenses; Criminal Actions, how
instituted
FACTS:
Petitioners Fidel M. Baares II,
Lilia C. Valeriano, Edgar M.
Baares, Emilia Gatchialian and
Fidel Besarino were the accused in
sixteen
criminal
cases
for
estafa filed
by
the
private
respondents. The cases were
assigned to the Municipal Trial
Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II.
After
the
petitioners
were
arraigned and entered their plea of
not guilty, they filed a Motion to
Dismiss the aforementioned cases
on the ground that the filing of the
same was premature, in view of
the failure of the parties to
undergo conciliation proceedings
before the Lupong Tagapamayapa
of Barangay Dalig, Antipolo, Rizal.
Petitioners averred that since they
lived in the same barangay as
private respondents, and the
amount involved in each of the
cases did not exceed Two Hundred
Pesos (P200.00), the said cases
were required under Section 412
in relation to Section 408 of the
Local
Government
Code
of
1991 and Section 18 of the 1991

Revised
Rule
on
Summary
Procedure to be referred to the
Lupong Tagapamayapa or Pangkat
ng
Tagapagkasundo
of
the
barangay
concerned
for
conciliation proceedings before
being filed in court.
The MTC issued an Order denying
petitioners' motion to dismiss on
the ground that they failed to
seasonably invoke the non-referral
of the cases to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo. It added that
such failure to invoke non-referral
of the case to the Lupon amounted
to a waiver by petitioners of the
right to use the said ground as
basis for dismissing the cases.
Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration
of
the
aforementioned Order, claiming
that nowhere in the Revised Rules
of Court is it stated that the
ground of prematurity shall be
deemed waived if not raised
seasonably
in
a
motion
to
dismiss. On November 13, 1995,
the
MTC
issued
an
Order
dismissing the sixteen criminal
cases against petitioners without
prejudice. More than two months
later, private respondents through
counsel, filed a motion to revive
the abovementioned criminal cases
against petitioners, stating that the
requirement of referral to the
Lupon for conciliation had already
been complied with. The parties
appeared
before
said
body
regarding the charges of estafa
filed
by
private
respondents
against petitioners but they failed

RULE 110
to reach an amicable settlement
with respect thereto.
Petitioners filed a comment and
opposition to motion to revive
claiming that the Order of the MTC
dismissing the cases had long
become final and executory; hence,
private respondents should have
re-filed the cases instead of filing a
motion to revive. The MTC issued
an
Order granting
private
respondents' motion to revive.
Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of
the
aforementioned Order which was
denied by the MTC.
Petitioners thereafter filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal, a petition for certiorari,
injunction and prohibition assailing
the Order of the MTC. They
claimed that the said Order,
dismissing the criminal cases
against them had long become
final and executory considering
that the prosecution did not file
any motion for reconsideration of
said Order. In response thereto,
private respondents filed their
Comment, arguing that the motion
to revive the said cases was in
accordance with law.
The RTC rendered the assailed
decision denying the petition
for certiorari,
injunction
and
prohibition. The RTC, likewise,
denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not an order
dismissing a case or action without
prejudice may attain finality if not

appealed within the reglementary

period, as in the present case; and
2. Whether or not the action or
case that had been dismissed
without prejudice may be revived
by motion after the order of
dismissal had become final and
executory
RULING:
This Court has previously held that
an order dismissing a case without
prejudice is a final order if no
motion for reconsideration or
appeal therefrom is timely filed.
The law grants an aggrieved party
a period of fifteen (15) days from
his receipt of the court's decision
or order disposing of the action or
proceeding to appeal or move to
reconsider the same. After the
lapse of the fifteen-day period, an
order becomes final and executory
and is beyond the power or
jurisdiction of the court which
rendered it to further amend or
revoke. A final judgment or order
cannot be modified in any respect,
even if the modification sought is
for the purpose of correcting an
erroneous conclusion by the court
which rendered the same. After
the order of dismissal of a case
without prejudice has become
final, and therefore becomes
outside the court's power to amend
and modify, a party who wishes to
reinstate the case has no other
remedy but to file a new
complaint. Contrary to private
respondents' claim, the foregoing
rule applies not only to civil cases
but to criminal cases as well.
Thus, the RTC erred when it
denied the petition for certiorari,

RULE 110
injunction and prohibition and
ruled that the order of the MTC,
dismissing without prejudice the
criminal cases against petitioners
had not attained finality and
hence, could be reinstated by the
mere filing of a motion to revive.
Equally
erroneous
is
private
respondents' contention that the
rules
regarding
finality
of
judgments under the Revised
Rules of Court do not apply to
cases covered by the 1991 Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure.
Private respondents claim that
Section 18 of the 1991 Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure
allows the revival of cases which
were dismissed for failure to
submit the same to conciliation at
the barangay level, as required
under Section 412 in relation to
Section
408
of
the
Local
Government Code.
Section 18 merely states that when
a case covered by the 1991
Revised
Rule
on
Summary
Procedure is dismissed without
prejudice for non-referral of the
issues to the Lupon, the same may
be revived only after the dispute
subject of the dismissed case is
submitted to barangay conciliation
as required under the Local
Government Code. There is no
declaration to the effect that said
case may be revived by mere
motion even after the fifteen-day
period within which to appeal or to
file a motion for reconsideration
has lapsed. Moreover, the 1991
Revised
Rule
on
Summary
Procedure expressly provides that
the
Rules
of
Court
applies

suppletorily to cases covered by

the former.
The rules regarding finality of
judgments also apply to cases
covered by the rules on summary
procedure. Nothing in Section 18
of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure conflicts with
the prevailing rule that a judgment
or order which is not appealed or
made subject of a motion for
reconsideration
within
the
prescribed
fifteen-day
period
attains finality.
The
doctrine
of
finality
of
judgments
is
grounded
on
fundamental
considerations
of
public policy and sound practice
that at the risk of occasional error,
the judgments of the courts must
become final at some definite date
set by law. It is but logical to infer
that the foregoing principle also
applies to cases subject to
summary
procedure
especially
since the objective of the Rule
governing the same is precisely to
settle these cases expeditiously. To
construe Section 18 thereof as
allowing the revival of dismissed
cases by mere motion even after
the lapse of the period for
appealing the same would prevent
the courts from settling justiciable
controversies with finality, thereby
undermining the stability of our
judicial system.
DOCTRINES:
Doctrine of finality of judgments
and orders: An order dismissing a
case without prejudice is a final
order if
no
motion
for
reconsideration
or
appeal

RULE 110
therefrom is timely filed. The law
grants an aggrieved party a period
of fifteen (15) days from his
receipt of the court's decision or
order disposing of the action or
proceeding to appeal or move to
reconsider the same. After the
lapse of the fifteen-day period, an
order becomes final and executory
and is beyond the power or
jurisdiction of the court which
rendered it to further amend or
revoke.
Maxim interpretare et concordare
legibus est optimus interpretandi.
(Every
statute
must
be
so
construed and harmonized with
other statutes as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence.)
Magbalon Reboroso
People of the Philippines vs.
Edgardo Barcena y Poca
G.R No. 168737 February 16,
2006
Topic: AVERMENTS IN
COMPLAINT/ INFORMATION
Facts:
Edgardo Barcena, the accused, is
the common law wife of Nenita
Barcena, which is the mother of
victim, Estrella Cabida. Barcena
was charge with qualified rape as
defined and penalized under Art.
335 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Republic Act No.
7659, due to the fact that the
victim is a minor (15yrs old) and
the accused was the common-law
husband of his mother.

Estrella testified that she was

alone in their house in the morning
of April 10, 1997, when suddenly
the accused strangled and
embraced her from behind pulling
her from their sala to the room,
where she was ravished. After the
incident, she was warned by the
accused not to tell anybody or else
she would be killed. The accused,
however, raised the defenses of
denial and alibi. He testified that
during April 10, 1997, on that
morning he reported for work at a
Rice Mill and went home already
in the evening. He insisted that the
rape case is motivated by the
remorse of Nenitas relatives
against him, since he squandered
the money of the latter. The alibi of
the accused was corroborated by
his co-worker at the rice mill,
which testified that the accused
really reported for work that day.
The accused further averred that
the age of Estrella was not duly
established due to the fact that
only a photocopy of the latters
birth certificate was presented.
The lower court found the accused
guilty of the offense of qualified
rape through the use of force or
intimidation, having been
committed with the attendant
circumstance of the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is the commonlaw spouse of the parent of the
victim. When the case was
elevated to the CA, it was affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not the
averments in the
information/complaint was duly
established.

RULE 110
Held: Yes.
R.A. No. 7659, which took effect on
December 31, 1993, imposes the
death penalty for rape committed
under any of the circumstances
provided under Section 11 thereof.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7659, provides that the death
penalty shall be imposed if the
victim of rape is under 18 years of
age and the offender is the parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil
degree or the common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim.
Minority and relationship
constitute special qualifying
circumstances, which, in
accordance with the settled rule,
must be alleged in the information
and proven during trial.
In the instant case, the filial
relationship between appellant and
the complainant has been
sufficiently alleged in the
information and established during
trial. Several witnesses from both
the prosecution and the defense
testified that the appellant is the
common law husband of Nenita,
the mother of the victim. In fact,
the appellant himself admitted that
he exercised parental authority
over the children, including the
complainant, of his common-law
wife Nenita.
With regard to Etrellas minority;
even granting that the certificate
of live birth is only a photocopy of
the original, the same sufficiently
proved Estrellas age and minority.

In People v. Cayabyab, we held

that:
We are not unaware of our ruling
in People v. Mantis that a mere
photocopy of the birth certificate,
in the absence of any showing that
the original copy was lost or
destroyed, or was unavailable,
without the fault of the
prosecution, does not prove the
victims minority, for said
photocopy does not qualify as
competent evidence for that
purpose.
However, there are other
exceptions to the "best evidence
rule" as expressly provided under
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, which reads:
Sec. 3. Original document must be
produced; exceptions. When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of
a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the
following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost
or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the
custody or under the control of the
party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of
numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be
examined in court without great
loss of time and the fact sought to

RULE 110
be established from them is only
the general result of the whole;
and
(d) When the original is a public
record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public
office.
Without doubt, a certificate of live
birth is a public record in the
custody of the local civil registrar
who is a public officer. Clearly,
therefore, the presentation of the
photocopy of the birth certificate
of Alpha Jane is admissible as
secondary evidence to prove its
contents. Production of the
original may be dispensed with, in
the trial courts discretion,
whenever in the case at hand the
opponent does not bona fide
dispute the contents of the
document and no other useful
purpose will be served by
requiring production.
Doctrine: Qualifying circumstances
must be alleged in the information
to be appreciated by the court.
Anything not alleged cannot be
acted upon.
People of the Philippines vs.
Juan Manggasin y Lucanas
G.R No. 130599-600
21, 1999

April

Topic:
Facts: Qualifying circumstances
must be alleged in the
information

Accused-appelant, Juan Maggasin,

is the common-law spouse of Lilia
Mangasin, the latter being the
mother of the victim Maria Fe
Empimo.
Maria Fe testified before the lower
court that at around 12 noon of
Spetember 3, 1991, she was
allured/hypnotized by the accused
which rendered her unconscious,
making it successful for the
accused to ravish her at that date.
Right after the sexual incident, the
accused warned her not to tell her
mother or else she and her mother
will be killed. On another date,
November 14, 1995, on their small
house, when everyone was asleep,
she was dragged then by the
accused and was successfully
ravished again by the accused.
Complainant said she related her
ordeal to her mother, but the latter
just told her to keep her disgrace
to herself.
The complaint reads as follows:
That sometime during the last
week of March, 1995, in Brgy.,
Tambulilid, Ormoc City, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused,
JUAN MANGGASIN y Lucanas
alias Johnny, being then the stepfather of the complainant herein
MARIA FE EMPIMO, by means of
violence and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge
of the said MARIA FE EMPIMO, a
seventeen (17) year old lass,
against her will.
The accused rejected the victims
claim, he averred that the first

RULE 110
claim of rape was false since he
reported for work at that time,
which the complainants mother
assented. The accused further
contends that he and the
complainant engaged in an
amorous relationship and had
several occasions of sexual
intercourse and all started when
the complainant was seventeen
(17) years old.
The trial court found him guilty of
two (2) counts of rape and
sentenced him to DEATH. By
virtue of R.A 7659, otherwise
known as the Death Penalty Law
which provides that death penaly
shall be imposed in the if the crime
of rape is committed when the
victim is under eighteen (18) years
of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim.
Issue:
Whether or not the imposition of
death as penalty is correct.
Held: No.
As this Court has held, the
concurrence of the minority of the
victim and her relationship to the
offender being a special qualifying
circumstance, which increases the
penalty as opposed to a generic
aggravating circumstance which
only affects the period of the
penalty, should be alleged in the
information, because of the
accused's right to be informed of

the nature and cause of the

accusation against him.
In this case, the informations in
Criminal Case Nos. 4730-0 and
4731-0 alleged that accusedappellant, who is the stepfather of
complainant, succeeded in having
carnal knowledge of the latter who
was then below eighteen (18)
years of age. However, the
evidence shows that accusedappellant is not the complainant's
stepfather because he and
complainant's mother were not
really married but only lived in a
common-law relationship. To this
effect are the testimonies of the
complainant, her mother, and even
accused-appellant himself. Thus,
although a common-law husband is
subject to punishment by death in
case he commits rape against his
wife's daughter, nevertheless the
death penalty cannot be imposed
on accused-appellant because the
relationship alleged in the
information in Criminal Case No.
4730-0 against him is different
from that actually proven.
Accordingly, accused-appellant
must be sentenced to the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Doctrine: Qualifying circumstances
must be alleged in the information.
An incorrect imposition of a
qualifying circumstance in the
information will not be appreciated
by the Court. This is anchored on
the accuseds right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ vs. The
Honorable HARRIET O.

RULE 110
DEMETRIOU (in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of Regional
Trial Court, NCR, Branch 70,
Pasig), The Honorable
FRANKLIN DRILON (in his
capacity as Secretary of
Justice), JOVENCITO R. ZUO,
LEONARDO C. GUIYAB,
CARLOS L. DE LEON,
RAMONCITO C. MISON,
REYNALDO J. LUGTU, and
RODRIGO P. LORENZO, the last
six respondents in their official
capacities as members of the
State Prosecutor's Office)
G.R No. 111771-77
November 9, 1993
Topic:
SUITS

`DUPLICITY OF

Facts:
Mayor Antionio L. Sanchez of
Calauan, Laguna, was among
others, charged in connection of
the rape-slay of Mary Elieen
Sarmena and the killing of Allan
Gomez of seven (7) counts of rape
with homicide which was
requested to be acted upon by the
Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission.
Mayor Sanchez was invited for
investigation at Camp Vicente Lim,
and was immediately taken there.
The Mayor was positively
identified as suspect by witnesses
present in the investigation and
was placed on arrest status and
taken to DOJ Manila. The
respondent prosecutors
immediately conducted an inquest
upon arrival, and after hearing a

warrant of arrest was served.

Mayor Sanhez was forthwith taken
to the CIS Detention Center, Cam
Crame, where he remains
confined.
The respondent prosecutors filed
with RTC of Calamba, Laguna,
seven informations charging
Mayor Sancehz among others, with
the rape and killing of Mary Eileen
Sarmaneta. Aftrer several days,
the court issued a warrant for the
arrest of all the accused, including
Mayor Sanchez, in connection with
the said crime. The Court later
ordered the treasfer of the venue
of the seven cases to Pasig, where
it was raffled to the sala of Judge
Demetriou. On that court, the
seven informations were amended
to include the killing of Allan
Gomez as an aggravating
circumstance. On that same day,
petitioner filed a motion to quash
the informations substantially on
the grounds now raised in this
petition, which, however, was
denied.
Mayor Sanchez now argues that
the seven information against him
should be quashed because, among
others, he is being with seven
homicides arising from the death
of only two persons.
Issue:
Whether or not the information is
correct, wherein seven counts of
homicide was charged which arose
from the death of only two
persons.
Held: Yes.

RULE 110
It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court that:
Sec. 13.
Duplicity of offense. A
complaint or information must
charge but one offense, except
only in those cases in which
existing laws prescribe a simple
punishment for various offenses.
Rape with homicide comes within
the exception under R.A. 2632 and
R.A. 4111, amending the Revised
Penal Code.
The petitioner and his six coaccused are not charged with only
one rape committed by him in
conspiracy with the other six. Each
one of the seven accused is
charged with having himself raped
Sarmenta instead of simply helping
Sanchez in committing only one
rape. In other words, the
allegation of the prosecution is
that the girl was raped seven
times, with each of the seven
accused taking turns in abusing
her with the assistance of the
other six. Afterwards, their lust
satisfied, all seven of them decided
to kill and thus silence Sarmenta.
Every one of the seven accused is
being charged separately for
actually raping Sarmenta and later
killing her instead of merely
assisting the petitioner in raping
and then slaying her. The separate
informations filed against each of
them allege that each of the seven
successive rapes is complexed by
the subsequent slaying of
Sarmenta and aggravated by the
killing of Allan Gomez by her seven
attackers. The separate rapes were

committed in succession by the

seven accused, culminating in the
slaying of Sarmenta.
It is of course absurd to suggest
that Mary Eileen Sarmenta and
Allan Gomez were killed seven
times, but the informations do not
make such a suggestion. It is the
petitioner who does so and is thus
hoist by his own petard.
This argument was correctly
refuted by the Solicitor General in
this wise:
Thus, where there are two or more
offenders who commit rape, the
homicide committed on the
occasion or by reason of each rape,
must be deemed as a constituent
of the special complex crime of
rape with homicide. Therefore,
there will be as many crimes of
rape with homicide as there are
rapes committed.
In effect, the presence of homicide
qualifies the crime of rape, thereby
raising its penalty to the highest
degree. Thus, homicide committed
on the occasion or by reason of
rape, loses its character as an
independent offense, but assumes
a new character, and functions like
a qualifying circumstance.
However, by fiction of law, it
merged with rape to constitute a
constituent element of a special
complex crime of rape with
homicide with a specific penalty
which is in the highest degree, i.e.
death.
Doctrine: In the crime of Rape with
Homicide, the Homicide partakes

RULE 110
the element of force and
intimidation in rape. Hence, the
crime of Rape and Homicide are
not distinct from each other. By
virtue of this, it does not run afoul
the rule on duplicity of suits,
although there were only two
counts of death in this case, each
one who participated in the crime
shall be charged with one count of
Rape with Homicide.

Agents cannot receive any form of

payment from buyers as well as to
issue any receipts, and after
receiving sum of money from
prospective buyers as
downpayment, misappropriate and
convert to their own personal use
the said amount and despite
several demands upon them to
return, failed and refused to
restitute the same.

Geruncio H. Ilagan, Claro Pinon

and Rosend Pinon vs. Hon.
Court of Appeals, Hon. Arturo
A. Romero, Salavado Q. Quimpo
and Hometrust Development
Corporation

Petitioners moved to quash the

informations on the ground of
duplicity of offenses charged. The
same was dismissed by the trial
court declaring that each
informations show different private
complainants and different
transactions on different dates.
Unfazed, the same was elevated to
the CA by writ of certiorari which
was still denied.

G.R No. 110617 December 29,

1994
Topic: Separate Crimes in an
Information
Facts:
Petitioners herein were charged
with eight infromations of estafa. It
were adduced that by means of
false manifestations and fraudulent
representations which they made
to prospective lots and house and
lot buyers, by representing
themselves that they are
authorized to collect/receive and
issue receipts of payments from
said buyers. Another information
states that petitioners herein
confederating with each other,
defrauded and deceived
HOMETRUST DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, by being agents
by the corporation on a
commission basis with the
restriction however, that the

Issue:
Whether or not the offenses
charged in the eight informations
actually constitute only one offense
or were correctly considered as
eight separate crimes of estafa.
Held: The lower court and the CA
were correct in considering eight
separate crimes of estafa.
The crime of estafa committed
against respondent corporation, on
the one hand, and those committed
against the lot buyers, on the
other, are definitely separate
felonies. They were dictated by
different criminal intents,
committed under different modes
of commission provided by the law
on estafa, perpetrated by different

RULE 110
acts, consummated on different
occasions, and caused injury to
different parties.
The crime of estafa against
respondent corporation was
committed through unfaithfulness
or abuse of confidence, specifically
as provided in Paragraph 1(b) of
Article 315, Revised Penal Code.
The operative act in the
perpetration thereof was the
failure to turn over or deliver to
respondent corporation the
amounts collected by the accused,
despite their duty to do so. The
felony was consummated on the
dates when and at the places
where such amounts were to be
delivered to respondent
corporation under the agency
agreement therefor or within a
reasonable time from receipt of the
payments made by the lot buyers.
The aggrieved party was
respondent corporation which
suffered damages basically to the
extent of the sums collected in its
behalf but not delivered or
accounted for by the accused.
With respect to the lot buyers, the
offense of swindling was
committed by deceit or false
pretenses employed prior to or
simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud, more
specifically as provided in
Paragraph 2(a) of the same article
of the Code, that is, by the accused
falsely pretending to possess the
power to collect the payments due
from said buyers, despite the
peculiar but specific prohibition
imposed by their said principal.
The felony was perpetrated

through the aforesaid the deceitful

misrepresentations which made
possible the unauthorized
collections. The offense was
consummated upon receipt by the
accused of the amounts in the
different occasions and places
where the payments were made by
the lot buyers. The aggrieved
parties were the lot buyers who
individually and separately
suffered damages by being
deprived not only of their money
but primarily of their property
rights to and in the lots they
respectively purchased.
Doctrine: The rule provides that
one information should only
contain one offense. If the crime is
Estafa which could be committed
by a single offender to different
prospective victims by different
criminal motives, each offense is
distinct from each other. Each
information then is distinct from
each other which only constitute
one count.
Miriam Defensor Santiago vs.
Hon. Justice Francis
Garchitorena, Sandiganbayan
and People of the Philippines.
G.R No. 109266
December 2, 1993
Topic: CONTINUING CRIMES
Facts:
Petitioner was charged of the
Sandiganbayan with violation of
Section 3 of R.A No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices

RULE 110
Act, allegedly commited by her
favoring unqualified aliens with
the benefit of the Alien
Legalization Program.

Sandiganbayan admitted the 32

Amended Informations and
ordered the petitioner to post bail
bonds. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner filed a petition for

certiorari and prohibition, to enjoin
the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding with the case on the
ground that said case was
intended solely to harass her as he
was then a presidential candidate.
On another date, petitioner filed a
motion for inhibition of Presiding
Justice Garchitorena. The
Sandiganbayan, of which Justice
Garchitorena is a member, set the
criminal case for arraignment.
Petitioner then moved to defer the
arraignment of the ground that
there was a pending motion for
inhibition, and that petitioner
intended to file a motion for a bill
of particulars. Motion to defer
arraignment was denied later on. A
day after being denied the motion,
petitioner filed a motion for a bill
of particulars, stating that unless
she was furnished with the names
and identities of the aliens, she
could not properly plead and
prepare for tiral. The arraignment
was then reset to another date and
the Sandiganbayan was ordered to
act upon the disqualification of
Justice Garchitorena and the
motion for bill of particulars.

Issue:

At the hearing for the motion for a

bill of particulars, the prosecution
stated that they would file only one
amended information against
petitioner, however, the
prosecution filed a motion to admit
the thirty-two (32) Amended
informations. At a later date, the

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan

is correct in admitting the 32
Amended Informations; does the
offense fall under the ambit of
delito continuado or continuing
crimes?
Held: It is a continuing crime.
Hence, the Sandigan is not correct
in admitting the 32 Amended
Informations.
The Supreme Court held that
technically, there was only one
crime that was committed in
petitioners case, and hence, there
should only be one information to
be filed against her.
Simply put, a delito continuado is
an offense consisting of a series of
acts arising from one criminal
intent or resolution (Criminal Law,
1988 ed. Pp. 53-54). In the case at
bench, the original information
charged petitioner with
performing a single criminal act
that of her approving the
application for legalization of
aliens not qualified under the law
to enjoy such privilege. The 32
Amended Informations aver that
the offenses were committed on
the same period of time, i.e., on or
about October 17, 1988. The
strong probability even exists that
the approval of the application or
the legalization of the stay of the
32 aliens was done by a single

RULE 110
stroke of the pen, as when the
approval was embodied in the
same document.
Likewise, the public prosecutors
manifested at the hearing the
motion for a bill of particulars that
the Government suffered a single
harm or injury. The Sandiganbayan
in its Order dated November 13,
1992 stated as follows: . . . Equally,
the prosecution has stated that
insofar as the damage and
prejudice to the government is
concerned, the same is
represented not only by the very
fact of the violation of the law
itself but because of the adverse
effect on the stability and security
of the country in granting
citizenship to those not qualified.
Doctrine: A continuing crime
comprises of several acts but only
constitute of one offense, because
the sole criminal motive of the
offender.
Jose Gamboa v. Court of
Appeals
and Benjamin Lu Hayco
68 SCRA 308; November 28, 1975
Topic: Continuing Crimes
Facts:
The
private
respondent
Benjamin Lu Hayco was a former
employee of petitioner company in
its optical supply business at Sta.
Cruz, Manila. One hundred twentyfour (124) complaints of estafa
under Article 315, para. 1-b of the
Revised Penal Code were filed
against him by the petitioner

company with the Office of the City

Fiscal
of
Manila.
After
the
procedural
preliminary
investigation, the Office of the City
Fiscal filed seventy-five (75) cases
of
estafa
against
private
respondent before the City Court
of Manila.
While the criminal suits in
particular were pending trial on
the merits before the twelve
branches of the City Court of
Manila,
private
respondent
commenced
a
petition
for
prohibition
with
preliminary
injunction before the Court of First
Instance of Manila (Branch XV)
against the petitioners herein and
the City Court Judges of Manila,
claiming
that
the
filing,
prosecution and trial of the
seventy-five (75) estafa cases
against him is not only oppressive,
whimsical and capricious, but also
without or in excess of jurisdiction
of the respondents City Fiscal and
the City Court Judges of Manila.
Private respondent asserts that all
the indictments narrated in the
seventy-five (75) informations were
mere components of only one
crime, since the same were only
impelled by a single criminal
resolution or intent.
The lower court dismissed the
petition on the ground that the
series
of
deposits
and
the
subsequent withdrawals thereof
involved in the criminal cases were
not the result of only one criminal
impulse on the part of private
respondent.
As

consequence,

private

RULE 110
respondent Benjamin Lu Hayco
appealed to the Court of Appeals
which reversed the order of the
lower court and granted the
petition for prohibition. It directed
the respondent City Fiscal "to
cause the dismissal of the seventyfive (75) criminal cases filed
against petitioner- appellant, to
consolidate in one information all
the charges contained in the
seventy-five (75) informations and
to file the same with the proper
court."
Issues:
(1)Whether or not the crime
committed is a continuous
crime.
(2)Whether
or
not
the
necessary elements of
estafa
may
separately
take place in different
territorial
jurisdictions
until the crime itself is
consummated.
Rulings:
(1)No.
Delito
continaudo
or
continuous crime is a single crime
consisting of a series acts arising
from a single criminal resolution or
intent not susceptible of division.
For Cuello Calon, when the actor,
there being unity of purpose and of
right violated, commits diverse
acts, each of which although of a
delitual
character,
merely
constitutes a partial execution of a
single particular delict, such
concurrence or delictual acts is
called a delito continuado.
In order that it may exist,
there should be plurality of acts

performed separately during a

period of time; unity of penal
provision
infringed
upon
or
violated and unity of criminal
intent and purpose, which means
that two or more violations of the
same penal provision are united in
one and the same intent leading to
the perpetration of the same
criminal purpose or aim.
Hence, daily abstractions
from and diversions of employee to
his own personal use and benefit of
deposits made by customers of
company constitute separate acts,
each
with
an
independent
existence and criminal intent of its
own.
(2)Yes. The necessary elements of
estafa may separately take
place in different territorial
jurisdictions until the crime
itself is consummated. The
moment, however, that the
elements of the crime have
completely
concurred
or
transpired, then an individual
crime of estafa has occurred or
has been consummated. The
term continuing must be
understood in the sense similar
to that of transitory and is
only intended as a factor in
determining the proper venue
or jurisdiction for that matter
of the criminal action pursuant
to Section 14, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court. This is so,
because a person charged
with transitory offense may be
tried in any jurisdiction where
the
offense
is
in
part
committed. In transitory or
continuing offense in which
some
acts
material
and

RULE 110
essential to the crime and
requisite to its consummation
occur in one province and
some in another, the court of
either province has jurisdiction
to try the case, it being
understood that the first court
taking cognizance of the case
will exclude the other.
Doctrine:
When a crime committed
constitutes a single act with an
independent
existence
and
criminal intent of its own it cannot
be
considered
a
continuing
crime.
People v. Hubilo
220 SCRA 389; March 23, 1993
Topic:
Continuing
Preliminary Investigation

Crimes;

Facts:
On 18 August 1988, at
around
5:00
o'clock
in
the
afternoon,, Hermogenia Cacayurin,
Cesario Gamiz and Ferdinand
Gamiz were riding on a tricycle
driven
by
Rogelio
Antonio,
proceeding north toward Barangay
Nagcuralan, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija,
where they resided. As they
approached
the
cemetery
of
Nagcuralan, gunfire greeted them
and driver Rogelio, being hit fell
off the tricycle. Ferdinand Gamiz
who had been seated behind the
tricycle driver jumped off the
tricycle and ran in a northerly
direction.
He
was
met
or
confronted by an armed man

whose face was covered by

handkerchief. The masked gunman
lifted his weapon, a 2-1/2 foot long
firearm and fired at Ferdinand,
hitting him near the right armpit.
As the gunman fired, the cover on
his
face
fell
off.
Ferdinand
recognized the assailant as Adly
Hubilo,
also
a
resident
of
Nagcuralan and known to him
since he reached the age of
reason. Wounded and fearing for
his
life,
Ferdinand
pleaded:
"Please, have mercy on me,
manong."
Hubilo,
however,
squeezed the trigger again but this
time the gun did not fire Ferdinand
seized his chance to escape death
and ran away as fast as he could in
a westerly direction. Hubilo tried
to pursue Ferdinand and reload his
weapon
at
the
same
time.
Ferdinand was able to elide him
and as he looked back while
fleeing, he saw Hubilo approach
stalled and fire tricycle and fire
many shots.
Thereafter, Police Station
Commander of Cuyapo filed o
complaint for multiple murder with
frustrated
murder
against
appellant Hubilo and Bernardo
Silapan before the Municipal Trial
Court("MTC") of Cuyapo. The next
day, which was also Ferdinand
Gamiz fifth day in the hospital,
policemen
brought
appellant
Hubilo with them to the hospital.
There,
Ferdinand
identified
appellant Hubilo as person who
had shot him.
Counsel
for
Hubilo
manifested that they were waiving
their right to present evidence at
the preliminary investigation and
prayed that the records of the

RULE 110
case, including the motion to fix
bail, be forwarded to the Regional
Trial Court ("RTC") of Guimba,
Nueva Ecija. Defense counsel also
requested that accused Hubilo be
transferred
and
detained
at
Guimba.
The MTC thereupon
issued an order granting the
request. An information was filed
by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Ubaldino A. Lacuron against
appellant, with the RTC. Appellant
Hubilo filed another motion to fix
bail, but this motion was detained
by the trial court.
On
a
motion
for
reconsideration, however the trial
court reversed itself and held a
hearing on the application for bail.
Ultimately, the RTC denied the
application for bail, holding that
the evidence of guilt of accused
Hubilo was strong.
Appellant responded by filing
a motion to disqualify or inhibit the
judge alleging that appellant
would not be afforded a fair trial
because of the findings of the RTC.
Judge Raymundo Z. Annang then
inhibited himself and ordered the
records of the case forwarded to
the Executive Judge, but Executive
Judge Pablo D. Atienza ordered the
return of the case to the sala of
Judge Annang. Judge Annang set
the case for arraignment, pre-trial
and trial; but these settings did not
materialize.
Appellant Hubilo filed a
Petition for certiorari before this
Court, questioning the denial of his
application for bail and the order
of
Executive
Judge
Atienza
returning the case to Judge
Annang
for
continuation
of
proceedings. This Petition was

dismissed by this Court for failure

to attach clearly legible duplicate
originals or certified true copies of
the questioned orders. Appellant
then filed with the trial court a
motion
for
preliminary
investigation. This motion was
denied.
Appellant Hubilo was finally
arraigned and he pleaded not
guilty. The case proceeded to trial
on the merits. In due time, the RTC
promulgated
its
judgment
convicting the accused.
Hubilo now contends that
the trial court erred in denying the
accused of his constitutional rights
of due process of law, when it
denied his 'Motion for Preliminary
Investigation and/or Investigation'.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the accused
is guilty of the crime of
multiple murder (triple) with
frustrated murder.
2. Whether or not the appellant
was
denied
of
his
constitutional rights of due
process of law, when RTC
denied
his
'Motion
for
Preliminary
Investigation
and/or Investigation'
Ruling:
1. The crime was correctly
characterized by the trial
court as murder, appellant
having employed treachery in
staging
the
ambuscade.
Appellant selected a secluded
and uninhabited area, where
thick cogon grass grew on the
side of the road, and suddenly
fired as the tricycle with its

RULE 110
three (3) passengers
driver approached.

and

A separate and distinct acts (or

shots) were directed at each of the
deceased victims. Cesario had
suffered eight (8) bullet wounds,
Rogelio Antonio, three (3); and
Hermogenia Cacayurin two (2)
which resulted to their immediate
death. Moreover, the evidence
showed that, after the wounded
Ferdinand had escaped, appellant
Hubilo went back to the stalled
tricycle and fired multiple shots at
the three (3) victims on the road,
presumably to make sure all three
(3) were dead.
2. No. The right to preliminary
investigation is a substantive
right and its denial amounts to
a denial of due process of law.
An accused in a criminal case,
however may waive his right to
preliminary investigation, and
here appellant Hubilo expressly
waived
preliminary
investigation.
Moreover,
appellant, by applying for bail
and
by
submitting
to
arraignment and proceeding to
trial, must be deemed to have
foregone
his
right
to
preliminary
investigation
to
question any irregularity that
might have attended such
investigation. The court notes
further that appellant did not
question the supposed denial of
his
right
to
preliminary
investigation by going to an
appellate court on certiorari
and prohibition. In the light of
the foregoing circumstances,

and considering that the trial

court has rendered after trial on
the merits a judgment of
conviction on what it regarded
as proof beyond reasonable
doubt, it is too late in the day
for appellant to make an issue
of his right to a preliminary
investigation.
Doctrine:
When
the
evidence
presented by the prosecution did
not show that a single shot slain
three
(3)
different
persons,
appellant is properly held liable for
three (3) separate murders.
People v. Victor
181 SCRA 818
Topic: Complex Crimes
Facts:

When Victor went to Boljoon

to visit his wife, Guneda met him
at the market place and proposed
to him a plan to rob the residence
of an American named Myles
Castle and the cottage of Charles
Turner, an American Peace Corps
Volunteer
assigned
in
the
Municipality of Boljoon The two
agreed to execute their plan on
Oct. 16, 1984.
As planned, Victor went to
Boljoon in the afternoon of October
16, 1984, together with Montebon,
who brought with him a .38 caliber
homemade
revolver.
They
proceeded to the store of a certain
Josefina Romero along McKinley
Street, where Victor used to leave
his things intended for his wife
everytime he came to Boljoon.

RULE 110
They passed the time there
drinking "tuba" and eating bread
while they were conversing in
subdued voices.
At past 6:00 o'clock that
afternoon, Victor and Montebon
left and proceeded towards a
bridge
where
they
were
subsequently joined by Guneda,
who led them to the house of
Myles Castle along Rodriguez
Street. As they entered the gate of
Castle's house, a maid went out to
get the clothes which were being
hanged
to
dry.
Forthwith,
Montebon held her and said:
"Don't move this is a hold up!"
Frightened the maid instinctively
shouted, causing the three to
scamper away and return to the
bridge where they stayed for a
while.
From
there,
the
trio
proceeded to rob Charles Turner in
his rented cottage located at
Lusapon Beach in the outskirts of
Boljoon Poblacion. However, upon
entering Charles Turner's cottage,
Montebon shot him at the back of
his head upon instruction of
Guneda, who wanted the American
killed because the latter knew him.
After killing Turner, the trio
ransacked the cottage of Turner's
personal belongings, and returned
to the culvert near the bridge
where they left the things which
they found to be unimportant. At
about 6:30 o'clock in the morning
of October 17, 1984, a report was
made to the Police Force of Boljoon
that Charles Turner was seen
lifeless in his cottage.
Forthwith,
Patrolman
Marcos
Florida,
Archimedes
Villanueva and Romulo Medida

proceeded to the cottage of the

Peace Corps Volunteer where he
was found dead while sitting on a
chair with his head stooping
towards a table. That same day at
about
2:00
o'clock
in
the
afternoon, a six-man PC-INP Team
proceeded to Cebu City to track
down the suspect.
Upon apprehension Victor
verbally admitted being one of
those who killed the American
Peace Corps Volunteer in Boljoon,
Cebu. Victor even voluntarily
turned over to the PC-INP team a
size 40 corduroy jacket owned by
the
victim.
The
team
also
recovered an empty .38 caliber
revolver shell inside the house of
Victor who explained that said
empty shell was left by his coaccused Roberto Montebon while
they were drinking liquor inside
the house immediately after the
incident From there, Victor led the
team to the house of Montebon in
Inawayan
Pardo,
Cebu
City.
Montebon was lying down inside
his house when the PC-INP team
arrived at about 11:00 o'clock in
the morning that same day. Then
and there, Captain Barias placed
Montebon under arrest. The team
also retrieved the items taken by
the suspects from the victim's
cottage in Boljoon.
Regional Trial Court found:
a) Both Roberto Montebon and
Ceferino Guneda guilty beyond
doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide.
They
were
both
sentenced to suffer Reclusion
Perpetua,
and
the
accessory
penalties provided for by law; and
b) Roger Victor guilty beyond

RULE 110
doubt of the offense of simple
Robbery, with two mitigating
circumstances of plea of guilty to
Robbery and testifying as to true
facts in favor of the State.
It is argued that Guneda
cannot be convicted of the special
complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide as the information filed
against him failed to allege that
the Homicide was committed "by
reason of or on the occasion of the
robbery," and that neither may one
infer from that charge alone that
the alleged Homicide was done for
purposes of committing the alleged
Robbery, thus violating Guneda's
right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation
against him.
Issue:
Whether or not Guneda can
be convicted of the special
complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide as the information filed
against him failed to allege that
the Homicide was committed "by
reason of or on the occasion of the
robbery,"
Ruling:
Yes. The court held that
although the phrase "by reason or
on occasion of the robbery", as
provided for by the Revised Penal
Code, was not literally used in the
recital of facts alleging the
commission of the crime of
Robbery
with
Homicide,
the
Information, as filed, sufficiently
and
distinctly
alleges
the
commission of the two crimes of
"Robbery" and "Homicide" and

adequately informs the accused of

the offense charged.
Doctrine:
An information charged is
sufficient when it adequately
informs the accused of the offense
charged.
People v. Feloteo
290 SCRA 627
Topic: Complex Crimes
Facts:
SONNY SOTTO, and his
friends, ARNEL ABELEDA and
JOHNNY ABREA, were walking
along the highway in Barangay
Bintuan,
Coron,
Province
of
Palawan. They had a few drinks
earlier that day and were on their
way home to Sitio Nagbaril. Abrea
walked ahead of the group, about
thirteen meters away from Sotto,
followed by Abeleda. They were in
a lively mood as Abeleda playfully
walked backwards, facing Sotto.
The accused, WILFREDO
FELOTEO,
appeared
on
the
opposite side of the road and
walked past Abrea and Abeleda.
He was armed with an armalite
rifle.
Abeleda
and
Abrea
recognized the accused, their
barriomate, as the moon was
shining brightly. They did not pay
much attention to the accused as
Abeleda was playing "habulan"
with Sotto. Without uttering a
word, the accused aimed the
armalite at Sotto and pressed its
trigger. Sotto was hit above the left
chest and fell on the ground, face

RULE 110
down.
Abeleda
and
Abrea
scampered away to find help, while
the accused fled from the crime
scene. Ten (10) minutes later,
Abeleda and Abrea, accompanied
by Barangay Tanod Tito Abrina and
a certain Inyong Adion, returned to
the locus criminis. They found
Sotto dead.
After trial, the accused was
found guilty as charged. He was
sentenced to suffer the penalties of
reclusion perpetua, for murder,
and imprisonment of twenty (20)
years, for illegal possession of
firearm. He was further ordered to
pay the heirs of Sotto the amount
of
fifty
thousand
pesos
(P50,000.00), as civil indemnity.
The appellant now contends
that the trial court erred in
appreciating
the
qualifying
circumstance of treachery as
attending the commission of the
crime alleged and in holding
accused-appellant guilty of murder
in the killing of Sonny Sotto.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial
court erred in appreciating the
qualifying
circumstance
of
treachery
as
attending
the
commission of the crime alleged
and in holding accused-appellant
guilty of murder in the killing of
Sonny Sotto.
Ruling:
No. Under par. 16, Article 14
of the Revised Penal Code, the
qualifying
circumstance
of
treachery is present when the
offender employs means, methods,
or forms in the execution of the

crime which tend directly and

especially to insure its execution
without risk to himself arising from
any defensive or retaliatory act
which the victim might make.
The settled rule is that
treachery can exist even if the
attack is frontal if it is sudden and
unexpected, giving the victim no
opportunity to repel it or defend
himself. What is decisive is that the
execution of the attack, without
the slightest provocation from a
victim who is unarmed, made it
impossible for the victim to defend
himself or to retaliate.
In the case at bar, treachery
is present for there was a sudden
attack against the unarmed Sotto.
When Sotto and his friends
encountered appellant on the road,
they were in a "jovial mood" as
they just came from a drinking
spree. Although they saw appellant
carrying an armalite, they did not
suspect anything untoward to
happen. However, without any
provocation, appellant shot Sotto.
The fact that the attack was frontal
cannot negate treachery. The
shooting was unexpected. There is
no showing that the alleged
warning given by appellant to
Sotto afforded the latter sufficient
time to defend himself. Indeed,
Sotto could not defend himself as
he was unarmed and a bit drunk
as observed by the appellant
himself, the victim was walking in
a zigzag manner. There was no
way for Sotto to avoid the armalite
bullets.
Doctrine:
Questions
regarding
the
information charged should be

RULE 110
raised at the earliest possible time
otherwise it shall be deemed
waived.
People v. Valdez
304 SCRA 611
Topic: Complex Crimes
Facts:
William Montano (16 years
old), Randy Tibule (17 years old),
Jean Maria Garcia, Willie Acosta,
Sandra Montano and Ramon
Garcia, Jr. were at the house of
Randy
Tibule
in
Manaoag,
Pangasinan. They were discussing
how to go to the wedding party of
Jean Marie's cousin in Sitio
Cabaoangan. After discussion, they
rode in the tricycle driven by
Ramon
Garcia
going
to
Cabaoangan. Behind Garcia were
Tibule and Willie. Jean was seated
inside the side car with Sandra and
William Montano. After making a
turn along the barangay road
leading to Sitio Cabaoangan they
met appellant Rolando Valdez and
his companions who were armed
with guns. The tricycle's headlight
flashed on their faces. Without
warning, they pointed their guns
and fired at Montano's group.
Thereafter, after uttering the
words, "nataydan, mapan tayon"
(They are already dead. Let us go),
Valdez and companions left. The
shooting incident left Ramon
Garcia, Jean Marie Garcia, Sandra
Montano and Willie Acosta dead.
The trial court held that the
accused Ronaldo Valdez is guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime of MULTIPLE MURDER
WITH
DOUBLE
FRUSTRATED
MURDER defined and penalized
under Republic Act No. 7659
otherwise known as the Heinous
Crime Law, the offense having
been a complex crime the penalty
of which is in the maximum, and
with the attendant aggravating
circumstances
of
evident
premeditation
and
abuse
of
superior
strength,
hereby
sentences
him
the
ultimum
suplicum of DEATH to be executed
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8177
known as the Lethal Injection Law,
to pay the heirs of the deceased
RAMON GARCIA, JR., WILLIE
ACOSTA, JEMARIE GARCIA and
SANDRA MONTANO and the
injured
victims
WILLIAM
MONTANO and RANDY TIBULE.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial
court erred when it allowed itself
to be carried away by the
erroneous Information filed by the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of
Pangasinan
charging
the
complex crime of multiple murder
and double frustrated murder.
Ruling:
Yes. It may be noted that in
his Resolution dated September
26,
1995,
the
investigating
municipal trial court judge of
Manaoag, Pangasinan, found a
prima facie case for four separate
counts of murder. Too, the same
investigating
judge
in
his
Resolution dated October 31, 1995
found prima facie for two counts of

RULE 110
frustrated murder. It was upon
reinvestigation by the Office of the
Provincial
Prosecutor
of
Pangasinan that a case for the
complex crime of murder with
double frustrated murder was
instead
filed
per
its
Joint
Resolution dated November 17,
1995.
The concept of a complex
crime is defined in Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Art. 48. Penalty for
complex crimes
When a single act
constitutes two or
more grave or less
grave felonies or
when an offense is a
necessary means for
committing
the
other, the penalty
for the most serious
crime
shall
be
imposed, the same
to be applied in its
maximum
period.
(As amended by Act
No. 4000.)
The case at bar does not fall
under any of the two instances
defined above. The Office of the
Provincial
Prosecutor
of
Pangasinan
erroneously
considered the case as falling
under the first. It is clear from the
evidence on record, however, that
the four crimes of murder resulted
not from a single act but from
several individual and distinct acts.
For one thing, the evidence
indicates that there was more than
one gunman involved, and the act
of each gunman is distinct from

that of the other. It cannot be said

therefore, that there is but a single
act of firing a single firearm. There
were also several empty bullet
shell recovered from the scene of
the crime. This confirms the fact
that several shots were fired.
Furthermore,
considering
the
relative position of the gunmen
and their victims, some of whom
were riding the motorized tricycle
itself while the others were seated
inside the sidecar thereof, it was
absolutely impossible for the four
victims to have been hit and killed
by a single bullet. Each act by each
gunman pulling the trigger of their
respective firearms, aiming each
particular moment at different
persons constitute distinct and
individual acts which cannot give
rise to the complex crime of
multiple murder.
We
therefore
rule
that
accused-appellant is guilty, not of a
complex crime of multiple murder,
but of four counts of murder for
the death of the four victims in this
case. In
the same
manner,
accused-appellant is likewise held
guilty for two counts of frustrated
murder.
Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, provides the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death for the crime of murder.
Without
any
mitigating
or
aggravating
circumstance
attendant in the commission of the
crime, the medium penalty is the
lower
indivisible
penalty
of
reclusion perpetua.
In the case at bar, accusedappellant, being guilty of four
separate counts of murder, the
proper penalty should be four

RULE 110
sentences of reclusion perpetua. In
addition, he being guilty of two
counts
of
frustrated
murder,
accused-appellant must be meted
out an indeterminate sentence
ranging from a minimum of 6 years
and 1 day of prison mayor to
maximum of 12 years and 1 day of
reclusion
perpetua
for
each
offense.
Accused- appellant is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
four counts of murder and hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of
four
sentences
of
reclusion
perpetua. He is also found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of frustrated murder and
hereby meted two indeterminate
sentences, each, ranging from six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.

her alleged recklessness, she hit

the car of Norberto Bonsol causing
him physical injuries, and damage
to property amounting to P
8,542.00. Three days after the
accident a complaint was filed
before the fiscals office against
the petitioner. She was
charged of "Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to
Property with Slight Physical
Injury." After pleading not guilty
trial ensued. RTC of Makati
rendered the decision convicting
petitioner of "quasi offense of
reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property with slight
physical injuries"
with arresto mayor of 6 months
imprisonment and a fine of P
13,542.00. Petitioner made an
appeal before the CA which reaffirmed the lower courts
decision.

Doctrine:
When a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave
felonies or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing
the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum
period.

Issues:
I

II

Reodica v. Court of Appeals

292 SCRA 87; July 8, 1998
Topic: Complex Crimes

III

Facts:
Petitioner Isabelita Reodica was
driving a van along Dona Soledad
Avenue, Better Living Subdivision,
Paranaque, Metro Manila. Due to

IV

Whether the penalty

imposed on petitioner is
correct.
Whether the quasi offenses
of reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to
property in the amount
of P8,542.00 and reckless
imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries are
light felonies.
Whether the rule on
complex crimes under
Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code applies to
the quasi offenses in
question.
Whether the duplicity of the
information may be

RULE 110

VI

Ruling:
I

II

questioned for the first time

on appeal.
Whether the Regional Trial
Court had jurisdiction over
the offenses in question.
Whether the quasi offenses
in question have already
prescribed.
No. The Court held that the
proper penalty for reckless
imprudence resulting to
slight physical injury is
public censure, it being the
penalty next lower in degree
to arresto menor, and the
proper penalty for reckless
imprudence resulting to
damage to property
amounting to 8,542.00
would be arresto mayor in
minimum and medium
periods.
Reckless imprudence
resulting to slight physical
injuries is a light felony.
Public censure is classified
under article 25 of the
Revised Penal Code as a
light penalty and it belongs
on the graduated scale in
Article 71 of the RPC as a
penalty next lower to arresto
menor. On the other hand,
reckless imprudence
resulting to damage to
property is punishable by
acorrectional penalty of
arresto mayor and thus
belongs to less grave
felony and not as a light
felony as claimed by

petitioner.
III

Yes. Applying article 48 of

the Revised Penal Code, the
Court held that it follows
that if one offense is light,
there is no complex
crime. The resulting
offenses may be treated as
separate or the light felony
may be absorbed by the
grave felony. Thus, the light
felonies of damage to
property and slight physical
injuries, both resulting from
a single act of imprudence,
do not constitute a complex
crime. They cannot be
charged in one
information. They are
separate offenses subject to
distinct penalties.

IV

No. Under Section 3, Rule

120 of the Rules of Court,
when two or more offenses
are charged in a single
complaint or information
and the accused fails to
object to it before trial, the
court may convict the
accused of as many offenses
as are charged and proved
and impose on him the
penalty for each of them.

No. The Court ruled that the

MTC has jurisdiction as it
has jurisdiction over
offenses punishable by
censure, such as reckless
imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries. As to
the reckless imprudence

RULE 110
resulting in damage to
property in the amount
of P8,542.00, the same was
also under the jurisdiction of
MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs
because the imposable
penalty therefor was arresto
mayor in its minimum and
medium periods.
VI

No. The Supreme Court held

that the prescriptive period
for the quasi offenses in
question was interrupted by
the filing of the complaint
with the fiscals office three
days after the vehicular
mishap and remained tolled
pending the termination of
this case.

months and eleven (11) days to six

(6) years, and to pay damages.
Napoleon had jumped bail and
remained at-large, and Section 8,
Rule 124 of the Rules of Court
authorizes the dismissal of appeal
when appellant jumps
bail. Counsel for accused, also
admittedly hired and provided by
the petitioner, filed a notice of
appeal which was denied by the
trial court. The judgment against
accused then became final and
executory.
The RTC further ruled that
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,
Inc., in the event of the insolvency
of Napoleon, shall be liable for the
civil liabilities of the latter.
Issue:
Whether or not an employer, who
dutifully participated in the
defense of its accused-employee,
may appeal the judgment of
conviction independently of the
accused

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,

Inc. v. People
G.R. No. 147703, April 14, 2004
Topic: Prosecution of Civil Action
Facts:
Napoleon Macadangdang Roman,
an employee of Philippine Rabbit
Bus Lines, Inc., was found guilty
and convicted of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting to
triple homicide, multiple physical
injuries and damage to property
and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of four (4) years, nine (9)

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court held that
when the accused-employee
absconds or jumps bail, the
judgment meted out becomes final
and executory. The employer
cannot defeat the finality of the
judgment by filing a notice of
appeal on its own behalf in the
guise of asking for a review of its
subsidiary civil liability. Both the
primary civil liability of the
accused-employee and the
subsidiary civil liability of the
employer, as set forth in Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code, are

RULE 110
carried in one single decision that
has become final and executory.
Javier v. Intermediate Appellate
Court
G.R. No. 75379, March 31, 1989
Topic: Prosecution of Civil Action
Facts:
Private respondent, Leon S.
Gutierrez, Jr., issued to petitioners,
Reynaldo and Estelita Javier, a
check that was subsequently
dishonored and not made good
despite the required notice of
dishonor. For this he has been
charged with estafa under B.P. Blg.
22 in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. The information against
the private respondent was filed
before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati and the civil case was not
reserved. Gutierrez then filed a
complaint for damages against the
petitioners in the Regional Trial
Court of Catarman, Northern
Samar, in the complaint, the herein
petitioners were charged with
having inveigled Gutierrez into
signing the very check subject of
the criminal case in the Makati
court. The complaint in effect
explains why he issued the check
for which he was facing
prosecution for.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondent
can raise the reason that he was
inveigled into signing the very
check subject of the criminal case
in the RTC of Makati in
another court, in a separate civil
action for damages filed by him
against the petitioners

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court sustaining the trial
judge. It held that as the civil
action was not reserved by the
petitioners, it was deemed
impliedly instituted with the
criminal case in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati in accordance with
Rule 111, Section 1, of the Rules of
Court. It was before the Makati
court that the private respondent,
as defendant in the criminal
charge of violation of B.P. Blg. 22,
could explain why he had issued
the bouncing check. As the civil
action based on the same act was
also deemed filed there, it was also
before that same court that he
could offer evidence to refute the
claim for damages made by the
petitioners. Further, the Court held
that the private respondent should
have done in the form of a
counterclaim for damages for his
alleged deception by the
petitioners. In fact, the
counterclaim was compulsory and
should have been filed by the
private respondent upon the
implied institution of the civil
action for damages in the criminal
action.
Casupanan v. Laroya
G.R. No. 145391, August 26, 2002
Topic: Prosecution of Civil Action
Facts:
Two vehicles, one driven by
respondent Mario Llavore Laroya
and the other owned by petitioner
Roberto Capitulo and driven by

RULE 110
petitioner Avelino Casupanan ,
figured in an accident. As a result,
two cases were filed with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a
criminal case against Casupanan
for reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property. On the
other hand, Casupanan and
Capitulo filed a civil case against
Laroya for quasi-delict. When the
civil case was filed, the criminal
case was then at its preliminary
investigation stage. Laroya,
defendant in the civil case, filed a
motion to dismiss the civil case on
the ground of forum-shopping
considering the pendency of the
criminal case. The MCTC granted
the motion and dismissed the civil
case. On Motion for
Reconsideration, Casupanan and
Capitulo insisted that the civil case
is a separate civil action which can
proceed independently of the
criminal case. The MCTC denied
the motion for reconsideration.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule
65 before the Regional Trial Court
of Capas, Tarlac which was
dismissed for lack of merit. The
Capas RTC ruled that the proper
remedy should have been an
appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not an accused in a
pending criminal case for reckless
imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently,
a separate civil action for quasidelict against the private
complainant in the criminal case
Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that

Under Section 1 of the present
Rule 111, the independent civil
action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code is not
deemed instituted with the
criminal action but may be filed
separately by the offended party
even without reservation, and that
the petitioners were right in filing
an appeal. The commencement of
the criminal action does not
suspend the prosecution of the
independent civil action under the
said articles of the Civil Code. The
suspension in Section 2 of the Rule
111 refers only to the civil action
arising from the crime, if such civil
action is reserved or filed before
the commencement of the criminal
action. Thus, the offended party
can file two separate suits for the
same act or omission. The first a
criminal case where the civil
action to recover civil liability exdelicto is deemed instituted, and
the other a civil case for quasidelict - without violating the rule
on non-forum shopping. The two
cases can proceed simultaneously
and independently of each
other. The commencement or
prosecution of the criminal action
will not suspend the civil action
for quasi-delict. The only limitation
is that the offended party cannot
recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the
defendant. Similarly, the accused
can file a civil action for quasidelict for the same act or omission
he is accused of in the criminal
case. This is expressly allowed in
paragraph 6, Section 1 of Rule 111
which states that the counterclaim

RULE 110
of the accused may be litigated in
a separate civil action.
General v. Claravall
G.R. No. 96724, March 22, 1991
Topic: Prosecution of Civil Action
Facts:
Private respondent Benneth
Thelmo filed a sworn complaint
accusing petitioner, Honesto
General, and another person of
libel, and alleged that by reason of
the offense he had suffered actual,
moral and exemplary damages in
the total sum of P100 million. The
information for libel was
subsequently filed with the RTC at
Pasig, after preliminary
investigation, did not however
contain any allegation respecting
the damages due the offended
party. At the trial, the defense
raised the issue of non-payment of
the docket fees corresponding to
the claim of damages contained in
Thelmo's sworn complaint before
the fiscal, as a bar to Thelmo's
pursuing his civil action therefor.
The trial Court overruled the
objection. It also denied the
defendants' motion for
reconsideration and motion for
suspension of proceedings.
Issue:
Whether or not the rule should be
that the filing fees for the civil
action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense
should first be paid in order that
said civil action may be deemed to
have been impliedly instituted with
the criminal and prosecuted in due
course.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court found no error
in the challenged orders of the
respondent and held that when a
civil action is deemed impliedly
instituted with the criminal in
accordance with Section 1, Rule
111 of the Rules of Court because
the offended party has not waived
the civil action, or reserved the
right to institute it separately, or
instituted the civil action prior to
the criminal actionthe rule is as
follows:
1) when "the amount of damages,
other than actual, is alleged in the
complaint or information" filed in
court, then "the corresponding
filing fees shall be paid by the
offended party upon the filing
thereof in court for trial;"

Tan v. Mendez
G.R. No. 138669; June 6, 2002
Topic: Prosecution of Civil Action
(Rule 111)
Facts:
Petitioners Steve Tan and
Marciano Tan are the owners of
Master
Tours
and
Travel
Corporation and operators of
Philippine Lawin Bus Co., Inc.,
while respondent Fabian Mendez,
Jr. is the owner of three gasoline
stations in Iriga City, Ligao, Albay,
and
Sipocot,
Camarines
Sur.
Petitioners opened a credit line for
their buses lubricants and fuel
consumption with respondent. At
the same time, the latter was also

RULE 110
designated by petitioners as the
booking and ticketing agent of
Philippine Lawin Bus Co. in Iriga
City.
Petitioners issued several
checks to respondent as payment
for oil and fuel products. One of
the checks was dishonored by the
bank
upon
presentment
for
payment for being drawn against
insufficient funds. Respondent sent
a
demand
letter
dated
to
petitioners demanding that they
make good the check or pay the
amount thereof, to no avail.
However, petitioners failed to pay
the amount thereof. Hence, an
information for violation of B.P. 22
was filed against petitioners before
the RTC.
Petitioners argue that he cannot be
held liable for violation of B.P. 22
because the amount subject of the
check
had
already
been
extinguished
by
offset
or
compensation
against
the
collection from ticket sales from
the booking offices. He presented
a memorandum showing the return
to
respondent
of
various
unencashed checks in the total
amount
of
Php
66,839.25
representing remittance of ticket
sales that were earlier sent by
respondent. After the alleged
offset, there remains a balance of
P226,785.83.
On
cross-examination,
Marciano admitted to have drawn
the subject check to pay private
respondents gasoline station and
that it was not covered by
sufficient funds at the time of its
issuance
due
to
uncollected
receivables. Upon query by the

court, he claimed that he did not

talk to private complainant and
could not tell if the latter agreed to
offset
the
checks
with
the
remittances.
Respondent disputed petitioners
claim of payment through offset or
compensation:

1. the
amount
of
the
four
unencashed checks totaling
P66,839.25 could not have
offset the amount of the
dishonored
checks
since
petitioners total obligations at
that time had already reached
P906,000; and
2. the compensation did not take
place
as
there
was
no
application of payment made by
the
petitioners
in
their
memorandum
dated
June
10,1991.

The trial court ruled against the

petitioners,
convicting
the
petitioners for violation of B.P. 22.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial
court.
Issues:

1. Whether or not petitioners can

be held liable for violation of
B.P. 22.
2. Whether
or
not
payment
through
compensation
can
offset or preclude prosecution
for violation of B.P. 22.

Ruling:
1. Yes. The elements of B.P. 22 are
present in the case at bar.
The
law
enumerates
elements of B.P. Blg. 22:

the

RULE 110
a. the making, drawing, and
issuance of any check to
apply for account or for
value;
b. the knowledge of the maker,
drawer, or issuer that at the
time of issue he does not
have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of the check
in full upon its presentment;
and
c. (3) the subsequent dishonor
of the check by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or dishonor
for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any
valid cause, ordered the
bank to stop payment.
2. No. The law has made the mere
act of issuing a bum check a
malum prohibitum, an act
proscribed by legislature for
being deemed pernicious and
inimical to public welfare. Thus,
even
if
there
had
been
payment,
through
compensation or some other
means, there could still be
prosecution for violation of B.P.
22.
Furthermore, according
to the Court, petitionerss
defense of compensation is
unavailing because petitioners
did not clearly specify in the
memorandum dated June 10,
1991 which dishonored check is
being offset. The Court also
said, in accordance Article 1279
of
the
Civil
Code,
no
compensation can take place
between
petitioners
and
respondent as respondent is not

a debtor of petitioners insofar

as the two checks representing
collections from the Baao ticket
sales are concerned.

Republic v. Bello
G.R. No. L-34906;
1983

January

27,

Topic: Prosecution of Civil Action

(Rule 111)
Facts:
Private respondent Arceo,
in his capacity as Cashier and
Disbursing
Officer
of
Capiz
Agricultural and Fishery School,
was charged for malversation of
public funds in the amount of
Php6,619.34 which he supposedly
failed to produce or to make
proper accounting thereof after
repeated demands.
After due trial, the respondent
Court of First Instance of Capiz,
finding the evidence of the
prosecution
not
sufficient
to
establish the guilt of the accused
beyond
reasonable
doubt,
rendered a decision acquitting
Arceo on the following grounds:
1. undisputed facts clearly and
unmistakably show lack of
criminal intent on accused's
part;
2. absence of proof that the
accused benefited personally
from his disbursements nor has
it been shown that he was
inexcusably negligent in the
administration of public funds
and properties entrusted to his
care;
3. it has not been shown and
proven that the government

RULE 110
suffered damage or prejudice
as the accused's disbursements
were for the benefit of the
Capiz Agricultural and Fishery
School; and
4. the funds claimed to be missing
in the amount of Php6,619.34 is
not really missing for the
accused demonstrated that said
amounts were spent for and in
the interest of the Capiz
Agricultural
and
Fishery
School.

After the acquittal of Arceo,

the Provincial Fiscal filed a civil
case against Arceo for the
recovery of the total sum of
Php13,790.71 which represented
the accountability of Arceo due to
his failure to issue official receipts
and to immediately deposit said
funds with the National Treasury.
Arceo filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint in the said civil case
alleging that the petitioner had no
cause of action against him
inasmuch as "the cause of action
had been decided in a prior
judgment."
Issue:
Whether or not the acquittal
of Arceo in the criminal case bars
the filing of the civil action against
him.
Ruling:
No. The Court ruled that the
decision did not absolve Arceo or
free him from responsibility insofar
as his accountability as Cashier
and
Disbursing
Officer
is
concerned.

A judgment of acquittal on
the ground that accused had no
criminal intent and that the
evidence of the prosecution was
not sufficient to establish the guilt
of the accused does not bar a civil
action for recovery of government
funds disturbed without prior
approval by the auditor.
It is also to be noted that the
subject subject-matter of the
malversation case was the amount
of Php6,619.34, the sum sought to
be recovered in the civil action
totalled
Php13,790.70
which
included the additional sum of
Php7,170.31
representing
the
income of the school from its
various projects for which the
accused failed to issue official
receipts.
Even insofar as the amount
of P6,619.34 is concerned, the
finding by the respondent court is
not a declaration that the fact
upon which the civil case is based
does not exist. The civil action
barred by such a declaration is the
civil liability arising from the
offense charged, which is the one
impliedly
instituted
with
the
criminal action. Such a declaration
would not bar a civil action filed
against an accused who had been
acquitted in the criminal case if
the criminal action is predicated
on factual or legal considerations
other than the commission of the
offense charged.
Therefore, Arceo cannot
invoke the provision of Section 3(c)
of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
to dismiss the civil case filed
against him.

RULE 110
Dela Cruz v. Ejercito
G.R. No. L-40895; November 6,
1975
Topic: Prosecution of Civil Action
(Rule 111)
Facts:
On May 20, 1974, the first
husband of Milagros Dela Cruz
filed a complaint in the Court of
First
Instance
of
Pampanga
charging the Dela Cruz with
bigamy
for
having
married
Sergeant Dominick L. Gaccino on
September 15, 1973.
On August 1, 1974, Dela
Cruz filed in the same court a
complaint for the annulment of her
marriage with Gaccino on the
ground of duress. Since the court
did not receive an answer from
Gaccino and there was no collusion
on the part of both parties, Judge
Castaneda rendered a decision
annulling the marriage of Dela
Cruz and Gaccino. The decision
became final.
On January 27, 1975, in view
of the annulment of her second
marriage, Dela Cruz filed a motion
to dismiss the bigamy charge
against her. Judge Ejercito denied
the motion to dismiss on the
ground that the decision in the
annulment case is not controlling
in the criminal case because the
parties and the issues in the two
cases are not the same.
Issue:
Whether or not the bigamy
case became moot or untenable
after the second marriage was
annulled.

Ruling:
Yes. It is necessary in a
prosecution for bigamy that the
second marriage be declared valid
if its validity is questioned in a civil
action.
The Court ruled that the
finding in the annulment case that
the second marriage contracted by
Dela Cruz with Sergeant Gaccino
was a nullity is determinative of
her innocence and precludes the
rendition of a verdict that she
committed bigamy. To try the
criminal case in the face of such a
finding would be unwarranted.
Furthermore, the Court said
that even supposing that the
decree
annulling
the
second
marriage was questionable or
erroneous because it was issued in
a judgment by default, still that
would not prevent the decree from
having legal effect. "An erroneous
judgment is not a void judgment."

Donato v. Luna
G.R. No. L-53642; April 15, 1988
Topic: Prosecution of Civil Action
(Rule 111)
Facts:
On January 23, 1979, the
City Fiscal of Manila filed an
information for bigamy against
Leonilo C. Donato with the Court
of First Instance of Manila based
on the complaint of private
respondent Paz Abayan.

RULE 110
On September 28, 1979,
before
the
petitioner's
arraignment, private respondent
filed with
the Juvenile
and
Domestic
Relations
Court
of
Manila
a
civil
action
for
declaration of nullity of her
marriage with petitioner on the
ground that the private respondent
had no previous knowledge that
the petitioner was already married
to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping.
Prior to the date set for the
trial on the merits of the bigamy
case, petitioner filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings of said
case on the ground that the civil
case seeking the annulment of his
second
marriage
raises
a
prejudicial question which must
first be determined or decided
before the criminal case can
proceed.
Hon.
Artemon
D.
Luna
denied the motion to suspend the
proceedings for bigamy based on
the ruling laid down in the case of
Landicho vs. Relova.
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration citing as one of his
grounds
for
suspension
of
proceedings the ruling laid down
in the case of De la Cruz vs.
Ejercito. The motion was likewise
denied due to lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not a criminal
case for bigamy pending before
the lower court be suspended in
view of a civil case for annulment
of marriage pending before the
juvenile and domestic relations
court on the ground that latter
constitutes a prejudicial question.

Ruling:
No. The requisites of a
prejudicial question is not present
in the case at bar.
A prejudicial question has
been defined to be one which
arises in a case, the resolution of
which question is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in
said case, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal.
It is one based on a fact distinct
and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence
of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it
must appear not only that said
case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be
based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.
The Court stated the ruling
in Landicho vs. Relova that it
must
be
shown
that
the
petitioner's
consent
to
such
marriage must be the one that was
obtained by means of duress, force
and intimidation to show that his
act in the second marriage must be
involuntary and cannot be the
basis of his conviction for the
crime of bigamy.
In the case at bar, petitioner
has not even sufficiently shown
that his consent to the second
marriage has been obtained by the
use
of
threats,
force
and
intimidation.

RULE 110
With regard to the contention of
the petitioner alleging that the
case of Dela Cruz vs. Ejercito
should be applied to the case at
bar, the Court said that the Dela
Cruz case and the case at bar are
markedly different due to the
following reasons:
1. Dela Cruz, the party who was
accused of bigamy was the one
who
filed
an
action
or
annulment
of
the
second
marriage while in the case at
bar,
it
was
the
private
respondent who filed an action

for the annulment

marriage; and

of

their

2. A
judgment
was
already
rendered in the civil case that
the second marriage of De la
Cruz was null and void, thus
determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. In the present
case, there is as yet no such
judgment in the civil case.