#1-ART.

17
Cabal vs. Kapunan
G.R. No. L-19052, December 29, 1962
MANUEL
F.
CABAL, petitioner,
vs. HON.
RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., and THE CITY FISCAL
OF
MANILA, respondents.
Concepcion, J.:
FACTS: 1. Col. Jose C. Maristela filed with the
Secretary of National Defense a letter-complaint
charging petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of
Staff of the AFP, with "graft, corrupt practices,
unexplained
wealth,
and
other
equally
reprehensible acts". The President of the
Philippines created a committee to investigate the
charge of unexplained wealth. The Committee
ordered petitioner herein to take the witness stand
in the administrative proceeding and be sworn to as
witness for Maristela, in support of his
aforementioned charge of unexplained wealth.
2. Petitioner objected to the order of the
Committee, invoking his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. The Committee
insisted that petitioner take the witness stand and
be sworn to, subject to his right to refuse to answer
such questions as may be incriminatory. This
notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully refused to
be sworn to as a witness to take the witness stand.
3. The Committee referred the matter to the Fiscal
of Manila, for such action as he may deem proper.
The City Fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance
of Manila a "charge" of contempt for failing to obey
the order of the Committee to take the witness
stand. The "charge" was assigned to the sala of
respondent judge Kapunan.
4. Petitioner filed with respondent Judge a motion
to quash, which was denied. Hence this petition for
certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Committee's order
requiring petitioner to take the witness stand
violates his constitutional right against selfincrimination.
HELD:Yes.
Although the said Committee was created to
investigate
the
administrative
charge
of
unexplained wealth, it seems that the purpose of
the charge against petitioner is to apply the

provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes

the forfeiture to the
State of property of a public officer or employee
which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
such public officer or employee and his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired
property. However, such forfeiture has been held to
partake of the nature of a penalty. As a
consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of property
are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the
exemption of defendants in criminal case from the
obligation to be witnesses against themselves are
applicable
thereto.
No person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself. This
prohibition against compelling a person to take
the stand as a witness against himself applies
to
criminal,
quasi-criminal,
and
penal
proceedings, including a proceeding civil in
form for forfeiture of property by reason of the
commission of an offense, but not a proceeding
in which the penalty recoverable is civil or
remedial
in
nature.
The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself
is not infringed by merely asking the witness a
question which he refuses to answer. The privilege
is simply an option of refusal, and not a prohibition
of inquiry. A question is not improper merely
because the answer may tend to incriminate but,
where a witness exercises his constitutional right
not to answer, a question by counsel as to whether
the reason for refusing to answer is because the
answer may tend to incriminate the witness is
improper.
The possibility that the examination of the witness
will be pursued to the extent of requiring selfincrimination will not justify the refusal to answer
questions. However, where the position of the
witness is virtually that of an accused on trial, it
would appear that he may invoke the privilege in
support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all
questions.
Note: It is not disputed that the accused in a
criminal case may refuse, not only to answer
incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the
witness stand.

malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent

Board.

#2. Article 17

ISSUE: Whether or not compelling petitioner to be

the first witness of the complainants violates the
Self-Incrimination Clause.

Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners

28 SCRA 344 (1969)

HELD: YES.

Doctrine: The privilege against self-incrimination

extends to administrative proceedings which
possess a criminal or penal aspect. In this case, it
was held that a doctor who was being investigated
by a medical board for alleged malpractice and
would lose his license if found guilty, could not be
compelled to take the witness stand without his
consent.

The Supreme Court held that in an administrative

hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged
malpractice, respondent Board of Medical
Examiners cannot, consistently with the selfincrimination clause, compel the person
proceeded against to take the witness stand
without his consent.

Fernado, J.:
FACTS: 1. On February 1, 1965, Arsenio Pascual,
Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with
prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board
of Medical Examiners, now respondent-appellant. It
was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an
administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel
for complainants announced that he would present
as his first witness herein petitioner- appellee, who
was the respondent in such malpractice charge.
2. Thereupon, petitioner-appellee, through counsel,
made of record his objection, relying on the
constitutional right to be exempt from being a
witness against himself. Respondent-appellant,
the Board of Examiners, took note of such a plea,
at the same time stating that at the next scheduled
hearing, on February 12, 1965, petitioner-appellee
would be called upon to testify as such witness,
unless in the meantime he could secure a
restraining order from a competent authority.
3. The answer of respondent Board, while admitting
the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to the
witness stand and interrogate him, the right against
self-incrimination being available only when a
question calling for an incriminating answer is
asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the
right against self-incrimination cannot be
availed of in an administrative hearing.
4. Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his
plea that he could not be compelled to be the first
witness of the complainants, he being the party
proceeded against in an administrative charge for

The Court found for the petitioner in accordance

with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a
criminal case may refuse, not only to answer
incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the
witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled
to testify against himself, he could suffer not
the forfeiture of property but the revocation of
his license as a medical practitioner. The
constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to
silence: "The accused has a perfect right to remain
silent and his silence cannot be used as
apresumption of his guilt." It is the right of a
defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent,
unless he chooses to take the witness stand with
undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free
genuine will."
The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along
with other rights granted an accused, stands for a
belief that while crime should not go unpunished
and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable
objectives should not be accomplished according to
means or methods offensive to the high sense of
respect accorded the human personality. More and
more in line with the democratic creed, the
deference accorded an individual even those
suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due
weight. The constitutional foundation underlying the
privilege is the respect a government ... must
accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.

provision

#3. Article 17
Beltran vs. Samson
53 P 570, GR 32025, Sept. 23, 2929
Romualdez, J.:
FACTS: 1. Petitioner Francisco Beltran, as a
defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to
write a sample of his handwriting as ordered by the
respondent Judge Felix Samson. This order was
given upon petition of the provincial fiscal for the
purpose of comparing his handwriting and
determining whether or not it is he who wrote
certain documents supposed to be falsified.
2. He contended that such order would be a
violation of his constitutional right against selfincrimination because such examination would give
the prosecution evidence against him, which the
latter should have gotten in the first place. He also
argued that such an act will make him furnish
evidence against himself.
3. Respondents contend that petitioner is not
entitled to the remedy applied for based on the
provisions of 1687 of the Administrative Code
where the fiscal under the same, and the proper
judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel
witnesses to be present at the investigation of any
crime of misdemeanor. But this power must be
exercised without prejudice to the constitutional
rights of persons cited to appear.
4. Petitioner, on the other hand, refused to perform
what the fiscal demanded and sought refuge under
the constitutional provision contained in the Jones
Law which reads as follows: Nor shall he be
compelled to in any criminal case to be a witness
against
himself.

ISSUE: Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's

dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of
comparing the latter's handwriting and determining
whether he wrote certain documents supposed to
be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself
within the scope and meaning of the constitutional

under

examination.

Held: Yes.
The court ordered the respondents and those under
their orders to desist and abstain absolutely and
forever from compelling the petitioner to take down
dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of
submitting the latter for comparison.
Writing is something more than moving
the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is
not a purely mechanical act, because it requires
the application of intelligence and attention;
and in the case at bar writing means that the
petitioner herein is to furnish a means to
determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as
the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly
states.
Except that it is more serious, we believe
the present case is similar to that of producing
documents or chattels in one's possession. We say
that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege,
there is a similarity between one who is compelled
to produce a document, and one who is compelled
to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both
cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence
against himself.
It cannot be contended in the present case
that if permission to obtain a specimen of the
petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime
would
go
unpunished.
Considering
the
circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal
treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the
fiscal to obtain genuine specimens of his
handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to
obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to
the means complained herein, that is no reason for
trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the
constitution. It might be true that in some cases
criminals may succeed in evading the hand of
justice, but such cases are accidental and do not
constitute the raison d'etre of the privilege. This
constitutional privilege exists for the protection of
innocent persons.