Chapter 3

MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011

Facts:
In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an Archepelagic State
pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was
amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The requirements complied
with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal
as regime of islands.
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;
2. it opens the countrys waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty and security;
and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as regime of islands would weaken our claim over those territories.
Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?
Ruling:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that regulates conduct of
States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic
starting points to measure. it merely notices the international community of the scope of our maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes within the archipelagic
waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such, international law norms operate.
the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place them in lesser footing vis
a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no modern state can invoke its
sovereignty to forbid such passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it increased the Phils.
total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils. continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.
If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:
Art. 47 (3): drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the
archipelago.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.
KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, well breach the rules: that it should follow the
natural configuration of the archipelago.
Government v. Monte De Piedad Digest
Facts:
1. Spain paid $400,000 into the treasury of the Philippine Islands for the relief of those damaged by an earthquake.
2. Upon the petition of Monte de Piedad, an institution under the control of the church, the Philippine Government
directed its treasurer to give $80,000 of the relief fund in Four (4)4 installments. As a result, various petitions were
filed, including the heirs of those entitled to the allotments. All prayed for the State to bring suit against Monte de
Piedad, and for it to pay with interest.
3.
The Defendant appealed since all its funds have been exhausted already on various jewelry loans.
Issue: Whether the government is the proper authority to the cause of action
YES.
The Philippine government, as a trustee towards the funds could maintain the action since there has been no change
of sovereignty. The state, as a sovereign, is the parens patriae of the people. These principles are based upon public

policy. The Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party because it was exercising its sovereign functions or
powers and was merely seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it when the Philippine Islands was ceded to the
United States. Finally, if said loan was for ecclesiastical pious work, then Spain would not exercise its civil capacities.
- See more at: http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2012/11/government-v-monte-de-piedaddigest.html#sthash.htwcSKdT.dpuf
Cabanas v Pilapil Digest
Facts:
1. Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child to be his sole beneficiary. He likewise indicated that if he
dies while the child is still a minor, the proceeds shall be administered by his brother Francisco. Florentino died when
the child was only ten years old hence, Francisco took charge of Florentinos benefits for the child. Meanwhile, the
mother of the child Melchora Cabaas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of money in her favor and
allow herself to be the childs trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and contended that as a
private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of parens patriae to the terms of the insurance policy?
YES.
The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that whenever any member
thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has
been filed should resolve according to the best interest of that person.
The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of the minor child
and it is assumed that the mother shows more care towards the child than an uncle.
It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae,
is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. It
may happen, family relations may press their respective claims. It would be more in consonance not only with the
natural order of things but the tradition of the country for a parent to be preferred. it could have been different if the
conflict were between father and mother. Such is not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the
judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae, cannot remain insensible to the validity of her
plea.
Soriano vs. La Guardia
G.R. No. 164785. April 29, 2009
Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV
37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavitcomplaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo
(INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly
alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
Issue:
Whether or not Sorianos statements during the televised Ang Dating Daan part of the religious discourse
and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III.
Held:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of
petitioners utterances on the viewers fundamental rights as well as petitioners clear violation of his duty as a public
trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it
cannot be properly asserted that petitioners suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as
a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers
rights, the public trusteeship character of a broadcasters role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast
media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content,
of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive
language.
Chapter 5
.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.
Issue:
The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce around 170 women
whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the
Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.
Facts:

Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170
women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao
specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution
situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.
That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women
were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced
the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on
account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have
presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present.
Held:
The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for
nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the
Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality,
and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was
under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his
power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do
so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the
application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no
authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have
the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be
permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with
impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ
of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

G.R. No. L-45892

July 13, 1938

People v Lagman & Sosa, 66 Phil. 13

AVANCEA, J.:
In these two cases (G.R. Nos. L-45892 and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a
violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two
appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to
register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had
been required to do so. The evidence shows that these two appellants were duly notified by the corresponding
authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service in accordance with law, and
that the said appellants, in spite of these notices, had not registered up to the date of the filing of the information.
The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not registered in the military service
because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and Tranquilino
Lagman also has a father to support, has no military learnings, and does not wish to kill or be killed.
Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one month and one day of imprisonment, with
the costs.
In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the accused were sentenced, is impugned on
the ground that it is unconstitutional. Section 2, Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines provides as follows:
SEC. 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens
may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.

The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this
constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend
the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens
would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist
therein.1vvphl.nt
In the United States the courts have held in a series of decisions that the compulsory military service adopted by
reason of the civil war and the world war does not violate the Constitution, because the power to establish it is derived
from that granted to Congress to declare war and to organize and maintain an army. This is so because the right of the
Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal
with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S.,
11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if
need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests, and even against his religious or political convictions, to take
his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. In the case of
United States vs. Olson (253 Fed., 233), it was also said that this is not deprivation of property without due process of
law, because, in its just sense, there is no right of property to an office or employment.
The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by reason on the actual existence of war does not make
our case any different, inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the
State, whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case of need. The circumstance that the
appellants have dependent families to support does not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the
Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for determent in complying with their duty and,
at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69
of Commonwealth Act No. 1).

Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949

I.
THE FACTS
Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during
the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military Commission of war crimes. He questioned the
constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the trial of accused
war criminals. He contended the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations
covering Land Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and international.
II.

THE ISSUES
Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.]
YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.
Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the Hague
Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United
Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression
and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and
customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and
enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally
accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed
in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first
and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva
conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these

rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations the United State and Japan who were signatories to
the two Convention. Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was
not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive
in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as contained in treaties to
which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Ichong vs Hernandez
FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are
not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the peoples economic life.
a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly
owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade
aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business, unless their
licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten
years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term.
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.
provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the laws on nationalization,
economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry.
provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or
branches of retail business
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships affected by the Act,
filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:
it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due
process
the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
the Act violates international and treaty obligations
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.
HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws.
There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the
legislative classification adopted.
RATIO:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike.
The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of
police power.
Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the retail trade. It is this
domination and control that is the legislatures target in the enactment of the Act.
The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien
is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his
living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or
emergency.
While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the country, the alien may become
the potential enemy of the State.
The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit.
Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on the
nations economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.
Angara v. Electoral Commission
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936
Laurel, J.
Facts:
In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua,
Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the
first district of the Province of Tayabas.

On October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National
Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes.
On December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest
against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of
Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of
the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified.
Issue:
Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy
upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative?
Held:
Yes. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ,
created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while
acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism
adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a
separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law
between department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable
and appropriate cases. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to
the Electoral Commission as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly.
Issue:
Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the
cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such
election by resolution of the National Assembly?
Held:
Section 4 of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the
Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party
having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The
senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.
The Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly. Under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into
effect, each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their
elective members.
The 1935 Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission. Such transfer of power
from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the
implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.
The avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ pass upon
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan
influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to
prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests.
Section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the
Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members,
but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing
contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds,
to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.
Confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect
may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly. Confirmation by the National
Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not

and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests
against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.
Based on the foregoing, the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against
the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3,
1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission
might prescribe.
Doctrine:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact
that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief
Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the
enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the
refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National
Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the
other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its
Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of
all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than
the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the
National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power
of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the
other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative
acts void if violative of the Constitution. (Garcia v. Macaraig)
G.R. No. L-21897 October 22 1963 [Executive Agreements]
GONZALES VS HECHANOVA
FACTS:
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the importation of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. Gonzales
filed a petition opposing the said implementation because RA No. 3542 which allegedly repeals or amends RA No.
2207, prohibits the importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government
agency."
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA 2207 is to be authorized by the President of the Philippines,
and by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines. They add that after enjoining the Rice and Corn
administration and any other government agency from importing rice and corn, S. 10 of RA 3542 indicates that only
private parties may import rice under its provisions. They contended that the government has already constitute valid
executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma, that in case of conflict between RA 2207 and 3542, the latter should
prevail and the conflict be resolved under the American jurisprudence.
ISSUE:
W/N the executive agreements may be validated in our courts.
RULING:
No. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive agreements has been sufficiently
established. Even assuming that said contracts may properly considered as executive agreements, the same are
unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the
provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional
system enter into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement,
enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. He may not
interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may
not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an
executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
Department of Education vs. San Diego G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989
Fundamental Principles and State Policies: Rearing of the Youth
The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the National
MedicalAdmission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again. The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule thatAstudent shall be allowed only 3 chances to take the NMAT. After 3 successive failures, a student shall not beallowed to
take the NMAT for the fourth time. The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.
Facts:

Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of BS Zoology. The petitionerclaims that he
took the NMAT 3 times and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again, thepetitioner rejected his
application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the RTC of Valenzuela tocompel his admission to the
test.In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and
qualityeducation. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on
April16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he
squarelychallenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule.
Theadditional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.
I
ssue:
Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitution on academic freedom, due process and equalprotection.
Held:
No. The court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission tomedical schools
only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education.
Ratio:
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. Thisis
true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge toone's
ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are notdissipated
or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promotethe common
good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the
right to quality education as a guarantee of theConstitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his
preparation and promise. The privaterespondent has failed the NMAT five times. While his persistence is noteworthy, to
say the least, it is certainlymisplaced, like a hopeless love. No depreciation is intended or made against the private
respondent. It is stressedthat a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any
work or occupation.The only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another
calling that hasnot excited his interest. In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is
more likely tosucceed and may even be outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality
education forthe full harnessing of his potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a
brilliantfuture. We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have left the
farmand engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who could be better as merchants. It is time
indeedthat the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the student to
thecourse for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be
"swampedwith mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we
are anation of misfits
MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Doctrine: Social Justice
LAUREL, J.:
Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public
Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
from passing along the following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act No.
548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use
of and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the
recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass
and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding
public as well.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth
Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal
liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion
of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the
interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of
public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the
public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote
the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.
Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither
should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in
the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws
and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of
the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through
the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi
estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units
of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health,
comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.
Espina vs. Zamora
ABAD, J.:

This case calls upon the Court to exercise its power of judicial review and determine the constitutionality of the Retail
Trade Liberalization Act of 2000, which has been assailed as in breach of the constitutional mandate for the
development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

The Facts and the Case

On March 7, 2000 President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.) 8762, also known as the Retail Trade
Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging
in the retail trade business. R.A. 8762 now allows them to do so under four categories:
Category A
Less than
US$2,500,000.00
Exclusively for Filipino citizens and corporations wholly owned by Filipino citizens.
Category B
US$2,500,000.00 up but less than US$7,500,000.00
For the first two years of R.A. 8762s effectivity, foreign ownership is allowed up to 60%. After the two-year period,
100% foreign equity shall be allowed.
Category C
US$7,500,000.00 or more
May be wholly owned by foreigners. Foreign investments for establishing a store in Categories B and C shall not be less
than the equivalent in Philippine Pesos of US$830,000.00.
Category D
US$250,000.00 per store of foreign enterprises specializing in high-end or luxury products
May be wholly owned by foreigners.

R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship and now reside in the Philippines, to
engage in the retail trade business with the same rights as Filipino citizens.
On October 11, 2000 petitioners Magtanggol T. Gunigundo I, Michael T. Defensor, Gerardo S. Espina, Benjamin S. Lim,
Orlando Fua, Jr., Prospero Amatong, Sergio Apostol, Robert Ace S. Barbers, Enrique Garcia, Jr., Raul M. Gonzales, Jaime
Jacob, Apolinario Lozada, Jr., Leonardo Montemayor, Ma. Elena Palma-Gil, Prospero Pichay, Juan Miguel Zubiri and
Franklin Bautista, all members of the House of Representatives, filed the present petition, assailing the constitutionality
of R.A. 8762 on the following grounds:
First, the law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution which enjoins the State to place the
national economy under the control of Filipinos to achieve equal distribution of opportunities, promote industrialization
and full employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and trade policies.
Second, the implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the retail trade, which taken together with alien
dominance of other areas of business, would result in the loss of effective Filipino control of the economy.
Third, foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino retailers and sari-sari store vendors, destroy selfemployment, and bring about more unemployment.
Fourth, the World Bank-International Monetary Fund had improperly imposed the passage of R.A. 8762 on the
government as a condition for the release of certain loans.
Fifth, there is a clear and present danger that the law would promote monopolies or combinations in restraint of trade.
Respondents Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., Trade and Industry Secretary Mar Roxas, National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) Secretary Felipe Medalla, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Gov. Rafael Buenaventura, and
Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Lilia Bautista countered that:
First, petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition. They cannot invoke the fact that they are taxpayers since
R.A. 8762 does not involve the disbursement of public funds. Nor can they invoke the fact that they are members of
Congress since they made no claim that the law infringes on their right as legislators.
Second, the petition does not involve any justiciable controversy. Petitioners of course claim that, as members of
Congress, they represent the small retail vendors in their respective districts but the petition does not allege that the
subject law violates the rights of those vendors.
Third, petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. 8762. Indeed, they could not
specify how the new law violates the constitutional provisions they cite. Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the
Constitution are not self-executing provisions that are judicially demandable.

Fourth, the Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition of foreign investments. It directs Congress to
reserve to Filipino citizens certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national
interest so dictates. But the Constitution leaves to the discretion of the Congress whether or not to make such
reservation. It does not prohibit Congress from enacting laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not
reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens.
The Issues Presented
Simplified, the case presents two issues:
1. Whether or not petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. 8762; and
2. Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional.
The Courts Ruling
One. The long settled rule is that he who challenges the validity of a law must have a standing to do so.[1] Legal
standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to come to a court of justice and make such a challenge. More
particularly, standing refers to his personal and substantial interest in that he has suffered or will suffer direct injury as
a result of the passage of that law.[2] To put it another way, he must show that he has been or is about to be denied
some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties
by reason of the law he complains of.[3]
Here, there is no clear showing that the implementation of the Retail Trade Liberalization Act prejudices petitioners or
inflicts damages on them, either as taxpayers[4] or as legislators.[5] Still the Court will resolve the question they raise
since the rule on standing can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators
when as in this case the public interest so requires or the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.[6]
Two. Petitioners mainly argue that R.A. 8762 violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution for the State to develop a
self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. They invoke the provisions of the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies under Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which read as follows:
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of
the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full
employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
xxxx
Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and
provides incentives to needed investments.

Petitioners also invoke the provisions of the National Economy and Patrimony under Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:
Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national
interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of
investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose
capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in
accordance with its national goals and priorities.
xxxx
Section 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced
goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.

Section 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.

But, as the Court explained in Taada v. Angara,[7] the provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the declarations
of principles and state policies, are not self-executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a
cause of action in the courts.
The Court further explained in Taada that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution lays down the ideals of economic
nationalism: (1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony and in the use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally-produced goods; (2) by mandating the State to adopt measures that help make them competitive; and (3) by
requiring the State to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.[8]
In other words, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino
monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from
maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development.
Indeed, the 1987 Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of a trade
policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity; and speaks of industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets as well as of the
protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. Thus, while the Constitution
mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, it also recognizes the need for business
exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises
only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.[9]
In other words, the 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods, and services. While it
does not encourage their unlimited entry into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.[10] The key, as
in all economies in the world, is to strike a balance between protecting local businesses and allowing the entry of
foreign investments and services.
More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipinos
certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest requires. Thus,
Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending on the economic exigencies. It can enact
laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this
case, Congress has decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign investments instead of
reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed such policy.
The control and regulation of trade in the interest of the public welfare is of course an exercise of the police power of
the State. A persons right to property, whether he is a Filipino citizen or foreign national, cannot be taken from him
without due process of law. In 1954, Congress enacted the Retail Trade Nationalization Act or R.A. 1180 that restricts
the retail business to Filipino citizens. In denying the petition assailing the validity of such Act for violation of the
foreigners right to substantive due process of law, the Supreme Court held that the law constituted a valid exercise of
police power.[11] The State had an interest in preventing alien control of the retail trade and R.A. 1180 was reasonably
related to that purpose. That law is not arbitrary.
Here, to the extent that R.A. 8762, the Retail Trade Liberalization Act, lessens the restraint on the foreigners right to
property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business, it cannot be said that the law amounts to a denial of the
Filipinos right to property and to due process of law. Filipinos continue to have the right to engage in the kinds of retail
business to which the law in question has permitted the entry of foreign investors.
Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of R.A. 8762 save when it blatantly
violates the Constitution. But as the Court has said, there is no showing that the law has contravened any
constitutional mandate. The Court is not convinced that the implementation of R.A. 8762 would eventually lead to alien
control of the retail trade business. Petitioners have not mustered any concrete and strong argument to support its
thesis. The law itself has provided strict safeguards on foreign participation in that business. Thus
First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the categories above-enumerated; Second, only
nationals from, or juridical entities formed or incorporated in countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall
be allowed to engage in retail trade business; and Third, qualified foreign retailers shall not be allowed to engage in
certain retailing activities outside their accredited stores through the use of mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use of
sales representatives, door-to-door selling, restaurants and sari-sari stores and such other similar retailing activities.

In sum, petitioners have not shown how the retail trade liberalization has prejudiced and can prejudice the local small
and medium enterprises since its implementation about a decade ago.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
AYTONA VS CASTILLO
Posted by kaye lee on 11:22 PM
4 SCRA 1 G.R. No. L-19313 January 19 1962 [Midnight Appointment]
FACTS:
On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner Dominador Aytona as ad interim
Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the corresponding oath. On the same day, at noon, President-elect
Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on the next day, he issued administrative order no. 2 recalling, withdrawing,
and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by former President Garcia. There were all-in all, 350 midnight or last
minute appointments made by the former President Garcia. On January 1, President Macapagal appointed Andres
Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona instituted a case (quo warranto) against Castillo,
contending that he was validly appointed, thus the subsequent appointment to Castillo by the new President, should
be considered void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were valid.
RULING:
No. After the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, previous President Garcia administration was no
more than a care-taker administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority the incoming
President, and he should not do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his
successor. It was not for him to use powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had ended or
to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies in important positions,
if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments
in one night and planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may,
with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a
mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive the new
administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.
ENDENCIA VS DAVID
93 Phil 696 August 31 1953 [Salaries of Judges Tax Exemption]
FACTS:
Saturnino David was the Internal Revenue Collector who ordered Judges Endencio and Jugos salaries. A case was filed.
However, upon construing Article VIII Section 9 of the constitution, it shows that judicial officers are exempt from
paying tax from their salaries and thus considered that the deduction of salaries from the said judges as a violation
from the compensation received by judicial officers.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.
RULING:
No, the Section 13 of RA 590 is unconstitutional. The collection of income taxes in judicial officers is considered as
against the provisions given by the Article VIII Sec 9 of the Constitution. The compensation shall not be diminished
during their continuance of their service. Section 13 of RA 590 stated that no salary received by any public officer of
the republic shall be exempted from paying its taxes. This specific part of RA 590 is in contrary with what is Article VIII
Sec 9 has provided.
Araneta v Dinglasan
G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949
Tuason, J.:
Facts:
1. The petitions challenged the validity of executive orders issued by virtue of CA No. 671 or the Emergency Powers
Act. CA 671 declared a state of emergency as a result of war and authorized the President to promulgate rules and
regulations to meet such emergency. However, the Act did not fix the duration of its effectivity.
2.
EO 62 regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The petitioner, Araneta, is under
prosecution in the CFI for violation of the provisions of this EO 62 and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition.

3.
EO 192, aims to control exports from the Philippines. Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the
Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes. Both
officials refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is
forbidden by this EO.
4.
EO 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to
June 30, 1950, and for other purposes was assailed by petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, elector, and
president of the Nacionalista Party. He applied for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from
disbursing the funds by virtue of this EO.
5. Finally, EO 226, which appropriated P6M to defray the expenses in connection with the national elections in 1949.
was questioned by Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter. He asked the Court to prevent "the respondents
from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it."
ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect
YES.
The Act fixed a definite limited period. The Court held that it became inoperative when Congress met during the
opening of the regular session on May 1946 and that EOs 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law .
The session of the Congress is the point of expiration of the Act and not the first special session after it.
Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating house and lot rentals, No. 192 (dated December 24, 1948)
regulating exports, Nos. 225 and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first appropriation funds for the operation of the
Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and the second appropriating funds for election expenses in
November 1949, were therefore declared null and void for having been issued after Act No. 671 had lapsed and/or
after the Congress had enacted legislation on the same subjects. This is based on the language of Act 671 that the
National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was
prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the war.
Emmanuel Pelaez vs. The Auditor General
FACTS:
From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive orders to create thirtythree municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public funds thereby stood to be
disbursed in the implementation of said executive orders.
Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain from the respondent or any person acting in his behalf,
from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the executive orders aforementioned.
ISSUE:
Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that the President does not have the authority to
create municipalities as this power has been vested in the legislative department.
RULING:
Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercise general supervision
over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such
discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar
as local governments are concerned. Such control does not include the authority to either abolish an executive
department or bureau, or to create a new one. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to
comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the President more power than what was vested in
him by the Constitution.
The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently
restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any
disbursement by the municipalities referred to.
Restituto Ynot Vs IAC GR NO 74457 March 20 1987 CASE DIGEST
Facts

On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by
the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering
the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The
petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
Issue:
Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Ruling:
The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule
prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable
connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is
missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent
their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than
in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than
moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the
petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly
observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were
returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard,
thus denying due process.