Professional Documents
Culture Documents
MODULE 1
REPUBLIC v. CA Possession of Public Land = No Appropriate Possession of public forestral
lands despite how long cannot ripen into private ownership. A public forestal land is not
registrable, whether the title was issued during the Spanish regime or under the Torrens system.
CHING v. MALAYA Mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case will not oust the
municipal court of its summary jurisdiction. There can be an exception to this rule; which is when
it appears during the trial that, by the nature of the evidence presented, the issue of possession
cannot be decided without deciding the issue of ownership. The certificate of title, in the absence
of evidence that the issuance of the certificate of title was challenged, is presumed valid also
when there is no encumbrance on the land, and there is no adverse claim or notice of lis pendens
annotated in the certificate. Such registration, it may be added, is binding against the whole world
unless annulled for cause in proper cases.
UMBAY v. ALECHA Section 46 of the Land Registration Law, now section 47 of the Property
Registration Decree, provides that no title to registered land in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Adverse, notorious
and continuous possession under a claim of ownership for the period fixed by law is
ineffective against a Torrens title.
PNB v. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK limited jurisdiction no more Sec. 2 of PD 1529
simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the RTC the authority to act not
only on applications for original registration but also over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such
applications or petitions. The court is no longer fettered by its former limited jurisdiction which
enabled it to grant relief only in cases where there was unanimity among the parties or none of
them raised any adverse claim or serious objection. Under the amended law, the court is now
authorized to hear and decide not only such non-controversial case but even the contentious and
substantial issues, such as the question at bar, which were beyond its competence before.
PNB v. CA A Torrens title concludes all controversy over ownership of the land covered by a
final decree of registration A person dealing with a registered land has a right to rely upon the
face of the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, EXCEPT
when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry. In this case, PNB is a mortgagee in good faith for
at the time the mortgages covering said properties were constituted it was not aware to any flaw
(that it was part of a conjugal property with other heirs and co-owners i.e. children) on the title of
Donata Montemayor, the widow mortgagor. In processing the loan applications of Donata
Montemayor, the PNB had the right to rely on what appears in the certificates of title that Donata
was the owner of the parcels of lands, and no more. In connection to this, PNB was also a
purchaser for value in good faith, when the properties were sold at public auction. The children
questioning the ownership of their mother and who are also the occupants and lessees are guilty
of laches.
Action to recover real property, bind only parties thereto - At any rate, although actions for
recovery of real property and for partition are real actions, however, they are actions in personam
that bind only the particular individuals who are parties thereto. The PNB not being a party in said
cases is not bound by the said decisions.
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BORNALES v. CA Purchasers of a land cannot invoke good faith as a defense when they had full
knowledge of the flaws and defect in the title of their vendors. The indefeasibility of a certificate of
title under the Torrens system cannot be invoked by purchasers in bad faith, for it cannot be used
as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner. The registration to be effective must be
made in good faith. If at all, they only acquire the right which their vendors then had.
VIAJAR v. CA Although Art. 457 gives the riparian owner the right to own the lands formed by
accretion, it should be read together with Articles 45 and 46 of Act No. 496 which prohibits
acquisition of originally registered lands. Thus only properties that were unregistered are those
that can be acquired by the riparian owner through accretion under Art. 457
*Note Art. 457 contemplates a situation where there are two owners of land separated only by a
bank of river
CORONEL v. IAC The simple possession of a certificate of title, under the Torrens System, does not
necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property described therein. If a person
obtains a title, under the Torrens system, which includes by mistake or oversight land which
cannot be registered under the Torrens systems, he does not, by virtue of said certificate alone,
become the owner of the lands illegally included.
GOLLOY v. CA Mere possession of certificate of title under the Torrens System is not conclusive as to
the holder's true ownership of all the property described therein. Any land that was illegally
included in the certificate of title does not, by virtue of said certificate alone, make him the
owner. Just because person A had his land surveyed and titled ahead of the rightful owner who
has been in continuous possession in the concept of owner for 50 years, does not give him the
right to claim ownership by virtue of the title ONLY.
REPUBLIC v. CA Action to recover registered lands does not prescribe Sec. 6 of Act 496
provides that no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession. The action to recover registered land does not
prescribe. A land registration court is w/o jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land
already registered in an earlier registration case, & that the 2nd decree entered for the same land
is null & void. It is axiomatic that public forestal land is not registerable. Its inclusion in a title,
whether the title be issued during the Spanish regime or under the Torrens system, nullifies the
title. Possession of public forestal lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership.
TONGSON v. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY Mangrove Swamps are registerable lands and are
NOT part of Forest Lands. The phrase agricultural land as used in the Act No. 926 means
those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. Under the Act of
Congress 1902, it classified the public lands in the Philippines as timber, mineral or agricultural
and all public lands that are NOT timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands.
Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees are small and
sparse, fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not commercial value as lumber,
do not convert the land into public land. These are not forest in character. They do not form part
of the public domain.
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As to prescription under Section 14 (2), it is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the
public domain are patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription (10
yrs., in good and with just title or 30 yrs. regardless of gf/jt). On the other hand, among the public
domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral
lands. But, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is
no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property,
even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only upon such declartion
that acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law.
Petitioners cannot invoke Section 14(2) when there is no competent evidence that the land is no
longer intended for public use, service or development of national wealth, conformable with Article
422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the property as alienable and disposable does not
change its status as property of the public domain under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it
is insusceptible to acquisitive prescription.
CHAVEZ v. PEA AMARI Private corporations are prohibited by the Constitution to acquire alienable
land of the public domain. This is pursuant to the Regalian doctrine, which declares that all
natural resources are owned by the state and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain, natural resources cannot be alienated. Private corporations can only hold these lands
through lease. The mere reclamation of these lands do not convert them to alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain. There must be 2 conditions before these can be alienated
after reclamation: (1) A classification that these are alienable and open to disposition; (2) A
declaration that these lands are no longer needed for public service.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. IAC Despite the 1973 Constitution prohibiting corporations from holding
PUBLIC land, the said law is not transgressed in this case when Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc. bought the lands of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and
owners of said land since 1962. This is due to the fact that both Infiels acquired the right to
register the land already under 48(b) of the Public Land Act by being in open, continuous and
exclusive possession of the land through them and their predecssor-in-interest for at least 30
years.
It must be noted that the law recognizes that the conversion from public land to private under
48(b) is by OPERATION of law. This only means that 48(b) was not there to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law." What Acme
corporation then acquired was already private lands owned by Infiels by virtue of 48(b) so there
was not violation of the Constitution.
The general rule is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through
his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed
statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
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MAQUILING v. UMADHAY What constitutes good faith and the reliance of title gained by
predecessors in interest Respondent Umadhay could not claim conclusiveness of what
appeared on the face of the certificate of title; it was not in Eriberto's name and his self-serving
declaration that he was Maquiling's sole heir could not be availed of by them where it prejudices
the share of the other heir Gumban or of the latter's transferree, petitioner. Good faith affords
protection only to purchasers for value from the registered owners. The petitioner's grantor was
not a registered owner, since the land was still in the name of Casimiro Evangelista. A person
who purchased the land when the title was already in the vendor had the right to rely on what
appeared on the title. Gumban's reliance is valid as there were no other circumstances which
should put her on guard and cause her to inquire beyond the certificate.
ESCONDE v. BARLONGAY Under Section 38 of Act 496, every decree of registration shall bind the
land, and quiet title thereto. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the
Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application,
notice or citation or included in the general description To all whom it may concern. Under said
section, this decree became conclusive after one year from the date of the entry.
Hence, it was established that when no answer in writing nor any opposition is made to an
application for registration of property in Court, all the allegations contained in the application
shall be held as confessed by reason of the absence of denial on the part of the opponent. A
person who has not challenged an application for registration of land even if the appeal
afterwards interposed is based on the right of dominion over the same land, cannot allege
damage or error against the judgment ordering the registration inasmuch as he did not allege or
pretend to have any right to such land.
CABRERA v. CA The defense of indefeasibility of the Torrens Title does not extend to a transferee who
takes the certificate of title with notice of a flaw in his title. The principle of indefeasibility of title is
unavailing where there was fraud that attended the issuance of the patents and titles. Also;
prescription applies when the person claiming to be the owner is NOT in actual possession of the
land.
GICANO v. GEGATO An action to recover an immovable from a defendant allegedly holding it under a
constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years, counted from the issuance of title to said
defendant. In this case, The action to recover property which was filed only after 23 years from
the issuance of the title to the property on the supposedly fraudulent sale, had been extinguished
by prescription.
SOTTO v. TEVEZ Co-ownership is a form of trust. From the very nature of a trust relation which
existed between Carmen Rallos and her co-owners, she cannot obtain and secure a Torrens title
to the properties in her name much less dispose of them by testament to her husband (Atty.
Sotto), a constructive trustee, to the prejudice and deprivation of the rights and interests of said
co-heirs. The registration consolidation of the lots to Carmen Rallos' name alone in a manner
shown to be fictitious, fraudulent and secretive, thereby keeping the beneficiary of the trust in the
dark did not constitute acts of repudiation of the express trust. Such registrations were ineffective
and not binding upon the beneficiary of the trust.
MANARPAAC v. CABANATAN The remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully
or erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of the decree,
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