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72.

BULILIS vs NUEZ
FACTS: Petitioner CeriacoBulilis (Bulilis) was proclaimed winner of the elections
for punong barangay of Barangay Bulilis, Ubay, Bohol. He won over respondent
VictorinoNuez (Nuez) by a margin of four (4) votes. Nuez filed an Election
Protest (for judicial recount and annulment of proclamation) with the MCTC.
Bulilis filed a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 with the (RTC)-> DISMISSED on the
ground that COMELEC has over petitions for certiorari in election cases involving
municipal and barangay officials. Hence, he filed the present petition
for certiorari (under Rule 65) with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction with this
Court (the Petition), claiming that he is raising purely questions of law.
Petitioner says that what he filed with the RTC is not an election case (i.e., not
relating to elections, returns or qualifications of elective officials), but one imputing
GAD on the part of the MCTC judge in his issuance of an interlocutory order. He
further claims that the COMELECs appellate jurisdiction is only limited to
decided barangay election cases.
ISSUE: WON under the rules relied upon by the RTC, the COMELECs appellate
jurisdiction in election cases is allegedly limited to decisions of election courts and
not interlocutory order?
HELD: No. Election cases and cases on GAD of a judge hearing an election case
arent mutually exclusive.
Also, in Galang v. Geronimo: the Court had the opportunity to rule that a petition
for certiorari questioning an interlocutory order of a trial court in an electoral protest
was within the appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC-> Since it is the COMELEC
which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the decision of the
regional trial court in election contests involving elective municipal officials, then it
is also the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.
PETITION DISMISSED.
73. COMELEC VS ESPANOL GR NO 149164-73
Facts: Bautista filed before the LAw Department of the Comelec a complaint against
certain individuals for vote buying. By virtue of a resolution, an information was filed
against respondents with the RTC. Meanwhile, criminal complaints were filed against
Bautista's
witnesses
for
vote
selling.
The Law Department of the COMELEC later on recommended that the resolutionof
the Office of the Cavite Provincial Prosecutor be nullified because the accused are
exempt and that the prosecution of election offesnses were under the sole cotrol of
the
COMELEC.
Issue: Whether or not the review of the Provincial Prosecutor's resolution by
COMELEC and the subsequent request for its nullification was proper.

Held:
Under Article IX, Section 2(b) of the Constitution, the petitioner is empowered to
investigate and, when appropriate, prosecute election offenses. The grant by
theConstitution to the petitioner of the express power to investigate and
prosecuteelection offenses is intended to enable the petitioner to assure the people
of a fine,orderly, honest, peaceful and credible election. Under Section 265 of the
OmnibusElection Code, the petitioner, through its duly authorized legal officers, has
theexclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offensespunishable under the Omnibus Election Code, and to prosecute the same.
Thepetitioner may avail of the assistance of the prosecuting arms of the
governmentbut as held in Margarejo vs.Escoses until revoked, the continuing
authority
of
theProvincial
or
City
Prosecutors
stays.
The power to grant exemptions is vested solely on the petitioner. This power is
concomitant with its authority to enforce election laws, investigate election offenses
and prosecute those committing the same. The exercise of such power should not
be interfered with by the trial court. Neither may this Court interfere with the
petitioners exercise of its discretion in denying or granting exemptions under the
law, unless the petitioner commits a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction.
74. MUTILAN VS. COMELEC GR NO 171248
FACTS: Petitioner Mutilan and Respondent Ampatuan were candidates for ARMM Governor. Pet says, there were
many parts of ARMM wherein no voting actually happened, substitute voting occurred, etc.
Petitoners counsel admitted that the case is not an election protest but an annulment of elections and prayed that it be
elevated to the COMELEC en banc and not the 2nd Division where it was originally in. Petitioner argued that
jurisdiction of this case may be heard by both division and en banc so the second division can legally elevate the
case to the Commission En Banc pursuant to its rules of procedure to expedite disposition of election case.
The COMELEC Second Division ruled that jurisdiction over petitions for annulment of elections is vested in the
COMELEC En Banc. However, the elevation of the case to the COMELEC En Banc is not sanctioned by the rules
or by jurisprudence. Thus, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
1.
2.

WON the COMELEC Second Division acted with GAD amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing the petition to annul elections and in not elevating the petition to the COMELEC En Banc.
WON the COMELEC En Banc acted in the same way in denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration for lack of verification.

HELD: The petition is partly meritorious


1.
2.

Division can elevate. While automatic elevation of a case erroneously filed with the Division to En Banc is
not provided in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, such action is not prohibited.
MFR must be verified before it may be acted by the COMELEC en banc

75. PHIL PRESS INSTITUTE VS COMELEC


Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers
to provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of
political parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the
Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known
their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government.
The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital
election
information.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper
and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution
No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition
imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent
Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise
of the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information
operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and
ensure
a
fair,
impartial
and
credible
election.
Issue:
Whether

or

not

Comelec

Resolution

No.

2772

is

unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to
compel print media companies to donate Comelec space amounts to taking of
private personal property without payment of the just compensation required in
expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been
established by respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not
unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is
authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also
Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the
state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national
emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.
76. TELECOMMUNICATIONS & BROADCAST ATTYS OF THE PHILS VS COMELEC
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.
(TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting
companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers and registered voters. It was
declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it
was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a
result of the subject law. Other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., appears to have the
requisite standing to bring this constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio

and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of


Sec. 92 of B.P Blg. 881 requiring radio and television broadcast companies to
provide free air time to the COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and
other political purposes. Petitioners challenge the validity of Sec. 92 on the ground
(1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just compensation;
(2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of
the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise
or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the
period of election. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million
pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election
and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be
required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of
revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and
to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of
private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in
providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this years elections, it stands
to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs requirement that it provide at least 30
minutes of prime time daily for COMELEC Time.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of the laws.
(2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without
due process of law and without just compensation.
RULING:
Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or
by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to
be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are
frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are
given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they
transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary
privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be
burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In
granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and
television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and
supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to
provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment
of just compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit.
Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does
not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free
air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no
private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the
COMELEC. The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the states
duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can find their just and
highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they may render in
connection with the holding of elections is for that common good.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed.
77. GMA NETWORK VS COMELEC

78.
79. MARUHOM VS COMELEC
Maruhom and Dimaporo were both candidates for Mayor in the Municipality of Marogong, Lanao del Sur.
During the counting of votes, serious irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds were committed at
the instance of petitioner or his followers in that votes actually casted for the private respondent were
not counted and credited in his favor thru the concerted acts, conspiracy and manipulation of the
Board of Election Inspectors, military, Election Officer and the Machine Operator who happens to be a
nephew of the petitioner. Many official ballots were refused or rejected by the machine. As a result of
the foregoing irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds, the petitioner was illegally proclaimed as
winner because he appeared to have obtained 2,020 votes while the private respondent garnered 2,000
votes with a slight margin of only 20 votes. Private respondent, knowing that he was cheated and the
true winner for Mayor, filed before this Honorable Commission a petition to annul the proclamation of
petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom as the duly elected Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del Sur. Subsequently, a
Revision Committee was created and its membership were duly appointed in open court which
committee was directed by the COMELEC to finish the revision of ballots. After the Revision Committee
was directed by the respondent to commence the revision of ballots, the petitioner Abdulmadid
Maruhom thru counsel orally moved for the dismissal of the protest on the grounds that (1) The ballot
boxes containing the ballots in the protested and counter-protested precincts have been violated; (2)
Automated counting of ballots does not contemplate a manual recount of the ballots.

Issue: WON the COMELEC may order manual recount of ballots even not mentioned in R.A. 8436
Held: Yes. Although admittedly there is a lacuna leges in R.A. No. 8436 which prescribes the adoption
of an automated election system. However, while conceding as much, this Court ruled in Tupay Loong
v. COMELEC, 42 that the Commission is nevertheless not precluded from conducting a manual count
when the automated counting system fails, reasoning thus:
. . . In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy
where the error in counting is not machine related for human foresight is not
all-seeing. We hold, however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the
COMELEC from levitating above the problem. Section 2(1) of Article IX (C) of
the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power "to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent
of this provision is to give the COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers
for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections. Congruent to this intent, this Court has not been niggardly
in defining the parameters of powers of COMELEC in the conduct of our
elections . . . In the case at bar, the COMELEC order for a manual count was
not only reasonable. It was the only way to count the decisive local votes . . .
The bottom line is that by means of the manual count, the will of the voters of
Sulu was honestly determined. We cannot kick away the will of the people by
giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual
counting when machine count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the
conduct of an election which is under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC . . .

. . . Our elections are not conducted under laboratory conditions. In running for public
offices, candidates do not follow the rules of Emily Post. Too often, COMELEC has to
make snap judgments to meet unforeseen circumstances that threaten to subvert the
will of our voters. In the process, the actions of COMELEC may not be impeccable,
indeed, may even be debatable. We cannot, however, engage in a swivel chair criticism
of these actions often taken under very difficult circumstances.
Verily, the legal compass from which the COMELEC should take its bearings in acting upon election
controversies is the principle that "clean elections control the appropriateness of the remedy." Be that
as it may, the fact is the averments in petitioner's counter-protest and private respondent's protest
already justified the determination of the issues through a judicial revision and recounting of

the ballots pursuant to Section 255 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides
that
Sec. 255. Judicial counting of votes in election contest. Where
allegations in a protest or counter-protest so warrant or whenever in
the opinion of the court the interests of justice so require, it shall
immediately order the book of voters, ballot boxes and their keys,
ballots and other documents used in the election be brought before it
and that the ballots be examined and votes recounted.
80. GUNSI SR VS COMELEC
81. QUINTO VS COMELEC
COMELEC issued a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate
of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions.
FACTS:
Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive
officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their
positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from
Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.
HELD:
NO.
In the Farias case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66
of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in
comparison with appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial
distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no violation of the
equal protection clause.
However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal

protection clause was an obiter dictum since the issue raised therein was against
the repealing clause. It didnt squarely challenge Sec. 66.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying
the 4 requisites of a valid classification, the proviso does not comply with the
second requirement that it must be germane to the purpose of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a
governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or
coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the
efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger
that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations
rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the
proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in
office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because
they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without
distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not.
Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto
resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy for the election. This scenario is
absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government
to wield influence in the political world.
The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they be
partisan or non partisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or
brgy. level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the
fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.
82. LUNA VS COMELEC
83. Penera vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), et al.
G.R. 181613
11 September 2009

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