G.R. No.

155014 November 11, 2005

CRESCENT PETROLEUM, LTD vs. M/V "LOK MAHESHWARI," THE
SHIPPING CORPORATION OF INDIA
Topic: CONTRACTS
FACTS: Respondent M/V "Lok Maheshwari" (Vessel) is an oceangoing vessel of
Indian registry that is owned by respondent Shipping Corporation of India (SCI),
a corporation organized and existing under the laws of India and principally
owned by the Government of India. It was time-chartered by respondent SCI to
Halla Merchant Marine Co. Ltd. (Halla), a South Korean company. Halla, in turn,
sub-chartered the Vessel through a time charter to Transmar Shipping, Inc.
(Transmar). Transmar further sub-chartered the Vessel to Portserv Limited
(Portserv). Both Transmar and Portserv are corporations organized and existing
under the laws of Canada.
On or about November 1, 1995, Portserv requested petitioner Crescent
Petroleum, Ltd. (Crescent), a corporation organized and existing under the laws
of Canada that is engaged in the business of selling petroleum and oil products
for the use and operation of oceangoing vessels, to deliver marine fuel oils
(bunker fuels) to the Vessel. Petitioner Crescent granted and confirmed the
request through an advice via facsimile dated November 2, 1995. As security for
the payment of the bunker fuels and related services, petitioner Crescent
received two (2) checks in the amounts of US$100,000.00 and US$200,000.00.
Thus, petitioner Crescent contracted with its supplier, Marine Petrobulk Limited
(Marine Petrobulk), another Canadian corporation, for the physical delivery of the
bunker fuels to the Vessel.
On or about November 4, 1995, Marine Petrobulk delivered the bunker fuels
amounting to US$103,544 inclusive of barging and demurrage charges to the
Vessel at the port of Pioneer Grain, Vancouver, Canada. The Chief Engineer
Officer of the Vessel duly acknowledged and received the delivery receipt.
Marine Petrobulk issued an invoice to petitioner Crescent for the US$101,400.00
worth of the bunker fuels. Petitioner Crescent issued a check for the same
amount in favor of Marine Petrobulk, which check was duly encashed.
Having paid Marine Petrobulk, petitioner Crescent issued a revised invoice dated
November 21, 1995 to "Portserv Limited, and/or the Master, and/or Owners,
and/or Operators, and/or Charterers of M/V Lok Maheshwari" in the amount of
US$103,544.00 with instruction to remit the amount on or before December 1,
1995. The period lapsed and several demands were made but no payment was
received. Also, the checks issued to petitioner Crescent as security for the
payment of the bunker fuels were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. As a

consequence, petitioner Crescent incurred additional expenses of US$8,572.61

for interest, tracking fees, and legal fees.
On May 2, 1996, while the Vessel was docked at the port of Cebu City, petitioner
Crescent instituted before the RTC of Cebu City an action "for a sum of money
with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary attachment"
against respondents Vessel and SCI, Portserv and/or Transmar.
On May 3, 1996, the trial court issued a writ of attachment against the Vessel
with bond at P2,710,000.00. Petitioner Crescent withdrew its prayer for a
temporary restraining order and posted the required bond.
On May 18, 1996, summonses were served to respondents Vessel and SCI, and
Portserv and/or Transmar through the Master of the Vessel. On May 28, 1996,
respondents Vessel and SCI, through Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation
(Pioneer), filed an urgent ex-parte motion to approve Pioneers letter of
undertaking, to consider it as counter-bond and to discharge the attachment. On
May 29, 1996, the trial court granted the motion; thus, the letter of undertaking
was approved as counter-bond to discharge the attachment.
ISSUE: Whether the Philippine court has or will exercise jurisdiction and
entitled to maritime lien under our laws on foreign vessel docked on
Philippine port and supplies furnished to a vessel in a foreign port?
RULING: In a suit to establish and enforce a maritime lien for supplies furnished
to a vessel in a foreign port, whether such lien exists, or whether the court has or
will exercise jurisdiction, depends on the law of the country where the supplies
were furnished, which must be pleaded and proved.
The Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis trilogy of cases, which replaced such singlefactor methodologies as the law of the place of supply. The multiple-contact test
to determine, in the absence of a specific Congressional directive as to the
statutes reach, which jurisdictions law should be applied. The following factors
were considered: (1) place of the wrongful act; (2) law of the flag; (3) allegiance
or domicile of the injured; (4) allegiance of the defendant shipowner; (5) place of
contract; (6) inaccessibility of foreign forum; and (7) law of the forum. This is
applicable not only to personal injury claims arising under the Jones Act but to all
matters arising under maritime law in general.
The Court cannot sustain petitioner Crescents insistence on the application of
P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 and hold that a maritime lien
exists. Out of the seven basic factors listed in the case of Lauritzen, Philippine
law only falls under one the law of the forum. All other elements are foreign

Canada is the place of the wrongful act, of the allegiance or domicile of the
injured and the place of contract; India is the law of the flag and the allegiance of
the defendant shipowner. Applying P.D. No. 1521,a maritime lien exists would not
promote the public policy behind the enactment of the law to develop the
domestic shipping industry. Opening up our courts to foreign suppliers by
granting them a maritime lien under our laws even if they are not entitled to a
maritime lien under their laws will encourage forum shopping. In light of the
interests of the various foreign elements involved, it is clear that Canada has the
most significant interest in this dispute. The injured party is a Canadian
corporation, the sub-charterer which placed the orders for the supplies is also
Canadian, the entity which physically delivered the bunker fuels is in Canada, the
place of contracting and negotiation is in Canada, and the supplies were
delivered in Canada.

G. R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III
Topic: MARRIAGE
Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of
the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboaga del Sur, Branch 23, granting
respondents petition for authority to remarry invoking par. 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code. On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva
were married in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a
daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing along their son and after
a few years she was naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son who was living
with his wife in the States that his wife had remarried after obtaining her divorce
decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry with the trial court
invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code. Having no opposition, on May 15,
2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted the petition of the
respondent and allowed him to remarry. The Solicitor Generals motion for
reconsideration was denied. In view of that, petitioner filed this petition for review
on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised
the issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER THE
ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Held: Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit
competent evidence showing his allegations that his naturalized American wife
had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried. Therefore, the Petition of the
Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the
RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is hereby SET ASIDE.
Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under the Philippine laws.
Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties

were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American
citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and
indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U. S. A.
Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does not apply to the instant case.
However, the legislative intent must be taken into consideration and rule of
reason must be applied. The Supreme Court ruled that par. 2 of Art. 26 should be
construed and interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of
the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of then
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be sanction absurdity and injustice. Were the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according
to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A
stature may therefore be extended to case not within the literal meaning of its
terms, so long as they come within its spirits or intent.

G.R. NO. 139325, April 12, 2005

MIJARES V. RANADA
Topic: Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Facts: Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered
human rights violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their
favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly
$1.9B in compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous violations of
international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was
affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.
As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for the
enforcement of the Final Judgment, paying P410 as docket and filing fees based
on Rule 141, 7(b) where the value of the subject matter is incapable of
pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed a MTD alleging the
non-payment of the correct filing fees. RTC Makati dismissed the Complaint
stating that the subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved
a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of a definite sum of
money allowing for the easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment.
As such, the proper filing fee was P472M, which Petitioners had not paid.
Issue: Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing
fee.
Ruling: Yes, but on a different basisamount merely corresponds to the same
amount required for other actions not involving property. RTC Makati erred in
concluding that the filing fee should be computed on the basis of the total sum
claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation. The Petitioners Complaint
was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly based on a judgment,
the Final Judgment of the US District Court. However, the Petitioners err in
stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation because it is
so capable. On this point, Petitioners state that this might lead to an instance
wherein a first level court (MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have jurisdiction to enforce a
foreign judgment. Under the B.P.129, such courts are not vested with such
jurisdiction. 33 of B.P.129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action or
subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights over property or a sum of money.
But here, the subject matter is the foreign judgment itself. 16 of B.P.129 reveals
that the complaint for enforcement of judgment even if capable of pecuniary
estimation would fall under the jurisdiction of the RTCs. Thus, the Complaint to
enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimations
but at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate,
thus placing it beyond the ambit of 7(a) of Rule 141. What governs the proper

computation of the filing fees over Complaints for the enforcement of foreign
judgments is 7(b)(3), involving other actions not involving property.